On the Nature of the Good 1–32

The highest good, than which there is nothing higher, is God; and for that reason he is an unchangeable good, and therefore truly eternal and truly immortal. All other good things are only from him, but not of him. For what is of him is what he himself is; but the things that have been made by him are not what he is. And therefore, if he alone is unchangeable, all the things he made are changeable, because he made them from nothing. For he is so omnipotent that he can make good things even from nothing, that is, from what does not exist at all, both great and small, both heavenly and earthly, both spiritual and bodily. But because he is also just, he did not make the things he made from nothing equal to what he begot of himself. Since, then, all good things, whether great or small, at whatever levels of being, can only be from God, and since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good, every nature can only be from the highest and true God. For all good things, even those that are not the highest but are near the highest good, and again all good things, even the lowest, which are far from the highest good, can only be from the highest good itself. Every spirit, then, even a changeable one, and every body is from God: this is the whole of created nature. For every nature is either spirit or body. The unchangeable spirit is God; changeable spirit is a created nature, but better than body. Body, however, is not spirit, except that the wind, because it is invisible to us and yet its considerable force is felt, is in a certain other sense called spirit.

But on account of those who, since they cannot understand that every nature, that is, every spirit and every body, is naturally good, are troubled by the wickedness of spirit and the mortality of body, and for that reason try to bring in another nature, of an evil spirit and a mortal body, which God did not make, we think that what we are saying can be brought within their understanding in this way. For they admit that every good can only be from the highest and true God; and this is both true and sufficient to correct them, if they are willing to pay attention.

For we catholic Christians worship God, from whom are all good things, whether great or small; from whom is every measure, whether great or small; from whom is every form, whether great or small; from whom is every order, whether great or small. For all things, the more measured, formed, and ordered they are, the more good they certainly are; and the less measured, the less formed, the less ordered they are, the less good they are. These three things, then, measure, form, and order (to say nothing of the countless things that are shown to belong to these three), these three, measure, form, order, are as it were general goods in the things made by God, whether in spirit or in body. God, therefore, is above every measure of the creature, above every form, above every order; and he is above not by extent of place, but by an ineffable and singular power, he from whom is every measure, every form, every order. Where these three are great, there are great goods; where they are small, there are small goods; where they are absent, there is no good. And again, where these three are great, there are great natures; where they are small, there are small natures; where they are absent, there is no nature. Every nature, therefore, is good.

Accordingly, when it is asked where evil comes from, one must first ask what evil is. It is nothing other than the corruption of natural measure or form or order. A nature is therefore called evil when it is corrupted; for when uncorrupted it is certainly good. But even when corrupted, insofar as it is a nature it is good; insofar as it is corrupted, it is evil.

It can happen, however, that a nature which is ranked more excellently by its natural measure and form is, even when corrupted, still better than another which is uncorrupted but ranked lower by a lesser natural measure and form. So, in human valuation according to the quality that meets the eye, even corrupted gold is certainly better than uncorrupted silver, and even corrupted silver is better than uncorrupted lead. So too among the more powerful and spiritual natures, a rational spirit, even when corrupted by an evil will, is better than an irrational one that is uncorrupted; and any spirit whatever, even corrupted, is better than any body whatever, even uncorrupted. For the nature that, when present to a body, gives it life is better than the one to which life is given. However corrupted the created spirit of life may be, it can give life to a body; and therefore, though corrupted, it is better than the body, however uncorrupted.

But if corruption takes away all measure, all form, all order from corruptible things, no nature will remain. And therefore every nature that cannot be corrupted is the highest good, as God is. But every nature that can be corrupted is also itself some good; for corruption could not harm it except by taking away and diminishing what is good.

To the most excellent creatures, that is, to rational spirits, God has granted this: that if they do not will it, they cannot be corrupted; that is, if they keep obedience under the Lord their God and so cling to his incorruptible beauty. But if they refuse to keep obedience, then, since they are corrupted willingly in sins, they are corrupted unwillingly in punishments. For God is such a good that it goes well with no one who deserts him; and among the things made by God, rational nature is so great a good that there is no good by which it can be happy except God. Sinners, therefore, are set in order in punishments; and this ordering, because it does not suit their nature, is therefore punishment; but because it suits their guilt, it is therefore justice.

