Questions and Answers to the Orthodox 110–127

[Question.] If the Lord promised to give a hundredfold to those who leave father or mother or children and the rest, will such people then also receive a hundred wives? And since many who left the things mentioned because of the commandment died in poverty, solitude, and desolation, how has such a promise not proved false? Answer. As he speaks of fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters, meaning those who by spiritual kinship have become father and mother, brothers and sisters, so he speaks of a wife, meaning the woman who, at the time of the abandonment for Christ's sake, provides for the one who left his natural wife. And the Church of the Master Christ, which from the beginning of the Christian preaching [was attacked] by the Greeks and … opposed to it — from where [has it come to abound] in spiritual things and in [material things], if not from the divine and living voice of the Savior, which promised many times over and worked the requital in it? And from where did rich men and women, bringing their own possessions, [seek out] the anchorites in the desert and supply their wants, as we know from the history of the holy men of old, unless the Master Christ was bringing his own promise to fulfillment through them? [111] Question. [If for the resurrection] of bodies the Apostle used the example of seeds as fitting, in the letter to the Corinthians, how will those who are cut up or burned rise, since seeds do not sprout after being cut or burned? Answer. Since it is nature that produces what comes from seeds, having received a measured power from the Creator, the seeds must be suitable for producing what comes from them. Therefore, if seeds are burned or cut, they become useless to nature for producing what comes from them. But God does not have a measured power; for this reason nothing is unsuitable to him for making all that he wishes, nor is he prevented by the cutting and burning of bodies from bringing about their resurrection. For God does not work by the law and measure of nature, but by the authority of a will that is at a loss for nothing in making what it wishes to make. The Apostle used the example of seeds to give assurance of the resurrection of the dead, so that by analogy he might give assurance of the teaching on the resurrection: just as we do not disbelieve the sprouting of the seed, though we see the seed die in the earth and cast off its nature, so we ought not to disbelieve the resurrection of the dead. For God, who has given to nature to produce the sprouting through the seed, much more can himself raise the dead from death …

[Question.] If the apostles supposed the kingdom of Israel to be earthly glory and luxury and ease, as some have said, why did the Lord, when asked about it by them, not only not correct them but even confirm their ignorance, saying to them, “It is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own authority”? For this answer confirms their question. Answer. This too is one of the things that could not be borne by the apostles before the coming of the Holy Spirit … , according to what was said: “I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now; but when that Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth.” And having learned from the Spirit that “God will abolish both the belly and the foods,” they were brought over from the Jewish supposition to the understanding that befits the state of those who rise from the dead, in which there is neither food, nor drink, nor marriage, but the sons of the resurrection will be equal to angels. “It is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own authority,” then, does not have the form of confirming those who asked in their ignorant supposition, but of leaving in doubt both their supposition about the time and about the manner. The apostle Paul too shows the manner of that state when he says, “The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.”

[Question.] If we understand the perfect to be perfect when it possesses all things perfect, and the perfect in the highest degree is what admits no addition or increase in any respect, how did God, who existed before creation and afterwards made creation, thereby take on, in addition to being God, the name and the reality of creator, and receive increase and change from being God to being also creator? Answer. Being oneself is one thing, being in relation to another is another. Being oneself is non-relational; being in relation to another is relational. Since, then, God's perfection lies in his being himself, being in relation to another does not increase him. And just as being the beginning of number contributes nothing to the one for its perfection (for even when it was not the beginning of number it was perfect; and when it became the beginning of number, it was not increased), so too God was perfect before creation and was not increased after creation. Nothing, then, that comes through creation increases God (“For you,” it says, “are the same”), but [it increases] the relation he has toward creation in many ways (“You are exceedingly exalted,” it says, “above all gods”); for he is related as Father, and Master, and Judge, and Shepherd, and the like. And just as God, by not making more worlds, though he is able to make them, did not show his perfection to be imperfect by this … ; if God was not diminished by not making more worlds, then neither was he increased by making one world.

