City of God 14.11–14.19
Latin text: Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Latin text: Dombart and Hoffmann, De civitate dei (CSEL 40, 1899-1900), digitized by Open Greek and Latin (csel-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0). Compare: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 1, vol. 2 (1887).
Chapter 14
14.11CSEL 40:26–30
CAPUT XI. De lapsu primi hominis, in quo bene condita natura uitiata est, nec potest nisi a suo auctore reparari. Sed quia Deus cuncta praesciuit et ideo quoque hominem peccaturum ignorare non potuit: secundum id, quod praesciuit adque disposuit, ciuitatem sanctam debemus adserere, non secundum illud, quod in nostram cognitionem peruenire non potuit, quia in Dei dispositione non fuit. Neque enim homo peccato suo diuinum potuit perturbare consilium, quasi Deum quod statuerat mutare conpulerit; cum Deus praesciendo utrumque praeuenerit, id est, et homo, quem bonum ipse creauit, quam malus esset futurus, et quid boni etiam sic de illo esset ipse facturus. Deus enim etsi dicitur statuta mutare (unde tropica locutione in scripturis etiam paenituisse legitur Deum), iuxta id dicitur, quod homo sperauerat uel naturalium causarum ordo gestabat, non iuxta id, quod se Omnipotens facturum esse praesciuerat. Fecit itaque Deus, sicut scriptum est, hominem rectum ac per hoc uoluntatis bonae. Non enim rectus esset bonam non habens uoluntatem. Bona igitur uoluntas opus est Dei; cum ea quippe ab illo factus est homo. Mala uero uoluntas prima, quoniam omnia opera mala praecessit in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua opera quam opus ullum, et ideo mala opera, quia secundum se, non secundum Deum; ut eorum operum tamquam fructuum malorum uoluntas ipsa esset uelut arbor mala aut ipse homo in quantum malae uoluntatis. Porro mala uoluntas quamuis non sit secundum naturam, sed contra naturam, quia uitium est, tamen eius naturae est, cuius est uitium, quod nisi in natura non potest esse; sed in ea, quam creauit ex nihilo, non quam genuit Creator de semet ipso, sicut genuit Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia; quia, etsi de terrae puluere Deus finxit hominem, eadem terra omnisque terrena materies omnino de nihilo est, animamque de nihilo factam dedit corpori, cum factus est homo. Usque adeo autem mala uincuntur a bonis, ut, quamuis sinantur esse ad demonstrandum quam possit et ipsis bene uti iustitia prouidentissima Creatoris, bona tamen sine malis esse possint, sicut Deus ipse uerus et summus, sicut omnis super istum caliginosum aerem caelestis inuisibilis uisibilisque creatura; mala uero sine bonis esse non possint, quoniam naturae, in quibus sunt, in quantum naturae sunt, utique bonae sunt. Detrahitur porro malum non aliqua natura, quae accesserat, uel ulla eius parte sublata, sed ea, quae uitiata ac deprauata fuerat, sanata adque correcta. Arbitrium igitur uoluntatis tunc est uere liberum, cum uitiis peccatisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo; quod amissum proprio uitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Unde Veritas dicit: Si uos Filius liberauerit, tunc uere liberi eritis. Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: Si uos Filius saluos fecerit, tunc uere salui eritis. Inde quippe liberator, unde saluator. Viuebat itaque homo secundum Deum in paradiso et corporali et spiritali. Neque enim erat paradisus corporalis propter corporis bona et propter mentis non erat spiritalis; aut uero erat spiritalis quo per interiores, et non erat corporalis quo per exteriores sensus homo frueretur. Erat plane utrumque propter utrumque. Postea uero quam superbus ille angelus ac per hoc inuidus per eandem superbiam a Deo ad semet ipsum conuersus et quodam quasi tyrannico fastu gaudere subditis quam esse subditus eligens de spiritali paradiso cecidit (de cuius lapsu sociorumque eius, qui ex angelis Dei angeli eius effecti sunt, in libris undecimo et duodecimo huius operis satis, quantum potui, disputaui), malesuada uersutia in hominis sensum serpere adfectans, cui utique stanti, quoniam ipse ceciderat, inuidebat, colubrum in paradiso corporali, ubi cum duobus illis hominibus, masculo et femina, animalia etiam terrestria cetera subdita et innoxia uersabantur, animal scilicet lubricum et tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum, per quem loqueretur, elegit; eoque per angelicam praesentiam praestantioremque naturam spiritali nequitia sibi subiecto et tamquam instrumento abutens fallacia sermocinatus est feminae, a parte scilicet inferiore illius humanae copulae incipiens, ut gradatim perueniret ad totum, non existimans uirum facile credulum nec errando posse decipi, sed dum alieno cedit errori. Sicut enim Aaron erranti populo ad idolum fabricandum non consensit inductus, sed cessit obstrictus, nec Salomonem credibile est errore putasse idolis esse seruiendum, sed blanditiis femineis ad illa sacrilegia fuisse conpulsum: ita credendum est illum uirum suae feminae, uni unum, hominem homini, coniugem coniugi, ad Dei legem transgrediendam non tamquam uerum loquenti credidisse seductum, sed sociali necessitudine paruisse. Non enim frustra dixit apostolus: Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta est, nisi quia illa quod ei serpens locutus est, tamquam uerum esset, accepit, ille autem ab unico noluit consortio dirimi nec in communione peccati; nec ideo minus reus, si sciens prudensque peccauit. Unde et apostolus non ait: Non peccauit\\ sed: Non est seductus; nam utique ipsum ostendit, ubi dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum intrauit in mundum, et paulo post apertius: In similitudine, inquit, praeuaricationis Adae. Hos autem seductos intellegi uoluit, qui id, quod faciunt, non putant esse peccatum; ille autem sciuit. Alioquin quo modo uerum erit: Adam non est seductus? Sed inexpertus diuinae seueritatis in eo falli potuit, ut ueniale crederet esse commissum. Ac per hoc in eo quidem, quo mulier seducta est, non est ille seductus, sed eum fefellit, quo modo fuerat iudicandum quod erat dicturus: Mulier, quam dedisti mecum, ipsa mihi dedit, et manducaui. Quid ergo pluribus? Etsi credendo non sunt ambo decepti, peccando tamen ambo sunt capti et diaboli laqueis inplicati.
Chapter 11. Of the fall of the first man, in which a nature well founded was vitiated and cannot be restored except by its author.
But since God foreknew all things and therefore could not be ignorant that man would sin, we must assert the holy city according to what he foreknew and ordained, not according to what could not come to our knowledge because it was not in God's ordaining. For man could not by his sin disturb the divine counsel, as if he forced God to change what he had decreed; since God by foreknowing anticipated both, that is, both how evil man, whom he himself created good, would become, and what good he himself would even so make from him. For even if God is said to change his decrees (whence, by a figurative expression, God is even read in the Scriptures to have repented), it is said in relation to what man had expected or the order of natural causes carried, not in relation to what the Almighty had foreknown he would do.
