Recognitions 7.37–8.20

Then Peter said: “Let not the evil one overcome us, seizing the occasion through affection for your mother; rather, let you and I with you fast today along with her, and tomorrow she will be baptized. For it is not right that the precepts of truth be relaxed and weakened for the sake of anyone's person and friendship. So let us not be reluctant to labor more with her, because to pass over any commandment is sin. Let us teach our bodily senses, which are outward, to serve the inward senses, and not compel the inward senses, which savor the things of God, to follow the outward ones, which savor the things of the flesh. For this reason the Lord also gave a commandment, saying: ‘Whoever looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.’ And to this he added: ‘If your right eye causes you to stumble, pluck it out and cast it from you; for it is better for you that one of your members perish than that your whole body be thrown into the gehenna of fire.’ He did not say ‘has caused you to stumble,’ as though you should cast away the cause of sin after you have sinned, but ‘if it causes you to stumble,’ that is, so that before you sin you may cut off the cause of the sin that provokes and incites you. But let none of you think, brothers, that the Lord commanded the cutting off of members. He wishes the purpose to be cut off, not the members—and the causes that entice to sin—so that our thought, carried on the vehicle of sight, may strive toward the love of God, unseen by the bodily senses, and may not slacken the reins and give free rein to the carnal eyes, like wanton horses eager to turn the chariot aside from the way of the commandments; but may call back the sight of the body to the judgment of the mind, and not allow our eyes, which God willed to be the observers and witnesses of his work, to become the panders of evil desire. And so let both the bodily senses and the inner thought yield to the law of God, and serve the will of him whose work they understand themselves to be.”

So, as the order and reason of the mystery required, on the following day she was baptized in the sea, and, returning to the lodging, she was instructed in turn in all the mysteries of religion. We her sons were present, Niceta and Aquila and I, Clement. After this we dined with her and together glorified God, giving thanks for the zeal and teaching of Peter, who showed us, on the occasion of our mother, how the good of chastity does not perish before God; “just as, on the contrary,” he said, “unchastity, even if not at once, nevertheless, though late, does not escape punishment. So pleasing to God,” he said, “is chastity, that it confers some grace in the present life even on those who are in error. For future blessedness is reserved only for those who through the grace of baptism have kept chastity and justice. Indeed what was done for your mother is an example of this: all this salvation has been restored to her as the reward of chastity. To guard and preserve it, continence alone is not enough; but when someone perceives that snares and deception are being prepared, let him flee at once as from the onrush of fire or the attack of a mad dog, and not trust that anyone can easily restrain snares of this kind by philosophizing or by coaxing. Rather, as I said, one must flee and go far away, as your mother did, truly and wholly loving the good of chastity. For this reason she was preserved for you and you for her, and besides she has been given the knowledge of eternal life.” When he had said these and many other similar things, evening came and we rested.

On the next day, early in the morning, Peter took my brothers and me and went down to the harbor so that we might bathe in the sea, and after this we withdrew to a more secluded place to pray. A certain poor old man, a workman as appeared from his dress, began to watch us curiously from hiding, to see what we were doing in that secluded place. When he had seen us praying, he waited until we came out, and greeting us said: “If you do not take it ill and do not mark me as inquisitive or intrusive, I should like to have a word with you. For I pity you, and would not want you to go astray under the appearance of truth and to be afraid of things that do not exist; or if you think there is something true in them, pass it on to me as well. If, then, you will take it patiently, I can teach you in a few words what is right; but if it is troublesome, I will go on and do my own business.” Peter answered him: “Come, say what seems good to you, and we will gladly receive it, whether it is true or false. For you are to be embraced, because, like a father anxious for his sons, you have wished to warn us of what seems good to you.”

Then the old man began to say: “I saw you bathing in the sea, and after that withdrawing to a secluded place. So, watching from hiding what you were doing in secret, I saw you praying. Pitying your error, I began to wait until I could speak to you when you came out and teach you not to go astray in an observance of this kind. For there is neither God nor any worship, nor providence in the world, but chance and birth-fate do everything, as I have found out most clearly from my own case, being trained above others in the discipline of astrology. Do not go astray, then; for whether you pray or do not pray, what your birth-fate holds, this will happen to you.” And I, Clement, was somehow stirred in heart, recalling many things in him as if familiar to me. For someone has well said that what is born of another, even if it has been away for a long time, yet the spark of kinship is never extinguished. So I began to ask him who he was and where he came from, or how he was born. But he, unwilling to answer this, said: “What has this to do with what I said to you? But first, if you please, let us have the discussion on what we proposed; and after that, if the matter requires, we can disclose to one another as friends to friends our name and family and country and the rest that follows.” Yet we all admired the man's eloquence, and the gravity of his bearing and the calmness of his speech.

