Retractations 1.12–1.14
Latin text: Knöll, CSEL 36 (Latin text: Pius Knöll, Retractationes (CSEL 36, 1902), digitized by Open Greek and Latin (csel-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0).
Chapter 1
1.12CSEL 36:57–65
Tunc etiam de uera religione librum scripsi, in quo multipliciter et copiosissime disputatur unum uerum deum, id est trinitatem, patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, religione uera colendum, et quanta misericordia eius per temporalem dispensationem concessa sit hominibus Christiana religio, quae uera religio est, et ad eundem cultum dei quemadmodum sit homo quadam suauitate coaptandus. maxime tamen contra duas naturas Manicheorum liber hic loquitur. In hoc libro quodam loco: sit, inquam, tibi manifestum atque perceptum nullum errorem in religione esse potuisse, si anima pro deo suo non coleret animam aut corpus aut fantasmata sua. hic animam pro uniuersa creatura incorporali posui non loquens more scripturarum, quae animam, quando non translato uerbo utuntur, nescio utrum uelint intellegi nisi eam, qua uiuunt animalia mortalia, in quibus et homines sunt, quamdiu mortales sunt. paulo post autem eundem sensum melius sum breuiterque conplexus, ubi dixi: non ergo creaturae potius quam creatori seruiamus nec euanescamus in cogitationibus nostris, et perfecta religio est. creaturam quippe uno nomine utramque, id est spiritalem corporalemque, significaui. restat, quod ibi dixi: aut fantasmata sua, propter quod hic dixi: nec euanescamus in cogitationibus nostris. Item quod dixi: ea est nostris temporibus Christiana religio, quam cognoscere ac sequi securissima et certissima salus est, secundum hoc nomen dictum est, non secundum ipsam rem, cuius hoc nomen est. nam res ipsa, quae nunc Christiana religio nuncupatur, erat et apud antiquos nec defuit ab initio generis humani, quousque Christus ueniret in carne, unde uera religio, quae iam erat, coepit appellari Christiana. cum enim eum post resurrectionem ascensionemque in caelum coepissent apostoli praedicare et plurimi crederent, primum apud Antiochiam, sicut scriptum est, appellati sunt discipuli Christiani. propterea dixi: haec est nostris temporibus Christiana religio, non quia prioribus temporibus non fuit, sed quia posterioribus hoc nomen accepit. Alio loco: intende igitur, inquam, in haec, quae secuntur, diligenter et pie, quantum potes; tales enim adiuuat deus. quod non ita intellegendum est, quasi tantummodo tales adiuuet, cum etiam adiuuet non tales, ut sint tales, id est ut diligenter et pie quaerant; tales autem adiuuat, ut inueniant. itemque alibi: deinde, inquam, iam erit consequens, ut post mortem corporalem, quam debemus primo peccato, tempore suo atque ordine suo hoc corpus restituatur pristinae stabilitati. quod sic accipiendum est, quia etiam pristina stabilitas corporis, quam peccando amisimus, habebat tantam felicitatem, ut in defectum non uergeret senectutis. huic ergo pristinae stabilitati restituetur hoc corpus in resurrectione mortuorum, sed habebit amplius, ut nec alimentis temporalibus sustentetur, sed ad sufficientiam uiuificetur solo spiritu, cum resurrexerit in spiritum uiuificantem, quia iam etiam spiritale erit. illud autem, quod primum fuit quamuis non moriturum, nisi homo peccasset, tamen animale factum est, hoc est in animam uiuentem. Et alibi: usque adeo, inquam, peccatum uoluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit uoluntarium. potest uideri falsa haec definitio, sed, si diligenter discutiatur, inuenietur esse uerissima. peccatum quippe illud cogitandum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam poena peccati, sicut superius ostendi, cum quaedam commemorarem ex libro tertio de libero arbitrio, quamuis et illa, quae non inmerito non uoluntaria peccata dicuntur, quia uel a nescientibus uel a coactis perpetrantur, non omni modo possunt sine uoluntate committi, quoniam et ille, qui peccat ignorans, uoluntate utique peccat, quod, cum faciendum non sit, putat esse faciendum, et ille, qui concupiscente aduersus spiritum carne non ea quae uult facit, concupiscit quidem nolens et ideo non facit quod uult, sed, si uincitur, concupiscentiae consentit uolens, et ideo non facit nisi quod uult, liber scilicet iustitiae seruusque peccati. et illud, quod in paruulis dicitur originale peccatum, cum adhuc non utantur arbitrio uoluntatis, non absurde uocatur etiam uoluntarium, quia ex prima hominis mala uoluntate contractum factum est quodam modo hereditarium. non itaque falsum est, quod dixi: usque adeo peccatum uoluntarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit uoluntarium. ideo gratia dei non solum reatus omnium praeteritorum soluitur in omnibus, qui baptizantur in Christo, quod fit spiritu regenerationis, uerum etiam in grandibus uoluntas ipsa sanatur et praeparatur a domino, quod fit spiritu fidei et caritatis. Alio loco quod dixi de domino Iesu Christo: nihil egit ui, sed omnia suadendo et monendo, non mihi occurrerat, quod uendentes et ementes flagellando eiecit de templo. sed quid hoc aut quantum est, quamuis et daemones nolentes ab hominibus non sermone suasionis, sed ui potestatis eiecerit? item alio loco: prius, inquam, isti sequendi sunt; qui unum summum et solum colendum esse dicunt; si apud hos ueritas non eluxerit, tunc demum migrandum. quod ita potest uideri dictum, quasi de huius religionis ueritate dubitauerim. dixi autem, sicut ei congruebat, ad quem scribebam. sic enim dixi: si apud hos ueritas non eluxerit, nihil dubitans, quod apud eos elucesceret, quemadmodum ait apostolus: si Christus non resurrexit, non utique dubitans, quod resurrexit. Item quod dixi: nec miracula illa in nostra tempora durare permissa sunt, ne anima semper uisibilia quaereret et eorum consuetudine frigesceret genus humanum, quorum nouitate flagrauit, uerum est quidem; non enim nunc usque, cum manus inponitur baptizatis, sic accipiunt spiritum sanctum, ut loquantur linguis omnium gentium, aut nunc usque per umbram transeuntem praedicatorum Christi sanantur infirmi, et si qua talia tunc facta sunt, quae postea cessasse manifestum est. sed non sic accipiendum est, quod dixi, ut nunc in Christi nomine fieri miracula nulla credantur. nam ego ipse, quando istum ipsum scripsi librum, ad Mediolanensium corpora martyrum in eadem ciuitate caecum inluminatum fuisse iam noueram et alia nonnulla, qualia tam multa etiam istis temporibus fiunt, ut nec omnia cognoscere nec ea, quae cognoscimus, enumerare possimus. Et alio loco illud, quod dixi: sicut ait apostolus: omnis ordo a deo est, non eisdem uerbis hoc dixit apostolus, quamuis eadem uideatur esse sententia. ait quippe ille: quae autem sunt, a deo ordinata sunt. et alibi: prorsus, inquam, nemo nos fallat: quidquid recte uituperatur, in melioris conparatione respuitur. hoc de substantiis atque naturis dictum est; inde enim disputabatur, non de bonis actibus atque peccatis. itemque alibi: sed nec sic quidem, inquam, ab homine homo diligendus est, ut diliguntur carnales fratres uel filii uel coniuges uel quique cognati aut adfines aut ciues; nam et ista dilectio temporalis est. non enim ullas tales necessitudines haberemus, quae nascendo et moriendo contingunt, si natura nostra in praeceptis et imagine dei manens in istam corruptionem non relegaretur. hunc