God made man, then, as it is written, upright, and therefore of good will. For he would not be upright if he did not have a good will. The good will, then, is the work of God; for man was made by him with it. But the first evil will, since it preceded all evil works in man, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works than any work; and therefore the works were evil because they were according to itself, not according to God; so that the will itself, or man himself in so far as he was of evil will, was like an evil tree of those works as of evil fruits. Further, the evil will, though it is not according to nature but contrary to nature, because it is a fault, yet belongs to that nature whose fault it is, since it cannot exist except in a nature; but in that nature which the Creator created from nothing, not that which he begot from himself, as he begot the Word, through whom all things were made; because, though God fashioned man from the dust of the earth, that earth and all earthly matter are altogether from nothing, and he gave the body a soul made from nothing when man was made. So far are evils overcome by goods that, although they are allowed to exist to show how the most provident justice of the Creator can make good use even of them, yet goods can exist without evils, as God himself, true and supreme, and every heavenly creature, invisible and visible, above this murky air; but evils cannot exist without goods, since the natures in which they are, in so far as they are natures, are certainly good. Further, evil is removed not by taking away some nature that had been added, or any part of it, but by healing and correcting the nature that had been vitiated and depraved. The choice of the will, then, is truly free when it is not the slave of faults and sins. Such it was given by God; and, lost by its own fault, it cannot be restored except by him by whom it could be given. Hence the Truth says: “If the Son sets you free, then you will be truly free.” This is the same as if he said, “If the Son saves you, then you will be truly saved.” For he is liberator for the same reason that he is savior.
Man, then, lived according to God in a paradise both bodily and spiritual. For there was not a bodily paradise for the goods of the body and not a spiritual one for those of the mind; nor was there a spiritual one for man to enjoy through the inner senses and not a bodily one for him to enjoy through the outer. There was plainly both, for both purposes. But after that proud angel, and therefore envious, turned by that same pride from God to himself, and, choosing with a kind of tyrannical arrogance to rejoice in subjects rather than to be a subject, fell from the spiritual paradise (of his fall and that of his companions, who from angels of God became his angels, I have argued sufficiently, as far as I could, in the eleventh and twelfth books of this work), seeking with evil-counseling cunning to creep into man's mind, whom he certainly envied for standing, since he himself had fallen, he chose in the bodily paradise, where with those two human beings, male and female, the other land animals too dwelt, subject and harmless, the serpent, an animal slippery and moving in winding coils, suited to his work, through which to speak. And having subjected it to himself by spiritual wickedness through his angelic presence and more excellent nature, and misusing it as an instrument, he spoke deceitfully with the woman, beginning, that is, with the lower part of that human couple, so as to come by degrees to the whole; not thinking that the man was easily credulous or could be deceived by erring himself, but only by yielding to another's error. For just as Aaron did not consent to the erring people's making of an idol by being persuaded, but yielded under constraint; and as it is not credible that Solomon thought by error that idols should be served, but that he was driven to those sacrileges by the blandishments of women: so it is to be believed that that man, one with one, human with human, spouse with spouse, did not transgress God's law because he believed his woman as though she spoke the truth, being deceived, but that he obeyed her out of the bond of fellowship. For the apostle said not in vain, “Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived,” except because she accepted what the serpent said to her as though it were true, while he was unwilling to be separated from his only companion, even in a fellowship of sin; nor is he less guilty on that account, if he sinned knowingly and wittingly. Hence the apostle does not say, “He did not sin,” but, “He was not deceived”; for he certainly shows that he sinned where he says, “Through one man sin entered into the world,” and a little later more plainly, “In the likeness,” he says, “of the transgression of Adam.” He wanted those to be understood as deceived who do not think that what they do is sin; but he knew. Otherwise how will it be true that “Adam was not deceived”? But, inexperienced in divine severity, he could be mistaken in thinking what he had committed was pardonable. And so he was not deceived in the way the woman was deceived; but he was mistaken as to how that would be judged which he was going to say: “The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me, and I ate.” Why say more? Though they were not both deceived by believing, yet both were caught by sinning and entangled in the snares of the devil.
Gen 6:6 (allusion, high confidence) · Eccl 7:29 (quotation, high confidence) · Matt 7:17 (allusion, medium confidence) · John 1:3 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 2:7 (allusion, high confidence) · John 8:36 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 3:1 (allusion, high confidence) · Exod 32:2 (allusion, high confidence) · 1 Kgs 11:4 (allusion, high confidence) · 1 Tim 2:14 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 5:12 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 5:14 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 3:12 (quotation, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: God foreknew the fall and his good use of it; man was made upright with a good will, lost true freedom by sin and can regain it only through the Son; the devil through the serpent deceived Eve, while Adam sinned knowingly out of attachment to her.
- Sources: Gen 6:6 (God “repented,” a figure of speech); Eccl 7:29; Matt 7:17–18; John 1:3; Gen 2:7; John 8:36; Gen 3:1; Exod 32 (Aaron); 1 Kgs 11:4 (Solomon); 1 Tim 2:14; Rom 5:12, 14; Gen 3:12. Augustine's account of Adam's motive (not deceived but unwilling to be parted from Eve) is given as he states it. A stray mark in the Latin (“Non peccauit\”) does not affect the sense.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (period misread for comma; stray parenthesis): Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: (Si uos → Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: Si uos; uni unum. hominem → uni unum, hominem; Mulier. quam dedisti → Mulier, quam dedisti.
Topics: Marriage
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.11 (CSEL 40:26–30; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-11). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-civitate-dei-14-11) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.12CSEL 40:30–31
CAPUT XII. De qualitate peccati a primis hominibus admissi. Si quem uero mouet, quur aliis peccatis sic natura non mutetur humana, quem ad modum illa duorum primorum hominum praeuaricatione mutata est, ut tantae corruptioni, quantam uidemus adque sentimus, et per hanc subiaceret et morti ac tot et tantis tamque inter se contrariis perturbaretur et fluctuaret adfectibus, qualis in paradiso ante peccatum, licet in corpore animali esset, utique non fuit — si quis hoc mouetur, ut dixi, non ideo debet existimare leue ac paruum illud fuisse commissum, quia in esca factum est, non quidem mala nec noxia, nisi quia prohibita; neque enim quidquam mali Deus in illo tantae felicitatis loco crearet adque plantaret. Sed oboedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae uirtus in creatura rationali mater quodam modo est omnium custosque uirtutum; quando quidem ita facta est, ut ei subditam esse sit utile; perniciosum autem suam, non eius a quo creata est facere uoluntatem. Hoc itaque de uno cibi genere non edendo, ubi aliorum tanta copia subiacebat, tam leue praeceptum ad obseruandum, tam breue ad memoria retinendum, ubi praesertim nondum uoluntati cupiditas resistebat, quod de poena transgressionis postea subsecutum est, tanto maiore iniustitia uiolatum est, quanto faciliore posset obseruantia custodiri.
Chapter 12. Of the nature of the sin committed by the first human beings.
