On Free Choice of the Will 2.18–3.2

E. I admit that I am sufficiently persuaded, and that it has become evident, as far as it can in this life and among such people as we are, that God exists and that all goods are from God; since all things that are, whether they understand and live and exist, or only live and exist, or only exist, are from God. Now let us look at the third question, whether it can be shown that free will is to be counted among goods. When this is demonstrated, I will grant without hesitation that God gave it to us, and that it ought to have been given. A. You remember well what was proposed, and you have noticed alertly that the second question has already been explained; but you ought to have seen that this third one too is already solved. For you had said that it seemed to you that free choice of the will ought not to have been given, because by it everyone sins. When I put to this view of yours that one cannot act rightly except by this same free choice of the will, and asserted that God gave it rather for that purpose, you answered that free will ought to have been given us as justice was given, which no one can use except rightly. That answer of yours drove us into such long circuits of discussion, in which we were to prove to you that both greater and lesser goods are only from God. That could not have been shown so clearly unless first, against the opinions of the impious folly by which “the fool says in his heart, There is no God,” some reasoning on so great a matter, undertaken according to our small capacity, with the same God helping us on so dangerous a journey, had been directed toward something evident. Yet these two things, that God exists and that all goods are from him, though they were held with unshaken faith even before, have been so treated that this third too, that free will is to be counted among goods, appears most evidently. For it was made plain in the earlier discussion, and agreed between us, that the nature of the body is of a lower rank than the nature of the mind, and so the mind is a greater good than the body. If, then, among the goods of the body we find some that a man can use wrongly, and yet we do not therefore say that they ought not to have been given, since we confess that they are goods, what wonder if in the mind too there are some goods that we can also use wrongly, but which, because they are goods, could not have been given except by him from whom all goods are? For you see how much good is lacking to a body that lacks hands; and yet he uses his hands badly who does cruel or shameful deeds with them. If you saw someone without feet, you would admit that a very great good is lacking to the soundness of the body; and yet you would not deny that one who used his feet to harm someone or to disgrace himself uses his feet badly. With the eyes we see this light and distinguish the forms of bodies; this is the most beautiful thing in our body, which is why these members are placed at a kind of summit of dignity; and the use of the eyes serves to protect health and brings many other conveniences of life. Yet very many people do very many things shamefully with their eyes and force them to serve lust. And you see how much good is lacking in a face if the eyes are lacking; and when they are present, who gave them, but God, the giver of all goods? Just as, then, you approve these things in the body, and, not looking at those who use them badly, praise him who gave these goods, so you must admit that free will, without which no one can live rightly, is both a good and given by God, and that those who use this good badly are to be condemned, rather than that he who gave it ought not to have given it. E. I would first like you to prove to me that free will is a good, and then I would grant that God gave it to us, since I admit that all goods are from God. A. Have I not, then, proved it to you after all, with such great labor in the earlier discussion, when you admitted that every appearance and form of body subsists from the highest form of all things, that is, from truth, and granted that it is good? For Truth itself says in the Gospel that our hairs are numbered. Have you forgotten what we said about the supremacy of number and the power that reaches from end to end? What great perversity is it, then, to count our hairs among goods, though among the smallest and most worthless, and to find no author to whom to ascribe them but God, the maker of all goods, since both the greatest and the least goods are from him from whom every good is; and to doubt about free will, without which, as even those who live worst grant, one cannot live rightly? Now answer, please: which seems to you better in us, that without which one can live rightly, or that without which one cannot live rightly? E. Spare me now, please; I am ashamed of my blindness. Who would doubt that that without which there is no right life is far more excellent? A. Will you deny, then, that a one-eyed man can live rightly? E. Far be such monstrous madness from me. A. Since, then, you grant that the eye is a good in the body, though one who loses it is not hindered from living rightly, will free will seem to you no good, when without it no one lives rightly? Look at justice, which no one uses badly. It is counted among the highest goods that are in man himself, as are all the virtues of the mind, of which the right and honorable life itself consists. For no one uses prudence or fortitude or temperance badly; in all of these, as in the justice you mentioned, right reason prevails, without which there can be no virtues. And no one can use right reason badly.