[Question.] If being in potentiality is less than being in actuality, how is the maker of the world, who was maker before the making of the world in potentiality and not in actuality, not subject to the name of diminution? Answer. Of things whose potentiality for actuality exists by some natural necessity, the potentiality is less than the actuality. But he whose potentiality for actuality exists not by natural necessity but by his own will is not subject to the name of diminution. “You purposed,” it says, “and all things are present to you.” [115] Question. [If kneeling] in prayer presents those who pray to God more than praying standing, and draws more of the divine compassion, why on the Lord's days, and from Easter to Pentecost, do those who pray not bend the knee? And from where did such a custom come into the churches? Answer. Since we ought always to remember both our fall into sins and the grace of our Christ, through which we have risen from the fall, for this reason our kneeling on the six days is a symbol of our fall into sins, and not bending the knee on the Lord's day is a symbol of the resurrection, through which, by the grace of Christ, we have been freed from sins and from the death that was put to death by them. This custom took its beginning from the apostolic times, as the blessed Irenaeus, martyr and bishop of Lyons, says in his discourse On the Pascha, in which he mentions also Pentecost, … [as equal] to the day of the Lord, for the reason given about it. [116] Question. [If the Lord, when he came out] of the tomb, left the grave clothes in the tomb, how is it that Scripture did not relate that after the resurrection he was either seen naked or obtained clothing from elsewhere? But if he appeared to those who saw him at that time neither in clothes from elsewhere nor naked, how is it true that he left the garments in the tomb? Answer. The Savior's garments the soldiers divided among themselves after crucifying him; and those brought into the tomb with him were unsuitable for the use of a living man. The garments the Lord wore after the resurrection he either created or took from elsewhere, as he also took the colt to sit on. For he could do either, create them or take them from elsewhere. And since there are many things of the Lord, said and done, whose stories the divine Scripture does not contain, necessarily the clothing after the resurrection too [is not recorded]. … it is [not] reasonable, out of all the things not recorded, to seek the cause of this one thing not recorded, nor, from its not being recorded, to construct a difficulty about the Lord's clothing, but rather to take from his power the belief concerning his clothing.

[Question.] If a dense body has its passage hindered by shut doors, how did the Lord, after the resurrection, come in to the disciples when the doors were shut? But if it is true that what was seen inside with the doors shut was a body, why was the stone lying on the Lord's tomb rolled away by the angel for the raising of the body itself? But if Scripture speaks truly in telling of the shutting of the doors, clearly not a body but a spirit came in. And if the body was sometimes a body and sometimes became spirit, how did the properties of the body's essence not undergo change? Answer. As the Lord walked on the sea not by a change from body into spirit, but by his divine power made the sea, impassable for walking, walkable, not only for his own body but also for Peter's, so by his own divine power he both came out of the tomb, with the stone lying on the tomb, and came in to the disciples with the doors shut. For the removal of the stone from the tomb did not take place for his raising, but so that … to those who saw it; [for to see] the garments of his burial, but not to see him, became the clearest proof of his resurrection. We must understand that things of equal force have the same credibility when they are granted, and the same when they are denied. Walking on the sea in an unchanged body is of equal force with coming in to the apostles in an unchanged body with the doors shut. And things beyond nature that happen in nature by divine power cannot be established by the reasoning of nature; therefore, when the disciples were terrified at such an entrance, he allowed them to touch the places of his body that had suffered, [showing] that he had made his entrance to them not by a change of the body into spirit, but in a dense body, by his divine power that makes things beyond nature.