But if anyone is troubled why human nature is not changed by other sins as it was changed by that transgression of the first two human beings, so that it became subject to so great a corruption as we see and feel, and through it to death, and was disturbed and tossed about by so many and so great and so mutually contrary affections, such as it certainly was not in paradise before sin, even though it was in an animal body; if anyone is troubled by this, as I said, he must not think that what was committed was light and small because it was done concerning food, food not evil or harmful except because it was forbidden; for God would not create and plant anything evil in that place of so great happiness. But obedience was commended in the command, which virtue in a rational creature is in a way the mother and guardian of all virtues; since it was so made that it is profitable to it to be subject, but ruinous to do its own will and not the will of him by whom it was created. This command, then, not to eat of one kind of food, where so great an abundance of others lay at hand, so light to observe, so brief to keep in memory, especially when desire did not yet resist the will, which came afterward from the punishment of the transgression, was violated with an injustice the greater as it could have been kept with an easier observance.
Gen 2:17 (allusion, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: The first sin, though about food, was grave because it violated obedience, the mother of virtues, in a command that was supremely easy to keep before desire resisted the will.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (period misread for comma): Si quem uero mouet. quur → Si quem uero mouet, quur; natura non mutetur humana. quem → natura non mutetur humana, quem.
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.12 (CSEL 40:30–31; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-12). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-civitate-dei-14-12) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.13CSEL 40:31–34
CAPUT XIII. Quod in praeuaricatione Adae opus malum uoluntas praecesserit mala. In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inoboedientiam laberentur. Non enim ad malum opus perueniretur, nisi praecessisset uoluntas mala. Porro malae uoluntatis initium quae potuit esse nisi superbia? Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est. Quid est autem superbia nisi peruersae celsitudinis adpetitus? Peruersa enim est celsitudo deserto eo, cui debet animus inhaerere, principio sibi quodam modo fieri adque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet. Sibi uero ita placet, cum ab illo bono inmutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit quam ipse sibi. Spontaneus est autem iste defectus, quoniam, si uoluntas in amore superioris inmutabilis boni, a quo inlustrabatur ut uideret et accendebatur ut amaret, stabilis permaneret, non inde ad sibi placendum auerteretur et ex hoc tenebresceret et frigesceret, ut uel illa crederet uerum dixisse serpentem, uel ille Dei mandato uxoris praeponeret uoluntatem putaretque se uenialiter transgressorem esse praecepti, si uitae suae sociam non desereret etiam in societate peccati. Non ergo malum opus factum est, id est illa transgressio ut cibo prohibito uescerentur, nisi ab eis qui iam mali erant. Neque enim fieret ille fructus malus nisi ab arbore mala. Ut autem esset arbor mala, contra naturam factum est, quia nisi uitio uoluntatis, quod contra naturam est, non utique fieret. Sed uitio deprauari nisi ex nihilo facta natura non posset. Ac per hoc ut natura sit, ex eo habet quod a Deo facta est; ut autem ab eo quod est deficiat, ex hoc quod de nihilo facta est. Nec sic defecit homo, ut omnino nihil esset, sed ut inclinatus ad se ipsum minus esset, quam erat, cum ei qui summe est inhaerebat. Relicto itaque Deo esse in semet ipso, hoc est sibi placere, non iam nihil esse est, sed nihilo propinquare. Unde superbi secundum scripturas sanctas alio nomine appellantur sibi placentes. Bonum est enim sursum habere cor; non tamen ad se ipsum, quod est superbiae, sed ad Dominum, quod est oboedientiae, quae nisi humilium non potest esse. Est igitur aliquid humilitatis miro modo quod sursum faciat cor, et est aliquid elationis quod deorsum faciat cor. Hoc quidem quasi contrarium uidetur, ut elatio sit deorsum et humilitas sursum. Sed pia humilitas facit subditum superiori; nihil est autem superius Deo; et ideo exaltat humilitas, quae facit subditum Deo. Elatio autem, quae in uitio est, eo ipso respuit subiectionem et cadit ab illo, quo non est quidquam superius, et ex hoc erit inferius et fit quod scriptum est: Deiecisti eos, cum extollerentur. Non enim ait: Cum elati fuissent\\ ut prius extollerentur et postea deicerentur; sed cum extollerentur, tunc deiecti sunt. Ipsum quippe extolli iam deici est. Quapropter quod nunc in ciuitate Dei et ciuitati Dei in hoc peregrinanti saeculo maxime commendatur humilitas et in eius rege, qui est Christus, maxime praedicatur contrariumque huic uirtuti elationis uitium in eius aduersario, qui est diabolus, maxime dominari sacris litteris edocetur: profecto ista est magna differentia, qua ciuitas, unde loquimur, utraque discernitur, una scilicet societas piorum hominum, altera inpiorum, singula quaeque cum angelis ad se pertinentibus, in quibus praecessit hac amor Dei, hac amor sui. Manifesto ergo apertoque peccato, ubi factum est quod Deus fieri prohibuerat, diabolus hominem non cepisset, nisi iam ille sibi ipsi placere coepisset. Hinc enim et delectauit quod dictum est: Eritis sicut di. Quod melius esse possent summo ueroque principio cohaerendo per oboedientiam, non suum sibi existendo principium per superbiam. Di enim creati non sua ueritate, sed Dei ueri participatione sunt di. Plus autem adpetendo minus est, qui, dum sibi sufficere deligit, ab illo, qui ei uere sufficit, deficit. Illud itaque malum, quo, cum sibi homo placet, tamquam sit et ipse lumen, auertitur ab eo lumine, quod ei si placeat et ipse fit lumen — illud, inquam, malum praecessit in abdito, ut sequeretur hoc malum quod perpetratum est in aperto. Verum est enim quod scriptum est: Ante ruinam exaltatur cor et ante gloriam humiliatur. Illa prorsus ruina, quae fit in occulto, praecedit ruinam, quae fit in manifesto, dum illa ruina esse non putatur. Quis enim exaltationem ruinam putat, cum iam ibi sit defectus, quo est relictus Excelsus? Quis autem ruinam esse non uideat, quando fit mandati euidens adque indubitata transgressio? Propter hoc Deus illud prohibuit, quod cum esset admissum, nulla defendi posset imaginatione iustitiae. Et audeo dicere superbis esse utile cadere in aliquod apertum manifestumque peccatum, unde sibi displiceant, qui iam sibi placendo ceciderant. Salubrius enim Petrus sibi displicuit, quando fleuit, quam sibi placuit, quando praesumsit. Hoc dicit et sacer psalmus: Inple facies eorum ignominia, et quaerent nomen tuum, Domine, id est, ut tu eis placeas quaerentibus nomen tuum, qui sibi placuerant quaerendo suum.
Chapter 13. That in Adam's transgression an evil will preceded the evil work.