sensum prorsus inprobo, quem iam et superius inprobaui in primo libro de Genesi contra Manicheos. ad hoc enim ducit, ut credantur illi coniuges primi non generaturi posteros homines, nisi peccassent, tamquam necesse fuerit, ut morituri gignerentur, si de concubitu maris et feminae gignerentur. nondum enim uideram fieri potuisse, ut non morituri de non morituris nascerentur, si peccato illo magno non mutaretur in deterius humana natura ac per hoc, si et in parentibus et in filiis felicitas fecunditasque mansisset, usque ad certum sanctorum numerum, quem praedestinauit deus, nascerentur homines non parentibus successuri morientibus, sed cum uiuentibus regnaturi. essent ergo etiam istae cognationes atque adfinitates, si nullus delinqueret nullusque moreretur. Item alio loco: ad unum deum tendentes, inquam, et ei uni religantes animas nostras, unde religio dicta creditur, omni superstitione careamus. in his uerbis meis ratio, quae reddita est, unde sit dicta religio, plus mihi placuit. nam non me fugit aliam nominis huius originem exposuisse latini sermonis auctores, quod inde sit appellata religio, quod religitur: quod uerbum compositum est a legendo, id est eligendo, ut ita latinum uideatur religo sicut eligo. Hic liber sic incipit: Cum omnis uitae bonae ac beatae uia.
At that time I also wrote a book On True Religion, in which it is argued in many ways and most fully that the one true God, that is, the Trinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, is to be worshiped by true religion; and with how great mercy the Christian religion, which is the true religion, has been granted to human beings through the temporal dispensation; and how man is to be fitted, by a certain sweetness, to that same worship of God. This book, however, speaks chiefly against the two natures of the Manichaeans. In one place in this book I said: “Let it be clear and understood by you that there could have been no error in religion if the soul did not worship, in place of its God, a soul or a body or its own phantasms.” Here I put “soul” for the whole incorporeal creation, not speaking in the manner of the Scriptures, which, when they do not use the word in a transferred sense, I do not know whether they wish “soul” to be understood as anything other than that by which mortal living creatures live, among whom are human beings too, as long as they are mortal. A little later, however, I expressed the same sense better and briefly, when I said: “Let us not, then, serve the creature rather than the Creator, nor become vain in our thoughts, and religion is perfect.” For by the one name “creature” I signified both, that is, the spiritual and the bodily. What remains, my saying there “or its own phantasms,” is the reason why I said here, “nor become vain in our thoughts.” Likewise what I said, “That is the Christian religion in our times, which to know and follow is the safest and most certain salvation,” was said with reference to this name, not to the reality itself whose name it is. For the reality itself which is now called the Christian religion existed among the ancients also, and was not lacking from the beginning of the human race until Christ came in the flesh; from which time the true religion, which already existed, began to be called Christian. For when, after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, the apostles had begun to preach him and very many believed, the disciples were first called Christians at Antioch, as it is written. That is why I said, “This is the Christian religion in our times”: not because it did not exist in earlier times, but because it received this name in later times. In another place I said: “Attend, then, to what follows, diligently and devoutly, as far as you can; for God helps such people.” This is not to be understood as though he helps only such people, since he also helps those who are not such, so that they may become such, that is, so that they may seek diligently and devoutly; but he helps such people so that they may find. And likewise elsewhere I said: “Then it will follow that after bodily death, which we owe to the first sin, this body will be restored in its own time and order to its former stability.” This is to be taken thus: that the former stability of the body too, which we lost by sinning, had so great a happiness that it did not decline into the failing of old age. To this former stability, then, this body will be restored in the resurrection of the dead; but it will have more, so that it is not even sustained by temporal food, but is given life sufficiently by the spirit alone, when it has risen into a life-giving spirit, because it will then be spiritual. That first body, however, although it would not have died if man had not sinned, was nevertheless made animal, that is, into a living soul. And elsewhere I said: “Sin is so much a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin if it is not voluntary.” This definition can seem false; but if it is examined carefully, it will be found to be most true. For that is to be thought of as sin which is only sin, not that which is also the punishment of sin, as I showed above when I recalled certain things from the third book On Free Choice; although even those things which are not undeservedly called involuntary sins, because they are committed either by people who do not know or by people who are compelled, cannot be committed altogether without the will. For he who sins in ignorance certainly sins by the will, since he thinks that what ought not to be done ought to be done; and he who, when the flesh lusts against the spirit, does not do what he wills, lusts indeed unwillingly, and therefore does not do what he wills; but if he is overcome, he consents willingly to the lust, and therefore does only what he wills, free, that is, from justice and a slave of sin. And what is called original sin in little children, since they do not yet use the choice of the will, is not absurdly called voluntary too, because, contracted from the first evil will of man, it has become in a certain way hereditary. It is not false, then, what I said: “Sin is so much a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin if it is not voluntary.” Therefore by the grace of God not only is the guilt of all past sins loosed in all who are baptized in Christ, which is done by the spirit of regeneration, but also in grown persons the will itself is healed and prepared by the Lord, which is done by the spirit of faith and charity. As for what I said in another place of the Lord Jesus Christ, “He did nothing by force, but everything by persuading and warning,” it had not occurred to me that he drove the sellers and buyers out of the temple with a whip. But what is this, or how much, although he also cast out demons from human beings against their will, not by the word of persuasion but by the force of power? Likewise in another place I said: “Those are to be followed first who say that the one supreme God alone is to be worshiped; if the truth has not shone out among them, then at last one must move elsewhere.” This can seem to have been said as though I had doubted the truth of this religion. But I said it as suited the person to whom I was writing. For I