Against Eunomius 4.643–4.657

And a little later: “The Son alone,” he says, “constituted by the activity of the Father, has a nature and a relation to the one who begot him that are shared with no other.” But in what precedes he says that he does not refuse to call the begotten “offspring,” “since the begotten substance itself and the name of Son make such a relation of the names appropriate.” Since, then, the contradiction in what has been said is so evident, I cannot help marvelling at the shrewdness of those who praise this doctrine. For it would be hard for them to find which of his statements they could turn to without offending against the other. His former argument established that the begotten substance and the appellation of Son make such a relation of the names appropriate; the present technical reasoning says the opposite, that the Son has a relation to the one who begot him which is shared with nothing. If they believe the first, they will certainly not accept the second; if they lean to this, they will take a stand against the first supposition. Who will resolve their battle? Who will mediate in the civil war? Who will reconcile the faction into agreement, when their very soul is divided against itself by what is said and drawn apart into contrary doctrines? Or perhaps this is the riddle of the prophecy that David speaks of the Jews: “They were divided and were not pricked to the heart.” For see, even when divided into contrary doctrines they have no sense of their fault, but are carried by the ears, like jars carried round by their handles to wherever the one who moves them pleases. It pleased him to say that the begotten substance naturally has the appellation of Son: at once, like men dozing, they nodded assent to what was said. He shifted his argument again to the opposite and denies the Son’s relation to the begetter: again the dear fellows nod along with this too, as the shadows of bodies change their shape by spontaneous imitation along with the movement of the one who goes before. Wherever he wishes, they lean that way, accepting even this, though he fights with himself. This is some other Homeric potion, which does not change the bodies of those drugged into the shapes of brutes, but works on their souls a transformation into brutishness. For of those the story says that their mind remained firm while their form was changed into that of beasts; here, while their bodies remain in their natural state, their souls are reshaped into brutishness. And just as the poetic marvel there says that those drugged were changed into the shapes of different beasts, as pleased the woman who used her sophistry on nature, so the same happens now from this Circean bowl. For those who drink of the bewitched deceit from the same treatise are changed into the shapes of different doctrines, formed now by this one, now by the other. And besides this, the dear fellows, as in the plot of the fable, still love the one who leads them into such brutishness. Like the fruit of the cornel or the acorn, they stoop and pick up the words he throws about, rushing greedily like swine at the doctrines cast on the ground, having no nature to gaze at what is lofty and heavenly. For this reason they do not see the argument turning to contrary positions, but snatch up without examination whatever comes to them. And as they say that the bodies of those stupefied by mandrake are held fast by a kind of torpor and sluggishness, in the same way the senses of the soul are disposed in these men too, numbed toward the understanding of the deceit. It is a terrible thing, then, to be caught unawares in hidden snares through some fallacy; still, the misfortune is pardonable when it is involuntary. But to draw the experience of evil upon oneself by forethought and eagerness, not ignorant of the disaster, surpasses every extreme of misfortune. How is it not right to lament, when we hear that even greedy fish flee the bare iron when it comes near, but, deceived by the bait, swallow the hook in hope of food? To desert willingly to this destruction where the evil is evident is more wretched even than the senselessness of fish. For the fish were led by gluttony to a hidden destruction; but these gape open-mouthed around the bare hook of impiety, loving their destruction through some irrational passion. For what could be more evident than this contradiction: to say that the same one both was begotten and is a creature, both has the natural fitness of the name Son and again is estranged from the meaning of Son? But so much for this. It might perhaps be useful to see in order the whole meaning of the statement of Eunomius quoted by us, running back to the beginning of the passage. For what has now been examined, because of the evident contradiction in what was said, moved us readily to begin our refutation from the end.