Peter, walking slowly as we talked, looked out for a suitable place for conversation. When he had found a secluded recess near the harbor, he had us sit down, and so he himself began first; nor did he treat the old man with contempt or look down on him because his clothing was cheap and dirty. He said: “Since you seem to me to be a learned man and a kind one, in that you came to us and did not want to hide from us what seemed good to you, we too wish to set out for you what we believe good and right. If it seems to you less true, accept our good intention toward you gladly, as we accept yours.” While Peter was saying this, a very great crowd gathered. Then the old man said: “Perhaps the presence of the crowd troubles you.” Peter said: “Not at all, except that I fear this alone: that perhaps, when in our discussion the truth has been made plain, you may feel ashamed, because of the presence of the crowd, to yield and assent to what you have understood to be said truly.” To this the old man said: “I have not grown old so foolish as to refuse what I understand to be true for the sake of popular favor.”

So Peter began to say: “Those who speak the word of truth and enlighten the souls of men seem to me like the rays of the sun, which, once they have gone forth and appeared to the world, can no longer be concealed or hidden in any way, since they are not so much seen by men as they enable all to see. Hence it was well said by someone to the heralds of truth: ‘You are the light of the world, and a city set on a hill cannot be hidden; nor do they light a lamp and put it under a bushel, but on a lampstand, so that it may give light to all who are in the house.’” The old man said: “Whoever he is, he spoke very well. But let one of you set out what he thinks must be followed, so that we may direct our speeches toward a definite goal. For to find the truth it is not enough to destroy what is said on the other side; one must also bring forward oneself something that the opponent can attack. So that the contest of the parties may be equal, it seems right to me that each of us first state what he defends; and, if you please, I will begin first. I say that the world is not governed according to the providence of God, because we see many things done in it unjustly and without order; but I say it is birth-fate that does and holds all things.”

When Peter wished to answer this, Niceta forestalled him and said: “Let my lord Peter allow me to answer this, and let it not seem impudent that I, a young man, should have a contest with an old one; rather, let me converse as a son with a father.” The old man said: “Not only do I wish you, my son, to pursue what you think, but also if any of your companions, or any of the bystanders, seems to know something, let him bring it forward without hesitation; we will gladly receive it. For the comparing of many views will more easily find what is not known.” Then Niceta answered: “Do not think, father, that I acted rashly in putting myself into the discourse of my lord Peter; rather I thought I was doing this out of respect for him. For he is a man of God, full of all knowledge, from whom not even Greek learning is hidden, because he is filled with the Spirit of God, from whom nothing is hidden. But since it befits him to speak of heavenly things, I will answer concerning those that belong to the talkativeness of the Greeks. Afterwards, when we have disputed in the manner of the Greeks and have come to the point where no way out appears, then he, as one filled with the knowledge of God, will openly and clearly disclose to us the truth of all things, so that not only we but all the hearers who are present may recognize the way of truth. And so let him now sit as arbiter, so that when one of us gives way, he may then take it up and pronounce an undoubted verdict.”

When Niceta had said this, those who had gathered said among themselves: “Is this the Peter we used to hear of, the most approved disciple of him who appeared in Judea and did very many signs and mighty works?” And gazing at him they stood with fear and great veneration, like good servants paying honor to their master. When Peter perceived this, he said to them: “Let us listen more attentively, keeping a right judgment about what will be said by each; and after their contest, we too will add what seems necessary.” When Peter had said this, the crowds rejoiced. Niceta began to speak in this way: “You have defined, father, that the world is not ruled by the providence of God, but that all things are subject to birth-fate, whether those that pertain to each one's character or those that pertain to his deeds. I could have answered this at once; but since it is right to keep order, let us also define what we hold, as you yourself asked to be done. I say that the world is governed by the providence of God, at least in those things that need his government. For there is one who holds all things, who also made the world, the just God, who will one day render to each according to his deeds. See, you have our definition too. Now pursue what you wish, either destroying mine or asserting yours, so that I may meet what you set forth. Or if you wish me to speak first, I will not delay.”