said, “if the truth has not shone out among them,” in no doubt that it would shine out among them; as the apostle says, “If Christ has not risen,” certainly not doubting that he had risen. Likewise what I said, “Nor have those miracles been permitted to last into our times, lest the soul should always seek visible things, and the human race grow cold through familiarity with the very things whose novelty set it on fire,” is indeed true. For now, when hands are laid on the baptized, they do not receive the Holy Spirit in such a way as to speak in the tongues of all nations; nor now are the sick healed by the passing shadow of the preachers of Christ; and if any such things were done then, it is clear that they ceased afterward. But what I said is not to be taken in such a way that no miracles are believed to be done now in the name of Christ. For I myself, when I wrote this very book, already knew that a blind man had been given sight at the bodies of the martyrs of Milan in that same city, and some other things; and so many such things happen even in these times that we can neither know them all nor count those we know. And in another place, what I said, “as the apostle says, ‘All order is from God,’” the apostle did not say in those words, although the sense seems to be the same. For he said: “Those that exist have been ordered by God.” And elsewhere I said: “Let no one deceive us at all: whatever is rightly blamed is rejected in comparison with something better.” This was said of substances and natures, for that was the subject of the discussion, not good actions and sins. And likewise elsewhere I said: “But not even so is man to be loved by man as brothers in the flesh, or sons, or spouses, or any kinsfolk or in-laws or fellow citizens are loved; for this love too is temporal. For we would have no such ties, which come about by being born and dying, if our nature, remaining in the commandments and image of God, had not been banished into this corruption.” I altogether disapprove this view, which I have already disapproved above in the first book On Genesis against the Manichaeans. For it leads to the belief that those first spouses would not have begotten human descendants if they had not sinned, as though it were necessary that those begotten should die if they were begotten from the union of male and female. For I had not yet seen that it could have come about that those who would not die should be born of those who would not die, if human nature had not been changed for the worse by that great sin; and thus, if happiness and fruitfulness had remained in both parents and children, human beings would have been born, up to the fixed number of saints whom God predestined, not to succeed parents who die but to reign with parents who live. So there would also be these kinships and relations by marriage if no one sinned and no one died. Likewise in another place I said: “Tending toward the one God and binding our souls to him alone, from which religion is believed to be named, let us be free of all superstition.” In these words of mine the reason given for the name “religion” pleased me more. For I am well aware that writers of the Latin language have explained another origin of this name: that religion is so called because it is re-chosen (religitur), a verb compounded from legere, that is, eligere (to choose), so that in Latin religo seems formed like eligo. This book begins thus: “Since the way of every good and happy life…”
Rom 1:25 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 1:21 (allusion, high confidence) · Acts 11:26 (allusion, high confidence) · John 2:15 (allusion, high confidence) · 1 Cor 15:14 (quotation, high confidence) · Acts 8:17 (allusion, medium confidence) · Acts 2:4 (allusion, medium confidence) · Acts 5:15 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 13:1 (quotation, high confidence) · 1 Cor 15:45 (allusion, high confidence) · Gal 5:17 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 6:20 (allusion, high confidence) · Prov 8:35 (allusion, medium confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Reviewing On True Religion, Augustine explains that the true religion existed before it was called Christian, defends the sense in which sin is voluntary, affirms that miracles still occur, and withdraws his view that the first couple would have had no children without sin.
- Latin title: De uera religione. Quotations: Rom 1:25, 1:21; Acts 11:26; 1 Cor 15:14 (“If Christ has not risen”); Rom 13:1 (Latin “quae autem sunt, a deo ordinata sunt”); 1 Cor 15:45 (life-giving spirit, living soul); Gal 5:17; Rom 6:20 (free from justice, slave of sin); Prov 8:35 LXX (will prepared by the Lord). Allusions: John 2:15 (cleansing of the temple); Acts 8:17 and 2:4 (tongues); Acts 5:15 (Peter's shadow).
- The blind man healed at Milan: at the finding of the relics of Gervasius and Protasius in 386 (cf. Confessions 9.7.16; City of God 22.8).
- On the first couple and procreation, Augustine corrects his earlier view (also in 1.9 above): he now holds that without sin children would have been born who did not die.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (OCR letter error; line-break hyphen and stray period in the digital text; split word in the digital text): uolun-. tarium → uoluntarium; miracula illa m nostra → miracula illa in nostra; lo quantur → loquantur.
Extrabiblical texts: Augustine, Conf. 9.7.16 (Confessions; allusion)
Topics: Marriage
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Retract. 1.12 (CSEL 36:57–65; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-retractationes/1-12/#p-1-12). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-retractationes-1-12) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Knöll (CSEL 36, 1902); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.
1.13CSEL 36:65–71
Iam uero apud Hipponem Regium presbyter scripsi librum de utilitate credendi ad amicum meum, quem deceptum a Manicheis adhuc eo errore noueram detineri et inridere in catholicae fidei disciplina, quod iuberentur homines credere, non autem, quid esset uerum, certissima ratione docerentur. In hoc libro dixi: in quibus tamen legis praeceptis atque mandatis, quibus nunc Christianos uti fas non est, quale uel sabbatum est uel circumcisio uel sacrificia et si quid huius modi est, tanta mysteria continentur, ut omnis pius intellegat nihil esse perniciosius, quam quidquid ibi est accipi ad litteram, id est ad uerbum, nihil autem salubrius quam spiritu reuelari. inde est: littera occidit, spiritus autem uiuificat. sed aliter exposui uerba ista apostoli Pauli et, quantum mihi uidetur uel potius ipsis rebus apparet, multo conuenientius in eo libro, qui scribitur de spiritu et littera, quamuis non sit et iste sensus respuendus. Item dixi: duae sunt enim personae in religione laudabiles, una eorum, qui iam inuenerunt, quos etiam beatissimos iudicari necesse est, alia eorum, qui studiosissime et rectissime inquirunt. primi ergo sunt iam in ipsa possessione, alteri in uia, qua tamen certissime peruenitur. in his uerbis meis, si illi, qui iam inuenerunt, quos in ipsa possessione iam esse diximus, sic accipiantur beatissimi, ut non in hac uita, sed in ea, quam speramus et ad quam per fidei uiam