# On Free Choice of the Will

- Author: [Augustine of Hippo](https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/authors/augustine-of-hippo/)
- Latin title: *De libero arbitrio libri tres*
- Date: ca. 387–395 (approximate)
- Source: J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina, vol. 32 (Paris, 1841), cols. 1221–1310 (Benedictine text of the Maurists) (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Latina, digitized by Open Greek and Latin (patrologia_latina-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0)

- Translation: Claude, from the original text, unless a passage says otherwise; each passage below gives the translator
- Work page: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/
- Passages: 61

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.1

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-1
- Source: PL 32:1222–1223
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Evodius asks whether God is the author of evil; Augustine distinguishes evil done from evil suffered and argues that evil cannot be learned, since learning and understanding are good.

### Latin text

EVODIUS: Dic mihi, quæso te, utrum Deus. non sit auctor mali? AUGUSTINUS: Dicam, si planum fcceris de quo malo quæras. Duobus enim modis ap­ pellare solemus malum: uno, cum male quemque fecisse dicimus: alio, cum mali aliquid esse perpes. v sum. E. De utroque scire cupio. A. At ei Deum bonum esse nosti vel credis, neque enim aliter fas est, male non facit: rursus, si Deum justum fatemur, nam et hoc negare sacrilegum est, ut bonis præmia, ita supplicia malis tribuit; quæ utique supplicia pa­ tientibus mala sunt. Quamobrem si ncmo injuste pcr­ nas luit. quod necesse est credamus, quandoquidem divina providentia Ine universum regi credimus, illius prin i generis malorum nullo modo, hujus autem se­ cundi auctor cst Deus. E. Est ergo alius auctor illius mali, cujus Deum non rise compertum est? A. Est certe: non enim nullo auctore fieri possel. Si antem quæris quisnam iste sil, dici non potest: non enim unus aliquis est, srd quisque malus sui malefacti auctor est. Unde si dubitas, illud atlende quod supra dictum est, malefacta justitia Dei vindicari. Non enim justc vindicarentur, nisi fierent voluntate. E. Nescio utrum quisquam peccet, qui non di­ diccrit: quod si,'crum cst, quisnam sit illc a quo peccare didicerimus, inquiro. A. Aliquid boni existi­ mas esse disciplinam? E. Quis audcat dicere malum esse disciplinam? A. Quid, si nec bonum nec malum est? E. Mihi bonum videtur. A. Bene sane; siquidem scientia ner illam datnr aut excitatur, nec quisquam nisi per disciplinam aliquid discit: an tu aliter putas? E. Ego per disciplinam non nisi bona disci arbitror. A. Vide ergo ne non discantur mala: nam disciplina, nisi a discendo non dicta est. E. Uude ergo ab ho­ mine fiunt si non discuutur? A. Eo fortasse quod se a disciplina, id est a discendo avertit atque abalienal: sed sive hoc, sive aliud aliqnid sit, illud certe mani­ festum est, quoniam disciplina bonum est, et a di­ sceudo dicta est disciplina, mala disci omnino non posse. Si enim discuntur, disciplina continentur, atque ita disciplina non erit bonum; bonum est autem, ut ipse concedis: non igitur discuntur mala, ct frustra illum a quo male facere discimus, quæris; aut si discuntur mala, vitanda non facienda discuntur. Ex quo male facere nihil est, nisi a disciplina deviare. E. Prorsus ego duas disciplinas esse puto; unam per quam bene faccre, aliam per quam male faccre discimus. Sed cum quæreres utrum disciplina bonum esset, ipsius boni amor intentionem meam rapuit, ut illam disciplinam intuerer, quae hene faciendi est, cx quo honum esse respondi: nunc autem admoneor esse aliam, quam procul dubio malum esse confirmo, et cujus auctorem requiro. A. Saltem intelligentiam non nisi bonum putas? E. Istam plane ita bonam puto, ut non videam quid in homine possit esse præstan­ tius; nec ullo modo dixcriln aliquam intelligentiam malam case posse. A. Quid? cum docetur quisque, si non intelligat, poteritne tibi doctus videri? E. Omni­ no nen poterit. A. Si ergo omnis intelligentia bona est, nec quisquam qui non intelligit, discit; omnis qui discit, bene facit: omnis enim qui discit, intelli­ git; et omnis qui intelligit, bene facit: quisquis igitur quærit auctorcm, pcr quem aliquid discimus, aucto­ rem profecto per quem bene facimus, quaerit. Qua­ propter dcsine velle investigare nescio quem malum doctorem. Si enim malus est, doctor non est: si do­ ctor est, ntalus non est.

### English translation (Claude)

Evodius: Tell me, please, whether God is not the author of evil?
Augustine: I will tell you, if you make plain which evil you are asking about. For we usually speak of evil in two ways: in one, when we say that someone has done evil; in the other, when he has suffered something evil.
E. I want to know about both.
A. If you know or believe that God is good (and it is not right to think otherwise), he does not do evil. Again, if we acknowledge that God is just (and to deny this too is sacrilege), then as he assigns rewards to the good, so he assigns punishments to the wicked; and these punishments are certainly evils to those who suffer them. Therefore, if no one pays a penalty unjustly, which we must believe, since we believe that this universe is ruled by divine providence, God is in no way the author of the first kind of evil, but he is the author of the second.
E. Is there, then, another author of that evil of which God has been found not to be the author?
A. There certainly is, for it could not be done with no author. But if you ask who that is, it cannot be said; for it is not some one being, but each wicked person is the author of his own wrongdoing. If you doubt this, attend to what was said above: wrongdoings are punished by the justice of God. They would not be punished justly unless they were done by will.
E. I do not know whether anyone sins who has not learned to sin. If that is true, I ask who it is from whom we have learned to sin.
A. Do you think learning is something good?
E. Who would dare to say that learning is evil?
A. What if it is neither good nor evil?
E. It seems good to me.
A. Quite right, since knowledge is given or awakened through it, and no one learns anything except through learning. Or do you think otherwise?
E. I think that through learning only good things are learned.
A. See, then, whether evil things are not learned at all; for “learning” (disciplina) takes its name from nothing but “to learn” (discere).
E. Then where do evil deeds come from in a human being, if they are not learned?
A. Perhaps from this, that he turns himself away and estranges himself from learning, that is, from learning anything. But whether it is this or something else, this at least is clear: since learning is good, and learning is named from learning, evil things cannot be learned at all. For if they are learned, they are contained in learning, and so learning will not be a good; but it is a good, as you yourself grant. So evil things are not learned, and you seek in vain the one from whom we learn to do evil; or, if evil things are learned, they are learned in order to be avoided, not to be done. Hence to do evil is nothing but to stray from learning.
E. I really think there are two kinds of learning: one by which we learn to do well, another by which we learn to do evil. But when you asked whether learning was a good, the love of the good itself carried off my attention, so that I looked at the learning that belongs to doing well, and so I answered that it was good. Now I am reminded that there is another, which I affirm without any doubt to be evil, and whose author I am looking for.
A. At least you think that understanding is nothing but good?
E. I think it so good that I do not see what could be more excellent in a human being; and I would in no way say that any understanding can be evil.
A. Well then, when someone is taught, if he does not understand, could he seem to you to have learned?
E. Not at all.
A. If, then, all understanding is good, and no one learns who does not understand, everyone who learns does well. For everyone who learns understands, and everyone who understands does well. So whoever seeks the author through whom we learn something is surely seeking the author through whom we do well. Stop wanting, then, to search out some evil teacher or other. For if he is evil, he is not a teacher; if he is a teacher, he is not evil.

### Translation notes

- The play on disciplina (learning, teaching) and discere (to learn) cannot be kept fully in English.
- The Migne OCR is noisy; clear letter slips are translated by sense.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.1 (PL 32:1222–1223; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-1).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.2

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-2
- Source: PL 32:1223
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine recalls that this question drove him to the Manichaeans and sets out the faith from which the inquiry starts: one good, almighty Creator, who is not the author of sin, and his begotten Son.

### Latin text

E. Agc jam, quoniam satis cogis ut fatcar non nos discere niale facere, dic mihi unde malc facia. mus. A. Eam quæstionem movcs, quæ me admodum adolescentem vehementer exercuit, et fatigatum in hæreticos impulit, atque dejecit. Quo casu ita sum afflictus, et tantis obrutus acervis inanium fabularum, ut nisi mihi amor inveniendi veri opem divinam im­ petravisset, emergere inde, atque in Ipsam primam quærendi libertatem respirare non possem. Et quo­ niam mecum sedulo actum cst, ut ista quæstione li­ bcrarcr, co tecum agam ordine quem secutus evasi. Adrit enim Deus, et nos intelligere quod credidimus, faciet. Præscriptum cnim per prophetam gradum, qui ait, Nisi credideritis, non intelligelis,tenere nos,bene nobis conscii sumus. Credimus autem ex uno Deo omnia csse qua sunt; et tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem Deum. Movetautem ac!­ mum, si peccata ex iis animabus sunt quas Deus crea­ vit, ilhc au!cm animae ex Deo, quomodo non parvo intervallo peccata referantur in Deum. E. Id nunc plane abs te dictum cst, quod me cogitantem satis excruciat, et quod ad istam inquisi­ tionem cocgil ct traxit. A. Virili animo esto, ct credo quod credis: nihil enim croditur melius, etiamsi causa latcat cur ita sit. Oplimc namque de Deo existi­ mare verissimum est pietatis exordium; nee quisquam de illo optime existimat, qui non cum omnipotentem, atque ex nulla particula commutabilem credit; bono­ rum ctiam omnium creatorem, quibus est ipse præ­ stantior; rectorem quoque justissimum comm omnium quæ creavit; nec ulla adjutum esse natura in crean­ do, quasi qui non sibi sufficeret. Ex quo fit ut de nihilo creaverit omnia; de se autem non creaverit, sed gcnuerit quod sibi par esset, quem Filium Dei unicum dicimus, quem cum planius enuntiare cona­ mur, Dei Virtutem ct Dei Sapientiam nominamus, per quam fecit omnia, quæ de nihilo facta sunt. Quibus constitutis, ad inlelligentiam ejus rei quam requiris, opitulante Deo, nitamur hoc modo.

### English translation (Claude)

E. Come now, since you press me hard enough to admit that we do not learn to do evil, tell me where our doing evil comes from.
A. You raise the question that troubled me intensely when I was quite young, wore me out, drove me into the company of heretics, and threw me down. I was so wounded by that fall, and buried under such heaps of empty fables, that if my love of finding the truth had not won me God's help, I could not have come up out of it and breathed again in that first freedom of inquiry. And since great pains were taken with me to free me from this question, I will deal with you in the same order that I followed in my escape. For God will be with us and will make us understand what we have believed. We are well aware that we are holding to the step prescribed by the prophet, who says, “Unless you believe, you will not understand.” Now we believe that all things that exist are from the one God, and yet that God is not the author of sins. But the mind is troubled: if sins come from the souls that God created, and those souls come from God, how are sins not, at a short remove, referred back to God?
E. You have now said plainly what torments me enough when I think about it, and what has driven and dragged me into this inquiry.
A. Be of manly spirit, and believe what you believe; for nothing is believed better, even if the reason why it is so is hidden. To think of God in the best way is the truest beginning of piety; and no one thinks of him in the best way who does not believe him almighty and unchangeable in any least part; the creator also of all good things, he himself being more excellent than they; the most just ruler, too, of all that he created; and that he was helped by no nature in creating, as if he were not sufficient for himself. From this it follows that he created all things from nothing; but from himself he did not create but begot what would be equal to himself, whom we call the only Son of God, whom, when we try to express him more plainly, we name the Power of God and the Wisdom of God, through whom he made all things that were made from nothing. With these points settled, let us strive with God's help toward an understanding of the matter you ask about, in this way.

### Scripture references

- Isa 7:9: quotation, high confidence
- 1 Cor 1:24: allusion, high confidence
- John 1:3: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Isa 7:9 is quoted in the Old Latin form that follows the Greek Septuagint (“unless you believe, you will not understand”); the Hebrew reads “you will not be established.”
- “The heretics” are the Manichaeans, whom Augustine followed in his youth.
- The OCR reads “Den esse peccatorum auctorem Dcum”; the sense and the argument require “non esse … Deum” (“that God is not the author of sins”), corrected here.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.2 (PL 32:1223; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-2).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.3

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-3
- Source: PL 32:1223–1225
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Testing why adultery is evil, Augustine rejects the law, the golden rule, and condemnation by courts as the reason and locates the evil in lust (libido), which makes even the unfulfilled desire guilty.

### Latin text

Qua'ris certe uude malc faciamus: prius ergo discutiendum est qnid sit male facere; qua de re tibi quid vidcatur exprome. Quod si non potes totum si­ mul brevitcr verbis comprehendere, saltem particu­ latim malefacta ipsa commemorando, sententiam tuam notam fac milii. E. Adulteria et homicidia et sacrilegia, ut omittam cætera, quibus enumeradis vel tempus vel memuria non suppetit, quis est cui non male facta vidcantur? A. Dic clio prius, cur adulterium male fieri putes; an quia id facere lex vetat? E. Non sane ideo malum est, quia vetatur lege; sed ideo vetatur lege, quia malum est. A. Quid, si quispiam nos exagitet, exaggerans delectationes adulterii, et quxrens a nobis cur hoc malum et da­ mnatione dignum judicemus; num ad auctoritatem legis confugicndum censes hominibus, jam non tan­ tum credere, sed intelligcre cupientibus? Nam et ego tecum credo, et inconcusse credo, omnibusque popu­ iis atque gentibus credendum esse ciamo, malum esse adulterium: sed nunc molimur id quod in fidem recepimus, etiam intelligendo scire ac tenere firmis­ simum. Considera itaque quantum potcs, et renuntia mihi, quanam ratione adulterium malum esse cogno­ veris. E. Hoc scio malum esse, quod hoc,ipse in uxore mea pati nollem: quisquis autem alteri facit quod sibi fieri non vull, male utique facit. A. Quid, si cujuspiam libido ca sit, ut uxorem suam præbeat alteri, liben­ terque ab eo corrumpi patiatur, in cujus uxorem vicis­ sim parem cupit habere licentiam? nihilne mali facere tibi vidctur? E. Imo plurimum. A. At iste non illa regula peccat: non enim id facit quod pali nolit. Quamobrem aliud tibi quærendum cst, unde malum esse adulterium convincas. E. Eo mihi vidctur malum, quod hujus criminis homines vidi sæpe damnari. A. Quid. propter recte facta nonne homines plerumque damnati sunt? Reccn. se historiam, ne te ad alios libros mittam, cam ipsam quæ divina auctoritate præcellit; jam invenies quam male de Apostolis ct de omnibus martyribus sentia­ mus, si placet nobis damnationem certum indicium esse malefacti, cum illi omnes damnatione digni pro­ pter confessionem suam judicati sint. Quamobrem si quidquid damnatur malum est, malum crat illo tem­ pore credere in Christum, et ipsam confiteri fidcin: si autem non omne malum est quod damnatur, quære aliud unde adulterium malum esse doceas E. Quid tibi respondeam non invenio. A. Fortassis ergo libido in adulterio malum est: sed dum tu foris in ipso facto quod jam vidcri potest, malum quæris, pateris angustias. Nam ut intelligas libidinem in adulterio malum esse, si cui etiam non contingat facultas concumbendi cnm conjuge aliena, planum tamen aliquo modo sit id cum cupere, ct si potestas detur facturum esse, non minus reus est, quam si in ipso facto deprehenderetur. E. Nihil est omnino manifestius, ct jam video non opus esse lon­ ga sermocinatione, ut mihi de homicidio et sacrilegio, ac prorsus de omnibus peccatis persuadeatur. Clarum est enim jam nihil aliud quam libidincm in toto ma­ lefaicndi genere dominari.

### English translation (Claude)

A. You are asking, of course, where our doing evil comes from; so first we must examine what doing evil is. Tell me what you think about it. If you cannot take in the whole briefly in words at once, at least make your view known to me by listing the evil deeds themselves one by one.
E. Adulteries and murders and sacrileges, to leave out the rest, for the listing of which neither time nor memory suffices: who is there to whom these do not seem evil deeds?
A. Tell me first, then, why you think adultery is an evil deed. Is it because the law forbids doing it?
E. Surely it is not evil because it is forbidden by law; it is forbidden by law because it is evil.
A. What if someone harasses us, magnifying the pleasures of adultery and asking us why we judge it evil and worthy of condemnation? Do you think that people who now desire not only to believe but to understand must take refuge in the authority of the law? For I too believe with you, and believe unshakably, and I proclaim that all peoples and nations must believe, that adultery is evil; but now we are striving to know by understanding, and to hold most firmly, what we have received in faith. So consider as well as you can, and report to me by what reasoning you have come to know that adultery is evil.
E. I know that it is evil because I would not want to suffer it myself in the case of my own wife; and whoever does to another what he does not want done to himself certainly does evil.
A. What if someone's lust is such that he offers his wife to another and willingly allows her to be corrupted by him, desiring in turn to have equal license with that man's wife? Does he seem to you to do nothing evil?
E. On the contrary, a great deal.
A. But he does not sin by that rule, for he is not doing what he would not want to suffer. So you must look for something else by which to prove that adultery is evil.
E. It seems evil to me because I have often seen people condemned for this crime.
A. What? Have not people very often been condemned for right actions? Review history (not to send you to other books, take the very history that excels by divine authority), and you will find how badly we would think of the apostles and of all the martyrs, if we choose to take condemnation as a sure sign of wrongdoing, since all of them were judged worthy of condemnation because of their confession. So if whatever is condemned is evil, it was evil at that time to believe in Christ and to confess that faith; but if not everything that is condemned is evil, look for something else by which to show that adultery is evil.
E. I cannot find what to answer you.
A. Perhaps, then, lust is the evil in adultery. But as long as you look for the evil outside, in the act itself that can be seen, you are in difficulties. To help you understand that lust is the evil in adultery: if someone has no opportunity of lying with another man's wife, but it is somehow plain that he desires it and would do it if he had the power, he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the act itself.
E. Nothing is more evident; and I see now that there is no need of a long conversation to convince me about murder and sacrilege and indeed about all sins. For it is now clear that nothing else but lust rules in every kind of wrongdoing.

### Scripture references

- Matt 7:12: echo, low confidence
- Matt 5:28: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Libido is rendered “lust” throughout this book; Augustine defines it at the end of 1.4 as love of things one can lose against one's will.
- Evodius's rule echoes the golden rule (Matt 7:12, in its negative form); the guilt of unfulfilled desire recalls Matt 5:28.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.3 (PL 32:1223–1225; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-3).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.4

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-4
- Source: PL 32:1225–1227
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Through the case of a slave who kills his master from fear, Augustine and Evodius define blameworthy lust as the love of things that one can lose against one's will.

### Latin text

A. Scisne cHam istam libidinem alio nomine cu­ pklidatem vocari? E. Scio. A. Quid? inter hanc et mctum nihilne interesse, an aliquid putas? E. Imo plurimum hæc ab invicem dislare arbitror. A. Credo te ob hoc arbitrari, quia cupiditas appetit, metus fu­ gil. E. Est ita ut diris. A. Quid si crgo quispiam non cupiditate adipiscendæ alicujus rei, sed metuens nc quid ei mali accidat, hominem occidcrit? num homi­ eida iste non erit? E. Erit quidem, sud non ideo fa­ ctum hoc cupiditatis dominatu caret: nam qui me­ tuens hominem occidit, cupit utique sine metu vivere. A. Et parvum tibi videtur bonum sine metu vivere? E. Magnum bonum est, sed hoc illi homicidæ por fa­ cinus suum provenire nullo modo potest. A. Non quæro quid ci provenire possit, sed quid ipse cupiat. certe cnim bonum cupit, qui cupit vitam mctu libe­ ram; ci idcirco ista cupiditas culpanda non est; alio­ quin omnes culpabimus amatores boni. Proinde co­ gimur fateri esse homicidium, in quo nequeat malæ illius cupiditatis dominatio reperiri; falsumque erit illud, quod in omnibus peccatis ut mala sint, libido dominatur; aut crit aliquod homicidium, quod pos­ sit non esse peccatum. E. Si homicidium est homi­ nem occidere, potest accidere aliqnando sine peccato: nam ct miles hostem, et judex vel minister ejus no­ centem, et cui forte invito atque imprudenti telum manu fugit, non mihi videntur peccare, cum homi­ nem occidunt. A. Assentior: sed homicidae isti appel­ lari non solent. Responde itaque, utrum illum qui do. minum occidit, a quo sibi metucbat cruciatus graves, in eorum numcro habendum existimes, qui sic homi­ nem occidunt, ut ne homicidarum quidem nomine digni sint? E. Longe ab eis istum differre video: nam illi vel ex legibus faciunt, vel non contra leges; hu­ jus autem facinus nulla lex approbat. A. Rursus me ad auctoritatem revocas: sed meminisse te oportet id nunc a nobis esse susceptum, ut intelligamus quod credimus; legibus autcm credi­ mus: tentandum itaque est, si quo modo possumus id ipsum intelligere, utrum jex quae punit hoc factum, non perperam puniat. E. Nullo modo perperam pu­ nit, quandoquidem punit eum qui volens et sciens do­ minum necat, quod nullus istorum. A. Ecquid, recor­ daris te paulo ante dixisse, in omni facto malo libidinem dominari, et eo ipso malum esse? E. Recordor sane. A. Quid? illud nonne idem tu.conces­ sisti, eum qui cupit sine metu vivere, non habere ma­ lara cupiditatem? E. Et hoc recordor. A. Cum ergo ista cupiditate a servo dominus interimitur, non illa culpabili cupiditate interimitur. Quamobrem cur sit hoc facinus malum, nondum comperimus. Convenit cnim inter nos omnia malefacta non ob aliud mab esse, nisi quod libidine, id est improbanda cupiditate, fiuut. E. Jam mihi videtur injuria istedamnari: quod quidem non auderem dicere, si aliud haberem quod dicerem. A. Itane prius tibi persuasisti tantum scelus impunitum esse oportere, quam c sideraros utrum ille servus propter satiandas libidines suas metu do­ mini carere cupiverit? Cupcre namque sine metu vi­ vere, non tantum bonorum, sed eliam malorum omnium est: verum hoc interest, quod id boni ap­ petunt avertendo amorcm ab iit rebus, quas sine amit­ tendi periculo ncqueunt haberi; mali autem ut his frucndis cum securitate incubent, removere impedi­ menta conantur, et propterca facinorosam scelera. tamque vitam, quæ mors mclius vocatur, gerunt. E. Resipisco, et admodum gaudeo jam Ine plane cogno­ visse quid sit etiam illa culpabilis cupiditas, quæ libi­ do nominatur. Quam esse jam apparet carum rerum amorem, quas potest quisque invitus amittere.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Do you know that this lust is also called by another name, desire (cupiditas)?
E. I know.
A. Well, do you think there is no difference between it and fear, or some difference?
E. On the contrary, I think they are very far apart.
A. I suppose you think so because desire seeks and fear flees.
E. It is as you say.
A. What, then, if someone kills a man not from desire to obtain something, but fearing that some evil may befall him? Will he not be a murderer?
E. He will; but that does not mean this act is free of the dominion of desire, for one who kills a man out of fear certainly desires to live without fear.
A. And does living without fear seem a small good to you?
E. It is a great good, but it can in no way come to that murderer through his crime.
A. I am not asking what can come to him, but what he himself desires. Surely one who desires a life free from fear desires a good, and so that desire is not to be blamed; otherwise we shall blame all lovers of the good. So we are forced to admit that there is a murder in which the dominion of that evil desire cannot be found; and then it will be false that in all sins lust rules, so that they are evil; or else there will be some murder that can be no sin.
E. If murder is killing a man, it can happen sometimes without sin. A soldier who kills an enemy, a judge or his officer who kills a guilty man, and one from whose hand a weapon slips, perhaps against his will and unawares: these do not seem to me to sin when they kill a man.
A. I agree; but these are not usually called murderers. Answer, then, whether you think that a slave who has killed his master, from whom he feared severe tortures, should be counted among those who kill a man in such a way that they do not even deserve the name of murderers.
E. I see that he differs greatly from them: they act either according to the laws or not against the laws, but no law approves his deed.
A. Again you call me back to authority. But you should remember that what we have now undertaken is to understand what we believe. We believe the laws; so we must try, if we can in any way, to understand this very point: whether the law that punishes this deed does not punish it wrongly.
E. It in no way punishes wrongly, since it punishes one who kills his master willingly and knowingly, which none of those others does.
A. Well, do you remember saying a little earlier that in every evil act lust rules, and that it is evil for that very reason?
E. I certainly remember.
A. And did you not also grant that one who desires to live without fear does not have an evil desire?
E. I remember that too.
A. When, then, a master is killed by his slave from that desire, he is not killed from that blameworthy desire. So we have not yet found why this crime is evil. For we agreed that all evil deeds are evil for no other reason than that they are done from lust, that is, from a desire that deserves disapproval.
E. Now it seems to me that he is condemned unjustly, which I would not dare to say if I had anything else to say.
A. Have you persuaded yourself that so great a crime ought to go unpunished before considering whether that slave desired to be free from fear of his master in order to satisfy his own lusts? For to desire to live without fear belongs not only to all the good but also to all the wicked. The difference is this: the good seek it by turning their love away from things that cannot be possessed without the danger of losing them; the wicked, in order to settle down securely in the enjoyment of these things, try to remove what stands in the way, and so lead a criminal and wicked life, which is better called death.
E. I come to my senses, and I am very glad that I have now plainly learned what that blameworthy desire is which is called lust. It now appears to be the love of those things that anyone can lose against his will.

### Translation notes

- The killings by soldier, judge, and accident are Evodius's examples; the dialogue treats them as cases not usually called murder.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.4 (PL 32:1225–1227; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-4).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.5

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-5
- Source: PL 32:1227
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Evodius argues that human law rightly permits killing in self-defense and war to prevent greater evils, yet doubts that those who kill for perishable goods are free of sin before divine providence; Augustine approves the distinction between human law and divine punishment.

### Latin text

Qnare nunc, age, quæramus, si placet, utrum cHam in sacrilegiis libido dominetur, quæ vidcmus plura superstitione Committi. A. Vide ne præprope­ rum sit: prius enim mihi discutiendum videtur utrum vel hostis irruens, Vel insidiator sicarius, sive pro vita, sive pro libertate, sive pro pudicitia, sine ulla interficiatur libidine. E. Quomodo possum arbitrari carere istos libidinp, qui pro iis rebus digladiantur, quas possunt amittere inviti: aut si non possunt, quid opus cst pro liis usque ad hominis necem pro­ gredi? A. Non ergo lex justa est, quæ dat potesta­ tcm vcl viatori ut latronem, ne ab eo ipse occidatur, occidat; vcl cuipiam viro aut feminæ ut violenter si. hi stupratorem irruentem ante illatum stuprum, si possit, interimat. Nam militi cHam jubetur lege, ut nostem necet: a qua cæde si temperaverit, ab impc­ ratore pœnas luit. Num istas leges injustas, vcl potius nullas dicere audebimus? Nam mibi lex esse non vi­ detur, quæ justa non fuerit. E. Legem quidem satis video esse munitam contra hujuscemodi accusationem, quæ in co populo quem regit, minoribus malcfacLis ne majora commit­ terentur, dcdit licentiam. Multo est enim mitius eum qni alienæ vitæ insidiatur, quam eum qui suam tue­ tur, occidi. Et muito est immanius invitum hominem stuprum perpeti, quam cum a quo vis illa infertur, ab co cui inferre cOnatur, interimi. Jam vero miles in hoste interficiendo minister cst legis; quare officium suum facile nulla libidine implevit. Porro Ipsa lex, quæ tuendi populi causa lata est, nullius libidinis ar­ gui potest. Siquidem ille qui tulit, bi Dei jussu tulit, id est quod præcepit æterna justitia, expers omnino libidinis id agere potuit: si autem ille cum aliqua Hbidinc hoc statuit, non cx co fit ut ei legi cum libi­ dinc obtemperare nccessc sit; quia bona lex et a non bono ferri potest. Non 'enim si quis, verbi causa, ty­ rannicam potestatem nactus, ab aliquo cui hoc con­ ducit, pretium accipiat, at statuat nulli licere vcl ad conjugium feminam rapicre, propterea mala lex erit, quia ille iujustus atque corruptus hanc tulit. Potest ergo illi lcgi quæ tuendorum civium causa vim ho­ stilcm cadem vi repelli jubet, sinc libidine obtempe­ rari: ct de omnibus ministris, qui jure atque ordine potestatibus quibusque subjecti sunt, id dici potest. Sed illi homines lege inculpata, quomodo inculpati queant esse, uon video: non enim lex. cos cogi: occi­ dcre, sed relinquit in potestate. Liberum eis itaque est nominem necare pro iis rcbus quas inviti possunt amittere, ct ob hoc amare non debent. De vita enim fortasse cuipiam sit dubium, utrum animæ nullo pa­ Cto a uferatur, dum hocicorpus interimitur: sed si an­ ferri potest, contemnenila est; si i.on potest, nihil metuendum. De pudicitia vcro quis dubitaverit, quin ea sit in ipso animo coAstituta, quandoquidem virtus est? unde a violento stupratore eripi nee ipsa potest. Quidquid igitur erepturus erat ille qui occiditur, id totum in potestate nostra non est: quare quemad­ modum nostrum appellandum sit, nou intelligo. Qua­ propter lcgem quidem non reprehendo, quæ tales permittit interfici; sed quo pacto istos defendam qui interficiunt, non invenio. A. Multo minus ego invenire possum, cur hominibus defensionem quæras, quos reos nulla lex tenet. E. Nulla fortasse, sed carum lcgum quæ appa­ rent, ct ab hominibus leguntur: nam nescio utrum non aliqua vehementiore ac secretissima lege teneantur, si nihil rerum est quod non administret divina provi­ dentia. Quomodo enim apud cam sunt isti peccato liberi, qui pro iis rebus quas contemni oportet, hn­ mana cæde polluti sunt? Videtur ergo mihi et legem istam, quæ populo regendo scribitur, recte ista per­ mittere, ct divinam providentiam vindicare. Ea enim vindicanda sibi hæc lex populi assumit, quæ satis sint conciliandæ paci hominibus imperitis, et quanta pos­ sunt per hominem regi. Illæ vero culp;e alias poenas aptas habent, a quibus sola mihi vidctur posse libe­ rare sapientia. A. Laudo ct probo istam, quamvis inchoatam minusque perfectam, tamen fidentem ct sublimia quædam petentem distinctionem tuam. Vi­ detur enim tibi lex. ista, qu;c regendis civitatibus fertur, multa concedere atque impunita rclinqucrc, quæ per divinam tamen providentiam vindicanlur; et recte. Neque cnim quia non omnia facil, idco qu;c facit improbanda -. sunt.

### English translation (Claude)

E. So now, come, let us ask, if you please, whether lust also rules in sacrileges, many of which we see committed through superstition.
A. See that this is not too hasty. First, I think, we must examine whether an attacking enemy, or an assassin lying in wait, is killed without any lust, whether in defense of life, of liberty, or of chastity.
E. How can I think that those are free of lust who fight with the sword for things they can lose against their will? Or, if they cannot lose them, what need is there to go as far as killing a man for them?
A. Then the law is not just that gives a traveler the power to kill a robber so as not to be killed by him, or gives any man or woman the power to kill, if possible, a violator who attacks them with force, before the violation is done. For the soldier too is commanded by law to kill the enemy, and if he refrains from that killing he is punished by his commander. Shall we dare to call those laws unjust, or rather no laws at all? For to me a law that is not just does not seem to be a law.
E. I see well enough that the law is protected against an accusation of this kind, since among the people it governs it has granted license to lesser wrongs to prevent greater ones being committed. For it is much milder that one who plots against another's life be killed than one who defends his own. And it is much more monstrous that a person should suffer violation against his will than that the one who inflicts that violence should be killed by the one on whom he tries to inflict it. As for the soldier, in killing the enemy he is a servant of the law; so he easily fulfills his duty without any lust. Further, the law itself, which was enacted to protect the people, cannot be charged with any lust. For if he who enacted it did so at God's command, that is, by what eternal justice commands, he could do it wholly free of lust; and if he made this decree with some lust, it does not follow that one must obey that law with lust, since a good law can be enacted even by one who is not good. If, say, someone who has seized tyrannical power takes a price from someone whom it profits, and decrees that no one may carry off a woman by force, even for marriage, that law will not be bad because an unjust and corrupt man enacted it. So the law that commands that hostile force be repelled by the same force, to protect the citizens, can be obeyed without lust; and the same can be said of all officers who are subject, rightly and in due order, to any authorities. But how those other men can be blameless, even though the law is blameless, I do not see. For the law does not compel them to kill; it leaves it in their power. They are free, then, to kill no one for things that they can lose against their will, and which for that reason they ought not to love. As for life, someone may perhaps doubt whether it is in no way taken from the soul when this body is killed; but if it can be taken away, it should be despised; if it cannot, there is nothing to fear. As for chastity, who would doubt that it is located in the mind itself, since it is a virtue? So it cannot be snatched away even by a violent violator. Whatever, then, the man who is killed was going to snatch away is not wholly in our power; so I do not understand how it is to be called ours. Therefore I do not blame the law that permits such men to be killed; but how to defend those who kill them I cannot find.
A. Much less can I find why you seek a defense for men whom no law holds guilty.
E. No law, perhaps, of those laws that are visible and read by men. For I do not know whether they are not held by some stronger and most hidden law, if there is nothing that divine providence does not govern. For how are they free of sin before it, who are polluted with human blood for the sake of things that ought to be despised? It seems to me, then, that this law written for governing a people rightly permits these things, and that divine providence punishes them. For this law of the people takes upon itself the punishment of as much as is enough to maintain peace among unlearned people, and as much as can be governed by man. Those faults have other, fitting penalties, from which, it seems to me, wisdom alone can set us free.
A. I praise and approve this distinction of yours, which, though only begun and not perfect, is yet confident and reaches toward lofty things. For you think that this law enacted for governing cities concedes and leaves unpunished many things that are nevertheless punished by divine providence; and rightly. For it does not follow that, because it does not do everything, what it does should be disapproved.

### Translation notes

- The view that killing an attacker for the sake of perishable goods is not free of sin is Evodius's; Augustine praises the distinction without settling the case here.
- Stuprum and stuprator are rendered “violation” and “violator” (rape) in this passage.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.5 (PL 32:1227; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-5).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.6

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-6
- Source: PL 32:1227–1229
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine distinguishes temporal law, which can justly change with the condition of a people, from the eternal law, the supreme reason by which it is just that all things be perfectly ordered.

### Latin text

Sed dispiciamus diligenter, si placet, quo usque pcr legem istam quin populos in hac vita cohibet, ma­ lefacta ulciscenda sint: deinde quid restet, quod por divinam providentiam inevitabilius secretoque punia­ tur. E. Cupio, si modo perveniri possit ad tantæ rei terminos: nam hoc ego infinitum puto. A. Imo ad­ esto animo, ct rationis vias pietate fretus ingredere. Nihil est enim tam arduum atque difficile, quod non Dco adjuvante planissimum atque expeditissimum fiat. In ipsum itaque suspensi atque ab co auxilium deprecantes quod insiiluimus, quæramus. Et prius responde mihi, utrum ista lex quæ litteris promulga­ tur, hominibus hanc vitam viventibus opituletur. E. Manifestum cst: nam et his hominibus utique populi civitatesque consistunt. A. Quid7 ipsi homines clpo­ puli, ejusdemne gencris, rcrum sunt, ut interire mu­ tarivc non possit, æternique omnino sint? an vero mutabiles temporibusque subjecli sunt? E. Mutabile plane at que tempori obnoxiwm hoc genus esse quis dubitet? A. Ergo, si populus sit boue moderatus et gravis, communisque utilitatis diligentissimus custos, in quo unusqnisque minoris rcm privatan quam pu­ hlicain pondat; nonnc recte lex fertur, qua huic ip i populo liciat creare sibi magistratus, per quos sua rcs, id est publica, administretur? E. Recte prorsus. A. porro si paulatim depravatus idem populus rem privatam rei publicae præferat, atque habeat vcnale sulTragium, corruptusque ab eis qui honores amant, rcgimcn in se flagitiosis consceleratisque committat; nonne item recte, si quis tunc exstiterit vir bonus, qui plurimum possit, adimat huic populo potestatem dandi honores, et in paucorum bonorum, vel etiam unius rcdigat arbitrium? E. Et id recte. A. Cum ergo duæ istæ leges ita sibi videantur esse contrariæ, ut una carum honorum dandorum populo tribuat pote­ statem, auferat altera; ct cum ista secunda ita lata sit, ut nullo modo ambæ in una civitate simul esse pos­ sint; num dicemus aliquam carum injustam esse, et ferri minime debuisse? E. Nullo modo. A. Appelle­ mus crgo istam legem, si placet, temporalem, quae quanquam justa sit, commutari tamen per tempora justc potest. E. Appellamus. A. Quid? illa lex quæ summa ratio nominatur, cui semper obtemperandum est, et per quam mali miseram, boni bcalam vitam merentur, per quam de­ nique illa quam temporalem vocandam diximus, recte fertur, recteque mntatur, potestne cuipiam intelligenti non incommutabilis æternaque vidcri? An potest ali­ quando injustum esse ut mali miseri, boni autem beati sint; aut ut modestus et gravis populus ipse sibi ma­ gistratus creet,dissolutus vero ct nequam ista licentia carcat? E. Video hanc æternam esse atquc incommu­ tabilem legcm. A. Simul etiam te videre arbitror in illa temporali nihil esse justum atque legitimum, quod non ex hac æterna sibi homines derivarint: nam si populus ille quodam tempore juste honores didit, quodam rursus juste non dedit; hæc vicis­ situdo temporalis ut justa esset, ex illa xternitate tracta cst. qua semper justum est gravem populum honoresdare, levem non dare: an tibi aliter videtur? E. Assentior. A. Ut igitur breviter æternæ legis no­ tionem, quæ impressa nobis est, quantum valeo verbis explicem, ea est qua justum est ut omnia sint ordi­ natissima: tu si aliter existimas, prome. E. Quid tibi vera dicenti contradicam non habeo. A. Cum ergo haec sit una lex, ex qua illæ omnes temporales ad homines regendos variantur, num ideo ipsa variari ullo modo potest? E. Intelligo omnino non posse: neque enim ulla vis, ullus casus, ulla rerum labes unquam effece­ rit ut justum non sit omnia esse ordinatissima.

### English translation (Claude)

A. But let us examine carefully, if you please, how far wrongdoings are to be punished by this law that restrains peoples in this life; and then what remains to be punished more inescapably and secretly by divine providence.
E. I want to, if only one can reach the limits of so great a matter; for I think it is endless.
A. On the contrary, take heart, and enter the paths of reason relying on piety. For nothing is so steep and difficult that it does not become very plain and easy with God's help. So, depending on him and begging his help, let us pursue what we have begun. And first answer me whether this law that is promulgated in writing helps people living this life.
E. That is evident; for it is of these people, after all, that peoples and cities consist.
A. Well, are these people and peoples of a kind of thing that cannot perish or change and is wholly eternal? Or are they changeable and subject to time?
E. Who would doubt that this kind is plainly changeable and subject to time?
A. So, if a people is well balanced and serious, and a most careful guardian of the common good, in which each person values his private affairs less than the public, is not a law rightly enacted by which this people is allowed to create its own magistrates, through whom its affairs, that is, the public affairs, are administered?
E. Quite rightly.
A. Further, if this same people, gradually corrupted, prefers private affairs to the public, holds its vote for sale, and, corrupted by those who love office, entrusts the government of itself to the vicious and criminal, would it not likewise be right that, if some good man of great power should then arise, he should take from this people the power to confer offices and bring it under the decision of a few good men, or even of one?
E. That too is right.
A. Since, then, these two laws seem so contrary that one gives the people the power to confer offices and the other takes it away, and since the second is enacted in such a way that the two can in no way exist at once in one city, shall we say that one of them is unjust and should never have been enacted?
E. By no means.
A. Let us call this law, then, if you please, temporal, since although it is just, it can justly be changed in the course of time.
E. Let us call it so.
A. Well, that law which is called the supreme reason, which must always be obeyed, by which the wicked deserve a miserable life and the good a happy one, and by which, finally, the law we said should be called temporal is rightly enacted and rightly changed: can it seem to anyone who understands to be anything but unchangeable and eternal? Or can it ever be unjust that the wicked be miserable and the good happy, or that a moderate and serious people create magistrates for itself, while a dissolute and worthless one lacks that license?
E. I see that this law is eternal and unchangeable.
A. I think you also see at the same time that in that temporal law there is nothing just and lawful that people have not derived for themselves from this eternal law. For if that people at one time justly conferred offices and at another time justly did not, this change over time, in order to be just, was drawn from that eternity by which it is always just for a serious people to confer offices and for a frivolous one not to. Or do you think otherwise?
E. I agree.
A. So, to explain briefly in words, as well as I can, the notion of the eternal law that is impressed upon us: it is the law by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered. If you think otherwise, say so.
E. I have nothing to say against you when you speak the truth.
A. Since, then, this is the one law from which all those temporal laws for governing people take their variations, can it itself therefore vary in any way?
E. I understand that it absolutely cannot; for no force, no chance, no collapse of things could ever bring it about that it is not just for all things to be most perfectly ordered.

### Translation notes

- “Supreme reason” (summa ratio) echoes Cicero's definition of law (Laws 1.18); the identification is general, not a quotation.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.6 (PL 32:1227–1229; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-6).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.7

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-7
- Source: PL 32:1229
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Turning to order within the human being, Augustine distinguishes living from knowing that one lives and notes that beasts, though stronger, never try to tame human beings.

### Latin text

A. Age nunc, videamus, homo ipse quomodo in seipso sit ordinatissimus: nam ex hominibus una Icgc sociatis, populus constat; quæ lex, ut diftum est, temporalis est. Et dic rnihi utrum certissimum sit tibi vicere te. E. Hoc vero quid certius responderim? A. Quid? illud potesne dignoscere, aliud esse vivere, aliud, nosse se vivere? E. Scio quidem neminem se nosse vivere, nisi viventem; sed utrum omnis vivens novcrit se vivere, ignoro. A. Quam vellem ut credis, ita etiam scires pecora carere ratione; cito nostra disputatio ab ista quæstione transiret: sed quoniam nescire to dicis, longam sermocinationem moves. Neque enim tatis res cst, qua prætermissa pergere in ca quæ intendimus, tanta connexione rationis, quanta opus esse sentio, sinamur. Dic itaque mihi, cum sæpe viderimus bestias ab bominibus domitas, id cst, non corpus bestiæ tantum, sed et animam ita homini sub­ jugatam, ut volontali ejus sensu quodam et consuetu­ dine serviat; utrum tibi ullo modo fieri posse videatur, ut bestia quælibet immanis vel fcritate vel corpore, vd etiam sensu quolibet acerrima, pan vice sibi hominem subjugare conetur, cum corpus ejus seu vi seu clam multe interimere valeant. E. Nullo modo istuc fieri posse consentio.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Come now, let us see how a human being himself is most perfectly ordered within himself; for a people consists of human beings joined together by one law, and that law, as was said, is temporal. Tell me whether it is most certain to you that you are alive.
E. What more certain answer could I give than this?
A. Well, can you distinguish that it is one thing to live and another to know that one lives?
E. I know that no one knows that he lives unless he is living; but whether every living thing knows that it lives, I do not know.
A. How I wish that, as you believe it, so you also knew that cattle lack reason! Our discussion would quickly pass on from this question. But since you say you do not know, you set off a long conversation. For it is not the kind of matter that we can pass over and go on to what we intend with as close a chain of reasoning as I feel is needed. So tell me: since we have often seen beasts tamed by human beings, that is, not only the body of a beast but also its soul so subjected to a human being that it serves his will by a kind of sense and habit, does it seem to you possible in any way that some beast, however monstrous in fierceness or in body, or very keen in any sense, should try in its turn to subject a human being to itself, although many of them can destroy his body by force or by stealth?
E. I agree that this can in no way happen.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.7 (PL 32:1229; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-7).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.8

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-8
- Source: PL 32:1229–1231
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine argues that reason sets human beings above beasts and that a human being is rightly ordered when reason, mind, or spirit rules the lower motions of the soul, as the eternal law requires.

### Latin text

A. Bene sane: sed item dic mihi, cum manifestum sit, viribus cæterisque officiis corpo. ris a plurimis bestiis hominem facile superari, quæ­ nam res sit qua homo excellit, ut nulla ei bestiarum, ipse autem multis imperure possit i an forte ipsa est quas ratio vel intelligentia dici solet? B. Non invenio aliud, quandoquidem in animo est id quo belluis an. tecellimus: quæ£ si exanimes cssent, dicercm nos eo præstare, quod animum habemus. Nunc vero cum et illa sint animalia, id quod corum animis non inest ut subdantur nobis, inest autem nostris ut eis meliores simus, quoniam neque nihil, neque parvum aliquid esse cuivis apparet; quid aliud rectius, quam ratio­ nem vocaverim? A. Vide quam facile flat Deo adju­ vante, quod homines difficillimum putant. Nam ego. fateor tibi, quæstionem istam, quae, ut intelligo, ter. minata est, tamdiu nos retenturam putaveram, quam fortasse omnia quæ dicta sunt ab ipso nostræ dispu­ tationis cxordio. Qqare accipe jam, ut dcinde rati o connectatur: nam credo non te ignorare, id quod sciro dicimus, nihil esse aliud quam ratione habere perce. ptum. E. Ita est. A. Qni ergo scitsc vivere, ratione non caret. E. Consequens est. A. Vivunt autem beslix, ct sicut jam emicuit, rationis expertes sunt.E. Manifestum est. A. Ecce igitur jam nosti,quod te ignorare respon­ deras, non omne quod vivit scire se vivcre, quanquam omne quod se vivcre sciat, vivat necessario. E. Non mihi est jam dubium; -perge quo in­ tenderas: aliud enim esse vivere, aliud scire so vi­ vcre, satis didici. A. Quid ergo libi horum duorum videtur esse præstantius? E. Quid puras, nisi scicn­ tiarn vitæ? A. Meliorne tibi videtur vitæ scientia quant ipsa vita? an forte intelligis superiorem quamdam et sinceriorcm vitam esse scientiam, quam scire nemo potest, nisi qui intelligit? Intelligere autem quid est, nisi ipsa luce inentis illustrius perfectiusque vivere? Quare tu mihi, nisi fallor, non vitas aliud aliquid, sed cuidam vitæ meliorem vitam.præposuisti. E. Outime omnino et cognovisti et explicasti sententiam meam: ki tamen scientia maia esse nunquam potest. A. Nullo modo arbitror, nisi cum translato verbo scientiam pro experientia dicimus: experiri enim non semper bonum csl: sicut experiri supplicia: illa vero qu;e proprie ac puro scientia nominatur, qnia ratione atque intelli­ gentia paratur, mala esse qui potest? I:. Teneo ct istam differentiam: persequere cætera. A. Illud est qnod volo dicere: hoc quidquid est, quo pecoribus homo præponitur, sive mens, sive spiritus, sivc utrumque rectius appellatur ( nam utrum­ que in divinis Libris invenimus), si dominemur atque imperet cæteris qnibuscumquc homo constat, tunc esse hominem ordinatissimum. Videmus enim habere nos non salum cum pecoribus, sed eliam cum arbu­ stis et stirpibus multa communia: namquc alimentum corporis sumere, crescere, gignere, vigere, arboribus quoque tributum videmus, quæ inlima quadam vita continentur; videre autem atque aadire, et olfactu, gustu, tactu corporalia sentire posse bestias, et acrius plerasque qnam uos, cernimus et fatcmur. Adde vires et valentiam firmitatemque membrorum, ct celeri­ tates facillimosque corporis motus, quibus omni­ bus quasdam earum superamus, qnibusdam æqua­ mur, a nonnullis eliam vincimur. Gemis tamen ipsum rerum est nobis certe commune cnm belluis: jam ■ vero appetere voluplalcs corporis, et vitare molestias, frinæ vitæ omnis actio e-t. Sunt alia qiucdam, quæ jam cadere in feras non videntur, nec tamen in ho­ mine ipso summa sunt, ut jocari et ridere: quod hu­ manum quidem, sed infimum hominis judicat, quisquis de natura humana rectissime judicat. Deinde amor laudis cl gluti;n, et affectatio dominandi, quæ tametsi bestiarum non sunt, non tamen earum rerum libidine bestiis meliores nos esse arbitrandum est. Nam et iste appetitus cum rationi subditus non est, miseros facit. Nemo autem cuiquam miseria se præponendum pu­ tavit. Hisce igitur motibus auimx cum ratio domina­ tur, ordinatus homo dicendus est. Non enim ordo rectus, ant ordo api ellandus est omnino, ubi deterio­ iibus meliora subjiciuntur: an tibi non videtur? E. M anifestum est. A. Ratio ista ergo, vel mens, vcl spi­ ritus cum irrationales animi mutus regit, id scilicet dominatur in Illine, cui dominetio lege debetur ea quam æternam esse comperimus. E. Intelligo ac sequor.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Quite right. But tell me also: since it is clear that a human being is easily surpassed by very many beasts in strength and in the other functions of the body, what is it in which a human being excels, so that no beast can command him while he can command many of them? Is it perhaps what is usually called reason or understanding?
E. I find nothing else, since what makes us surpass the brutes lies in the mind. If they were without souls, I would say that we excel them because we have a mind. But since they too are living beings, what is absent from their minds, so that they are subject to us, but present in ours, so that we are better than they, is plainly neither nothing nor something small; what could I more rightly call it than reason?
A. See how easily, with God's help, a thing is done that people think most difficult. For I confess to you that I had thought this question, which, as I see, is now settled, would hold us as long as perhaps everything that has been said since the very beginning of our discussion. So take this now, so that the reasoning may next be linked together: I believe you are aware that what we call knowing is nothing other than having perceived by reason.
E. So it is.
A. Then one who knows that he lives does not lack reason.
E. It follows.
A. But beasts live, and, as has now become clear, they have no share in reason.
E. That is evident.
A. See, then: you now know what you answered you did not know, that not everything that lives knows that it lives, although everything that knows that it lives necessarily lives.
E. I no longer doubt it; go on where you were heading. For I have learned well enough that it is one thing to live and another to know that one lives.
A. Which of these two, then, seems to you more excellent?
E. What do you suppose, but the knowledge of life?
A. Does the knowledge of life seem to you better than life itself? Or do you perhaps understand knowledge to be a higher and purer life, which no one can know unless he understands? And what is understanding but living more brightly and perfectly by the very light of the mind? So, unless I am mistaken, you have not preferred something other than life to life, but a better life to a certain kind of life.
E. You have grasped and set out my view perfectly; provided, however, that knowledge can never be evil.
A. In no way, I think, unless we use the word in a transferred sense, saying knowledge when we mean experience. For to experience is not always good, as when one experiences punishments. But how can that which is properly and purely called knowledge, since it is acquired by reason and understanding, be evil?
E. I grasp that distinction too. Go on with the rest.
A. This is what I want to say: whatever this is by which a human being is set above cattle, whether it is more rightly called mind or spirit or both (for we find both in the divine books), if it rules and commands all the other parts of which a human being consists, then that human being is most perfectly ordered. For we see that we have many things in common not only with cattle but even with trees and plants. To take food for the body, to grow, to reproduce, to flourish: we see these granted also to trees, which are contained in a lowest kind of life. And we see and admit that beasts can see and hear and perceive bodily things by smell, taste, and touch, most of them more keenly than we. Add strength, power, and firmness of limbs, and speed and very easy motions of the body: in all these we surpass some of them, equal others, and are even beaten by some. This whole class of things is certainly common to us and the brutes; and to seek the pleasures of the body and to avoid discomforts is the whole activity of the life of beasts. There are some other things that do not seem to fall to wild animals, yet are not the highest in a human being, such as joking and laughing; whoever judges human nature most rightly judges this to be human indeed, but the lowest part of a human being. Then there is the love of praise and glory, and the desire to rule; though these do not belong to beasts, we must not think that we are better than beasts by lusting for these things. For this appetite too, when it is not subject to reason, makes people miserable; and no one has thought that he should be ranked above anyone by misery. So when reason rules these motions of the soul, a human being must be called ordered. For it is not right order, or to be called order at all, where better things are subjected to worse. Or does it not seem so to you?
E. It is evident.
A. When, then, this reason, or mind, or spirit, rules the irrational motions of the soul, then that rules in a human being to which rule is owed by that law which we found to be eternal.
E. I understand and follow.

### Translation notes

- Migne's chapter heading (chapter 8) inside this section is removed by a logged correction.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.8 (PL 32:1229–1231; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-1/#p-1-8).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.9

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-9
- Source: PL 32:1231
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: The wise man is one in whom the mind rules; the fool has a mind that does not rule, as animal-tamers show, who use the mind without being wise.