These, then, are great goods; but you must remember that not only great goods but even the least cannot exist except from him from whom all goods are, that is, from God. For the earlier discussion convinced you of this, and you assented to it so often and so gladly. So the virtues by which one lives rightly are great goods; the beauties of any bodies, without which one can live rightly, are the least goods; and the powers of the mind, without which one cannot live rightly, are middle goods. No one uses the virtues badly; but the other goods, that is, the middle and the least, anyone can use not only well but also badly. And no one uses virtue badly because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can also use not well; and no one uses something badly by using it well. So the abundance and greatness of God's goodness has granted the existence not only of great goods but also of middle and least ones. His goodness is more to be praised in the great goods than in the middle, and more in the middle than in the least; but more in all of them than if he had not bestowed them all. E. I agree. But this troubles me: since the question is about free will, and we see that it uses the other things well or not well, how is it itself to be counted among the things we use? A. In the same way as all the things that we know with knowledge we know by reason, and yet reason itself is counted among the things that we know by reason. Or have you forgotten that, when we asked what things are known by reason, you admitted that reason too is known by reason? So do not wonder if, while we use other things through free will, we can also use free will itself through itself, so that in a way the will that uses other things uses itself, just as reason, which knows other things, knows itself. For memory too not only holds all the other things that we remember; but since we do not forget that we have memory, memory in a way holds itself in us, remembering not only other things but itself; or rather, we remember both other things and memory itself through memory. When the will, then, which is a middle good, cleaves to the unchangeable good, and to one that is common and not private, such as is that truth of which we have spoken much and said nothing worthy, the man holds the happy life; and that happy life itself, that is, the disposition of a mind that cleaves to the unchangeable good, is the proper and primary good of man. In it are also all the virtues, which no one can use badly. For although these are great and primary in man, it is understood well enough that they are proper to each individual, not common. For by truth and wisdom, which is common to all, all become wise and happy by cleaving to it. But one man does not become happy by the happiness of another; for even when he imitates him in order to become so, he seeks to become happy by that by which he sees the other has become so, namely, by that unchangeable and common truth. Nor does anyone become prudent by another's prudence, or brave by another's fortitude, or temperate by another's temperance, or just by another man's justice; but by fitting the mind to those unchangeable rules and lights of the virtues, which live incorruptibly in the common truth and wisdom itself, to which that other man too fitted and fixed his mind, whom one has set before oneself, endowed with these virtues, to imitate. The will, then, cleaving to the common and unchangeable good, obtains the first and great goods of man, though it is itself a kind of middle good. But the will turned away from the unchangeable and common good, and turned toward its own good, or toward an exterior good, or toward a lower good, sins. It turns toward its own when it wants to be in its own power; toward an exterior good when it is eager to know the private affairs of others or whatever does not concern it; toward a lower good when it loves bodily pleasure. And so a man, made proud, curious, and lascivious, is taken up by another life, which in comparison with the higher life is death; and yet that life is ruled by the governance of divine providence, which arranges all things in their fitting places and distributes to each what is his according to his merits. So it comes about that neither those goods which sinners seek are in any way evil, nor is free will itself, which we found must be counted among certain middle goods; but the evil is its turning away from the unchangeable good and its turning toward changeable goods. And since this turning away and turning toward is not forced but voluntary, the punishment of misery follows it worthily and justly.