The old man answered: “Whether you prefer to speak first, my son, or prefer that I should speak, makes no difference, especially among those who dispute with good will. But you speak first; I accept it gladly. And I wish you could also set out what I am to say, and object to it what is contrary, and show the truth from the comparison of both.” Niceta answered: “If you wish, I can also state your side and answer it.” The old man said: “Show me first how you can know what I have not yet said, and then I will believe you that you can set out my side.” Niceta said: “Your school and the view you have defined are plain to those who are trained in disciplines of this kind, and its consequences are certain. And since I am not ignorant of what the definitions of the philosophers are, from what you have proposed I recognize what follows; especially since, more than the other philosophers, I attended the schools of Epicurus. My brother Aquila followed the Pyrrhonists more, and our other brother the Platonists and Aristotelians; so you are speaking with educated hearers.” Then the old man said: “You have shown well and logically how you would notice from the definitions proposed what follows from them. But I have professed something more than Epicurus holds, for I have introduced birth-fate and made it the cause of all men's deeds.”

When the old man had said this, I, Clement, said to him: “Listen, father: if my brother Niceta wins against you that the world is not run without the providence of God, I shall be able to answer you on the part that remains, about birth-fate; for I have knowledge of this science.” When I had said this, my brother Aquila said: “What need is there for us to call him father, when we have it among the commandments to call no one on earth father?” And after this, looking at the old man, he said: “Do not take it as an insult, father, that I blamed my brother for calling you father; for we have such a commandment, not to call anyone by that name.” When Aquila had said this, the whole company of bystanders laughed, together with the old man and Peter. When Aquila asked why everyone had laughed, I said to him: “Because you yourself are doing what you blame others for, since you have called the old man father.” But he denied it, saying: “Truly I do not know whether I called him father.” Meanwhile Peter was stirred by certain suspicions, as he himself told us afterwards; and looking at Niceta he said: “Carry out what you proposed.”

Then Niceta began in this way: “Everything that exists is either simple or composite. What is simple lacks number, division, color, difference, roughness, smoothness, weight, lightness, quality, quantity, and therefore also limit. What is composite is composed of two or three or even four things, or certainly of more; and what is composed can necessarily also be divided.” Hearing this, the old man said: “You speak excellently and most learnedly, my son.” Niceta said: “So that which is simple, and lacks all these things by which what subsists can be dissolved, is without doubt incomprehensible and immeasurable, knowing neither any beginning nor end; and therefore it is one and alone, and subsists without an author. But what is composite, and subject to number and diversity and division, has necessarily been composed by some author, and diversity gathered into one form. That which is immeasurable, then, is father in goodness, founder in power. Neither could the power of founding cease in the immeasurable one, nor his goodness be idle; but he is moved by goodness to bring into being the things that are, and by power to compose and establish them. So some things are brought into being and composed, as we said, of two or of three, some of four, others of more. But since we are now inquiring about the plan of the world and its substance, which is agreed to be composed of four elements, to which all those ten differences we listed above belong, we will begin from these lower steps and come to the higher. For a way to the intellectual and invisible things is given us from those we see and handle, as is contained in the arithmetical disciplines, where, when divine things are inquired into, one ascends from lower to higher numbers, but when the account of present and visible things is set out, the order is directed from higher to lower numbers. Or is it not so?”

The old man said: “You are proceeding very well.” Niceta said: “Now, then, we must proceed to the plan of the world, the first question about which is divided into two parts. For it is asked whether it was made or not. If it was not made, it will itself be that unbegotten from which all things come. But if it was made, the question about it is again split into two parts: whether it was made of itself or by another. If of itself, Providence is without doubt excluded. If Providence is not accepted, the soul is urged to virtue in vain, justice is kept in vain, since there is no one to repay the just one day according to his merits. Nor will the soul itself seem immortal, if after its release from the body no dispensation of providence receives it.

“Now if it is shown that there is Providence, and that the world was made through it, other questions to be discussed arise again. For it will be asked how Providence exists: whether generally over all things, or specially over parts, or generally over parts, or both generally over all and specially over parts. It is understood as general in this way: as if God, making the world in the beginning, gave things their order and fixed their course, and thereafter ceased to care for what happens. It is special over parts in this way: that he exercises providence over some men or places but not over others. And it is at once general over all and special over parts in this way: as if God both made all things in the beginning and exercises providence over each one until the end, and renders to each according to his acts.