### Latin text

A. Cum ergo ila homo constitutus atque ordi­ natus est, nonne tibi sapiens vidclur? E. Nescio alius quis mihi sapiens homo videri possit, si hic non vi­ demur. A. Credo eliam te illud scire, plerosque homi­ nes stultos esse. E. Hoc quoque satis constat. A. At si stultus sapienti est contrarius, quoniam sapientem comperimus, quis etiam stultus sit, profecto jam in­ telligis. E. Cui nun apparcaL hunc esse, in quo ntens summam fotestatem non habel? A. Quid igitur di­ cendum, cum homo ita est affectus? deesse iili men­ tem; an, quamvis insit, eam carere dominatu? E. Hoc potius quod ultimum subjecisti. A. Pervellem abs te audire, quibus documentis perceptum habeas, mentem inesse homini, quai suam non exserat prin­ cipatum. E. Utinam tuas istas partes facere velles: n un non mibi facile est sustinere qnod ingeris. A. Illud saltem facile eSI libi recordari, quod paulo ante diximus, quemadmodum bestiæ mansuefactæ ab homi­ nibus ac domitæ serviant: quod ab eis vicissim ho­ mines, ut demonstravit ratio, paterentur nisi aliquo excellerent. Id autem non inveniebamus in corpore: ita cum in animo esse appareret, quid aliud appel­ landum esset quam ratio, non comperimus; quam postea et mentem et spiritum vocari recordati sumus. Sed si aliud ratio, aliud mens, constat certe nonnisi mentem uti posse ratione. Ex quo illud conficitur, eum qui rationem habet, mente carere non posse. E. Probe ista reminiscor ac teneo. A. Quid? illud credisnc, domitores belluarum nisi sapientes esse non posse? Eos enim sapientes voco, quos veritas vocari jubet, id est, qui regno mentis omni libidinis subju­ gatione pacati sunt. E. Ridiculum est tales putaro istos, quos vulgo mansuctarios nuncupant, vcl eliam pastores aut bubulcos, aut aurigas, quibus omnibus domimum pecus subjectum videmus, et quorum indu­ stria indomitum subjici. A. En igitur habes documen­ tum certissimum, quo manifestum fiat inesse mentem homini sine dominatu. Ilis quippe inest; agunt enim talia, qu:c agi siric mente non possent: non tamen regnat; nam stulti sunt, neque regnum mentis nisi sapientium esse, percognitnm est. E. Mirum est hoc jam fuissc a nobis in supcriuribus confeclum, et mihi quid responderem. uon potuisse in mentem venire.

### English translation (Claude)

A. When, then, a human being is so constituted and ordered, does he not seem to you wise?
E. I do not know who else could seem to me a wise man, if this one does not.
A. I believe you also know that most people are foolish.
E. That too is well established.
A. But if the fool is the opposite of the wise man, then since we have found the wise man, you surely now understand who the fool is.
E. To whom is it not plain that he is the one in whom the mind does not have supreme power?
A. What, then, should be said when a human being is in that condition? That he lacks a mind, or that, although it is present, it lacks dominion?
E. Rather the latter, which you put last.
A. I would very much like to hear from you by what evidence you have perceived that there is in a human being a mind that does not exercise its rule.
E. I wish you would take that part yourself; for it is not easy for me to bear what you heap on me.
A. At least it is easy for you to remember what we said a little earlier: how beasts tamed and broken by human beings serve them, which human beings would suffer in turn from them, as reason showed, unless they excelled in something. This we did not find in the body; and since it appeared to be in the soul, we found nothing else to call it but reason, which we afterward remembered is also called mind and spirit. But if reason is one thing and mind another, it is certainly agreed that only the mind can use reason. From this it follows that one who has reason cannot lack a mind.
E. I remember this well and hold to it.
A. Well, do you believe that tamers of beasts can only be wise men? For I call wise those whom truth bids us call so, that is, those who are at peace through the rule of the mind and the subjugation of all lust.
E. It is ridiculous to think that those are such whom people commonly call animal-tamers, or shepherds or cowherds or charioteers, to all of whom we see tame animals subject, and by whose effort untamed ones are subjected.
A. There, then, you have the surest evidence to make it plain that there is a mind in a human being without dominion. It is in these men, for they do things that could not be done without a mind; yet it does not rule, for they are fools, and it is well known that the rule of the mind belongs only to the wise.
E. It is remarkable that we had already settled this above and that I could not think of what to answer.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.9 (PL 32:1231; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-9).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.10

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-10
- Source: PL 32:1231–1233
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine argues that lust cannot be stronger than the mind, no vicious mind can overcome a virtuous one, no body can overcome a virtuous mind, and nothing is higher than the wise mind except God.

### Latin text

Sed alia contexamus. Jam enim et reguum mendis human:e humanam esse sapicnliam, et eam posse etiam non regnare, compertum est. A. Putasne ista mente, cui regnum in libidines æterna lege con­ cessum esse cognoscimus, potentiorem esse libi­ dinem? ego enim nullo pacto puto. Neque enim esset ordinatissimum ut impotentiora potentioribus imperarent. Quare necesse arbitror csse ut plus possit mens quam cupiditas, eo ipso quo cupiditati recte justeque dominatur. E. Ego quoque ita sentio. A. Quid? virtutem omnem num dubitamus omni vitio sic anteponere, ut virtus quanto melior atque subli­ mior, tanto firmior invictiorque sit? E. Quis dubita­ verit? A. Nullus igitur vitiosus animus virtute arma­ tam animum superat. E. Verissimum est. A. Jam corpore omni qualemlibet animum meliorem poten­ tioremque esse, non tc arbitror negaturum. E. Nemo id negat, qui (quod facile est) videt aut substantiam viventem non viventi, aut eam quae vitam dat ei qua accipit, esse præferendam. A. Multo minus igitur cur­ pus, qualecumqUe id sit, aniu:um virtute præditum vincit. E. Evidentissimum est. A. Quid? animus ju­ sius, mensque jus proprium imperiumque custodiens, nam potest aliam mentem pari æquitate ac virtute I regnantem, ex arce dejicere, atque libidini subjugare? I:. Nullo modo; non solum propter eamdem in utra­ que excellentiam, sed etiam quod a justitia prior de­ cidet, fletque vitiosa mens, quae aliam facere conabi­ tur, eoque ipso erit infirmior. A. Bene intelligis; quare illud restat ut respon­ deas, si potes, utrum tibi videatur rationali et sapienti mente quidquam esse præstantius. E. Nihil praeter Deum arbitror. A. Et mea ista sententia est. Sed quoniam res ardua est, neque nunc opportune quæ­ ritnr, ut ad intelligentiam veniat, quanquam robu­ stissima teneatur lide, integra nobis sit bujus qua:­ stionis, diligens ct cauta tractatio.

### English translation (Claude)

E. But let us link up the other points. For it has now been found that the rule of the human mind is human wisdom, and that the mind can also fail to rule.
A. Do you think lust is more powerful than this mind, to which we know that rule over the lusts has been granted by the eternal law? I in no way think so. For it would not be most perfectly ordered for weaker things to command stronger ones. So I think it necessary that the mind be more powerful than desire, by the very fact that it rightly and justly rules desire.
E. I think so too.
A. Well, do we doubt that every virtue so far surpasses every vice that the better and loftier a virtue is, the firmer and more unconquerable it is?
E. Who would doubt it?
A. So no vicious mind overcomes a mind armed with virtue.
E. Most true.
A. Now I do not think you will deny that any mind whatever is better and more powerful than any body.
E. No one denies it who sees (and it is easy to see) that a living substance is to be preferred to one that is not living, or one that gives life to one that receives it.
A. Much less, then, does any body whatever overcome a mind endowed with virtue.
E. That is most evident.
A. Well, can a just mind, a mind guarding its own right and rule, cast down from its citadel another mind that rules with equal justice and virtue, and subject it to lust?
E. In no way: not only because of the same excellence in both, but also because the mind that tries to do this to the other will fall from justice first and become vicious, and by that very fact will be weaker.
A. You understand well. So it remains for you to answer, if you can, whether anything seems to you more excellent than a rational and wise mind.
E. Nothing, I think, except God.
A. That is my view too. But since the matter is difficult, and this is not the right time to inquire into it so as to come to an understanding of it, although it is held by the strongest faith, let a careful and cautious treatment of this question be kept in reserve for us.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.10 (PL 32:1231–1233; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-10).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.11

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-11
- Source: PL 32:1233
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Since neither a higher nor a lower nature can force the mind to serve lust, only its own will and free choice can do so; the mind's resulting slavery to lust is itself a just and heavy penalty.

### Latin text

In praesentia enim scire possumus quaecumque illa natura sit, quam menti virtute pollenti fas est excel­ lere, injustam esse nullo modo posse. Quare ne ista quidem, tametsi babeat potestatem, coget mentem servire libidini. E. Istud prorsus nemo est qui npn sine ulla cunctatione fateatur. A. Ergo relinquitur ut quoniam regnanti menti compotiqne virtutis, quidquid per aut prælutum qst, non eam tici. seram libidinis propter justitiam; quidquid autem inferius estvnon possit hoc fecere propter infirmitatem, sicut ea quæ inter nos constiterunt docent; nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat, quan propris voluntas et liberum arbitrium. E. Nibil tam necessarium restare video. A. Sequitur jam ut tibi videatur juste illam pro peccato tanto poenas pendere. E. Negare non possum. A. Quid igitur? Num ista ipsa pœna parva existimanda est, quod ei libido dominatur, exspolia­ tamque virtutis opulentia, per diversa inopem atque indigentem trahit, nunc falsa pro veris approbantem, nunc eliam defensitantem, nunc improbantem quae antea probavisset, et nihilominus in alia falsa irruen­ lem; nunc assensionem suspendentem suam, et pie­ rumque perspicuas ratiocinationes formidantem; nunc desperantem de tota inventione veritatis, et stultitiæ tenebris penitus inhaerentem; nanc conantem in lu­ cem intelligendi, rursusque fatigatione decidcutem: cum interea cupiditatum illud regnum tyrannice sæ­ viat, et variis contrariisque tempestatibus totum ho­ minis animum vitamque perturbet-, binc timore, inde desiderio; binc anxietate, inde inani falsaque lætitia; hinc eruciatu rei amissa! quæ diligebatur, inde ardore adipiscendæ quæ non habebatur; hinc acceptæ injurinc doloribus, inde facibus vindicandæ: quaquaversum potest coarctare avaritia dissipare luxuria, addicere ambitio, inflare superbia, torqnere invidia, desidia sepelire, porvicacia concitare, amictare subjecto, et quæcumque alia innumerabilia regnum illius lihidinis frequentant et exercent! possumusne tandem nullam istam paenam putarc, quam, ut cernis, omnes qui non inhærent sapientiæ, necesse est perpeti? E. Magnam quidcm istam pœnam esse ju­ dico, et omnino justam, si quis jam in sublimitate sapientiæ collocatus, inde descendere ac libidini scr­ vire delegerit: sed utrum esse qnisquam possit incer­ tum est, qui hæc aut voluerit facere, aut velit. Quan­ quam enim credamus hominem tam perfecte con­ ditum a Deo, et in beata vita constitutum, ut ad aerumnas mortalis vite ipse inde propria voluntata delapsus sit; tamen hoc cum Ormissima fide teneam, intelligentia nondum assecutus sum: cnjus rei dili­ gentem inquisitionem, si nunc differendam putas, me inxito facis.

### English translation (Claude)

For at present we can know that whatever that nature is which may rightly excel a mind strong in virtue, it can in no way be unjust. So not even it, though it has the power, will compel the mind to serve lust.
E. There is absolutely no one who would not admit this without any hesitation.
A. It remains, then, since whatever is equal or superior to the mind that rules and possesses virtue does not make it the slave of lust, because of justice, and whatever is inferior cannot do this, because of weakness, as the points we have agreed on teach, that nothing else makes the mind a companion of desire but its own will and free choice.
E. I see that nothing follows so necessarily.
A. It follows, then, that it seems to you right that the mind should pay penalties for so great a sin.
E. I cannot deny it.
A. Well then, should this very penalty be thought small: that lust rules over it, and, stripped of the wealth of virtue, drags it, poor and needy, in different directions; now approving false things as true, now even defending them, now rejecting what it had approved before and nonetheless rushing into other falsehoods; now suspending its assent and often dreading clear reasonings; now despairing of finding truth at all and clinging deep in the darkness of folly; now striving toward the light of understanding, and falling back again from weariness? Meanwhile that reign of the desires rages like a tyrant and throws the whole mind and life of the man into confusion with various and contrary storms: on this side fear, on that longing; on this side anxiety, on that empty and false joy; on this side the torment of losing a thing that was loved, on that the burning to obtain what one did not have; on this side the pains of an injury received, on that the torches of revenge for it. Wherever it turns, avarice can constrict it, luxury squander it, ambition bind it over, pride puff it up, envy twist it, sloth bury it, obstinacy goad it, subjection afflict it, along with all the other countless things that crowd and busy the reign of that lust. Can we, after all, think this no penalty, which, as you see, all who do not cling to wisdom must suffer?
E. I judge this to be a great penalty indeed, and wholly just, if someone already set on the height of wisdom should choose to come down from there and serve lust. But it is uncertain whether there can be anyone who has wanted or wants to do this. For although we believe that man was created by God so perfectly, and established in a happy life, that he fell from there into the hardships of mortal life by his own will, yet while I hold this with the firmest faith, I have not yet attained it by understanding. If you think a careful inquiry into this should now be put off, you do so against my will.

### Scripture references

- Gen 3:6: allusion, low confidence

### Translation notes

- The digital text is garbled in the sentence about what is equal or superior to the mind (“quidquid per aut prælutum qst, non eam tici. seram”); it is translated by sense (“par aut prælatum est, non eam facit servam”).
- Evodius's reference to man's fall from a happy life by his own will recalls Genesis 3.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.11 (PL 32:1233; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-11).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.12

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-12
- Source: PL 32:1233–1235
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Leaving open whether the soul lived wisely before the body, Augustine shows that we have a will, that a good will surpasses all external goods, and that whether we have it lies in our will itself.

### Latin text

Verum illud quod me maxime movct, cur lau­, juscemodi acerbissimas poenas patiamur nos, qui certu stulti sumus, nec sapientes unquam fuimus, ut merito hæc dicamur perpeti propter desertam virtutis arcem, et electam sub libidine servitutem, quin apcrias dis­ putando, si vales, nullo modo libi differendum esso concesserim. A. Ita istuc dicis, quasi liquido comper­ tum habeas nunquam nos fuisse sapicnLes: attendis enim tempus ex quo in hanc vitam nat! sumus. Sed cum sapientia in animo sit, utrumn anlc consortium hujus corporis alia quadam vita vixerit animus, et an aliquando sapienter vixerit, magna quæstio est, ma­ gnum secretum, et suo considerandum loco: ncque ideo tamen hoc quod nunc habemus in. manibus iul­ pcditur, quominus aperiatur ut potest, Nam quæro abs te, sitne aliqua nubis voluntas. E Nescio. A. Visne hoc scire? E. Et hoc nescio. A. Nihil ergo dcinceps me interroges. E. Quare? A. Quia roganti tibi respondere non debeo, nisi volenti scire quod rogas. Deinde nisi velis ad sapientiam pervenire, sermo tecum de hnjusmodi rebus non est habendus. Postremo meus amicus esse non poteris, nisi vclis ut bene sit mihi. Jam vero de te tu ipse videris, utrum tibi voluntas nulla sit beata vitæ tusc. E. Fateor, ne­ gari non potest habere nos voluntatem: perge jam, vi­ deamus quid hinc conficias. A. Faciam: sed die etiam prius, utrum et bonam voluntatem te habere sentias. E. Quid est bona voluntas? A. Voluntas qua appetimus recte honesteque vivere, et ad summam sapiendam pervenire. Modo tu vide uirum rectam honestamque non appetas vitam, aut esse; snpicns nun vehementer velis, aut certe negare audeas, cum hæc volumus, nos habere voluntatem bonam. E. Nihil horum nego, et propterea me non solum voluntatem, sed etiam bonam voluntatem jam habere confiteor. A. Quanti pendis, oro te. hanc voluntatem? Numquiduam ei ulli ex parte divitias, aut honores, aut voluptates corpo­ ris, aut hæc simul omnia conferenda arbitraris? E. Averterit Deus istam sceleratam dementiam. A. Pa­ rumne ergo gaudendum est habere nos quiddam in animo, hanc ipsam dico bonam voluntatem, in cujus comparatione abjectissima sint ca quæ commemora timus, pro quibus adipiscendis multitudinem videmus hominum nullos laborcs, nulla pericula recusare? E. Gaudendum vero, ac plurimum. A. Quid? hoc gaudio qui non fruuntur, parvo damno cos affectos putas tanti boni? E. Imo maximo. A. Vides igitur jain, ut existimo, in voluntate nostra esse constitutum,,ut hoc vel fruamur vel ca­ reamus tantop et tum vero bono. Quid enim tam in vo­ lunate, quam ipsa voluntas sita est? Quam quisque cum habet bonam, id certe habet quod terrenis omni­ bus regnis, voluplatibusque omnibus corporis longe anteponendum sit. Quisquis autem non habet, caret 1 profecto illa re, quam præstantiorum omnibus bonis in potestate nostra non constitutis, sola illi voluntas per seipsam daret. Itaque cum se ipse miserrimum judicet, si amiserit gloriosam famam, ingentes opes, et quaelibet corporis bona; tu eum non miserrimum judicabis, etiamsi talibus abundet omnibus, cum iis inhæret quai amittere facillime potest, neque dum vult habet, caret autem bona voluntate, quæ nee compa­ randa est cum istis, et cum sit tam magnum bonum, velle solum opus est, ut habeatur? E. Verissimum est. A. Jure igitur ac merito stulti homines, tametsi nun­ quam fuerunt sapientes (hoc enim dubium et occultisbimum cst), hujuscemodi afficiuntur miseria. E. As­ sentior.

### English translation (Claude)

E. But what troubles me most is why we suffer such very bitter penalties, we who are certainly fools and were never wise, so that we could deservedly be said to suffer them for deserting the citadel of virtue and choosing slavery under lust. I would in no way grant that you should put off explaining this by argument, if you can.
A. You say this as if you had clearly established that we were never wise; for you are looking at the time from which we were born into this life. But since wisdom is in the soul, whether the soul lived some other life before its partnership with this body, and whether it ever lived wisely, is a great question, a great secret, to be considered in its own place. Yet this does not hinder what we now have in hand from being explained as far as it can be.
For I ask you whether we have any will.
E. I do not know.
A. Do you want to know this?
E. This too I do not know.
A. Then ask me nothing more.
E. Why?
A. Because I ought not to answer your questions unless you want to know what you ask. Further, unless you want to attain wisdom, no conversation on such matters should be held with you. Finally, you cannot be my friend unless you want me to be well. And as for yourself, see for yourself whether you have no will for your own happy life.
E. I admit that it cannot be denied that we have a will. Go on now; let us see what you conclude from this.
A. I will. But first tell me also whether you are aware that you have a good will.
E. What is a good will?
A. The will by which we desire to live rightly and honorably and to attain the highest wisdom. Just see whether you do not desire a right and honorable life, or do not strongly want to be wise, or at least whether you dare deny that when we want these things we have a good will.
E. I deny none of these, and so I confess that I now have not only a will but a good will.
A. How highly, I beg you, do you value this will? Do you think that riches or honors or bodily pleasures, or all these together, are in any way to be compared with it?
E. God forbid such wicked madness!
A. Is it, then, a small cause for joy that we have something in the mind, I mean this very good will, in comparison with which the things we mentioned are utterly worthless, though we see a multitude of people refuse no labors and no dangers to obtain them?
E. A cause for joy indeed, and a very great one.
A. Well, those who do not enjoy this joy: do you think they suffer a small loss of so great a good?
E. No, a very great one.
A. You see now, I think, that it is placed in our will whether we enjoy or lack so great and so true a good. For what is so much in the will as the will itself? Whoever has it good certainly has something to be preferred far above all earthly kingdoms and all bodily pleasures. Whoever does not have it certainly lacks that which is more excellent than all the goods not placed in our power, and which the will alone would give him by itself. So, while he judges himself most miserable if he loses a glorious reputation, great wealth, and any goods of the body, will you not judge him most miserable even if he abounds in all such things? For he clings to things he can very easily lose and does not have for as long as he wants, but he lacks a good will, which is not even to be compared with these, and which, though so great a good, needs only to be willed to be had.
E. Most true.
A. Rightly and deservedly, then, foolish people, even if they were never wise (for this is doubtful and most hidden), are afflicted with misery of this kind.
E. I agree.

### Translation notes

- Whether the soul lived before its union with the body is left open here as “a great question”; Augustine returns to the origin of the soul in Book 3 (3.20–21).
- Pelagius later cited this passage on the power of the will; Augustine answered in Retractations 1.9.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.12 (PL 32:1233–1235; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-12).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.13

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-13
- Source: PL 32:1235–1237
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine shows that one who loves his good will has prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice, and so lives a praiseworthy and happy life, which is gained simply by willing it above fleeting goods.

### Latin text

A. Considera nunc utrum tibi videatur esse prudentia appetendarum et vitandarum rerum scien­ lia. E. Videtur. A. Quid? fortitudo nonne illa est animæ affectio, qua omnia incommoda et damna re­ lUm non in nostra potestate constitutarum contemni­ mus? E. Ita existimo. A. Porro temperantia est at­ fectio coercens et cohibens appetitum ab iis rebus quæ turpiter appetuntur: an tu aliter putas? E. Imo ita ut dicis sentio. A. Jam justitiam quid dicamus esse, nisi virtulem qua sua cuique tribuuntur? E. Nulla inihi alia justitiæ notio est. A. Quisquis ergo bonam habens voluntatem, de cujus excellentia jam diu lo­ quimur, hanc unam dilectione amplexetur, qua inte­ rim mclius nihil habel, hac sese oblectet, hac denique perfruatur et gaudcat, considerans eam et judicars quanta sit, quamque invito illi eripi vel surripi ne­ qucat; num dubitare poterimus istum adversari rebus omnibus, quæ huic uni bono inimicae sunt? E. Ne­ < esse est omnino ut adversetur. A. Nullane hunc pu­ tamus præditum esse prudentia, qui hoc bonum appc­ tendum, et vitanda ea quæ huic inimica sunt videt? E. Nullo modo mihi videtur hoc posse quisquam sine prudentia. A. Recte: sed cur non huic etiam fortitu­ dinem tribuamus? Illa quippe omnia quæ in potestate nostra non sunt, amare iste ac plurimi æstimare non potest. Mala enim voluntate amantur, cui tanquam inimicæ charissimo suo bono resistat necesse est. Cum autcm non amal hæc, non dolet amissa,ct omnino contemnit; quod opus esse fortitudinis, di­ ctumatquc concessum est. E Tribuamus sanc: non enim intelligo quem fOl'tem verius appellare passim, quam eum qui rebus iis quas neque ut adipiscamur, ncquc ut obtineamus in nobis situm est; æquo et tranquillo animo caret; quod hunc necessario facere compertum est. A. Vide jam nunc utrum ab eo tcm­ perantiam alienare possimus, cum ea sit virtus quæ libidines cohibet. Quid autem tam inimicum bonæ voluntati est quam libido? Ex quo profecto intelligis istum bonæ voluntatis sua; amatorem resistere omni modo, atque adversari libidinibus, et idco jure temperantem vocari. E. Perge; assentior. A. Justitia re­ stat, quae quomodo desit huic homini, non sane video. Qui enim babet et diligit voluntatem bonam, et ob­ sistit cis, ut dictum cst, quæ huic inimica sunt, male cuiquam velle nou potest. Sequitur ergo ut nemini fa­ ciat injuriam; quod nullo pacto potest, nisi qui sua cuique tribuerit: hoc autem ad justitiam pertinere cum dicerem, approbasse te, ut puto, meministi. E. Ego vero memini et fateor in hoc homine, qui suam bonam voluntatem magni pendit et diligit, omnes quatuor virtutes quæ abs tc paulo ante, me assen­ tiente, descriptae sunt, esse compertas. A. Quid igitur impedit cur hujus vitam non concedamus esse laudabilem? E. Nihil prorsus; imo hortantur vel etiam cogunt omnia. A. Quid? vitam miscram potesne ullo niodo non judicare fugiendam? E Et magnopcre quidem judico, nihilque aliud agen­ dum existimo. A. At laudabilcm non fugiendam pro­ recto putas. E. Quin eliam appetendam sedulo existi­ mo. A. Non ergo misera est qu:e laudabilis vita est. E. Hoc utiquc sequitur. A. Nihil jam, quantum opinor, difficile tibi ut assentiaris relinquitur, eam scilicet quæ misera non cst, beatam esse vitam. E. Manife­ stissimum est. A. Placet igitur bcatum esse hominem dilectorem bonæ voluntatis suæ, et præ illa conte­ mnentem quodcumque aliud bonum dicitur, cujus:mis. sio potest accidere etiam cum volmitas tenendi manet. E. Quidni placeat, quo superiora quæ concessimus, nccessario trahunt? A. Bene intelligis: sed dic, quæso. nonne bonam voluntatem suam diligerc, et tam magni xstimare quam dictum cst, etiam ipsa bona voluntas est? E. Verum dicis. A. At si hunc beatum recte judicamus, nonne rectc miserum, qui contrariæ voluntatis est? E. Rectissime. A. Quid ergo causæ est cur dubitandum putemus, etiamsi nunquam antea sa­ pientes fuimus, voluntate nos tamen laudabilem et beatam vitam, voluntate turpem ac miseram mereri ac dcgere? E. Fateor buc certis et minime negan­ dis rebus esse perventum. A. Vide etiam aliud: nam credo te memoria icnerc quam dixerimus esse bonam voluntatem: opi­ nor enim, ca dicta est qua recte atquc honeste vivere appetimus. E. Ita memini. A. Hanc igitur voluntatem, si bona itidem voluntate diligamus atquc amplecta­ mur, rebusque omnibus quas retinere non quia voiu­ mus possumus, anteponamus; consequentcr illæ vir­ tutes, ut ratio docuit, animum nostrum incolent, quas habcre idipsum est recte honesteque vivere. Ex quo conficitur ut quisquis recte honesteque vult vivere, si iit se velle præ fugacibus honis,citt, assequamur tan­ tam rem tanta facilitate, ut nihil aliud ci quam ipsum vellc sit hahere quod voluit. E. Vere tibi dico, vix me contineo quin exclamem lætitia, repente mihi oborto tam magno, et lam in facili constituto hono. A. Atqui hoc ipsum gaudium, quod hujus boni ade­ ptione gignitur, rum tranquille et quiete atque con­ stanter erigit animum, beata vita dicitur: nisi tu putas aliud esse beate vivere, quam veris bonis certisque gaudere. E. lla sentio.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Consider now whether prudence seems to you to be the knowledge of what is to be sought and what is to be avoided.
E. It does.
A. Well, is not fortitude that disposition of the soul by which we despise all the discomforts and losses of things not placed in our power?
E. I think so.
A. Further, temperance is the disposition that restrains and holds back the appetite from things that are desired shamefully. Or do you think otherwise?
E. No, I think as you say.
A. Now what shall we say justice is, but the virtue by which each is given his own?
E. I have no other notion of justice.
A. Whoever, then, has a good will, of whose excellence we have been speaking for some time, and embraces it alone with love, since meanwhile he has nothing better; who delights in it, and finally enjoys it fully and rejoices in it, considering and judging how great it is, and that it cannot be snatched or stolen from him against his will: can we doubt that he will oppose all things that are hostile to this one good?
E. He must absolutely oppose them.
A. Do we think that he has no prudence, who sees that this good is to be sought and the things hostile to it avoided?
E. In no way does it seem to me that anyone can do this without prudence.
A. Right. But why should we not grant him fortitude as well? For he cannot love and value highly all those things that are not in our power. They are loved by an evil will, which he must resist as an enemy of his dearest good. And since he does not love these things, he does not grieve when they are lost, and he despises them altogether; and this, as was said and granted, is the work of fortitude.
E. Let us grant it indeed. For I do not see whom I could more truly call brave than one who goes without, with an even and calm mind, those things which it is not in our power either to obtain or to keep; and we found that he necessarily does this.
A. See now whether we can deny him temperance, since it is the virtue that restrains lusts. And what is so hostile to a good will as lust? From this you surely understand that this lover of his own good will resists lusts in every way and opposes them, and so is rightly called temperate.
E. Go on; I agree.
A. Justice remains, and I certainly do not see how it could be lacking in this man. For one who has and loves a good will, and opposes, as was said, what is hostile to it, cannot wish evil to anyone. It follows that he does injury to no one, which is impossible unless one gives each his own; and you remember, I think, that you approved when I said that this belongs to justice.
E. I do remember, and I confess that in this man, who values and loves his good will highly, all four virtues are found that you described a little earlier with my agreement.
A. What, then, prevents us from granting that his life is praiseworthy?
E. Nothing at all; rather, everything urges or even compels it.
A. Well, can you in any way not judge that a miserable life is to be fled?
E. I judge so emphatically, and I think nothing else should be done.
A. But a praiseworthy life, surely, you do not think should be fled.
E. Indeed, I think it should be diligently sought.
A. Then the life that is praiseworthy is not miserable.
E. That certainly follows.
A. Nothing now remains, I think, that is hard for you to assent to: that the life that is not miserable is the happy life.
E. That is most evident.
A. We agree, then, that the man is happy who loves his own good will and, in comparison with it, despises whatever else is called good, the loss of which can happen even while the will to keep it remains.
E. Why should we not agree, when what we granted above necessarily leads to it?
A. You understand well. But tell me, please: is not loving one's own good will and valuing it as highly as was said itself a good will?
E. You speak the truth.
A. And if we rightly judge this man happy, do we not rightly judge miserable the one whose will is the contrary?
E. Most rightly.
A. What reason is there, then, why we should think it doubtful that, even if we were never wise before, it is by the will that we deserve and lead a praiseworthy and happy life, and by the will a shameful and miserable one?
E. I admit that we have arrived at this by certain and undeniable steps.
A. See another point too. I believe you remember what we said a good will is: it was said, I think, to be the will by which we seek to live rightly and honorably.
E. So I remember.
A. If, then, we love and embrace this will in turn with a good will, and prefer it to all the things that we cannot keep merely because we want to, then, as reason has taught, those virtues will dwell in our mind, and to have them is the very thing that it is to live rightly and honorably. From this it follows that whoever wants to live rightly and honorably, if he wills to want this above fleeting goods, attains so great a thing with such ease that for him to have what he willed is nothing other than to will it.
E. Truly I tell you, I can hardly keep from shouting for joy, since so great a good has suddenly dawned on me and is placed so within easy reach.
A. And this very joy that arises from attaining this good, when it lifts up the mind calmly, quietly, and steadily, is called the happy life; unless you think that living happily is something other than rejoicing in true and certain goods.
E. So I think.

### Translation notes

- The four virtues are the classical cardinal virtues; the definitions follow the common philosophical tradition (compare Cicero, On Invention 2.159–164) without quoting it.
- The clause “si id se velle præ fugacibus bonis velit” is garbled in the digital text (“si iit se velle præ fugacibus honis,citt”) and is translated by sense.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.13 (PL 32:1235–1237; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-13).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.14

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-14
- Source: PL 32:1237
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: All want happiness but not all want to live rightly, and since the eternal law joins happiness to the will to live rightly, the miserable fail to reach what they want.

### Latin text

Cur ergo pauci evadant beati, cum omnes esse velint. A. Recte: sed censesne quemquam hominum uon omnibus modis velle atque optare vitam beatam? E. Quis dubitat omnem hominem velie? A. Cur igitur eam non adipiscuntur omnes? Dixeramus enim atque convenerat inter nos, voluntate illam mere i homines, voluntate etiam miseram, et sic mereri ilL accipiant: nanc vero existit nescio quæ repugnantia, ct nisi di­ ligenter dispiciamus, perturbare nititur superiorem tam evigilatam firmamque rationem. Quomodo enim voluntate quisque miseram vitam patitur, cum omnino nemo velit misere vivere? Aut quomodo voluntate beatam vilam consequimur homo, cum lam multi mi­ scri sint, ct beati onmes csse velint? An eo evenit, quod aliud est velle bcne aut male, aliud mereri ali­ quid per bonam vel malam voluntatem? Nam illi qui beati suut, quos etiam bonos esse oportet, non pro­ pie rea suuL beati, quia beate vivere voluerunt; nam hoc volunt etiam mali: sed quia recte; quod mali no­ lunt. Quainubrem nihil mirum est quod miseri homi­ lies non adipiscuntur quod volunt, id cst, beatam vi­ tam. Illud cnim cui comes est, et sine quo ea nemo dignus cst, nemoque assequitur, recte scilicet vivere, non itidem volunt. Hoc enim a terna lex illa, ad cujus considerationem redire jam tempus est, incommuta­ hit! stabilitate firmavit, ut in voluntate meritum sit; in beatitate autem ct miseria pricmium atque suppli­ cium. tuque cum dicimus voluntate homines esse miseros, non idco dicimus, quod miseri essc vcliut, sed quod in ea voluntate sunt, quam etiam cis iititis miseria sequitur necesse est. Quare nun repugnat superiori rationi, quod volunt omnes beati esse, nec possunt; non enim volunt omnes recte vivere, cui uni voluntati vita beata debetur: nisi quid habes ad­ versus hæc dicere. E. Ego vero nibil.

### English translation (Claude)

E. Why, then, do few become happy, when all want to be?
A. A fair question. But do you think there is any human being who does not in every way want and wish for a happy life?
E. Who doubts that every human being wants it?
A. Why, then, do not all attain it? For we had said and agreed between us that people deserve it by the will, and a miserable life also by the will, and that so they receive what they deserve. But now some sort of contradiction appears, and unless we examine it carefully, it threatens to upset our earlier reasoning, so carefully worked out and so firm. For how does anyone suffer a miserable life by his will, when no one at all wants to live miserably? Or how does a human being attain a happy life by his will, when so many are miserable, and all want to be happy? Does it come about because it is one thing to will well or ill, and another to deserve something through a good or evil will? For those who are happy, who must also be good, are not happy because they wanted to live happily, since the wicked want that too, but because they wanted to live rightly, which the wicked do not want. So it is no wonder that miserable people do not attain what they want, that is, the happy life. For that which accompanies it, and without which no one is worthy of it or attains it, namely living rightly, they do not likewise want. For that eternal law, to the consideration of which it is now time to return, has established with unchangeable stability that merit lies in the will, while reward and punishment lie in happiness and misery. So when we say that people are miserable by their will, we do not mean that they want to be miserable, but that they are in a will that misery must follow even against their wishes. So it does not contradict our earlier reasoning that all want to be happy and cannot be; for not all want to live rightly, and to that will alone the happy life is owed. Unless you have something to say against this.
E. I have nothing.

### Translation notes

- Evodius's opening question probably continues his reply at the end of 1.13; Migne prints it at the head of this chapter.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.14 (PL 32:1237; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-14).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.15

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-15
- Source: PL 32:1237–1238
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Lovers of eternal things live under the eternal law, lovers of temporal things under the temporal law, which can punish only by taking away temporal goods; such goods are not evil, but their bad use is.

### Latin text

Sed videamus jam quomodo haec ad propositam illam quæstionem de duabus legibus referantur. A. Fiat: sed dic mihi prius, utrum qui recte vivere dili­ git, coque ita delectatur, ut non solum ei rectum sil, sed ctiam dulce atque jucundum, amet hanc legem, habeatque charissimam, qua videt tributant esse bonæ voluntati beatam vitam, malæ miseram? E. Amat omnino ac vehementer: nam istam ipsam sequens ita _ visit. A. Quid? cum hancamat, mutabile aliquid amat ac temporale, an stabile ac sempiternum? E. Æter­ num sane atque incommutabile. A. Quid illi qui in mala voluntate perseverantes, nihilominus beati esse cupiunt? possuntne amare istam legem, qua talibus hominibus miseria merito rependitur? E. Nullo modi, arbitror. A. Nihilne amant aliud? E. Imo plurima; ea scilicct in quibus adipiscendis vel retinendis mala vo­ luntas illa persistit. A. Opinor te dicere divitias, ho­ nores, voluptates, et pulchritudinem corporis, cæte­ raque omnia quæ possunt ct volentes non adipisci, et amittere inviti. E. Ista ipsa suut. A. Num hæc æterna. esse censes, cum temporis volubilitati vidcas obnoxia? E. Quis hoc vel dementissimus senserit? A. Cum igi­ tur manifestum sit alios esse homines amatores rerum æternarum, alios temporalium, cumque duas leges csse convenerit, unam æternam, aliam temporalem; si quid xquilalis sapis, quos istorum judicas æternæ legi, quos temporali esse subdendos? E. Puto in promptu esse quod quæris: nam beatos illos oh amo­ rem ipsorum æternorum sub æterna lege agere exi­ stimo; miseris vero temporalis imponitur. A. Recte judicas, dummodo illud inconcussum teneas, quod apertissime jam ratio demonstravit, cos qui temporali legi serviunt, non esse possc ab æterna liueros; unde omnia quæ justa sunt, justeque variantur, exprimi diximus: eus vero qui legi æternæ per bonam volun­ tatem hærent, temporalis legis non indigcre, satis, III apparct, intelligis. E. Tcneo quod dicis. A. Jubct igilur æterna lcx avertere amorem a temporalibus, et cum mundatum convertere ad æterna. E. Jubet vero. A. Quid deinde censes temporalem ju­ bere, nisi ut hæc quæ ad tempus nostra dici possunt, quando cis homines cupiditate inhaerent, eo jure pos­ sideant, quo pax et societas humana servetur, quanta in his rebus servari potest? Ea sunt autem: primo, hoc corpus, ct ejus quæ vocantur bona, ut ætegra valetudo, acumen sensuum, vires, pulchritudo, cl si qua sunt. caMera, parlim necessaria bonis artibus, eU idco pluris pensanda, partum viliora. Dcinde libertas, quæ quidem nulla vera est, nisi beatorum, æternæ adhærcutium: scd cam nunc libertatem com­ memoro, qua se liberos putantqui dominos homines non habent, et quam dcsidcrant ii qui a dominis ho­ minibus manumitti volunt. Deinde parentes, fratres, conjux, libcri, propinqui, affiucs, familiares, et qui­ cumque nobis aliqua necessitudine adjuncti suut. Ipsa denique civitas, quæ parentis loco haberi solet; ho­ norcs etiam cl laudes, et ea quæ dicitur gloria popu­ laris. Ad extremum pecunia, quo uno nomine conti­ nentur omnia quorum jure domini sumus, ct quorum vendendorum aut donandorum habere potestatem v idemur. Horum omnium quemadmodum Ice illa sua cuique distribuat, difficile et longum est explicare, et plane ad id quod proposuimus non necessarium. Satis est enim videre nou ultra porrigi hujus legis potesta­ tem in vindicando, quam ut hæc vel aliquid horum adimat atque auferat ei quem punit. Metu coercet ergo, et ad id quod vult, torquet ac retorquet mise­ rorum animus, quibus regendis accommodata est. Dum enim hæc amittere timent. tenent in bis uten­ dis quemdam modum apjum vinculo civitatis, quala ex hujuscemodi bominibus constitui potest. Non all­ leni ulciscitur peccatum cum amantur ista, sed cum aliis per improbitatem auferuntur. Quamobrem vide utrum jam perventum sit ad id quod infinitum puta- I bas. Institueramus enim quærere, quatenus habeat ' jus ulciscendi ea lex qua populi terreni civitatesque gubernantur. E. Video perventum. A. Vides ergo etiam illud, quod poena non es­ set, sive quæ per injuriam, sive quoe per talem vindi­ etam infertur hominibus, si eas res quæ invito auferri possunt, non amarent? E. Id quoque video. A. Cum igitur eisdem rebus alius male, alius benc utatur; et is quidem qui male, amore his inhæreat atque impli­ cetur, scilicet subditus eis rebus quas ei subditas esse oportebat, et ea bona sibi constituens, quibus ord!­ nandis beneque tractandis ipse esse utique deberet bonum: ille autem qui recte his utitur, ostendat qui­ dem bona esse, sed non sibi; non enim eum bonum melioremve faciunt, sed ab eo potius flunt: et ideo uon eis amore agglutinetur, neque velut membra sui animi faciat, quod fit amando, ne cum resecari caepe­ riut, cum cruciatu ac tabe fœdent; sed eis totus SII­ perferatur, ct habere illa atque regere, cum opus esi, paratus, et amittre ac non habere paratior: cum ergo h:cc ita siut, num aut argentum et aurum propter ava­ ros accusandum putas, aut cibos propter voraces, aut vinum propter ebriosos, aut muliebres formas pro­ pter scortatores et adulteros, atque boc modo cætera, cum praesertim videas et igne bene uti medicum, et panc scelerate veneficum? E. Verissimum est, non res ipsas, sed homines qui eis male utuntur esse cuI.. I andos.

### English translation (Claude)

E. But let us now see how these things relate to that question we set ourselves about the two laws.
A. Very well. But tell me first whether one who loves living rightly, and so delights in it that it is not only right for him but also sweet and pleasant, loves this law and holds it most dear, by which he sees that a happy life is assigned to a good will and a miserable one to an evil will.
E. He loves it altogether and intensely; for it is by following that very law that he lives as he does.
A. Well, when he loves it, does he love something changeable and temporal, or something stable and everlasting?
E. Something eternal, surely, and unchangeable.
A. What of those who persist in an evil will and nevertheless desire to be happy? Can they love this law by which misery is deservedly paid back to such people?
E. In no way, I think.
A. Do they love nothing else?
E. On the contrary, very many things: those in obtaining or keeping which that evil will persists.
A. I suppose you mean riches, honors, pleasures, beauty of body, and all the other things that people may fail to obtain though they want them, and may lose against their will.
E. Those are the very things.
A. Do you think these are eternal, when you see that they are subject to the turning of time?
E. Who, even the most demented, would think so?
A. Since it is clear, then, that some people are lovers of eternal things and others of temporal things, and since we agreed that there are two laws, one eternal and the other temporal, if you have any sense of fairness, which of these people do you judge should be subject to the eternal law, and which to the temporal?
E. I think what you ask is plain: I consider that the happy, because of their love for eternal things themselves, act under the eternal law, while the temporal law is imposed on the miserable.
A. You judge rightly, provided you hold unshaken what reason has now shown most clearly: that those who serve the temporal law cannot be free from the eternal law, from which, we said, all things that are just, and are justly varied, are drawn; and that those who cleave to the eternal law by a good will do not need the temporal law, as you seem to understand well enough.
E. I hold to what you say.
A. The eternal law, then, commands us to turn our love away from temporal things and, once it is cleansed, to turn it toward eternal things.
E. It does command this.
A. What, then, do you think the temporal law commands, but that people, when they cling with desire to the things that can be called ours for a time, should possess them by a right by which peace and human society may be kept, as far as they can be kept in such things? These things are, first, this body and what are called its goods, such as sound health, keenness of the senses, strength, beauty, and whatever others there are, partly necessary for the good arts and so to be valued more, partly of less worth. Then liberty; which indeed is not true liberty at all except that of the happy, who cleave to the eternal law; but I mean now the liberty by which those who have no human masters think themselves free, and which those desire who want to be set free by their human masters. Then parents, brothers, wife, children, relatives, in-laws, friends, and whoever is joined to us by any tie. Then the city itself, which is usually held in the place of a parent; honors too, and praises, and what is called popular glory. Finally money, under which one name is contained everything of which we are lawful owners and over which we seem to have power to sell or give away. How that law distributes to each his own of all these things is hard and long to explain, and plainly not necessary for what we have set out to do. It is enough to see that the power of this law in punishing extends no further than to take away and remove these things, or some of them, from the one it punishes. So it restrains by fear, and bends and turns toward what it wants the minds of the miserable, for whose governing it is suited. For while they fear to lose these things, they keep, in using them, a certain measure fit for the bond of a city such as can be formed from people of this kind. It does not punish the sin when these things are loved, but when they are taken from others through wickedness. So see whether we have now arrived at what you thought endless. For we had set out to ask how far the law by which earthly peoples and cities are governed has the right to punish.
E. I see that we have arrived.
A. You see, then, also this: that there would be no punishment, whether inflicted on people through injury or through such legal penalty, if they did not love the things that can be taken from them against their will?
E. That too I see.
A. One person, then, uses the same things badly and another well. The one who uses them badly clings to them with love and is entangled in them, that is, made subject to the things that ought to be subject to him, and makes them goods for himself, when he himself ought rather to be a good for ordering and handling them well. The one who uses them rightly shows indeed that they are goods, but not for himself, for they do not make him good or better, but rather become good through him; and therefore he is not glued to them by love, nor does he make them, as it were, limbs of his own mind, which is what loving does, lest, when they begin to be cut off, they disfigure him with torment and decay. Rather, he rises wholly above them, ready to have and govern them when need be, and readier to lose them and not have them. Since this is so, do you think that silver and gold should be blamed because of the greedy, or food because of gluttons, or wine because of drunkards, or women's beauty because of fornicators and adulterers, and so with the rest, especially when you see that a physician uses fire well and a poisoner uses bread wickedly?
E. It is most true that not the things themselves but the people who use them badly are to be blamed.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.15 (PL 32:1237–1238; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-15).

## On Free Choice of the Will 1.16

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-16
- Source: PL 32:1238
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Evil-doing is turning from eternal to temporal things, and it comes from the free choice of the will; Evodius asks whether God should have given free choice, which Augustine defers to the next book.

### Latin text

A. Recte: sed quoniam et quid valeat aeterna lex, ut opinor, vid: re jam coepimus, et quantum ICI - icmporalis in vindicando progredi possit, inventum esl; et rcrum duo genera, æternarum et tempotalium, duoque rursus hominum, aliorum æternas, aliorum temporales sequentium et diligentium, satis aperteque distincta sunt: quid autem quisque sectandum et an­ plectendum eligat, in voluntate eSse positum consti­ tit; nullaque re de arce dominandi, rectoqne or­ dine mentum deponi, nisi voluntate: et est manifestum. non rem ullam, cum ea quisque male utitur, sed ipsum male utentem esse arguendum: referamus nos, si pia­ cet, ad quaestionem in exordio hujus sermonis propo­ sitam, et videamus utrum soluta sit; nam quærere institueramus quid sit male facere, et propter hoc omnia quae dicta suut, diximus. Quocirca licet nunc animadvertere et considerare, utrum sit aliud male facere, quam neglectis rebus æternis, quibus per seipsam mens fruitur, et per seipsam percipit, et quas amans amittere non potest, temporalia et quæ per corpus bominis partem vilissimamsentiuntur, et nun­ quam esse certa possunt, quasi magna et miranda sectari. Nam hoc uno genere omnia malefacta, id est peccata, mihi videntur includi. Tibi autem quid vi­ deatur, exspecto cognoscere. E. Est ita ut dicis, et assentior, omnis peccata­ boc uno genere continem, cum quisque avertitur a di­ vinis vereque manentibus, ct ad mutabilia atque in­ certa convertitur. Quoe quanquam in ordine suo recte locata sint, et suam quamdam pulchritudinem per­ agant; perversi tamen animi est et inordinati, eis se­ quendis subjici, quibus ad, riutum suum ducendis po­ tius divino ordine ac jure pra:latus est. Et illud sboul mibi videre jam videor absolutum atque compertuw, quod post illam quæstionem, quid sit male faccre, deinceps quaerere institueramus, unde male faciamus. Nisi enim fallor, ut ratio tractata monstravit, id raci­ mus exlibero voluntatis arbitrio. Sed quaero utrum ipsum liberum arbitriuni, quo peccandi facultatem habere convincimur, oportuerit nobis dari ab eo qui nos fecit. Videmur enim non fuisse peccaturi, si isto careremus; et metuendum est ne hoc modo Deus etiam malefactorum nostrorum auctor existimetur. A. Nullo modo istuc thnueris: sed ut diligentius requiratur, aliud tempus sumendum est. Nam hæc sermocinatio modum terminumque jam desiderat; qua velim cre­ das magnarum abditarumque rerum inquirendarum quasi fores esse pulsatas. In quarum penetralia cum Deo duce venire coepcrimus, judicabis profecto quan­ tum inter hanc disputationem, et cas quæ sequuntur intersit, quantumque illac præstent, non modo in­ vestigationis sagacitate, sed etiam majestate rerum, et clarissima luce veritatis: pietas tantum adsit, ut nos divina providentia cursum quem instituimus, te­ nere et perficere permittat. E. Cedo voluntati tuæ, et ei meam judicio et voto libentissime adjungo.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Right. We have now begun, I think, to see what the eternal law can do, and we have found how far the temporal law can go in punishing. Two kinds of things, eternal and temporal, and again two kinds of people, some following and loving eternal things, others temporal ones, have been distinguished clearly enough. It has been established that what each chooses to pursue and embrace lies in the will, and that nothing but the will puts the mind down from its citadel of rule and from right order; and it is clear that when anyone uses a thing badly, not the thing but the one who uses it badly is to be blamed. Let us return, then, if you please, to the question set at the beginning of this conversation and see whether it has been solved. For we had set out to ask what doing evil is, and it was for this that we said everything that has been said. So we may now notice and consider whether doing evil is anything other than neglecting eternal things, which the mind enjoys through itself and perceives through itself, and which it cannot lose while it loves them, and pursuing as if they were great and wonderful the temporal things that are perceived through the body, the lowest part of a human being, and that can never be certain. For all evil deeds, that is, sins, seem to me to be included in this one class. But I wait to learn what you think.
E. It is as you say, and I agree that all sins are contained in this one class: when someone turns away from divine and truly abiding things and turns toward changeable and uncertain ones. Although these are rightly placed in their own order and achieve a certain beauty of their own, yet it belongs to a perverse and disordered mind to be subjected to following those things which, by divine order and right, it was set over, to lead them rather at its own nod. And I think I now see settled and found what, after that question of what doing evil is, we had next set out to ask: where our doing evil comes from. Unless I am mistaken, as the reasoning we pursued has shown, we do it from the free choice of the will. But I ask whether free choice itself, by which we are shown to have the capacity to sin, ought to have been given us by him who made us. For it seems that we would not have sinned if we lacked it; and it is to be feared that in this way God may be thought the author even of our evil deeds.
A. Do not fear that at all. But to examine it more carefully, another time must be taken. For this conversation now calls for a limit and an end; and I would have you believe that in it we have, as it were, knocked at the doors of great and hidden matters to be investigated. When, with God as guide, we begin to enter their inner rooms, you will surely judge how great a difference there is between this discussion and those that follow, and how far they excel, not only in keenness of investigation but also in the majesty of their subject and in the clearest light of truth. Only let piety be with us, so that divine providence may allow us to hold to and complete the course we have begun.
E. I yield to your will, and most gladly join my judgment and my wish to it.

### Scripture references

- Matt 7:7: echo, low confidence

### Translation notes

- “Knocked at the doors” may echo Matt 7:7 (“knock, and it will be opened”).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 1.16 (PL 32:1238; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/1-9/#p-1-16).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.1

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-1
- Source: PL 32:1238–1239
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine argues that man is a good from God who can live rightly only by willing, so God had to give him free will, which was given for acting rightly; otherwise just punishment and reward could not exist.

### Latin text

E. Jam, si fieri potest, explica mibi quare dede-. rit Deus homini liberum voluntatis aibitrium: quod utique si non accepisset, peccare uon posset. A. Jain euim certum tibi atque cognitum est, Deum dedisse homini hoc, quod dari debuisse non putas? E. Quan­ tum in superiori libro intelligere mibi visus sam, ct habemus liberum voluntatis arbitrium, et nou nisi eo peccamus. A. Ego quoque memini jam nobis id fa­ ctum esse perspicuum. Sed nunc interrogavi utrum hoc quod nos habere, et quo nos peccare manifestum est, Deum nobis dedisse scias. E. Nullum alium puto. Ab ipso enim sumus; et sive peccantes, sive recte agentes, ab iUlo poenam meremur aut praemium. A. Hoc quoque utrum liquido noveris, an auctoritate commotus libenter etiam incognitum credas, cupio scire. E. Auctoritati quidem me primum de hac rc credidisse confirmo. Sed quid verius quam omne bo­ num ex Deo esse, et omne justum bonum esse, et pec­ cantibus poenam recteque facientibus præmium ju­ stum esse? Ex quo conficitur a Deo affici, et peccan­ tes miseria, et recte facientes beatitate. A. Nihil resisto: sed quæro illud alterum, quo­ modo noveris nos ab ipso esse. Neque enim hoc nunc, sed ab ipso nos vel poenam, vel præmium mereri explicasti. E. Hoc quoque non aliunde video esse ma­ nifestum, nisi quod jam constat Deum vindicare pec­ cata. Siquidem ab illo est omnis justitia. Non enim ut alicujus est bonitatis alienis praestare beneficia ita justi­ tiæ vindicare in alienos. Unde manifestum est ad eum nos pertinere, quia non solum in nos benignissimus in præstando, sed etiam justissimus in vindicando est. Deinde ex eo quod ego posui, tuque concessisti, omne honum ex Deo esse, etiam hominem ex Deo esse intelligi potest. Homo enim ipse in quantum homo est, aliquod bonum est; quia recte vivere, cum vult, potest. A. Plane si hæc ita sunt, soluta quaestio est quam proposuisti. Si euim homo aliquod bonum est, et non posset, nisi cum vellet, recte facere, debuit habere liberam voluntatem, sine qua recte facere non posset. Non enim quia per illam etiam peccatur, ad hoc eam Deum dedisse credendum est. Satis ergo causæ est cur dari debuerit, quoniam sine ilia homo recte non po­ test vivere. Ad hoc autem datam vel hinc intelligi po­ test, quia si quis ea usus fuerit ad peccandum, divi­ nitus in eum vindicatur. Quod injuste fieret, si non solum ut recte viveretur, sed etiam ut peccaretur, libera esset voluntas data. Quomodo enim juste vin­ dicaretur in eum, qui ad hanc rem usus esset volun­ tate, ad quam rem data cst? Nunc vero Deus cum peccantem punit, quid videtur tibi aliud dicere nisi, Cur non ad cam rem usus es libera voluntatc, ad quam tibi eam dedi,hoc eat ad recte faciendum? Deinde illud bonum, quo commendatur ipsa justitia in jamnandis peccatis recteque factis honorandis, quomodo esset, si homo careret libero voluntatis ar­ bitrio? Non enim aut peccatum esset, aut recte fa­ ctum, quod non fieret voluntate. Ac per hoc et poena injusta esset et pramium, si homo voluntatem non haberet liberam. Debuit autem et in supplicio, ct in præmio esse justitia; quoniam hoc unum est bonorum quæ sunt ex Deo. Debuit igitur Deus dare homini li­ beram voluntatem.