[Question.] If God, having made all things around the circle of nature, is Master of the universe — and so David too commands us to bless the Lord in every place of the Lord's dominion, and likewise the Apostle commands us to lift up holy hands to God in every place — why do we send up our hymns and prayers to God looking toward the region of the sunrise, as though considering it an august work and a divine dwelling? And who taught Christians this custom? Answer. Since we set apart the more honorable of our things for the honor of God, and according to men's common opinion the east is more honorable than the other parts of creation, for this reason at the time of prayer we all turn toward the east. Just as we seal with the right hand, in the name of Christ, those who need this seal, because it is considered more honorable than the left, though it differs from it by position and not by nature, so too the east, as the more honorable part of creation, has been set apart for the worship of God. Making our prayers toward the east does not contradict the prophetic and apostolic word. For in every place the east is there for those who pray; and since we have our sight toward one side, we worship toward that side, as it is impossible at the time of prayer to look toward the four parts of creation. For this reason, looking toward one part of creation, we make our worship, not as to the only work of God, nor as to a part set apart as God's dwelling, but as to a place appointed for the worship we offer to God … the custom from which the Church received praying [so], and this from the holy apostles. [119] Question. If those before the flood partook neither of [anything but the fruit of trees] nor of eating meat, as some of the fathers taught, how did Abel offer of the fat of the sheep that he shepherded, and Cain likewise of the fruits of the earth that he farmed? Clearly each of them, preferring the Divine to his own food, made use of such a sacrifice. But if they brought to God things useless to themselves, how did they not insult the Ever-Existent by such an offering? For each of them laid down a costless and mocking favor. How then was Cain's sacrifice rejected but Abel's gifts [accepted]? Answer. The blessed Apostle, father of the fathers and teacher of piety, says: “Who plants a vineyard and does not eat of its fruit? Who shepherds a flock and does not eat of the milk of the flock?” — meaning, no one. But if no one, it is clear that Abel did not shepherd his flock so as not to eat of the milk of his flock, nor did Cain farm the earth so as not to eat of its fruits. Further, if the fruits of the earth were useless to Cain, why did he honor God with the worse and prefer himself to God with the better (for which his sacrifice was rejected), if he had no need of the fruits of the earth? But if Abel preferred God to his own need, and Cain preferred his own need to God, it is clear that each of them needed the support that came from his own labors. [120] Question. [If the kingdom of God is the res]urrection, as some have supposed, and righteous and sinners are believed to be counted worthy of it, how did Paul declare those who did forbidden things to be disinherited, saying that neither fornicators nor adulterers and [the rest will inherit the kingdom of God]? Answer. The divine Scripture is accustomed to name as the kingdom of God not the resurrection simply, but the state established after the resurrection, in which the division of those punished and those glorified takes place, God being confessed by all beyond doubt, who works glory in those glorified and punishment in those punished. “Those in the tombs,” it says, “will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who have done good will come out to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil to the resurrection of judgment.” The resurrection, then, is divided into life and judgment according to the differences of the just and the unjust. For the resurrection extends further than the kingdom of God; for the resurrection includes the just and the unjust, but the kingdom of God the just only. [121] Question. [If anathema and katathema are things] … the Old and the New Testament know, how did the blessed Peter, in the passion, … the Master? … [Teach us] about both, that is, the anathematizing and the katathematizing, and what is signified by each. [Answer.] … and set apart for God, and not taken into common use, or what is estranged from God through wickedness; but katathema is to agree with those who anathematize … [122] Question. [If time] does not hold us, how did the Lord at the wedding say, “My hour has not yet come,” and the [evangelist] about him, “No one laid hands on him, because his hour had not yet come”? Answer. Even if [we are not held by] hours and days, yet of the things that happen among us some happen at a suitable time and some at an unsuitable one. The divine Scripture calls the time suitable for the thing being done the presence of the hour, and the unsuitable time the absence of the hour. And since the Lord considered the time after the making of the wine suitable for departing from the wedding, for this reason before the making of the wine the Lord said, “My hour has not yet come.” And again, since at the time of the Jews' Passover the Lord had to be arrested and suffer what he suffered, for this reason it was said of him before the Passover, “No one laid hands on him, because his hour had not yet come”: not that the necessity of the hour prevented his arrest, but the providence of God. [For if] the Lord's arrest had been prevented by the necessity of the hour, the divine Scripture would not have added to the passage this: “Jesus withdrew into Galilee; for he did not wish to walk in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him”; nor before this would he have withdrawn into Egypt, since the necessity of the hour would have been sufficient … [123] Question. [If the good is] the best, and what is made bad is the worst of things that exist; and God is good, but man, being made bad, is the worst of all; for none of the other beings — I mean heaven and earth, air, luminaries, and the like — can be made bad … Answer. If the other things named exist for the sake of man, and things that exist for the sake of something are less than it, then man is the best, being above the things that exist for his sake. And if being made bad itself contributes something to man's improvement, man is the best in this respect too, [being exposed] by divine providence to the things that make bad … [One who] wishes to understand the good man [must] look to the end laid up for man after this life. For that is the fruit of the present life, namely endless blessedness instead of the short-lived life that is made bad. [124] Question. If the Master is the provider of each one's life, why did he not settle the souls of the pious in strong bodies? And if, storing up their rewards for them in the future, he allowed them to be afflicted in the present, why were not all the pious alike tested in afflictions, so that from this the good and the terrible might be clearly shown? But if both are found with both, how is the one who chose the better not unrecognizable? And how do all things, being borne along at random, not show the things in the world to be without providence, since there is no distinction of [pious and] impious? Answer. God did not wish to honor those dedicated to him with present things as a reward of virtue … the death of the pious is not a wage of virtue; and just as the pious are said not to be of the world, so their glory and wealth are not earthly. When, then, we see present with the pious what is present also with the impious, [let us learn] from this that present things are not worthy of the [rewards] of virtue. And if God appears at times to men to have [glorified] some of those dedicated to him, like Joseph or David, yet he did not reward their virtues by these things, but through Joseph provided for the increase of the Israelite race, and through David established the kingdom of the Spirit. The pious do not differ from the impious at all in material and bodily things; for all things are present to both, the pleasant and the painful. They differ from one another chiefly in the hope of the future and in the sufferings for piety, and then also in the divine alliances, in which God often made his own renowned: at one time dissolving the dominion of the Egyptians, at another subjecting the Canaanites to the Israelites, at another putting to sleep the boldness of the Assyrians, at another taking away the kingdom of the Babylonians, at another commanding the sun a course and a standing still contrary to nature. In these things the providence of God is shown; and in those he prepares the pious to look toward another life, in which the distinction of the just and the unjust in glory and dishonor takes place.