“That first proposition, then, which says that God made all things in the beginning and, having imposed a course and order on things, calls nothing back to himself thereafter, confirms that all things are done according to birth-fate. We shall answer this first, and especially those who worship the gods and defend birth-fate. When they sacrifice to the gods and entreat them, they certainly hope to obtain something against birth-fate, and by this they undo birth-fate. But when they laugh at those who urge to virtue and exhort to self-control, and say that no one can do or suffer anything except what has been decreed for him by fate, they surely cut away all worship of divinity. For why should you worship those from whom you can obtain nothing that the logic of the decree does not permit? So much meanwhile against them. But I say that the world was made by God and will one day be dissolved by him, so that that world may appear which is eternal and was made for this, that it may exist forever and receive those who are worthy of it by the judgment of God. And that there is another invisible world which contains this visible one within itself, we shall come to that also after we have discussed the visible world.

“Now meanwhile, that this visible world was made, very many wise men among the philosophers also testify. But so that we may not seem, as if lacking proofs, to have wished to use witnesses, let us, if you please, inquire about its first principles. That this visible world is bodily is sufficiently clear from the very fact that it is visible. Every body admits two distinctions: either it is joined and solid, or divided and separated. If the body from which the world was made was joined and solid, and that body was parted and divided into various forms and parts according to its differences, it must be understood that there was someone who separated the body that was joined and solid and drew it out into many parts and various forms. Or if this whole mass of the world was composed and fitted together from various and scattered parts of bodies, it must equally be understood that there was someone who gathered the scattered parts into one and clothed things with various forms.

“And I know that most of the philosophers held rather this: that God the founder made divisions and distinctions out of one body, which they call matter, which nevertheless consisted of four simple elements mixed into one by a certain tempering of divine Providence. For I think it was said superfluously by some that the body of the world is simple, that is, without any combination, since it is clear that what is simple cannot be a body, nor be mixed or propagated or dissolved—all of which we certainly see happening to the bodies of the world. For how would it be dissolved if it were simple and had nothing within it by which it could be resolved and divided? But if bodies are seen to consist of two or three or even four things, to whom with even a little sense is it not plain that there was someone who gathered many into one and, keeping the moderation of the tempering, made a solid body out of various parts? This one, then, we call God the founder of the world; this one we acknowledge as the author of the universe.

“For the philosophers of the Greeks, inquiring about the first principles of the world, went each his own way. Pythagoras says that numbers are the elements of the first principles; Callistratus, qualities; Alcmaeon, contrarieties; Anaximander, the boundless; Anaxagoras, equality of parts; Epicurus, atoms; Diodorus, partless things, that is, things in which there are no parts; Asclepiades, onkoi, which we may call swellings or masses; the geometers, lines; Democritus, ideas; Thales, water; Heraclitus, fire; Diogenes, air; Parmenides, earth; Zeno, Empedocles, and Plato, fire, water, air, and earth. Aristotle also introduces a fifth element, which he called akatonomaston, that is, ‘unnameable’—without doubt indicating him who made the world by joining the four elements into one. Whether, then, there are two or three or four or even more or innumerable things from which the world consists, in every case God is shown to be the one who gathered many into one and again led what was gathered into various forms; and it is proved by this that the fabric of the world could not have existed without a maker and provider.

“And by the very fact that, in the combination of the elements, when one is lacking or in excess the rest are dissolved and collapse, it is shown that they received their beginning from nothing. For example, if moisture is lacking in anything, the dry will not stand either; for the dry is nourished by moisture, as cold is by heat; and in these, as we said, if one is lacking, all are wholly dissolved, and in this the signs of their origin, by which they were made from nothing, are betrayed. And if matter itself is proved to have been made, how will its parts and forms, of which the world consists, seem unmade? But this is not the place to speak of matter and qualities; let it suffice to have shown only this, that God is the founder of all things, because neither, if the body from which the world consists was solid and joined, could it have been separated and distinguished without a founder, nor, if it was collected into one from various and distinct parts, could it have been gathered and mixed without a craftsman. If, then, God is shown so plainly to be the founder of the world, what room will there be for Epicurus to introduce atoms, and to assert that from insensible particles not only sensible bodies but intellectual and rational minds come into being?”