### English translation (Claude)

E. Now, if it can be done, explain to me why God gave man free choice of the will; for certainly, if he had not received it, he could not sin.
A. Is it already certain and known to you that God gave man this, which you think ought not to have been given?
E. As far as I seemed to understand in the previous book, we both have free choice of the will and sin only by it.
A. I too remember that this was made clear to us. But I have now asked whether you know that it was God who gave us this which we evidently have and by which we evidently sin.
E. No one else, I think. For we are from him; and whether we sin or act rightly, we deserve punishment or reward from him.
A. I want to know whether you know this too clearly, or whether, moved by authority, you willingly believe it even though it is not known.
E. I affirm that on this matter I first believed authority. But what is truer than that every good is from God, that everything just is good, and that punishment for sinners and reward for those who act rightly is just? From this it follows that by God sinners are afflicted with misery and those who act rightly with happiness.
A. I do not object; but I ask the other thing: how do you know that we are from him? For you have not explained that, but that we deserve punishment or reward from him.
E. This too I see is clear from nothing else than this, that it is already established that God punishes sins. For all justice is from him. While it belongs to a certain goodness to do kindnesses to strangers, it does not belong to justice to punish strangers. Hence it is clear that we belong to him, since he is not only most kind to us in giving but also most just in punishing. Then, from what I laid down and you granted, that every good is from God, it can be understood that man too is from God. For man himself, insofar as he is man, is a good, since he can live rightly when he wills.
A. Plainly, if this is so, the question you proposed is solved. For if man is a good, and could not act rightly unless he willed, he had to have a free will, without which he could not act rightly. We must not believe that God gave it for this purpose because sin is also committed through it. It is reason enough why it ought to have been given that without it man cannot live rightly. And that it was given for this purpose can be understood from this too: if anyone has used it to sin, he is punished by God. That would happen unjustly if free will had been given not only for living rightly but also for sinning. For how would a man be justly punished who had used his will for the purpose for which it was given? But now, when God punishes a sinner, what else does he seem to you to say but, “Why did you not use free will for the purpose for which I gave it to you, that is, for acting rightly?” Further, how could that good exist by which justice itself is commended, in condemning sins and honoring right deeds, if man lacked free choice of the will? For what was not done by will would be neither a sin nor a right action. And so both punishment and reward would be unjust if man did not have free will. But there had to be justice both in punishment and in reward, since this is one of the goods that are from God. God, then, had to give man free will.

### Translation notes

- Pelagius later cited the sentence on man as a good “since he can live rightly when he wills”; Augustine discusses it in Retractations 1.9.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.1 (PL 32:1238–1239; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-1).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.2

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-2
- Source: PL 32:1239–1240
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Evodius asks why a will given for doing right can be turned to sin; Augustine agrees to inquire as if all were uncertain, beginning from faith and seeking understanding, as Scripture commands.

### Latin text

E. Jam concedo cain Deum dedisse. Scd nonne tibi videtur, qu eso te, si ad recte facicndum data est, quod non debuerit ad peccandum posse converti? sic ut ipsa justitia quæ data est homini ad bene viven­ dum: numquid enim potest quispiam per justitiam suam male vivere? Sic nenDo posset per voluntatem peccare, si voluntas data esset ad recte faciendum. A. Donabit quidem Deus, ut spero, ut tibi valeam re­ spondere, vel potius ut ipse tibi eadem, quæ summa omnium m.igistra est, vcritate intus docente respon­ deas. Sed paulisper mihi volo dicas, si id quod abs te quaesiveram, certum ct cognitum tenes, Deum nobis dedisse liberam voluntatem, utrum oporteat dicere dari non debuisse, quod dedisse confitemur Deum. Si enim incertum est utrum dederit, recte quærimus utrum bene sit data, ut cum invenerimus bene datam esse, inveni itur etiam illum dedisse, a quo homini data sunt omnia bona 1: si autem invenerimus non bene datam esse, non eum dedisse intelligamus, quem culpare nefas est. Si vero certum est quod ipse illam dederit, oportet fatcamur, quoquo modo data est, ne­ que non dari, neque alitcr dari cam dcbuisse quam data est. Ille enim dedit, cujus factum recte repre­ hendi nullo pacto potest. E. Quanquam hæc inconcussa fide tenenti, ta­ men quia cognitione nondum teneo, ita quæramus quasi omnia incerta sint. Video enim ex hoc quod in­ certum est, utrum ad recte faciendum voluntas libera data sit, cum per illam etiam peccare possimus, fieri etiam illud incertum, utrum dari debuerit. Si enim incertum est ad recte faciendum datam esse, incer­ tum est etiam dari debuisse: ac per hoc etiam utrum eam Deus dederit, incertum erit; quia si incertum est dari debuisse, incertum est ab eo datam esse, quem nefas est credere dedisse aliquid quod dari non debuit. A. Illud saltem tibi certum est, Deum esse. E. Etiam hoc non contemplando, sed credendo incon­ cussum teneo. A. Si quis ergo illorum insipientium, de quibus scriptum est, Dixit insipiens in corde suo. Non est Deus, hoc tibi diceret, nec vel­ let tecum credere quod credis, sed cognoscere utruiu vera credideris; relinqueresne hominem, an aliquo modo, quod inconcussum tenes, persuadendum esse arhitrareris; præsertim si ille non obluctari pervicaci­ ter, sed studiose id vellet agnoscere? Et hoc quod ultimum posuisti, satis me admonet quid ci respon­ dere deberem. Certe enim quamvis esset absurdissi­ mus, concederet mihi, cum doloso ct pervicaci de nulla omnino et maxime de re tanta, non esse disse­ rendum. Quo concesso, prior mecum ageret, ut sibi crederem bono animo eum istuc quærere, neque:ii - quid in se, quod ad rem hanc attinet, doli ac pervi­ caciæ latere. Tuni ego demonstrarem, quod cuivis facillimum puto, quanto esset aquius, cum sibi de occultis animi sui quæ ipse nosset, veHet alterum cre­ dere qui non nosset, ut eliam ipse tantorum virorum Libris, qui se cum Filio Dei vixisse testatum Litteris reliquerunt, esse Deum, crederet; quia et ea ac vi­ disse scripserunt, quæ nuilo modo heri possent, si non esset Deus; ct nimium stultus esset, si ine re­, prehenderet quod illis crediderim, qui sibi vellet ut crederem. Jain vero quod recte reprehendere non va­ leret, nullo modo reperiret cur etiam nollet imitari. A. Si ergo utrum sit Deus, satis esse cxislimas, quod non temere tantis viris credendum esse judicavimus; cur non, quæso te, de iis quoque rebus, quas tan­ quam incertas ct piane incognitas quærere instituimus,, similiter putas corumdem virorum auctoritate sic esse credendum, ut de investigatione earum nihil amplius laborcmus? E. Sed nos id quod credimus, nosse et intelligere cupirnus. A. Recte meministi, quod etiam in exordio su­ peri oris disputationis a nobis positum esse, negare non possumus. Nisi enim aliud esset credere. et aliud intelligere, et primo credendum es­ set, quod magnum et divinum intelligere cuperemus, frustra propheta dixisset, Nisi credideritis, nou intel­ ligetis. Ipse quoque Dominus noster et dictis et factis ad credendum primo borta­ tus est, quos ad salutem vocavit. Sed postea cum de ipso dono loquerctur, quod erat daturus credentibus, non ait, Hæc eit autem vita aeterna ut credant; sed, Hæc est, inquit, vita alterna, ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum. Deinde jam credentibus dicit, Quærite et invenietis: nam neque inventum dici potest, quod incognitum creditur; neque quisquam inveniendo Deo fit idonens, nisi antca crediderit quod est postea cogniturus. Quapropter Domini præceptis obtemperantes quæramus instanter. Quod enim hor­ tante ipso quaerimus, eodem ipso demonstrante in­ veniemus, quantum hæc in hac vita, et a nobis talibus inveniri queunt: nam et a melioribus etiam dum has terras incolunt, et certe a bonis et piis omnibus post hanc vitam, evidentius atque perfectius ista cerni ob­ tinerique credendum est; et nobis ita fore speran­ dum est, et ista contemptis terrenis et humanis, omni modo desideranda et diligenda sunt.

### English translation (Claude)

E. I now grant that God gave it. But does it not seem to you, I beg you, that if it was given for acting rightly, it ought not to have been capable of being turned to sinning, like justice itself, which was given to man for living well? For can anyone live badly by means of his justice? So no one could sin by means of the will, if the will had been given for acting rightly.
A. God will grant, I hope, that I may be able to answer you, or rather that you may answer yourself, with that same Truth, the supreme teacher of all, teaching you within. But I want you to tell me briefly: if you hold as certain and known what I had asked you, that God gave us free will, ought we to say that what we confess God gave ought not to have been given? For if it is uncertain whether he gave it, we rightly ask whether it was well given, so that, when we have found that it was well given, we find also that he gave it from whom all good things have been given to man; but if we find that it was not well given, we may understand that he did not give it, whom it is impious to blame. But if it is certain that he gave it, we must admit that, however it was given, it ought neither not to have been given nor to have been given otherwise than it was given. For he gave it whose act can in no way be rightly blamed.
E. Although I hold this with unshaken faith, yet since I do not yet hold it by knowledge, let us inquire as if everything were uncertain. For I see that, because it is uncertain whether free will was given for acting rightly, since through it we can also sin, it becomes uncertain too whether it ought to have been given. For if it is uncertain that it was given for acting rightly, it is uncertain also that it ought to have been given; and so it will be uncertain too whether God gave it, because if it is uncertain that it ought to have been given, it is uncertain that it was given by him, of whom it is impious to believe that he gave anything that ought not to have been given.
A. At least this is certain to you, that God exists.
E. This too I hold unshaken, not by contemplating but by believing.
A. If, then, one of those fools of whom it is written, “The fool has said in his heart, There is no God,” should say this to you, and did not want to believe with you what you believe, but to know whether what you believe is true, would you abandon the man, or would you think that he should somehow be persuaded of what you hold unshaken, especially if he wanted not to resist obstinately but earnestly to come to know it?
E. That last point you made reminds me well enough what I ought to answer him. For surely, however absurd he was, he would grant me that with a deceitful and obstinate person one should not argue about anything at all, and least of all about so great a matter. Having granted this, he would first press me to believe that he asked this in good faith and that there was in him no hidden deceit or obstinacy in this matter. Then I would show him, which I think is very easy for anyone, how much fairer it would be, since he wanted another who did not know them to believe him about the hidden things of his own mind, which he himself knew, that he too should believe that God exists on the strength of the books of such great men, who left it witnessed in writing that they had lived with the Son of God; for they also wrote that they had seen things that could in no way have happened if there were no God. And he would be very foolish if he blamed me for believing them, when he wanted me to believe him. And what he could not rightly blame, he would find no reason not to want to imitate.
A. If, then, as to whether God exists, you think it enough that we have judged that such great men are not rashly to be believed, why, I ask you, do you not think likewise that on those other matters too, which we set out to investigate as uncertain and wholly unknown, we should so believe the authority of the same men as to labor no more over investigating them?
E. But we want to know and understand what we believe.
A. You remember rightly what we cannot deny we also laid down at the beginning of the previous discussion. For unless believing were one thing and understanding another, and unless we had first to believe the great and divine thing we desired to understand, the prophet would have said in vain, “Unless you believe, you will not understand.” Our Lord himself too, both by words and by deeds, first urged those whom he called to salvation to believe. But afterwards, when he spoke of the very gift he would give to believers, he did not say, “And this is eternal life, that they believe,” but he says, “This is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” Then to those who already believe he says, “Seek, and you will find”; for what is believed without being known cannot be said to have been found, and no one becomes fit to find God unless he has first believed what he will afterwards know. So, obeying the Lord's commands, let us seek earnestly. For what we seek at his urging we shall find at his showing, as far as these things can be found in this life and by people such as we are. For we must believe that they are seen and grasped more clearly and perfectly by better people even while they dwell on this earth, and certainly by all the good and devout after this life; and we must hope that it will be so for us; and, despising earthly and human things, we must desire and love these things in every way.

### Scripture references

- Ps 14:1 (13:1 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Isa 7:9: quotation, high confidence
- John 17:3: quotation, high confidence
- Matt 7:7: quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Ps 14:1 (Ps 13:1 in the Latin numbering); compare Ps 53:1.
- The speaker mark “E.” before “That last point you made …” is missing in the digital text; the reply belongs to Evodius.
- The “great men” who lived with the Son of God are the apostles and evangelists.
- Isa 7:9 is again quoted in the Septuagint-based Latin form (see 1.2).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.2 (PL 32:1239–1240; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-2).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.3

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-3
- Source: PL 32:1240–1241
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Beginning the proof that God exists, Augustine establishes that Evodius exists, lives, and understands, and ranks the bodily senses, the inner sense that presides over them, and reason, which judges them all and knows itself.

### Latin text

Quaeramus autem hoc ordine, si placet: primum, quomodo manifestum est Deum esse; dciude, utrum ab illo sint quacumque iu quantumcumque sunt bona; postremo, utrum in bonis numeranda sit vo­ luntas libera. Quibus compertis satis apparebit, ut opinor, utrum recte homini data sit. Quare prius abs te quæro, ut de manifestissimis capiamus exordium; utrum tu ipse sis. An tu fortasse metuis, ne in hac interrogatione fallaris, cum utique si non esses, falli omnino non posses? E. Pergc potius ad caetera. A. Ergo quoniam manifestum est esse te, nee tibi aliter manifestum esset, nisi viveres, id quoque manifestum est, vivere te: intelligisne ista duo esse verissima? E. Prorsus intelligo. A. Ergo etiam boc tertium nUl.. nifestum est, hoc est intelligere te. E. Manifestum. A. Quid in his tribus Libi videtur excellere? E, Intel­ ligentia. A. Cur tibi hoc videtur? E. Quia cum tria sint bac, esse, vivere, intelligere; et lapis cst, ct pecus vivit, nec tamer. lapidem puto vivere, aut pe­ cus intelligere; qui autem intelligit, eum et esse et vivere certissimum est: quare non dobito id excel­ leutius judicare, cui omnia tria insunt, quam id cui duo vel unum desit. Nam quod vivit, utique et est, sed non sequitur ut etiam etiam intelligat: qualem vitam esse pecoris arbitror. Quod autem est, uon utique consequens est ut et vivat et iutelligat: nam esse cadavcra possum fateri, vivere autem nullus dixerit. Jamveroquod non vivit, multo minus intelligit. A. Te­ nemus igitur horum trium duo deesse cadaveri, unum pecori, nihil homini. E. Verum est. A. Tenenius euam id esse in his tribus præstantius, quod homo cum duobus cæteris habet, id est intelligere, quod habentem sequitur et esse et vivere. E. Tencmus sane. A. Dic mihi jam utrum illos vulgatissimos cor­ poris sensus babere te noveris, videndi, et audiendi, ct olfaciendi, et gustandi, ct tangendi. E. Novi. A. Quid putas pertinere ad videndi sensum? id est, quid putas nos videndo sentirc? E. Quæcumque corpora­ lia. A. Num etiam dura et mollia videndo sentimus? E. Non. A. Quid ergo proprie ad oculos pertinet, quod per cos sentimus? E. Color. A. Quid ad aures? E. Sonus. A. Quid ad olfactum? E. Odor. A. Quid ad gustum? E. Sapor. A. Quid ad tactum i E. Molle vel durum, lene vel asperum, et multa talia. A, Quid? corporum formas, magnas, breves, quadras, rotum­ das, et si quid hujusmodi est, nonne et tangendo et videndo sentimus, et ideo nec visui proprie, nec ta­ ctui tribui possunt, sed utrique? E. Intelligo. A. In­ telligis ergo et quædam singulos sensus habere pro­ pri;., de quibus renuntient, et quædam quosdam habere communia? E. Et hoc intelligo. A. Quid igitur ad quemque sensum pertineat, et quid inter se vel omnes vel quidam eorum communiter habeant, num possumus ullo eorum sensu dijudicare? E. Nullo modo, sed quodam interiore ista dijudicantur. A. Num fortasse ipsa est ratio, qua bestiæ carent? nam, ut opinor, ratione ista comprebendimus, et ita sese ha­ here cognoscimus. E. Magis nos arbitror ratione com­ prehendere esse interiorem quemdam sensum, ad quem ab istis quinque notissimis cuncta referantur. Namque aliud est quo videt bestia, aliud quo ea quæ videndo sentit, vel vitat vel appetit: Ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem intus in ipsa anima; quo non solum ea quæ videntur, sed etiam quae audiuntur, quæque caeteris capiuntur corporis sensibus, vel ap­ petunt animalia delectata et assumunt, vel offensa de­ vitant et respuunt. Hic autem nee visus, nec auditus, nec olfactus, nec gustatus, nee tactus dici potest, sed nescio quid aliud quod omnibus communiter pre­ sidet. Quod cum ratione comprehendamus, ut dixi, hoc ipsum tamen rationem vocare non possum; quo­ niam et bestiis inesse manifestum est. A. Agnosco istud quidquid est, et cum interio­ rem sensum appellare non dubito. Sed nisi et istum transeat, quod ad nos rcfertur a sensibus corporis, pervenire ad scientiam non potest. Quidquid enim scimus, id ratione comprehensum tenemus. Scimus autem, at de cæteris taceam, nec colores auditu, nic Voces visu posse sentiri. Et cum hoc seimus, nec ocu­ lis, nec auribus scimus neque illo sensu interiore, quo nec bestiæ carent. Non enim credendum est eas nosse, nec auribus sentiri lucem, nec oculis vocem; quoniam ista nonnisi rationali animadversione et co­ gitatione discernimus. E. Non possum dicere hoc me habere perceptum. Quid si enim sensu illo interiore, quo eas non carere concedis, hoc quoque dijudicant, nec colores auditu uec visu voces posse sentiri? A. Num eliam putas cas posse discernere, ab inviceln colorem qui sentitur, et sensum qui in oculo est, et interiorem ilium sensum apud animam, et rationem qua ista singillatim definiuntur et dinUmerantur? E. Nullo modo. A. Quid? ista ratio posset haec quatuor discernere ab invicem et definitionibus terminare, nisi ad eam referretur et color per oculorum sensum, et ipse rursus per ilium iutcriorem qui ei presidet, et idcm interior per seipsum, si tamen jam nihil aliud interpositum est? E. Non video quomodo aliter pos­ set. A. Quid? hoc videsne, sensu oculorum colorem sentiri, eumdem autem sensum eodem sensu non sentiri? Non enim quo sensu colorem vides, hoc eodem vides etiam ipsum videre. E. Non omnino. A. Enitere etiam ista dijudicare: nam credo te non negare aliud colorem esse, et aliud colorem videre, et item aliud etiam, cum color non subest, habere sensam quo vidcri posset, si subesset. E. Discerno et ista, et inter se differre concedo. A Nam horum trium quidquam vidcs oculis, nisi colorem? E. Nihil aHud. A. Dic ergo unde videas alia duo; non enim ea non visa posses discernere. E. Nescio quid aliud; esse scio, nihil amplius. A. Nescis igitur utrum jam ipsa sit ratio, an ilia vita sit quam sensum interiorem vocamus praecellentem sensibus corporis, an aliquid aliud? E. Nescio. A. Illud tamen scis, ea definiri nisi ratione non posse; neque rationem id facere, nisi de iis quae sibi examinanda offeruntur. E. Certum est. A. Quidquid igitur est aliud quo sentiri potest omne quod scimus, ministerium rationis est, cui offert et renuntiat quidquid attingit, ut ea quæ sentiuntur discerni suis finibus possint, et non senticndo lautum, sed etiam sciendo comprehendi. E. Ita est. A. Quid? ipsa ratio quæ ministros suos, et ea quae suggerunt, discernit ab invicem, et item quid inter hæc et scipsum distet, agnoscit, seque illis præpotentiorem esse confirmat; num alia re seipsam nisi seipsa, id est ratione comprehendit'? an aliter scires te habere rationem, nisi id ratione perciperes? E. Verissi­ mum est. A. Quoniam ergo cum colorem sentimus, non itidem sensu ipso nos sentire etiam sentimus; neque cum audimus sonum, nostrum etiam audimus auditum; neque cum olfacimus rosam, olet nobis ali­ quid ct ipse olfactus; neque quidquam gustantibus sapit in ore ipse gustus; nec tangentes aliquid, ipsum etiam tangendi sensum possumus tangere: manifestum est quinque istos sensus nullo eorumsensu posse sentiri, quamvis eis corporalia quaeque seu­ tiantur. E. Manifestum est.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Let us inquire in this order, if you please: first, how it is evident that God exists; then, whether all things whatsoever, insofar as they are good, are from him; last, whether free will is to be counted among goods. When these are found, it will be clear enough, I think, whether it was rightly given to man. So first I ask you, to begin with the most evident things, whether you yourself exist. Or are you perhaps afraid of being deceived in this question, when surely, if you did not exist, you could not be deceived at all?
E. Go on rather to the rest.
A. Since, then, it is evident that you exist, and this would not be evident to you unless you lived, this too is evident, that you live. Do you understand that these two things are most true?
E. I understand completely.
A. Then this third thing is evident too, namely that you understand.
E. It is evident.
A. Which of these three seems to you to excel?
E. Understanding.
A. Why does it seem so to you?
E. Because, while there are these three, to be, to live, and to understand, a stone exists and an animal lives, yet I do not think that a stone lives or that an animal understands; but it is most certain that one who understands both exists and lives. So I do not hesitate to judge that which has all three more excellent than that which lacks two or one. For what lives certainly also exists, but it does not follow that it also understands; such, I think, is the life of an animal. And what exists does not necessarily live and understand; for I can admit that corpses exist, but no one would say that they live. And what does not live understands much less.
A. We hold, then, that of these three a corpse lacks two, an animal one, a man none.
E. That is true.
A. We hold also that among these three the most excellent is what man has together with the other two, namely understanding, and whoever has it also exists and lives.
E. We do hold it.
A. Tell me now whether you know that you have those very familiar bodily senses, of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching.
E. I know it.
A. What do you think belongs to the sense of sight? That is, what do you think we perceive by seeing?
E. Any bodily things.
A. Do we also perceive hard and soft by seeing?
E. No.
A. What, then, belongs properly to the eyes, which we perceive through them?
E. Color.
A. What belongs to the ears?
E. Sound.
A. To smell?
E. Odor.
A. To taste?
E. Flavor.
A. To touch?
E. Soft or hard, smooth or rough, and many such things.
A. Well, the shapes of bodies, large, small, square, round, and anything of that kind: do we not perceive them both by touching and by seeing, so that they cannot be assigned properly either to sight or to touch, but to both?
E. I understand.
A. You understand, then, that the single senses have some things proper to each, which they report, and that some senses have some things in common?
E. I understand this too.
A. Can we, then, judge by any of these senses what belongs to each sense, and what all or some of them have in common?
E. In no way; these things are judged by something within.
A. Is it perhaps reason itself, which beasts lack? For, I think, it is by reason that we grasp these things and know that they are so.
E. I think rather that we grasp by reason that there is a certain inner sense to which everything is referred from those five very familiar senses. For that by which a beast sees is one thing, and that by which it avoids or seeks what it perceives by seeing is another. The one sense is in the eyes; the other is within, in the soul itself, and by it animals either seek and take up with delight, or avoid and reject when offended, not only what is seen but also what is heard and what is caught by the other senses of the body. This cannot be called sight or hearing or smell or taste or touch, but something else that presides over them all in common. Although we grasp it by reason, as I said, I cannot call it reason, since it is clearly present in beasts too.
A. I acknowledge this, whatever it is, and I do not hesitate to call it the inner sense. But unless what is brought to us by the senses of the body passes beyond this sense too, it cannot arrive at knowledge. For whatever we know, we hold as grasped by reason. And we know, to say nothing of the rest, that colors cannot be perceived by hearing nor voices by sight. And when we know this, we know it neither by the eyes nor by the ears, nor by that inner sense which beasts do not lack either. For we must not believe that they know that light is not perceived by the ears nor a voice by the eyes, since we distinguish these things only by rational attention and thought.
E. I cannot say that I have grasped this. For what if by that inner sense, which you grant they do not lack, they also judge that colors cannot be perceived by hearing nor voices by sight?
A. Do you also think they can distinguish from one another the color that is perceived, the sense that is in the eye, that inner sense in the soul, and the reason by which these are defined one by one and counted?
E. In no way.
A. Well, could this reason distinguish these four from one another and mark them off by definitions, unless the color were referred to it through the sense of the eyes, and that sense in turn through that inner sense which presides over it, and that inner sense through itself, if indeed nothing else stands between?
E. I do not see how it could otherwise.
A. Well, do you see this: that color is perceived by the sense of the eyes, but that this sense is not perceived by the same sense? For you do not also see seeing itself by the same sense by which you see color.
E. Not at all.
A. Try to distinguish these too. For I believe you do not deny that color is one thing, seeing color another, and again another, when no color is present, having the sense by which it could be seen if it were present.
E. I distinguish these too, and grant that they differ from one another.
A. Of these three, do you see anything with the eyes except color?
E. Nothing else.
A. Tell me, then, by what you see the other two; for you could not distinguish them without seeing them.
E. I do not know what else; I know that it exists, nothing more.
A. So you do not know whether it is reason itself, or that life which we call the inner sense, surpassing the senses of the body, or something else?
E. I do not know.
A. Yet you know this: that these things cannot be defined except by reason, and that reason does this only about what is offered to it for examination.
E. That is certain.
A. Whatever else, then, there is by which all that we know can be perceived, it is the servant of reason, to which it offers and reports whatever it touches, so that what is perceived can be distinguished within its own bounds and grasped not only by perceiving but also by knowing.
E. So it is.
A. Well, reason itself, which distinguishes its servants and what they supply from one another, and likewise recognizes what difference there is between these and itself, and affirms that it is more powerful than they: does it grasp itself by anything else than by itself, that is, by reason? Or would you know otherwise that you have reason, unless you perceived it by reason?
E. Most true.
A. Since, then, when we perceive color we do not likewise perceive by that same sense that we perceive; and when we hear a sound we do not also hear our hearing; and when we smell a rose, our sense of smell does not itself give off any smell to us; and when we taste, taste itself has no flavor in our mouth; and when we touch something, we cannot also touch the sense of touch itself: it is evident that these five senses cannot be perceived by any of these senses, although all bodily things are perceived by them.
E. It is evident.

### Translation notes

- The point that one who did not exist could not be deceived anticipates Augustine's later “if I am deceived, I exist” (City of God 11.26).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.3 (PL 32:1240–1241; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-3).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.4

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-4
- Source: PL 32:1241
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: The inner sense perceives both the objects of the bodily senses and the senses themselves, and reason knows all of these and itself.

### Latin text

A. Arbitror etiam illud esse manifestum, sen­ sum illum interiorem non ea tantum sentire, quje acceperit a quinque sensibus corporis, sed etiam ipsos ab eo sentiri. Non enim aliter bestia moveret se, vel appetendo aliquid; vel fugiendo, nisi sc sen- Lire sentiret; non ad scicndum, nam hoc rationis est, sed tantum ad movendum, quod non utique aliquo iliorum quinque sentit. Quod si adhuc obscurum cat, elucescet, si animadvertas quod exempli gratia sat est in uno aliquo sensu, velut in visu. Namque ape­ rire oculum, et movere aspiciendo ad id quod videre appetit, nullo modo posset, nisi oculo clauso vel uon ita moto se id non videre sentiret. Si autem sentit se non videre dum non videt, necesse est etiam sentiat se.videre dum videt; quia cum eo appetitu non mo­ vet oculum videns, quo movet non videns, indicat se nitrumque sentire. Sed utrum et se ipsam hæc vita sentiat, quæ se corporalia sentire sentit, non ita cia­ rum eSI, nisi quod se quisque intus interrogans, inve­ nit omnem rem viventem fugere mortem; quæ cum sit vitae contraria, necesse est ut vita etiam seipsam sentiat, quae contrarium suum fugit. Quod si adhuc nou liquet, omittatur, ut non nitamur ad id'quod volumus, nisi certis manifestisque documentis. Manifesta enim sunt, sensu corporis sentiri corporalia; eumdem autem sensum hoc codem sensu non posse sentiri; sensu autcm interiore et corporalia per sensum corporis sen­ tiri, et ipsum corporis sensum: ratione vero ct illa omnia, et eamdem ipsam notam fieri, ct scientia conti­ neri: an tibi nou videtur? E. Videtur sane. A. Age, nunc responde unde sit quæstio, ad cujus solutionem pervenire cupientes, jam diu istam molimur viam.

### English translation (Claude)

A. I think this too is evident, that that inner sense not only perceives what it has received from the five senses of the body, but also perceives the senses themselves. For otherwise a beast would not move itself, either seeking something or fleeing it, unless it perceived that it perceives: not so as to know, for that belongs to reason, but only so as to move; and this it does not perceive by any of those five. If this is still obscure, it will become clear if you notice what is enough as an example in one sense, such as sight. For it could in no way open its eye and move it in looking toward what it wants to see, unless it perceived that it does not see it while the eye is closed or not so moved. And if it perceives that it does not see while it does not see, it must also perceive that it sees while it sees; for since it does not move its eye when seeing with the same appetite with which it moves it when not seeing, it shows that it perceives both. But whether this life, which perceives that it perceives bodily things, also perceives itself is not so clear, except that each one, questioning himself within, finds that every living thing flees death; and since death is the contrary of life, life must also perceive itself, since it flees its contrary. If this is still not plain, let it be left aside, so that we may strive toward what we want only by certain and evident proofs. For these things are evident: that bodily things are perceived by bodily sense; that this sense cannot be perceived by the same sense; that by the inner sense both bodily things are perceived through bodily sense and bodily sense itself is perceived; and that by reason all these things, and reason itself, become known and are contained in knowledge. Or does it not seem so to you?
E. It certainly does.
A. Come now, answer: what was the question from which we started, toward whose solution we have long been laboring along this path?

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.4 (PL 32:1241; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-4).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.5

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-5
- Source: PL 32:1241–1242
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: The bodily sense, which lives, is better than the bodies it perceives, and the inner sense is better than the bodily sense because it governs and judges it.

### Latin text

E. Quantum memini, trium illarum quæstionum quas paulo ante ad contexendum ordinem hujus dis­ putationis posuimus, nunc prima versatur, id est, quo­ modo manifestum fieri possit, quamvis tenacissime firmissimeque credendum sit, Deum esse. A. Recta hoc tencs: sed etiam illud diligenter tenere te volo, cum de teipso quærerem utrum te esse noveris, nun solum hoc, sed etiam alia duo nobis apparugse quod noveris. E. Id quoquo tenco. A. Nunc ergo vide ad quam rem istarum trium intelligis pertinere omne quod corporis scosus attingit; id est, in quo rertun genere tibi ponendum vidcatur, quidquid vel oculo­ rum, vel alio quolibet corporis instrumento noster sensus attingit: utrum in eo quod tantum est, an in eo quod etiam vivit, an in eo quod etiam intelligit. E. In eo quod tantum est. A. Quid? ipsum sensum in quo gencre trium horum esse censes? E. In eo quod vivit. A. Quid igitur horum duorum melius esse judicas? sensum ipsum, an quod sensus attingit? E. Sensum scilicet. A. Quare? E. Quia melius est id quod etiam vivit, quam id quod tantum est. A. Quid? illum sensum interiorem, quem qui­ dem infra rationem, et adhuc nobis communem cum bestiis superius indagavimus, dubitabisne huic sensui præponere quo corpus attingimus, et quem jam ipsi corpori praeponendum esse dixisti? E. Nullo modo du­ bitaverim. A. Etiam hoc cur non dubites, volo abs te audire. Non enim poteris dicere hunc sensum inte­ riorem jam in eo genere trium illorum esse poncn­ dum, quod etiam intelligit, sed adhuc in eo quod et est et vivit, etiamsi intellectu caret: iste enim sensus inest et bestiis, quibus intellectus nun inest. Quae cum ita sint, quæro cur præponas sensum interiorem huic sensui quo corporalia sentiuntur, cum sit uterque III eo genere quod vivit. Sensum autem istum qui cor­ pora attingit, ideo præposuisti corporibus, quia illa suut in eo genere quod tantum cst, iste vcro in eo quod etiam vivit: in quo cum et ille interior repe­ riatur, cur cum meliorem putes dic mihi. Si enim dixeris, quia ille istum sentit, non te credo inven­ turum regulam qua figere possimus omne sentiens melius esse quam id quod ab eo sentitur, ne fortassis ex hoc etiam cogamur dicere, omne intelligens melius esse quam id quod ab eo intelligitur. Hoc enim fal­ sum est; quia homo intelligit sapientiam, et non est melior quam ipsa sapientia. Quamobrem vide qua causa tibi visuAi sit, sensum interiorem huic sensui quo scutimus corpora, esse præferendum. E. Quia moderatorem ct judicem quemdam hujus ilium esse cognosco. Nam et si quid huic hi officio suo defuerit, ille tanquam debitum a ministro flagitat, sicut paulo ante disputatum est. Non enin. se videre, aut non vi­ dere sensus oculi videt, et quia non videt, non potest quid sibi desit, aut quid satis sit judicare; sed HIe in­ terior, quo admonetur et anima bestiæ aperire oculum clausum, ct quod deesse sentit implere. Nulli autem dubium est eum qui judicat, eo de quo jndicat esse meliorem. A. Cernis ergo istum etiam corporis sen­ sum de corporibus quodammodo judicare? Ad ilium enim pertinet voluptas et dolor, cum vel leniter vel asperc corpore attingitur. Nam sicut ille interior quid desit vel satis sit oculorum sensui judicat; sic ipse sensus oculorum quid desit, vei satis sit coioribus judicat. Item sicut ille interior de auditu noslrojudi­ cat, utrum minus an sufficienter intentus sit; sic judi­ cat auditus ipse de vocibus, r,uid carum icniter influat. aut aspere perstrepat. Non necesse est cæteros sensus corporis persequi; jain enin, ut opinor, animadvertis quid velim dicere, ita scilicet sensum illum interiorem de istis corporis sensibus judicare, cum eorum et in­ tegritatem probat, et debitum flagitat, quemadmodum et ipsi corporis sensus de corporibus judicant, assu­ mentes in eis lenem tactum, rejicientesque contra­ rium. E. Cerno sane, et verissima esse consentio.

### English translation (Claude)

E. As far as I remember, of those three questions which we set out a little earlier to arrange the order of this discussion, the first is now being handled: how it can be made evident that God exists, although it must be believed most tenaciously and firmly.
A. You hold this rightly. But I also want you to keep carefully in mind that, when I asked you whether you knew that you exist, it appeared to us that you know not only this but also two other things.
E. I hold that too.
A. Now, then, see to which of these three you understand everything to belong that the senses of the body touch; that is, in what class of things you think you should place whatever our sense touches through the eyes or any other instrument of the body: in that which only exists, or in that which also lives, or in that which also understands.
E. In that which only exists.
A. Well, in which of these three classes do you put the sense itself?
E. In that which lives.
A. Which of these two, then, do you judge better: the sense itself, or what the sense touches?
E. The sense, of course.
A. Why?
E. Because what also lives is better than what only exists.
A. Well, that inner sense, which we tracked down above as being below reason and still common to us and the beasts, will you hesitate to rank it above this sense by which we touch body, and which you have already said is to be ranked above body itself?
E. I would in no way hesitate.
A. I want to hear from you why you do not hesitate about this either. For you will not be able to say that this inner sense is to be placed in that class of the three which also understands; it is still in the class that exists and lives, though it lacks understanding, for this sense is present in beasts too, in which there is no understanding. This being so, I ask why you rank the inner sense above this sense by which bodily things are perceived, since both are in the class that lives. You ranked the sense that touches bodies above bodies because they are in the class that only exists, while it is in the class that also lives; since the inner sense too is found in that class, tell me why you think it better. If you say it is because the one perceives the other, I do not think you will find a rule by which we can establish that everything that perceives is better than what it perceives; otherwise we might be forced to say also that everything that understands is better than what it understands. That is false; for a human being understands wisdom and is not better than wisdom itself. So see for what reason it seemed to you that the inner sense should be preferred to this sense by which we perceive bodies.
E. Because I recognize that it is a kind of governor and judge of this one. For if this one fails in any way in its duty, that one demands it like a debt from a servant, as was discussed a little earlier. The sense of the eye does not see that it sees or does not see, and since it does not see this, it cannot judge what it lacks or what is enough; but the inner sense does, by which even the soul of a beast is prompted to open a closed eye and to supply what it perceives is lacking. And no one doubts that the one who judges is better than that about which he judges.
A. Do you see, then, that this bodily sense too in a way judges about bodies? For pleasure and pain belong to it, when it is touched by a body gently or roughly. Just as that inner sense judges what is lacking or enough for the sense of the eyes, so the sense of the eyes itself judges what is lacking or enough in colors. Likewise, just as that inner sense judges about our hearing, whether it is too little or sufficiently attentive, so hearing itself judges about voices, which of them flows in gently or roars harshly. There is no need to go through the other senses of the body; you notice already, I think, what I mean: that inner sense judges about these bodily senses, when it approves their soundness and demands what is owed, just as the bodily senses themselves judge about bodies, accepting gentle touch in them and rejecting the contrary.
E. I certainly see it, and agree that it is most true.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.5 (PL 32:1241–1242; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-5).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.6

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-6
- Source: PL 32:1242–1243
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Reason judges everything below it and is the highest thing in human nature; if something eternal and unchangeable is found above reason, it is God, or God is whatever is higher still.

### Latin text

A. Attende jam utrum ratio etiam de hoc inte­ riore sensu judicet. Jam enim non quaero utrum cain mcliorem illo esse dubites, quia non dubito id te ju­ dicare: quanquam ne id quidem jam quærendum pu­ tem, utrum de isto sensu judicet ratio. Namquc in iis ipsis quæ infra eam sunt, id est in corporibus et ia sensibus corporis et isto interiore sensu, quomodo sit aliud alio melius, et quam sit illis prestantior ipsa, quae tandem, nisi ipsa renuntiat? quod profecto nullo modo posset, nisi de his ipsa judicaret. E. Manifestum est. A. Cum ergo eant naturam quae tantum est, nec vivit nec intelligit, sicuti est corpus exanime, præce­ dat ea natura quae non tantum est, sed etiam,-ivit. nec intelligit, sicuti est anima bestiarum; et rursus hanc praecedat ea quæ simul et est et vivit et intelli­ git, sicut in homine mens rationalis; num arbitraris in nobis, id est in iis quibus natura nostra completur ut homines simus, aliquid inveniri posse præstantius, quam hoc quod in his tribus tertio loco posuimus? Nam et corpus nos habere manifestum est, ct vitam quamdam qua ipsum corpus animatur atque vegeta­ tur, quas duo eliam in bestiis agnoscimus, et tertium quiddam quasi animæ nostræ caput aut oculum, aut si quid congruentius de ratione atquc intelligentia dici potest, quam non habet natura bestiarum. Quare vide, obsecro, utrum aliquid invenire possis, quod sit iu natura hominis ratione sublirnius. E. Nihil omnino melius video. A. Quid si aiiquid invenire potuerimus, quod non solum esse non dubites, sed etiam ipsa nostra ratione præstamius? dubitabisne illud quidquid est, Deum dicere? E. Non continuo, si quid melius quam id quod in mea natura optimum est, invenire potuero, Deum esse dixerim. Non enim mihi placet Deum ap­ pelLire, quo mea ratio est inferior, sed quo nullus est superior. A. Ita piane: nam ipse huic tuæ rationi dedit, tam de se pic vereque sentire. Sed, quæso. te, si non inveneris esse aliquid supra nostram rationem, nisi quod æternum atque incommutabile cst, dubita­ bisne hunc Deurn dicere? Nam et corpora mutabilia esse cognoscis; et ipsam vitam qua cornus animatur per affectus varios mutabilitate non carere manifestum est; ei ipsa ratio cum modo ad vcrum pervenire ni­ titur, modo non nititur, ct aliquando pervenit, a!iquando non pervenit, mutabilis esse profecto convin­ citur. Quae si nullo adhibito corporis instrumento, neque per tactum, ncque per gustatum, neque per ol­ factum, fleque per aures, neque per oculos, neque per ullum sensum se inferiorem, sed per seipsam cer­ nit aeternum aliquid et incommutabile, simul et seipsam inferiorem, et illum oportet Deum suum esse fateatur. E. Hunc plane fatcbor Deum, quo nihil su.. perius esse constilcrit. A. Bene habet: nam mihi sa­ tis erit ostendere esse aliquid hujusmodi, quod aut faleberis Deum esse, aut si aliquid supra est, eum ipsum Deum esse concedes. Quare sive supra sit al:­ quid, sive non sit, manifestum crit Dcum esse., c um ego, quod proinisi, esse supra rationem, eodem ipso adjuvante monstravero. E. Demonstra ergo qnod pol­ liceris.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Consider now whether reason also judges about this inner sense. I do not ask now whether you doubt that reason is better than it, because I have no doubt that you judge so; though I think that not even this needs asking now, whether reason judges about that sense. For among the very things that are below it, that is, bodies, the bodily senses, and that inner sense, how one is better than another, and how much more excellent reason itself is than they, who reports this, after all, but reason itself? This it surely could in no way do unless it judged about them.
E. That is evident.
A. The nature that only exists, and neither lives nor understands, such as a lifeless body, is surpassed by the nature that not only exists but also lives, though it does not understand, such as the soul of beasts; and this in turn is surpassed by that which at once exists, lives, and understands, such as the rational mind in man. Do you think, then, that in us, that is, among the things that make up our nature so that we are human beings, anything can be found more excellent than this which we placed third among these three? For it is evident that we have a body, and a certain life by which the body itself is animated and made vigorous (these two we recognize in beasts too), and a third thing, as it were the head or the eye of our soul, or whatever more fitting thing can be said of reason and understanding, which the nature of beasts does not have. So see, I beg you, whether you can find anything in the nature of man more sublime than reason.
E. I see absolutely nothing better.
A. What if we could find something that you not only do not doubt exists but that is also more excellent than our reason itself? Will you hesitate to call it, whatever it is, God?
E. I would not at once say that it is God, if I could find something better than what is best in my nature. For I do not like to call God that to which my reason is inferior, but that to which nothing is superior.
A. Quite so; for he himself has given this reason of yours the power to think so piously and truly about him. But, I ask you, if you find that there is nothing above our reason except what is eternal and unchangeable, will you hesitate to call this God? For you know that bodies are changeable; and it is evident that the very life by which the body is animated is not without changeableness through its various states; and reason itself, since it now strives to reach the truth and now does not strive, and sometimes reaches it and sometimes does not, is certainly proved to be changeable. If, using no instrument of the body, neither touch nor taste nor smell nor ears nor eyes nor any sense lower than itself, but through itself, it perceives something eternal and unchangeable, and itself at the same time as inferior, it must confess that this is its God.
E. I will plainly confess that to be God than which nothing is shown to be higher.
A. Good. For it will be enough for me to show that there is something of this kind, which you will either confess to be God, or, if there is something above it, you will grant that this is God. So whether there is something above it or not, it will be evident that God exists, when, with his help, I have shown, as I promised, that there is something above reason.
E. Show, then, what you promise.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.6 (PL 32:1242–1243; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-1/#p-2-6).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.7

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-7
- Source: PL 32:1243–1244
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Each person has his own senses and reason, yet many can perceive the same light, sound, or body without changing it; such things are common and public, while what we consume becomes private.

### Latin text

A. Faciam: sed prius quæro utrum sensus cor­ poris mous idcm sit qui tuus, an vero meus non sit nisi incus, ct tuus non sit nisi tuus; quod si non ita esset, non possem per oculos meos vidcre aliquid, quod tu non vidcres. E. Concedo prorsus, quamvis ejusdem generis, tamen singulos nos habere sensus, videndi, vel audiendi, vel quoslibet alios cæterorum. Non enim solum videre, sed etiam audire potest ali­ qnis hominum quod alius non audiat, et aliud aliquid quolibet alio sensu quisquam sentire quod alius non sentiat Undc manifestum est et tuum nonnisi tuum, et meum sensum non esse nisi meum. A. Hoc idem respoudcbis de illo ctiam sensu interiore? an aliquid aliud? E. Nihil sane aliud. Nam et ille utique sensum incum sentit meus, et tuum sentit tuus: nam ideo plerumque interrogor ab eo qui aliquid videt, utrum hoc etiam ego videam, quia ego me videre aut non vidcre sentio, non ille qui interrogat. A. Quid? ipsam rationem nonne unusquisque nostrum hahet suam? quandoquidem fieri potest ut ego aliquid intelligam, cum tu id non intelligis; nec utrum intelligam tu scire possis, ego autem sciam. E. Manifestum est etiam ra­ tionales mentes singulos quosque nostrum singulas habere. A. Num etiam poteris dicere singulos soles nns habere quos videmus, aut lunas, aut luciferos, aut cætera hujusmodi, quamvis suo quisque ac proprio sensu ista videat? E. Nullo modo istud dixerim. A. Possumus ergo videre unum aliquid multi simul, cum sint sensus nostri nobis singulis singuli, quibus olnnihus illud unum sentimus quod simul videmus; ut quamvis alius sensus meus sit, et alius tuus, pos­ sit tamen fieri ut id quod vidcmus, non sit aliud meum, aliud tuum; sed illud unum præsto sit utri­ que nostrum ct siinul ab utroque videatur. E. Mani­ festissimum est. A. Possumus etiam un:mi aliqnam vocem simul audire, ut quamvis alius sit audinus meus, alius tuus, non sit tamen alia mca, ct alia tua vox qnam simul audimus, vel alia pars ejus an­ diiu meo capiatur, et alia tuo, sed quidquid sonue­ rit, et unum ei totum audiendum simul adsit ambo­ bus. E. Et hoc manifestum est. A. Jam etiam de caeteris sensibus corporis Ii­ cct animadvertas quod dicimus, neque omnino illos, qnod ad hanc rem attinet, ita se habere ut il os duos oculorum et aurium, neque omnino non ita. Nam quia ex uno aere et cgo et tu possumus implere spiramentum, et ejus aeris affectionem odore sentire: et item quia ex uno melle, vel quolibet alio cibo seu potu ambo gustare possumus, et ejus affectionem sa­ poro sentire, quamvis ille unus sit, nostri antem sint sensus singuli, tibi tuus et mihi meus; ut anam odorem vel unum saporem cum ambo sentiamus, occ in tamen cum meo sensu sentias, nec ego tuo, nec aliquo uno qui utriusque nostrum possit esse communiter, sed prorsus mihi meus sensus sit, et tuus tibi, etiamsi unus aut odor, aut sapor ab utro­ que sentiatur: hinc ergo isti sensus inveniuntur ha. bere aliquid tale, qualc ilii duo in visu et auditu: sed in eo dispares sunt, quantum ad id quod nunc agimus pertinet, quod ctsi unum acrem naribns ambo trahimus, aut unum cibum gustando capimus; non tamen eam partem acris duco quam tu, nec eam­ dem partem cibi sumo quam tu, sed aliam ego, aliam tu: et idco de toto acre cum spiro,,duco partem quanta milii satis cst, ct tu itcm de toto aliam quanta libi satis est ducis: et cibus quamvis unus et tolus ab utroque absumatur, non tamen ct a nic to­ tus, et a te totus absumi potest, quomodo verbum et ego totum audio, et tu totum simul, et speciem quamlibet quantam ego video, tantam et tu simul; sed cibi vel potionis alia pars in rnc, alia in le trans­ eat necesse cst: an parum ista intelligis? E. Imo vero apertissima et certissima esse consentio. A. Num censes tangendi sensum comparandum esse oculorum et aurium sensibus in ea re de qua nunc agitur; quia non solum corpus unum ambo pos­ sumus sentire tangendo, sed etiam eamdem partem in quoque poteris tangere quam ego tetigero, ut non so­ lum idem corpus, sed eamdem quoque corporis par­ tom possimus ambo sentire tangendo? Non enim sic­ uti cibum aliquem appositum non possumus et ego totum et tu totum capere, cum ambo illo vescimur, sic etiam in tangendo accidit: sed et unum et totum quod ego tetigero, etiam tu potes, ut id ambo tanga­ mus, non singulis partibus, sed totum singuli. E. Fateor hoc modo duobus illis superioribus sensibus, hunc tangendi sensum csse simillimum: sed in hoc vidco esse dissimilem, quod simul, id cst uno tem­ pure, et videre aliquid unum totum ambo possumus et audire; tangere autem possumus quidem totum aliquid ambo uno tempore, sed partibus singulis, eamdem autem partem nonnisi temporibus singulis: nam nulli parti quam factu capis, possum meum ta­ etum admovere, nisi tu amoveris tuum. A. Vigilantissime respondisti: sed. oportet te etiam illud videre, cnm horum omnium quae senti­ mus, alia sint quae ambo, alia quae singuli sentia­ mus; ipsos vero sensus nostros suos quiaque sin­ guli sentiamus ut neque ego sentiam sensum tuum, neque tu meum, quod de his rebus quae sentiuntur a nobis per corporis sensus, id est quod de corporali­ bus rebus non possumus sentire ambo, sed singuli, nisi quod ita fit nostrum ut hoc in nos vertere, et commutare possimus, sicuti est cibus et potus, cujus nullam partem quam ego percepero, et tu percipere poteris: quia et si nutrices alimenta manSa infantibus reddunt, illud tamen quod inde gustatus rapuerit at­ que in mandentis viscera commutaverit, nullo modo revocari poterit ut in escam refundatur infantis. Gula onim cum aliquid jucunde sapit, etiamsi exiguam, ta­ men irrevocabilem partem sibi vindicat, et hoc cogit fieri quod naturæ corporis convenit: qnod nisi ita es­ set; nullus remaneret sapor in ore posteaquam rue. rint mansa illa reddita atque desputa. Quod ctiam de aeris partibus recte dici potest, quos naribus duci­ mus: nam etiamsi aliquid acris quod ego reddidero, possis etiam tu ducere, non tamen potcris ctiam i!- Ind, quod inde in alimentum mcum cesserit; quia nec reddi potest. Nani etiam naribus alimentum nos rapere medici docent: quod alimentum ct spirando solus sentire possum, et reflando restituere non pos­ sum, ut abs te etiam ductum nnribus sentiatur. Nam cætera sensibilia quæ quamvis sentiamus, non tamen ea sentiendo in nostrum corpus corrupta mutamus, possumus ea, sive uno tempore, sive singulis vicis­ sim temporibus ambo sentire, sicut vcl totum vel pars ipsa quam senlio, abs te etiam sentiatur; qualia sunt, sive lux, sive sonus, sive corpora quæ attin­ ginius, non tamen lædimus. E. Intelligo. A. Manife­ stum est ergo ca quæ non commutamus et tamen sen­ limus corporis sensibus, et non pertinere ad naturam scusuum nostrorum, et propterea magis nobis esse communia, quia in nostrum proprium et quasi pri­ vatum non vertuntur atque mutantur. E. Prorsus as­ sentior. A. Proprium ergo et quasi privatum intelli­ gendum cst, quod unicuique nostrum soli est, et quod in se solus sentit, quod ad suam naturam pro­ pric pertinet: commune autem et quasi publicum, quod ab omnibus sentientibus nulla sui corruptione atque commutatione sentitur. E. Ita est.

### English translation (Claude)

A. I will. But first I ask whether my bodily sense is the same as yours, or whether mine is only mine and yours only yours; if it were not so, I could not see anything with my eyes that you did not see.
E. I fully grant that, though they are of the same kind, we each have our own senses, of seeing or hearing or any of the others. For a person can not only see but also hear what another does not hear, and perceive by any other sense something that another does not perceive. Hence it is evident that your sense is only yours and mine only mine.
A. Will you give the same answer about that inner sense too, or a different one?
E. No different one, surely. For my inner sense perceives my sense, and yours perceives yours. That is why I am often asked by someone who sees something whether I see it too: because it is I who perceive that I see or do not see, not the one who asks.
A. Well, does not each of us have his own reason? For it can happen that I understand something when you do not understand it, and you cannot know whether I understand, while I know.
E. It is evident that each of us has his own rational mind.
A. Can you also say that each of us has his own suns that we see, or moons, or morning stars, or other such things, although each sees them with his own sense?
E. In no way would I say that.
A. So many of us can see one thing at once, although each of us has his own senses, by all of which we perceive that one thing which we see at once; so that although my sense is one and yours another, it can still be that what we see is not one thing that is mine and another that is yours, but that one thing is present to each of us and is seen by both at once.
E. That is most evident.
A. We can also hear one voice at once, so that, although my hearing is one and yours another, the voice that we hear at once is not one voice that is mine and another that is yours, nor is one part of it caught by my hearing and another by yours, but whatever has sounded is present whole and one, to be heard by both at once.
E. That too is evident.
A. Now you may also notice about the other senses of the body what we are saying: that, as regards this matter, they are neither entirely like those two of the eyes and ears, nor entirely unlike them. For you and I can fill our breath from one air and perceive the quality of that air by smell; and likewise we can both taste from one honey, or any other food or drink, and perceive its quality by taste, although it is one while our senses are each our own, yours to you and mine to me. So, when we both perceive one odor or one flavor, you do not perceive it with my sense, nor I with yours, nor with any one sense that could be common to us both; my sense is wholly mine and yours yours, even if one odor or flavor is perceived by both. In this respect these senses are found to have something like those two, sight and hearing; but they are unlike in this, as regards what we are now dealing with, that although we both draw one air through our nostrils, or take one food in tasting, yet I do not draw the same part of the air as you, nor take the same part of the food as you, but I take one part and you another. So when I breathe, I draw from the whole air the part that is enough for me, and you likewise draw from the whole another part, as much as is enough for you. And although one whole food is consumed by both, it cannot be consumed whole by me and whole by you, in the way that I hear a whole word and you hear the whole at the same time, and see any appearance just as large as I see it at the same time. With food or drink, one part must pass into me and another into you. Or do you not understand this well enough?
E. On the contrary, I agree that it is most plain and certain.
A. Do you think the sense of touch is to be compared with the senses of the eyes and ears in the matter now in question, since we can both perceive by touching not only one body, but you can also touch the same part that I have touched, so that we can both perceive by touch not only the same body but also the same part of the body? For it is not with touching as with some food set before us, which you and I cannot each take whole when we both eat it; one whole thing that I have touched you can touch too, so that we both touch it, not each a separate part, but each the whole.
E. I admit that in this way the sense of touch is very like those two earlier senses; but I see that it is unlike them in this, that we can both see and hear one whole thing at once, that is, at the same time, whereas we can both touch some whole thing at the same time only with separate parts, and the same part only at separate times. For I cannot bring my touch to any part that you are holding by touch unless you have taken yours away.
A. You have answered most alertly. But you must also see this. Of all the things that we perceive, some we perceive both together and others each alone, while our senses themselves each of us perceives as his own, so that I do not perceive your sense nor you mine. Of the things perceived by us through the senses of the body, that is, of bodily things, the only thing that we cannot both perceive, but only each alone, is what so becomes ours that we can turn it into ourselves and change it, as food and drink are; no part of which that I have taken in can you take in as well. For even if nurses give chewed food back to infants, what the taste has seized from it and changed into the body of the one chewing can in no way be called back to be poured out again as the infant's food. When the palate enjoys some flavor, it claims for itself a part, small but irrecoverable, and makes it become what suits the nature of the body; if this were not so, no flavor would remain in the mouth after the chewed food had been given back and spat out. The same can rightly be said of the parts of the air that we draw through our nostrils. Even if you can breathe some air that I have breathed out, you cannot also breathe that part of it which has gone into my nourishment, because it cannot be given back. For physicians teach that we take nourishment even through the nostrils; and this nourishment I alone can perceive by breathing in, and cannot restore by breathing out so that it may be perceived also by you when you draw it in. As for the other sensible things, which we perceive without changing them by perceiving, corrupting them into our body, we can both perceive them, either at one time or at separate times in turn, so that either the whole or the very part that I perceive is perceived by you too; such are light, or sound, or bodies that we touch without damaging them.
E. I understand.
A. It is evident, then, that the things which we do not change and yet perceive by the senses of the body do not belong to the nature of our senses, and are therefore more common to us, because they are not turned and changed into what is our own and, as it were, private.
E. I fully agree.
A. So by “one's own” and, as it were, private, we must understand what belongs to each of us alone, which he alone perceives in himself, and which belongs properly to his own nature; by “common” and, as it were, public, what is perceived by all who perceive it without any corruption or change of itself.
E. So it is.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.7 (PL 32:1243–1244; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-7).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.8

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-8
- Source: PL 32:1244–1245
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Evodius offers the unchangeable truth of number as something common to all minds; Augustine shows that numbers, built from the unit, which no body truly is, are known not through the senses but in an inner light.