Eunomius, then, has said this: “These things being so distinguished, one might reasonably say that the most proper and first and only substance that subsists by the activity of the Father receives into itself the appellations of offspring, thing made, and creature.” First, then, I wish to remind those who attend to the argument that in his first book he says the substance of the Father too is most proper, advancing his argument through these words: “The whole account of our doctrines is completed from the highest and most proper substance.” And here he calls the substance of the Only-begotten most proper and first. Putting together, then, the words of Eunomius from each book, we shall present the man himself as a witness to the community of substance, the man who declared somewhere else that things whose appellations are the same do not differ in nature at all. For he who fights with himself would not have signified things differing in nature by the identity of appellations. But since the definition of substance in Father and Son is one, for this reason he certainly says that that substance is most proper and this one most proper too. Human usage too bears witness to the argument, applying “most proper” to nothing of which the name is not true together with the nature. For example, we call a likeness a “man” by an extended use, but properly we name by this word the living being shown in nature. And likewise the word of Scripture knows how to call an idol, and a demon, and the belly “god”; but these do not have the proper sense, and all the rest likewise. Someone is said to have eaten in the imagination of a dream, but one cannot call the imagination proper eating. As, then, when two men subsist equally according to nature, we properly call each of them by the word “man,” but if someone, putting a lifeless image beside the real man, were to count them, he would say “two,” the one who really is and the likeness, but would no longer attest the proper sense of the word to both; so if the nature of the Only-begotten were supposed to be something other than the Father’s substance, the writer would not have named each of the substances “most proper.” For how could anyone signify things differing in nature by identity of names? But it seems that the truth is made manifest even through those who fight it, falsehood being altogether unable to overpower truth even in the words of enemies. For this reason the account of godliness is proclaimed by the mouth of opponents who do not know what they say, as in the case of Caiaphas too the Lord’s saving passion for us was foretold, though he did not know what he said. If, then, being “most proper” is common to the substance of both, I mean of the Father and of the Son, what room is there to say that the substances differ from each other? Or how is a difference toward the more powerful, greater, and more honourable seen in them, when the most proper substance admits no diminution? For what is imperfect, whatever it may be, is not properly that thing: not nature, not power, not dignity, nor anything else among things considered individually. So the Father’s superiority in substance, as the heresy would have it, proves the imperfection of the Only-begotten’s substance. If, then, it is imperfect, it is not proper; but if it is most proper, it is certainly perfect too. For what is deficient cannot by nature be named perfect. But neither, when perfect is set beside perfect in comparison, can any difference by excess or defect be conceived. For the perfection in both is one, as on a ruler, neither hollowed by lack nor uneven by excess. Eunomius’s advocacy for our doctrine, then, may be seen sufficiently from what has been said; or rather not his zeal for us but his fight with himself. For by the very words with which he supports our doctrine, he turns his devices against himself. But we shall again follow what was written word for word, so that it may become plain to all that, apart from the wish to do mischief, their argument has no strength for wickedness. Let us hear, then, what was said: “One might reasonably say that the most proper and first and only substance that subsists by the activity of the Father receives into itself the appellations of offspring, thing made, and creature.” Who does not know that what separates the Church from the heresy is the word “creature” said of the Son? Since, then, the difference in doctrine is agreed by all, what would have been more reasonable for one attempting to show his own suppositions truer than ours? Plainly, to establish his own argument by whatever means he could, demonstrating that one must think the Lord created.

Or, passing this over, to lay down the law for his hearers that they should speak of disputed things as agreed? For my part I say the former; and perhaps all who have a share of understanding will look for this from those who argue against us: that they first set the beginning of their argument on some indisputable foundation, and only then contend about what follows. But this man, passing over the proof that we must think him created, goes through what comes next, fitting the sequence of his reasonings to an unfounded premise, just like those who sink deep in their souls into vain desires, letting their thoughts spread out toward a kingdom or some other object of their eagerness. They do not consider how any of the things they desire might come about, but arrange and manage their good fortune for themselves as they please, as though it were present, wandering with a kind of pleasure among things that do not exist. So too our wise writer, having put his much-talked-of dialectic to sleep somewhere, before he proves anything about the question, tells this deceptive and unsupported nonsense of his own doctrine as one tells stories to children, setting it out like some drunken tale. For he says that the substance that subsists by the activity of the Father receives the appellation of offspring, thing made, and creature. What argument has shown that the Son came to exist by some activity of making, while the nature of the Father remained inactive with respect to the Son’s existence? For this was what was disputed and sought: whether the substance of the Father begot the Son, or something accompanying the nature from outside produced him. The Church, according to the divine teaching, believes that the Only-begotten is truly God and abhors polytheistic superstition, and for this reason does not accept a difference of natures, lest by the variation of substances the godheads should fall under number, which is nothing other than to bring polytheism back into life. Since, then, the Church teaches these things in plain language, that the only-begotten God, from the substance of the true God, is true God in substance, how ought one who opposes what is known to overturn the established conviction? Is it not by establishing the opposing argument, demonstrating the doubtful point from some agreed principle? I do not think any sensible person would look for anything other than this. But this man starts from what is disputed, and, as if it had been proved, makes it the starting point for the following argument. For had it first been proved that the Son came to exist through some activity, what battle