But perhaps you are going to ask: since the will is moved when it turns away from the unchangeable good toward a changeable good, where does this motion come from? It is certainly evil, even though free will, since without it one cannot live rightly, is to be counted among goods. For if this motion, that is, the turning of the will away from the Lord God, is without doubt sin, can we call God the author of sin? So this motion will not be from God. Where, then, will it be from? If I answer your question by saying that I do not know, you will perhaps be sadder; yet I would be answering truly. For what is nothing cannot be known. Only hold fast to unshaken piety, so that no good comes before you, whether you perceive it or understand it or think of it in any way, that is not from God. For so no nature comes before you that is not from God. Wherever you see measure and number and order, do not hesitate to ascribe the thing to God as its craftsman. And from whatever you take these away entirely, nothing at all will remain. For even if some beginning of some form remains, where you find neither measure nor number nor order (since wherever these are, form is complete), you must take away even that beginning of form, which seems to lie before the craftsman like material to be completed. For if the completion of form is a good, the beginning of form is already some good. So, when every good has been taken away entirely, not something but absolutely nothing will remain. But every good is from God; so there is no nature that is not from God. As for that motion of turning away, then, which we admit is sin: since it is a defective motion, and every defect is from nothing, see where it belongs, and do not doubt that it does not belong to God. Yet since this defect is voluntary, it is placed in our power. For if you fear it, you must not will it; and if you do not will it, it will not exist. What, then, is more secure than to be in that life where what you do not will cannot happen to you? But since man cannot rise of his own accord as he fell of his own accord, let us hold with firm faith the right hand of God stretched out to us from above, that is, our Lord Jesus Christ; let us wait for him with sure hope and long for him with burning love. But if you think that something about the origin of sin still needs to be inquired into more carefully (for I myself think there is no need at all now), if you do think so, it must be put off to another discussion. E. I certainly follow your wish that we put off to another time what arises from this. For I would not grant you that enough has already been inquired into it.

E. Since it is clear enough to me that free will is to be counted among goods, and not the least of them, and since from this we are also forced to admit that it was given by God and ought to have been given, I now want to learn from you, if you think it timely, where that motion comes from by which the will itself is turned away from the common and unchangeable good and turned toward goods that are its own, or another's, or lowest, all of them changeable. A. Why do we need to know this? E. Because if the will was given in such a way that it has this motion by nature, then it is turned toward these things by necessity; and no fault can be found where nature and necessity rule. A. Does this motion please you or displease you? E. It displeases me. A. Then you blame it. E. I certainly blame it. A. Then you blame a blameless motion of the mind. E. I do not blame a blameless motion of the mind; but I do not know whether there is any fault in leaving the unchangeable good and turning toward changeable goods. A. Then you blame what you do not know. E. Do not press me on a word. I said, “I do not know whether there is any fault,” meaning to be understood that there is undoubtedly fault. By the word I used, “I do not know,” I was surely mocking any doubt about a plain matter. A. See what the most certain truth is, which forced you to forget so quickly what you said a little earlier. For if this motion exists by nature or necessity, it can in no way be blameworthy; but you hold so very firmly that it is blameworthy that you thought even a doubt about so certain a matter deserved mockery. Why, then, did it seem to you something to assert, or at least to say with some doubt, which you yourself prove plainly false? For you said: “If free will was given in such a way that it has this motion by nature, then it is turned toward these things by necessity; and no fault can be found where nature and necessity rule.” But you ought in no way to have doubted that it was not so given, since you do not doubt that this motion is blameworthy. E. I said that the motion itself is blameworthy, and that it therefore displeases me, and I cannot doubt that it is to be blamed; but I deny that the soul which is drawn by this motion from the unchangeable good to changeable goods is to be blamed, if its nature is such that it is moved by it of necessity. A. Whose is this motion, which you grant is certainly to be blamed? E. I see it in the mind, but whose it is I do not know. A. Do you deny that the mind is moved by that motion? E. I do not deny it. A. Do you deny, then, that the motion by which a stone is moved is the stone's motion? I do not mean the motion by which we move it, or by which it is moved by some outside force, as when it is thrown up into the sky, but the motion by which it tends toward the earth by its own inclination and falls. E. I do not deny that the motion by which, as you say, it inclines and seeks the depths is the stone's motion; but it is natural. If the soul too has that motion in this way, it is certainly natural as well; and because it is moved naturally, it cannot rightly be reproached; for even if it is moved to its ruin, it is driven by the necessity of its own nature. But since we do not doubt that this motion is blameworthy, we must deny altogether that it is natural; and so it is not like that motion by which the stone is moved