### Latin text

A. Age, nunc attende, et dic mibi utrum in­ veniatur aliquid quod omnes ratiocinantes sua quis­ que ratione atque mente communiter videant, cum illud quod videtur præsto sit omnibus, nee in usnm corum quibus præsto est commutctur, quasi ci­ hus nuL potio, sed incorruptum integrumque per­ maneat, sive illi videant, sive non vidcant: an forte nihil hujusmodi esse arbitraris? E. Imo multa esse video; e quibus unum commemorari satis est, quod ra io et vcritas numcri omnibus ratiocinantibus præsto est, nt oinnis cam computator sua quisque ratione et intelligentia conetur apprehenderc; et alius id facilius, alius difdcilius possit, alius omnino non possit: cum tamen ipsa xqualiter omnibus se pra­ beat valentibus eam capere; nec cum eam quisque percipit, in sui perceptoris quasi alimentum vertatur atque mutetur; nec cum in ea quisque fallitur, ipsa deficiat, sed ea vera et integra permanente, ille in prrorc sit tanto amplius, quanto minus cam videt. A. Recte sane; sed vidco te tanquam non ru­ dem harum rerum cito invenisse quod diceres: ta­ men, si tibi aliquis diceret numeros istos non ex aliqua sua natura, sed ex iis rebus quas sensu cor­ poris attingimus, impressos esse animo nostro quasi quasdam imagines quo umque visibilium; quid re­ sponderes? an tu quoqne id putas? E. Nullo modo id putavcrim: non enim si sensu corporis percepi numeros, idcirco etiam rationem partitionis nume­ rorum vel copulationis sensu corporis percipere po­ lui. Hac enim luce mentis refello eum, quisquis vet in addendo vel in retrahendo dum computat falsam summam rcnuntiavcrit. Et quidquid sensu corporis tango, veluti est hoc cœlum et hæc terra, et quæ­ cumque in eis alia corpora sentio, quamdiu futura sint nescio: septem autem et tria decem sunt; ei non solum nunc, sed etiam semper; neque ullo modo nliquando septem et tria non fuerunt decem, aut ali­ quando septem et tria non erunt decem. Hanc ergo incorruptibilem numeri veritatem, dixi mibi et cui­ libet ratiocinanti esse communem. A. Non rcsisto tibi verissima et certissima re­ spondenti. Sed ipsos quoque numeros non per corpo­ ris sensus attractos esse facile videbis, si cogitaveris quemlibet numerum tot vocari quoties unum habue­ rit: verbi gratia, si bis habuerit unum, duo vo­ cantur; si ter, tria; et si decies unum habent, tunc vocantur decem: ct quilibet omnino nu­ merus quoties habet unum, hinc illi nomen est, ct tot appellatur. Unum vero quisquis verissime co­ gitat, profecto invenit corporis sensibus non posse sentiri. Quidquid enim tali sensu aUingitor, jam non unum, sed multa esse convincitur: corpus est enim, et ideo habet innumerabiles partes. Sed ut minutas qua que minusque articulatas non per­ sequar, quantulumcumque illud corpusculum sit, haLet ccrtc aliam partem dexteram, aliam sinistram; aliam superiorem, aliam inferiorem; aut aliam ulteriorem, aliam citeriorem; aut alias finales, aliam media...: hæc enim necesse est quamlibet exiguo cor­ poris modulo inesse fatcamur; et propterea nullum corpus vere pureque unum esse concedimus, in quo tamen non possent tam multa numerari nisi illius unius cognitione discreta. Cum enim quæro unum in corpore, et me non invenire non dubito, novi utique quid ibi quaeram, ot quid ibi non inveniam, et non posse inveniri, vel potius omnino ibi non esse. Ubi ergo novi quod non est corpus unum, quid sit unum nori: unum enim si non nossem, multa in corpore numerare non possem. Ubicumque autem unum noverim, non utique per corporis sensum novi; quia per corporis sensum non novi nisi corpus, quod vcre purcque unum non esse convincimus. Porro si unum non percepimus corporis sensu, nul­ lum numerum eo sensu percepimus, eorum duntaxat numcrorum quos intelligentia cernimus. Nullus enim cat ex iis, qui non tot vocetur, quoties habet unum, eojus perceptio corporis sensu non fit. Cujuslibet enim corpusculi pars dimidia quantis duabus totum constat, habet et ipsa dimidiatn suam. Sic ergo sunt illae duae partes in corpore, ut nec ipsae simpliciter dux sint. Numcrus autem ille qui vocatur duo, quo­ niam bis habet illud quod simpliciter unum est, pars, ejus dimidia, id est illud ipsum quod simpliciter unum est, non potest rursus habere dimidiam partem vel tertium, vel quotamlibet, quoniam simplex et vere unum est. Dcindo quoniam tenentes ordinem numerorum, post unum duo videmus, qui numerus ad unum col­ latus, duplus invenitur: duplus duorum non conse­ quenter adjungitur, sed interposito ternario quater­ narius sequitur, qui duplus est duorum. Et hæc ratio per omnes cæteros numeros certissima et incommu­ tabili lege pertenditur, ut post unum, ill est post primum omnium numerorum, ipso excepto primus sit qui duplum ejus habet; duo enim sequuntur. Post secundum autem, id est post duo, ipso excepto se­ cundus sil qui duplum I'jus hahet: post duo eniin primus est ternarius, secundus quaternarius, duplus secundi. Post tertium, id cst ternarium, ipso excepto tertius sit qui duplus est cjus: post tertium enim, id est post ternarium primus est quaternarius, secundus quinarius, tertius senarius, qui duplus est tertii. At­ que ita post quartum, ipso excepto quartus habel du­ plum ejus: post quartum enim, id est quaternarium primus est quinarius, secundus senarius, tertius se­ plenarius, quartus octonarius, qui duplex est quarti. Al'lue ita per omnes c:cteros reperies hoc quod in prima copula numerorum, id est uno et duobus inven­ tum est, ut quotus quisque numerus est ab ipso prin­ cipio, totus post illum sit duplus ejus Hoc ergo quod per omnes numeros esse immobile firmum incorru­ ptumque conspicimus, unde couspicimus? Nou enim ullus ullo sensu corporis omnes numeros attingit; innumerabiles enim sunt: unde ergo novimus per omnes hoc esse, aut qua phantasia vel phantasmate tam certa veritas numeri per innumerabilia tam fidenter, nisi in luce interiore conspicitur, quam corporalis sensus ignorat? ilis et talibus multus documentis coguntur fa­ teri, quibus di putantibus Deus donavit ingenium, et pertinacia caliginem nun obducit, rationem verita­ temque numerorum, et ad sensus corporis non per­ tincre, et invrrtibilem sinceramque consistere, et omnibus ratiocinantibus ad videndum esse commu­ nem. Quapropter cum nulla alia possint occurrere, quæ communiter et tanquam publice præsto suut ra­ tiocinantibus, et ab eis videantur mente atque ratione si gulorum quorumque cernentium, eaque inviolata et incommutabilia mancant; non tamen invitus accepe­ rim quod ista ratio et veritas numeri libi potissimum occurrerit, cum ad id quod interrogavcram, respon­ dere voluisses: non enim frustra in sanctis Libris sapientiæ conjunctus est numerus, ubi dictum est: Circuivi ego et cor meum, ut scirem, et considcrarem, et quœrerem sapientiam et numerum.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Come now, pay attention, and tell me whether anything can be found that all who reason see in common, each with his own reason and mind; something such that what is seen is present to all, and is not changed for the use of those to whom it is present, as food or drink is, but remains uncorrupted and whole whether they see it or not. Or do you perhaps think there is nothing of this kind?
E. On the contrary, I see there are many such things, of which it is enough to mention one: the rule and truth of number is present to all who reason, so that every calculator tries to grasp it, each with his own reason and understanding. One can do it more easily, another with more difficulty, another not at all, though it offers itself equally to all who are able to take it in. When anyone perceives it, it is not turned and changed into a kind of nourishment for the one who perceives it; and when anyone is mistaken about it, it does not fail, but while it remains true and whole, he is the more in error the less he sees it.
A. Quite right. I see that, as one not unfamiliar with these matters, you have quickly found what to say. Yet if someone told you that these numbers were impressed on our mind not from some nature of their own but from the things that we touch by the bodily sense, as images, so to speak, of visible things, what would you answer? Or do you think so too?
E. I would in no way think so. For even if I perceived numbers by the bodily sense, I could not therefore also perceive by the bodily sense the rule of dividing or joining numbers. It is by this light of the mind that I refute anyone who, in calculating, reports a false total, whether in adding or in subtracting. And whatever I touch by the bodily sense, such as this sky and this earth and whatever other bodies I perceive in them, I do not know how long it will last; but seven and three are ten, and not only now but always; and there has never been a time when seven and three were not ten, nor will there ever be a time when seven and three are not ten. So I have said that this incorruptible truth of number is common to me and to anyone who reasons.
A. I do not resist you, since your answer is most true and certain. But you will easily see that numbers themselves too were not drawn in through the senses of the body, if you consider that any number is called by as many units as it contains. For example, if it contains one twice, it is called two; if three times, three; and if they contain one ten times, then they are called ten; and absolutely any number has its name from the number of times it contains one, and is called so many. But whoever thinks most truly about one surely finds that it cannot be perceived by the senses of the body. For whatever is touched by such a sense is shown to be not one but many; for it is a body, and therefore has countless parts. Not to pursue the tiny and less distinct parts, however small that little body may be, it certainly has one part on the right and another on the left, one above and another below, one farther and another nearer, or parts at the ends and a part in the middle; for we must admit that these are present in any body, however small its measure. And so we grant that no body is truly and purely one; yet so many things could not be counted in it unless they were distinguished by knowledge of that one. For when I look for one in a body and have no doubt that I do not find it, I certainly know what I am looking for there and what I do not find, and that it cannot be found there, or rather that it is not there at all. So where I know that a body is not one, I know what one is; for if I did not know one, I could not count many in a body. And wherever I know one, I surely do not know it through the sense of the body; for through the sense of the body I know only body, which we have shown is not truly and purely one. Further, if we have not perceived one by the sense of the body, we have perceived no number by that sense, at least of those numbers that we discern by understanding. For there is none of them that is not called by as many units as it contains, and one is not perceived by the sense of the body. The half of any little body, of which two make up the whole, itself has its own half. So those two parts are in the body in such a way that they are not simply two. But the number called two contains twice that which is simply one; and its half, that is, that very thing which is simply one, cannot in turn have a half or a third or any fraction, since it is simple and truly one. Then, keeping the order of numbers, we see two after one, and this number, compared with one, is found to be double. The double of two is not added next, but with three in between, four follows, which is the double of two. And this rule extends through all the other numbers by a most certain and unchangeable law: after one, that is, after the first of all numbers, leaving itself aside, the first number is the one that is its double, for two follows. After the second, that is, after two, leaving itself aside, the second is the one that is its double; for after two the first is three, the second four, the double of the second. After the third, that is, three, leaving itself aside, the third is its double; for after the third, that is, after three, the first is four, the second five, the third six, which is double the third. And so after the fourth, leaving itself aside, the fourth is its double; for after the fourth, that is, four, the first is five, the second six, the third seven, the fourth eight, which is double the fourth. And so through all the rest you will find what was found in the first pair of numbers, one and two: that whatever place a number has from the very beginning, the number that same distance after it is its double. This, then, which we see to be unmoved, firm, and incorrupt through all numbers: from where do we see it? For no one touches all numbers by any sense of the body, since they are innumerable. How, then, do we know that this holds through all of them? By what image or phantasm is so certain a truth of number seen so confidently through innumerable instances, unless it is seen in an inner light of which the bodily sense knows nothing? By these and many such proofs, those to whom God has given ability in argument, and whom obstinacy does not cover with darkness, are compelled to confess that the rule and truth of numbers does not belong to the senses of the body, that it stands unchangeable and pure, and that it is common to all who reason, for them to see. Therefore, although many other things could occur to one that are present in common and, as it were, publicly to those who reason, and are seen by them with the mind and reason of each one who discerns them, while remaining inviolate and unchangeable, I am not displeased that this rule and truth of number occurred to you above all when you wanted to answer what I had asked. For not in vain is number joined to wisdom in the holy books, where it is said: “I went round, I and my heart, to know and to consider and to seek wisdom and number.”

### Scripture references

- Eccl 7:25 (7:26 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Eccl 7:25 is quoted in the Old Latin form based on the Septuagint, which reads “number” (Greek psēphos, “reckoning”) where the Vulgate has “reason” (ratio).
- The digital text reads “cum nulla alia possint occurrere”; the sense requires “multa” (“many other things”), and it is translated so.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.8 (PL 32:1244–1245; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-8).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.9

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-9
- Source: PL 32:1245–1246
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Wisdom is the truth in which the highest good is discerned and held; all want happiness and so want wisdom, and, like sunlight in which many things are seen, one wisdom may be common to all the wise.

### Latin text

Verumtamen, quæso te, quid de ipsa sapientia putas existimandum? Singulas quasque suas arbitra­ ris singulos quosque homines habere sapientias? an vero unam præsto esse communitcr omnibus, cujus quanto magis quisque fit particeps, tanto est sapien­ tior? E. Quam dicas sapientiam nondum scio; video quippe varie videri hominibus, quid fiat dicaturve sa­ pienter: nam et qui militant, sapienter sibi facere videntur; et qui contempta militia colendo agro CII­ ram atque operam impendunt, hoc potius laudant, tribuuntque sapientiæ; ct qui astuti sunt ad excogi­ tandos modos conquirendæ pecuniæ, sibi videntur esse sapientes; et qui hæc omnia negligunt vel abji­ ciunt, et quæque sunt hujusmodi temporalia, et totum studium suum ad investigationem conferunt veritatis, ut semetipsos Deumque cognoscant, magnum hoc esse sapientiæ munus judicant; et qni huic otio quærendi ei contemplandi veri nolunt se dedere, sed potius la­ horiosissimis curis ct officiis agunt, III hominibus con­ sulant, et in rerum humanarum juste moderandarum et gubernandarum actione versantur, sapientes se esse arbitrantur; et qui utrumque horum agu. I, el parlim vivunt in contemplatione veritatis, partim in laboribus officiosis, quos humana; societati deberi pu­ tant, sibi palmam sapicnliae tenere videntur. Qmitto innumerabiles sectas, quarum nulla est quæ non se­ ctatores suos præponens cæteris, eos solos velit esse sapientes. Quamobrem cum id nunc agatur inter nos, ut non quid credamus respondendum sit, sed quid di­ lucida intelligentia teneamus, nullo modo ad id tibi quod interrogasti respondere potero, nisi quod ere­ dendo teneo, contemplando etiam et ratione cernendo noverim, quæ sit ipsa sapientia. A. Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veri­ tatem, in qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum? Nam illi omnes quos commemorasti diversa sectantes, Lonum appetunt, et malum fugiunt; sed propterea diversa sectantur, quod aliud alii videtur bonum. Quisquis ergo appetit quod appetendum non crat, tametsi id non appeteret nisi ei videretur bonum, cr­ rat tamen. Errarc autem neque ille potest qui nihil appetit, neque ille qui hoc appetit quod debet appe­ tere. In quantum igitur omnes homines appetunt, vitam beatam, non crrant. In quantum autem quis que non eam tenet vitæ viam quæ ducit ad beatitudi­ nem, cum se fateatur et profiteatur nolle nisi ad bea­ titudinem pervenire, in tantum errat. Error est enim, cum sequimur aliquid quod non ad id ducit que volu­ mus pervenire. Et quanto magis invia vitæ quis er-. rat, tanto minus sapit. Tanto euim magis longe est a veritate, in qua cernitur et leuclur summum bonum. Summo autem bono assecuto et adepto, beatus quis­ que fit; quod omnes sine controversia volumus. Ut ergo constat nos beatos esse velle, ila nos constat velle esse sapientes; quia nemo sinc sapientia beatui est. Nemo enim beatus est, nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate, qnam sapientiam vocamus, cernitur et tenetur. Sicut ergo antequam beati simus, mentibus tamen nostris impressa cst notio bcatilalis; per nanc enim scimus, fidenterque, cl sinc ulla dubuatione di­ cimus beatos nos esse velle: ita Etiam priusquam sa­ pientes simus, sapientiæ notionem in mente habemus impressam, per quamunusquisque nostrum si inter. rogeiur velitue esse sapiens, sine ulla caligine dubi­ tationis se vellc respondet. Quare si jam constat inter nos quae sit sapicn­ iia, quam fortasse verbis explicare non poteras nam si eam nullo modo animo cerneres, nullo modo scires et velletc essc sapientem et velle debere,quod tc ne­ gaturum esse non arbitror), volo jam dicas mihi, utrum eliam sapicnliam, sicut numcri rationem atque veritaem omnibus ratiocinantibus communem sc præ­ here arbitreris; an quoniam tot sunt mentes homi­ num quot homines sunt, unde nec ego de tua mente aliquid cerno, nec tu de mea, tot etiam putes esse sapientias, quot potuerint esse sapientes. E. Si sum­ mMm bonum omnibus unum est, oportet etiam vcri­ tatem in qua cernitur et tenetur, id est sapientiam, omnibus unam esse communem. A. Dubitas autem summum bonum, quidquid illud est, omnibus hom:­ nibus unum esse? E. Dubito sane, quia diversos di­ versis rebus gaudere video tanquam summis bonis suis. A. Vellem quidem, ut de summo bono ita nemo dubitaret, ut nemo dubitat quidquid illud est, non nisi co adepto posse fieri hominem bcatum. Sed quo­ niam magna quæstio est, et longum sermonem forte desidcral, putemus omnino tut summa bona esse, quot sunt ipsas res diversæ quæ a diversis tanquam summa bona appetuntur: num ideo sequitur, ut ipsa sapientia etiam non sit una communis omnibus, quia cn bona, quæ in illa cernunt et cligunt homines, multa et diversa sunt? Si enim boc putas, potes et de luce solis dubitare quod una sit, quia multa et di­ versa sunt, quæ in. ea cernimus. De quibus multis ele­ git quisque pro voluntate quo fruatur per oculorum sensum: et alius altitudinem montis alicujus intuetur libenter, ct eo gaudet aspectu; alius campi planitiem, alius convexa vallium, alius nemorum viriditatem, alius mobilem æqualitatem maris, alius hæc omnia. vel quædam horum simul pulchra confert ad lætitiam v idendi. Sicut ergo ista multa ct diversa sunt, quæ in luce solis homines vident et eligunt ad frucndum, lux tamen ipsa una est, in qua vidct et tenet quo fruatur uniuscujusque intuentis aspectus: ita, etiamsi multa sunt bona eaque diversa, e quibus elidat quisque quod volet, idque videndo et tenendo ad fruendum sum­ inum sibi bonum recte vereque constituat; fieri ta­ men potest ut lux ipsa sapientiæ, in qua hxc videri et teneri possunt, omnibus sapientibus sit una commu­ nis. E. Fatcor fieri posse, nec impedire aliquid, ut non sit omnibus communis una sapientia, etiamsi niulta et diversa siut summa bona: sed vellem scire an ita sit. Quod enim concedimus fieri posse ut ita sit, non continuo ita esse concedimus. A. Tenemus interim esse sapientiam: sed utrum sit communis una omnihus, an singuli sapicntes suas habeant, sicuti animas vel mentes suas, hoc nondum tenemus. E. Ita est.

### English translation (Claude)

But, I ask you, what do you think we should judge about wisdom itself? Do you think that each human being has his own wisdom? Or is one wisdom present in common to all, so that the more anyone shares in it, the wiser he is?
E. I do not yet know what wisdom you mean; for I see that people hold different views about what is done or said wisely. Those who serve as soldiers think they act wisely; those who despise military service and spend their care and effort on farming praise this rather and attribute it to wisdom; those who are clever at devising ways of getting money think themselves wise; those who neglect or reject all these and all such temporal things, and give their whole effort to searching out the truth, so as to know themselves and God, judge this to be the great gift of wisdom; those who do not want to give themselves to this leisure of seeking and contemplating truth, but rather busy themselves with most laborious cares and duties in order to look after people, and are occupied in the work of justly managing and governing human affairs, think that they are wise; and those who do both, and live partly in the contemplation of truth and partly in the dutiful labors that they think are owed to human society, think that they hold the palm of wisdom. I leave aside countless sects, none of which does not prefer its own followers to the rest and want them alone to be wise. So, since what we are now doing is answering not what we believe but what we hold by clear understanding, I can in no way answer what you have asked unless, besides holding it by belief, I also come to know by contemplating and discerning with reason what wisdom itself is.
A. Do you think that wisdom is anything other than the truth in which the highest good is discerned and held? For all those you mentioned, pursuing different things, seek good and flee evil; but they pursue different things because one thing seems good to some and another to others. Whoever, then, seeks what he should not have sought, even though he would not seek it unless it seemed good to him, nevertheless errs. But neither he who seeks nothing nor he who seeks what he ought to seek can err. Insofar, then, as all people seek the happy life, they do not err. But insofar as anyone does not keep to that way of life which leads to happiness, though he admits and professes that he wants nothing but to arrive at happiness, to that extent he errs. For error is when we follow something that does not lead to where we want to arrive. And the more anyone errs in the way of life, the less wise he is; for he is so much farther from the truth in which the highest good is discerned and held. When the highest good has been reached and attained, each becomes happy, which we all, beyond dispute, want. So, as it is agreed that we want to be happy, so it is agreed that we want to be wise; for no one is happy without wisdom. For no one is happy except by the highest good, which is discerned and held in that truth which we call wisdom. So, just as before we are happy the notion of happiness is nevertheless impressed on our minds (for through it we know, and say confidently and without any doubt, that we want to be happy), so also, before we are wise, we have the notion of wisdom impressed on our mind, through which each of us, if asked whether he wants to be wise, answers without any shadow of doubt that he does.
So if it is now agreed between us what wisdom is (which perhaps you could not explain in words; for if you did not in any way discern it in your mind, you would in no way know both that you want to be wise and that you ought to want it, which I do not think you will deny), I want you to tell me now whether you think that wisdom too, like the rule and truth of number, offers itself in common to all who reason; or whether, since there are as many human minds as there are human beings, so that I discern nothing of your mind nor you of mine, you think there are also as many wisdoms as there can be wise men.
E. If the highest good is one for all, the truth in which it is discerned and held, that is, wisdom, must also be one and common to all.
A. But do you doubt that the highest good, whatever it is, is one for all human beings?
E. I do doubt it, because I see different people rejoicing in different things as their highest goods.
A. I wish that no one doubted about the highest good, just as no one doubts that, whatever it is, a human being can become happy only by attaining it. But since it is a great question and perhaps needs a long discussion, let us suppose that there are altogether as many highest goods as there are different things sought by different people as highest goods. Does it follow that wisdom itself is not one and common to all, because the goods that people discern and choose in it are many and different? If you think so, you can also doubt that the light of the sun is one, because the things we see in it are many and different. From these many things each chooses at will what to enjoy through the sense of the eyes: one gladly gazes at the height of some mountain and rejoices in that sight; another at the flatness of a plain, another at the hollows of valleys, another at the green of woods, another at the moving level of the sea; another brings all these, or some of them, together for the delight of seeing. So, just as these things which people see in the light of the sun and choose to enjoy are many and different, and yet the light itself is one, in which the gaze of each beholder sees and holds what it enjoys; so, even if there are many and different goods, from which each chooses what he wants, and, seeing and holding it for enjoyment, rightly and truly makes it his highest good, it can still be that the very light of wisdom, in which these things can be seen and held, is one and common to all the wise.
E. I admit that it can be, and that nothing prevents one wisdom from being common to all, even if there are many and different highest goods; but I would like to know whether it is so. For when we grant that it can be so, we do not at once grant that it is so.
A. We hold meanwhile that wisdom exists; but whether it is one and common to all, or each wise man has his own, as he has his own soul or mind, we do not yet hold.
E. So it is.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.9 (PL 32:1245–1246; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-9).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.10

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-10
- Source: PL 32:1246–1247
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Truths such as that one should live justly and prefer the eternal to the temporal are seen by each mind yet common to all; these rules and lights of the virtues belong to wisdom and are as unchangeable as the rules of number.

### Latin text

A. Quid? hoc quod tenemus vcl csse sapientiam, vcl sapicntes, et bcatos esse omnes homines velle, ubi videmus? Nam hoc te videre, et vcrum esse nullo modo utique dubitaverim. Hoc ergo vcrum sic vides ut cogitationem tuam, quam si mihi non cnun­ tics, ego prorsus ignoro? an ita ut intelligas et a me videri posse hoc vcrum, tametsi mihi abs te non dica­ tnr? E. Imo ita ut abs te quoque, etiam me invito, vi­ dcri posse non dubitcm. A. Quod ergo unum verum videmus ambo singulis mentibus, nonne utrique no­ strum commune cst? E. Manifestissime. A. Item credo te non negare studendum esse sapicntiæ, atque hoc verum esse concedere. E. Pror.us non dubito. A. IIoc item verum, et unum esse, et omnibus qui hoc sciunt, ad videndum esse commune, quamvis unusquisque id nec mea, nec tua, nec cujusquam al­ terius, sed sua mente conspiciat, cum id quod conspi­ citur, omnibus conspicientibus communiter præsto sit, numquid negare poterimus? E. Nullo modo, A. Item, juste esse videndum, deteriora melioribus esse subdenda, et paria paribus comparanda, et pro­ pria suis quibusque tribuenda, nonne fateberis esse verissimum, et tam mihi quam tibi atque omn:bus id videntibus præsto esse communiter? E. Assentior. A. Quid incorruptum melius esse cornipto, æter­ num temporali, inviolabile violabili, poteris negare? E. Quis potest? A. Hoc ergo verum potest quisque suum proprium dicere, cum incornmutabililer con­ templandum adsit omnibus qui hoc contemplari va­ lent? E. Nullus hoc vere dixerit situm esse proprium, cum tam sit unuin atque omnibus commone quam verum est. A. Item a corruptione avertendum ani. mum, atquead incorruptionem convertendum esse, id est non corruptionem, sed incorruptionem diligendam esse quis negat? Aut quis cum verum esse fateatur, non etiam incommutabile intelligat, atque omnibus mentibus id valentibus intueri, communiter præsto csse videat? E. Vcrissimum cst. A. Quid? eam vitam qu.c nullis adersitatibus de certa et honesta senten­ tia demovetur, dubitabit aliquis esse meliorem, quam eam quæ facile incommodis temporalibus frangitur atque subvertitur? E. Quis dubitaverit? A. Jam hujusmodi plura non quæram: satis enim est quod istas tanquam regulas, et quædam lu­ mina virtutum, et vera et incommutabilia, et sive singula sive omnia communiter adesse ad contemplan­ dum cis qui haic valent sua quisque ratione ac mente conspicere, pariter mecum vides certissimumque esse concedis. Sed sanc quæro utrum hæc tibi videantur ad sapientiam pertinere. Nam credo videri tibi eum qui sapientiam assecutus est, csse sapientem. E. Vi­ detur omnino. A. Quid? ille qui juste vivit, possetne ita vivere, nisi viderct quæ inferiora quibus potiori­ bus subdat, et quæ paria sibimet copulet, et quæ propria suis quibusque distribuat? E. Non posset- A. Qui ergo hæc videt, num cum. negabis sapienter videre? E. Non nego. A, Quid? ille qui prudenter vi. vit, nonne eligit incorruptionem, et cam corruptioni præponendam esse decernit? E. Manifestissime. A. Cum crgo id eligit quo couvertat animum, quod eligendum esse nemo ambigit, num negari potest sapienter eli­ gere c? E. Nullo modo negaverim. A. Cum ergo ad id quod sapienter eligit convertit animum, sapienter uti­ que convertit. E. Certissimum est. A. Et qui ab eo quod sapienter eligit, et quo sc sapienter convertit, nullis terroribus pocnisque depellitur, sapienter sinc dubio facit. E. Prorsus sine dubio. A. Manifestissi­ mum est igitur omnes has, quas rcgulas diximus et lumina virtutum, ad sapientiam pertinere: quan­ doquidem quanto magis quisque ad agendam vitam eis ulitur, et secundum hæc agit viiam, tanto magis vivit facitque sapicuter; omne autcm quod sapienter lit, non potest recte dici a sapientia esse separatum. E. Omnino ita est. A. Quam ergo veræ atquc incom­ mutabiles sunt rcguljc numerorum, quorum rationem atquc veritatem incommutabiliter atquc communiter omnibus cam cernentibus, præsto esse dixisti: tam suut veræ atque incommutabiles reguLæ sapientiæ. de quibus paucis nunc singillatim interrogatus respon­ disti esse veras atque manifestas, easque omnibus qui hæc intueri valent, communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Well, this that we hold, that wisdom or wise men exist and that all people want to be happy: where do we see it? For I would in no way doubt that you see this and that it is true. Do you see this truth as you see your own thought, of which I know nothing unless you tell me? Or do you see it so that you understand that this truth can be seen by me too, even if you do not tell it to me?
E. Rather so that I do not doubt that it can be seen by you too, even against my will.
A. Then the one truth that we both see, each with his own mind, is it not common to both of us?
E. Most evidently.
A. Likewise, I believe you do not deny that one should pursue wisdom, and you grant that this is true.
E. I have no doubt at all.
A. Can we deny, likewise, that this truth is one and is common to all who know it, for them to see, although each beholds it not with my mind or yours or anyone else's but with his own, since what is beheld is present in common to all who behold it?
E. In no way.
A. Likewise, that one should live justly, that worse things should be subjected to better, that equals should be compared with equals, and that to each his own should be given: will you not admit that this is most true, and present in common to me as to you and to all who see it?
E. I agree.
A. Can you deny that the incorrupt is better than the corrupt, the eternal than the temporal, the inviolable than the violable?
E. Who can?
A. Can anyone, then, call this truth his own, when it is present, unchangeably, to be contemplated by all who are able to contemplate it?
E. No one would truly say that it is his own, since it is as much one and common to all as it is true.
A. Likewise, who denies that the mind should be turned away from corruption and turned toward incorruption, that is, that not corruption but incorruption should be loved? Or who, admitting that this is true, does not also understand that it is unchangeable, and see that it is present in common to all minds able to behold it?
E. Most true.
A. Well, will anyone doubt that the life which no adversities move from a sure and honorable resolve is better than one that is easily broken and overturned by temporal troubles?
E. Who would doubt it?
A. I will not ask more of this kind now. It is enough that you see with me, and grant as most certain, that these, as rules and certain lights of the virtues, are true and unchangeable, and that, singly or all together, they are present in common to be contemplated by those who are able to behold them, each with his own reason and mind. But I do ask whether these seem to you to belong to wisdom. For I believe you think that one who has attained wisdom is wise.
E. I certainly do.
A. Well, could one who lives justly live so unless he saw which lower things to subject to which better ones, which equals to join with one another, and which things to distribute as their own to each?
E. He could not.
A. Will you deny, then, that one who sees these things sees wisely?
E. I do not deny it.
A. Well, does not one who lives prudently choose incorruption and decide that it is to be preferred to corruption?
E. Most evidently.
A. When, then, he chooses that to which to turn his mind, which no one doubts should be chosen, can it be denied that he chooses wisely?
E. I would in no way deny it.
A. When, then, he turns his mind to what he wisely chooses, he surely turns it wisely.
E. Most certainly.
A. And one who is driven by no terrors or penalties from what he wisely chooses and to which he wisely turns himself acts wisely beyond doubt.
E. Absolutely beyond doubt.
A. It is most evident, then, that all these, which we have called rules and lights of the virtues, belong to wisdom; since the more anyone uses them in leading his life, and leads his life according to them, the more wisely he lives and acts; and nothing that is done wisely can rightly be said to be separated from wisdom.
E. That is altogether so.
A. As true and unchangeable, then, as are the rules of numbers, whose rule and truth, you said, are present unchangeably and in common to all who discern it, so true and unchangeable are the rules of wisdom. A few of these you were asked about just now, one by one, and you answered that they are true and evident, and you grant that they are present in common to be contemplated by all who are able to behold them.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.10 (PL 32:1246–1247; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-7/#p-2-10).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.11

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-11
- Source: PL 32:1247
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Asked how wisdom and number are related, Augustine suggests they may be one thing, number reaching all things and wisdom ordering them, like the light and heat of one fire; at least both are unchangeably true.

### Latin text

E. Dubitare non possum. Sed pervellem scire uirum uno aliquo genere contineantur h;rc duo, sa­ pientia scilicet et numerus, quia conjuncta etiam in Scripturis sanctis hæc posita esse commemorasti; an alterum existat ab altero, aut alterum in altero con­ sistat, veluti numerus a. sapientia, vel in sapientia. Nam sapientiam existere a nuinero, aut consistere in numero, non ausim dicere: nescio enin quomodo, quia multos novi numerarios aut numeratores, vel si quo alio nomine vocandi sunt, qui summe atque mi­ rabiliter computans, sapientes autem perpaucos, aut forsitan ncmiucm, longe venerabilior mihi ocrurrit sap enlia quam numerus. A. Rem dicis quam ego quo­ que mirari soleo. Nam cum incommutabilem vcrita­ tem numerorum mecum ipse considero, et ejus quasi cubile ac pencarale vel regionem quamdam, vel st quod aliud nomen aptum inveniri potest, quo nomi­ nemus quasi habitaculum quoddam sedemquc nume. rorum; longe removeor a corpore: et inveniens for­ tasse aliquid quod cogitare possim, non tamen ali­ quid inveuicns quod verbis proferre sufficiam, redeo tanquam lassatus in hæc nostra, ut loqui possim, et ea quae ante oculos sita sunt dico, sicut dici solent. Hoc mihi accidit etiam cnm de sapientia quantum va­ leo, vigilantissime atque intentissime cogito. Eipro­ pterea multum miror, cum hæc duo sint in secretis­ sima certissimaque veritate, accedente etiani tes;imonio Scripturarum, quo commemoravi conjuncte illa posita; plurimum miror, ut dixi, quare nume­ i us vilis sit multitudini hominum, et chara sapien­ tia. S<d nimirum illud est, quod una quædam ca­ demque res ost; verumtamen quoniam nihilominus in divinis Libris de sapientia dicitur, qnod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter, ea potentia qua fortiter a fine usque ad finem attingit, numerus fortasse dicitur: ca vero qua disponit omnia suaviter, sapientia propric jam vocn­ tur; cum sit utrumque unius ejusdemque sapientæ. Sed quia dcdit numeros omnibus rebus etiam infimis, et in Hine rerum locatis; et corpora euim omnia quamvis in rebus extrema sint, habent nume­ ros snus; sapere autem non dedit corporibus, neque animis omnibus, sed tantum rationalibus, tanquam in eni sibi sedem locaverit, de qua disponat omnia illa etiam infinia quibas numeros dedit t itaque quoniam dc corporibus. facile judicamus, tanquam de rebus quæ infra nos ordinate sunt, quibus impressos nume­ ras infra nos esse cernimus; et eos propterea vilius ha­ bemus. Sed cum cœperimus tanquam sursum versus re­ currere, invenimus eos etiam nostras mentes transcen­ dere, atque incommutabiles in ipsa manere veritate. Et quia sapcre pauci possunt, numerare autem etiam stultis concessum est, mirantur homines sapientiam, numerosque contemnunt. Docti autem et studiosi, quanto remotiores sunt a labe terrena, tanto magis et numerum ct sapientiam in ipsa veritate contuentur, et utrumque charum habent: et in ejus veritatis coni­ paratione non cis aurum et argentum, et cætera de quibus homines dimicant, sed ipsi etiam vilescunt sibi. Nee mireris numeros ideo viluisse hominibus, et charam esse sapientiam, quia facilius possunt nu­ merare quam sapere, cum videas charius illos ha­ bere aurum qnam lumen lucernae, cui comparatum aurum ridetur. Sed honoratur amplius res longe infe­ rior, quia lucernam sibi et mendicus accendit, aurum vero pauci habent: quanqnam sapientia absit ut in comparatio:ic numeri inveniatur inferior, cum eadem sit; sed oculum quo cerni possit, inquirit. Sed quemadmodum in uno igne consubstantialis, ut iU dicam, sentitur fulgor et calor, nec separari ab invi­ cem possunt; tamen ad ea calor pervenit, quæ prope admoventur, fulgor vero etiam longius latiusque dir­ funditur: sic intelligentiæ potentia, qua inest sa­ pientiæ, propinquiora fervescunt, sicuti sunt ani­ mae rationales; ca vero quae remotiora sunt, sicuti corpora, non attingit calore sapiendi, sed perfundit lumine numerorum: quod libi fortassis obscurum est. Non enim ulla visibilis similitudo invisibili rei potest ad omnem convenientiam coaplari. Tantum illud ale tende, quod et quæstioni quam suscepimus satis est, et humilioribus etiam mentibus, quales nos sumus, sese manifestat, quia etsi clarum nobis essenon pot­ est utram in sapientia, vel ex sapientia numerus, an ipsa sapientia ex numero, an in numero sit, aD utrumque nomen unius rei possit ostendi; illud certe manifestum est utrumque verum esse, et incommu­ tabiliter verum.

### English translation (Claude)

E. I cannot doubt it. But I would very much like to know whether these two, wisdom and number, are contained in some one class, since you mentioned that they are set side by side even in the holy Scriptures; or whether one arises from the other or consists in the other, for instance number from wisdom or in wisdom. For I would not dare to say that wisdom arises from number or consists in number. I do not see how it could, since I know many arithmeticians or calculators, or whatever else they should be called, who calculate supremely and wonderfully, but very few wise men, or perhaps none; wisdom strikes me as far more worthy of reverence than number.
A. You speak of something at which I too often marvel. For when I consider within myself the unchangeable truth of numbers, and what is, so to speak, its lair and inner sanctuary, or a certain region, or whatever other fitting name can be found to name the dwelling, as it were, and seat of numbers, I am carried far from the body; and finding perhaps something that I can think, yet not finding anything that I am able to express in words, I return as if wearied to these things of ours so that I can speak, and I speak of the things placed before our eyes as they are usually spoken of. This happens to me also when I think about wisdom as alertly and intently as I can. And so I marvel greatly, since these two are in the most hidden and most certain truth, and the testimony of the Scriptures is added, in which, as I mentioned, they are set side by side; I marvel greatly, as I said, why number is cheap to the multitude of people and wisdom dear. But no doubt the reason is that they are one and the same thing. Yet, since in the divine books it is said of wisdom that it “reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly,” perhaps the power by which it reaches mightily from end to end is called number, and that by which it orders all things sweetly is properly called wisdom, though both belong to one and the same wisdom. But it has given numbers to all things, even the lowest and those placed at the end of things (for all bodies, though they are the last among things, have their numbers), while it has given the power to be wise not to bodies, nor to all souls, but only to rational ones, as if it had set its seat in them, from which to order all those things, even the lowest, to which it gave numbers. And so, since we judge easily about bodies, as things ordered below us, we see that the numbers impressed on them are below us, and so we hold them cheaper. But when we begin to run back upward, as it were, we find that they also transcend our minds and remain unchangeable in truth itself. And because few can be wise, while counting is granted even to fools, people admire wisdom and despise numbers. But the learned and studious, the farther they are from earthly stain, the more they behold both number and wisdom in truth itself and hold both dear; and in comparison with that truth, not only gold and silver and the other things for which people fight become cheap to them, but they even become cheap to themselves. Nor should you wonder that numbers have become cheap to people and wisdom dear because they can count more easily than they can be wise, when you see that they hold gold dearer than the light of a lamp, in comparison with which gold is laughable. Yet the far inferior thing is honored more, because even a beggar lights a lamp for himself, while few have gold. Far be it, though, that wisdom should be found inferior in comparison with number, since it is the same; but it requires an eye by which it can be seen. Just as in one fire brightness and heat are perceived as consubstantial, so to speak, and cannot be separated from each other, yet the heat reaches only the things brought near, while the brightness is spread farther and wider; so by the power of understanding that is in wisdom the nearer things, such as rational souls, grow warm, while the more distant things, such as bodies, it does not touch with the warmth of wisdom but floods with the light of numbers. This is perhaps obscure to you; for no visible likeness can be fitted to an invisible thing in every respect. Only attend to this, which is enough for the question we have taken up and shows itself even to humbler minds such as ours: even if it cannot be clear to us whether number is in wisdom or from wisdom, or wisdom itself from number or in number, or whether both can be shown to be names of one thing, this at least is evident, that both are true, and unchangeably true.

### Extrabiblical texts

- Wis 8:1 (Wisdom of Solomon): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Wis 8:1 (“reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly”); the Wisdom of Solomon is outside the 66-book canon and is tagged as an extrabiblical text.
- “Consubstantial” is Augustine's own word here for the inseparable light and heat of fire, used of the comparison only.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.11 (PL 32:1247; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-11).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.12

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-12
- Source: PL 32:1248
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: There is one unchangeable truth, common to all minds and belonging to none, by which we judge our minds and which we cannot judge; so it is higher than our minds.

### Latin text

Quapropter nullo modo negavcris esse incom­ mutabilem vcritatcm, hæc omnia quæ incomnutabi- I iter vera sunt continentem; qnam non possis dicere tuam vcl mcam, vel cujusquam bominis, sed otnni­ bus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen, pra sto esse ac se præbere communiter: omne autcm quod commu­ niter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque intelligentibus præsto est, ad ullius eorum proprie naturam perii­ nere quis dixerit? Meministi cnim, ut opinor, quid de sensibus corporis paulo ante tractatum sit; ea scilicet quæ oculornm vel aurium sensu communitcr tangi­ mus, sicuti sunt colores et soni, quos ego et tu simul videmus, vel simul audimus, non pertinere ad ocu­ lorum nostrorum auriumve naturam, sed ad sentien­ dum nobis esse communia. Sic ergo etiam illa quæ ego et tu communiter propria quisque mente conspi­ cimus, nequaquam dixeris ad mentis alicujus nostrum pertinere naturam. Duorum enim oculi quod simul vident, nec hujus nec illius oculos esse poteris dicere, sed aliquid tertium in quod utriusque conferatur aspe­ ctus. E. Apertissimum atque verissimum est. A. Hanc ergo veritatem, de qua jam diu loqui­ mur, et in qua una tam multa conspicimus, excellen­ tiorem pUtas esse quam mens nostra est, an æqualem mentibus nostris, an etiam inferiorem? Sed si esset inferior, non secundum illam, sed de illa judicaremus, sicut judicamus de corporibus, quia infra sunt, et di­ cimus ca plerumque non tantum iia esse vel non ita, sed ita vel non ita esse debere: sic et de animis no­ stris non solum ita esse animum novimus, sed plerum­ que etiam ita esse dcberc. Et de corporibus quidem sic judicamus, cum dicimus, Minus candidum est quam debuit; aul, minus quadrum, et multa similiter: de animis vero, Minus apius est quam debet; aut, mi­ nus lenis; aut minus vehemens, sicut nostrorum mo­ rum se ratio tulerit. Et judicamus hæc secundum illas interiores regulas vcritatis, quas communiter cernimus: de ipsis vero nullo medo quis judicat. Cum enim quis dixcril aeterna temporalibus esse po­ tiora, aut septem et tria decem esse, nemo dicit ita esse debuisse, sed cantum ita esse cognoscens, non examinator corrigit, sed tantum lætatur inventor. Si autcm esset æqualis menibus nostris hæc veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostræ ali­ quando eam plus vident, aliquando minus, et ex hoc fatentur sc esse mutabiles: cum illa in sc manens nee proficiat cum plus a nobis videtur, nec deficiat cum minus, sed integra ct incorrupta, et conversos lætificet lumine, et aversos puniat cæcitate. Quid, quod etiam de ipsis mentibus nostris secundum illain judicamus, cum de illa nullo modo judicare possimus? Dicimus enim, Minus intelligit quam debet, aut tan­ tum quantum debet intelligit. Tantum autcm mens debet iutelligcre, quantum propius admoveri atque inhærere potuerit incommutabili veritati. Quare si nec inferior, nec æqualis est, restat ut sil superior at­ que excellentior.

### English translation (Claude)

So you will in no way deny that there is an unchangeable truth containing all these things that are unchangeably true, which you cannot call yours or mine or any human being's, but which is present and offers itself in common to all who discern unchangeable truths, like a light that is in wonderful ways both hidden and public. And who would say that anything present in common to all who reason and understand belongs properly to the nature of any one of them? For you remember, I think, what was discussed a little earlier about the senses of the body: that the things we touch in common by the sense of the eyes or ears, such as colors and sounds, which you and I see at once or hear at once, do not belong to the nature of our eyes or ears, but are common to us for perceiving. So too you would in no way say that the things which you and I behold in common, each with his own mind, belong to the nature of the mind of either of us. For what the eyes of two people see at once you cannot say is the eyes of this one or of that one; it is something third, toward which the gaze of both is directed.
E. That is most plain and most true.
A. This truth, then, of which we have been speaking for so long, and in which, though it is one, we behold so many things: do you think it more excellent than our mind, or equal to our minds, or even inferior? If it were inferior, we would judge not according to it but about it, as we judge about bodies, because they are below us, and we often say not only that they are so or not so, but that they ought to be so or not so. So too with our minds: we know not only that the mind is so, but often also that it ought to be so. We judge so about bodies when we say, “It is less white than it should have been,” or “less square,” and many such things; and about minds, “It is less fit than it ought to be,” or “less gentle,” or “less vigorous,” as the character of our conduct has led. And we judge these things according to those inner rules of truth which we discern in common; but about them no one in any way judges. For when someone has said that eternal things are better than temporal ones, or that seven and three are ten, no one says that it ought to have been so; knowing only that it is so, he does not correct it as an examiner but only rejoices as a discoverer. And if this truth were equal to our minds, it too would be changeable. For our minds see it sometimes more and sometimes less, and by this confess that they are changeable; whereas it, remaining in itself, neither gains when it is seen more by us nor fails when it is seen less, but, whole and incorrupt, it gladdens with its light those who are turned toward it and punishes with blindness those who are turned away. What of the fact that we judge even about our minds themselves according to it, while we can in no way judge about it? For we say, “He understands less than he ought,” or “He understands as much as he ought.” And a mind ought to understand as much as it has been able to draw near to the unchangeable truth and cleave to it. So if it is neither inferior nor equal, it remains that it is superior and more excellent.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.12 (PL 32:1248; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-12).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.13

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-13
- Source: PL 32:1248–1249
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Truth itself is higher than our mind; to enjoy it, more than any bodily pleasure, is the happy life, and our freedom lies in being subject to this truth, which is God.

### Latin text

Promiseram autem, si meministi, me Libi demon­ straturum essealiquid qnod sit mente nostra atque ra­ tione sublimius. Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: amplectere illam si potes, et fruere illa, et delectare in Domino, et dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui. Quid enim petis amplius quam ut beatus sis? Et quid beatius eo qui fruitur inconcussa et incommutabili et excel­ lentissima veritate? An vero clamant homines beatos se esse, cum pulchra corpora magno desiderio con­ cupita, sive conjugum, sive etiam meretricum am­ plexantur; et nos in amplexu veritatis beatos esse du­ bilamus? Clamant homines se beatos esse, cum æstu aridis faucibus ad fontem abundantem salubremque perveniunt, aut esurientes prandium cœnamve orna­ tam copiosamque reperiunt; et nos negabimus bcatos esse, cnm irrigamur pascimurque veritate? Solemus audire voces clamantium se beatos, si jaceant in rosis et aliis floribus, vel eliam unguentis odoratissimis perfruantur: quid fragrantius, quidjucundius inspira­ tione veritatis? ct dubitamus nos cum ab illa inspira­ mur, dicere beatos? Multi beatam vitam in cantu vocum et nervorum et tibiarum sibi constituunt, et cum ea sibi dcsunt, se miseros judicant; cum autem adsunt, efferuntur lætitia: et nos cum mentibus no­ stris sine ullo strepitu, ut ita dicam, canorum et fa­ cundum quoddam silentium veritatis illabitur, aliam beatam vitam quærimus, et tam cet ta et præsente non fruimur? Luce auri et argenti, luce gemmarum etalio­ rum colorum, sive ipsius lucis qua; ad bos oculos per­ tinet, sive in ignibus terrenis, sive in stellis vel luna vcl sole, claritate et jucunditate delectati homines, cum ab ista lætitia nullis molestiis, nulla indigentia revo­ cantur, beati sibi videntur, et propter hæc semper volunt vivere: et nos in luce veritatis beatam vitam collocare metuimus? Imo vero quoniam in veritate cognoscitur ci tenetur summum bonum, caque veritas sapientia est, cernamus in ea, teneamusque summum bonum. eoque perfruamur. Beatus est quippe qui fruitur summo bono. Hæc enim veritas ostendit omnia bona, quæ vera sunt, quur. sibi pro suo captu intelligentes homi­ nes, vel singula, vcl plura eligunt, quibus fruantur. Scd quemadmodum illi qui in luce solis eligunt quod libenter aspiciant, ct eo aspectu lætificantur; in quibus si qui forte fuerint vcgetioribns sanisque et fortissimis oculis præditi, nihil libentius quam ipsum solem con­ tuentur, qui etiam caHera quibus infirmiores oculi delectantur, illustrai: sic fortis acies mentis et vegeta cum multa vera et incommutabilia certa ratione con­ spexeril, dirigit se in ipsam veritatem, qua cuncte monstrantur, eiqne inhærens tanquam obliviscitur cætera, et in ilia simul omnibus fruitur. Quidquid enim jucundum est in cæteris veris, ipsa utiquæ veri­ Late jucundum est. Hæc est libertas nostra, cum isti subdimur veritati: et ipse est Deus noster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a conditione peccati. Ipsa enim Veritas cHam homo cum hominibus loquens, ait credentibus sibi: Si manseritis in verbo meo, vere discipuli mei estis, et cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos. Nulla enim re fruitur anima cum liber­ tate, nisi qua fruitur cum secui italc.

### English translation (Claude)

I had promised, if you remember, to show you that there is something higher than our mind and reason. Here it is for you: truth itself. Embrace it if you can, and enjoy it, and “take delight in the Lord, and he will give you the requests of your heart.” For what more do you ask than to be happy? And who is happier than one who enjoys unshaken, unchangeable, and most excellent truth? People cry out that they are happy when they embrace beautiful bodies desired with great longing, whether of wives or even of prostitutes; and shall we doubt that we are happy in the embrace of truth? People cry out that they are happy when, with throats parched by heat, they come to an abundant and healthful spring, or, hungry, find a dinner or supper richly furnished and plentiful; and shall we deny that we are happy when we are watered and fed by truth? We often hear the voices of people crying out that they are happy if they lie among roses and other flowers, or enjoy most fragrant ointments; what is more fragrant, what more pleasant, than the breath of truth? And do we hesitate to call ourselves happy when we breathe it in? Many place the happy life in the music of voices and strings and pipes, and when these are lacking they judge themselves miserable, and when they are present they are carried away with joy; and when a certain melodious and eloquent silence of truth, so to speak, glides without any noise into our minds, shall we seek another happy life, and not enjoy one so sure and so present? People delight in the light of gold and silver, the light of gems and other colors, or in the brightness and pleasantness of the light itself that belongs to these eyes, whether in earthly fires or in the stars or the moon or the sun; and when they are called away from this delight by no troubles and no want, they think themselves happy and want to live forever for the sake of these things. And are we afraid to place the happy life in the light of truth? Rather, since the highest good is known and held in truth, and that truth is wisdom, let us discern the highest good in it, hold it, and enjoy it fully. For he is happy who enjoys the highest good. This truth shows all the goods that are true, from which people of understanding choose, according to their capacity, one or several to enjoy. Those who choose in the light of the sun what they like to look at are gladdened by that sight; and if some among them are endowed with more vigorous, healthy, and very strong eyes, they look at nothing more gladly than the sun itself, which also lights up the other things in which weaker eyes delight. So the strong and vigorous gaze of the mind, when it has beheld by sure reason many true and unchangeable things, directs itself to truth itself, by which all are shown, and cleaving to it, as it were forgets the rest, and in it enjoys all of them at once. For whatever is pleasant in the other truths is pleasant by truth itself. This is our freedom, when we are subject to this truth; and it is our God himself, who frees us from death, that is, from the condition of sin. For the Truth itself, speaking also as a man with men, says to those who believe in him: “If you abide in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” For the soul enjoys nothing with freedom except what it enjoys with security.