would there be about what follows, the statement that the substance which came to exist through some activity receives into itself the appellation of thing made? But as long as the premise is unsupported, let the advocates of deceit say how what follows has any strength. For if one grants by hypothesis that a man has become winged, the consequences will no longer be disputed: the one who has become winged will somehow fly, and will raise himself aloft above the earth, carried on wings through the air; but one must consider how one who was not given an aerial nature could become winged. If this is not so, it is vain to go through what follows. Let him too, then, first show that the Church has believed in vain that the only-begotten Son truly is Son, not adopted by a father falsely so called, but being by nature, by begetting, from the one who is, not estranged from the nature of the begetter. Let him first refute these things as false, and then he will be persuasive when he goes through the consequences. But as long as the first remains unproved, it is nonsense to linger over the second. And let no one object to me that what we hold should also be confirmed by argument. For it suffices as proof of our account that we have the tradition that has come to us from our fathers, like an inheritance handed down in succession from the apostles through the saints who followed. But those who change the doctrines into this novelty would need much support from reasonings, if they meant to win over not the dusty and easily blown-about sort of people, but those who are weighty and steady in their minds. As long as their argument is brought forward unsupported and unproved, who is so foolish and brutish as to make the teaching of the evangelists and apostles, and of those who have shone after them in the churches, weaker than unproved nonsense? But let us see the most remarkable feature of the writer’s shrewdness, how by the abundance of his dialectical experience he cleverly draws the more simple-minded to the opposite. To the appellations “thing made” and “creature” he has thrown in the word “offspring” as well, saying that the substance of the Son receives these names into itself. And as if addressing an assembly of drunkards, he thinks that his mischief about the doctrine will be obvious to no one. For by joining “offspring” to “creature” and “thing made” he thinks to steal away the difference in the meaning of the names through combining things that have nothing in common. These are the wise devices of dialectic. But we who are unskilled in speech do not deny that we are this, as far as voice and tongue go, as the argument shows about us.

But we confess that our ears too, as the Prophet says, have been fitted for intelligent hearing. Therefore we are not led into confusing the things signified by the joining of names that have nothing in common. Even if the great Apostle names together wood and hay and straw, gold and silver and precious stones, we both reckon up the number of the things mentioned in total and shall not be ignorant of the nature of each thing named in particular. So now too, when “offspring” and “thing made” are mentioned together, passing from the words to the things signified, we do not see the same sense in each of the names. For a creature is one thing, and “offspring” signifies another; so that even if he mixes what does not mix, the intelligent hearer will hear “creature” and “offspring” distinctly, and will show that it is impossible for one nature to receive into itself both the appellation of offspring and that of creature. For if one of these is true, the other will necessarily be false: so that if he is a creature, he is not offspring; and conversely, if he is called offspring, he is estranged from the title of creature. But Eunomius says that the substance of the Son receives into itself the appellations of offspring, thing made, and creature. Has he then, by what remains, secured this headless and rootless argument, which was laid down through his first words with no power toward what he was establishing? Or does the rest too hold to the same vanity, having obtained no strength in advance from any support of reasonings, but containing a rambling and unsupported exposition of blasphemy, as in the telling of dreams? For he says, adding to what has been said: “…having its begetting without mediation, and preserving undivided its relation to the one who begot, made, and created it.” If we leave aside “without mediation” and “undivided” and consider the sense of the words by itself, we shall find that everywhere the silliness of the teaching, strengthened by no argument, is thrown at the ears of the deceived. “The one who begot,” he says, “and created and made.” These, though they seem three, have the meaning of two notions, since two of the words are equivalent to each other in sense. For to make is the same as to create; but begetting is something other than what has been said. Since, then, the common understanding of mankind divides into different notions according to the meaning of the words, what argument has shown us that the thing made is the same as the begetting, so that we should fit the one substance to the difference of the words? For as long as the customary meaning of the terms prevails, and no argument is found that changes the implications of the words into the opposite, it is not possible for one nature to be split between the notion of thing made and that of offspring. For since each of these, said by itself, has its own interpretation, it is altogether necessary that the relative pairing proper and akin to the names be understood along with them. For the other relative terms too have their kinship not with what is foreign and unsuitable; but even if what the term is said in relation to is left unsaid, its correlative is heard of itself along with the primary term: for example, maker, slave, friend, son, and the like. For all things contemplated in reference to another present, each of them, through its appellation, its proper and connected kinship with what is shown, admitting no communion with what is of a different kind. For neither is the name of maker yoked to son, nor is the word slave referred to maker, nor did friend indicate slave, nor son master; but we recognize the clear and distinct pairing of each of these with its correlative, understanding through “friend” another friend, through “slave” the master, the work through “maker,” and the father through “son.” So too “offspring” has its proper implication in relation to something. The begetter, then, is yoked to the offspring, the creator to the creature. And we must certainly, if we are not to produce some confusion of things by exchanging names, keep for each relative term what is properly signified along with it. Since, then, the sense of these terms is plain in what it looks to, how is it that one who advances doctrines by logical technique did not perceive the proper sense of relatives in these names? But he thinks to fit the offspring to the maker and the thing made to the begetter, saying that the substance of the Son receives into itself the appellations of offspring, thing made, and creature, and preserves undivided its relation to the one who begot, made, and created it.