[Question.] If the apostle Paul forbade returning evil for evil and reviling for reviling, how did he himself do the opposite of what he said, cursing at one time the high priest and at another Alexander the coppersmith? Answer. If Paul had struck back the high priest who struck him, or harmed in return the one who had harmed [him], … [it would have come] from his own wilful wickedness … ; [then] it would not be possible to infer the holiness of the better [men from the fact that he did] what he taught. But to say what was going to happen to each from God — to the high priest, “God is going to strike you, you whitewashed wall,” and to Alexander, “The Lord will repay him in that day” — is neither a curse nor [revenge], but predictions fitting for an apostolic man, who does not avenge himself but gives place to wrath.

[Question.] If God [honored] the pious with brilliance in this life, like Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and their descendants, with wealth and good children and abundant crops, from where were the same things supplied to the Greeks when they served idols everywhere? And how is Hellenism not [better] and holier, since as long as it held the cities, the cities and the fields possessed every prosperity and plenty, and this abundantly; but from the time the Christian preaching [took hold of] them, they have become empty of houses and inhabitants and of their former plenty, and, scarcely keeping the remains of the [buildings] made of old by the Greeks, [show] that they were once cities, so that each religion is shown to be the cause of each, of the old plenty and of the new desolation? Answer. From the Master God, who makes his sun rise on the evil and the good and sends rain on the just and the unjust, the [goods] of the present life are supplied to both … , by whose providence [all] is governed; so that the righteous, seeing themselves abounding in labors for piety, but equal to the impious in the things of life, may expect another life, in which there is a difference of honor and punishment, the distribution according to the just and the unjust, as was said. That the desolations of cities and fields took place while Hellenism prevailed is witnessed by the desolation of the Babylonians and Assyrians, and of Nineveh, and of many other nations. But it cannot be shown what city or field was desolated while Christianity prevailed. And from the plenty and prosperity, the habitation and desolation, of cities and fields [no judgment can be made], since the Master God makes the supply of such things, and their removal, to all men for their benefit. The holiness of the better is judged from the good things done by them by choice. To offer men as a sacrifice to demons (“They sacrificed,” it says, “their sons and their daughters to the demons”), and to offer to idols the honor that befits God, took place while the Greeks prevailed; the prevention of such Greek impieties took place while Christians prevailed. One must, then, recognize the holiness of Christians from such things, and not from the plenty and habitation of cities and fields. And Christianity excels so much in these things … that while it prevails the world is warred upon less than it was warred upon when Hellenism prevailed.

[Question.] If what is destroyed by the destroyer perishes, and the destroyer brings about the destruction by wickedness; and very many such things are found among all the irrational living creatures, in which one can see plotting not only against one another but also against men; how does he speak truly who says that God made all things good and very good? But if he speaks truly, and yet both good and bad things exist in creation, how are not the good things recognized as belonging to a good creator and the bad to a bad creator, and two contrary principles shown to exist, as the Manichaeans say? And if the destruction of those destroyed takes place for some good, as some have supposed, how would it not have been better at the beginning to prevent their passage from non-being into being? Answer. He who inquires consistently about the Creator from the creation of living beings, rational and irrational, ought to look to the nature that, according to the Creator's limit, leads all mortal things, as into generation, so also into corruption and destruction. And if among the [irrational] animals there is no difference with respect to reason, then of things without difference the Creator is one and the same; and the destruction they suffer from plots against one another has been permitted by divine providence to befall them. For if, when they are subject to corruption and destruction both by nature and by plotting, some did not refrain from deifying them, how much more would they have been deified if they had always remained outside harm and destruction? So that, from what they suffer, they may be known for what they are, that is, unworthy of the honor and name of God, for this reason [this was permitted]. And the irrational animals came into being, some for the service of man, some for food, some for discipline, as in “I will send the teeth of beasts upon them, with the fury of things that crawl on the earth.” But if it is good for man to be fed by irrational animals, to be served by them, and to be disciplined through them, then their passage into being is good, and blameless as to wickedness, both of their nature and of their use. And if this is so, clearly all the irrational animals are the works of one good Creator. [128] Question. … [which] the enemy works in men [against] the salvation of men, contriving through these to subject them to the punishments to come … composed with another, composite; how is God uncomposite … about to be punished … and therefore … how not by wickedness of nature alone … [Answer.] … to blame the natures of the irrational animals is not reasonable. For doing good or evil belongs to those who share in reason, not to those without reason; and since the nature of the irrational animals came into being for the need mentioned before, it is clear that, as the need is good, the nature too is good.