tendimus, sint non habet iste sensus errorem; ipsi enim iudicandi sunt quod quaerendum erat inuenisse, qui iam ibi sunt, quo nos quaerendo et credendo, id est uiam fidei tenendo, cupimus peruenire. si autem in hac uita isti esse putantur uel fuisse, id uerum esse non mihi uidetur, non quia in hac uita nihil uerum omnino inueniri potest, quod mente cernatur, non fide credatur, sed quia tantum est, quidquid est, ut non faciat beatissimos. neque enim quod ait apostolus: uidemus nunc per speculum in aenigmate et: nunc scio ex parte, ex parte non cernitur mente; cernitur plane, sed beatissimos nondum facit. illud enim beatissimos facit, quod ait: tunc autem faciem ad faciem et: tunc cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum. qui hoc inuenerunt, ipsi dicendi sunt in beatitudinis possessione consistere, ad quam ducit uia fidei, quam tenemus et quo credendo cupimus peruenire. sed quinam sint illi beatissimi, qui iam sunt in ea possessione, quo ducit haec uia, magna quaestio est. et angeli quidem sancti quod ibi sint, nulla quaestio est. sed de sanctis hominibus iam defunctis, utrum ipsi dicendi sint iam in illa possessione consistere, merito quaeritur. iam enim corpore quidem corruptibili, quo anima grauatur, exuti sunt, sed adhuc expectant etiam ipsi redemptionem corporis sui, et caro eorum requiescit in spe, nondum in futura incorruptione clarescit. sed utrum ad contemplandam cordis oculis ueritatem, sicut dictum est: faciem ad faciem, nihil ex hoc minus habeant, non hic locus est disputando requirere. item quod dixi: nam scire magna et honesta uel etiam diuina beatissimum est, ad eandem beatitudinem referre debemus. in hac enim uita, quantumcumque id sciatur, nondum est beatissimum, quoniam inconparabiliter longe est amplius, quod inde nescitur. Et quod dixi: multum interesse, utrum aliquid mentis certa ratione teneatur, quod scire dicimus, an fama uel litteris credendum posteris utiliter commendetur, et paulo post: quod scimus igitur, debemus rationi, quod credimus, auctoritati, non sic accipiendum est, ut in sermone usitatiore uereamur nos dicere scire, quod idoneis testibus credimus. proprie quippe cum loquimur, id solum scire dicimus, quod mentis firma ratione conprehendimus. cum uero loquimur uerbis consuetudini aptioribus, sicut loquitur etiam scriptura diuina, non dubitemus dicere scire nos et quod percipimus nostri corporis sensibus et quod fide dignis credimus testibus, dum tamen inter haec et illud quid distet intellegamus. Item quod dixi: nemini dubium est omnes homines aut stultos esse aut sapientes, potest uideri esse contrarium illi, quod legitur in libro tertio de libero arbitrio: quasi uero natura humana praeter stultam et sapientem nullam mediam recipiat affectionem. sed illud ibi dictum est, ubi de primo homine quaerebatur, utrum sapiens fuerit factus an stultus an neutrum, quoniam nullo modo stultum dicere poteramus, qui sine uitio factus est, cum sit stultitia magnum uitium, et sapientem quomodo diceremus, qui potuit seduci, non satis apparebat. ideoque ad conpendium dicere uolui: quasi uero natura humana praeter stultitiam et sapientiam nullam mediam recipiat affectionem. intuebar quippe etiam paruulos, quos licet confiteamur trahere originale peccatum, tamen nec sapientes nec stultos possumus proprie dicere nondum utentes libero arbitrio seu bene seu male. nunc autem aut sapientes aut stultos esse omnes homines dixi eos uolens intellegi, qui iam ratione utuntur, qua discernuntur a pecoribus, ut homines sint, sicut dicimus beatos esse omnes homines uelle. numquid enim in hac sententia tam uera atque manifesta metuimus ne intellegantur et paruuli, qui hoc adhuc uelle non possunt? Alio loco, cum miracula commemorassem, quae dominus Iesus fecit, cum hic esset in carne, adiunxi dicens: cur, inquies, ista modo non fiunt? atque respondi: quia non mouerent, nisi mira essent; si autem solita essent, mira non essent. hoc autem dixi, quia non tanta nec omnia modo, non quia nulla fiunt etiam modo. In fine autem libri: sed quoniam sermo iste noster, inquam, multo processit longius, quam putabam, hic finem libro faciamus. in quo memineris uolo nondum me Manicheos coepisse refellere et illas nugas nondum inuasisse neque de ipsa catholica magnum aliquid aperuisse, sed uoluisse tantummodo eruere tibi, si possem, etiam opinionem de ueris Christianis malitiose aut inperite nobis insinuatam et erigere ad magna quaedam et diuina discenda. quare hoc uolumen ita sese habeat. placatiore autem animo tuo facto ero fortassis in ceteris promtior. haec non ita dixi, quasi nihil contra Manicheos adhuc scripsissem uel nihil de doctrina catholica mandassem litteris, cum tot superius edita uolumina de utraque re non me tacuisse testantur, sed in hoc libro ad illum scripto nondum Manicheos refellere coeperam et illas nugas nondum inuaseram neque de ipsa catholica magnum aliquid aperueram, quoniam sperabam hoc initio facto ad eum me scripturum fuisse, quae hic non scripseram. Hic liber sic incipit: Si mihi, Honorate, unum atque idem uideretur esse.
When I was already a presbyter at Hippo Regius, I wrote a book On the Usefulness of Believing to a friend of mine who, I knew, had been deceived by the Manichaeans and was still held in that error, and who mocked the discipline of the Catholic faith because people were commanded to believe and were not taught what is true by most certain reasoning. In this book I said: “Yet in those precepts and commands of the law which Christians may not now observe, such as the sabbath or circumcision or sacrifices and anything of the kind, such great mysteries are contained that every devout person understands that nothing is more harmful than to take whatever is there according to the letter, that is, word for word, and nothing more wholesome than that it be revealed by the spirit. Hence it is said: ‘The letter kills, but the spirit gives life.’” But I explained these words of the apostle Paul otherwise, and, as it seems to me, or rather as the matter itself shows, much more fittingly, in the book entitled On the Spirit and the Letter; although this sense too is not to be rejected. Likewise I said: “For there are two kinds of persons praiseworthy in religion: one, those who have already found, whom one must also judge most blessed; the other, those who seek most zealously and most rightly. The first, then, are already in possession itself; the others are on the way, by which, however, one most certainly arrives.” In these words of mine, if those who have already found, whom we said to be already in possession itself, are taken to be most blessed in such a way that they are so not in this life but in the life which we hope for and toward which we tend by the way of faith, this sense contains no error; for those are to be judged to have found what was to be sought who are already there where we desire to arrive by seeking and believing, that is, by holding to the way of faith. But if they are thought to be, or to have been, such in this life, that does not seem to me to be true; not because nothing true at all can be found in this life which is discerned by the mind and not believed by faith, but because whatever it is, it is not so great as to make people most blessed. For what the apostle says, “We see