But the other things that have been made from nothing, which are certainly lower than rational spirit, can be neither happy nor miserable. Yet because by their own measure and form they too are good, and could not exist, though lesser and least goods, except from God, the highest good, they are so ordered that the weaker give way to the stronger, the feebler to the more robust, and the less powerful to the more powerful; and so earthly things are in harmony with heavenly things, as subjects with those that excel them. Thus, as things depart and others follow them, there arises a certain temporal beauty of its own kind, so that even those things that die, or cease to be what they were, do not disfigure or disturb the measure, form, and order of the whole creation; just as a well-composed speech is certainly beautiful, although in it the syllables and all the sounds pass by, as it were, being born and dying.

What kind and how great a punishment is due to each fault belongs to divine judgment, not human. When it is remitted to those who are converted, there is great goodness with God; and when it is paid as due, there is no injustice with God, because a nature is better ordered when it suffers justly in punishment than when it rejoices with impunity in sin. Yet even so, still having some measure, form, and order, in whatever extremity, it is still some good; and if these were taken away altogether and wholly consumed, there would be no good for the reason that no nature would remain.

All corruptible natures, then, would not be natures at all unless they were from God; nor would they be corruptible if they were of him, because they would then be what he himself is. So they exist in whatever measure, form, and order they have because it is God by whom they were made; and they are not unchangeable because it is nothing from which they were made. For it is sacrilegious audacity to make nothing and God equal, if we want what has been made by him from nothing to be such as that which has been born of God.

Therefore neither can the nature of God be harmed at all, nor can any nature under God be harmed unjustly. For even when some do harm unjustly by sinning, the unjust will is imputed to them; but the power by which they are permitted to do harm is only from God, who knows, even when they themselves do not, what those should suffer whom he permits them to harm.

If those who bring in another nature, which God did not make, were willing to pay attention to all these things, so clear and so certain, they would not be filled with such great blasphemies as to place so many goods in the highest evil and so many evils in God. For, as I said above, it is enough to correct them, if they are willing to attend to it, that the truth forces them even against their will to confess that absolutely all good things are only from God. Great goods, then, are not from one source and small goods from another; but both great and small goods are only from the highest good, which is God.

Let us then list, as far as we can, the good things that it is fitting for us to attribute to God as their author, and let us see whether, if they are taken away, any nature will remain. All life, both great and small; all power, both great and small; all health, both great and small; all memory, both great and small; all understanding, both great and small; all tranquillity, both great and small; all strength, both great and small; all abundance, both great and small; all sensation, both great and small; all light, both great and small; all sweetness, both great and small; all measurement, both great and small; all beauty, both great and small; all peace, both great and small; and whatever similar things may occur to us, and especially those that are found in all things, whether spiritual or bodily, every measure, every form, every order, both great and small, are from the Lord God. Whoever chooses to use all these goods badly will pay the penalty by divine judgment; but where none of them is present at all, no nature will remain.

But among all these, whatever things are small are called by contrary names when compared with greater ones. So, in the form of a human being, because its beauty is greater, the beauty of an ape is called ugliness in comparison with it; and this deceives the unwary, as though the one were good and the other evil. They do not look in the body of the ape at its own measure, the equality of the limbs on either side, the harmony of the parts, the safeguarding of its soundness, and the other things that would take long to go through.

But so that what we are saying may be understood, and the very slow may be satisfied, or even the stubborn who resist the plainest truth may be forced to confess what is true, let them be asked whether corruption can harm the body of an ape. If it can, so that it becomes uglier, what does it diminish except the good of beauty? Hence something will remain as long as the nature of the body subsists. Accordingly, if the nature is consumed when the good is consumed, then the nature is good. So too we call slow the contrary of swift; yet one who does not move at all cannot even be called slow. So we call a deep voice the contrary of a high one, or a harsh voice the contrary of a melodious one; but if you take away every form of voice entirely, there is silence, where there is no voice; yet silence, by the very fact that there is no voice, is usually set against voice as its contrary. So too bright things and dark things are spoken of as two contraries; yet even dark things have some light, and if they lacked it entirely, darkness would be the absence of light just as silence is the absence of voice.