### Scripture references

- Ps 37:4 (36:4 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- John 8:31: quotation, high confidence
- John 8:32: quotation, high confidence
- John 14:6: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Ps 37:4 (Ps 36:4 in the Latin numbering); John 8:31–32.
- The identification of the Truth with God and with Christ (“speaking also as a man with men”) is Augustine's, stated here without further argument.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.13 (PL 32:1248–1249; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-13).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.14

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-14
- Source: PL 32:1249
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Unlike bodily goods, truth and wisdom cannot be lost against one's will, are shared whole by all without crowding, and, being judged by none and judging all, are beyond doubt higher than our minds.

### Latin text

Nemo autem securus est in iis bonis qux potest invitus amittere. Veritatem autem atque sapientiam nemo amittit invitus: non euim locis separari ab ea quisquam potest; sed ea quæ dicitur a veritate atque sapieutia separatio, perversa voluntas est, qua infe­ riora diliguntur. Nemo autem vult aliquid nolens. Ha­ bemus igitur qua fruamur omnes æqualiter atque communiter: null.c sunt angustiæ, nullus in ea de­ fectus. Omnes amatores suos nullo modo sibi invidos recipit, et omnibus communis est, et singulis casta est. Ncmo alicui dicit: Recede, ut etiam ego acce­ dani; remove manus, ut etiam ego amplectar. Omnes inhærent, idipsum omnes tangunt. Cibus ejus nulla ex parte discerpitur; nihil de ipsa bibis quod ego non possim. Non enim abejus communione in privatum tuum mutas aliquid; sed quod tu de illa capis, et mihi manet integrum. Quod te inspirat non exspecto ut reddatur abs te, et sic ego inspirer ex eo: non enim aliquid ejus aliquando fit cujusquam unius aut quorumdam proprium, sed simul omnibus tota est communis. Minus ergo ca quæ tangimus, vel quæ gustamus, vel quæ olfacimus, huic sunt veritati similia, sed magis ca quae audimus et cernimus: quia et omne verbum a quibus auditur, totum auditur ab omnibus, et simul a singulis totum; et species omnis quoe oculis adjacet, quanta videtur ab uno, tanta et ab alio simul. Sed multum longo intervallo sunt ista similia: nec tota enim simul sonat quælibet vox, quia per tempora tenditur et producitur, et alind rjus prius sonat, aliud posterius; et species omnis visibilis tanquam intume­ scit pcr locos, nec ubique tota est. Et certe omnia hæc aufiruntur invito, et quominus eis frui possimus, quibusdam impedimur angustiis. Nam et si posset esse cujusquam suavis cantus sempiternus, et studiosi ejus certatim ad eum aodicndum venirent, coarctarent sese, atque pugnarent de locis, quanto plures essent, at cantanti esset quisque propinquior, et in audiendo ni­ hil tenerent manere sccum, sed omnibus vocibus fu­ gientibus tangerentur. Solem autem istum si vellem, intueri, atque id pertinaciter possem; et in occasu me desereret, et subvelaretur nubilo, et multis aliis obstaculis voluptatem videndi eum invitus amitterem. Postremo etiam si adesset semper suavitas, et lucis videnti, et vocis audienti, quid magnum ad me perve­ niret, cum mihi csset comulunc cum belluis? At illa veritatis et sapientiæ pulehritudo, tantum adsit per­ severans voluutas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium constipata secludit venientes, nec peragitur tempore, nec migrat lccis, nee nocte intercipitur, nee umbra intercluditur, nee sensibus cerporis subjacct. De toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt eam, omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam deest; foris admonet, intusdocet; cernentes se commutat omnes in melius, a nullo in deterius cammutatur; nullus de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bcne. Ac per hoc cam manifestum est menti­ bus nostris, quæ ab ipsa una fiunt singul.c sapientes, et non dc ipsa, sed per ipsam de cæteris judices, sine dubitatione esse potiorem.

### English translation (Claude)

But no one is secure in goods that he can lose against his will. Truth and wisdom no one loses against his will; for no one can be separated from it by places, but what is called separation from truth and wisdom is a perverse will, by which lower things are loved. And no one wills anything unwillingly. We have, then, something to enjoy, all of us equally and in common; there is no crowding, no deficiency in it. It receives all its lovers without their envying one another; it is common to all and chaste to each. No one says to another, “Step back, so that I too may come near; take your hands away, so that I too may embrace it.” All cleave to it, all touch the very same thing. Its food is torn into no parts; you drink nothing from it that I cannot. For you change nothing from sharing in it into your private property; what you take from it remains whole for me too. What it breathes into you I do not wait to have given back by you, so that I may then be breathed upon by it; for no part of it ever becomes the property of any one person or of a few, but it is wholly common to all at once. So the things we touch or taste or smell are less like this truth, and the things we hear and see are more like it; because every word is heard whole by all who hear it, and whole by each at once, and every appearance that lies before the eyes is seen as large by one as by another at once. But these are like it only at a very great distance. For no voice sounds whole all at once, since it is stretched out and drawn out through time, and one part of it sounds earlier and another later; and every visible appearance swells out, as it were, through space and is not whole everywhere. And certainly all these things are taken away from us against our will, and we are hindered by certain constraints from enjoying them. For even if someone's sweet singing could be everlasting, and its admirers came eagerly to hear it, they would crowd one another and fight over places, the more of them there were, so that each might be nearer the singer; and in hearing they would hold nothing that stayed with them, but would be touched by sounds that all flee away. And if I wanted to gaze at this sun and could do so steadily, it would desert me at its setting, it would be veiled by cloud, and through many other obstacles I would lose the pleasure of seeing it against my will. Finally, even if the sweetness of light for the one who sees and of voice for the one who hears were always present, what great thing would come to me, when I would have it in common with the beasts? But that beauty of truth and wisdom, provided only there is a persevering will to enjoy it, neither shuts out those who come because it is crowded by a throng of hearers, nor passes with time, nor moves from place to place, nor is cut off by night, nor shut off by shadow, nor subject to the senses of the body. To those from the whole world who are turned toward it and love it, it is nearest to all, everlasting for all; it is in no place, and nowhere absent; it admonishes outwardly, it teaches inwardly; it changes all who behold it for the better, and is changed by none for the worse; no one judges about it, and no one judges well without it. And so it is evident that it is beyond doubt superior to our minds, which by it alone become, each of them, wise, and judge not about it but through it about other things.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.14 (PL 32:1249; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-14).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.15

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-15
- Source: PL 32:1249–1250
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine concludes that God exists, either as truth itself or as what is above it, adding that by faith the begotten Wisdom is equal to the Father; Evodius, not yet wise, already knows something of wisdom.

### Latin text

Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstrarem. Si euim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum tamen esse, negare uon poteris: quæ nobis erat ad disserendum et tractandum quæstio constituta. Nam si te hoc movet quod apud sacrosanctam disciplinam Christi in fidem recepimus, esse Patrem Sapientiæ; memento nos etiam hoc in fidem accepisse, qnod æterno Patri sit æqualis quæ ab ipso genita est Sapientia. Unde nunc nihil quae. rendum est, scd inconcussa fide retinendum. Est enim Deus,et vere summeque est. Quod jam non so­ lum indubitatum, quantum arbitror, fide retinemus, sud etiam certa, quamvis adhuc tenuissima, forma cognitionis attingimus; quod quæstioni susceptæ suf­ ficit, ut cætera quæ ad rem pertinent, explicare pos­ simus: nisi quid habes adversus ista qnod opponas. E. Ego vero incredibili omnino, et quam tibi verbis explicare non possum, lætitia perfusus accipio ista, et. clamo esse certissima. Clamo autem voce interiore, qua exaudirt cupio ab ipsa veritate, et illi iuhærere: quod non solum bonum, sed etiam summum bonum, et beatificum esse concedo. A. Recte sane; etiam ego plurimum gau­ dco. Sed, quæso te, numquid jam sapientes et beati sumus? an adhuc tendimus eo, ut id nobis esse proveniat? E. Eo nos potius tendere cxistimo. A. Unde ergo ista comprehendis, quibus veris certisque gaudcre lc clamas, et hoc ad sapientiam pertinere concedis? an quisquam insipiens potest nosse sapien­ tiam? E. Quamdiu insipiens est, non potest. A. Tu ergo jam sapiens es, aut nondum nosti sapientiam. E. Non sum quidem adhuc sapiens, sed nec insipien­ tem me dixerim, in quantum novi sapientiam; quo­ niam et certa sunt ista quæ novi, et ad sapientiam pertinere, ncgare non possum. A. Dic, quæso te, nonne fateberis eum qui non est justus, injustum csse; et qni non est prudens, imprudentem esse; et qui non est temperans, intemperantem? an dubitari de his aliquid potest? E. Fatcor hominem, quando justus non est, injustum esse; boc ctiam de prudente ei temperante responderim. A. Cur ergo et quando sapiens non est, non sit insipiens? E. Hoc quoque fateor, quando quisque sapiens non est, eum esse insipientem.A. Nunc ergo tu quid horum es? E. Quodlibet bornm me appelles, nondum audeo me dicere sapientem; ei ex iis quae concessi, video esse consequens ut me insipientem non dubitem dicere. A. Novit crgo insipiens sapientiam. Nun cnim, sicut jam dictum est, certus esset velle sc esse sapientem, idque oportere, nisi notio sapientiæ menti ejus inhæ­ ievet, sicut carum rerum de quibus singillatim inter­ rogatus respondisti, quæ ad ipsam sapientiam perti­ nent, qnarum cognitione lætatus es: E. Ita est utdicis.

### English translation (Claude)

You had granted that if I showed there was something above our minds, you would confess it to be God, provided there was nothing higher still. Accepting this concession of yours, I said that it was enough for me to show this. For if there is something more excellent, that rather is God; but if there is not, then truth itself is God. Whether that is so or not, then, you cannot deny that God exists, which was the question set for us to discuss and treat. And if you are troubled because in the most holy teaching of Christ we have received in faith that there is a Father of Wisdom, remember that we have also received in faith that the Wisdom begotten by the eternal Father is equal to him. About this, then, nothing is to be inquired now; it is to be held with unshaken faith. For God exists, and exists truly and supremely. This, I think, we not only hold by faith as undoubted, but we also reach by a certain, though still very slender, form of knowledge; and this is enough for the question we took up, so that we can explain the other things that bear on the matter, unless you have something to object against this.
E. I accept these things filled with a joy altogether beyond belief, which I cannot explain to you in words, and I cry out that they are most certain. I cry out with the inner voice, by which I desire to be heard by truth itself and to cleave to it; for I grant that it is not only good, but the highest good and the giver of happiness.
A. Quite right; I too rejoice greatly. But, I ask you, are we already wise and happy, or are we still tending there, so that it may come to be ours?
E. I think rather that we are tending there.
A. How then do you grasp these true and certain things in which you cry out that you rejoice, and which you grant belong to wisdom? Can any foolish person know wisdom?
E. As long as he is foolish, he cannot.
A. Then either you are already wise, or you do not yet know wisdom.
E. I am not yet wise, indeed, but neither would I call myself foolish, insofar as I know wisdom; for the things I know are certain, and I cannot deny that they belong to wisdom.
A. Tell me, please, will you not admit that one who is not just is unjust, one who is not prudent is imprudent, and one who is not temperate is intemperate? Or can anything be doubted about these?
E. I admit that a man, when he is not just, is unjust; I would answer the same about the prudent and the temperate.
A. Why, then, when he is not wise, should he not be foolish?
E. This too I admit: when anyone is not wise, he is foolish.
A. Now, then, which of these are you?
E. Whichever of these you call me, I do not yet dare to call myself wise; and from what I have granted I see it follows that I should not hesitate to call myself foolish.
A. So a fool knows wisdom. For, as was said, he would not be certain that he wants to be wise, and that he ought to be, unless the notion of wisdom were fixed in his mind, as are the notions of those things belonging to wisdom itself about which you answered when asked one by one, and in the knowledge of which you rejoiced.
E. It is as you say.

### Scripture references

- 1 Cor 1:24: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- The equality of the begotten Wisdom (the Son) with the Father is stated as held by faith and not argued here.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.15 (PL 32:1249–1250; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-15).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.16

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-16
- Source: PL 32:1250–1251
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Wisdom meets its seekers in the numbered beauty of creatures and of human art, which points beyond itself to everlasting number and to an eternal, unchangeable form; those who love the signs instead of wisdom fall into darkness.

### Latin text

A. Quid igitur aliud agimus cum studemus esse sapientes, nisi ut quanta possumus aLicritate, ad id quod mente contingimus, totam animam nostram quodammodo colligamus, ci ponamus ibi, atque sta­ biliter infigamus; ut nou jam privato suo gaudat quod implicavit rebus transcuntibus, sed exuta omni­ bus temporum et locorum affectionibus apprehendat id quod uuum atque idem semper est? Sicut euim tola vita corporis est anima, sic bcala vita animae Deus est. Quod dum agimus, donec pergamus, in via su- Mtus. Et quod istis veris ct certis bonis, quamvis ad­ huc in hoc tenebroso itinere coruscantibus, gaudere concessum cst, vide uirum hoc sit quod scriptum est de sapientia, quid agat cum amatoribus suis cum ad eam veniunt, ct cam quærunt: dictum cst enim, In viis ostendet se illis hiluriler, et omni providentia occur­ rel illis. Quoquo cnim te verteris, vestigiis quibusdam, quæ opcribus suis impressit, loquitur tibi, ct te in ceteriora relabentem, ipsis exteriorum formis intro rcvocal; ut quidquid te delectat in cor­ pore, et per corporcos illicit sensus, videas esse nu­ merosum, ct quæras unde sit, et in teipsum redeas, atquc intilligas te id quod attingis sensibus corporis, probare aut improbare non posse, nisi apud tc habeas quasdam pulchritudinis legcs, ad quas referas quaque pulchra sentis exterius. Intuere cælum et terram et mare, et quæ­ cumque in eis vel desuper fulgent, vel deorsum repunt vel volant vel nataut; formas babent, quia numeros habent: adime illis hæc, nihil erunt. A quo ergo sunt, nisi a quo numerus; quandoquidem in tantum illis est esse, in quantum numerosa esse? kt omnium quidem formarum corporearum artifi­ ces homines in arte habent numeros, quibus coaptant opera sua: et tamdiu. manus atque instrumenta in fabricando movent, donec illud quod formatur fo­ ris, ad eam quæ intus est lucem numerorum relatum, quantum potest impetret absolutionem, placeatque per interpretem sensum interno judici supernos numeros intuenti. Quære deinde artilicis ipsius membra quis moveat; numerus erit: nam moventur etiam illa nu­ merose. Et si detrahas de manibus opus, et de animo intentionem fabricandi, motusque ille membrorum ad delectationem refcratur, salt atio vocabitur. Quære ergo quid iu saltatione delectet; respondebit libi numerus: Ecce sum. Inspice jam pulchritudinem for. mali co poris; numeri tenentur in loco. Inspice put­ chritudinem mobilitatis in corpore; numeri versan­ tur in tempore. Intra ad artem unde isti procedunt, quære in ea tempus ct locuin; nunquam crit, nusquam crit; vivit in ea tamen numcrus: nee cjos regio spa­ torum est, nec ætas dierum; et discendæ arti tamcn cum se accommodant, qui se artifices fieri volunt, corpus suum per loca et tempora movent, animom vero per tempora: accessu quippe temporis peritiores fiunt. Transcende ergo et animum artificis, lit iui­ merum sempiternum videas; jam tibi sapientia de ipsa interiore sede fulgebit, ct de ipso secretario re­ ritatis: quæ si adhuc languidiorem aspectum tuum reverberat, refer oculum mentis in illum viam, ubi se ostendebat hilariter. Memento sane distulisse te visionem qnam fortior saniorquc rcpetas.. Væ qui derelinquunt tc duccm, et oberrant in vestigiis tuis, qui nutus tuos pro te aman!. ct oblivi­ scuntur quid innuas, o suavissima lux purgatæ mentis sapientia! non cnim cessas innuere nohis quæ ct quanta sis; ct nutus tui sunt omne creaturarum dccus. Et artifex enim quodammodo innuit spectatori operissuide ipsa operis pulchritudine, ne ibi totus b.crcat, sed speciem corporis fabricati sic percurrat oculis, ut in cum qui fabricaverit recurrat affectu. Similes autem sunt hominibus, qui ea quæ facis pro te amant, qui cum audiunt aliquem facundum sapicn­ tem, dum nimis suavitatem vocis ejus, et structuras syllabarum apte locatarum avidc audiunt. amittunt sententiarum principatum, cujus illa verba tanquam signa sonuerunt. Væ qni se avertunt a lumine tuo, ct obscuritati suæ dulciter inhærent Tanquam cnim dorsum ad te ponentes, in carnali opere velut in um­ bra sua defiguntur, et tamen ctiam ibi quod eos de­ lectat, adbuc habent de circumfugentia lucis tuæ Sed umbra dum amatur, languidiorem facit oculum animi, et iuvalidiorem ad perferendum conspectum tuum. Propterea magis magisque bomo tenebratur, dum sectatur libentius quidquid infirmiorem tolera­ bilius cxcipit. Ex quo incipit non posse videre quod summe est, et malum putare quidquid fallit impro­ vidum, aut illicit indigum, aut captum excruciat, cutI ea pro merito patiatur aversionis suae, et quid­ quid justum est, malum esse non possit. Si ergo quidquid mutabile aspexeris, vel sensu corporis, vel animi consideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numeroruin forma teneatur, qua detracta in nibil recidat; noli dubitarc, ut ista mutabilia non intercipiantur, sed dimensis motibus, et distincta va­ rietate formarum, quasi quosdam verus temporum peragant, esse aliquam formam aeternam et incommu­ tabilem; quæ nequc contine tur et quasi diffundatur locis, neque potendatur atque varietur temporibus, per qunm cuncta ista formari valeant, ct pro suo genere implere atque agere locorum ac temporum numeros.

### English translation (Claude)

A. What else, then, are we doing when we strive to be wise, but in some way gathering our whole soul, with all the eagerness we can, toward what we touch with the mind, placing it there and fixing it firmly, so that it may no longer rejoice in its own private good, which has entangled it in passing things, but, stripped of all attachments to times and places, may grasp that which is always one and the same? For as the soul is the whole life of the body, so God is the happy life of the soul. While we are doing this, until we reach the end, we are on the way. And that we are granted to rejoice in these true and certain goods, though they still only flash out on this dark journey: see whether this is what is written of wisdom, what it does with its lovers when they come to it and seek it. For it is said, “In the ways it will show itself to them cheerfully, and meet them with all providence.” For wherever you turn, it speaks to you by certain traces that it has impressed on its works, and when you are slipping back into outward things, it calls you back within by the very forms of outward things; so that you may see that whatever delights you in a body and lures you through the bodily senses is full of number, and may ask where it comes from, and return into yourself, and understand that you cannot approve or disapprove what you touch by the senses of the body unless you have within yourself certain laws of beauty to which you refer whatever beautiful things you perceive outside.
Look at the sky and the earth and the sea, and whatever in them shines above or creeps below, or flies or swims: they have forms because they have numbers; take these away from them, and they will be nothing. From whom, then, are they, but from him from whom number is, since they have being only insofar as they are numbered? And human craftsmen of all bodily forms have numbers in their art, to which they fit their works; they move their hands and tools in making until what is formed outside, referred to that light of numbers which is within, attains completion as far as it can, and pleases, through the sense that interprets, the inner judge that beholds the numbers above. Then ask who moves the craftsman's limbs: it will be number, for they too move in measure. And if you take the work from the hands and the intention of making from the mind, and that motion of the limbs is directed to delight, it will be called dancing. Ask, then, what delights in dancing: number will answer you, “Here I am.” Look now at the beauty of a formed body: numbers are held in place. Look at the beauty of motion in a body: numbers turn in time. Enter into the art from which these come forth, and seek time and place in it: there will never be any time, nowhere any place; yet number lives in it, and its region is not of spaces nor its age of days. And yet those who want to become craftsmen, when they apply themselves to learning the art, move their body through places and times, and their mind through times; for with the passing of time they become more skilled. Go beyond, then, the craftsman's mind as well, so that you may see everlasting number; now wisdom will shine on you from its very inner seat and from the very sanctuary of truth. And if it still beats back your gaze as too weak, turn the eye of your mind back to that way where it showed itself cheerfully. Remember, of course, that you have only put off a vision which you may seek again when you are stronger and healthier.
Woe to those who forsake you as their guide and wander among your traces, who love your signs instead of you and forget what you signify, O wisdom, sweetest light of a purified mind! For you do not cease to signal to us what and how great you are; and your signs are all the beauty of creatures. For even a craftsman in a way signals to the beholder of his work, by the very beauty of the work, not to cling to it wholly, but so to run his eyes over the appearance of the made body that he runs back in affection to the one who made it. And those who love the things you make instead of you are like people who, hearing some eloquent wise man, listen too eagerly to the sweetness of his voice and the arrangement of well-placed syllables, and lose the chief thing, the thoughts, of which those words sounded as signs. Woe to those who turn away from your light and cling sweetly to their own darkness! For as if turning their backs to you, they are fixed in fleshly work as in their own shadow, and yet even there what delights them they still have from the light of yours that shines around them. But the shadow, while it is loved, makes the eye of the mind weaker and less able to bear the sight of you. So a man is darkened more and more, as he more gladly follows whatever receives him more bearably in his weakness. From this he begins to be unable to see what supremely is, and to think evil whatever deceives him when he is unwary, or lures him when he is needy, or torments him when he is caught; though he suffers these things as the desert of his turning away, and whatever is just cannot be evil.
If, then, whatever changeable thing you look at, you cannot grasp either by bodily sense or by the mind's consideration unless it is held by some form of numbers, and it falls back into nothing when that is taken away, do not doubt that there is some eternal and unchangeable form, so that these changeable things are not cut off but, by measured motions and a distinct variety of forms, complete, as it were, certain verses of times: a form which is neither contained and as it were spread out in places, nor stretched out and varied in times, through which all these things can be formed and, according to their kind, fill out and carry through the numbers of places and times.

### Extrabiblical texts

- Wis 6:16 (Wisdom of Solomon): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Wis 6:16 (“In the ways it will show itself to them cheerfully …”); the Wisdom of Solomon is outside the 66-book canon and is tagged as an extrabiblical text.
- Numerus here covers number, measure, and rhythm; it is rendered “number” or “measure” as the context requires.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.16 (PL 32:1250–1251; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-16).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.17

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-17
- Source: PL 32:1251
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Since nothing can form itself, all changeable things, body and life alike, are formed by an unchangeable form that is their providence; so every good, great or small, is from God.

### Latin text

Otnnis enim res mutabilis, etiam formabilis sit necesse est. Sicut autem mutabile dicimus quod mu­ tari potest, ita formabile quod formari potest appel­ laverim. Nulla autcm res formare seipsam potest: quia nulla res potest dare sibi quod non habct; et utique ut habeat formam, formatur aliquid. Quapro­ pter quaelibet res si quam habet formam, non ei opus est accipere quod habct; si qua vero non habet for­ mam, non potest a se accipere quod non habui. Nulia ergo res, ut diximus, formare se potest. Quid autem amplius de mutabilitate corporis et animi dicamus? superius enim satis dictum est. ConfIcitur itaque, ut et corpus et animus forma quadam incommutabili et semper manente formentur. Cui formæ dictum cst: Mutabis ea et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient. Annos sine defectu, pro æternitate posuit prophetica locutio. De bac itcm forma dictum est, quod in scipsa manens innovet omnia. Hinc etiam comprehen­ ditur omnia providentia gubernari. Si enim omnia quæ sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt, furma ipsa incommutabilis, per quam mutabilia cuncta sub­ sistunt, ut formarum suarum numeris impleantur et agantur, ipsa est corum providentia: non enim ista essent, si illa non esset. intuens ergo et consiJe­ rans universam creaturam, quicumque iter agit ad sapientiam, sentit sapicntiam in via se sibi ostendere hilariter, et in omni providentia occurrere sihi: et tanto alacrius ardescit viam istam peragere, quanto et ipsa via per illam pulchra est, ad quam exæstuat pervenire. Tu autem si præter id qnod est et non vivit, et id quod cst et vivit noque intelligit, et id quod cst et vivit et intelligit, inveneris aliquod aliud creaturarum genus; tunc ande dicere aliquod bonum esse, quod non sit ex Dco. Tria enim bxc duobus etiam nomini­ bus enuntiari possunt, si appellentur corpus et viia: quia cL illa quae tantum vivit, neque intelligit, qualis est pccorunl, et hæc quæ intelligit, sicuti est homi­ num, rectissime vita dicitur. Hæc autcm duo, id est, corpus et vita, quæ quidem creaturæ deputantur (nam et Creatoris ipsius vita dicitur, et ea summa vita esl): istæ igitur duæ creaturæ corpus et vita quoniam formabilia sunt, sicuti suprius dicta docuerunt, amissa lue omnino forma in nihilum recidunt, satis ostendunt se ex illa forma subsistere, qunc semper ejusmodi est. Quamobrem quantacumque bona, quam­ vis magna, quamvis minima, nisi ex Deo esse non possunt. Quid enim majus in creaturis quam vita in­ telligens, aut quid minus potest esse quam corpus? Quæ quantumlibet deficiant, et co tendant ut non sint, tamen aliquid formas illis remanet, ut quoquo nodo sint. Quidquid autem formæ cuipiam rei defi­ cienti remane t; ex illa forma est quæ nescit deficere, motusque ipsos rerum deficientium vel proficientium excedere numerorum suorum leges non sinit. Quid­ quid igitur laudabile advertitur in rerum natura, sive exigua sive ampla laude dignum judicetur, ad ex­ cellentissimam ct ineffabilem laudem referendum est Conditoris: nisi quid habes ad hæc.

### English translation (Claude)

For every changeable thing must also be formable. Just as we call changeable what can be changed, so I would call formable what can be formed. But nothing can form itself, because nothing can give itself what it does not have; and surely a thing is formed so that it may have form. So if any thing has some form, it does not need to receive what it has; and if any thing does not have form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not have. So nothing, as we said, can form itself. What more shall we say about the changeableness of body and mind? Enough was said above. It follows, then, that both body and mind are formed by a certain form that is unchangeable and always abiding. To this form it was said: “You will change them, and they will be changed; but you are the same, and your years will not fail.” The prophetic speech put “years without failing” for eternity. Of this form too it is said that, remaining in itself, it renews all things. From this it is also understood that all things are governed by providence. For if all things that are will be nothing when form is wholly taken away, the unchangeable form itself, through which all changeable things subsist, so that they are filled out and carried through by the numbers of their forms, is itself their providence; for they would not exist if it did not exist. Whoever, then, is making his way toward wisdom, beholding and considering the whole creation, feels that wisdom shows itself to him cheerfully on the way and meets him with all providence; and he burns the more eagerly to complete that way, as the way itself is beautiful through that wisdom which he longs to reach. But if, besides that which exists and does not live, that which exists and lives but does not understand, and that which exists, lives, and understands, you find some other class of creatures, then dare to say that there is some good that is not from God. For these three can also be expressed by two names, if they are called body and life; for both the life that only lives and does not understand, such as that of cattle, and the life that understands, such as that of human beings, are most rightly called life. These two, body and life, considered as creatures (for the life of the Creator himself is also spoken of, and that is the highest life), these two creatures, then, body and life, since they are formable, as what was said above has taught, and fall back into nothing if form is wholly lost, show clearly enough that they subsist from that form which is always the same. Therefore all goods, however great, however small, can only be from God. For what is greater among creatures than understanding life, or what can be less than body? However much these fail and tend toward not being, yet some form remains to them, so that they exist in some way. And whatever form remains to any failing thing is from that form which does not know failing, and which does not allow even the motions of things failing or advancing to exceed the laws of their numbers. Whatever, then, is noticed as praiseworthy in the nature of things, whether it is judged worthy of slight or of ample praise, is to be referred to the most excellent and ineffable praise of the Maker, unless you have something to say to this.

### Scripture references

- Ps 102:26 (101:27 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Ps 102:27 (101:28 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence

### Extrabiblical texts

- Wis 7:27 (Wisdom of Solomon): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Ps 102:26–27 (Ps 101:27–28 in the Latin numbering).
- “Remaining in itself, it renews all things” is Wis 7:27, tagged as an extrabiblical text.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.17 (PL 32:1251; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-17).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.18

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-2-18
- Source: PL 32:1251–1252
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Having shown that God exists and that every good is from him, Augustine argues that free will, without which no one can live rightly, is a good like the eyes and hands, which can be misused yet are rightly given.

### Latin text

E. Satis mihi persuasum esse fateor, et qnem­ admodum manifestum fiat, quantum in hac viia atque inter tales, qualcs nos sumus, potest, Deum esse, et ex Deo esse omnia bona: qHaiidoquidem omnia quæ sunt, sive quæ intelligunt et vivunt ct sunt, sive quæ tantum vivunt ei sunt, sive quæ tantum sunt, ci Deo sunt. Nunc jam tertiam quæstionem videamus, utrum expediri possit, inter bona esse numerandam liberam voluntatem. Quo demonstrato, sine dubitatione con­ cedam Deum dedisse nobis eam, darique oportuisse. A. Bcne meministi proposita, et secundam quæstio­ nem jam explicatam vigilanter animadvertisti: sed videre debuisii etiam istam tertiam jam solutam. Propterca quippe tibi videri dixeras, dari non de­ buisse liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quod eo quisque peccat, Cui sententiæ tuæ cum cgo intulissem, recte fieri non posse. nisi codem libero voluntatis arbitrio, atque ad id potius hoc Dcum dedisse asseverarem; respondisti liberam voluntatem ita nobis dari de­ buisse, ut justitia data est, qua nemo nisi rectc pot­ est uti. Quæ responsio tua in tantos circuitus disputa­ tionis nos ire compulit, quibus tibi probarcmus ct majora et minora bona non esse nisi cx Dco. Quod non tam dilucide ostendi posset, nisi prius adversu!; opiniones impiæ stultitiæ, qua dicit insipiens in cordo suo, Non est Dcus, qualiscumque de re tanta pro modulo nostro inita ratio, eodem ipso Dco in tam periculoso itinere nobis opitulante,in aliquid manifestum intenderetur. Quæ duo tamen, id eSI, Deum esse, et omnia bona ex ipso esse, quanquam inconcussa fide etiam antca tenerentur, sic tamen tra­ ctata sunt, ut lac quoque tertium, inter bona esse numerandam liberam voluntatem, manifestissime ap­ pareat. Jam enim superiore disputatione patefactum est, constititque inter nos, naturam corporis inferiore gradu esse quam animi naturam, ac per hoe animum majus bonum esse quam corpus. Si ergo in corporis bonis invenimus aliqua quibus non recte uti homo possit, nee tamen propterea dicimus non ea dari debaisse, quoniam esse confitemur bona; quid mirum si et in animo suut quædam bona, quibus ctiam non recte uti possimus, sed quia bona sunt, non potuerunt dari nisi ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona? Vides enim quantum boni desit corpori cui desunt manus, et ta­ men manibus male utitur qui eis operatur vel. sæva vel turpia. Sine pedibus aliquem si aspiceres, fatero­ ris deesse integritati corporis plurimum bonum; ct tamen eum qui ad nocendum cuipiam, vcl scipsum dehonestandum pcdibus uteretur, male uti pcdibus non negares. Oculis hanc lucem videmus, formas­ que internoscimus corporum; idque et speciosissi­ mum est in nostro corpore, undc in fastigio quodam dignitatis hæc membra locata sunt; et ad salutem lucndam, multaque alia vitae commoda refert usus oculorum: oculis tamen plerique pleraque agunt tur­ piter, et eos militare cogunt libidini. Et vides quan­ tum bonum desit in facie, si oculi desint: cum au­ tem adsunt, quis hos dedit, nisi bonorum omnium largitor Deus? Qnemadmodum ergo ista probas in corpore, et non intuenseos qui male his utuntur, laudas illum qui haec dedit bona: sic liberam volun­ tatem sine qua nemo potest recte vivere, oportet et bonum, et divinitus datum, et potius eos damnandos jui hoc bono male utuntur, quam eum qui dederit dare non debuisse fatearis. E. Prius ergo vellem ot milii probares aliquod bonum esse liberam voluutatem, et ego concederem Deum illam dedisse nobis, quia fateor ex Deo omnia bona esse. A. Itane tandem non probavi tibi tanto mo­ limine superioris disputationis, cum omnem speciem formatoque corporis a summa omnium rerum forma, id est a veritate, subsistere fatereris, et bonum esse concederes? Nam et capillos nostros numeratos esse, ipsa in Evangelio lo:luitur Veritas. De numcri autem summitate, et a fine usque ad finem pertendente potentia, quae locuti fuerimus, excidit tibi? Quæ igitur ista est tanta perversitas, capillos nostros quamvis inter exigua et omnino abjectissima, tamen inter bona numerare, nec invenire cui auctori tri­ buantur nisi bonorum omnium condilori Deo, quia et maxima et minima bona ab illo sunt, a quo est omne bonum; et dubitare de libera voluntate, sine qua recte vivi non posse concedunt, etiam qui pessime vivunt? Et certe nunc responde, quæso, quid tibi me­ lius esse videatur in uobis, sine quo recte vivi potest, an sine quo recte vivi non potest. E. Jamjam parce, quæso; pudet caecitatis. Quis enim ambigat id longe esse præstantius, sine quo recta vita nulla est? A.Jarn crgo tu negabis luscum hominem recte posse vivere? E. Absit tam immanis amentia. A. Cum ergo in cor­ pore oculum concedas esse aliquod bonum, quo amisso tamen ad recte vivendum non impeditur; vo­ luntas libera tibi videbitur nullum bonum, sine qua recte nemo vivit? Intueris enim justitiam, qua nemo male utitur. Hæc inter summa bona quæ in ipso sunt homine nu­ mcratur, omnesque virtutes animi quibus ipsa recta vita et honesta constat. Nam neque prudentia, neque fortitudine, neque temperantia male quis utitur: in his enin omnibus, sicut in ipsa etiam qnam tu com­ memorasti justitia, recta ratio viget, sine qua virtutes esse non possunt. Recta autem ratione male uti nemo potest.

### English translation (Claude)

E. I admit that I am sufficiently persuaded, and that it has become evident, as far as it can in this life and among such people as we are, that God exists and that all goods are from God; since all things that are, whether they understand and live and exist, or only live and exist, or only exist, are from God. Now let us look at the third question, whether it can be shown that free will is to be counted among goods. When this is demonstrated, I will grant without hesitation that God gave it to us, and that it ought to have been given.
A. You remember well what was proposed, and you have noticed alertly that the second question has already been explained; but you ought to have seen that this third one too is already solved. For you had said that it seemed to you that free choice of the will ought not to have been given, because by it everyone sins. When I put to this view of yours that one cannot act rightly except by this same free choice of the will, and asserted that God gave it rather for that purpose, you answered that free will ought to have been given us as justice was given, which no one can use except rightly. That answer of yours drove us into such long circuits of discussion, in which we were to prove to you that both greater and lesser goods are only from God. That could not have been shown so clearly unless first, against the opinions of the impious folly by which “the fool says in his heart, There is no God,” some reasoning on so great a matter, undertaken according to our small capacity, with the same God helping us on so dangerous a journey, had been directed toward something evident. Yet these two things, that God exists and that all goods are from him, though they were held with unshaken faith even before, have been so treated that this third too, that free will is to be counted among goods, appears most evidently. For it was made plain in the earlier discussion, and agreed between us, that the nature of the body is of a lower rank than the nature of the mind, and so the mind is a greater good than the body. If, then, among the goods of the body we find some that a man can use wrongly, and yet we do not therefore say that they ought not to have been given, since we confess that they are goods, what wonder if in the mind too there are some goods that we can also use wrongly, but which, because they are goods, could not have been given except by him from whom all goods are? For you see how much good is lacking to a body that lacks hands; and yet he uses his hands badly who does cruel or shameful deeds with them. If you saw someone without feet, you would admit that a very great good is lacking to the soundness of the body; and yet you would not deny that one who used his feet to harm someone or to disgrace himself uses his feet badly. With the eyes we see this light and distinguish the forms of bodies; this is the most beautiful thing in our body, which is why these members are placed at a kind of summit of dignity; and the use of the eyes serves to protect health and brings many other conveniences of life. Yet very many people do very many things shamefully with their eyes and force them to serve lust. And you see how much good is lacking in a face if the eyes are lacking; and when they are present, who gave them, but God, the giver of all goods? Just as, then, you approve these things in the body, and, not looking at those who use them badly, praise him who gave these goods, so you must admit that free will, without which no one can live rightly, is both a good and given by God, and that those who use this good badly are to be condemned, rather than that he who gave it ought not to have given it.
E. I would first like you to prove to me that free will is a good, and then I would grant that God gave it to us, since I admit that all goods are from God.
A. Have I not, then, proved it to you after all, with such great labor in the earlier discussion, when you admitted that every appearance and form of body subsists from the highest form of all things, that is, from truth, and granted that it is good? For Truth itself says in the Gospel that our hairs are numbered. Have you forgotten what we said about the supremacy of number and the power that reaches from end to end? What great perversity is it, then, to count our hairs among goods, though among the smallest and most worthless, and to find no author to whom to ascribe them but God, the maker of all goods, since both the greatest and the least goods are from him from whom every good is; and to doubt about free will, without which, as even those who live worst grant, one cannot live rightly? Now answer, please: which seems to you better in us, that without which one can live rightly, or that without which one cannot live rightly?
E. Spare me now, please; I am ashamed of my blindness. Who would doubt that that without which there is no right life is far more excellent?
A. Will you deny, then, that a one-eyed man can live rightly?
E. Far be such monstrous madness from me.
A. Since, then, you grant that the eye is a good in the body, though one who loses it is not hindered from living rightly, will free will seem to you no good, when without it no one lives rightly? Look at justice, which no one uses badly. It is counted among the highest goods that are in man himself, as are all the virtues of the mind, of which the right and honorable life itself consists. For no one uses prudence or fortitude or temperance badly; in all of these, as in the justice you mentioned, right reason prevails, without which there can be no virtues. And no one can use right reason badly.

### Scripture references

- Ps 14:1 (13:1 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Matt 10:30: allusion, high confidence
- Luke 12:7: allusion, medium confidence

### Extrabiblical texts

- Wis 8:1 (Wisdom of Solomon): allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Ps 14:1 (Ps 13:1 in the Latin numbering); the hairs that are numbered: Matt 10:30, Luke 12:7; “from end to end” recalls Wis 8:1 (see 2.11).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.18 (PL 32:1251–1252; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-2-18).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.19

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-2-19
- Source: PL 32:1252–1253
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine ranks the virtues as great goods, bodily beauty as least, and the powers of the mind, free will among them, as middle goods; sin is the will's voluntary turning from the unchangeable common good to its own, external, or lower goods.

### Latin text

Ista ergo magna bona sunt: sed meminisse te opor­ tet, non solum magna, sed etiam mininia bona non esse posse, nisi ab illo a quo sunt omnia bona, hoc est Deo. Id enim superior disputatio persuasit, cui toties tamque lætus assensus es. Virtules igitur quibus recte vivitur, magna bona sunt: spedes autem quorumlibet corporum, sine quibus recte vivi potest, minima bona sunt: potentiæ vero animi sine quibus recte vivi noR potest, media bona sunt. Virtutibus nemo male utitur: caeteris autem bonis, id est, mediis et minimis, non so­ lum bene, sed etiam male quisque uti potest. Et ideo virtute nemo male utitur, quia opus virtutis est bonas usus istorum, quibus etiam non bene uti possumus. Nemo autem bene utendo male utitur. Quare abundantia et magnitudo bonitatis Dei non solum magna, sed etiam media et minima bona esse praestitit. Magis laudanda est bonitas ejus in magnis quam in mediis, et magis in mediis quam in minimis bonis: sed magis in omni­ bus quam si non omnia tribuisset. E. Assentior. Sed illud me movet, quoniam de libera voluntate quæstio est, et videmus ipsam bene uti caeteris vel non bene, quomodo et ipsa inter illa quibus utimur numeranda sit. A. Quomodo omnia quae ad scientiam cognoscimus, ratione cognoscimus, et tamen etiam ipsa ratio inter illa numeratur quæ ra­ tione cognoscimus. An oblitus es, cum quaereremus quæ ratione cognoscantur, confessum te fuisse etiam rationem ratione cognosci? Noli ergo mirari si cæteris per liberam voluntatem utimur, etiam ipsa libera vo­ luntate per eam ipsam uti nos posse; ut quodammodo se ipsa utatur voluntas qnac utitur cæteris, sicut se­ ipsam cognoscit ratio, quae cognoscit et caetera. Nam et memoria non solum coLera omnia, quæ memini­ mus comprehendit; sed etiam quod non obliviscimur nos babere memoriam, ipsa se memoria quodammodo tenet in nobis, quae noti soluin aliorum, sed etiam sui meminit, vel potius nos et cætera et ipsam por ipsam meminimus. Voluntas ergo quæ medium bonum est, cum in­ harret incommutabili bono, eique communi non pro­ prio, siculi est illa de qua mullum locuti sumus, et nihil digne diximus. veritas; tenet homo beatam vi­ tam: eaque ipsa vita beata, id est animi affectio in­ hærentis incommutabili bono, proprium et prim'lIn est hominis bonum. In eo sunt etiam virtutes omnes; quibus male uti nemo potest. Nam hæc quamvis rua- IDa in homin e ct prima sint, propria tamen esse uniuscujusque hominis, non communia, satis intelli­ gitur. Vcritate enim atque sapientia, quæ communis eslomnibus, omnes sapientes et beati Muni, inhæ­ rendo illi. Beatitudine autem alterius hominis non fit alter beatus; quia et cum cum imitatur ut sit, mode appetit beatus fieri, unde illum factum videl, illa sci­ licet incommutabili communique veritate. Ncque prudentia cujusquam fit prudcos alius, aut fortis fortitudine, aut temperans temperantia, aut justus justitia hominis alterius quisquam efGcitur; sed coaptando animum illis incommutabilibus regulis luminibusque virtutum, quæ incorruptibiliter vivunt in ipsa veritate sapientiaque communi, quibus et ille coaptavit et fixit animum, quem istis virtutibus præditum sibi ad imi. tandum proposuit. Voluntas ergo adhærens communi atque incom­ mutabili bono, impetrat prima et magna hominis bona, cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum. Volun­ tas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono, et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius, aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium convertitur, cum suæ potestatis vult esse; ad exterius, cum aliorum propria, vel quæcumque ad se non pertinent, cogno- Icere studct; ad inferius, cum voluptatem corporis diligit: atque ita homo superbus, et curiosus, et la­ scivus effectus, excipitur ab alia vita, quoe in compa­ ratione superioris vit, mors est; quæ tamen regitur administratione divinæ providentiæ, quæ congruis se­ dibus ordinat omnia, etpro meritis sua cuique dis­ tribuit. Ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus; sed malum sit aversio ejus ab in­ commutabili bono, et conversio ad mutabilia bona: quae tamen aversio atque conversio, quoniam non co­ gitur, sed est voluntaria, digna et justa eam miseriæ poena subsequitur.

### English translation (Claude)

These, then, are great goods; but you must remember that not only great goods but even the least cannot exist except from him from whom all goods are, that is, from God. For the earlier discussion convinced you of this, and you assented to it so often and so gladly. So the virtues by which one lives rightly are great goods; the beauties of any bodies, without which one can live rightly, are the least goods; and the powers of the mind, without which one cannot live rightly, are middle goods. No one uses the virtues badly; but the other goods, that is, the middle and the least, anyone can use not only well but also badly. And no one uses virtue badly because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can also use not well; and no one uses something badly by using it well. So the abundance and greatness of God's goodness has granted the existence not only of great goods but also of middle and least ones. His goodness is more to be praised in the great goods than in the middle, and more in the middle than in the least; but more in all of them than if he had not bestowed them all.
E. I agree. But this troubles me: since the question is about free will, and we see that it uses the other things well or not well, how is it itself to be counted among the things we use?
A. In the same way as all the things that we know with knowledge we know by reason, and yet reason itself is counted among the things that we know by reason. Or have you forgotten that, when we asked what things are known by reason, you admitted that reason too is known by reason? So do not wonder if, while we use other things through free will, we can also use free will itself through itself, so that in a way the will that uses other things uses itself, just as reason, which knows other things, knows itself. For memory too not only holds all the other things that we remember; but since we do not forget that we have memory, memory in a way holds itself in us, remembering not only other things but itself; or rather, we remember both other things and memory itself through memory.
When the will, then, which is a middle good, cleaves to the unchangeable good, and to one that is common and not private, such as is that truth of which we have spoken much and said nothing worthy, the man holds the happy life; and that happy life itself, that is, the disposition of a mind that cleaves to the unchangeable good, is the proper and primary good of man. In it are also all the virtues, which no one can use badly. For although these are great and primary in man, it is understood well enough that they are proper to each individual, not common. For by truth and wisdom, which is common to all, all become wise and happy by cleaving to it. But one man does not become happy by the happiness of another; for even when he imitates him in order to become so, he seeks to become happy by that by which he sees the other has become so, namely, by that unchangeable and common truth. Nor does anyone become prudent by another's prudence, or brave by another's fortitude, or temperate by another's temperance, or just by another man's justice; but by fitting the mind to those unchangeable rules and lights of the virtues, which live incorruptibly in the common truth and wisdom itself, to which that other man too fitted and fixed his mind, whom one has set before oneself, endowed with these virtues, to imitate.
The will, then, cleaving to the common and unchangeable good, obtains the first and great goods of man, though it is itself a kind of middle good. But the will turned away from the unchangeable and common good, and turned toward its own good, or toward an exterior good, or toward a lower good, sins. It turns toward its own when it wants to be in its own power; toward an exterior good when it is eager to know the private affairs of others or whatever does not concern it; toward a lower good when it loves bodily pleasure. And so a man, made proud, curious, and lascivious, is taken up by another life, which in comparison with the higher life is death; and yet that life is ruled by the governance of divine providence, which arranges all things in their fitting places and distributes to each what is his according to his merits. So it comes about that neither those goods which sinners seek are in any way evil, nor is free will itself, which we found must be counted among certain middle goods; but the evil is its turning away from the unchangeable good and its turning toward changeable goods. And since this turning away and turning toward is not forced but voluntary, the punishment of misery follows it worthily and justly.

### Scripture references

- 1 John 2:16: echo, low confidence

### Translation notes

- The triad of pride, curiosity, and lust (to one's own, external, and lower goods) recalls 1 John 2:16, which Augustine elsewhere links with these three.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.19 (PL 32:1252–1253; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-2-19).

## On Free Choice of the Will 2.20

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-2-20
- Source: PL 32:1253
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: The will's turning from God is a defective motion that comes from nothing and not from God, since every nature with measure, number, and order is from God; man fell of his own will but can rise only by Christ, God's right hand.

### Latin text

Sed tu fortasse quæsiturus cs, quoniam movetur voluntas cum se avertit ab incommutabili bon:) ad mutabile bonum, unde ei iste motus existat; qui pro­ fecto malus est, tametsi voluntas libera, quia sinc iila nec recte vivi potest, in bonis numeranda sit. Si enim motus iste, id est aversio voluntatis a Domino Deo, sine dubitatione peccatum est, num possumus auctorem peccati Deum dicere? Non erit ergo iste motus ex Deo: Unde igitur erit? Ita quærenti tibi, si respondeam nescire me, fortasse eris tristior:sed ta­ nen vera responderim. Sciri enirn non potest quod nihi! est. Tu tantum pietatem inconcussam tene, ut nullum tibi bonum vel sentienti, vel intelligenti, vel quoquo modo cogitanti occurrat quod non sit ex Deo. Ita cnim nulla natura occurrit quae non sit ex Deo. Omnem quippe rem ubi mensuram et numerum et ordinem videris, Deo artifici tribuere ne cuncteris. Unde autem ista penitus detraxeris, nihil omnino re­ manebit: quia etsi remanserit aliqua formae alicujus inchoatio, ubi neque mensuram neque numcrum ne­ que ordinem invenias, quia ubicumque ista sunt, forma perfecta est; oportet auferas etiam ipsam in­ choationem formæ, quæ tanquam materies ad perfi­ ciendum subjacere videtur artifici. Si enim formæ perfectio bonum est, nonnullum jain bonum est et formae inchoatio. Ita, detracto penitus omni bono, non quidem nonnihil, sed omnino nihil remanebit. Omne autem bonum ex Deo: nulla ergo natura cst quæ non sit ex Deo. Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem dcfectus ex nihilo est, vide quo perti­ neat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites. Qui ta­ men defectus quoniam est voluntarius, in nostra est positus potestate. Si enim times illum, oportet ut no­ lis; si autem nolis, non erit. Quid ergo sccurius quam esse in ea vita, ubi non possit tibi evenire quod non vis? Sed quoniam non sicut bomo sponte cecidit, ita etiam sponte surgere potest; porrectam nobis desu­ per dexteram Dei, id est Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, fide firma teneamus, et exspectemus certa spe, et charitate ardenti desideremus. Si quid autem de origine peccati diligentius quarendum adhuc putas (nam omnino ego jam opus esse non arbitror): si quid tamen putas, in aliam disputationem differen­ dum est. E. Sequor sane voluntatem tuam, ut in tem­ pus aliud, quod hinc moverit, differamus. Nam illud lihi non concesserim, ut satis jam indc quæsitum putes.

### English translation (Claude)

But perhaps you are going to ask: since the will is moved when it turns away from the unchangeable good toward a changeable good, where does this motion come from? It is certainly evil, even though free will, since without it one cannot live rightly, is to be counted among goods. For if this motion, that is, the turning of the will away from the Lord God, is without doubt sin, can we call God the author of sin? So this motion will not be from God. Where, then, will it be from? If I answer your question by saying that I do not know, you will perhaps be sadder; yet I would be answering truly. For what is nothing cannot be known. Only hold fast to unshaken piety, so that no good comes before you, whether you perceive it or understand it or think of it in any way, that is not from God. For so no nature comes before you that is not from God. Wherever you see measure and number and order, do not hesitate to ascribe the thing to God as its craftsman. And from whatever you take these away entirely, nothing at all will remain. For even if some beginning of some form remains, where you find neither measure nor number nor order (since wherever these are, form is complete), you must take away even that beginning of form, which seems to lie before the craftsman like material to be completed. For if the completion of form is a good, the beginning of form is already some good. So, when every good has been taken away entirely, not something but absolutely nothing will remain. But every good is from God; so there is no nature that is not from God. As for that motion of turning away, then, which we admit is sin: since it is a defective motion, and every defect is from nothing, see where it belongs, and do not doubt that it does not belong to God. Yet since this defect is voluntary, it is placed in our power. For if you fear it, you must not will it; and if you do not will it, it will not exist. What, then, is more secure than to be in that life where what you do not will cannot happen to you? But since man cannot rise of his own accord as he fell of his own accord, let us hold with firm faith the right hand of God stretched out to us from above, that is, our Lord Jesus Christ; let us wait for him with sure hope and long for him with burning love. But if you think that something about the origin of sin still needs to be inquired into more carefully (for I myself think there is no need at all now), if you do think so, it must be put off to another discussion.
E. I certainly follow your wish that we put off to another time what arises from this. For I would not grant you that enough has already been inquired into it.

### Translation notes

- The statement that man cannot rise by his own will but needs Christ was later cited by Augustine (Retractations 1.9) as showing that this work already taught the necessity of grace.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.20 (PL 32:1253; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-2-20).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.1

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-3-1
- Source: PL 32:1253–1254
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Unlike a stone's natural fall, the soul's turning from the unchangeable good is its own voluntary and blameworthy motion; otherwise praise, blame, and admonition would make no sense.