now through a mirror in an enigma,” and, “Now I know in part,” is not something not discerned by the mind; it is plainly discerned, but it does not yet make people most blessed. What makes them most blessed is what he says: “But then face to face,” and, “Then I shall know as I also am known.” Those who have found this are to be said to stand in the possession of blessedness, to which the way of faith leads, which we hold and where we desire to arrive by believing. But who those most blessed ones are who are already in that possession to which this way leads is a great question. That the holy angels are there is no question. But concerning holy human beings already dead, whether they are to be said to stand already in that possession is rightly asked. For they have indeed already been stripped of the corruptible body by which the soul is weighed down; but they too are still awaiting the redemption of their body, and their flesh rests in hope and does not yet shine in the incorruption to come. But whether they lack anything on that account for contemplating the truth with the eyes of the heart, as it is said, “face to face,” this is not the place to inquire by discussion. Likewise what I said, “For to know great and honorable or even divine things is most blessed,” we must refer to that same blessedness. For in this life, however much it is known, it is not yet most blessed, since what is not known of it is incomparably greater. And what I said, “It makes a great difference whether something is held by the certain reasoning of the mind, which we call knowing, or is usefully commended to posterity by report or by writing to be believed,” and a little later, “What we know, then, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority,” is not to be taken in such a way that in more ordinary speech we should be afraid to say that we know what we believe on suitable witnesses. Properly speaking, indeed, we say that we know only what we grasp by the firm reasoning of the mind. But when we speak in words more suited to custom, as the divine Scripture also speaks, let us not hesitate to say that we know both what we perceive by the senses of our body and what we believe on witnesses worthy of faith, provided that we understand the difference between these and the other. Likewise what I said, “No one doubts that all human beings are either fools or wise,” can seem contrary to what is read in the third book On Free Choice: “As if human nature admitted no intermediate condition besides the foolish and the wise.” But that was said there where the question was about the first man, whether he was made wise or foolish or neither; since we could in no way call him foolish who was made without fault, folly being a great fault; and how we could call him wise who could be led astray was not clear enough. And so I wished to say, for brevity: “As if human nature admitted no intermediate condition besides folly and wisdom.” For I was also considering little children, whom, though we confess that they contract original sin, we nevertheless cannot properly call either wise or foolish, since they do not yet use free choice either well or badly. Here, however, I said that all human beings are either wise or foolish, wishing those to be understood who already use reason, by which they are distinguished from beasts so as to be human; just as we say that all human beings wish to be happy. For in so true and clear a statement are we afraid that little children might be understood too, who cannot yet wish this? In another place, when I had recalled the miracles which the Lord Jesus did when he was here in the flesh, I added: “Why, you will say, are these things not done now?” And I answered: “Because they would not move people unless they were wonderful; but if they were usual, they would not be wonderful.” I said this because such great ones are not done now, nor all of them; not because none at all are done even now. At the end of the book I said: “But since this discourse of ours has gone on much longer than I thought, let us end the book here. In it I want you to remember that I have not yet begun to refute the Manichaeans and have not yet attacked those trifles, nor have I disclosed anything great about the Catholic Church itself, but I have only wished to root out of you, if I could, the opinion about true Christians maliciously or ignorantly instilled into you, and to raise you up to learn certain great and divine things. So let this volume stand as it is. When your mind has been made more peaceable, I shall perhaps be readier in the rest.” I did not say this as though I had not yet written anything against the Manichaeans or committed nothing to writing about Catholic teaching, since so many volumes published earlier testify that I had not kept silent on either subject; but in this book written to him I had not yet begun to refute the Manichaeans and had not yet attacked those trifles, nor had I disclosed anything great about the Catholic Church itself, because I hoped that, this beginning having been made, I would write to him what I had not written here. This book begins thus: “If to me, Honoratus, it seemed one and the same…”
Textual problem in this passage: see the notes.
2 Cor 3:6 (quotation, high confidence) · 1 Cor 13:12 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:23 (allusion, high confidence) · Ps 16:9 (15:9 LXX) (allusion, medium confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Reviewing On the Usefulness of Believing, Augustine refines his remarks on the letter that kills, on who is already blessed, on knowing and believing, on wise and foolish, and on miracles today.
- Latin title: De utilitate credendi, addressed to Honoratus. Quotations: 2 Cor 3:6; 1 Cor 13:12; Wis 9:15 (the corruptible body weighs down the soul, allusion); Rom 8:23; Ps 16:9 (15:9 LXX/Vulg., “my flesh shall rest in hope”).
- The other interpretation of 2 Cor 3:6 is in On the Spirit and the Letter, 4.6–5.8.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (OCR dropped letter; OCR letter error; OCR read I as l; line-break hyphen and stray period in the digital text; printed line number in the digital text; stray mark in the digital text; stray period in the digital text): lam uero → Iam uero; libmm → librum; quantum mihi. uidetur → quantum mihi uidetur; quod quaerendum eat → quod quaerendum erat; uel etiam diuina. beatissimum → uel etiam diuina beatissimum; b.eatissimum → beatissimum; muUum → multum; na-. tura → natura; et sapientem. quomodo → et sapientem quomodo; dominus lesus → dominus Iesus; inuasisse -neque → inuasisse neque; placatiore autem 15 animo → placatiore autem animo.
Extrabiblical texts: Augustine, Util. cred. (On the Profit of Believing; allusion); Augustine, Spir. et litt. (On the Spirit and the Letter; allusion); Wis 9:15 (Wisdom of Solomon [in RC, EO, ETH canons]; allusion)
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Retract. 1.13 (CSEL 36:65–71; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-retractationes/1-12/#p-1-13). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-retractationes-1-13) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Knöll (CSEL 36, 1902); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.