Yet even these privations of things are so ordered in the universe of nature that, to those who consider wisely, they hold their turns not unfittingly. For God, too, by not illuminating certain places and times, made darkness as fittingly as day. For if we, by holding back the voice, fittingly insert silence in speaking, how much more does he, as the perfect artist of all things, fittingly make the privations of certain things? Hence in the hymn of the three children even light and darkness praise God, that is, they bring forth his praise in the hearts of those who consider well.

No nature, then, insofar as it is a nature, is evil; rather, for each nature, evil is nothing but being diminished in good. If by being diminished the good were used up, then just as no good, so no nature would be left: not only such a nature as the Manichaeans bring in, in which so many goods are found that their excessive blindness is astonishing, but any nature that anyone can bring in.

For not even that matter which the ancients called hyle is to be called evil. I do not mean the one that Mani, in most senseless vanity, not knowing what he is saying, calls hyle, the former of bodies; hence it is rightly said to him that he brings in another god, for no one can form and create bodies except God; for they are not created unless measure and form and order subsist with them, which, I think, even they now admit are good and can only be from God. But by hyle I mean a certain matter entirely formless and without quality, from which the qualities we perceive are formed, as the ancients said. Hence also wood is called hyle in Greek, because it is suitable for workers, not so that it itself makes anything, but as that from which something is made. Nor, then, is this hyle to be called evil; it cannot be perceived through any form, but can scarcely be thought of except through the utter privation of form. For it too has a capacity for forms; for if it could not receive the form imposed by the craftsman, it would certainly not even be called matter. Further, if form is some good, for which those in whom it prevails are called formosi (“shapely”), as from species (“form”) they are called speciosi (“beautiful”), then beyond doubt the capacity for form is also something good; just as, because wisdom is a good, no one doubts that to be capable of wisdom is good. And because every good is from God, no one ought to doubt that even this matter, if there is such a thing, is only from God.

Magnificently and divinely, therefore, did our God say to his servant: “I am who am,” and: “You shall say to the children of Israel: He who is has sent me to you.” For he truly is, because he is unchangeable; for every change makes what was not be. He, then, truly is who is unchangeable; the other things that have been made by him have received being from him according to their measure. To him, then, who supremely is, nothing can be contrary except what is not; and therefore, just as everything that is good is from him, so everything that is natural is from him, since everything that exists naturally is good. Every nature, therefore, is good, and every good is from God; every nature, therefore, is from God.

Pain, which some think is especially evil, whether it is in the mind or in the body, can itself only exist in good natures. For the very thing that resists so as to feel pain in some way refuses not to be what it was, because it was some good. But when it is forced toward something better, pain is useful; when toward something worse, useless. In the mind, then, pain is caused by the will resisting a greater power; in the body, pain is caused by sensation resisting a more powerful body. But there are evils without pain that are worse; for it is worse to rejoice in iniquity than to grieve over corruption. Yet even such joy can only come from obtaining lower goods; but iniquity is the desertion of better ones. Likewise in the body a wound with pain is better than putrefaction without pain, which is specifically called corruption. This the dead flesh of the Lord did not see, that is, did not suffer, as had been foretold in prophecy: “Nor will you let your holy one see corruption.” For who denies that it was wounded by the piercing of the nails and struck with the lance? But even that which all properly call corruption of the body, that is, putrefaction itself, if it still has something to consume deeply, corruption grows by diminishing the good. And if it has consumed it entirely, then just as no good, so no nature will remain, because there will no longer be anything for corruption to corrupt; and so there will not even be putrefaction, because there will be nothing at all for it to be in.

For this reason, in common speech, things that are small and slight are called modica (“moderate”), because some measure (modus) still remains in them, without which they would no longer be moderate but nothing at all. But those that are called immoderate because of excessive growth are blamed for the very excess; yet even they, under God, who “has arranged all things in measure and number and weight,” must be restrained by some measure.