They began to be evil in secret, so as to slip into open disobedience. For no one would come to an evil work unless an evil will had gone before. And what could be the beginning of an evil will but pride? For “pride is the beginning of all sin.” And what is pride but the craving for a perverse exaltation? For it is a perverse exaltation to forsake the principle to which the mind ought to cleave and to become and be, in a way, a principle to oneself. This happens when it is too pleased with itself. And it is so pleased with itself when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to have pleased it more than it pleased itself. This falling away is voluntary; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of the higher, unchangeable good, by which it was enlightened to see and kindled to love, it would not have turned away from it to please itself, and from this grown dark and cold, so that either she would believe the serpent had spoken the truth, or he would set his wife's will above God's command and think he was a pardonable transgressor of the precept if he did not forsake the companion of his life even in the fellowship of sin. The evil work, then, that is, that transgression of eating the forbidden food, was done only by those who were already evil. For that evil fruit would not have come except from an evil tree. But that the tree was evil came about contrary to nature, because it would certainly not have happened except by a fault of the will, which is contrary to nature. But only a nature made from nothing could be depraved by a fault. And so, that it is a nature, it has from being made by God; but that it falls away from what it is, from being made from nothing. Nor did man fall away so as to be nothing at all, but so as, turned toward himself, to be less than he was when he cleaved to him who supremely is. To forsake God, then, and be in oneself, that is, to please oneself, is not yet to be nothing, but to draw near to nothing. Hence the proud, according to the holy Scriptures, are called by another name, self-pleasers.
For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to oneself, which belongs to pride, but to the Lord, which belongs to obedience, which can only be of the humble. There is, then, something in humility which in a wonderful way lifts the heart up, and something in exaltation which casts the heart down. This indeed seems a kind of contradiction, that exaltation should be downward and humility upward. But godly humility makes one subject to what is higher; and nothing is higher than God; and therefore humility, which makes one subject to God, exalts. But exaltation, which is in fault, by that very fact spurns subjection and falls from him than whom nothing is higher, and thereby will be lower; and there comes to pass what is written: “You cast them down when they were being lifted up.” For it does not say, “when they had been lifted up,” as if they were first lifted up and afterward cast down; but when they were being lifted up, then they were cast down. For to be lifted up is itself already to be cast down. Therefore, since now in the city of God, and to the city of God on pilgrimage in this age, humility is most highly commended, and is most highly proclaimed in its king, who is Christ, and the contrary fault of exaltation is taught by the sacred writings to rule most in his adversary, who is the devil: this is surely the great difference by which the two cities of which we speak are distinguished, the one a society of godly men, the other of the ungodly, each with the angels that belong to it, in whom there went before, on the one side, the love of God, on the other, the love of self.
The devil, then, would not have caught man in the manifest and open sin, where what God had forbidden to be done was done, unless man had already begun to please himself. For this is why he was also delighted by what was said: “You will be like gods.” They could have been this better by cleaving to the supreme and true principle through obedience, not by being their own principle through pride. For created gods are gods not by their own truth but by participation in the true God. But by seeking more one becomes less, when, choosing to be sufficient to oneself, one falls away from him who is truly sufficient. That evil, then, by which man, pleasing himself as if he were himself light, is turned away from that light which, if it pleased him, would make him light too, that evil, I say, went before in secret, so that this evil which was committed in the open might follow. For what is written is true: “Before a fall the heart is exalted, and before glory it is humbled.” That fall which happens in secret precedes the fall which happens openly, while the former is not thought to be a fall. For who thinks exaltation a fall, though there is already there the falling away by which the Most High has been forsaken? But who does not see that it is a fall when there is an evident and undoubted transgression of the command? For this reason God forbade that which, once it was committed, could be defended by no pretense of righteousness. And I dare to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, so that they may be displeased with themselves, who had already fallen by pleasing themselves. For Peter was more healthily displeased with himself when he wept than pleased with himself when he presumed. The sacred psalm too says this: “Fill their faces with shame, and they will seek your name, O Lord”; that is, that you may please them as they seek your name, who had pleased themselves by seeking their own.
2 Pet 2:10 (allusion, medium confidence) · Matt 7:18 (allusion, medium confidence) · Ps 73:18 (72:18 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 3:5 (quotation, high confidence) · Prov 18:12 (quotation, high confidence) · Matt 26:75 (allusion, high confidence) · Ps 83:16 (82:17 LXX) (quotation, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: The evil deed was preceded by an evil will, whose beginning was pride, a self-pleasing turning from God; humility lifts up and pride casts down, and love of God and love of self distinguish the two cities.
- Sources: Sir 10:13 (“pride is the beginning of all sin”); 2 Pet 2:10 (Vulgate “sibi placentes,” self-pleasers); Matt 7:18; Ps 73:18 (LXX 72:18); Gen 3:5; Prov 18:12; Matt 26:75; Ps 83:16 (LXX 82:17). “Lift up your hearts” (sursum cor) alludes to the eucharistic liturgy's Sursum corda.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (OCR slip; stray period): ad malum. opus → ad malum opus; centra naturam → contra naturam; humilitas et. in → humilitas et in.
Extrabiblical texts: Sir 10:13 (Sirach [in RC, EO, ETH canons]; quotation)
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.13 (CSEL 40:31–34; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-13). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.14CSEL 40:34
CAPUT XIIII. De superbia transgressoris, quae ipsa fuit transgressione deterior. Sed est peior damnabiliorque superbia, qua etiam in peccatis manifestis suffugium excusationis inquiritur; sicut illi primi homines, quorum et illa dixit: Serpens seduxit me, et manducaui, et ille dixit: Mulier, quam dedisti mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, et edi. Nusquam hic sonat petitio ueniae, nusquam inploratio medicinae. Nam licet isti non sicut Cain quod commiserunt negent, adhuc tamen superbia in aliud quaerit referre quod perperam fecit: superbia mulieris in serpentem, superbia uiri in mulierem. Sed accusatio potius quam excusatio uera est, ubi mandati diuini est aperta transgressio. Neque enim hoc propterea non fecerunt, quia id mulier serpente suadente, uir muliere inpertiente commisit, quasi quidquam Deo, cui uel crederetur uel cederetur, anteponendam fuit.
Chapter 14. Of the pride of the transgressor, which was worse than the transgression itself.
But worse and more damnable is the pride by which a refuge of excuse is sought even in manifest sins; as with those first human beings, of whom she said, “The serpent deceived me, and I ate,” and he said, “The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me from the tree, and I ate.” Nowhere here is there the sound of a plea for pardon, nowhere an entreaty for healing. For although these do not deny what they committed, as Cain did, yet pride still seeks to refer to another what it did wrongly: the woman's pride to the serpent, the man's pride to the woman. But where there is an open transgression of a divine command, this is an accusation rather than a true excuse. For they did not fail to do it because the woman committed it at the serpent's persuasion and the man at the woman's offering, as if anything were to be preferred to God, whether to be believed or to be yielded to.
Gen 3:13 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 3:12 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 4:9 (allusion, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Worse than the sin was Adam's and Eve's proud excuse-making, blaming the serpent and the woman instead of seeking pardon.