1.14CSEL 36:71–82
Post hunc librum scripsi adhuc presbyter contra Manicheos de duabus animabus, quarum dicunt unam partem dei esse, alteram de gente tenebrarum, quam non condiderit deus et quae sit deo coaeterna, et has ambas animas, unam bonam, alteram malam, in homine uno esse delirant, istam scilicet malam propriam carnis esse dicentes, quam carnem etiam dicunt gentis esse tenebrarum, illam uero bonam ex aduenticia dei parte, quae cum tenebrarum gente conflixerit, atque utrumque misceri, et omnia quidem bona hominis illi bonae animae, omnia uero mala illi malae animae tribuunt. In hoc libro illud, quod dixi, nullam esse qualemcumque uitam, quae non eo ipso, quo uita est et in quantum omnino uita est, ad summum uitae fontem principiumque pertineat, ita dixi, ut tamquam creatura ad creatorem pertinere intellegatur, non autem de illo esse tamquam pars eius existimetur. Item quod dixi: nusquam scilicet nisi in uoluntate esse peccatum, possunt Pelagiani pro se dictum putare propter paruulos, quos ideo negant habere originale peccatum, quod eis in baptismo remittatur, quia nondum arbitrio uoluntatis utuntur. quasi uero peccatum, quod eos ex Adam dicimus originaliter trahere, id est reatu eius inplicatos, et ab hoc poenae obnoxios detineri, umquam esse potuit nisi ex uoluntate, qua uoluntate commissum est, quando diuini praecepti est facta transgressio. potest etiam putari falsa esse ista sententia, qua diximus nusquam nisi in uoluntate esse peccatum, quia dixit apostolus: si autem, quod nolo, hoc facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod in me habitat peccatum. hoc enim peccatum usque adeo non est in uoluntate, ut dicat: quod nolo, hoc facio. quomodo ergo nusquam est nisi in uoluntate peccatum? sed hoc peccatum, de quo sic est locutus apostolus, ideo peccatum uocatur, quia peccato factum est et poena peccati est, quandoquidem hoc de concupiscentia carnis dicitur, quod aperit in consequentibus dicens: scio, quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum; uelle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non. perfectio quippe boni est, ut nec ipsa concupiscentia peccati sit in homine, cui quidem, quando bene uiuitur, non consentit uoluntas; uerum tamen non perficit bonum, quia inest adhuc in concupiscentia, cui repugnat uoluntas; cuius concupiscentiae reatus in baptismate soluitur, sed infirmitas manet, cui, donec sanetur, omnis fidelis, qui bene proficit, studiosissime reluctatur. peccatum autem, quod nusquam est nisi in uoluntate, illud praecipue intellegendum est, quod iusta damnatio consecuta est - hoc enim per unum hominem intrauit in mundum - quamquam et hoc peccatum, quo consentitur peccati concupiscentiae, non nisi uoluntate committitur. propter hoc et alio loco dixi: non igitur nisi uoluntate peccatur. Itemque alio loco ipsam uoluntatem definiui dicens: uoluntas est animi motus cogente nullo ad aliquid uel non amittendum uel adipiscendum. quod propterea dictum est, ut hac definitione uolens a nolente discerneretur et sic ad illos referretur intentio, qui primi in paradiso fuerunt humano generi origo mali nullo cogente peccando, hoc est libera uoluntate peccando, quia et scientes contra praeceptum fecerunt, et ille temptator suasit, ut hoc fieret, non coegit. nam et qui nesciens peccauit, non incongruenter nolens peccasse dici potest, quamuis et ipse, quod nesciens fecit, uolens tamen fecit; ita nec ipsius esse potuit sine uoluntate peccatum. quae uoluntas utique, sicut definita est, animae motus fuit cogente nullo ad aliquid uel non amittendum uel adipiscendum. quod enim, si noluisset, non fecisset, non coactus est facere. quia uoluit, ergo fecit, etsi non, quia uoluit, peccauit nesciens peccatum esse, quod fecit. ita nec tale peccatum sine uoluntate esse potuit, sed uoluntate facti, non uoluntate peccati, quod tamen factum peccatum fuit; hoc enim factum est, quod fieri non debuit. qui autem sciens peccat, si potest cogenti ad peccatum sine peccato resistere nec tamen facit, utique uolens peccat, quoniam qui potest resistere, non cogitur cedere. qui uero cogenti cupiditati uoluntate resistere non potest et ideo facit contra praecepta iustitiae, iam hoc ita peccatum est, ut sit etiam poena peccati. quapropter peccatum sine uoluntate esse non posse uerissimum est. Itemque definitio peccati, qua diximus: peccatum est uoluntas retinendi uel consequendi, quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere, propterea uerum est, quia id definitum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati. nam quando tale est, ut idem sit et poena peccati, quantum est, quod ualet uoluntas sub dominante cupiditate, nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium? in tantum enim libera est, in quantum liberata est, et in tantum appellatur uoluntas. alioquin tota cupiditas quam uoluntas proprie nuncupanda est, quae non est, sicut Manichei desipiunt, alienae naturae additamentum, sed nostrae uitium, a quo non sanatur nisi gratia saluatoris. quod si quisquam dicit etiam ipsam cupiditatem nihil esse aliud quam uoluntatem, sed uitiosam peccatoque seruientem, non resistendum est nec de uerbis, cum res constet, controuersia facienda. etiam sic enim ostenditur sine uoluntate nullum esse peccatum siue in opere siue in origine. Rursus in eo, quod dixi: iam quaerere coeperam, utrum illud malum genus animarum, antequam bono misceretur, habuisset aliquam uoluntatem. si enim non habebat, sine peccato atque innocens erit et ideo nullo modo malum, cur ergo, inquiunt, peccatum dicitis paruulorum, quorum uoluntatem non tenetis ream? respondetur non eos proprietate uoluntatis, sed origine reos teneri. omnis enim homo terrenus quid est origine nisi Adam? porro autem Adam habebat utique uoluntatem, qua uoluntate cum peccasset, peccatum per eum intrauit in mundum. Itemque in eo, quod dixi: natura esse malae animae nullo modo queunt, si quaeritur, quomodo accipiamus, quod ait apostolus: fuimus et nos natura filii irae sicut et ceteri, respondemus naturam in his uerbis meis me intellegi uoluisse illam, quae proprie natura dicitur, in qua sine uitio creati sumus. nam ista propter originem natura appellatur, quae origo utique habet uitium, quod est contra naturam. et iterum quod dictum est: peccati reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est et insaniae, cur ergo, inquiunt, paruuli tenentur rei? respondetur, quia eius ex origine tenentur, qui non fecit quod facere potuit, diuinum scilicet seruare mandatum. quod autem dixi: illae animae quidquid faciunt, si natura, non uoluntate faciunt, id est si libero et ad faciendum et ad non faciendum motu animi carent, si denique abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur, peccatum earum tenere non possumus, propterea non perturbat de paruulis quaestio, quia ex illius origine rei tenentur, qui uoluntate peccauit, quando libero et ad faciendum et non faciendum motu animi non carebat eique ab opere malo abstinendi summa potestas erat. quod Manichei de tenebrarum gente non dicunt, quam fabulosissime inducunt, eamque naturam semper malam, numquam bonam fuisse contendunt. Illud autem quaeri potest quomodo dixerim: etiamsi sunt animae, quod interim incertum est, corporeis officiis non peccato, sed natura deditae nosque, quamquam sint inferiores, aliqua tamen interiore uicinitate contingunt, non illas ideo malas haberi oportere, quia nos, cum eas sequimur et corporea diligimus, mali sumus, quandoquidem de illis hoc dixi, de quibus apertius loqui coeperam dicens: quamquam etiamsi eisdem concedatur inferiore alio genere animarum nos inlici ad turpia, non inde conficiunt aut illas naturas malas esse aut istas summum bonum — de his enim disputationem usque ad hunc loculum perduxi, ubi dixi: etiamsi sunt animae, quod interim incertum est, corporeis officiis non peccato, sed natura deditae et cetera - quaeri ergo potest, cur dixerim: quod interim incertum, cum prorsus dubitare non debuerim non esse tales animas. sed hoc ideo dixi, quia expertus sum, qui dicerent diabolum et angelos eius bonos esse in genere suo et in ea natura, in qua eos creauit deus ordine proprio tales, quales sunt, sed nobis malum esse, si inliciamur et seducamur ab eis, si autem caueamus eos atque uincamus, decorum atque gloriosum. et hoc qui dicunt, uidentur sibi, ut id probent, de scripturis adhibere