“But you will say, as Epicurus held: ‘Solid bodies are produced by the joinings of atoms coming in an unceasing stream, mingling through immense and endless ages and gathering into one mass.’ I do not go on to call this a fabulous and foolishly composed thing; let us rather see whether what is said, such as it is, can stand. For they say that these very particles which they call atoms are of different qualities: some moist and therefore heavy and tending downward; others dry and earthy, and therefore also heavy; others fiery and therefore always striving upward; and others cold and therefore sluggish and always in the middle. How then, since some always tend upward, being fiery, and others always downward, being moist and dry, while others are in the middle and do not move with equal course, could they come together and make one body? For if someone threw down from a height, for example, very fine chaff and particles of very fine lead of the same size, could the light chaff overtake the particles of lead, though they are equal in size? The heavier reach the bottom far more swiftly. So too the atoms, even if they are equal in size, yet being unequal in weight, the light ones will never be able to overtake the heavier; and if they cannot overtake them, without doubt they can neither be mixed nor make a body.

“Then again, if they are borne along unceasingly and always keep coming and are added to things whose measure is already complete, how can the universe stand, when new weights are always heaped on such immense weights? And I ask this too: if this circuit of heaven that we see was built up by particles gradually coming together, how did it not collapse at once as it rose, since the top of its gaping structure was held together by no supports? For as those who build the domes of buildings in a circle find that, unless they bind together the closing of the central crown, the whole falls apart at once, so too the circle of the world, which we see gathered in so beautiful a form—if it was not made suddenly and at once by the turning of divine power, by the might of the founder, but by atoms gradually running together and building, not as reason required but as chance fell out—how did it not slip apart and dissolve before it could be gathered and closed? I ask this too: what is the support on which the foundations of so immense a mass have been laid? And again, on what does that very support you name rest? And that other, on what? And I will go on asking until the answer comes to nothing and emptiness.

“And if someone should say that atoms of fiery quality joined together made one body, and that, since the quality of fire tends not downward but upward, the nature of fire, always striving upward, bears up the mass of the world placed on it, we will answer this: how could atoms of fiery quality, which always strive upward, descend downward and be found in the depth, in a place sunk beneath all things? For certainly the heavier ones, that is, the earthy or moist qualities, outrun the lighter, as we said. Hence they assert that the heaven too, as the structure of the upper regions, was built of fiery atoms, which are lighter and always flee upward. So the world can have no foundations of fire or of anything else, nor can there be any fellowship or fitting together of heavier atoms with lighter, that is, of those that always plunge downward with those that always flee upward. That it is impossible, then, for the bodies of the world to be made solid from the joining of atoms has been sufficiently said; and also that insensible bodies, even if they could by any means have come together and been joined, could not give forms and measures to bodies, shape limbs, produce qualities, or express quantities—all of which, by their harmony, testify to the hand of a craftsman and show the work of reason; and that reason I call the Word and God.”

“But someone will say that these things are done by nature. Then this is a dispute about a name. For since it is agreed that this is the work of mind and reason, what you call nature I call God the founder. It is agreed that neither the forms of bodies, established with such necessary distinctions, nor the senses of souls could have been, or can be, produced by an irrational work that lacks sense. And if the philosophers seem suitable witnesses to you, Plato testifies about these things in the Timaeus, where, discussing the making of the world, he asks whether it always existed or took a beginning, and declares that it was made: ‘For it is visible,’ he says, ‘and tangible and bodily; and all such things are agreed to have been made; and what has been made has without doubt some author by whom it was made. This maker and parent of all things,’ he says, ‘is both hard to find, and, when found, impossible to declare to the many.’ This Plato says. But even if he and the other philosophers of the Greeks had chosen to be silent about the making of the world, would it not be plain to all who have understanding? For who is the man of even slight sense who, seeing a house that has everything necessary for use, whose vault he sees gathered into the round of a sphere, painted with varied splendor and various images, and adorned with special and very great lights—who, I ask, seeing such a building, would not at once declare that it was built by a most wise and powerful craftsman? And who will be found so foolish that, when he looks on the work of heaven and sees the splendor of the sun and moon, and sees the courses and forms and paths of the stars fixed by sure reasons and times, he would not cry out that these were made not so much by a wise and rational craftsman as by wisdom and reason itself?