- Gen 3:12–13; Gen 4:9 (Cain's denial).
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (comma misread for period): transgressione deterior, Sed → transgressione deterior. Sed.
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.14 (CSEL 40:34; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-14). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.15CSEL 40:34–37
CAPUT XV. De iustitia retributionis, quam primi homines pro sua inoboedientia receperunt. Quia ergo contemtus est Deus iubens, qui creauerat, qui ad suam imaginem fecerat, qui ceteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat, sed uno breuissimo adque leuissimo ad oboedientiae salubritatem adminiculauerat, quo eam creaturam, cui libera seruitus expediret, se esse Dominum commonebat: iusta damnatio subsecuta est, talisque damnatio, ut homo, qui custodiendo mandatum futurus fuerat etiam carne spiritalis, fieret etiam mente carnalis et, qui sua superbia sibi placuerat, Dei iustitia sibi donaretur; nec sic, ut in sua esset omnimodis potestate, sed a se ipse quoque dissentiens sub illo, cui peccando consensit, pro libertate, quam concupiuit, duram miseramque ageret seruitutem, mortuus spiritu uolens et corpore moriturus inuitus, desertor aeternae uitae etiam aeterna, nisi gratia liberaret, morte damnatus. Quisquis huius modi damnationem uel nimiam uel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas. Sicut enim Abrahae non inmerito magna oboedientia praedicatur, quia, ut occideret filium, res difficillima est imperata: ita in paradiso tanto maior inoboedientia fuit, quanto id, quod praeceptum est, nullius difficultatis fuit. Et sicut oboedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est oboediens usque ad mortem: ita inoboedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inoboediens usque ad mortem. Ubi enim magna est inoboedientiae poena proposita et res a Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non oboedire in re facili et tantae potestatis imperio et tanto terrente supplicio? Denique, ut breuiter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inoboedientia retributa est? Nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi aduersus eum ipsum inoboedientia eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest uelit? In paradiso enim etiamsi non omnia poterat ante peccatum, quidquid tamen non poterat, non nolebat, et ideo poterat omnia quae uolebat; nunc uero sicut in eius stirpe cognoscimus et diuina scriptura testatur: Homo uanitati similis factus est. Quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest uelit, dum sibi ipse, id est uoluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat? Ipso namque inuito et animus plerumque turbatur et caro dolet et ueterescit et moritur, et quidquid aliud patimur, quod non pateremur inuiti, si uoluntati nostrae nostra natura omni modo adque ex omnibus partibus oboediret. At enim aliquid caro patitur, quo seruire non sinitur. Quid interest unde, dum tamen per iustitiam dominantis Dei, cui subditi seruire noluimus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non seruiendo molesta sit, quamuis nos Deo non seruiendo molesti nobis potuerimus esse, non illi? Neque enim sic ille nostro, ut nos seruitio corporis indigemus, et ideo nostra est quod recipimus, non illius poena quod fecimus. Dolores porro, qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne et ex carne. Quid enim caro per se ipsam sine anima uel dolet uel concupiscit? Sed quod concupiscere caro dicitur uel dolere, aut ipse homo est, sicut disseruimus, aut aliquid animae, quod carnis adficit passio, uel aspera, ut faciat dolorem, uel lenis, ut uoluptatem. Sed dolor carnis tantum modo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio, sicut animi dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. Sed tristitiam plerumque praecedit metus, qui et ipse in anima est, non in carne. Dolorem autem carnis non praecedit ullus quasi metus carnis, qui ante dolorem in carne sentiatur. Voluptatem uero praecedit adpetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis. Nam et ipsam iram nihil aliud esse quam ulciscendi libidinem ueteres definierunt; quamuis nonnumquam homo, ubi uindictae nullus est sensus, etiam rebus inanimis irascatur, et male scribentem stilum conlidat uel calamum frangat iratus. Verum et ista licet inrationabilior, tamen quaedam ulciscendi libido est, ut nescio qua, ut ita dixerim, quasi umbra retributionis, ut qui male faciunt, mala patiantur. Est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur. Sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent. Quis enim facile dixerit, quid uocetur libido dominandi, quam tamen plurimum ualere in tyrannorum animis etiam ciuilia bella testantur?
Chapter 15. Of the justice of the retribution which the first human beings received for their disobedience.
Since, then, God was despised when he commanded, he who had created them, who had made them in his own image, who had set them over the other animals, who had placed them in paradise, who had supplied them with abundance of all things and of well-being, who had burdened them with commands neither many nor great nor difficult, but had supported them in the wholesomeness of obedience with a single one, very brief and very light, by which he reminded that creature, for whom free service was profitable, that he was Lord: a just condemnation followed, and such a condemnation that man, who by keeping the command would have been spiritual even in the flesh, became carnal even in mind; and he who in his pride had pleased himself was, by God's justice, given over to himself; yet not so as to be in every way in his own power, but, at odds with himself too, he led, under him to whom he consented by sinning, instead of the freedom he desired, a hard and wretched slavery; dead in spirit by his own will, and destined to die in body against his will; a deserter of eternal life, condemned also to eternal death, unless grace should set him free. Whoever thinks such a condemnation either excessive or unjust certainly does not know how to measure how great was the iniquity in sinning where there was so great an ease of not sinning. For as Abraham's great obedience is not undeservedly proclaimed, because a most difficult thing was commanded, to kill his son, so in paradise the disobedience was the greater as what was commanded was of no difficulty. And as the obedience of the second man is the more to be proclaimed in that he became obedient to death, so the disobedience of the first man is the more detestable in that he became disobedient to death. For where a great punishment of disobedience has been set forth and an easy thing commanded by the Creator, who can sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter, both the command of so great a power and so great a terrifying punishment?
In short, to say it briefly, in the punishment of that sin what was the retribution for disobedience but disobedience? For what other misery of man is there but his own disobedience against himself, so that, because he would not what he could, he wills what he cannot? For in paradise, even if he could not do all things before sin, yet whatever he could not do he did not will, and therefore he could do all that he willed; but now, as we recognize in his stock and as divine Scripture testifies, “Man has become like vanity.” For who can count how many things he wills that he cannot do, while he himself does not obey himself, that is, while his very mind, and his flesh which is lower, do not obey his will? For against his will the mind is very often disturbed and the flesh feels pain, grows old, and dies, and whatever else we suffer which we would not suffer against our will if our nature obeyed our will in every way and in all its parts. But, it is said, the flesh suffers something by which it is not allowed to serve. What does it matter from where, so long as, by the justice of God our ruler, whom we would not serve as subjects, our flesh, which had been subject, is troublesome to us by not serving, although we, by not serving God, could be troublesome to ourselves, not to him? For he does not need our service as we need the service of the body; and therefore what we receive is our punishment, not his that we did.