God, however, is not to be said to have a measure, lest it be thought that an end of him is being spoken of. Nor yet is he therefore immoderate, he by whom measure is given to all things so that they may exist in some measure. Nor again should God be called moderate, as though he had received a measure from someone. But if we call him the highest measure, perhaps we say something, provided that in saying “the highest measure” we understand the highest good. For every measure, insofar as it is a measure, is good; hence all things cannot be called moderated, modest, measured without praise, although in another sense we take measure for end, and say there is no measure where there is no end; and this is sometimes said with praise, as it has been said: “And of his kingdom there will be no end.” For it could also be said, “There will be no measure,” so that measure would be understood as said for end; for one who reigns in no measure does not reign at all.

An evil measure, then, or an evil form or an evil order is so called either because they are less than they ought to have been, or because they are not fitted to the things to which they should be fitted, so that they are called evil because they are foreign and incongruous. It is as if someone were said to have acted not in a good measure because he did less than he ought, or because he acted in a way he ought not in such a matter, or more than was proper, or not fittingly; so that the very thing that is blamed as done in an evil measure is justly blamed for no other reason than that measure was not kept there. Likewise a form is called evil either in comparison with a more shapely and beautiful one, because this form is lesser and that greater, not in size but in comeliness; or because it does not suit the thing to which it is applied, so that it seems foreign and unfitting, as if a man should walk naked in the forum, which does not offend if he is seen in the baths. Similarly order too is called evil when order itself is kept less; hence it is not order but rather disorder that is evil there, when something is either less ordered than it ought to have been or not ordered as it ought. Yet where there is some measure, some form, some order, there is some good and some nature; but where there is no measure, no form, no order, there is no good, no nature.

These things, which our faith holds and reason has in some way traced out, must be fortified by testimonies of the divine Scriptures, so that those who cannot attain them with lesser understanding may believe divine authority and by this deserve to understand; and those who understand, but are less instructed in the church's writings, may not think that we are bringing these things out of our own understanding rather than that they are in those books. Thus that God is unchangeable is written in the Psalms: “You will change them and they will be changed; but you are the same.” And in the book of Wisdom, of Wisdom herself: “Remaining in herself she renews all things.” Hence also the apostle Paul: “To the invisible, incorruptible, only God.” And the apostle James: “Every best giving and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of a moment.” Again, that what he begot of himself is what he himself is, is said briefly by the Son himself: “I and the Father are one.” And that the Son was not made, since through him all things were made, is written thus: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made,” that is, nothing was made without him.

For we must not listen to the ravings of men who think that in this passage “nothing” is to be understood as something, and who think that someone can be forced into such vanity because “nothing” is placed at the end of the sentence. “Therefore,” they say, “it was made; and because it was made, nothing itself is something.” For they have lost their senses through eagerness to contradict, and do not understand that it makes no difference whether one says “without him was made nothing” or “without him nothing was made.” For even if it were said in that order, “without him nothing was made,” they could nonetheless say that nothing itself is something, because it was made. For in the case of what really is something, what difference does it make whether one says “without him was made a house” or “without him a house was made,” as long as it is understood that something was made without him, and that something is a house? So, since it has been said, “without him was made nothing,” since nothing is certainly not something when it is said truly and properly, whether one says “without him was made nothing” or “without him nothing was made” or “nothing has been made,” it makes no difference. But who would want to talk with men who, about the very words I have just used, “it makes no difference” (nihil interest), can say: “Therefore it makes some difference, because nothing itself is something”? Those who have a sound brain see the most obvious fact, that when I said “nihil interest” the same is understood as would be understood if I said “interest nihil.” But if someone said to such people, “What did you do?” and he replied that he had done nothing, it would follow that they would falsely accuse him, saying: “So you did something, because you did nothing; for nothing itself is something.” But they have the Lord himself also placing this word at the end of a sentence, where he says: “And in secret I have spoken nothing.” Let them read, then, and be silent.