idonea testimonia uel illud, quod scriptum est in libro Iob, cum diabolus describeretur: hoc est initium figmenti domini, quod fecit ad inludendum ab angelis suis, uel illud in Psalmo centesimo tertio: draco hic, quem finxisti ad inludendum ei. quam quaestionem, quae non aduersus Manicheos, qui hoc non sentiunt, sed aduersus alios, qui hoc sentiunt, suscipienda esset atque soluenda, pertractare atque enodare tunc nolui, ne librum multo, quam uellem, facerem longiorem, cum uiderem, etiamsi hoc concederetur, tamen debere Manicheos ac iam posse conuinci introducentes insanissimo errore naturam mali aeterno bono coaeternam. ideo ergo dixi: quod interim incertum est, non quod ego inde dubitarem, sed quod inter me et illos, quos ita sapere inueneram, nondum esset ista quaestio dissoluta. quod tamen in aliis longe posterioribus libris meis de Genesi ad litteram secundum scripturas sanctas quanta potui manifestatione dissolui. Alio loco: propterea, inquam, corporea diligendo peccamus; quia spiritalia diligere et iustitia iubemur et natura possumus, et tunc in nostro genere optimi et beati sumus. ubi quaeri potest, cur natura et non gratia possumus dixerim. sed contra Manicheos de natura quaestio uersabatur, et utique id agit gratia, ut ista natura, quod uitiata non potest, possit per eum, qui uenit quaerere et saluum facere, quod perierat, quam tamen gratiam etiam tunc recolens oraui pro familiarissimis meis, qui mortifero illo adhuc tenebantur errore, et dixi: deus magne, deus omnipotens, deus summae bonitatis, quem inuiolabilem et incorruptibilem credi atque intellegi fas est, trina unitas, quam catholica ecclesia colit, supplex oro expertus in me misericordiam tuam, ne homines, cum quibus mihi a pueritia in hominum uictu fuit summa consensio, in tuo cultu a me dissentire permittas. sic utique orans iam fide retinebam non solum conuersos ad deum gratia eius adiuuari, ut proficiant ac perficiantur — ubi adhuc dici potest pro merito conuersionis illorum istam dari gratiam — uerum etiam ut conuertantur ad deum, ad ipsam dei gratiam pertinere, quem pro eis oraui, qui erant ab illo nimis auersi, atque ad illum conuerterentur oraui. Hic liber sic incipit: Opitulante dei misericordia.
After this book, while still a presbyter, I wrote against the Manichaeans On the Two Souls, of which they say that one is a part of God, the other from the race of darkness, which God did not create and which is coeternal with God; and they rave that both these souls, one good and the other evil, are in one man, saying that the evil one belongs properly to the flesh, which flesh they also say is of the race of darkness, but that the good one is from the part of God that came in from outside and fought with the race of darkness, and that both are mixed together; and they attribute all the good in man to the good soul and all the evil to the evil soul. In this book, what I said, that there is no life of any kind which, by the very fact that it is life and insofar as it is life at all, does not belong to the highest fount and principle of life, I said in such a way that it is to be understood as belonging to him as a creature to its creator, not as being thought to be from him as a part of him. Likewise what I said, that sin is nowhere except in the will, the Pelagians can think was said in their favor, because of little children, whom they deny to have original sin to be remitted to them in baptism, because they do not yet use the choice of the will. As if the sin which we say they contract originally from Adam, that is, being entangled in his guilt and on that account held liable to punishment, could ever have existed except from the will, the will by which it was committed when the transgression of the divine commandment took place. This statement, in which we said that sin is nowhere except in the will, can also be thought false because the apostle said: “But if I do what I do not will, it is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me.” For this sin is so far from being in the will that he says, “What I do not will, this I do.” How then is sin nowhere except in the will? But this sin of which the apostle spoke in this way is called sin because it was made by sin and is the punishment of sin, since this is said of the lust of the flesh, as he makes plain in what follows, saying: “I know that good does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh; for to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good is not.” For the accomplishment of the good is that even the lust of sin itself should not be in man; to which indeed, when one lives well, the will does not consent; yet he does not accomplish the good, because there is still in him the lust which the will resists. The guilt of this lust is loosed in baptism, but the weakness remains, against which every believer who is making good progress struggles most zealously until it is healed. But the sin which is nowhere except in the will is to be understood especially as that which just condemnation followed; for this “entered the world through one man”; although this sin too, by which one consents to the lust of sin, is not committed except by the will. For this reason I also said in another place: “One does not sin, then, except by the will.” Likewise in another place I defined the will itself, saying: “Will is a movement of the soul, with nothing compelling it, toward either not losing or obtaining something.” This was said so that by this definition the one who wills might be distinguished from the one who does not will, and so that the attention might thus be directed to those who were first in paradise and became the origin of evil for the human race by sinning with nothing compelling them, that is, by sinning with free will; because they both acted knowingly against the commandment, and the tempter persuaded them to do it, he did not compel them. For one who sinned without knowing can also not unfittingly be said to have sinned unwillingly; although he too, what he did without knowing, nevertheless did willingly; thus not even his sin could exist without the will. That will, certainly, as defined, was a movement of the soul, with nothing compelling it, toward either not losing or obtaining something. For what he would not have done if he had not willed, he was not compelled to do. Because he willed, therefore, he did it, even if he did not sin because he willed, not knowing that what he did was a sin. So not even such a sin could exist without the will, but by the will of the deed, not by the will of the sin; which deed was nevertheless a sin, for what was done was what ought not to have been done. He, however, who sins knowingly, if he can resist without sin what compels him to sin and yet does not do so, certainly sins willingly, since he who can resist is not compelled to yield. But he who cannot resist compelling desire with his will, and therefore acts against the precepts of justice, this is then sin in such a way that it is also the punishment of sin. Therefore it is most true that sin cannot exist without the will. Likewise the definition of sin in which we said, “Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain,” is true for this reason: that what was defined is what is only sin, not what is also the punishment of sin. For when it is such that the same thing is also the punishment of sin, how much can the will do under the domination of desire, except perhaps, if it is devout, to pray for help? For it is free to the extent that it has been set free, and to that extent it is called will. Otherwise the whole of it is properly to be called desire rather than will; which is not, as the Manichaeans foolishly say, an addition from an alien nature, but a fault of our own, from which it is healed only by the grace of the Savior. And if anyone says that desire itself is nothing other than will, but will that is faulty and enslaved to sin, there is no need to resist or to dispute about words when the matter is settled. For even so it is shown that there is no sin without the will, whether in act or in origin. Again, in what I said, I had already begun to ask whether that evil kind of souls had any will before it was mixed with the good. “For if it had none, it will be without sin and