Further, the pains which are called pains of the flesh are pains of the soul in the flesh and from the flesh. For what does the flesh by itself, without the soul, feel pain at or desire? But when the flesh is said to desire or to feel pain, it is either man himself, as we have argued, or some part of the soul which the passion of the flesh affects, either harsh, so as to cause pain, or gentle, so as to cause pleasure. But pain of the flesh is only an offense to the soul from the flesh and a kind of dissent from its passion, just as the pain of the mind, which is called sadness, is a dissent from things that have happened to us against our will. But sadness is usually preceded by fear, which too is in the soul, not in the flesh. But no fear of the flesh, as it were, precedes the pain of the flesh, to be felt in the flesh before the pain. Pleasure, however, is preceded by a certain craving, which is felt in the flesh as its desire, such as hunger and thirst and that which in the genitals is more usually called lust, though this is the general word for every desire. For the ancients defined even anger as nothing else than the lust for revenge; although sometimes a man, where there is no sense of vengeance, is angry even with inanimate things, and in anger dashes down a pen that writes badly or breaks a reed. But even this, though more irrational, is still a kind of lust for revenge, and I know not what, so to speak, shadow of retribution, that those who do evil should suffer evil. There is, then, a lust for revenge, which is called anger; there is a lust for having money, which is called avarice; there is a lust for winning at any cost, which is called obstinacy; there is a lust for glorying, which is called boasting. There are many and various lusts, some of which have their own names, while some do not. For who could easily say what the lust for ruling is called, which nevertheless is very powerful in the minds of tyrants, as civil wars too bear witness?
Gen 1:26 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 1:28 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 2:8 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 2:17 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 22:2 (allusion, high confidence) · Phil 2:8 (allusion, high confidence) · Ps 144:4 (143:4 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 7:15 (allusion, medium confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: The just penalty of disobedience was disobedience: man, given over to himself, cannot command his own mind and flesh; pains and pleasures of the flesh belong to the soul, and “lust” (libido) is the general name for every craving, though used chiefly of sexual desire.
- Terms: in Books 12–14 libido is rendered “lust” throughout, both in the general sense Augustine defines here (any craving, e.g. lust for revenge, for ruling) and in its narrower sense of sexual desire; concupiscentia is “concupiscence” and cupiditas “desire.” Sources: Gen 1:26–28; Gen 2:8, 16–17; Gen 22 (Abraham); Phil 2:8; Ps 144:4 (LXX 143:4); Rom 7:15–23 in view. The definition of anger as lust for revenge is in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.11 and 4.21.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (OCR slip; split word; stray period): tanto maior inboedientia → tanto maior inoboedientia; prae-. ceptum → praeceptum; diurna scriptura → diuina scriptura; ab eius passione. dissensio → ab eius passione dissensio.
Extrabiblical texts: Cicero, Tusc. 4.21 (Cicero; allusion)
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.15 (CSEL 40:34–37; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-15). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.16CSEL 40:37–38
CAPUT XVI. De libidinis malo, cuius nomen cum multis uitiis congruat, proprie tamen motibus obsceni caloris adscribitur. Cum igitur sint multarum libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes corporis excitantur. Haec autem sibi non solum totum corpus nec solum extrinsecus, uerum etiam intrinsecus uindicat totumque commouet hominem animi simul adfectu cum carnis adpetitu coniuncto adque permixto, ut ea uoluptas sequatur, qua maior in corporis uoluptatibus nulla est; ita ut momento ipso temporis, quo ad eius peruenitur extremum, paene omnis acies et quasi uigilia cogitationis obruatur. Quis autem amicus sapientiae sanctorumque gaudiorum coniugalem agens uitam, sed, sicut apostolus monuit, sciens suum uas possidere in sanctificatione et honore, non in morbo desiderii, sicut et gentes, quae ignorant Deum, non mallet, si posset, sine hac libidine filios procreare, ut etiam in hoc serendae prolis officio sic eius menti ea, quae ad hoc opus creata sunt, quem ad modum cetera suis quaeque operibus distributa membra seruirent, nutu uoluntatis acta, non aestu libidinis incitata? Sed neque ipsi amatores huius uoluptatis siue ad concubitus coniugales siue ad inmunditias flagitiorum cum uoluerint commouentur; sed aliquando inportunus est ille motus poscente nullo, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferueat, friget in corpore; adque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi uoluntati, uerum etiam lasciuiendi libidini libido non seruit, et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti aduersetur, nonnumquam et aduersus se ipsam diuiditur commotoque animo in commouendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur.
Chapter 16. Of the evil of lust, whose name fits many faults, but is properly assigned to the motions of obscene heat.
Although, then, there are lusts for many things, yet when lust is spoken of without adding what it is lust for, there usually occurs to the mind hardly anything but that by which the shameful parts of the body are aroused. And this lust claims for itself not only the whole body, nor only from without, but also from within, and moves the whole man, the affection of the mind being joined and mingled with the craving of the flesh, so that there follows that pleasure than which none is greater among the pleasures of the body; so much so that at the very moment of time when its climax is reached, almost all the sharpness and, as it were, the watchfulness of thought is overwhelmed. But what friend of wisdom and of holy joys, living a married life, yet, as the apostle warned, knowing how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor, not in the disease of desire, like the gentiles who do not know God, would not prefer, if he could, to beget children without this lust, so that even in this duty of sowing offspring the members created for this work might serve his mind, as the other members serve, each allotted to its own works, set in motion by the bidding of the will, not stirred by the heat of lust? But not even the lovers of this pleasure themselves are aroused when they will, whether for conjugal intercourse or for the impurities of shameful acts; but sometimes that motion is importunate when no one asks for it, and sometimes it deserts one who longs for it, and while concupiscence burns in the mind, it is cold in the body; and so, in a wonderful way, lust does not serve not only the will to beget but even the lust to wanton; and though for the most part it wholly opposes the mind that restrains it, sometimes it is divided even against itself, and, having stirred the mind, does not follow itself in stirring the body.
1 Thess 4:4 (quotation, high confidence) · 1 Thess 4:5 (quotation, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Lust, in its narrow sense of sexual arousal, overwhelms the mind and does not obey the will, so that a wise married person would prefer to beget children without it if he could.
- 1 Thess 4:4–5 quoted. Augustine's claim that a wise spouse would prefer procreation without lust is his own view, stated here without comment. On the terms lust and concupiscence see 14.15.