naturally. A. Did we accomplish anything in our two earlier discussions? E. We certainly did. A. I believe, then, that you remember that in the first discussion it was well established that the mind becomes the slave of lust by nothing but its own will. For it cannot be forced into this disgrace by a superior or by an equal, because that is unjust, nor by an inferior, because that is impossible. It remains, then, that this motion by which the mind turns its will to enjoy from the Creator to the creature is its own. And if this motion is counted as a fault (and whoever doubts it seemed to you to deserve mockery), it is certainly not natural but voluntary. In this it is like the motion by which a stone is carried downward, that as that one is the stone's own, so this is the mind's own; but it is unlike it in this, that the stone does not have it in its power to check the motion by which it is carried downward, while the mind, as long as it does not will, is not so moved as to abandon higher things and choose lower ones. And so that motion is natural to the stone, while this one is voluntary to the mind. Hence anyone who said that a stone sins because it tends by its weight toward the depths would be judged, I will not say more stupid than the stone, but certainly mad; but we accuse the mind of sin when we prove that it has abandoned higher things and preferred lower ones for enjoyment. So what need is there to ask where this motion comes from by which the will is turned away from the unchangeable good toward a changeable good, since we confess that it is only the mind's, and voluntary, and therefore blameworthy? All useful teaching on this matter serves this purpose: that, having condemned and checked this motion, we may turn our will from its slide into temporal things to the enjoyment of the everlasting good. E. I see, and in a way I touch and hold, that what you say is true. For I feel nothing so firmly and inwardly as that I have a will and am moved by it to enjoy something; and I find absolutely nothing that I could call mine, if the will by which I will and do not will is not mine. So to whom is it to be attributed, if I do something evil through it, but to me? For since the good God made me, and I can do nothing well except through the will, it is clear enough that it was given by the good God rather for this. And unless the motion by which the will turns this way or that were voluntary and placed in our power, a man would neither be praised when he turns the hinge of the will, so to speak, toward higher things, nor blamed when he twists it toward lower things; nor should he be admonished at all to neglect these and want to attain eternal things, and to be unwilling to live badly and willing to live well. Whoever thinks that a man is not to be admonished in this way should be cast out of the number of human beings.

This being so, I am inexpressibly troubled as to how it can be that God foreknows all future things and yet we sin by no necessity. For whoever says that anything can turn out otherwise than God foreknew it is trying, with most insane impiety, to destroy God's foreknowledge. So if God foreknew that the first man would sin (which anyone must grant me who confesses with me that God foreknows all future things), if this is so, I do not say that he should not have made him, for he made him good, nor could the sin of one whom he made good harm God in any way; rather, as he had shown his goodness in making him, he showed also his justice in punishing him and his mercy in setting him free. So I do not say that he should not have made him; but I say this: since he had foreknown that he would sin, what God foreknew would happen had to happen. How, then, is the will free, where so inevitable a necessity appears? A. You have knocked hard; may God's mercy be with us and open to those who knock. Yet I would believe that most people are tormented by this question for no other reason than that they do not ask it piously, and are quicker to excuse their sins than to confess them. Some gladly suppose that no divine providence presides over human affairs; and while they commit both their minds and their bodies to chance happenings, they hand themselves over to be beaten and torn by their lusts. Denying divine judgments and deceiving human ones, they think they can ward off their accusers by the patronage of fortune; yet they usually represent and paint fortune as blind, so that either they are better than the power by which they think themselves ruled, or they admit that they too feel and say these things with the same blindness. Nor is it absurd to grant such people that they do everything by chance, since in acting they fall. But against this opinion, full of most foolish and mad error, enough was said, I think, in our second conversation. Others, though they do not dare to deny that God's providence presides over human life, prefer to believe with wicked error that it is weak or unjust or evil, rather than to confess their sins with suppliant piety. If all these would allow themselves to be persuaded that, when they think of the best, the most just, and the most powerful, they should believe that the goodness and justice and power of God are far greater and higher than whatever they conceive in thought; and if, considering themselves, they would understand that they owe God thanks even if he had willed them to be something lower than they are, and would cry out with all the bones and marrow of their conscience, “I said, Lord, have mercy on me; heal my soul, for I have sinned against you”: then they would be led along the sure paths of divine mercy into wisdom, so that they would be neither puffed up by what they found nor troubled by what they did not find, becoming by knowing better equipped for seeing, and by not knowing gentler in seeking. But you, of whom I do not doubt that you are already persuaded of this, see how easily I shall answer so great a question, once you have first answered a few questions of mine.