### Latin text

E. Quoniam satis mihi manifestum est, inter bona, et ea quidem non minima, numcrandam esse libcram voluntatem, ex quo etiam fateri cogimur cam divinitus datam esse, darique oportuisse: jam si op­ portunum existimas, cupio per te cognoscere unde illc motus existat, quo ipsa voluntas avertitur a communi atquc incommutabili bono, et ad propria vel aliena vel infima, atque omnia commutabilia conver­ titur bona. A. Quid enim opus est hoc scire? E. Quia si ita dala est, ut naturalem habeat istum motum, jain necessitate ad hæc convertitur; neque ulla culpa de­ prehendi potest, ubi natura necessitasque dominatur. A. Placetne tibi iste motus, an displicet? E. Displicet. A. Reprehendis ergo eum. E. Utique reprehendo. A. Reprehendis igitur animi motum inculpabilem. E. Inculpabilem animi motum non reprehendo, sed nescio an ulla culpa sit, relicto incommutabili bono ad commutabilia converti. A. Reprehendis ergo quod nescis. E. Noli verbo premcre: ita enim dixi, Nescio an ulia culpa sit, ut intelligi volucrim sinc dubio cul­ pam esse. Nam hoc verbo quod dixi, Nescio, satis profecto irrisi dubitationem de ro manifesta. A. Vide quid sit certissima veritas, qum te cocgit tam cito oblivisci quod paulo ante dixisti. Si enim natura vel necessitate iste motus existit, culpabilis esse nullo pacto potest: tu vcro esse culpabilem ita firmissime tenes. ut dubitationem de hac re tam certa etiam ir­ ridendam putaveris. Cur ergo tibi vel affirmandum, vel certe cum aliqua dubitatione dicendum visum est, quod perspicue falsum esse ipse convincis? Dixisti enim: Si ita data est voluntas libera, ut naturalem habeat istum motum, jam necessitate ad haec conver­ titur; neque ulla culpa deprehendi potest, ubi natura necessitasque dominatur. Nullo modo autem dubitare debuisti non esse ita datam, quando istum motum culpabilcm esse non dubitas. E. Ego ipsum molum culpabilem dixi, et ideo mibi displicere, et reprehen­ dcudum esse dubitare non possum: animam vero quæ isto motu ab incommutabili bono ad commutabilia detrahitur, ncgo esse culpandam, si ejus natura talis est, ut eo necessario moveatur. A. Cujus est iste motus, quem profecto culpan­ dum esse concedis? E. In animo eum video, sed cujus sit nescio. A. Numquid negas co motu animum mo­ veri? E. Non nego. A. Negas ergo motum quo move­ tur lapi., motum esse lapidis? Neque enim illum dico motum quo cum nus movemus, vcl aliqua vi aliena movetur, veluti cum in cœlum jacitur, sed eum quo ad terram nutu suo vergit et cadit. E. Non equidem nrgo motum quo ita ut dicis inclinatur, et ima petit, motum esse lapidis, sed naturalem. Si autem hoc modo etiam illum motum habet anima, profecto etiam ipse naturalis est; nec ex eo quod naturaliter move­ tur, recte vituperari potest: quia etiamsi ad perniciem movctur, natura: tamen suæ necessitate compellitur. Porro quia istum motum non dubitamus esse culpabi­ lent, omnimodo negandum est csse naturalem; ct ideo non est similis illi motui quo naturaliter move­ tur lapis. A. Egimusne aliquid superioribus duabus disputationibus? E. Egimus sanc. A. Credo ergo me­ minisse te, in prima disputatione satis esse com per. tum, nulla re fieri meutcm servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate: nom neque a superiore, neque ab æquali eam posse ad hoc dedecus cogi, quia injustum est; neque ab inferiore, quia non potest. Restat igitur ut ejus sit proprius iste motus, quo frueudi voluntatem ad creaturam a Creatort convertit: qui motus si culpæ deputatur (unde qui dubitat, irrisione dignus tibi visus est), non est utique naturalis, sed voluntarius; in coque similis est illi motui quo deorsum versus lapis fertur, quod sicut iste proprius est lapidis, sic ille animi: verumtamen in eo dissimilis, quod in potestate noo habet lapis cohiberc motum quo fertur inferius; animus vero dum non vult, non ita movetur, ut superioribus desertis inferiora deligat; ct ideo lapidi naturalis est ille motus, animo vero iste voluntarius. Hinc est quod la­ pidcm si quis dicat peccare, quod pondere suo tendit in infima, non dicam ipso lapide stolidior, sed pro­ fecto demens judicatur: animum vero peccati argui. mus, cum cum convincimus superioribus desertis ad fruendum inferiora praponcre. Propterea, quid opus est quærcre unde iste motus existat, quo voluntas avertitur ah incommutabili bono ad commutabile bo­ num, cum cum nonnisi animi, et voluntarium, et ob hoc culpabilem esse fateamur; omnisque de hac te disciplina utilis ad id valeat, ut eo motu improbato atqne cohibitoo, voluntatem nostram ad fruendum sempiterno bono, a lapsu temporalium convertamus? E. V ideo, et quodammodo tango, cl tcneo vera esse quai dicis: non enim quidquam tam firme atque intime sentio, quam me habere voluntatem, eaquc me movcri ad aliquid fru< ndum; quid autcm meum di­ cam, prorsus nnn invenio, si voluntas qua volo et nolo non est: quapropter cui tribuendum est, si quid per illam male facio, nisi mibi? Cum enim bonus Deus me fecerit, nec bene aliquid faciam nis! per volunta­ tem, ad hoc p-tius datam esse a bono Deo, s: tis ap­ paret. Motus autcm quo huc aut illuc voluntas con­ vertitur, nisi esset voluntarius, atque in nostra positus potestate, neque laudandus cum ad superiora, neque culpandus homo csset cum ad inferiora detorquet quasi quendam cardinem voluntatis; neque omnimo monendus esset ut istis neglectis aterna Tenet adi­ pisci, atquc ut male nollet vivere, vellet autem bene. Hoc autem monendum non esse hominem, quisquis cxistimat, dc hominum numero exterminandus est.

### English translation (Claude)

E. Since it is clear enough to me that free will is to be counted among goods, and not the least of them, and since from this we are also forced to admit that it was given by God and ought to have been given, I now want to learn from you, if you think it timely, where that motion comes from by which the will itself is turned away from the common and unchangeable good and turned toward goods that are its own, or another's, or lowest, all of them changeable.
A. Why do we need to know this?
E. Because if the will was given in such a way that it has this motion by nature, then it is turned toward these things by necessity; and no fault can be found where nature and necessity rule.
A. Does this motion please you or displease you?
E. It displeases me.
A. Then you blame it.
E. I certainly blame it.
A. Then you blame a blameless motion of the mind.
E. I do not blame a blameless motion of the mind; but I do not know whether there is any fault in leaving the unchangeable good and turning toward changeable goods.
A. Then you blame what you do not know.
E. Do not press me on a word. I said, “I do not know whether there is any fault,” meaning to be understood that there is undoubtedly fault. By the word I used, “I do not know,” I was surely mocking any doubt about a plain matter.
A. See what the most certain truth is, which forced you to forget so quickly what you said a little earlier. For if this motion exists by nature or necessity, it can in no way be blameworthy; but you hold so very firmly that it is blameworthy that you thought even a doubt about so certain a matter deserved mockery. Why, then, did it seem to you something to assert, or at least to say with some doubt, which you yourself prove plainly false? For you said: “If free will was given in such a way that it has this motion by nature, then it is turned toward these things by necessity; and no fault can be found where nature and necessity rule.” But you ought in no way to have doubted that it was not so given, since you do not doubt that this motion is blameworthy.
E. I said that the motion itself is blameworthy, and that it therefore displeases me, and I cannot doubt that it is to be blamed; but I deny that the soul which is drawn by this motion from the unchangeable good to changeable goods is to be blamed, if its nature is such that it is moved by it of necessity.
A. Whose is this motion, which you grant is certainly to be blamed?
E. I see it in the mind, but whose it is I do not know.
A. Do you deny that the mind is moved by that motion?
E. I do not deny it.
A. Do you deny, then, that the motion by which a stone is moved is the stone's motion? I do not mean the motion by which we move it, or by which it is moved by some outside force, as when it is thrown up into the sky, but the motion by which it tends toward the earth by its own inclination and falls.
E. I do not deny that the motion by which, as you say, it inclines and seeks the depths is the stone's motion; but it is natural. If the soul too has that motion in this way, it is certainly natural as well; and because it is moved naturally, it cannot rightly be reproached; for even if it is moved to its ruin, it is driven by the necessity of its own nature. But since we do not doubt that this motion is blameworthy, we must deny altogether that it is natural; and so it is not like that motion by which the stone is moved naturally.
A. Did we accomplish anything in our two earlier discussions?
E. We certainly did.
A. I believe, then, that you remember that in the first discussion it was well established that the mind becomes the slave of lust by nothing but its own will. For it cannot be forced into this disgrace by a superior or by an equal, because that is unjust, nor by an inferior, because that is impossible. It remains, then, that this motion by which the mind turns its will to enjoy from the Creator to the creature is its own. And if this motion is counted as a fault (and whoever doubts it seemed to you to deserve mockery), it is certainly not natural but voluntary. In this it is like the motion by which a stone is carried downward, that as that one is the stone's own, so this is the mind's own; but it is unlike it in this, that the stone does not have it in its power to check the motion by which it is carried downward, while the mind, as long as it does not will, is not so moved as to abandon higher things and choose lower ones. And so that motion is natural to the stone, while this one is voluntary to the mind. Hence anyone who said that a stone sins because it tends by its weight toward the depths would be judged, I will not say more stupid than the stone, but certainly mad; but we accuse the mind of sin when we prove that it has abandoned higher things and preferred lower ones for enjoyment. So what need is there to ask where this motion comes from by which the will is turned away from the unchangeable good toward a changeable good, since we confess that it is only the mind's, and voluntary, and therefore blameworthy? All useful teaching on this matter serves this purpose: that, having condemned and checked this motion, we may turn our will from its slide into temporal things to the enjoyment of the everlasting good.
E. I see, and in a way I touch and hold, that what you say is true. For I feel nothing so firmly and inwardly as that I have a will and am moved by it to enjoy something; and I find absolutely nothing that I could call mine, if the will by which I will and do not will is not mine. So to whom is it to be attributed, if I do something evil through it, but to me? For since the good God made me, and I can do nothing well except through the will, it is clear enough that it was given by the good God rather for this. And unless the motion by which the will turns this way or that were voluntary and placed in our power, a man would neither be praised when he turns the hinge of the will, so to speak, toward higher things, nor blamed when he twists it toward lower things; nor should he be admonished at all to neglect these and want to attain eternal things, and to be unwilling to live badly and willing to live well. Whoever thinks that a man is not to be admonished in this way should be cast out of the number of human beings.

### Translation notes

- Evodius's final speech was later cited by Pelagius on the freedom of the will; compare Augustine, Retractations 1.9.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.1 (PL 32:1253–1254; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-3-1).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.2

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-3-2
- Source: PL 32:1254–1255
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Evodius asks how God's foreknowledge of the first man's sin can leave the will free; Augustine says most people are troubled by this because they excuse rather than confess their sins.

### Latin text

Quae cum ila sint, ineffabiliter me movet, quo­ modo fieri possit ut et Deus præscius sit omnium fu­ turorum, et nos nulla necessitate peccemus. Quisquis cnim dixerit aliter evenire posse aliquid quam Deus ante præscivit, præscientiam Dei destruere insanissima impietate molitur. Quapropter, si prescivit Deus pec­ caturum esse primum hominem, quod necesse est concedat mibi quisquis mecum omnium futurorum præscium fatetur Dcum; si ergo ita est, non dico non eum faceret, bonum enim fecit,. nec obesse quidquam Deo posset peccatum ejus qucm bonum ipse fecit: ino in quo faciendo bonitatcm suam ostenderat, ostendit cliam in puniendo justitiam, ct in hberando misericordiam: non itaque dico, non eum faceret; sed hoc dico, quoniam peccaturum esse præsciverat, nccesse crat id fieri, quod futurum esse præsciebat Deus. Quomodo est igitur voluntas libera ubi tam ine­ vitabilis apparet necessitas? A. Pulsasti vchementer: misericordia Dei adsit, aperiatque pulsantibus. Verumtamen maximam par­ tem hominum ista quæstione torqueri non ob aliud crediderim, nisi quia non pie quærunt, velocioresque sunt ad excusationem, quam ad confessionem pecca­ torum suorum. Alii enim nullam divinam providen­ tiam præesse rebus humanis libenter opinantur, dum­ que fortuitis committunt casibus et animus et corpora sua, tradunt se fcriendos et dilaniandos libidinibus, divina judicia negantes, humana fallentes, eos a qui­ bus accusantur, fortunæ patrocinio propulsare sc pu­ tant; quam tamen cæcam eflingere ac pingere con­ sueverunt, ut aut meliores ea sint a qua se regi arbitrantur, aut se quoque cum eadcm cæcitate ct sentire ista fatcantur et dicere. Nec enim talibus absurde etiam conceditur casibus eos agere omni, quando agendo cadunt. Sed adversus hanc opinioncm plenam stultissimi ac dementissimi erroris, satis, ut arbitror, secunda nostra sermocinatione dissertum est. Alii vero quanquam negare non audeant præsi­ dere humanæ vitæ providcniiam Dei, malunt tamen eam vcl infirmam, vel injustam, vel malam nefario errore credere, quam sua peccata pietate supplici confiteri. Qui omnes si persuaderi sibi paterentur, ut cum de optimo et justissimo et potentissimo cogitant, bonitatem et justitiam et potentiam Dei longe majo­ rem superioremque esse crederent, quam quidquid cogitatione concipiunt; considerantesque semetipsos, gratias Deo se debere intelligerent, clialnsi aliquid inferius eos voluisset esse quam sunt, omnibusque ossibus et medullis conscientiæ suæ clamarenl: Ego dixi, Domine, miserere mei, cura animam meam, quia peccavi tibi: ita certis itineribus divinæ misericordiæ in sapientiain ducerentur, ut neque in­ ventis rebus inflati, nrque non inventis turbulenti, et cognoscendo instructiores fierent ad videndum, et ad quaerendum ignorando mitiores. Tibi vcro cui jam hoc persuasum esse non dubito, vide quam facile de tam magna quæstione respondeam, cum mihi prior interroganti pauca responderis.

### English translation (Claude)

This being so, I am inexpressibly troubled as to how it can be that God foreknows all future things and yet we sin by no necessity. For whoever says that anything can turn out otherwise than God foreknew it is trying, with most insane impiety, to destroy God's foreknowledge. So if God foreknew that the first man would sin (which anyone must grant me who confesses with me that God foreknows all future things), if this is so, I do not say that he should not have made him, for he made him good, nor could the sin of one whom he made good harm God in any way; rather, as he had shown his goodness in making him, he showed also his justice in punishing him and his mercy in setting him free. So I do not say that he should not have made him; but I say this: since he had foreknown that he would sin, what God foreknew would happen had to happen. How, then, is the will free, where so inevitable a necessity appears?
A. You have knocked hard; may God's mercy be with us and open to those who knock. Yet I would believe that most people are tormented by this question for no other reason than that they do not ask it piously, and are quicker to excuse their sins than to confess them. Some gladly suppose that no divine providence presides over human affairs; and while they commit both their minds and their bodies to chance happenings, they hand themselves over to be beaten and torn by their lusts. Denying divine judgments and deceiving human ones, they think they can ward off their accusers by the patronage of fortune; yet they usually represent and paint fortune as blind, so that either they are better than the power by which they think themselves ruled, or they admit that they too feel and say these things with the same blindness. Nor is it absurd to grant such people that they do everything by chance, since in acting they fall. But against this opinion, full of most foolish and mad error, enough was said, I think, in our second conversation. Others, though they do not dare to deny that God's providence presides over human life, prefer to believe with wicked error that it is weak or unjust or evil, rather than to confess their sins with suppliant piety. If all these would allow themselves to be persuaded that, when they think of the best, the most just, and the most powerful, they should believe that the goodness and justice and power of God are far greater and higher than whatever they conceive in thought; and if, considering themselves, they would understand that they owe God thanks even if he had willed them to be something lower than they are, and would cry out with all the bones and marrow of their conscience, “I said, Lord, have mercy on me; heal my soul, for I have sinned against you”: then they would be led along the sure paths of divine mercy into wisdom, so that they would be neither puffed up by what they found nor troubled by what they did not find, becoming by knowing better equipped for seeing, and by not knowing gentler in seeking. But you, of whom I do not doubt that you are already persuaded of this, see how easily I shall answer so great a question, once you have first answered a few questions of mine.

### Scripture references

- Ps 41:4 (40:5 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Matt 7:7: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Ps 41:4 (Ps 40:5 in the Latin numbering).
- “In acting they fall” plays on casus, which means both “chance” and “fall.”
- The goddess Fortune was commonly portrayed as blind.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.2 (PL 32:1254–1255; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-18/#p-3-2).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.3

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-3
- Source: PL 32:1255–1256
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine argues that God's foreknowledge does not remove the will: what God foreknows is a will, and a will is necessarily in our power, so foreknowledge makes our free willing certain rather than impossible.

### Latin text

Certe enim hoc te move!, et boc miraris, quomodo non sint contraria et repugnantia, ut et Deus praescius sit omnium futurorum, et nos non necessitate, sed voluntate peccemus. Si enim præscius est Deus, in­ quis, peccaturum esse hominem, necesse est ut pec­ cet: si autem necesse est, non ergo est in peccando voluntatis arbitrium, sed potius inevitabilis et fixa ne­ cessitas. Qua ratiocinatione hoc vidclicel ne conficia­ tur times, ut aut Deus futurorum omnium præscius impie negetur, aut si hoc negare non possumus, fa­ teamur non voluntate, sed necessitate peccari: an aliquid aliud te movct?'E. Nihil interim aliud. A. Res ergo universas quarum Deus est pracscius, non volun­ tate sed necessitate fieri putas. E. Omnino ita puto. A. Expergiscere tandem, teque ipsum paululum in­ tucre, et dic mihi, si potes, qualem sis babiturus cras voluntatem, utrum peccandi, an recte faciendi. E. Ne­ scio. A. Quid? Deum itidem nescire h<;c putas? E. Nullo modo id putaverim. A. Si ergo volunlatem luam crastinam novit, et omnium hOminum, sive qui sunt, sive qui futuri sunt, futuras prævidet voluntatcs, multo magis prævidet quid de justis impiisque factu­ rus sit. E. Prorsus si meorum opcrum præsciunt Deum dico, multo fidentius eum dixerim præscire opera sua, et quid sit facturus certissime prævidere. A. Nonne igitur caves ne tibi dicatur, eliam ipsum quæcumque facturus est, uon voluntate sed necessitate fauturum, si omnia quorum Deus praescius est, necessitate flunt, nun voluntate? E. Ego cum dicerem necessitate uni­ versa fieri quæ Deus futura præscivit, ea sola intuebar quæ in creatura ejus fiunt, nun autem quæ in ipso: non enim ea fiunt, sed sunt sempiterna. A. Nihil ergo in sua crcalura operatur Deus. E. Jam semel statuit quemadmodum feratur ordo ejus universitatis quam condidit; neque enim aliquid nova voluntate admi­ nistrat. A. Numquid neminem beatum facit? E. Facit vero. A. Tunc utique facit, quando ille fit. E Ita est. A. Si igitur, verbi gratia, post annum beatus futu­ rus es, post annuin lc beatum facturus est. E. Etiam. A. Jam ergo pranscit hodie quod post annum factorus est. E. Semper hoc præscivit: nunc quoque hoc eum præscire consentio, si est ita futurum. A. Dic, quæso, num Ut creatura ejus non es, aut tua beatitudo non in te GeL? E. Imo et creatura ejus sum, et in me fiet quod beatus ero. A. Non ergo vo­ luntate sed necessitate in te fiet hcaliiudo tua Dco fa­ ciente. E. Voluntas illius mihi est nccessitas. A. Tu itaque invitus beatus eris. E. Mihi si esset potestas ut essem beatus, jam profecto essem: volo enim etiam nunc, et non sum, quia non ego, sed ille me beatum facit. A. Optime de te veritas clamat. Non enim pos­ ses aliud sentire esse in potestate nostra, nisi quod cum volumus facimus. Quapropter nihil tam in no­ stra potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est. Ea enim pror­ sus nullo intervallo, mox ut volumus præsto cst. Et ideo recte possumus direre, Non volunt ite senesci­ mus2, sed necessitate; aut, non voluntate morimur, sed necessitate; et si quid aliud hujusmodi: non vo­ luntate autem volumus, quis vel delirus audeat dicere? Quamobrem, quamvis praesciat Deus nostras volunta­ tcs futuras, non ex eo tamen conficitur ut non volun­ tate alijuid velimus. Nam et de beatitudine quod dixi­ sti, nan abs teipso beatum fieri, ita dixisti, 'nasi hoc ego negaverim: sed dico, cum futurus ea beatus, non te invitum, sed volentem futurum. Cum igitur præ­ scius Deus sil futuræ beatitudinis tuae, nec aliUT ali­ quid fieri possit quam ille præscivit, alioquin nulla præscientia est; non tamen ex eo cognimur sentire, quod absurdissimum cst ct tonge a veritate seclusum, uon te volentem beatum futurum. Sicut autem volun­ tatcm beatitudinis, cum esse cœperis beatus, non tibi aufert præscientia Dei, quæ hodicque de tua futura beatitudine certa est: sic cliam voluntas culpabilis, si qua in te futura est, non propterea voluntas non erit, quoniam Dcus eam futuram esse præscivit. Attende enim, quæso, quanta cæcitate dicatur, Si præscivit Deus futuram voluntatem meam, quoniam nihil aliter potest fieri quam præscivit, nccesse est ut velim quod ille præscivit: si autem necesse est, non jam voluntate, sed necessitate id me velle fatendum est. O stultitiam singularem! Quomodo ergo non po­ cst aHud fieri quam præscivit Deus, si voluntas non crit, quam voluntatem futuram illc præsciverit? Omit­ to illud æque monstruosum, quod paulo ante dixi eumdem bominem dicere, Necesse est ut ila velim, qui necessitate supposita auferre nititur voluntatem. Si enim necesse est-ut velit, unde volet cum voluntas non crit? Quod si non hoc modo dixerit, sed dixerit se, quia necesse est ut velit, ipsam voluntatem in pole­ state non habere; occurretur ex eo quod ipse dixisti, cum quærerem utrum invitus beatus futurus sis: re­ spondisti enim quod jam esses beatus, si potestas es­ set in te; velle eniin te, sed nondum posse dixisti. Ubi ego subjeci de te clamasse veritatem: non enim ne­ gare possumus habere nos potestatem, nisi dum nobis non adest quod volumus; dum autem volumus, si vo­ luntas ipsa deest nobis, uon utique volumus. Quod si fieri non potest ut dum volumus non velimus, adest utique voluntas volentibns; nec aliud quidquam est in potestate, nisi quod volentibus ad st. Voluntas igi­ tur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra po­ testate. Porro, quia est in potestate, libera est nobis. Non enim est nobis liberum, quod in potestate non ba­ bemus, aut potest non esse quod habemus. Ita fit ut et Deum non negemus esse præscium omnium futuro­ rum, et nos tamen velimus quod volumus. Cum enim sit præscius voluntatis nostræ, cujus eat præscius ipsa crit. Voluntas ergo erit, quia voluntatis cst præ­ scius. Nec voluntas esse poterit, si in potestate non erit. Ergo ct potestatis est præscius. Non igitur per ejus præscientiam mihi potestas adimitur, quæ pro­ pterea mihi certior aderit, quia ille cujus præscientia non fallitur, adfuturam mihi esse præscivit. E. Ecce jam non nego ita necesse esse fieri quæcumque pra­ scivit Deus, et ita eum peccata nostra præscire, ut maneat tamen nobis voluntas libera, atque in nostra posita potestate.

### English translation (Claude)

For surely this is what troubles you and makes you wonder: how it is not contradictory and inconsistent that God foreknows all future things and that we sin not by necessity but by will. For if God foreknows, you say, that a man will sin, it is necessary that he sin; and if it is necessary, there is no choice of the will in sinning, but rather an inevitable and fixed necessity. By this reasoning you are evidently afraid that it will be concluded either that God's foreknowledge of all future things must be impiously denied, or, if we cannot deny this, that we must admit that sin is committed not by will but by necessity. Or does something else trouble you?
E. Nothing else for the moment.
A. You think, then, that all the things God foreknows happen not by will but by necessity?
E. I think exactly so.
A. Wake up at last, look at yourself a little, and tell me, if you can, what kind of will you will have tomorrow, to sin or to act rightly.
E. I do not know.
A. Well, do you think that God likewise does not know this?
E. I would in no way think so.
A. If, then, he knows your will of tomorrow, and foresees the future wills of all human beings, both those who are and those who will be, much more does he foresee what he will do with the just and the ungodly.
E. Certainly, if I say that God foreknows my works, I would say much more confidently that he foreknows his own works and foresees most certainly what he will do.
A. Then do you not beware lest it be said to you that he too will do whatever he will do not by will but by necessity, if all things that God foreknows happen by necessity, not by will?
E. When I said that all the things God foreknew as future happen by necessity, I was looking only at the things that happen in his creation, not those in himself; for those do not happen, but are everlasting.
A. Then God does nothing in his creation.
E. He has once for all established how the order of the universe that he founded is to run; for he governs nothing by a new will.
A. Does he make no one happy?
E. Indeed he does.
A. He makes him happy, surely, at the time when he becomes so.
E. So it is.
A. If, then, for example, you will be happy a year from now, he will make you happy a year from now.
E. Yes.
A. So today he already foreknows what he will do a year from now.
E. He has always foreknown it; I agree that he foreknows it now too, if it is going to be so.
A. Tell me, please, are you not his creature, or will your happiness not come about in you?
E. Indeed, I am his creature, and it will come about in me that I will be happy.
A. Then your happiness will come about in you, by God's doing, not by will but by necessity.
E. His will is necessity for me.
A. So you will be happy against your will.
E. If I had the power to be happy, I would surely be so already; for I want it even now, and I am not, because not I but he makes me happy.
A. Truth cries out from you most excellently. For you could not think that anything else is in our power except what we do when we will. So nothing is so much in our power as the will itself; for it is present without any interval at all, as soon as we will. And so we can rightly say, “We grow old not by will but by necessity,” or “We die not by will but by necessity,” and anything else of this kind; but who, even if delirious, would dare to say, “We will not by will”? Therefore, although God foreknows our future wills, it does not follow from this that we do not will something by will. As to what you said about happiness, that you are not made happy by yourself, you said it as if I had denied it; but I say that when you are going to be happy, you will be so not against your will but willingly. Since, then, God foreknows your future happiness, and nothing can happen otherwise than he foreknew (otherwise there is no foreknowledge), we are not therefore forced to think, what is most absurd and far removed from the truth, that you will be happy without willing it. And just as God's foreknowledge, which even today is certain of your future happiness, does not take from you the will for happiness when you have begun to be happy, so too a blameworthy will, if there is to be one in you, will not therefore fail to be a will because God foreknew that it would be. For notice, please, with what blindness it is said: “If God foreknew my future will, since nothing can happen otherwise than he foreknew, it is necessary that I will what he foreknew; and if it is necessary, it must be admitted that I will it no longer by will but by necessity.” What singular folly! How, then, can nothing happen otherwise than God foreknew, if there will be no will, when he foreknew that there would be a will? I pass over the equally monstrous thing that I mentioned a little earlier, that the same man says, “It is necessary that I will so,” who, by supposing necessity, tries to take away the will. For if it is necessary that he will, how will he will, when there will be no will? And if he does not say it this way, but says that, because it is necessary that he will, he does not have the will itself in his power, he will be met by what you yourself said when I asked whether you would be happy against your will. For you answered that you would already be happy if the power were in you; you said you willed it but could not yet. Whereupon I added that truth had cried out from you. For we cannot deny that we have power, except when what we will is not present to us; but when we will, if the will itself is lacking to us, we certainly do not will. And if it cannot be that when we will we do not will, then the will is certainly present to those who will; and nothing else is in our power except what is present to us when we will. So our will would not be a will unless it were in our power. And since it is in our power, it is free to us. For what we do not have in our power, or what can fail to be when we have it, is not free to us. So it comes about that we do not deny that God foreknows all future things, and yet we will what we will. For since he foreknows our will, the will of which he has foreknowledge will be. It will therefore be a will, because he foreknows a will. And it could not be a will if it were not in our power. So he also foreknows the power. My power, then, is not taken from me by his foreknowledge; rather, it will be present to me the more certainly, because he whose foreknowledge does not err foreknew that it would be present to me.
E. See, I no longer deny that whatever God foreknew must necessarily happen, and that he foreknows our sins in such a way that the will remains free to us and placed in our power.

### Translation notes

- The argument concerns foreknowledge and the freedom of the will; it is translated as written, without later theological terms.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.3 (PL 32:1255–1256; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-3).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.4

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-4
- Source: PL 32:1256
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Foreknowledge does not compel: as our memory does not cause past deeds, God's foreknowledge does not cause future sins, so he justly punishes sins he foresees but does not commit.

### Latin text

A. Quid ergo te movet? an forte oblitus quid prima nostra disputatio peregerit, negabis nullo co­ gcme, aut superiore, aut inferiore, aut æquali, sed ea nos voluntate peccare? E. Nihil horum prorsus audeo negare: sed tamen, fateor, nondum video quomodo sibi non adversentur hæc duo, præscientia Dei de pec. catis nostris, et nostrum in peccando liberuui arbi­ trium. Nam et justum Deum necesse esi fateamur, et præscium. S d scire vellem qua justitia puniat peccata quæ necesse cst ficri; aut quomodo non sit necesse fieri quoe futura esse præscivit; aut quomodo non Crea­ tori deputandum est, quidquid in ejus creatura fieri necesse est. A. Unde tibi videtur adversum esse liberum arbitrium nostrum præscientiæ Dei? quia præscientia est, an quia Dei præscicntia est? E. Quia Dei potius. A. Quid ergo? si tu praescires peccaturum esse aliquem, non esset necesse ut peccaret? E. Imo necesse esset ut peccaret: nonenim aliter esset præscientia mea, nisi certa prjescirem. A. Non igitur quia Dei præscientia est, necesse est fieri quae præscierit, sed tantum­ modo quia præscientia est; quæ si non certa praeno­ scit, utique nulla est. E. Consentio: sed quorsum ista? A. Quia, nisi fallor, non continuo tu peccare cogeres, quem peccaturum esse præscires; nequc ipsa præ­ scientia tua peccare eum cogeret, quamvis sine dubio peccaturus esset: non enim aliter id futurum esse praescircs. Sicut itaque non sibi adversantur hæc duo, nt tu praescientia tua noveris quod alius sua voluntate facturus est; ita Deus neminem ad peccandum cogens, praevidet tamen eos qui propria voluntate peccabunt. Cur ergo non vindicet justus, quæ fieri nonco­ git pneecius? Sicut enim tu memoria tua non cogis facta esse quæ praeterierunt; sic Deus præscientia sua non cogit facienda quae futura sunt. Et sicut tu quædam quae fccisLi meministi, nec tamen quæ me­ ministi omnia fecisti; ita Deus omnia quorum ipse auctor est praescit, nee tamen omnium quae præscit, ipse auctor est. Quorum autem non est malus auctor, justus est ultor. Hinc ergo jam intellige qua justitia Deus peccata puniat, quia quae novit futura, non fa­ cit: nam si propterea non debet retribuere suppli­ cium peccantibus, quia praevidet peccaturos, nec reGe facientibus debet præmia retribuere, quia et recte fa­ cturos nihilominus praevidet. Imo vero fateamur et ad praescientiam ejus pertinere ne quid cum lateat fu­ turorum, et ad justitiam, ut peccatum, quia voiun­ taLe committitur, ita judicio ejus impune non fiat, sicut praescientia non cogitur fieri.

### English translation (Claude)

A. What, then, troubles you? Have you perhaps forgotten what our first discussion accomplished, and will you deny that we sin, compelled by no one, superior, inferior, or equal, but by our own will?
E. I absolutely dare not deny any of these; but I confess that I do not yet see how these two do not conflict: God's foreknowledge of our sins and our free choice in sinning. For we must admit that God is both just and foreknowing. But I would like to know by what justice he punishes sins that must necessarily happen; or how what he foreknew would happen does not necessarily happen; or how whatever must necessarily happen in his creation is not to be attributed to the Creator.
A. Why does our free choice seem to you to conflict with God's foreknowledge? Because it is foreknowledge, or because it is God's foreknowledge?
E. Rather because it is God's.
A. Well then, if you foreknew that someone would sin, would it not be necessary that he sin?
E. Yes, it would be necessary that he sin; for my foreknowledge would not otherwise be foreknowledge unless I foreknew certain things.
A. So it is not because it is God's foreknowledge that what he has foreknown must happen, but only because it is foreknowledge; and foreknowledge that does not foreknow certain things is surely no foreknowledge.
E. I agree; but where is this leading?
A. To this, unless I am mistaken: you would not by that fact compel the man to sin whom you foreknew would sin; nor would your foreknowledge itself compel him to sin, although he would undoubtedly sin, for otherwise you would not foreknow that it would be. So, just as these two do not conflict, that you know by your foreknowledge what another will do by his own will, so God, compelling no one to sin, nevertheless foresees those who will sin by their own will.
Why, then, should he not punish as a just judge what, though he foreknows it, he does not compel to be done? For just as you do not by your memory compel past things to have been done, so God does not by his foreknowledge compel future things to be done. And just as you remember some things that you have done, yet have not done all that you remember, so God foreknows all the things of which he himself is the author, yet is not himself the author of all that he foreknows. And of those things of which he is not the evil author, he is the just avenger. Understand from this, then, by what justice God punishes sins: what he knows will happen, he does not do. For if he ought not to repay punishment to sinners because he foresees that they will sin, neither ought he to repay rewards to those who act rightly, because he foresees no less that they will act rightly. Rather, let us confess that it belongs to his foreknowledge that nothing of the future is hidden from him, and to his justice that sin, since it is committed by the will, does not go unpunished by his judgment, just as it is not compelled to happen by his foreknowledge.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.4 (PL 32:1256; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-4).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.5

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-5
- Source: PL 32:1256–1258
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Sinful souls are still better than the brightest bodies, and God is to be praised for creating every grade of being, from unsinning angels to souls that sin and may repent; the unwise judge creatures by use rather than by reason.

### Latin text

Jam illud quod tertio loco posuisti, quomodo nou Creatori deputandum sit quidquid in ejus crea­ tura fieri nccesse esi; regula illa pietatis facile com­ monebit, quam meminisse nos convenit, gratiarum actionem nos debere Crcatori nostro. Cujus profecto largissima bonitas justissime laudaretur, etiamsi ali­ quo inferiore creaturae gradu uos condidisset. Quam­ vis enim anima nostra peccatis tabefacta sit, subli­ odor cst lameD et melior, quam si in hanc lucem visibilem verteretur. Et vides profecto de hujus lucis eminentia, quantum laudent animæDeum etiam cor­ poris sensibus deditae. Quapropter non te jam moveat, quod vituperantur animae peccatrices, ut dicas in corde tuo nielius fuisse si non essent. In sui enim com­ paratione vituperantur, dum cogitatur quales essent, si peccare noluissent. Institutor tamen earum Deus præclarissime pro bumana facultate laudandus est, non solum quoniam peccantes eas juste ordinat, scd etiam quia tales instituit, ut cliam peccatis sordidatæ, nullo modo lucis corporalis dignitate superentur, de qua tamen jure laudatur. Illud quoque moneo caveas, ne forte non dicas quidem melius fuisse ut non essent, sed dicas aliter fieri eas debuisse. Quidquid enim tibi vera ratione me­ lius occurrerit, scias fecisse Deum tanquam bonorum omnium conditorem. Non est autem vera ratio, sed invida infirmitas, cum aliquid mcliusfaciendum fuisse cogitaveris, jam nibil aliud inferius velle fieri, tan­ quam si perspecto cœlo, nolles terram factam esse; inique omnino. Recte enim reprehenderes, si præter.. misso cœlo terram factam videres, quoniani dicercs ita eam fieri debuisse, sicuti posses cogitare foetum. Cum ergo etiam illud ad cujus speciem volcbas ter­ ram perducere, factum esse perspiceres, non autem boclerram, sed cœlum vocari; credo quod re me­ liore non fraudatus, ut inferior quoquc aliqua fieret et terra esset, nequaquam invidere deberes. In qua terra rursus secundum partes ejus tanta est varietas, ut nihil quod ad terræ pertinet speciem cogitanti oc­ currat, quod non in tota ejus mole Deus omnium eon­ ditor fcrerit. Namque a terra feracissima et amœnis­ sirna usque ad salsissiniam et infecundissimam, ita gradatim per medias pervenitur, ut nullam reprehen­ dcre audeas, nisi in comparatione melioris; atque ila per omnes gradus laudis ascendas, ut quod summum genus terræ inveneris, solum tamen esse nolis. Jam vero inter totam terram et cœlum quanta.distantia cst? Interponuntur enim humida flabilisque natura: utque cx his quatuor elementis aliae innumerabiles nobis, numeratæ autem Deo rerum species formaeque va­ riantur. Potest ergo esse aliquid in rerum natura, quod tua ratione noa cogitas. Non esse autem quod vera raLione cogitas, non potest. Neque enim tu potes aliquid melius in creatura cogitare, quod creatura artificem fugerit. Humana quippe anima naturaliter di­ vinis ex quibus pendet connexa rationibus, cum di­ cit, Melius hoc fieret quant illud; si verum dicit, et videt quod dicii, in illis quibus connexa est rationibus videt. Credat ergo Deum fecisse quod vera ratione ab eo faciendum fuisse cognovit, etiamsi hoc in rebus facti. non videt. Quia etiainsi coelum oculis videre non posset, et tamen ratione vera tale aliquid facien­ dum fuisse colligeret, credere debuit factum esse, quamvis id oculis non videret. Non enim cogitatione videret fuisse faciendum, nisi in iis rationibus quibus facta sunt omnia. Quod autem ibi non est, tam nemo potest veraci cogitatione videre, quam non est vcrum. In eo plerique homines errant, quia meliora cum mente conspexerint, non in sedibus congruis ea oculis quærunt. Velut si quisquam perfectam rotundi­ tatem ratione comprehendens, stomachetur quod ta­ lem in nuce non invenit, si nullum unquam corpus rotundum præter hujuscemodi poma conspexit. Nam ita quidam cum ratione verissina videant meliorem esse creaturam, quæ quamvis habeat liberam volun­ tatem, Deo tamen semper infixa, nunquam peccaverit; intuentes peccata hominum, non ut peccare desinam, sed qnia facti sunt dolent, dicentes: Tales nos tace­ ret, ut semper incommutabili ejus veritate perfrui, nunquam autem peccare vellemus. Non clament, non succenseant: quia neque ipsos ideo coegil peccare, quia fecit, quibus potestatem utrum vellent de dit; et sunt tales quidam Angeli, qui neque peccaverunt un­ quam, neque peccaturi sunt. Quamobrem si te dele­ ctat creatura quæ perseverantissima voluntate non peccat, non est dubitandum quod eam peccanti recta ratione præponas: sed sicut eam tu cogitatione præ­ pouis; sic eam creator Deus ordinatione praeposuit. Crede esse.talem in superioribus sedibus, et in subli­ mitate coelorum: quia si bonitatem Conditor præbuit ad eam condendam cujus praevidit futura peccata, nullo modo non præberet eam bonitatem, ut creatu­ ram conderet quam peccaturam non esse præscivit. Habet enim illa sublimis perpetuam beatitudi­ nem suam, in perpetuum fruens Creatore suo, quam perpetua tenendae justitiae voluntate promeretur. Ila­ beL deinde ordinem suum etiam ista peccatrix, amissa in peccatis beatitudine, sed non dimissa recuperandæ beatitudinis faculute. Quae profecto superat eam quam peccandi perpetua voluntas tenet: inter quam et it­ lam priorem permanentem in voluntate justitiæ, hæc medietatem quamdam demonstrat, quæ poenitendi hu­ militate altitudinem suam rccipil. Nam neque ab illa creatura, quam praescivit Deus non solum peccatu­ ram, sed ctiam in peccandi voluntate mansuram, abs­ tinuit largitatem bonitatis lum, ut eam non conderet,. Sicut cnim melior cst vel aberrans cquus, quam lapis propterea non aberrans, quia proprio motu ct sensu caret; ita est excellentior creatura quæ libera volun­ tate peccat, quam quae propterea non peccat, quia non babet liberam voluntaleln. Et sicut laudarem vinum in suo genere bonum, de quo vino inebriatum hominem vituperarem, ct tamen eumdem hominem jam vituperatum et adhuc ebrium, laudato illi vino, de quo ebrius factus est, anteponerem: ita corporalis creatura in suo gradu jure laudanda est; cum illi vis tuperandi sint, qui ejus immoderato usu a veritatis perceptione avertuntur; quamvis iidem rursus jam perversi, ct quodammodo temulenti, eidcm creatune in ordine suo laudabili, cujus aviditate evanuerunt, non jam merito vitiorum, sed adhuc naturae dignitate præferuntur. Quia igitur omnis anima omni corpore est me- Hor, omnisque peccatrix anima quocumque ceciderit, nulla commutatione corpus efficitur, nec omnino illi aufertur qnod anima est, et ideo nullo p cto amittit quod corpore est mclior, in corporibus autem lux Lx­ net primum iocum; consequcns est ut primo co popi anim. extrema præponatur, fierique possit ut corpori alicujus animæ aliquod aliud corpus anteferatur, ut autem ipsi animæ nullo modo. Cur ergo non laudetur Deus, ct ineffabili prædicatione laudetur, qui cum fe­ cerit eas quæ in legibus essent justitiae permansuræ. fecit citam alias animas, quas vel peccaturas, vel in peccatis etiam perseveraturas esse prævidebat: cum et tales adhuc meliores sint eis, quæ quoniam nullum habent rationale ac liberum voluntatis arbitrium, pec­ care non possunt? Quæ tamen adhuc etiam ipsæ me liores sunt, quam corporum quorumlibet quamlibet splendidissimus fulgor, quem pro ipsius summi Dei substantia quidam, quamvis cum magno errore, vene­ rantur. Quod si in ordine corporearum creaturarum ab ipsis siderum ch Iris usque ad numerum capillorum nostrorum, ita gra latim bonarum rerum pulc hritudo contexitur, ut imperitissime dicatur, Quid e t hoc? utquid hoc? omnia enim ordine suo creata sunt: quanto imperitius de quncumque anima dicitur, quae ad quantamlibet sui decoris diminutionem defectum­ que pervenerit, omnium corporum dignitatem sinc ulla dubitatione semper superabit? Aliter enim æstimat ratio, aliter usus. Ratio æstimat luce veritatis, ut recto judicio subdat minora majoribus: usus autem consuetudine commod tatis plerumque inclinatur, ut ea pluris æStimet quæ veri­ tas minora esse convincit. Cum enim corpora coelestia corporibus terrestribus magna differentia ratio præ­ ponat, quis tamen carnalium hominum non malit unum, vel plura, deesse in cœlo sidera, quam unam arbuscu­ lam in agro suo, aut vaccam in armento? Sed sicut æ tate majores homines vel omnino contemnunt, vel cer te patienter corrigenda exspectant judicia parvulo­ rum, qui excep:is quibusdam quorum amore lætantur, quemlibet hommum cæterorum mori malunt, quam passerem suum; et multo magis si homo sit illc terri­ bilis, passer autem canorus et pulcher: ita ii qni pro­ vectu animi ad sapientiam profecerunt, imperitos re. rum æstimatores cum invenerint Dcum laudantes in creaturis ininoribus, qui eas carnalibus suis sensibus accommodatius adhibent, in superioribus vero atque naclioribus partim cum non laudantes, minusve lau­ dantes, partim etiam vituperare aut emendare conan­ tes, partim non credentes quod earum ille sit conditor; talium judicia vel omnino contemnere, si corrigere nequeunt, vel donec corrigant, æquo animo tolerare ac sustinere consuescant.

### English translation (Claude)

Now as to what you put third, how whatever must necessarily happen in his creation is not to be attributed to the Creator: that rule of piety which we should remember will easily remind us that we owe thanks to our Creator. His most abundant goodness would most justly be praised even if he had created us at some lower grade of creation. For although our soul is wasted by sins, it is nonetheless higher and better than if it were turned into this visible light. And you see how greatly souls praise God for the excellence of this light, even souls given over to the senses of the body. So do not let it trouble you any longer that sinful souls are reproached, so that you say in your heart that it would have been better if they did not exist. For they are reproached in comparison with themselves, when one considers what they would be if they had not willed to sin. Yet God their founder is to be praised most gloriously, as far as human ability allows, not only because he orders them justly when they sin, but also because he founded them such that, even when soiled by sins, they are in no way surpassed in dignity by bodily light, for which he is nevertheless rightly praised.
I warn you also to beware lest perhaps you do not indeed say that it would have been better for them not to exist, but say that they ought to have been made otherwise. For whatever better thing occurs to you by true reason, know that God has made it, as the maker of all goods. But it is not true reason but envious weakness when, having thought that something better ought to have been made, you then want nothing else lower to be made; as if, having looked at the sky, you did not want the earth to have been made; and that is quite unfair. You would rightly find fault if you saw the earth made and the sky left out, since you would say that the earth ought to have been made such as you could think the sky. But since you see that that also has been made to whose appearance you wanted to bring the earth, only it is called not earth but sky, I believe that, not having been cheated of the better thing, you ought by no means to begrudge that something lower too should be made and that there should be earth. And in this earth, again, there is such variety in its parts that nothing occurs to one thinking of the appearance of the earth that God, the maker of all, has not made somewhere in its whole mass. For from the most fertile and pleasant land to the saltiest and most barren, one passes by degrees through intermediate ones, so that you would dare to find fault with none except in comparison with a better; and you would so ascend through all the degrees of praise that, even when you had found the highest kind of land, you would not want it to be the only one. And how great is the distance between the whole earth and the sky! For between them are set the moist and the airy natures; and from these four elements other species and forms of things vary, innumerable to us but numbered by God. So there can be something in the nature of things that you do not think of by your reason; but it cannot be that what you think of by true reason does not exist. For you cannot think of anything better in creation that has escaped the Maker of creation. For the human soul, naturally connected with the divine reasons on which it depends, when it says, “This would be better made than that,” if it speaks the truth and sees what it says, sees it in those reasons with which it is connected. Let it believe, then, that God has made what by true reason it knew ought to have been made by him, even if it does not see this among things made. For even if it could not see the sky with its eyes, and yet gathered by true reason that some such thing ought to have been made, it ought to believe that it was made, though it did not see it with its eyes. For it would not see in thought that it ought to have been made except in those reasons by which all things were made. And what is not there, no one can see by true thought, any more than what is not true. Most people err in this, that when they have beheld better things with the mind, they do not look for them with the eyes in their proper places; as if someone, grasping perfect roundness by reason, should be annoyed that he does not find such roundness in a nut, if he had never seen any round body except fruits of this kind. So some people see by most true reason that a creature is better which, though it has free will, has yet, fixed always on God, never sinned; and looking at the sins of human beings, they grieve, not that they may stop sinning, but that they were made, saying: “He should have made us such that we would always want to enjoy his unchangeable truth and never want to sin.” Let them not cry out, let them not be angry. For he did not compel them to sin because he made them, giving them the power to do as they willed; and there are such angels, who have never sinned and never will sin. So if a creature delights you which by a most persevering will does not sin, there is no doubt that by right reason you put it above a sinning one; but just as you rank it above in thought, so God the Creator has ranked it above in his ordering. Believe that such a creature exists in the higher dwellings and in the height of the heavens; for if the Creator showed goodness in creating one whose future sins he foresaw, he would by no means fail to show that goodness in creating a creature which he foreknew would not sin.
That lofty creature has its perpetual happiness, enjoying its Creator forever, which it merits by a perpetual will to keep justice. And this sinful creature too has its order, having lost happiness in its sins, but not having let go of the capacity to recover happiness. It certainly surpasses that creature which a perpetual will to sin holds fast; between that one and the former, which abides in the will for justice, this one shows a kind of middle position, and recovers its height by the humility of repentance. For not even from that creature which God foreknew would not only sin but also remain in the will to sin did he withhold the bounty of his goodness, so as not to create it. For just as a horse, even a straying one, is better than a stone that does not stray because it lacks its own motion and sense, so a creature that sins by free will is more excellent than one that does not sin because it does not have free will. And just as I would praise wine that is good of its kind, and blame a man drunk on that wine, and yet rank that same man, already blamed and still drunk, above the praised wine on which he got drunk, so the bodily creature is rightly praised in its own rank, while those are to be blamed who by its immoderate use are turned away from perceiving truth; although these same people, now perverted and, as it were, drunk, are still ranked above that same creature, praiseworthy in its own order, through greed for which they became empty, not now by the merit of their vices but still by the dignity of their nature.
Since, then, every soul is better than every body, and every sinful soul, wherever it has fallen, is by no change made a body, nor is it deprived at all of being a soul, and so in no way loses its being better than body; and since among bodies light holds the first place, it follows that the lowest soul is ranked above the first body; and it can be that some other body is preferred to the body of some soul, but never to the soul itself. Why, then, should God not be praised, and praised with ineffable proclamation, who, having made those souls which would remain in the laws of justice, made also other souls which he foresaw would sin, or even persevere in their sins? For even these are still better than those which, having no rational and free choice of will, cannot sin. And these again are still better than the most splendid brightness of any bodies whatever, which some, though in great error, venerate as the substance of the supreme God himself. And if in the order of bodily creatures, from the very brightness of the stars down to the number of our hairs, the beauty of good things is woven together by degrees in such a way that it is most ignorant to say, “What is this? What is this for?” (for all things are created in their order), how much more ignorant it is to say this about any soul, which, to whatever diminution and failure of its beauty it has come, will always, beyond any doubt, surpass the dignity of all bodies!
For reason values things one way and use another. Reason values by the light of truth, so that by right judgment it subjects lesser things to greater; but use is usually inclined by the habit of convenience to value more highly what truth proves to be lesser. For though reason ranks heavenly bodies far above earthly ones, which fleshly man would not rather have one or more stars missing from the sky than one little tree from his field or a cow from his herd? But older people either wholly disregard, or at least patiently wait to correct, the judgments of little children, who, except for some whose love delights them, would rather any other human being died than their sparrow, and much more so if the man is fearsome and the sparrow tuneful and pretty. Just so, those who by the progress of the mind have advanced toward wisdom, when they find unskilled judges of things who praise God in the lesser creatures, which suit their fleshly senses better, but in the higher and better ones partly do not praise him or praise him less, partly even try to find fault with them or correct them, and partly do not believe that he is their maker, become accustomed either to disregard the judgments of such people altogether, if they cannot correct them, or to bear and endure them calmly until they correct them.

### Scripture references

- Matt 10:30: allusion, low confidence

### Extrabiblical texts

- Sir 39:21 (Sirach): allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- “What is this? What is this for? For all things are created in their order” recalls Sir 39:21 (tagged as an extrabiblical text).
- Those who “venerate” bodily light “as the substance of the supreme God” are probably the Manichaeans.
- The digital text is garbled in the sentence on the lowest soul and the first body (“primo co popi anim. extrema”); it is translated by sense (“primo corpori animam extremam”).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.5 (PL 32:1256–1258; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-5).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.6

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-6
- Source: PL 32:1258
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Sins done by the will of sinners cannot be attributed to the Creator; even one who says he would rather not exist than be miserable still wills to exist, and whatever misery follows is either just or will not happen.

### Latin text

Quæ cum ita se habeant, tantum abest a vero, quod Crcatori deputanda existimantur pecca!a crca­ lune, qunmvis necesse esi fiant quæ ipse futura præ­ scivit, ut cum tu dixeris non tc invenire quomodo non. ei deputetur quidquid in ejus creatura fieri necesse est; ego contra non inveniam modum, neque inveniri posse atque omnino non esse co nfirmem, quo ei de. putetur quidquid in ejus creatura ita fieri necesse est, ut voluntate peccantium fiant. Si enim quis dixerit, Non esse, quam miserum me csse mallem: respondeho, Mentiris. Nam ei nunc miser es, nec ob aliud mori non vis, nisi ut sis: ita cum miser nolis esse, esse vis tamen. Age igitur gratias ex eo quod es volens, ut quod invitus es auferatur. Volens enim es, et miser invitus es. Quod si ingratus cs in co quod esse vis, jure cogeris esse quod non vis. Ex illo igitur quod eliam ingratus habes quod vis, Creatoris laudo boni­ talem: ex illo autem quod pateris ingratus quod non vis, ordinatoris laudo jusliliarn. Si dixerit, Non ideo mori nolo, quod malim mi­ scr csse quam omnino non esse, scd ne post mortem miserior sim: respondebo, Si hoc injustum est, non sic eris; si autem hoc justum est, laudemus eum cu­ jus Icgibus sic eris. Si dixerit, Unde præsumam quod si hoc injustum est, non sic ero? respondebo, Quia si cris in tua potestate, aut miser non eris, aut tu ipse te injustc regendo, juste eris miscr; aut volendo et non valendo tc juste regere, non eris in tui potestate, et aut in nullius eris, aut in alterius: si in nullius, aut in­ vitus, aut volens: sed invitus esse nihil potes, nisi te vis aliqua supcraverit; porro nuila vi superari potest, qui est in nullius potestate: si autem volens in nullius eris pofestate, ad hoc ratio recurrit, ut sis in tua; et aut te injuste regendo juste miser sis; aut quoniam qu dlibet volens cris, habes adhuc unde gratias agas bon:itali Conditoris tui. Quod si in lua potestate non eris, aut potentior profecto, aut infirmior te habebit in potestate. Quod si infirmior, tua culpa, ct justa miseria: poteris enim infirmiorem superare si voles. Si autem potentior te infirmiorem habebit in pote­ state, nullo modo tam rectam ordinationem recte in­ justam putabis. Verissime igitur dictum est: Si hoc injustum est, non sic eris; si autem justum, laude­ mus eum cujus legibus sic eris.

### English translation (Claude)

This being so, it is so far from true that the sins of a creature are to be attributed to the Creator, although what he foreknew would happen must necessarily happen, that, while you said you could not find how whatever must necessarily happen in his creation is not to be attributed to him, I on the contrary cannot find a way, and I affirm that none can be found and that there is none at all, by which whatever must necessarily happen in his creation in such a way that it happens by the will of those who sin is to be attributed to him. For if anyone says, “I would rather not exist than be miserable,” I will answer: “You lie. For you are miserable now, and you do not want to die for no other reason than that you may exist; so, though you do not want to be miserable, you nevertheless want to exist. Give thanks, then, for what you willingly are, so that what you unwillingly are may be taken away. For you exist willingly, and you are miserable unwillingly. And if you are ungrateful for what you want to be, you are justly forced to be what you do not want.” So, from the fact that even when ungrateful you have what you want, I praise the goodness of the Creator; and from the fact that, being ungrateful, you suffer what you do not want, I praise the justice of the one who orders all things.
If he says, “I do not want to die, not because I would rather be miserable than not exist at all, but lest I be more miserable after death,” I will answer: “If this is unjust, you will not be so; but if it is just, let us praise him by whose laws you will be so.” If he says, “From where do I presume that if this is unjust I will not be so?” I will answer: “Because if you are in your own power, either you will not be miserable, or, by ruling yourself unjustly, you will be justly miserable; or, wanting and not being able to rule yourself justly, you will not be in your own power, and you will be either in no one's power or in another's. If in no one's, then either unwillingly or willingly. But you can be nothing unwillingly unless some force has overcome you; and one who is in no one's power cannot be overcome by any force. And if you are willingly in no one's power, the reasoning comes back to this, that you are in your own; and either, by ruling yourself unjustly, you are justly miserable, or, since whatever you are you will be willingly, you still have reason to give thanks to the goodness of your Maker. And if you are not in your own power, either something more powerful or something weaker than you will have you in its power. If something weaker, the fault is yours, and the misery just; for you could overcome the weaker if you wanted. But if something more powerful has you, the weaker, in its power, you will in no way rightly think so right an ordering unjust.” So it was said most truly: “If this is unjust, you will not be so; but if it is just, let us praise him by whose laws you will be so.”