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.16 (CSEL 40:37–38; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-16). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.17CSEL 40:38–40
CAPUT XVII. De nuditate primorum hominum, quam post peccatum turpem pudendamque uiderunt. Merito huius libidinis maxime pudet, merito et ipsa membra, quae suo quodam, ut ita dixerim, iure, non omni modo ad arbitrium nostrum mouet aut non mouet, pudenda dicuntur, quod ante peccatum hominis non fuerunt. Nam sicut scriptum est: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur, non quod eis sua nuditas esset incognita, sed turpis nuditas nondum erat, quia nondum libido membra illa praeter arbitrium commouebat, nondum ad hominis inoboedientiam redarguendam sua inoboedientia caro quodam modo testimonium perhibebat. Neque enim caeci creati erant, ut inperitum uulgus opinatur; quando quidem et ille uidit animalia, quibus nomina inposuit, et de illa legitur: Vidit mulier quia bonum lignum in escam et quia placet oculis ad uidendum. Patebant ergo oculi eorum, sed ad hoc non erant aperti, hoc est non adtenti, ut cognoscerent quid eis indumento gratiae praestaretur, quando membra eorum uoluntati repugnare nesciebant. Qua gratia remota, ut poena reciproca inoboedientia plecteretur, extitit in motu corporis quaedam inpudens nouitas, unde esset indecens nuditas, et fecit adtentos reddiditque confusos. Hinc est quod, postea quam mandatum Dei aperta transgressione uiolarunt, scriptum est de illis: Et aperti sunt oculi amborum et agnouerunt quia nudi erant, et consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria. Aperti sunt, inquit, oculi amborum, non ad uidendum, nam et antea uidebant, sed ad discernendum inter bonum quod amiserant et malum quo ceciderant. Unde et ipsum lignum, eo quod istam faceret dignoscentiam, si ad uescendum contra uetitum tangeretur, ex ea re nomen accepit, ut appellaretur lignum sciendi boni et mali. Experta enim morbi molestia euidentior fit etiam iucunditas sanitatis. Cognouerunt ergo quia nudi erant, nudati scilicet ea gratia, qua fiebat ut nuditas corporis nulla eos lege peccati menti eorum repugnante confunderet. Hoc itaque cognouerunt, quod felicius ignorarent, si Deo credentes et oboedientes non committerent, quod eos cogeret experiri infidelitas et inoboedientia quid noceret. Proinde confusi inoboedientia carnis suae, tamquam teste poena inoboedientiae suae, consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria, id est succinctoria genitalium. Nam quidam interpretes succinctoria posuerunt. Porro autem campestria latinum quidem uerbum est, sed ex eo dictum, quod iuuenes, qui nudi exercebantur in campo, pudenda operiebant; unde qui ita succincti sunt, campestratos uulgus appellat. Quod itaque aduersus damnatam culpa inoboedientiae uoluntatem libido inoboedienter mouebat, uerecundia pudenter tegebat. Ex hoc omnes gentes, quoniam ab illa stirpe procreatae sunt, usque adeo tenent insitum pudenda uelare, ut quidam barbari illas corporis partes nec in balneis nudas habeant, sed cum earum tegimentis lauent. Per opacas quoque Indiae solitudines, cum quidam nudi philosophentur, unde gymnosophistae nominantur, adhibent tamen genitalibus tegmina, quibus per cetera membrorum carent.
Chapter 17. Of the nakedness of the first human beings, which after sin they saw to be shameful and to be ashamed of.
Rightly is there shame above all at this lust, and rightly are those members too, which it moves or does not move by its own, so to speak, right, not in every way at our choice, called shameful, which they were not before man's sin. For, as it is written, “They were naked and were not confounded,” not that their nakedness was unknown to them, but nakedness was not yet shameful, because lust did not yet move those members beyond the choice of the will, and the flesh did not yet, by its own disobedience, in some way bear witness to convict the disobedience of man. For they had not been created blind, as the ignorant crowd thinks; since he saw the animals to which he gave names, and of her we read, “The woman saw that the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eyes to look at.” Their eyes, then, were open, but they were not opened to this, that is, not attentive, so as to know what was provided them by the garment of grace, when their members did not know how to resist the will. When this grace was withdrawn, so that disobedience might be punished by a penalty in kind, there arose in the motion of the body a certain shameless novelty, from which nakedness became indecent; and it made them attentive and left them confounded. Hence it is that, after they had violated God's command by open transgression, it is written of them: “And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked, and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons.” The eyes of both, it says, were opened, not to see, for they saw before too, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. Hence the tree itself too, because it would produce this discernment if it were touched for eating against the prohibition, took its name from this, so as to be called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. For when the trouble of disease has been experienced, the pleasantness of health too becomes more evident. They knew, then, that they were naked, stripped, that is, of that grace by which it came about that the nakedness of the body did not confound them, since no law of sin opposed their mind. So they came to know what they would more happily have been ignorant of, if, believing and obeying God, they had not committed what forced them to experience what harm unbelief and disobedience do. Accordingly, confounded by the disobedience of their flesh, as by a penalty bearing witness to their own disobedience, they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves campestria, that is, coverings for the genitals. For some translators have put succinctoria (girdles). Campestria is indeed a Latin word, but it comes from this, that the young men who exercised naked on the campus (field) covered their shameful parts; hence those who are so girded the common people call campestrati. So what lust was disobediently moving against the will condemned for the guilt of disobedience, modesty modestly covered. From this all nations, since they have been begotten from that stock, hold it so ingrained to veil the shameful parts that some barbarians do not have those parts of the body naked even in the baths, but bathe with their coverings on. In the shady solitudes of India too, although certain men philosophize naked, whence they are called gymnosophists, they nevertheless put coverings on their genitals, which they lack on their other members.
Gen 2:25 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 2:20 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 3:6 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 3:7 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 2:9 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 7:23 (allusion, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Adam and Eve were not blind before the fall; their eyes were opened to the shame of the flesh's new disobedience, a penalty in kind, so they covered their genitals, as all nations still do.
- Sources: Gen 2:25; Gen 2:19–20; Gen 3:6–7; Gen 2:9; Rom 7:23 (the law of sin). Campestria were loincloths worn for exercise on the Campus Martius.
Topics: Marriage
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.17 (CSEL 40:38–40; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-17). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.18CSEL 40:40–42
CAPUT XVIII. De pudore concubitus non solum uulgaris, sed etiam coniugalis. Opus uero ipsum, quod libidine tali peragitur, non solum in quibusque stupris, ubi latebrae ad subterfugienda humana iudicia requiruntur, uerum etiam in usu scortorum, quam terrena ciuitas licitam turpitudinem fecit, quamuis id agatur, quod eius ciuitatis nulla lex uindicat, deuitat tamen publicum etiam permissa adque inpunita libido conspectum, et uerecundia naturali habent prouisum lupanaria ipsa secretum faciliusque potuit inpudicitia non habere uincla prohibitionis, quam inpudentia remouere latibula illius foeditatis. Sed hanc etiam ipsi turpes turpitudinem uocant, cuius licet sint amatores, ostentatores esse non audent. Quid? concubitus coniugalis, qui secundum matrimonialium praescripta tabularum procreandorum fit causa liberorum, nonne et ipse quamquam sit licitus et honestus, remotum ab arbitris cubile conquirit? Nonne omnes famulos adque ipsos etiam paranymphos et quoscumque ingredi quaelibet necessitudo permiserat, ante mittit foras, quam uel blandiri coniux coniugi incipiat? Et quoniam, sicut ait etiam quidam Romani maximus auctor eloquii, omnia recte facta in luce se conlocari uolunt, id est adpetunt sciri: hoc recte factum sic adpetit sciri, ut tamen erubescat uideri. Quis enim nescit, ut filii procreentur, quid inter se coniuges agant? quando quidem ut id agatur, tanta celebritate ducuntur uxores; et tamen cum agitur, unde filii nascantur, nec ipsi filii, si qui inde iam nati sunt, testes fieri permittuntur. Sic enim hoc recte factum ad sui notitiam lucem adpetit animorum, ut tamen refugiat oculorum. Unde hoc, nisi quia sic geritur quod deceat ex natura, ut etiam quod pudeat comitetur ex poena?