innocent, and therefore in no way evil.” Why then, they say, do you speak of the sin of little children, whose will you do not hold guilty? The answer is that they are held guilty not by any will of their own but by their origin. For what is every earthly man by origin but Adam? And Adam certainly had a will, and when he sinned by that will, sin entered the world through him. Likewise in what I said, “Souls can in no way be evil by nature,” if it is asked how we take what the apostle says, “We too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest,” we answer that in these words of mine I meant to be understood the nature which is properly called nature, in which we were created without fault. For that other is called nature because of origin, which origin certainly has a fault, which is contrary to nature. And again, as for what was said, “To hold anyone guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do is the height of injustice and madness”: why then, they say, are little children held guilty? The answer is that they are held guilty by their origin from him who did not do what he could have done, namely, keep the divine commandment. As for what I said, “Whatever those souls do, if they do it by nature and not by will, that is, if they lack a free movement of the soul both for doing and for not doing, if, finally, no power is granted them to abstain from their work, we cannot hold them guilty of sin”: the question about little children does not trouble this, because they are held guilty by their origin from him who sinned by his will, when he did not lack a free movement of the soul both for doing and for not doing, and had the fullest power to abstain from the evil work. This the Manichaeans do not say of the race of darkness, which they bring in most fabulously, and which they contend was a nature always evil, never good. It can be asked, however, how I said: “Even if there are souls (which for the moment is uncertain) given over to bodily functions not by sin but by nature, and which, although they are inferior, touch us by a certain inner proximity, they should not therefore be held evil because we are evil when we follow them and love bodily things.” For I said this of those of whom I had begun to speak more openly, saying: “Although, even if it is granted to them that we are enticed to shameful things by another, inferior kind of souls, they do not conclude from this either that those natures are evil or that these are the highest good.” For I carried the discussion of these as far as this point, where I said: “Even if there are souls (which for the moment is uncertain) given over to bodily functions not by sin but by nature,” and so on. It can be asked, then, why I said, “which for the moment is uncertain,” when I ought not to have doubted at all that there are no such souls. But I said it because I had come across people who said that the devil and his angels are good in their own kind and in the nature in which God created them, in their own order, such as they are; but that it is evil for us if we are enticed and led astray by them, while if we beware of them and overcome them, it is honorable and glorious. And those who say this think that they bring suitable testimonies from the Scriptures to prove it: either what is written in the book of Job, when the devil is being described, “This is the beginning of the Lord's fashioning, which he made to be mocked by his angels,” or that in the hundred and third Psalm: “This dragon, which you formed to mock him.” This question, which would have to be taken up and solved not against the Manichaeans, who do not hold this, but against others who do, I did not wish to treat and unravel at that time, lest I should make the book much longer than I wished, since I saw that, even if this were granted, the Manichaeans could and should already be refuted, who in their most insane error bring in a nature of evil coeternal with the eternal good. So I said “which for the moment is uncertain,” not because I had any doubt about it, but because the question had not yet been settled between me and those whom I had found to think so. This, however, I settled with as much clarity as I could in other, much later books of mine, On Genesis according to the Letter according to the holy Scriptures. In another place I said: “We sin, therefore, by loving bodily things, because we are commanded by justice and are able by nature to love spiritual things, and then we are best and happy in our own kind.” Here it can be asked why I said “we are able by nature” and not “by grace.” But the question against the Manichaeans was about nature; and grace certainly accomplishes this: that this nature can do, through him who came to seek and to save what was lost, what it cannot do as vitiated. Yet remembering this grace even then, I prayed for my closest friends, who were still held in that deadly error, and said: “Great God, almighty God, God of supreme goodness, whom it is right to believe and understand to be inviolable and incorruptible, threefold unity, whom the Catholic Church worships, I humbly pray, having experienced your mercy in myself, that you do not allow those men with whom I have had the closest agreement in human life since boyhood to disagree with me in your worship.” Praying thus, I already held by faith not only that those converted to God are helped by his grace to make progress and be perfected (where it can still be said that this grace is given for the merit of their conversion) but also that their being converted to God belongs to the very grace of God; for I prayed to him for those who were far turned away from him, and prayed that they might be converted to him. This book begins thus: “With the help of God's mercy…”
Rom 7:20 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 7:15 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 7:18 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 5:12 (quotation, high confidence) · Eph 2:3 (quotation, high confidence) · Job 40:19 (40:14 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Ps 104:26 (103:26 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Luke 19:10 (quotation, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Reviewing On the Two Souls, Augustine explains in what sense sin exists only in the will, how infants are guilty by origin from Adam, why he left open the question of souls given to bodily functions, and how even then he prayed for the grace of conversion for his Manichaean friends.
- Latin title: De duabus animabus. Quotations: Rom 7:20, 7:15, 7:18; Rom 5:12; Eph 2:3; Job 40:19 (40:14 LXX/Vulg.; Latin wording following the Greek); Ps 104:26 (103:26 LXX/Vulg.); Luke 19:10.
- The later treatment of the devil's nature: On Genesis according to the Letter, Book 11 (not yet on this site).
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (OCR capital; OCR letter error; OCR line-break error; misplaced punctuation in the digital text; stray mark in the digital text; stray marks in the digital text; stray period in the digital text; stray periods in the digital text): de gente tenebrarum. quam non → de gente tenebrarum, quam non; in uoluntate. esse → in uoluntate esse; sic est.locutus → sic est locutus; illud.. praecipue → illud praecipue; uobmtas → uoluntas; nihil esse - aliud → nihil esse aliud; malae tmimae → malae animae; sicut et ceteri,. → sicut et ceteri,; cur ergo., inquiunt, 'paruuli → cur ergo, inquiunt, paruuli; quidquia → quidquid; si Libero → si libero; non iUas → non illas; dixi,. quia → dixi, quia; caueamus. eos → caueamus eos; quod. fecit → quod fecit; non aduersus. Manicheos → non aduersus Manicheos; Manicheos. ac iam → Manicheos ac iam; optimi et. beati → optimi et beati; ubi -quaeri → ubi quaeri; utique id. agit → utique id agit; perierat., quam → perierat, quam; bonitatis,.. → bonitatis,; pro- Sciant → proficiant; OpitularUe → Opitulante.
Extrabiblical texts: Augustine, Duab. an. (On Two Souls; allusion)
Topics: Heresy
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Retract. 1.14 (CSEL 36:71–82; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-retractationes/1-12/#p-1-14). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Knöll (CSEL 36, 1902); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.