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.6 (PL 32:1258; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-6).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.7

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-7
- Source: PL 32:1258–1259
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Even the miserable prefer to exist, which shows how great a good being is; by loving and increasing existence one draws near to him who supremely is and escapes misery.

### Latin text

Si dixerit: Ideo magis volo vel miser esse, quam omnino non esse, quia jam sum; si autem priusquam essem possem consuli, eligerem non esse potius quam ut essem miser. Nunc cnim quod timeo non esse cum miser sim, ad ipsam miseriam pertinet, qua non id volo, quod velle deberem; magis enim non esse, quam miser esse velle deberem. Nunc vero fatcor nic qua­ dem malle vcl miserum esse quam nihil; sed tanto stultius id volo, quanto miscrius: tanto autem misc­ rius, quanto verius video non hoc Ine vellc dcbuissc. Respondebo: Cave potius ne hic crres, ubi te videre verum putas. Nam si bcatus esses, utique esse quam non esse malles; et nunc miser cum sis, mavis tamen esse vcl miscr quam omnino non esse, cum esse nolis miser. Considera igitur, quantum potes, quam magnum bonum sit ipsum esse, quod ei beati et miseri volunt. Nam si hoc bene consideraveris, videbis te in tantum esse miscrum, in quantum non propinquas ei quod summe est; in tantum autem putare melius esse, ut quisque non sit quam ut miser sit, in quantum non vi­ des quod summe est: et ideo tamen te esse velle, quo­ niam ab illo es qui summe est. Si vis itaque miseriam fugere, ama in te hoc ipsum, quia esse vis. Si enim magis magisque esse vo­ lucris, ei quod summe est propinquabis: et gratias age nunc quia es. Quamvis euim beatis sis inferior, supe. rior tamen es quam ea quai non habent vel beatitudi­ nis voluntatem; quorum tamen multi ctiam a miseris laudantur. Omnia tamcn eo ipso quo sunt, jure lau­ danda suut; quia eo ipso quo sunt, bona sunt. Quanto enim ainplius esse amaveris, tanto amplius vitam æternam desiderabis, teque ita formari cxoptabis, ut affectiones tuæ non sint temporales, de temporalium rerum amoribus inustæ et impressæ: quæ temporalia et antequam sint non sunt, et cum sunt fuginnt, et cum fugerint non erunt. Itaque cum futura sunt, nonduln sunt; cum autem præter la suut, jam non sunt. Quo­ modo igitur tenebuntur ut maneant, quibus hoc est incipere ut sint, quod est pergere ut non sint? Qni au­ tem amat esse, probat ista in quantum sunt, et amat quod semper est. Et si var iabatur in amore istorum, munietur in illius; et si diffluebat in amore trans­ euntium, in permanentis amorc solidabitur, et stabit, et obtinebit ipsum esse, quod volebat cum timebat non esse, et stare non potcrat irretitus amore fugientium. Non igitur tibi displiceat, imo maxime placcat, quod mavis esse vel miser, quam propterca miser non esse, quia nihil cris. Huic enim exordio quo esse vis, si ad­ jicias magis magisque esse, consurgis atquc exstruc­ ris in id quod summe cst; atquc ita te ab omni labe cohibebis, qua trausil ut non sit quod infime est, et tecum amantis vires subruit. Hinc fiet ut qui mavult non esse, ne miser sil, quia non esse non potest, restet ut miser sit. Qui autem plus amat esse quam odit miser esse, adjiciendo ad id quod amat, quod odit excludat: cum enim in suo gcnerc perfecec esse coeperit, miser non erit.

### English translation (Claude)

If he says: “I would rather be even miserable than not exist at all, because I already exist; but if I could have been consulted before I existed, I would have chosen not to exist rather than to be miserable. For now, that I fear not to exist though I am miserable belongs to my very misery, by which I do not will what I ought to will; for I ought to will not to exist rather than to be miserable. But now I admit that I would rather be even miserable than nothing; yet I will this the more foolishly the more miserable I am, and I am the more miserable the more truly I see that I ought not to have willed it”: I will answer, “Beware rather that you do not err here, where you think you see the truth. For if you were happy, you would certainly prefer to exist rather than not to exist; and now, though you are miserable, you still prefer to exist, even miserable, rather than not to exist at all, though you do not want to be miserable. Consider, then, as far as you can, how great a good being itself is, which both the happy and the miserable want. For if you consider this well, you will see that you are miserable insofar as you do not draw near to that which supremely is; that you think it better for someone not to exist than to be miserable insofar as you do not see that which supremely is; and that you nonetheless want to exist because you are from him who supremely is.”
If, then, you want to flee misery, love in yourself this very fact that you want to exist. For if you want to exist more and more, you will draw near to that which supremely is; and give thanks now that you exist. For although you are lower than the happy, you are yet higher than the things that do not even have the will for happiness, many of which are nevertheless praised even by the miserable. Yet all things, by the very fact that they exist, are rightly to be praised, because by the very fact that they exist they are good. For the more you love to exist, the more you will desire eternal life, and you will long to be so formed that your affections are not temporal, branded and stamped with the loves of temporal things; for temporal things are not before they are, flee while they are, and will not be when they have fled. So when they are future, they are not yet; and when they are past, they are no longer. How, then, will they be held so as to remain, when for them to begin to be is to proceed toward not being? But one who loves to exist approves them insofar as they exist, and loves what always is. And if he was unstable in the love of these, he will be strengthened in the love of that; and if he was dissipated in the love of passing things, he will be made solid in the love of what abides, and will stand, and will obtain that very being which he wanted when he feared not to exist and could not stand, entangled in the love of fleeting things. So let it not displease you, but rather please you greatly, that you would rather exist even miserable than cease to be miserable by being nothing. For if to this beginning, your will to exist, you add more and more being, you rise up and are built up toward that which supremely is; and so you will hold yourself back from every fall by which what is lowest passes into not being and with itself undermines the strength of the one who loves it. Hence it comes about that one who prefers not to exist, so as not to be miserable, is left to be miserable, since he cannot not exist. But one who loves to exist more than he hates to be miserable, by adding to what he loves, may shut out what he hates; for when he has begun to exist perfectly in his own kind, he will not be miserable.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.7 (PL 32:1258–1259; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-3/#p-3-7).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.8

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-8
- Source: PL 32:1259
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: No one can rightly choose not to exist, since non-existence is nothing; even those who take their own lives desire rest, which is more being, not annihilation.

### Latin text

Nam illud vide quam absurde et inconvenienter dicatur: Mallem non esse quam miser esse. Qui enim dicit, Mallem hoc quam illud, eligit aliquid. Non esse autcm non est aliquid, sed nihil; et ideo nullo pacto potes recte eligere, quando quod eligas non est. Di­ cis velle te quidem esse, cum sis miser, sed non hoc velle debuisse. Quid igitur velle debuisti? Non esse, inquis, potius. Si hrc velle debuisti, hoc est melius; quod autem non est, melius esse non potest: non ergo jd velle debuisti; veraciorque sensus est quo id non vis, quam opinatio per quam te id velle debuisse ar­ bitraris. Deinde quod quisque recte eligit appetendum, cum ad id pervenerit, necesse est melior fiat; melior antem esse non poterit, qui non erit: nemo igitur recto potest eligere ut non sit. Neque enim moveri nos opor. tet eorum judicio, qni urgente miseria sese intereme­ runt. Aut enim eo confugerunt, ubi melius fore sibi putarunt; et non est contrariam rationi nostræ, quo­ quo modo putaverint: aut si nullos se futuros omnino crediderunt, multo minus falsa electio nihil eligentium commovebit. Quomodo enim seqnar eligentem, a quo si qu:rram quid eligat, respondebit, Nihil? Nam qui eligit non esse, profecto se nihil eligere, etiamsi boc nolit respondere, convincitur. Verumtamen ut de h ic tota re, si potero, di­ cnm quod sentio: nemo mihi videtur cum seipsum necat, aut quolibet modo emori cupit, habere ill sensu quod post mortem non sit futurus; tametsi aliquan­ tum hoc in opinione habeat. Nam opinio aut in errore, aut in veritate ratiocinantis est, vel credenitis: sensus autem aut consuetudine, aut natura valet. Possc aulcm fieri ut aliud sit in opinione, aliud in sensu, vel ex hoc cognoscere facile est, quod plerumque alind faciendum esse credimus. et aliud facere delectat. Et aliquando veracior est sensus quam opinio, si illa de errore, ille de natnra est: velut cum æger plerumque aqua frigida conducibiliter delectatur, quam tamen credit, si bi­ berit, esse nocituram. Aliquando veracior opinio quam sensus, si credit arti medicinæ, obesse frigidam, cum revera oberit, et tamen bibere delectet: aliquando utrumque in veritate cst, cum id quod prodest, non solum ita creditur, sed etiam libel; aliquando nitrum­ que in errore, cum id quod nocet, et prodesse credi­ tur, et libere non desinit. Solet autem et recta opinio pravam corrigere consuetudinem, et prava opinio re­ eta In depravare naturam: tanta vis e>t in dominatu et | rinciptu rationis. Cum ergo quisque credens quod post mortem non erit, intolerabilibus tamen mo­ lestiis ad lotam cupiditatem mortis impellitur, et de­ cernit atque arripit mortem; in opinione habet erro­ rem omnimodæ defectionis, in sensu autem naturale dcside ium quietis. Quod autem quietum est, uon est nihil; imo etiam magis est quam id quod inquietum est. Inquietudo euim variat aflectioncs, lit altera al­ teramperimat: quies autem habet constantiam, in qua maxime intelligitur quod dicitur, est. Omnis itaque ille appetitus in voluntate mortis, non ut qui moritur non sit, sed ut requiescat intenditur. Ita cum errore credat non se futurum, natura tamen quietus esse, hoc est magis esse desiderat. Quapropter, sicut nullo pacto fieri potest ut non esse aliquem libeat; ita nullo pacto fieri oportet ut ex eo quod est quisque, bouitati Crea­ toris ingratus sit.

### English translation (Claude)

For see how absurdly and inconsistently it is said: “I would rather not exist than be miserable.” For one who says, “I would rather this than that,” chooses something. But not to exist is not something but nothing; and so you can in no way choose rightly, when what you would choose does not exist. You say that you do indeed want to exist, since you are miserable, but that you ought not to have wanted this. What, then, ought you to have wanted? “Rather not to exist,” you say. If you ought to have wanted this, this is better; but what does not exist cannot be better; so you ought not to have wanted it; and the feeling by which you do not want it is truer than the opinion by which you think that you ought to have wanted it. Further, what anyone rightly chooses as a thing to be sought must, when he has reached it, make him better; but one who will not exist cannot be better; so no one can rightly choose not to exist. Nor should we be moved by the judgment of those who, under the pressure of misery, have killed themselves. For either they fled to where they thought it would be better for them, and this, whatever they thought, is not contrary to our reasoning; or, if they believed that they would be nothing at all, much less will the false choice of those who chose nothing move us. For how shall I follow one who chooses, if, when I ask him what he chooses, he will answer, “Nothing”? For one who chooses not to exist is certainly shown to choose nothing, even if he does not want to answer so.
But to say what I think about this whole matter, if I can: no one, it seems to me, when he kills himself or in any way desires to die, has it in his feeling that he will not exist after death, although he may have this to some extent in his opinion. For opinion belongs to the error or the truth of one who reasons or believes; but feeling draws its force either from habit or from nature. And that one thing can be in opinion and another in feeling is easy to recognize even from this, that we often believe one thing should be done and delight in doing another. And sometimes feeling is truer than opinion, if the opinion comes from error and the feeling from nature, as when a sick man often delights, to his benefit, in cold water which he nevertheless believes will harm him if he drinks it. Sometimes opinion is truer than feeling, if he believes the art of medicine that cold water is harmful, when it really will harm him, and yet it delights him to drink. Sometimes both are in the truth, when what is beneficial is not only believed to be so but also pleases; sometimes both are in error, when what is harmful is both believed to be beneficial and does not cease to please. And right opinion often corrects a bad habit, and wrong opinion depraves a right nature: such is the force of the rule and sovereignty of reason. When, then, someone who believes that he will not exist after death is nevertheless driven by intolerable troubles to a total desire for death, and decides on death and seizes it, he has in his opinion the error of complete annihilation, but in his feeling the natural desire for rest. And what is at rest is not nothing; rather, it is even more than what is restless. For restlessness varies the affections, so that one destroys another; but rest has constancy, in which what is meant by “it is” is most of all understood. So all that desire in the will to die is directed not to the dying person's not existing but to his resting. So, though he wrongly believes that he will not exist, by nature he desires to be at rest, that is, to exist more. Therefore, just as it can in no way happen that not existing should please anyone, so it should in no way happen that anyone is ungrateful to the goodness of the Creator for the fact that he exists.

### Translation notes

- Augustine discusses suicide here only to show that no one truly wills non-existence; the passage is translated as written.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.8 (PL 32:1259; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-8).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.9

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-9
- Source: PL 32:1259–1261
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: God rightly made every grade of creature, as the moon beside the sun; not sin but souls able to sin complete the universe, and just punishment fits sinful souls into its order, while the proud who refuse the humility shown by Christ share the punishment of the fallen angels.

### Latin text

Si dixerit: Non crat tamen difficile aut laborio­ sum omnipotenti Deo, ut omnia quæcumque fecit sie haberent ordinem suum, ut nulia creatura usque ad miscriam perveniret; uon enim hoc aut omnipotens non potuit, aut bonus invidit. Respondebo, ordinem creaturarum a summa us quead infimam gradibus justis ita decurrere, ut illu inv:dcat qui dixerit, Ista non esset; invideat etiam ille qui dixerit, Ista talis esset. Si enim talem vult esse qualis est superior, jam illa est, et tanta est ut adjici ei non oporteat, quia perfecta est. Qui crgo dicit, Eliam ista talis esset, aut perfectie superiori vult addere, et erit immoderatus ct injustus; aut istam vult interimere, et erit malus atque invidus. Qui autem dixerit, Ista non esset, nihilominus erit malus atque invidus, cum eam non vult esse, qua in­ feriorem laudarc adhuc cogitur. Velut si dicat, Non esset luna, cum etiam lucernæ claritatem longe infe­ riorem, in suo tamcn genere pulchram, et terrenis te­ nebris esse decoram atque aptam nocturnis usibus, atque in his omnibus pro suo modulo utique laudahi­ lem aut fatealur, aut stultissime vel contentiose neget. Quomodo ergo rectc dicere audebit, Luna non esset in rebus, qui si diceret, Lucerna non esset, deridendum sc esse sentiret? Quod si non dicit, Luna non esset, sed qualem solem videt, talem dicit lunam esse debuisse, non intelligit nihil aliud se dicere quam, Non esset luna, sed essent soles duo. In quo dupliciter errat, quod rerum perfectioni et addere aliquid cupit, cum desidcraL alterum solem; et minuere, cum lunam vult detrahi. Hic fortasse dicat, ideo nihil se de luna con­ queri, quia splendor ejus ita minor cst, ut miser non sit; de animarum autem non obscuriiate, sed miseria an dolere. Sedulo cogitet, ita lunæ splendorem non esse miserum, ut nec splendor solis sit beatus. Quam­ vis enim corpora cælestia sint, corpora sunt tamen quantum ad lucem istam pertinet, quæ per corporeos oculos sentiri potest. Nulla autem corpora, quantum a i sese attinet, vel beata possunt esse, vel misera; quanquam beatorum aut miserorum corpora possint esse. Sed de illis luminibus similitudo adhibita id do­ cet, ut quemadmodum corporum differentias contem­ plando, videns alia clariora, injuste petis auferri quæ obscuriora conspexeris, aut clarioribus adæquari; sed ad perfectionem universitatis referens omnia, quanto magis minusve inter se clara sunt, tanto magis cernis esse omnia; nec lilii occurrit perfecta universitas, nisi ubi majora sic præsto suut, ut minora non desint; s:e etiam differentias animarum cogites, in quibus I:oc quoque invenies, ut miseriam quam doles, ad id quo­ q ie valere cognoscas, ut universitatis perfectioni nec illæ desint animæ, quæ miseræ fieri debuerunt, quia peccatrices esse voluerunt. Tantumque abest ut Deus tales facere non debuerit, ut eliam cæteras creaturas laudabiliter fecerit longe inferiores animis miseris. Sed adhuc videtur minus intelligens quod dictum est, habere quod contradicat. Dicit enim: Si uuiver­ sitatis perfectionem complet etiam nostra miseria, defuisset aliquid huic perfectioni, si beati semper essemus. Quapropter si ad miseriam nisi peccando non pervenit anima, etiam peccata nostra necessaria sunt perfectioni universitatis quam condidit Deus, Quomodo ergo juste peccata punit, quae si defuissent, creatura ejus plena et perfecta non esset? Hic respon­ detur, nou ipsa peccata vel ipsam miseriam perfectioni universitatis esse necessaria, sed animas in quantum animae sunt; quae si velint, peccant; si peccaverint, miseræ fiunt. Si enim peccatis earum detractis miseria perseverat, aut etiam peccata præcedit, recte defor­ mari dicitur ordo atque administratio universitatis. Rursus, si peccata fiant, et desit miseria, nihilominus dehonestat ordinem iniquitas. Cum autem non pec­ cantibus adest beatitudo, perfecta est universitas. Cum vero peccantibus adest miseria, nihilominus perfecta est universitas. Qnod autem ipsæ non desunt animæ. quas vel peccantes sequitur miseria, vel recte facien­ les beatitudo, semper naturis omnibus universitas plena atque perfecta est. Non enim peccatum et sup­ plicium peccati naturæ sunt quædam, sed affectiones. naturarum, illa voluntaria, ista pœnalis. Sed voluntaria quæ in peccato fit, turpis affectio esi. Cui propterea poenalis adhibetur, utordinct eam, ubi talem esse non lurpc sit, et decori universitatis congruere cogat, ut peccati dedecus emendet poena peccati. Hinc lit ut peccans creatura superior, a crea­ turis inferioribus puniatur, quia illæ tam sunt infimae, ut ornari etiam a lurpibus animis possint, atque ita decori universitatis congruere. Quid enim tam magnum in domo est quam homo? et quid lam abjectum et infimum quam cloaca domus? Servus tamen in tali peccato delectus, ut mundandæ cloacæ dignus habea­ tur, ornat eam eliam turpitudine sua; et utrumque horum, id est turpitudo servi, et mundatio cloacæ, jam conjunctum et redactum in quamdam sui generis unitatem, ita dispositae domui coaptatur atque sub­ texitur, ut ejus universitati ordinatissimo decorccon­ veniat. Qui tamen servus si peccare noluisset, non dcfuissot domesticæ disciplinne alia provisio, qua necessaria mundarentur. Quid itaque tam infimum in rebus quam corpus omne lerrenum? Hanc tamen cor­ ruptibilem carnem eliam peccatrix anima sic ornat, III ei speciem decentissimam pra.beat, motumque vita­ lem. Habitationi ergo cœlesti talis anima non congruit pcr peccatum, terrestri autem congruit per supplicium; ut quodlibet elegerit, semper sit pulchra universitas decentissimis partibus ordinata, cujus est conditor et administrator Deus. Namque optim;e animae cum in infimis creaturis habitant, non cas ornant miseria sua, quam non habent, sed usu earum bono. Si autem peccatrices animæ permittantur habilare in suhlimi­ bus locis, inhonestum cst; quia non conveniunt illis, quibus nee bene uti possunt, nec ornamenti aliquid coufcrunt. Ideo quanquam orbis iste terrenus rebus cor­ ruptibilibus deputatus sit, tamen servans quantum potest imaginem superiorum, exempla nobis et indicia quædam demonstrare non cessat. Si enim bonum et magnum aliquem virum, hortante honestatis officin. videamus ignibus, quantum ad corpus attinl, con­ cremari; non hoe vocamus pœnam peccali, sed for­ titudinis et patientiæ documentum, eumque magis diligimus, cum foedissima corruptio corporea membra ejus absumat, quam si nihil hujusmodi pateretur; miramur quippc animi naturam mutabilitate corporis non mutari. At vero crudelissimi latronis membra cum tali supplicio confici aspicimus, approbamus or­ dinem legum. Ornant ergo ambo illa tormenta; scd ille merito virtutis, iste peccati. At si post illos ignes, vel etiam ante illos, optimum virum illum commuta- Ium ad congruentiam cœlestis habitationis ad sidera videremus attolli, utique lætaremur. Si autem scele­ ratum latronem, sive ante supplicium, sive post sup­ plicium. cum eadem malitia voluntatis ad sedem hono­ ris sempiternam levari videremus in cœlum, quis non offenderetur? Ita fit ut inferiores creaturas ambo ornare potuerint, superiores autcm unus illorum. Ex quo admonemur advertere, mortalitatem carnis hujus et primum hominem ornasse, ut peccato pœna con­ grueret, et Dominum nostrum, ut a peccato misericor­ dia liberaret. Non autem sicut justus potuit in ipsa justitia permanens corpus habere mortale; ita iniquus potest, dum iniquus est, ad immortalitatem pervenire sanctorum, scilicet sublimem et angelicam; non eorum angelorum, de quibus Apostolus ait, Nescitis quia angelos sumus judicaturi; scd corum de quibus Dominus ait, Et erunt æquales Angelis Dei. Qui enim æqualitatem Angelorum desi­ derant propter inanem gloriam suam, non ideo volunt æquales esse Angelis, sed Angelos sibi. Itaque in tali voluntate perseverantes, æquabuntur supplicio præ­ varicatoribus angelis, potestatem suam potius qnam Dei omnipotentis diligentibus. Talibus enim ad sini­ stram constitutis, quia non quæsierunt Deum per humilitatis januam, quam in seipso Dominus Jesus Christus ostendit, et immisericorditer superbeque vixerunt, dicetur, Ite in ignem æternum, qui præpara­ tus est diabolo et angelis ejus.

### English translation (Claude)

If he says, “Yet it was not difficult or laborious for almighty God so to order all the things he made that no creature would come to misery; for being almighty he could not have been unable to do this, nor being good would he have begrudged it,” I will answer: the order of creatures runs down from the highest to the lowest by just degrees in such a way that he who says, “This one should not exist,” is envious, and he who says, “This one should be like that,” is envious too. For if he wants it to be like the higher one, that higher one already exists, and is so great that nothing should be added to it, because it is perfect. So he who says, “This one too should be like that,” either wants to add to the perfect higher one, and will be immoderate and unjust, or wants to destroy this one, and will be wicked and envious. And he who says, “This one should not exist,” will be no less wicked and envious, since he does not want that to exist which, though lower, he is still compelled to praise. It is as if he were to say, “There should be no moon,” when he either admits that even the brightness of a lamp, though far inferior, is beautiful in its kind, becoming in the earthly darkness, fit for night-time uses, and in all these things surely praiseworthy in its small measure, or denies it most foolishly or contentiously. How, then, would he dare to say rightly, “There should be no moon among things,” when, if he said, “There should be no lamp,” he would feel that he deserved to be laughed at? And if he does not say, “There should be no moon,” but says that the moon ought to have been such as he sees the sun, he does not understand that he says nothing else than, “There should be no moon, but two suns.” In this he errs doubly: he wants both to add something to the perfection of things, when he desires another sun, and to take something away, when he wants the moon removed.
Here he may perhaps say that he makes no complaint about the moon, because its brightness is lesser in such a way that it is not miserable; but that he grieves not over the dimness but over the misery of souls. Let him consider carefully that the moon's brightness is not miserable, just as the sun's brightness is not happy. For although they are heavenly bodies, they are still bodies as far as this light is concerned, which can be perceived through bodily eyes. And no bodies, as far as they themselves are concerned, can be either happy or miserable, although there can be bodies of the happy or of the miserable. But the comparison drawn from those lights teaches this. In contemplating the differences of bodies and seeing some brighter, you would unjustly ask that those you see dimmer be taken away or made equal to the brighter; but, referring all things to the perfection of the universe, you see that the more they differ in brightness from one another, the more all of them exist; and a perfect universe does not appear to you except where the greater are present in such a way that the lesser are not lacking. So think also of the differences of souls, in which you will find this too: that the misery you lament also serves this purpose, that the perfection of the universe should not lack even those souls which had to become miserable because they willed to be sinful. And so far is it from true that God ought not to have made such souls, that he has also made, in a praiseworthy way, other creatures far lower than miserable souls.
But one who understands less still seems to have something to say against what has been said. For he says: “If even our misery completes the perfection of the universe, something would have been lacking to this perfection if we had always been happy. So if the soul comes to misery only by sinning, even our sins are necessary to the perfection of the universe that God founded. How, then, does he justly punish sins, without which his creation would not be full and perfect?” The answer is that neither sins nor misery themselves are necessary to the perfection of the universe, but souls insofar as they are souls, which, if they will, sin, and if they have sinned, become miserable. For if, when their sins are taken away, misery continues, or even precedes sins, then the order and governance of the universe is rightly said to be disfigured. Again, if sins happen and misery is absent, injustice no less dishonors the order. But when happiness attends those who do not sin, the universe is perfect; and when misery attends those who sin, the universe is no less perfect. And since those souls are not lacking which misery follows when they sin, or happiness when they act rightly, the universe is always full and perfect with all natures. For sin and the punishment of sin are not natures but states of natures, the one voluntary, the other penal. But the voluntary state that comes about in sin is shameful. To it the penal state is applied in order to set it where it is not shameful to be such, and to compel it to fit the beauty of the universe, so that the punishment of sin corrects the disgrace of sin.
Hence it is that a higher creature that sins is punished by lower creatures, since these are so low that they can be adorned even by shameful souls and so fit the beauty of the universe. For what is so great in a house as a human being? And what so abject and low as the house's sewer? Yet a slave caught in such a fault that he is thought fit to clean the sewer adorns it even by his disgrace; and both of these, the disgrace of the slave and the cleaning of the sewer, now joined and brought into a kind of unity of their own, are so fitted and woven into the well-ordered house that they suit its whole in most orderly beauty. Yet if that slave had not wanted to sin, the household management would not have lacked some other provision by which the necessary cleaning would be done. What, then, is so low among things as every earthly body? Yet even a sinful soul so adorns this corruptible flesh that it gives it a most becoming appearance and vital motion. Such a soul, then, does not fit the heavenly dwelling because of sin, but fits the earthly one through punishment; so that, whatever it chooses, the universe, of which God is the maker and governor, is always beautiful, ordered with most becoming parts. For the best souls, when they dwell among the lowest creatures, adorn them not by their misery, which they do not have, but by their good use of them. But if sinful souls were allowed to dwell in lofty places, it would be unseemly, because they do not suit things which they can neither use well nor adorn in any way.
So, although this earthly world is assigned to corruptible things, yet, keeping as far as it can an image of higher things, it does not cease to show us examples and certain signs. For if we see some good and great man, at the urging of the duty of honor, burned with fire as far as his body is concerned, we do not call this the punishment of sin but a proof of fortitude and patience; and we love him more when the most hideous corruption consumes his bodily limbs than if he suffered nothing of the kind; for we marvel that the nature of the mind is not changed by the changeableness of the body. But when we see the limbs of a most cruel robber destroyed by such a punishment, we approve the order of the laws. So both those torments adorn; but the one by the merit of virtue, the other by that of sin. And if, after those fires, or even before them, we saw that excellent man changed to suit a heavenly dwelling and raised to the stars, we would surely rejoice. But if we saw the wicked robber, either before or after his punishment, raised with the same malice of will to an everlasting seat of honor in heaven, who would not be offended? So it is that both could adorn lower creatures, but only one of them the higher. From this we are reminded to notice that the mortality of this flesh adorned both the first man, so that punishment fitted sin, and our Lord, so that mercy might set us free from sin. But it is not the case that, just as the just man could have a mortal body while remaining in justice itself, so the unjust man, while he is unjust, can attain the immortality of the saints, that is, the lofty and angelic immortality; not that of those angels of whom the Apostle says, “Do you not know that we are to judge angels?” but of those of whom the Lord says, “And they will be equal to the angels of God.” For those who desire equality with the angels for their own empty glory do not therefore want to be equal to the angels, but want the angels equal to themselves. So, persevering in such a will, they will be made equal in punishment to the transgressing angels, who love their own power rather than that of almighty God. To such, set on the left, because they did not seek God through the door of humility which the Lord Jesus Christ showed in himself, and lived without mercy and proudly, it will be said: “Depart into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.”

### Scripture references

- 1 Cor 6:3: quotation, high confidence
- Luke 20:36: quotation, high confidence
- Matt 25:33: allusion, medium confidence
- Matt 25:41: quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- 1 Cor 6:3; Luke 20:36 (compare Matt 22:30); Matt 25:41, with the sheep and goats “on the left” (Matt 25:33).
- The good man burned for the sake of duty is probably a martyr; Augustine does not name anyone.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.9 (PL 32:1259–1261; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-9).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.10

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-10
- Source: PL 32:1261–1262
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Sins arise from one's own thought or from another's persuasion; man, persuaded by the devil, was justly subjected to him, until the Word became flesh and, killed though sinless and born without lust, justly freed those who believe in him.

### Latin text

Cum enim duæ sint origines peccatorum, una spontanea cogitatione, alia persuasione alterius, quo pertincre arbitror quod Propheta dicit: Ab occultis meis munda me, Dominc, et ab alienis parte servo tuo: utrumque voluntarium est qui­ dcm. Nam sicut propria cogitationc non peccat invitus, ita dum consentit male suadenti, non utique nisi vo­ luntate consentit: sed tamen gravius est, non solum nullo suadente propria cogitatione peccare, sed etiam peccandum alteri per invidentiam dolumque suadere, quam ad peccandum alterius suasione traduci. Servata est ergo in utroque peccato justitia Domini punientis. Nam et illud appensum cst æquitatis examine, ut nec ipsius diaboli potestati negaretur homo, quem sibi male suadendo subjecerat. Iniquum enim erat ut ei quem ceperat, non dominaretur. Nee fieri ullo modo potest ut Dei summi et veri perfecta justitia, quæ usquequaque pertenditur, deserat etiam ordinandas ruinas peccantium. Et tamen quia minus peccaverat homo quam diabolus, idipsum ei valuit ad reparandam salutem, quod principi hujus mundi, partis rerum scilicet hujus mortalis atquo infimæ, hoc est principi omnium peccatorum, et praeposito mortis, usque ad mortalitatem carnis addictus cst. Ita enim conscientia mortalitatis timidus, et a vilissimis et abjectissimis bestiis vel etiam minutissimis, molestias atque inter­ itum reformidans, incertusque futurorum, et illicitas cohibere lætitias, et maxime superbiam, cnjus per­ suasione dejectus est, et quo uno vitio misericordiæ medicina respuitur, frangere consuevit. Quid enim tam opns habens misericordia quam miser? Et quid tam indignum misericordia quam superbus miser? Ex quo factum est ut illud Dei Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia, et quo fruitur omnis angelica beatitudo, usque ad miseriam nostram clementiam suam porrigeret, et Verbum caro fieret, ct habitaret in nobis. Sic enim posset panem An­ gelorum homo manducare, nondum Angelis adaequa­ tus, si panis ipse Angelorum hominibus dignaretur aequari. Nec sic descendit ad nos, ut illos desereret; sed simul integer illis, integer nobis, illos intrinsecus pascens per id quod Deus est, nos forinsecus adrno­ nens per id quod nos sumus, idoneos facit per fidem, quos per speciem pascat æqualiter. Quia enim rationa­ lis creatura Verbo illo tanquam optimo cibo suo pasci­ tur; humana autem anima rationalis est, quæ morta­ libus vinculis peccati poena tenebatur, ad hoc diminu­ tionis redacta, ut per conjecturas rerum visibilium ad intelligenda invisibilia nitcretur: cibus rationalis creaturæ factus est visibilis, non commutatione na. turæ suar, sed habitu nostræ, at visibilia sectantes, ad se invisibilem revocaret. Sic eum anima, quem superbiens intus reliquerat, foris humilem invenit, imitalura ejus humilitatem visibilem, et ad invisibilem altitudinem reditura. Atque Verbum Dei unicus Dei Filius, diabolum quem semper sub legibus suis habuit et habebit, homine indutus etiam homini subjugavit: nihil ei extorquens violento dominatu, sed superans eum lege justitiæ; ut quoniam, femina decepta, et dejecto per feminam viro, omnem prolem primi hominis tanquam peccatricem legibus mortis, malitiosa quidem nocendi cupiditate, sed tamen jure æquissimo vindicabat, tam. diu potestas ejus valeret, donec interficeret justum, in quo nibil dignum morte posset ostendere, non so­ lum quia sine crimine occisus est, sed etiam quia sine libidine natus: cui subjugaverat ille quos ceperat. ut quidquid inde nasceretur, tanquam suæ arboris fructus, prava quidcm habendi cupiditate, sed tameM non iniquo possidendi jure retincret. Justissime ita­ qne dimittere cogitur credentes in eum quem injustis­ sime occidit, ut et quod temporaliter moriuntur, de­ bitum exsolvant, et quod semper vivunt, in illo vivant, qui pro eis quod non debebat exsolvit. Quibus autem infidelitatis perseverantiam persuasisset, juste secum haberet in perpetua damnatione consortes. Ita factum est ut neque diabolo per vim eriperetur homo, quem nec ipse vi, sed persuasione ceperat: ct qui juste plus humiliatus est, ut serviret cui ad malum consense­ rat, juste per eum cui ad bonum consensit liberaretur; quia minus iste in consentiendo, quam ille in male suadendo peccavcrat.

### English translation (Claude)

For there are two origins of sins, one in one's own spontaneous thought, the other in another's persuasion; and to these, I think, refers what the Prophet says: “Cleanse me, Lord, from my hidden sins, and spare your servant from those of others.” Both are indeed voluntary. For just as one does not sin unwillingly by one's own thought, so when one consents to someone who persuades to evil, one consents surely only by the will. Yet it is graver not only to sin by one's own thought with no one persuading, but also to persuade another to sin through envy and deceit, than to be led into sin by another's persuasion. So the justice of the Lord who punishes was preserved in both sins. For this too was weighed in the balance of equity, that man should not be withheld even from the power of the devil himself, whom the devil had subjected to himself by evil persuasion. For it would have been unjust that he should not rule over the one he had captured. Nor can it in any way be that the perfect justice of the supreme and true God, which extends everywhere, should fail to order even the ruins of sinners. And yet, because man had sinned less than the devil, this very thing served him for the recovery of salvation: that he was handed over, even to the mortality of the flesh, to the prince of this world, that is, of this mortal and lowest part of things, the prince of all sins and the ruler of death. For so, made fearful by the awareness of his mortality, dreading troubles and destruction from the vilest and most abject beasts, even the tiniest, and uncertain of the future, he grew used to restraining unlawful pleasures, and above all to breaking pride, by whose persuasion he was cast down, and by which one vice the medicine of mercy is rejected. For what needs mercy so much as one who is miserable? And what is so unworthy of mercy as one who is miserable and proud? Hence it came about that the Word of God, through whom all things were made, and whom all angelic happiness enjoys, extended his clemency even to our misery, and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. For so man, not yet made equal to the angels, could eat the bread of angels, if the bread of angels itself deigned to be made equal to men. Nor did he so come down to us as to abandon them; but at once whole to them and whole to us, feeding them inwardly through what he is as God, admonishing us outwardly through what we are, he makes fit through faith those whom he will feed equally through sight. For the rational creature is fed by that Word as by its best food; and the human soul is rational, but it was held by mortal bonds as the penalty of sin, and reduced to such diminishment that it strove to understand invisible things through conjectures from visible things. So the food of the rational creature became visible, not by changing his own nature but by taking on ours, so that he might call back to himself, the invisible one, those who follow visible things. So the soul, which in its pride had left him within, finds him humble outside, to imitate his visible humility and to return to his invisible height. And the Word of God, the only Son of God, having put on man, subjected even to man the devil, whom he always had and always will have under his laws; wresting nothing from him by violent domination, but overcoming him by the law of justice. For after the woman had been deceived and the man cast down through the woman, the devil claimed all the offspring of the first man as sinners under the laws of death, with a malicious desire to harm, indeed, but yet by a most equitable right; so his power was to last until he should kill the just one, in whom he could show nothing deserving death, not only because he was killed without crime but also because he was born without lust, to which the devil had subjected those whom he had captured, so that whatever was born from it he might keep as the fruit of his own tree, with a perverse desire of having, indeed, but yet by a not unjust right of possession. So, most justly, he is forced to release those who believe in him whom he most unjustly killed, so that in dying temporally they pay a debt, and in living forever they live in him who paid for them what he did not owe. But those whom he had persuaded to persevere in unbelief he would justly have with him as companions in perpetual damnation. So it came about that man was not snatched from the devil by force, since the devil had captured him not by force but by persuasion; and he who was justly humbled the more, so as to serve the one to whom he had consented for evil, was justly set free through the one to whom he consented for good; because he had sinned less in consenting than the devil had in persuading to evil.

### Scripture references

- Ps 19:12 (18:13 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Ps 19:13 (18:14 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- John 12:31: allusion, high confidence
- Heb 2:14: allusion, medium confidence
- John 1:3: allusion, high confidence
- John 1:14: quotation, high confidence
- Ps 78:25 (77:25 Vulg.): allusion, medium confidence
- 1 Tim 2:14: allusion, medium confidence
- Gen 3:6: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Ps 19:12–13 (Ps 18:13–14 in the Latin numbering), quoted in the Latin form “from those of others” (ab alienis); the Hebrew reads “from presumptuous sins.”
- The account of the devil's “right” over fallen humanity, ended justly by the death of the sinless Christ, is Augustine's own and is translated as written.
- “Prince of this world”: John 12:31; “the Word became flesh and dwelt among us”: John 1:14; “bread of angels”: Ps 78:25 (Ps 77:25 in the Latin numbering); the woman deceived: 1 Tim 2:14 and Gen 3.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.10 (PL 32:1261–1262; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-10).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.11

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-11
- Source: PL 32:1262
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: God made both the highest spirits, whose sin would disturb the universe and who hold it together, and lower rational souls, whose sin does not diminish its order; the fallen soul rules its mortal body only within the laws of the universe.

### Latin text

Naturas igitur omnes Dens fecit, non solum in virtute atque justitia permansuras, sed etiam pecca­ turas; nou ut peccarent, sed ut essent ornature uni­ versum, sive peccare, sive non peccare voluissent. Si enim rebus deessent animæ qu;c ipsum fastigium ordinis in universa creatura sic obtinerent, ut si pec­ carc voluissent, infirmaretur et labefactaretur univer­ sitas, magnum quiddam deesset creaturæ: illud enim deesset, quo remoto stabilitas rerum atque connexio turbaretur. Tales sunt optimæ, et sanctæ, et sublimes creaturæ cælestium vel supercœlestium potestatum, quibus solus Deus imperat; universus autem mundus subjeclus est. Sine istarum officiis justis atque perfe­ ctis esse universitas non potest. Item, si deessent quæ sive peccarent, sive non peccarent, nibil universitatis ordini minueretur, etiam sic plurimum deesset. Animæ sunt enim rationales, et illis superioribus officio qui­ dem impares, sed natura pares: quibus adhuc infe­ riores sunt multi, ct tamen laudabiles a summo Deo constitutarum rerum gradus. Illa ergo natura sublimioris officii cst, qua' non solum si non esset, sed etiamsi peccarct, minueret ordinem universitatis. Inferioris officii est ista, quæ tantummodo si non esset, non autem si peccaret, ali­ quid minus babcret universitas. Illi data est potentia omnia continendi officio proprio, quod rerum or­ dini decsse non possit: nec ideo in bona voluntate permanet, quia hoc accepit officium; sed ideo acce­ pit, quoniam ab illo qui dedit permansura prævisa est. Nec tamen sua majestate continet omnia, sed inhæ­ rendo illius majestati, et ejus imperiis devotissime obtemperando, a quo et per quem et in quo facta sunt omnia. Huic autem datum est quidein non peccanti po. tentissimum oflicium continendi omnia; non tamcn proprium, sed cum illa, tanquam ei quae peccatura præcognita est. Habent sane spiritualia quaeque inter sc et conjunctionem sine cumulo, et sejunctionem sine diminutione: ut neque adjuvaretur illa in actionis suæ facilitate, cum hæc sibi conjungeretur; neque difficilior illi actio fieret, si hxc oflicium suum pec­ cando desereret. Non enim locis et mole corporum, sed parilitate affectuum jungi, ct disparilitate sejungi possunt spiritualcs creaturæ. quamvis,corpora sua quaeque possideant. In corporibus autcm inferioribus atque morta­ libus post peccatum anima ordinata, regit corpus suum, non omnimodo pro arbitrio, sed sicut leges universitatis sinunt. Nee ideo tamen talis aaima iu­ ferior est corpore cœlesti, cui corpori etiam corpora terrena subjecta sunt. Pannosa quippe vestis damnati servi multo est inferior veste hene meriti, et in lio­ nore magno apud dominum constituti; sed ipse ser­ vus melior est qualibet veste pretiosa, quia homo est. Illa ergo inhæret Deo, et in coelesti corpore, angelica potestate, etiam terrestre corpus ornat et regit, sic­ ut jubet ille cujus nutum intuetur ineffabiliter. Ista vero mortalibus membris onerata, vix hoc ipsum quo premitur, administrat intrinsecus, et tamen ornat quan­ tum potest: caetera vero extrinsecus adjacentia, longe infirmiore operatione extrinsecus afficit sicut po­ test.

### English translation (Claude)

God, then, made all natures, not only those that would remain in virtue and justice, but also those that would sin; not so that they should sin, but so that they should adorn the universe, whether they willed to sin or not to sin. For if there were lacking among things souls holding the very summit of order in all creation in such a way that, if they willed to sin, the universe would be weakened and shaken, something great would be lacking to creation; for that would be lacking whose removal would disturb the stability and connection of things. Such are the best, holy, and sublime creatures, the heavenly or supercelestial powers, over whom God alone rules, and to whom the whole world is subject. Without their just and perfect services the universe cannot exist. Likewise, if those were lacking whose sinning or not sinning would diminish nothing of the order of the universe, even so a great deal would be lacking. For they are rational souls, unequal indeed in function to those higher ones, but equal in nature; and below them are still many grades of things established by the supreme God, which are nonetheless praiseworthy. That nature, then, is of the higher function which would diminish the order of the universe not only if it did not exist but even if it sinned. This one is of a lower function: the universe would have something less only if it did not exist, but not if it sinned. To the former is given the power of holding all things together by a function of its own, which cannot be lacking to the order of things; nor does it remain in good will because it received this function, but it received it because it was foreseen by him who gave it that it would remain. Nor does it hold all things together by its own majesty, but by cleaving to his majesty and most devotedly obeying the commands of him from whom and through whom and in whom all things were made. To the latter there was indeed given, if it did not sin, a most powerful function of holding all things together, yet not as its own, but together with the former, as to one foreknown to sin. For spiritual beings have among themselves both union without increase and separation without diminution: so the former would neither be helped in the ease of its action when the latter was joined to it, nor would its action become harder if the latter deserted its function by sinning. For spiritual creatures can be joined not by places and the mass of bodies but by likeness of dispositions, and separated by unlikeness, though each possesses its own body.
But the soul, placed in lower and mortal bodies after sin, rules its body not altogether at its own will, but as the laws of the universe allow. Yet such a soul is not therefore lower than a heavenly body, to which even earthly bodies are subject. For the ragged garment of a condemned slave is far inferior to the garment of a slave of good merit, held in great honor by his master; but the slave himself is better than any precious garment, because he is a man. The former soul, then, cleaves to God, and in a heavenly body, by angelic power, adorns and rules even the earthly body, as he commands whose will it ineffably beholds. But this one, burdened with mortal members, barely manages from within the very body by which it is weighed down, and yet adorns it as much as it can; and the other things lying around it outside, it affects outwardly, as far as it can, by a far weaker activity.

### Scripture references

- Rom 11:36: allusion, high confidence

### Translation notes

- “From whom and through whom and in whom all things were made” echoes Rom 11:36.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.11 (PL 32:1262; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-11).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.12

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-12
- Source: PL 32:1262–1263
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: The highest spirits abstain from sin freely; yet even if all angels had sinned, God could rule the universe by himself or create others, so he is to be praised in every case.

### Latin text

Unde colligitur non defuturum fuisse ornatum congruentissimum infimæ corporeæ creaturæ, etiamsi ista peccare noluisset. Quoniam quæ totum potest rogere, etiam partem rcgit; quae autem minus potest, non continuo potest ampliora. Perfectus enim medi­ cus etiam scabiem sanat efficaciter; at non continue qui scabioso utiliter consulit, universæ humanæ vale­ tudini mederi potest. Et ratio quidem si certa coa­ spicitur, qua manifestum fiat esse oportuisse creatu­ ran quæ nunquam peccavcrit, nunquam peccatura sit, ctiain illud eadem ratio renuntiata peccato illam libera voluntate abstinere, neque coactam uon pec­ care, sed sponte.Verumtamen etiamsi peccaret (quan­ quam non peccavit, sicut cam non peccaturam præ­ scivit Deus): tamen si etiam ipsa peccaret, sufficeret Dei potestas ineffabilis potentiæ ad regendam istam uuiversitatein, ut omnibus congrua et condigna re­ tribuens, nihil in toto imperio suo turpe atque inde­ corum essc permitteret. Quia sive per nullas ad hoe ipsum conditas potestates, si omnis angelica natura ab ejus præceptis peccando defecisset, majestate sua decentissime atque optime regeret omnia: nee sic invidens creatura spirituali ut esset; qui etiam carpo­ ratem peccantibus quoque spiritualibus longe inferio­ rem, tanta largitate bonitatis instituit, ut uullus sit coelum terramque rationabiliter intuens, omnesque naturas visibiles in suis generibus moderatas, forma­ tas, ordinatas, qui vel alium credat artificem omnium esse quam Dcum, vel non eum ineffabiliter laudan­ dum esse fateatur. Sive nulla est melior rerum or­ dinatio, nisi potestas angelica natur.c excellentia et bonitate voluntatis in dispositione universitatis su­ peremineat, etiamsi omnes peccassent Angeli, nullam inopiam facerent ad regendum imperiuln suum Crca­ tori Angelorum. Non enim vel bonitas cjus quasi ali­ quo taedio, vel omnipotentia difficultate deficeret ad creaudos alios, quos in eis sedibus collocaret, quas peccando alii deseruissent; aut creatura spiritualis quantilibet numeri, si pro suis mcritis damnaretur, angustare posset ordinem, qui convenienter et decen­ ter excipit quoscumque damnandos. Quacumque se igitur consideratio nostra converterit, ineffabiliter lauJandum invenit Deum naturarum omnium condito­ rem optimum, et administratorem justissimum. Postremo, ut relinquamus contemplationem pulchritudinis rerum iis qui,eam divino munere vi­ dere possunt, nec eos qui non possunt ad ineffabilia contuenda verbis conemur adducere, et tamen pro­ pter loquaces aut infirmos aut insidiosos homines tantam quæstionem brevissima complexione pcr­ ngamus.

### English translation (Claude)

From this it is gathered that the most fitting adornment of the lowest bodily creation would not have been lacking even if this soul had not willed to sin. For one that can rule the whole also rules the part; but one that can do less cannot thereby do greater things. A perfect physician also cures the itch effectively; but not everyone who gives useful advice to someone with the itch can heal all human ailments. And if the reasoning is clearly seen by which it becomes evident that there had to be a creature that has never sinned and never will sin, the same reasoning also declares that it abstains from sin by free will, and does not sin not under compulsion but of its own accord. Yet even if it sinned (though it has not sinned, just as God foreknew it would not), yet even if it did sin, the power of God's ineffable might would suffice to rule this universe, so that, rendering to all what is fitting and deserved, he would allow nothing shameful or unbecoming in his whole empire. For either, if the whole angelic nature had fallen away from his commands by sinning, he would rule all things most becomingly and excellently by his own majesty, through no powers created for this purpose; and he would not do so begrudging the spiritual creature its existence, he who created even the bodily creature, far lower than even sinning spiritual ones, with such bounty of goodness that there is no one who, looking reasonably at sky and earth and all visible natures, measured, formed, and ordered in their kinds, either believes that anyone other than God is the maker of all, or does not admit that he is to be praised ineffably. Or, if there is no better ordering of things than that the angelic power should be preeminent in the disposition of the universe by the excellence of its nature and the goodness of its will, then even if all the angels had sinned, they would cause no shortage for the Creator of angels in ruling his empire. For neither would his goodness fail as if through weariness, nor his omnipotence through difficulty, in creating others to place in the seats which the others had deserted by sinning; nor could a spiritual creature of any number, if condemned according to its merits, cramp the order, which fittingly and becomingly receives whoever are to be condemned. Wherever, then, our consideration turns, it finds that God, the best maker and most just governor of all natures, is to be praised ineffably.
Finally, let us leave the contemplation of the beauty of things to those who can see it by divine gift, and not try by words to lead those who cannot to behold ineffable things; and yet, for the sake of talkative or weak or insidious people, let us go through so great a question in the briefest summary.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.12 (PL 32:1262–1263; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-12).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.13

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-13
- Source: PL 32:1263
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good, since corruption makes it less good; every substance is God or from God, and blaming a rational creature's fault, which is against its nature, praises both its nature and its Maker.

### Latin text

Omnis natura quae minus bona fieri potest, bona esi; et omnis natura dum corrumpitur, minus bona fit. Aut enim non ei nocet corruptio, et non corrumpitur; aut si corrumpitur, nocet ei corruptio: et si nocet, minuit aliquid de bono ejus, et eam minus bonam fa­ cit. Nam si penitus eam privat omni bono, quidquid ejus remanebit, jam corrumpi non poterit; quia nul­ lum erit bonum cujus ademptione possit noccre cor­ ruptio: cui autem non potest nocere corruptio, non corrumpitur. Porro natura quæ non corrumpitur, incorruptibilis ost: erit ergo natura, quod absur­ dissimum est dicere, corruptione facta incorrupti­ bitis. Quapropter quod verissime dicitur, omnis na­ tura in quantum natura est, bona est: quia si incorru­ ptibilis est, melior est quam corruptibilis; si autem corruptibilis est, quoniam dum corrumpitur minus bona fit, sine dubitatione bona est. Omnis autem natura aut corruptibilis cst, aut incorruptibilis, Om­ nis ergo natura bona est: naturam voco quae ct sub­ stantia dici solet. Omnis igitur substantia aut Deus, aut ex Deo; quia omne bonum aut Deus, aut ex Deo. Quibus constitutis atque firmatis tanquam in capite ratiocinationis nostræ, attende quid dicam. Omnis natura rationalis, cum libero voluntatis arbitrio condita, si manet in fruendo summo atque. incommu­ tabili bono, procul dubio laudanda est; et omnis quæ tendit ut maneat, etiam ipsa laudanda est: omnis air­ tem quae non in eo manet, et non vult agere ut maneat, in quantum ibi non est,et in quantum non agit ut ibi sit, vituperanda est. Si ergo laudatur rationalis natura quæ est facta, nemo dubitat laudandum esse qui fecit; et si vituperatur, nemo dubitat ejus Condi: torem in ipsa ejus vituperatione laudari. Cum enim propterea vituperamus hanc, quoniam summo et in­ commutabili bono, id est Creatore suo frui non vult, illum sine ulla dubitatione laudamus. Quantum ergo bonum, et quam vel ineffrabiliter linguis omnibus, vel ineffabiliter cogitationibus omnibus pradicandus et honorandus est creator omnium Deus, sine cujus laude nec laudari possumus, nee vituperari! Non enim vituperari possumus quia in co non manemus, nisi quia magnum ct summum et primum. nostrum bonum est manere in illo: unde autem boc, nisi quia ille ineffabile bonum est? Quid ergo inveniri potest in nostris peccatis unde ille vituperetur, quando vitu pera­ tio peccatorum nostrorum nulla est, nisi ille laudetur? Quid, quod etiam in ipsis rebus quae vituperan­ tur, nullius vituperatur nisi vitium? Nullius autem vituperatur vitium, nisi cujus natura laudatur. Aut cnim secundum naturam est quod vituperas; et non est vilium, tuque magis emendandus es, ut recte vi­ tuperare noveris, quam illud quod non recte vituperas; aut si vitium est, ut recte vituperari possit, etiam contra naturam sit necesse est. Omne quippe vitium, eo ipso quo vitium est, contra uaturam est. Si enim naturae non nocet, ncc vitium est;si autem quia nocet ideo vitium est, ideo vitium est quia contra naturam est. Quod si non suo, sed alieno vitio aliqua natura corrumpitur, injuste vituperatur, et quærendum cst utrum illa natura non corrumpatur vitio suo, cujus vitio potuit aliena natura corrumpi. Sed quid est aliud vitiari, nisi vitio corrumpi? Porro natura quæ non vitiatur, caret vitio: cujus autem vitio aliena natura corrumpitur, habet utique vitium. Prior ergo vitiosa est, et prior corrumpitur vitio suo, cujus vi­ tio alia quoque corrumpi potest. Ex quo colligitur, contra naturam esse omne vitium, etiam cjus rei cir­ jus est vitium. Quapropter, quoniam in quacumque re non vituperatur nisi vitium, ideo autem vitium est, quia contra naturam ejus rei est cujus eat vitium, nullius rei recte vituperatur vitium, nisi cujus na­ tura laudatur. Non enim tibi recte in vitio displicet, nisi qnia vitiat quod in natura placet.