For it is not in the nature of one thing to be divided among different relations. But the Son is akin to the Father, and the begotten to the begetter, while the thing made has its reference to the maker; unless someone should think that some loose use in an undiscriminating habit of speech is more proper than the natural meaning. By what reasonings, then, and of what kind, using that invincible dialectic of his, has he changed the opinions of the many to the opposite, so that he goes through these things with such high-handed authority: that, while the God over all is both thought of and called Creator and Father, the Son is suited to both appellations, being called creature and offspring equally? For the usage and exactness of language properly distinguish such names, applying the name of begetting to things begotten from the substance itself, and that of creation to things that subsist outside the nature of the one who makes them. And for this reason the divine doctrines, in handing down the knowledge of God, have handed down Father and Son, not creator and work, so that there might be no slipping into blasphemy by pushing the Son out to what is alien and foreign to such an appellation, and so that the godless doctrines that separate the Only-begotten from kinship in substance with the Father might find no entrance. One who says that the appellation “thing made” fits the Son will certainly say, consequently, that the calling “son” naturally belongs to the thing made as well. So, if the Son is a creature, heaven too is a son, and each of the things that have come to be is properly named by the appellation “son,” according to the writer. For if he has the name not by sharing the nature of the begetter, but is named Son inasmuch as he is created, the same reasoning will grant that the lamb, the dog, the frog, and everything that came to exist by the will of the maker be named by the appellation “son.” But if each of these is neither a son nor called God, because it is outside the nature of the Son, then consequently the one who is properly Son, because he is from the very nature of the begetter, is Son and is confessed to be God. But he loathes the notion of begetting and excludes it from the divine doctrines, slandering the name by a fleshly natural science. Our discussion has already shown sufficiently on these matters that, as the Prophet says, “they fear a fear where there is no fear.” For even among human beings not every begetting was shown to take place through passion: the material one is through passion, but the spiritual one is pure and undefiled. For what is born of the Spirit becomes spirit and not flesh, and no passible condition is seen together with the spirit. Since the writer has thought it necessary to reckon the divine power from examples drawn from us, let him persuade himself from the other mode of begetting to think of the divine begetting as impassible. But by confusing these three appellations with one another, two of which are equivalent, he thinks to sweep his hearers along, through the shared meaning of the two words, into thinking the same of the third as well. For since the appellations “thing made” and “creature” show that what was made is outside the nature of the maker, he attaches to them the word “offspring,” so that it too may be interpreted along with the former. But such a form of argument is called mischief and deceit and trickery, not a considered and technical demonstration. For only that which makes the unknown manifest through what is agreed is called demonstration. But to reason falsely through mischief, to steal away the refutation, and with superficial deceptions to confuse the understanding of those who, as the Apostle says, are corrupted in mind: no sensible person would call that a technical demonstration. But let us pass on to what follows. He says that the begetting of the substance is without mediation, and that it preserves undivided its relation to the one who begot, made, and created it. If, then, having said that the substance is undivided and without mediation, he had stopped his statement there, he would not have turned aside from the pious conception, since we too confess the Son’s connection with the Father and its lack of mediation, so that nothing is inserted between them, found in the midst of the Son’s connection with the Father: no notion of interval, not even that instantaneous and indivisible point which, when time is cut in two into past and future, is understood by itself, without parts, in the present, unable to become part either of the past or of the future, because it is altogether without extension and indivisible, and adds nothing perceptible to whatever it is added to.