Chapter 18. Of the shame of sexual intercourse, not only illicit but also conjugal.
As for the act itself which is performed by such lust, not only in all acts of sexual immorality, where hiding places are sought to escape human judgment, but also in the use of harlots, which the earthly city has made a lawful shamefulness, although what is done there is punished by no law of that city, yet even a permitted and unpunished lust avoids the public gaze; and by a natural modesty the brothels themselves have provided privacy, and unchastity found it easier to do without the chains of prohibition than shamelessness to remove the hiding places of that foulness. But even the shameful themselves call this shameful, of which, though they are lovers of it, they do not dare to be displayers. What of conjugal intercourse, which takes place, according to the prescriptions of the marriage contract, for the sake of begetting children? Does it not too, though it is lawful and honorable, seek a bedroom removed from witnesses? Does it not send outside all the servants, and even the groomsmen themselves and whoever any relationship had allowed to enter, before the husband even begins to caress his wife? And since, as even a certain very great author of Roman eloquence says, all right actions wish to be placed in the light, that is, seek to be known, this right action so seeks to be known that it nevertheless blushes to be seen. For who does not know what spouses do with each other so that children may be begotten? Since, indeed, wives are married with such great ceremony in order that it may be done; and yet when that is done from which children are born, not even the children themselves, if any have already been born of it, are allowed to become witnesses. For thus this right action seeks the light of minds for knowledge of itself, yet flees that of eyes. Whence is this, unless because what is fitting by nature is so carried out that what is shameful accompanies it by way of punishment?
Notes and citation
Summary: Even lawful marital intercourse, though honorable and publicly known, is hidden from every eye, a sign that shame accompanies it as a punishment while the act itself is natural and fitting.
- The “very great author of Roman eloquence” is Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.64. “Sexual immorality” renders stupra; the matrimonial tablets (tabulae matrimoniales) were the marriage contract, which named the begetting of children as its purpose.
Extrabiblical texts: Cicero, Tusc. 2.64 (Cicero; quotation)
Topics: Marriage
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.18 (CSEL 40:40–42; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-18). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).
14.19CSEL 40:42–43
CAPUT XVIIII. Quod partes irae adque libidinis, quae in homine tam uitiose mouentur, ut eas necesse sit frenis sapientiae cohiberi, in illa ante peccatum naturae sanitate non fuerint. Hinc est quod et illi philosophi, qui ueritati propius accesserunt, iram adque libidinem uitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide adque inordinate mouerentur ad ea etiam, quae sapientia perpetrari uetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente adque ratione. Quam partem animi tertiam uelut in arce quadam ad istas regendas perhibent conlocatam, ut illa imperante, istis seruientibus possit in homine iustitia ex omni animi parte seruari. Hae igitur partes, quas et in homine sapiente ac temperante fatentur esse uitiosas, ut eas ab his rebus, ad quas iniuste mouentur, mens conpescendo et cohibendo refrenet ac reuocet adque ad ea permittat, quae sapientiae lege concessa sunt (sicut iram ad exercendam iustam cohercitionem, sicut libidinem ad propagandae prolis officium) — hae, inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum uitiosae non erant. Non enim contra rectam uoluntatem ad aliquid mouebantur, unde necesse esset eas rationis tamquam frenis regentibus abstinere. Nam quod nunc ita mouentur et ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt, alias facilius, alias difficilius, tamen cohibendo et repugnando modificantur, non est utique sanitas ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. Quod autem irae opera aliarumque adfectionum in quibusque dictis adque factis non sic abscondit uerecundia, ut opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae adfectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? Nam quisquis uerbum emittit iratus uel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodam modo uoluntate mouerentur; quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. At uero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo iuri quodam modo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit et nisi ipsa uel ultro uel excitata surrexerit. Hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos erubescendo deuitat; magisque fert homo spectantium multitudinem, quando iniuste irascitur homini, quam uel unius aspectum et quando iuste miscetur uxori.
Chapter 19. That the parts of anger and lust, which are moved so viciously in man that they must be restrained by the reins of wisdom, did not exist in that health of nature before sin.
Hence it is that even those philosophers who came nearer to the truth confessed that anger and lust are vicious parts of the soul, because they are moved in a disturbed and disordered way even toward things which wisdom forbids to be done, and therefore need a governing mind and reason. This third part of the soul they say is placed as in a kind of citadel to rule these, so that, with it commanding and these serving, justice may be preserved in man from every part of the soul. These parts, then, which they admit are vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind must rein them in and call them back by checking and restraining them from those things to which they are unjustly moved, and allow them toward those that are granted by the law of wisdom (as anger for exercising just correction, as lust for the duty of propagating offspring): these parts, I say, were not vicious in paradise before sin. For they were not moved toward anything contrary to a right will, so that it would be necessary to hold them back as with the governing reins of reason. For that they are now so moved, and are moderated by those who live temperately, justly, and piously, sometimes more easily, sometimes with more difficulty, yet by restraining and resisting, is certainly not health from nature but sickness from guilt. And why is it that modesty does not hide the works of anger and of other affections in any words and deeds as it hides the works of lust, which are done by the genital members, unless because in the others it is not the affections themselves that move the members of the body, but the will, when it has consented to them, which altogether rules in their use? For whoever utters a word in anger or even strikes someone could not do this unless tongue and hand were moved, as it were, at the command of the will; and these members are moved by the same will even when there is no anger. But lust has so enslaved the genital parts of the body to its own jurisdiction, as it were, that they cannot be moved if it is absent, and unless it has risen of its own accord or when aroused. This is what shames; this is what, blushing, avoids the eyes of onlookers; and a man will more readily bear a crowd of spectators when he is unjustly angry with a man than the gaze of a single one even when he justly unites with his wife.
Titus 2:12 (echo, medium confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: The philosophers rightly saw anger and lust as vicious parts of the soul needing reason's rule, but this disorder is the sickness of sin; lust alone moves the genitals apart from the will, which is why its acts are hidden.
- The tripartite soul (reason ruling from a “citadel” over anger and desire) is Plato's, Republic 4.439d–441e and Timaeus 70a, as reported also by Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.20. Titus 2:12 (“temperately, justly, piously”) echoed.
Extrabiblical texts: Plato, Resp. 4.439d (Plato (works); allusion); Cicero, Tusc. 1.20 (Cicero; allusion)
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 14.19 (CSEL 40:42–43; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/14-11/#p-14-19). (abbreviation not yet checked)
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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).