Since, then, God made all the things that he did not beget of himself, but made through his Word, not from things that already existed, but from things that did not exist at all, that is, from nothing, the apostle says: “Who calls the things that are not as though they were.” But more plainly it is written in the book of the Maccabees: “I pray you, son, look at the heaven and the earth and all that is in them; see and know that the Lord God made us from things that were not.” And what is written in the psalm, “He spoke, and they were made,” makes it plain that he did not beget these things of himself, but made them by his Word and command; and what is not of himself is certainly from nothing. For there was nothing else from which he could make them. Of this the apostle says most plainly: “For from him and through him and in him are all things.”

“From him” (ex ipso) does not mean the same as “of him” (de ipso). For what is of him can be said to be “from him”; but not everything that is “from him” is rightly said to be “of him.” For heaven and earth are from him, because he made them, but not of him, because they are not of his substance. So, if a man begets a son and builds a house, the son is from him and the house is from him; but the son is of him, the house of earth and wood. But this is because he is a man, who cannot make anything from nothing; whereas God, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, had no need of any matter that he had not made himself to assist his omnipotence.

When we hear “all things from him and through him and in him,” we ought certainly to understand all natures that exist naturally. For sins, which do not preserve nature but vitiate it, are not from him. Holy Scripture testifies in many ways that these sins come from the will of those who sin, especially in the passage where the apostle says: “Do you think, O man, who judge those who do such things and do them yourself, that you will escape the judgment of God? Or do you despise the riches of his kindness and patience and long-suffering, not knowing that the patience of God leads you to repentance? But according to the hardness of your heart and your impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to each according to his works.”

Nor yet, although all things he has created are in God, do those who sin defile him, of whose Wisdom it is said: “She reaches all things because of her purity, and nothing defiled enters into her.” For just as we believe God to be incorruptible and unchangeable, so we ought consequently to believe him also incapable of defilement.

That he also made even the least goods, that is, earthly and mortal things, is understood beyond doubt from that passage of the apostle where, speaking of the members of our flesh, “that if one member is glorified, all the members rejoice with it; and if one member suffers, all the members suffer with it,” he also says: “God has placed the members, each one of them, in the body as he willed,” and: “God has tempered the body, giving greater honor to the part that lacked it, so that there might be no divisions in the body, but that the members might have the same care for one another.” And what the apostle thus praises in the measure, form, and order of the members of the flesh you find in the flesh of all animals, both the largest and the smallest, since all flesh is counted among earthly goods and therefore among the least.

Again, that what kind and how great a punishment is due to each fault belongs to divine judgment, not human, is written thus: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!” Again, that by God's goodness sins are forgiven to those who are converted is shown sufficiently by the very fact that Christ was sent, who died for us not in his own nature, in which he is God, but in ours, which he took from a woman. This goodness and love of God toward us the apostle proclaims thus: “God commends his love toward us,” he says, “in that while we were still sinners Christ died for us; much more, being now justified by his blood, shall we be saved from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his life.” And that there is no injustice with God even when due punishment is paid to sinners, he says thus: “What shall we say? Is God unjust who inflicts wrath?” And in one place he briefly reminded us that both goodness and severity are from him, saying: “You see, then, the goodness and severity of God: severity toward those who have fallen, but goodness toward you, if you continue in goodness.”

Again, that the power even of those who do harm is only from God is written thus, where Wisdom speaks: “Through me kings reign, and through me tyrants hold the earth.” The apostle also says: “For there is no power except from God.” And that this happens deservedly is written in the book of Job: “Who makes a hypocrite reign,” it says, “because of the perversity of the people.” And of the people of Israel God says: “I gave them a king in my wrath.” For it is not unjust that, when the wicked receive the power to harm, the patience of the good should be tested and the iniquity of the evil punished. For through the power given to the devil both Job was tested, so that he might appear righteous, and Peter was tempted, so that he might not presume on himself, and Paul was buffeted, so that he might not be exalted, and Judas was condemned, so that he hanged himself. Since, then, through the power he gave the devil God himself did all things justly, yet it is not for these justly done things, but for the unjust will to harm, which was the devil's own, that punishment will be paid to him at the end, when it will be said to the ungodly who have persevered in consenting to his wickedness: “Depart into the eternal fire, which my Father has prepared for the devil and his angels.”