### English translation (Claude)

Every nature that can be made less good is good; and every nature, while it is being corrupted, becomes less good. For either corruption does not harm it, and it is not corrupted; or, if it is corrupted, corruption harms it; and if it harms it, it takes away something of its good and makes it less good. For if it deprives it entirely of all good, whatever remains of it can no longer be corrupted, because there will be no good by whose removal corruption could harm it; and what corruption cannot harm is not corrupted. Further, a nature that is not corrupted is incorruptible; so a nature would be made incorruptible by corruption, which is most absurd to say. Therefore it is most truly said that every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good: for if it is incorruptible, it is better than the corruptible; and if it is corruptible, since it becomes less good while it is being corrupted, it is undoubtedly good. And every nature is either corruptible or incorruptible; so every nature is good. By nature I mean what is also usually called substance. Every substance, then, is either God or from God; because every good is either God or from God.
With these points established and confirmed as the foundation of our reasoning, attend to what I say. Every rational nature created with free choice of the will, if it remains in the enjoyment of the highest and unchangeable good, is undoubtedly to be praised; and every one that strives to remain is itself also to be praised; but every one that does not remain in it, and does not want to act so as to remain, is to be blamed insofar as it is not there and insofar as it does not act so as to be there. If, then, the rational nature that was made is praised, no one doubts that he who made it is to be praised; and if it is blamed, no one doubts that its Maker is praised in that very blame. For when we blame it because it does not want to enjoy the highest and unchangeable good, that is, its Creator, we praise him beyond any doubt. How great a good, then, is God, the creator of all, and how ineffably he is to be proclaimed and honored by all tongues and all thoughts, since without praising him we can neither be praised nor blamed! For we can be blamed for not remaining in him only because it is our great, highest, and first good to remain in him; and why is this, but because he is an ineffable good? What, then, can be found in our sins for which he could be blamed, when there is no blaming of our sins unless he is praised?
What of the fact that even in the things that are blamed, nothing in anything is blamed but its fault? And no one's fault is blamed unless his nature is praised. For either what you blame is according to nature, and then it is not a fault, and you need correcting, so that you may learn to blame rightly, rather than the thing you wrongly blame; or, if it is a fault, so that it can rightly be blamed, it must also be against nature. For every fault, by the very fact that it is a fault, is against nature. If it does not harm the nature, it is not a fault; but if it is a fault because it harms, it is a fault because it is against nature. And if some nature is corrupted not by its own fault but by another's, it is unjustly blamed, and we must ask whether that nature by whose fault another nature could be corrupted is not itself corrupted by its own fault. For what is being vitiated but being corrupted by a fault? Further, a nature that is not vitiated lacks fault; but one by whose fault another nature is corrupted certainly has a fault. That one, then, is faulty first, and is first corrupted by its own fault, by whose fault another too can be corrupted. From this it is gathered that every fault is against nature, even against the nature of the thing whose fault it is. Therefore, since in anything nothing is blamed but its fault, and it is a fault because it is against the nature of the thing whose fault it is, no thing's fault is rightly blamed unless its nature is praised. For nothing rightly displeases you in a fault except that it vitiates what pleases you in the nature.

### Translation notes

- Vitium is rendered “fault”; it covers both a defect and a moral vice.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.13 (PL 32:1263; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-8/#p-3-13).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.14

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-14
- Source: PL 32:1263–1264
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: No nature is corrupted by another's fault without its own consent unless it is weaker; only faulty corruption is blameworthy, and blaming a fault praises the nature it damages.

### Latin text

Videndum est ctiam illud. utrum vere dicatur aliquam naturam naturæ alterius vitio corrumpi, nullo adjuncto vitio suo. Si enim natura quae accedit cum vitio suo ad aliam corrumpendam, non in ea corrupti­ bile aliquid invenit, non eam corrumpit. Si autcm in­ venit, adjuncto ejus vitio corruptionem ejus operatur. Potentior enim ab infirmiore si corrumpi nolit, non corrumpitur: si autem velit, prius incipit suo vitio corrumpi quam alieno. Æqualis autem ab æquali nihilominus si corrumpi nolit, non potest. Nam quae­ cumque natura cum vitio ad cam quæ sine vitio est, ut corrumpat accedit, eo ipso non accedit æqualis, sed infirmior vitio suo. Si vero potentior invalidiorem corrumpit, aut utriusque vitio fit, si utriusque prava cupiditate fit; aut vitio potentioris, si naturae tanta præstantia cst, ut inferiorem quam corrumpit, etiam vitiosa praecedat. Quis enim recte vituperaverit fructus terræ, quod homines eis non utantur bene, corrupti­ que vitio suo, corrumpant eos abutendo ad luxuriam; cum tamen dubitare dementis sit praestantiorem po­ tentioremque esse hominis naturam etiam viliosam, quam non vitiosas quasque fruges? Potest etiam fieri ut aliquam inferiorem poten­ tior natura corrumpat, et hoc nullius earum vitio fiat: siquidem vitium dicimus, quod vituperatione dignum est. Quis autem vel frugalem hominem nihil aliud de frugibus, quam supplementa naturæ quæritantem vi- 4uperare audeat, aut easdem fruges quod usu ciborum ejus corrumpantur? Talis enim nec usitate corruptio dicitur, quia maxime vitii nomen solet esse corruptio. Nam et illud in rebus facile animadverti potest, quod plerumque in nullos usus explendae indigentiæ suas natura potentior inferiorem corrumpit, vel justitiæ.ordine dum vindicat culpam; ex qua regula illud di­ ctum cst ab Apostolo, Si quis templum Dei corruperit, corrumpet illum Deus: vel ordine mu­ tabilium rerum sibi cedentium secundum leges con­ gruentissimas pro valentia cujusque partis universitati datas. Neque enim si cujusquam oculos pro naturae suae modulo ferendae lucis invalidos sol fulgore cor­ rumpat, aut ad explendam indigentiam sui luminis eos commutare putandus est, aut id facere ullo vitio suo; aut saltem ipsi oculi vituperandi sunt, quia et domino suo cesserunt ut contra lucem aperirentur, et ipsi luci ut corrumperentur. Omnium igitur corruptionum sola quæ vitiosa est corruptio recte vituperatur: cæteræ autcm, aut ne corruptiones quidem dicendae sunt. aut certe quia vitiosæ non sunt, dignæ vituperatione esse uon possunt. Nam et ipsa vituperatio, quod soli vitio parata, id est apta et debita sit, inde traxisse vocabu­ lum creditur, ut vituperatio diceretur. Vitium antem, dicerc cœperam, non aliunde malum est; nisi qnia naturæ adversatur ejus ipsius rei cujus est vitium. Unde manifestum est hanc eam- -dem rem cujus vitium vituperatur, natura esse lauda­ bilem; ita ut omnino hanc ipsam vituperationem vi­ tiorum, naturarum laudem esse fateamur, earum sci­ licet quarum vitia vituperantur. Quia enim vilium na­ turae adversatur, tantum additur malitiae vitiorum, quantum naturarum integritati minuitur. Cum ergo vituperas vitium, id profecto laudas cujus integrita­ tem desideras: cujus autem, nisi nature integritatem? Natura cnim perfecta, non solum nulla vituperatione, sed cHam laude in suo genere digna est. Quod ergo perfectioni naturæ deesse perspexeris, id vocas vi­ tium, salis tibi eam placere contestans, quam vitupc­ ratione imperfectionis ejus velles esse perfectam.

### English translation (Claude)

We must also see whether it is truly said that some nature is corrupted by the fault of another nature, with no fault of its own added. For if a nature that approaches another with its fault in order to corrupt it finds nothing corruptible in it, it does not corrupt it. But if it finds something, it works its corruption with the other's fault joined to its own. For a stronger nature, if it does not want to be corrupted by a weaker, is not corrupted; but if it wants to be, it begins to be corrupted by its own fault before another's. And an equal likewise cannot be corrupted by an equal if it does not want to be. For whatever nature with a fault approaches one without fault in order to corrupt it, by that very fact approaches not as an equal but as weaker through its fault. But if a stronger nature corrupts a weaker, this happens either by the fault of both, if it happens through the depraved desire of both, or by the fault of the stronger, if its nature is of such excellence that even when faulty it surpasses the lower one it corrupts. For who would rightly blame the fruits of the earth because people do not use them well, and, corrupted by their own fault, corrupt the fruits by misusing them for luxury? Yet it would be madness to doubt that human nature, even when faulty, is more excellent and powerful than any fruits, even unspoiled ones.
It can also happen that a stronger nature corrupts some inferior one, and this by the fault of neither, since by fault we mean what is worthy of blame. For who would dare to blame a frugal man who seeks nothing else from fruits than the replenishment of nature, or the fruits themselves because they are corrupted by his use of them as food? Such corruption is not even ordinarily called corruption, since corruption is usually above all a name for a fault. For it can easily be noticed in things too that a stronger nature often corrupts an inferior one for no use in filling its own need: either by the order of justice, when it punishes a fault (by which rule the Apostle said, “If anyone corrupts the temple of God, God will corrupt him”), or by the order of changeable things giving way to one another according to the most fitting laws given to the universe according to the strength of each part. For if the sun by its brightness corrupts someone's eyes, which by the measure of their nature are too weak to bear light, it is not to be thought that it changes them to fill a lack in its own light, or that it does this by any fault of its own; nor are the eyes themselves to be blamed, because they yielded both to their master, so as to be opened against the light, and to the light itself, so as to be corrupted. Of all corruptions, then, only the faulty corruption is rightly blamed; the others are either not to be called corruptions at all, or certainly, since they are not faulty, cannot be worthy of blame. For blame itself (vituperatio) is believed to have taken its name from the fact that it is prepared (parata), that is, fitting and owed, for fault (vitium) alone.
But fault, as I had begun to say, is evil for no other reason than that it is opposed to the nature of the very thing whose fault it is. Hence it is evident that the same thing whose fault is blamed is praiseworthy by nature; so that we must admit that this very blame of faults is the praise of natures, namely of those whose faults are blamed. For since fault is opposed to nature, as much is added to the malice of faults as is taken from the soundness of natures. When, then, you blame a fault, you surely praise that whose soundness you desire; and whose soundness but that of the nature? For a perfect nature is worthy not only of no blame, but even of praise in its kind. What, then, you see lacking to the perfection of a nature you call fault, testifying well enough that the nature pleases you, since by blaming its imperfection you would want it to be perfect.

### Scripture references

- 1 Cor 3:17: quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- 1 Cor 3:17 is quoted in the Latin form “corrupts … will corrupt” (corruperit … corrumpet), usually rendered “destroys … will destroy.”
- The derivation of vituperatio from vitio parata is Augustine's own wordplay.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.14 (PL 32:1263–1264; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-14).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.15

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-15
- Source: PL 32:1264–1265
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Temporal things that pass away are not to be blamed, but a rational creature's failing is voluntary and blameworthy; the soul must pay its debt to God either by doing justice or by suffering misery, with no interval between.

### Latin text

Si igitur vituperatio vitiorum ipsarum etiam, quarum sunt vitia, naturarum decus dignitatemque commendat, quanta inagis Deus conditor omnium na­ turarum etiam in earum vitiis laudandus est; cum et hoc ab illo habeant quod naturæ sunt, et in tantum vi­ tiosæ sint, in quantum ab ejus qua factæ sunt arte discedant, et in tantum recte vituperentur, in quantum earum vitnperator artem qua factae sunt videt, ut boc in eis vituperet, quod ibi non videt. Et si ars ipsa per quam facta sunt omnia, boc est summa et incom­ mutabilisSapientia Dei, vere summeque est, sicuti est, respice quo tendat quidquid ab illa discedit. Qui ta­ men defectus non esset vituperatione dignus, nisi es­ set voluntarius. Attende enim, quaeso, utrum recte vituperes quod ita est sicut esse debuit: non opinor;. scd utique quod non ita est ut debuit. Nemo autem debet, quod non accepit: et quisquis debet, cui de­ bet, nisi a quo accepit ut debeat? Nam et qu:e red­ duntur translegando, ei redduntur qui translegaverat. Et quod creditorum justis successoribus redditur, ipsis utique redditur quibus isti jure succedunt. Aliter non redditio, sed cessio vel admissio, vel si quid aliud hujusmodi nominanda eat. Qua propter omnia tempora­ lia, quae ill hoc rerum ordine ita locata suut, ut nisi deficiant, non possint preteritis futura succedere, ut tota temporum in suo genere pulchritudo peraga­ tur, absurdissime dicimus non debere deficere. Quan. tum enim acceperunt, tantum agunt, et tantum red. dunt ei cui debent quod sunt in quantumcumque sunt. Qui enim dolet ea deficere, sermonem suum oportet attendat, eum certe ipsum quod ista conqueritur, si justum et a prudentia profectum esse arbitratur; cu* jus sermonis quod ad sonum ejus attinet, si quis unam particulam diligat, nec eam velit caeteris deficiendo locum dare, quibus decedentibuselsuccedentibuslo­ tus ille sermo contexitur, mirabilis dementiæ judi­ cabitur. In iis igitur rebus quæ ideo deficiunt, quia non ultra esse acceperunt, ut suis temporibus omnia per­ agamur, nemo defectum recte vituperat; quia ncmo potest dicere, Debuit permanere, cum acceptas metas transire non posset. In creaturis autem rationabilibus, quibus sive peccantibus sive non peccantibus, uni versa­ lis pulchritudo modis congruentissimis terminatur, aut nulla peccata sunt, quod absurdissimum est dicere;pec­ cat enim saltem, qui vel damnat quasi peccata quæ nulla sunt: aut non sunt vituperanda peccata, quod nihilominus absurdum est; incipient quippe nec recte facta laudari, et tota turbabitur humanae nieutis inten­ tio, vitamque subvertet: aut vituperabitur factum quod ita factum est ut debuit, et exsecrabilis insania, vel, ut mitius loquar, error miserrimus orietur: aut si cogit verissima ratio, sicuti cogit, ut et vituperentur peo­ cala, et quidquid recte vituperatur ideo vituperctur, quia non est ita ut esse debuit; quære quid debeat natura peccatrix, et invenies recte factum; quaere cui debent, et invenies Deum. A quo enim accepit posse recte facere cum vclit, ab eo accepit ut sit etiam misera si non fecerit, ct beata si fecerit. Quia enim nemo superat legcs omnipotentis Creatoris, non sinitur anima non reddere debitum. Aut enim reddit bene utendo quod accepit, aut red­ dit amittendo quo bene uti noluit. Itaque si non red­ dit faciendo justitiam, reddel patiendo miseriam; quia in utroque verbum illud debiti sonat. Hoc enim etiam modo dici potuit quod dictum est. Si non reddit fa­ eiendo quod debet, reddet patiendo quod debet. Nullo autem temporis intervallo ista dividuntur, ut quasi alio tempore non faciat quod debet, et alio patiatur quod debet, ne vel puncto temporis universalis pal­ chritudo turpetur, ut sit in ea peccati dedecus sine de­ core vindictæ. Sed in futurum judicium servatur ad manifestationem atque ad acerrimum sensum mise­ riæ, quidquid nunc occultissime vindicatur. Sicut enim qui non vigilat, dormit; sic quisquis non facit quod debet, sine intervallo patitur quod debet, quo­ niam tanta est beatitudo justitie, ut nemo ab ea nisi ad miseriam possit abscedere. In omnibus ergo defectibus, aut non acceperunt ultra esse quae deR­ ciunt, et nulla culpa est; sicut etiam cum sunt, quia non acceperunt amplius esse quam sunt, nihilomi­ nus nulla culpa est; aut nolunt esse, quod si vel­ lent, esse acceperunt; et quia bonum est, reatus est si nolunt.

### English translation (Claude)

If, then, the blaming of faults commends the beauty and dignity even of the very natures whose faults they are, how much more is God, the maker of all natures, to be praised even in their faults! For they have from him that they are natures; they are faulty insofar as they depart from his art by which they were made; and they are rightly blamed insofar as the one who blames them sees the art by which they were made, so that he blames in them what he does not see there. And if that art through which all things were made, that is, the highest and unchangeable Wisdom of God, truly and supremely is, as it is, see where whatever departs from it is tending. Yet this failing would not be worthy of blame unless it were voluntary. For consider, please, whether you rightly blame what is as it ought to be. I think not; surely you blame what is not as it ought to be. And no one owes what he has not received; and whoever owes, to whom does he owe, but to the one from whom he received what he owes? For even what is repaid by bequest is repaid to the one who made the bequest; and what is repaid to the lawful successors of creditors is surely repaid to those whom they lawfully succeed. Otherwise it should be called not repayment but cession or remission or something of that kind. Therefore it is most absurd to say of all temporal things that they ought not to fail; for they are so placed in this order of things that, unless they fail, future things cannot succeed past ones, so that the whole beauty of the ages may be completed in its kind. For as much as they have received, so much they do, and so much they repay to him to whom they owe what they are, to whatever extent they are. Whoever grieves that they fail should attend to his own speech, that very speech in which he complains of them, if he thinks it just and coming from prudence. If anyone, as regards its sound, loved one little part of that speech and did not want it to give place to the rest by passing away, though it is by their passing and succeeding that the whole speech is woven, he would be judged astonishingly mad.
In those things, then, which fail because they have not received further being, so that all things may be completed in their times, no one rightly blames the failing; for no one can say, “It ought to have remained,” since it could not pass the limits it received. But as for rational creatures, through whom, whether they sin or not, the beauty of the universe is bounded in the most fitting ways: either there are no sins, which is most absurd to say (for at least one sins who condemns as sins what are none); or sins are not to be blamed, which is no less absurd (for right deeds too will begin not to be praised, and the whole attention of the human mind will be thrown into confusion and will overturn life); or what was done as it ought to have been done will be blamed, and an execrable madness, or, to speak more mildly, a most wretched error will arise; or, if most true reason compels, as it does compel, both that sins be blamed and that whatever is rightly blamed be blamed because it is not as it ought to have been, ask what a sinful nature owes, and you will find: right action; ask to whom it owes it, and you will find: God. For from him from whom it received the ability to act rightly when it wills, it also received that it should be miserable if it does not, and happy if it does. Since no one surpasses the laws of the almighty Creator, the soul is not allowed not to pay its debt. For either it pays by using well what it received, or it pays by losing what it was unwilling to use well. So if it does not pay by doing justice, it will pay by suffering misery; for in both cases the word “debt” sounds. What was said could also have been said this way: “If it does not pay by doing what it owes, it will pay by suffering what it owes.” And these are separated by no interval of time, as if at one time it did not do what it owes and at another suffered what it owes, lest even for a moment of time the beauty of the universe be marred, so that there should be in it the disgrace of sin without the grace of punishment. But whatever is now punished most hiddenly is kept for the future judgment, to be made manifest and to be felt as misery most keenly. For just as one who is not awake sleeps, so whoever does not do what he owes suffers without any interval what he owes; for so great is the happiness of justice that no one can depart from it except into misery. In all failings, then, either the things that fail have not received further being, and there is no fault (just as, while they exist, there is again no fault, because they have not received more being than they have), or they are unwilling to be what they received the ability to be if they willed; and because that is good, there is guilt if they are unwilling.

### Translation notes

- The “future judgment” is the last judgment; the passage is translated as written.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.15 (PL 32:1264–1265; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-15).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.16

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-16
- Source: PL 32:1265
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: God owes no one anything, while every creature owes him what it is and what it ought to be; since neither one's own nature nor another's forces anyone to sin, sin comes from one's own will and cannot be attributed to the Creator.

### Latin text

Deus autem nulli debet aliquid, qui omnia gra­ tuito præstat. Et si quisquam dicet ab illo aliquid de­ beri meritis suis, certe ut esset, non ei debebatur. Non enim erat cui deberetur. Et tamen, quod meri­ tum cst converti ad eum ex quo es, ut ex ipso etiam melior sis, ex quo habes ut sis? Quid ergo ei praero­ gas, ut tanquam debitum poscas; quando si nolles ad eum converti, nibil ei deesset, tibi autem ipse, sine quo nihil esses, et ex quo ita es aliquid, ut nisi con­ vertendo te ad illum, reddideris ei quod ab ipso es, non quidem nihil, sed miser tamen eris? Omnia ergo illi dcbent, primo quidquid sunt, in quantum naturæ sunt: deinde quidquid melius possunt esse si velint, quæcumque acceperunt ut velint; et quidquid opor­ let eas esse. Ex eo igitur quod non accepit, nullus reus cst: ex co vero quod non facit qnod debet, juste reus est. Debet autem, si accepit et voluntatem liberam, et sufficientissimam facultatem. Usque adeo antem dum non facit quisque quod debet, nulla culpa est Conditoris, ut et laus sit. quo­ niam quod debet patitur, et in eo ipso quod vilupe­ ratur non faciendo quod debet, non nisi laudatur ille cui debet. Si enim tu laudaris videndo quid facere debeas, cum id non videas, nisi in illo qui est incom­ mutabilis Veritas: quanto magis ille qui et veilc præ­ cepit, ct posse præbuit, et non impune nolle permi­ sit? Si enim boc dcbel quisque quod accepit, et sic homo factus est, ut necessario peccet, hoc debet ut peccet. Cum ergo peccat, quod debet facit. Quod si scelus est dicere, neminem natura sua cogit ut pec­ cet. Sed nee aliena. Non enim quisquis dum id quod non vult patitur, peccat. Nam si juste patitur, non in eo peccat quod patitur invitus, sed in eo peccavit quod ita fecit volens, ut quod nollet jure pa­ teretur. Si autem injuste patitur, quomodo peccat? Non enim injuste aliquid pati, sed injuste aliquid fa­ cere, peccatum est. Quod si neque sua neque aliena natura quis peccare cogitur, restat ut propria volun­ tate peccetur. Quod si tribuere volueris Conditori, peccantem purgabis, qui nihil præter sui Conditoris in­ stituta commisit, qui si recte defenditur, non pecca­ vit: non est ergo quod tribuas Conditori. Laudemus ergo Conditorem, si potest defendi peccator; laude­ mus, si non potest. Si enim juste defenditur, non est peccator: lauda ergo Creatorem. Si autem defendi non potest, in tantum peccator est in quantum se a Creatore avertit: lauda ergo Creatorem. Omnino igi­ tur non invenio, nec inveniri posse, et prorsus non esse confirmo, quomodo tribuantur peccata nostra creatori nostro Deo; quando et in ipsis eum lauJabi­ lem invenio, non solum quod ea punit, sed etiam quod tunc fiunt, cum ab cjus veritate receditur. E. Accipio ista libentissime ac probo; et omnino verum esse consentio, nullo modo fieri posse ut Crcatori nostro recte peccata nostra tribuantur.

### English translation (Claude)

But God owes nothing to anyone, since he gives all things freely. And if anyone says that something is owed to him by God for his merits, certainly his existence was not owed to him; for there was no one to whom it could be owed. And yet what merit is it to turn to him from whom you are, so that you may be made better by him from whom you have your being? What, then, have you paid him in advance, that you should demand anything as a debt? If you were unwilling to turn to him, he would lack nothing; but you would lack him, without whom you would be nothing, and from whom you are something in such a way that, unless you repay him what you are from him by turning to him, you will not indeed be nothing, but you will be miserable. All things, then, owe him, first whatever they are, insofar as they are natures; then whatever better they can be if they will, as many as have received the power to will; and whatever they ought to be. No one, then, is guilty for what he has not received; but for not doing what he ought he is justly guilty. And he owes it, if he has received both a free will and a fully sufficient capacity.
So far is it from being any fault of the Maker when anyone does not do what he ought, that it is even to his praise; for the person suffers what he owes, and in the very fact that he is blamed for not doing what he owes, nothing but praise goes to him to whom it is owed. For if you are praised for seeing what you ought to do, though you see it only in him who is unchangeable Truth, how much more is he praised who both commanded the willing, and supplied the power, and did not allow unwillingness to go unpunished? For if each owes what he has received, and man was made such that he sins necessarily, then he owes this: to sin. So when he sins, he does what he owes. But if it is wicked to say this, then his own nature compels no one to sin. Nor does another's nature. For no one sins while he is suffering what he does not will. If he suffers justly, he does not sin in what he suffers against his will, but he sinned in doing willingly what made him justly suffer what he did not will. And if he suffers unjustly, how does he sin? For sin is not suffering something unjustly but doing something unjustly. So if no one is forced to sin either by his own nature or by another's, it remains that sin is committed by one's own will. And if you want to attribute it to the Maker, you will acquit the sinner, who did nothing beyond what his Maker established; and if he is rightly defended, he did not sin; so there is nothing for you to attribute to the Maker. Let us praise the Maker, then, if the sinner can be defended; let us praise him if he cannot. For if he is justly defended, he is not a sinner: so praise the Creator. And if he cannot be defended, he is a sinner insofar as he turns away from the Creator: so praise the Creator. I absolutely do not find, then, and I affirm that it cannot be found and that there is no way at all, how our sins are to be attributed to God our creator; for I find him praiseworthy even in them, not only because he punishes them but also because they happen when one withdraws from his truth.
E. I accept these things most gladly and approve them; and I fully agree that it is true that our sins can in no way rightly be attributed to our Creator.

### Scripture references

- Rom 11:35: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- “What have you paid him in advance …?” echoes Rom 11:35 (“Who has given to him first, that he should be repaid?”).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.16 (PL 32:1265; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-16).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.17

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-17
- Source: PL 32:1265–1266
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Asked why some creatures sin and others do not, Augustine answers that the wicked will, the avarice that is the root of all evils, is the first cause of sin, and no cause before the will need be sought.

### Latin text

Sed tamen scire vellem, si fieri posset, quare illa natura non peccet, quam non peccaturam præ­ scivit Deus, ct quare ista peccet, quæ ab illo pecca­ tura praevisa est. Non enim jam puto, ipsa Dei pra­ scientia vel istam peccare, vel illam non peccare cogi- Sed tamen si nulla causa esset, non ita dispertiretur creatura rationalis, ut alia nunquam peccet, alia in peccando perseveret, alia quasi media inter utramque aliquando peccet, aliquando ad recte faciendum con­ vertatur. Quæ, causa in has tres partes eam distri­ buit? Sed nolo mihi respondeatur, Voluntas: ego euim causam quæro ipsius voluntatis. Non enim sine causa nunquam vult illa peccare, nunquam ista non vult, quædam vero aliquando vult, aliquando non vult, cun ejusdem generis omnes sint. Hoc solum enim mihi videre videor, non sine causa esse istam tripartitam voluntatem rationalis creatura;; sed quoe causa sit, nescio. A. Quoniam voluntas est causa peccati, tu au­ tem causam ipsius voluntatis inquiris, si hanc inve­ nire potuero, nonne causam etiam ejus causæ quæ in­ venta fucrit quæsiturus es? Et quis erit quærendi modus, quis finis percunctandi ac disserendi, cum te ultra radicem quaerere nihil oporteat? Cave enim pu­ tes quidquam potuisse dici verius quam id quod di­ ctum est, radicem omnium malorum esse avaritiam, hoc est, plus velle quam sat est. Tantum autem sat est, quantum sibi exigit naturæ in suo genere conservandae modus. Avaritia enim, quæ græce ϕιλαργυρια dicitur, non in solo argento vel in nummis, unde magis nomen duxisse resonat; argento enim nummi vel mixto argento frequentius apud ve­ teres fiebant: sed in omnibus rebus quae immoderate cupiuntur intelligenda est, ubicumque omnino plus vult quisque quam sat est. Hæc autem avaritia cupi­ ditas est; cupiditas porro improba voluntas est. Ergo improba voluntas, malorum omnium causa est. Quæ si secundum naturam esset, conservaret utique naturam, nec ei perniciosa esset, et ideo non esset improba. Unde colligitur radicem omnium malorum non esse secundum naturam; quod suf­ ficit adversus omnes qui volunt accusare naturas. Tu autem si hujus radicis causam requiris, quomodo crit ista radix omnium malorum? Illa enim erit quae causa hujus est, quam cum inveneris, ut dixi, etiam ipsius causam quæsiturus es, et quærendi nullum ba­ bebis modum. ' Sed quæ tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem causa voluntatis? Aut cnim et ipsa voluntas est; et a radice ista voluntatis non receditur: aut non est vo­ luntas; et peccatum nullum habet. Aut igitur ipsa voluntas est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum pec­ catum est prima causa peccandi. Nec est cui recte imputetur peccatum nisi peccanti. Non est ergo cui recte imputetur nisi volenti: sed nescio cur aliud te quærere libeat. Deinde quæcumque illa causa est voluntatis, aut justa profecto est, aut injusta. Si justa, quisquis ei obtemperaverit non peccabit: si injusta, non ei obtemperet, et non peccabit.

### English translation (Claude)

E. But I would still like to know, if possible, why that nature does not sin which God foreknew would not sin, and why this one sins which he foresaw would sin. For I no longer think that God's foreknowledge itself forces this one to sin or that one not to sin. Yet if there were no cause, the rational creature would not be divided so that one part never sins, another persists in sinning, and another, as it were between the two, sometimes sins and sometimes turns to acting rightly. What cause has divided it into these three parts? But I do not want to be answered, “The will”; for I am asking the cause of the will itself. For it is not without cause that the one never wills to sin, the other never fails to will it, and another sometimes wills it and sometimes does not, though they are all of the same kind. This alone I seem to see, that this threefold will of the rational creature is not without a cause; but what the cause is, I do not know.
A. Since the will is the cause of sin, and you are asking the cause of the will itself, if I can find it, will you not then ask the cause also of the cause that has been found? And what limit of seeking will there be, what end of questioning and discussing, when you ought to seek nothing beyond the root? For beware of thinking that anything truer could have been said than what was said: that the root of all evils is avarice, that is, wanting more than is enough. And as much is enough as the measure of preserving a nature in its own kind requires. For avarice, which in Greek is called philargyria, is to be understood not only of silver or coins, from which it seems rather to have taken its name (for among the ancients coins were usually made of silver or of silver mixed with other metal), but of all things that are desired immoderately, wherever anyone wants altogether more than is enough. And this avarice is cupidity; and cupidity is a wicked will. So a wicked will is the cause of all evils. If it were according to nature, it would surely preserve nature and not be destructive to it, and so it would not be wicked. From this it is gathered that the root of all evils is not according to nature; and this is enough against all who want to accuse natures. But if you seek the cause of this root, how will it be the root of all evils? For the root will be that which is its cause; and when you have found it, as I said, you will seek its cause too, and you will have no limit to seeking.
But what, after all, could be the cause of the will before the will? Either it is itself a will, and there is no departing from this root, the will; or it is not a will, and it has no sin. Either, then, the will itself is the first cause of sinning, or no sin is the first cause of sinning. And there is no one to whom sin is rightly imputed but the one who sins. So there is no one to whom it is rightly imputed but the one who wills; and I do not know why you would want to look for anything else. Further, whatever that cause of the will is, it is surely either just or unjust. If just, whoever obeys it will not sin; if unjust, let him not obey it, and he will not sin.

### Scripture references

- 1 Tim 6:10: quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- 1 Tim 6:10, quoted in the Latin form “avarice” (avaritia) for Greek philargyria, “love of money.”

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.17 (PL 32:1265–1266; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-17).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.18

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-18
- Source: PL 32:1266
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Sins done in ignorance or under the necessity of the flesh are a just penalty inherited from man's condemnation; ignorance and difficulty are not human nature as created but the punishment of sin.

### Latin text

An forte violenta est et cogit invitum? Num eadem toties replicaturi sumus? Reminiscere supe­ rtorum, quae a nobis tam multa de peccato et volun­ late libera dicta sunt. Sed si laboriosum est omnia mandare memoriæ, hoc brevissimum tene. Quæcum­ que ista causa est voluntatis, si non ei potest resisti, sinc peccato ei ceditur: si autem potest, non ei ceda­ tur, et non peccabitur. An forte fallit incautum? Ergo caveat ne fallatur. An tanta fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non possit? Si ita est, nulla peccata sunt. Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem: caveri igitur potest. Et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quædam improbantur, et corrigenda judicantur, sicut in divi­ nis auctoritatibus legimus: ait enim Apostolus, Mi­ sericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci; ait et propheta, Delicta juventutis et ignorantia meœ ne memineris. Sunt etiam neces­ sitate facti improbanda, ubi vult homo recte facere, et non potest: nam uude sunt illae voccs, Non enim quod volo facio bonum, sed quod nOlo malum, hoc ago; et illud, Velle adjacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio; et illud, Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem: hœc enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quœ vultis faciatis? Sed haec omnia hominum sunt, ex illa mortis damnatione venientium: nam si non est ista poena hominis, sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt. Si enim non receditur ab eo modo quo naturaliter factus est, ita ut melius esse non possit, ea quae debet facit, cum haec facit. Si autem bonus homo esset, aliter esset; nunc autem quia ita est, non est bonus, nec babet in potestate ut bonus sit, sive non videndo qua­ lis esse debeat, sive videndo et non valendo esse, qualem debere esse se videt: paenam istam esse quis dubitet? Omnis autem paena si justa est, peccati poena est, et supplicium nominatur: si autem injusta est poena, quoniam poenam esse nemo ambigit, injusto aliquo dominante homini imposita est. Porro quia de omnipotentia Dei et justitia dubitare dementis est, justa hec poena est, et pro peccato aliquo penditur. Non enim quisquam injustus dominator aut surripere hominem potuit, velut ignoranti Deo; aut extorquere invito, tanquam invalidiori, vel terrendo vel confli­ gendo, ut hominem injusta poena cruciaret. Relinqui­ tur ergo ut haec justa poena de damnatione hominis veniat. Nec mirandum est qnod vel ignorando non ha­ beat arbitrium liberum voluntatis ad eligendum quid recte faciat: vel resistente carnali consuetudine, quæ violentia mortalis successionis quodammodo naturali­ ter inolevit, videat quid recte faciendum sit, et velit, nec possit implere. Illa est enim peccati paena justis­ sima, ut amittat quisque quo hene uti noluit, cum sine ulla posset difficultate, si vellet. Id est autem, ut qui sciens recte non facit, amittat scire quid rectum sit; et qui recte facere, cum posset, noluit, amittat posse cum velit. Nam sunt revera omni peccanti ani­ mæ duo ista, poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas. Ex ' ignorantia dehonestat error, ex difficultate cruciatus affligit. Sed approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invi­ tus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vin­ culi, non posse a libidinosis operibus temperare, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de ilia scilicet in qua homo factus est loquimur.

### English translation (Claude)

Or is it perhaps violent, and does it force one against his will? Must we repeat the same things so many times? Remember the many things we said earlier about sin and free will. But if it is laborious to commit everything to memory, hold this very brief point: whatever that cause of the will is, if it cannot be resisted, one yields to it without sin; but if it can, let one not yield to it, and there will be no sin. Does it perhaps deceive the unwary? Then let him beware that he is not deceived. Is the deception so great that it cannot be guarded against at all? If so, there are no sins. For who sins in what can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed; so it can be guarded against.
And yet some things done even through ignorance are disapproved and judged to need correction, as we read in the divine authorities. For the Apostle says, “I obtained mercy, because I acted in ignorance”; and the prophet says, “Remember not the sins of my youth and of my ignorance.” There are also things done by necessity that are to be disapproved, when a man wants to act rightly and cannot. For where else do those words come from: “For I do not do the good that I want, but the evil that I do not want, this I do”; and, “To will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find”; and, “The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, so that you do not do what you want”? But all these belong to human beings who come from that condemnation to death. For if this is not man's punishment but his nature, none of these are sins. For if there is no departure from the way in which he was naturally made, so that he could not be better, then he does what he ought when he does these things. But if man were good, he would be otherwise; now, because he is as he is, he is not good, and he does not have it in his power to be good, whether by not seeing what he ought to be, or by seeing it and not being able to be what he sees he ought to be. Who would doubt that this is a punishment? And every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of sin and is called a penalty; but if the punishment is unjust (since no one doubts that it is a punishment), it was imposed on man by some unjust master. Further, since it is madness to doubt God's omnipotence and justice, this punishment is just and is paid for some sin. For no unjust master could either steal man away, as if God did not know, or wrest him from God against his will, as if God were weaker, whether by terrifying or by fighting, so as to torment man with an unjust punishment. It remains, then, that this just punishment comes from the condemnation of man.
Nor is it to be wondered at that, through ignorance, he does not have free choice of will to choose what to do rightly; or that, with fleshly habit resisting, which by the violence of mortal descent has in a way grown in as if by nature, he sees what should rightly be done, and wills it, and cannot fulfill it. For this is the most just punishment of sin, that each one loses what he was unwilling to use well, when he could have done so without any difficulty if he had willed. That is, he who knowingly does not act rightly loses the knowledge of what is right; and he who was unwilling to act rightly when he could loses the ability when he wills. For truly these two penal things belong to every sinning soul: ignorance and difficulty. From ignorance error disgraces it; from difficulty torment afflicts it. But to approve false things for true, so as to err unwillingly, and to be unable to refrain from lustful works because the pain of the fleshly bond resists and tortures, is not the nature of man as he was established, but the punishment of man as condemned. When we speak of the free will to act rightly, we speak, of course, of the will in which man was made.

### Scripture references

- 1 Tim 1:13: quotation, high confidence
- Ps 25:7 (24:7 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Rom 7:19: quotation, high confidence
- Rom 7:18: quotation, high confidence
- Gal 5:17: quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- 1 Tim 1:13; Ps 25:7 (Ps 24:7 in the Latin numbering); Rom 7:19 and 7:18; Gal 5:17.
- Augustine later quoted this section in Retractations 1.9 to show that the work already taught the inherited penalty of sin; it is translated as written.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.18 (PL 32:1266; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-18).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.19

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-19
- Source: PL 32:1266–1267
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: To those who complain that they inherit ignorance and difficulty from Adam, Augustine answers that God everywhere helps those who seek; inherited weakness is called sin because it comes from the first free sin, and nature is spoken of both as created and as fallen.

### Latin text

Hic occurrit illa quæstio, quam inter se mur­ murantes homines rodere consueverunt, qui quodlibet aliud in peccando quam se accusare parati sunt. Di­ cunt enim: Si Adam et Eva peccaverunt, quid nos miseri fecimus, ut cum ignorantiae caecitate, et diffi­ cultatis cruciatibus nasceremur, et primo erraremus nescientes quid nobis esset faciendum; deinde ubi nobis inciperent aperiri præcepta justitiæ, vellemus ea facere, et renitente carnalis concupiscentiæ nescio qua necessitate non valeremus? Quibus breviter respondetur ut quiescant, adversus Deum murmurare desistant. Recte enim fortasse quererentur, si erroris et libidinis nullus hominum victor existeret: cum vero ubique sit praesens, qni multis modis per creatu­ ram sibi Domino servientem aversum vocet, doccat credentem, consoletur sperantem, diligentem adhor­ tctur, conantem adjuvet, exaudiat deprecantem; non libi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras, sed quod negligis quærere quod ignoras; neque illud qnod vulnerata membra non colligis, scd quod volentem sanare contemnis: ista tua propria peccata sunt. Nulli enim homini ablatum cst scire utiliter quæri quod inutiliter ignoratur et humiliter confitendam esse imbecillitatem, ut quærenti et confitenti ille sub­ veniat, qui nec errat dum subvenit, nec laborat. Nam illud qnod ignorans quisque non recte fa­ cit, et quod recte volens facere non potest, ideo di­ cuntur peccata, quia de peccato illo liberae voluntatis originem ducunt: illud enim praecedens meruit ista sequentia. Nam sicut linguam dicimus non solum membrum quod movemus in ore dum loquimur, sed etiam illud quod hujus membri motum consequitur, id est formam tenoremque verborum, secundum quem modum dicitur alia lingua græca, alia latina: sic non solum peccatum illud dicimus, quod proprie vocatur peccatum, libera enim voluntate et a sciente com­ mittitur; sed etiam illud quod jam de hujus supplicio consequatur necesse est. Sic etiam ipsam naturam aliter dicimus, cum proprie loquimur,naturam homi­ nis, in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est: aliter istam, in qua ex illius damnati poena, ct mortales et ignari et carni subditi nascimur; juxta quem modum dicit Apostolus, Fuimus enim et nos na­ turaliter filii iræ, sicut et cæteri.

### English translation (Claude)

Here that question arises which people who grumble among themselves usually gnaw at, ready as they are to accuse anything rather than themselves when they sin. For they say: “If Adam and Eve sinned, what have we wretches done, that we should be born with the blindness of ignorance and the torments of difficulty; that we should first err, not knowing what we ought to do, and then, when the commands of justice begin to be opened to us, want to do them and be unable, because some necessity or other of fleshly concupiscence resists?” The brief answer to them is that they should be quiet and stop grumbling against God. For perhaps they would rightly complain if no human being were victor over error and lust. But he is everywhere present who in many ways, through the creation that serves him as its Lord, calls back the one who has turned away, teaches the one who believes, comforts the one who hopes, encourages the one who loves, helps the one who strives, and hears the one who prays. So it is not counted to you as a fault that you are ignorant against your will, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know; nor that you do not bind up your wounded limbs, but that you despise him who wants to heal them: these are your own sins. For no human being has been deprived of knowing that it is useful to seek what it is harmful not to know, and that weakness must be humbly confessed, so that he may come to the help of the one who seeks and confesses, who neither errs nor labors in helping.
For what anyone does not do rightly through ignorance, and what he cannot do though he rightly wills to, are called sins because they take their origin from that sin of free will; for that preceding sin deserved these consequences. Just as we call “tongue” not only the member that we move in the mouth when we speak, but also what follows from the motion of this member, that is, the form and pattern of the words, in which sense one tongue is called Greek and another Latin, so we call sin not only that which is properly called sin, for it is committed by free will and knowingly, but also that which necessarily follows from its punishment. So too we speak of nature itself in two ways: properly, of the nature of man in which he was first made blameless in his kind; and otherwise, of this nature in which, from the penalty of that condemned man, we are born mortal and ignorant and subject to the flesh; in which sense the Apostle says, “For we too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest.”

### Scripture references

- Eph 2:3: quotation, high confidence
- Gen 3:6: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Eph 2:3.
- Augustine's account of inherited ignorance and difficulty is translated as written; the term “original sin” does not occur here.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.19 (PL 32:1266–1267; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-19).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.20

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-20
- Source: PL 32:1267–1268
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine shows that, whichever account of the soul's origin is true (derived from the first soul, newly created, sent by God, or coming of its own accord), inherited ignorance and difficulty can be overcome with God's help, and God is not to blame.

### Latin text

Ut autem de illo primo conjugio, et cum igno­ rantia, et cum difficultate, et cum mortalitate nasca­ mur, quoniam illi cum peccavissent, et in errorem, et in aerumnam, et in mortem præcipitati sunt, rerum moderatori summo Deo justissime placuit; ut et in ortu hominis originaliter appareret justitia punientis, et in provectu misericordia liberantis. Non enim da­ mnato primo homini sic adempta est beatitudo, ut etiam fecunditas adimeretur. Poterat enim et de prole ejus, quamvis carnali ct mortali, aliquod in suo ge­ nere fieri decus ornamentumque terrarum. Jamvero ut mcliores gigneret quam ipse esset, non erat aequi­ tatis: sed ex conversione ad Deum, ut vinceret quis­ que supplicium quod origo ejus ex aversione meruerat, non solum volentem non prohiberi, sed etiam adjuvari oportebat; etiam sic enim rerum Creator ostendit quanta facilitate potuisset homo, si voluisset, retinere quod factus est, cum proles ejus potuit etiam supcrare quod nata est. Deinde, si una anima facta est, ex qua omnium hominum animae trahuntur nascentium, quis potest dicere non se peccasse, cum primus ille peccavit? Si autem singillatim fiunt in unoquoque nascentium, non est perversum, imo convenientissimum et ordinatissi­ mum apparet, ut malum meritum prioris, natura se­ qnentis sit; et bonum meritum sequentis, natura prioris sit. Quid enim indignum, si etiam sic voluit Creator ostendere, usque adeo excellere creaturis corporeis animæ dignitatem, ut ab eo gradu possit esse ortus alterius, ad quem alterius perductus est occasus? Nam cum ad ignorantiam difficultatemque pervencrit illa peccatrix, ideo poena recte dicitur, quia melior ante hanc poenam fuit. Si ergo altera talis esse coepit, non solum ante peccatum, sed ante omnem vitam suam, qualis alia post vitam culpabilem facta est, non parvum bonum habet, unde Conditori suo gratias agat; quia ipse ortus ejus et inchoatio quovis perfecto corpore est melior. Non enim mediocria bona sunt, non solum quod anima eSI, qua natura jam omne corpus præcedit; sed eliam quod faculta­ tem habet, ut adjuvante Creatore seipsam excolat, et pio studio possit omnes acquirere et capere virtutes, per quas et a difficultate cruciante, et ab ignorantia caecante liberetur. Quod si ita est, non erit nascenti­ bus animis ignorantia et difficultas supplicium peccati; sed proficiendi admonitio, et perfectionis exordium. Non cnim ante omne meritum boni operis parum est accepisse naturale judicium, quo sapientiam præpo­ nat errori, et quietem difficultati ut ad hæc non nascendo, sed studendo perveniat. Quod si agere no­ luerit, peccati rea jure tenebitur, tanquam quæ non Quanquam enim in ignora Iii etsit, non tamen ad permanendum in eo quod nata est, aliqua necessi­ tate comprimitur: neque omnino potuit nisi Deus omnipotens esse etiam talium creator animarum, quas et non dilectus ipse faciat, et diligens cas reficiat, et dilectus ipse perficiat; qui et non existentibus praestat ut sint, ct amantibus eum a quo sunt praestat ut beatæ siut. Si vero in Dei aliquo secreto jam existentes ani­ mac mittuntur ad inspiranda et rcgenda corpora sin­ gulorum quorumque nascentium, ad hoc utique mittuntur officium, ut corpus quod de poena peccati, hoc est mortalitate primi hominis, nascitur, bene administrando, id est castigando per virtutes, et or­ dinatissimæ atque legitimæ servituti subjiciendo, etiam ipsi comparent ordine atque tempore opportuno cae­ testis incorruptionis locum. Qua; cum introcunt in hanc vitam, subeuntque gestanda membra mortalia, subeant etiam necesse est et oblivionem vitæ prioris, et præsentis laborem: unde illa ignorantia et difficul­ tas consequitur, quod in primo homine supplicium mortalitatis fuit, ad animi expendendam miseriam; in istis autem janua ministerii ad rcparandam corpo­ ris incorruptionem. Nam hoc quoque modo non di­ cuntur ista peccata, nisi quia caro de propagine ve­ niens peccatoris, venientibus ad se animis hanc igno­ rantiam et difficultatem facit; quae neque his, neque Creatori tanquam culpanda tribuatur. Dedit enim ille et facultatem bene operandi in laboriosis officiis, et viam fidei in oblivionis cæcitate; judicium illud vel maxime, quod anima omnis et quaerendum esse con­ cedit quod inutiliter nescit, et perseveranter in off­ ciosis laboribus enitendum ad evincendam recte fa­ ciendi difficultatem, et opem a Creatore implorandam, ut conantem adjuvct; qui vel extrinsecus lege, vel in intimis cordis allocutione conandum esse præcepit, et præparat civitatis beatissimae gloriam triumphantibus de illo qui primum bominem ad istam miseriam per­ duxit victum pessima suasionc; quam miseriam isti suscipiunt ad eum vincendum optima fide. Non enim parvæ gloriæ militia est diabolum vincere codem sus­ cepto supplicio, quo se ille bominein victum per­ duxisse gloriatur. Quisquis autem hoc istius vitæ captus amore neglexerit, nullo pacto juste flagitium desertionis suae regis imperio deputabit: sed erit po­ tius sub omnium Domino in ejus partibus ordinatus, cujus turpe stipendium ut castra sua desereret, ad­ amavit. Si autem alibi animae constitutæ non mittuntur a Domino Deo, sed sua sponte ad inhabitanda corpora veniunt; facile est jam hoc videre, quidquid ignoran­ tiæ difficultatisque secuturn fuerit earum propriam voluntatem, nullo modo Creatorem hinc esse culpan­ dum: quandoquidem etiamsi eas ipsc misisset, quibus etiam in ipsa ignorantia et difficultate liberam volun­ tatem petendi et quærendi ct conandi non abstulit, daturus petentibus, demonstraturus quærentibus, pul­ santibus aperturus, omnino extra culpam esset. Hanc enim ignorantiam et difficultatem studiosis etbenevo­ lis evincendam, ad coronam gloriae valere præstaret; negligentibus autem et peccata sua de infirmitate de­ fendere volentibus, non ipsam ignorantiam difficulta­ temque pro crimine objiceret; sed quia in eis potius permanere, quam studio quærendi atque discendi, et humilitate confitendi atque orandi, ad veritatem ac facilitatem pervenire voluerunt, justo supplicio vin­ dicaret.

### English translation (Claude)

That we should be born from that first couple with ignorance, with difficulty, and with mortality, since they, having sinned, were cast headlong into error, hardship, and death, most justly pleased God, the supreme governor of things; so that the justice of the one who punishes might appear at the origin of man, and the mercy of the one who sets free in his progress. For happiness was not taken from the condemned first man in such a way that fertility too was taken away. For even from his offspring, though fleshly and mortal, there could come some beauty and ornament of the earth in its kind. That he should beget offspring better than he himself was would not have been fair; but it was fitting that anyone who, by turning to God, would overcome the punishment that his origin had deserved by turning away, should not only not be prevented if he willed it, but should even be helped. For even in this way the Creator of things showed with what ease man could have kept, if he had willed, what he was made, since his offspring could even overcome what it was born.
Further, if one soul was made, from which the souls of all human beings who are born are derived, who can say that he did not sin when that first man sinned? But if souls are made one by one in each person who is born, it is not perverse, but appears most fitting and well ordered, that the evil merit of the earlier soul should be the nature of the later, and the good merit of the later the nature of the earlier. For what is unworthy if the Creator wished to show even in this way how far the dignity of the soul excels bodily creatures, so that one soul could begin at the level to which another's fall had brought it? For when that sinful soul came to ignorance and difficulty, this is rightly called punishment, because it was better before this punishment. If, then, another soul began to be, not only before sin but before all its life, such as the first became after a blameworthy life, it has no small good for which to thank its Maker; for its very beginning and inception is better than any perfect body. For they are no ordinary goods, not only that it is a soul, by which nature it already surpasses every body, but also that it has the capacity, with the Creator's help, to cultivate itself, and by devoted effort to acquire and take in all the virtues by which it may be freed both from tormenting difficulty and from blinding ignorance. If this is so, ignorance and difficulty will not be a punishment of sin for souls being born, but an admonition to make progress and the beginning of perfection. For it is no small thing, before any merit of good work, to have received a natural judgment by which the soul prefers wisdom to error and rest to difficulty, so as to arrive at these not by being born but by striving. And if it is unwilling to do this, it will rightly be held guilty of sin, as one that has not [used well the capacity it received]. For although it was born in ignorance and difficulty, it is not compelled by any necessity to remain in what it was born as. And no one but almighty God could be the creator even of such souls, which he makes without being loved by them, restores because he loves them, and perfects when he is loved by them; who gives to things that do not exist that they may exist, and to those who love him from whom they are, that they may be happy.
But if souls already existing in some secret place of God are sent to animate and rule the bodies of individuals as they are born, they are surely sent for this task: that, by governing well the body which is born from the penalty of sin, that is, from the mortality of the first man, chastening it through the virtues and subjecting it to a most orderly and lawful servitude, they too may obtain, in due order and time, a place of heavenly incorruption. When they enter this life and take up mortal limbs to carry, they must also take up forgetfulness of their former life and the labor of the present one. From this follows that ignorance and difficulty which in the first man was the punishment of mortality, for paying out the misery of the mind, but which in these souls is the door of service for restoring the body's incorruption. For in this way too these are called sins only because the flesh, coming from the stock of the sinner, produces this ignorance and difficulty in the souls that come to it; and this is to be attributed as a fault neither to the souls nor to the Creator. For he gave both the capacity to work well in laborious duties and the way of faith in the blindness of forgetfulness; and above all that judgment by which every soul grants that what it is harmful not to know must be sought, that one must strive perseveringly in dutiful labors to overcome the difficulty of acting rightly, and that help must be implored from the Creator, that he may help the one striving. He commanded, either outwardly by the law or inwardly by speaking in the depths of the heart, that one must strive; and he prepares the glory of the most blessed city for those who triumph over him who brought the first man, conquered by most wicked persuasion, into this misery, a misery which these souls take up in order to conquer him by most excellent faith. For it is a service of no small glory to conquer the devil by taking up the same punishment into which he boasts that he brought man as his conquered captive. But whoever, captured by love of this life, neglects this will in no way justly attribute the shame of his desertion to the king's command; rather, under the Lord of all, he will be ranked on the side of the one whose shameful pay he loved so much that he deserted his own camp.
But if souls established elsewhere are not sent by the Lord God but come of their own accord to inhabit bodies, it is easy now to see that, whatever ignorance and difficulty has followed their own will, the Creator is in no way to be blamed for it. For even if he himself had sent them, he would be wholly beyond blame, since even in that ignorance and difficulty he did not take from them the free will to ask and seek and strive, ready as he is to give to those who ask, to show to those who seek, and to open to those who knock. For to the earnest and well-disposed he would grant that this ignorance and difficulty, when overcome, should avail for a crown of glory; and to the negligent, who want to defend their sins by weakness, he would not charge the ignorance and difficulty itself as a crime, but would punish them with just punishment because they chose to remain in these rather than to arrive at truth and ease by the effort of seeking and learning and by the humility of confessing and praying.

### Scripture references

- Matt 7:7: allusion, high confidence

### Translation notes

- The four accounts of the soul's origin are set out as hypotheses; Augustine does not choose among them (see 3.21).
- Some words are missing in the digital text after “tanquam quæ non”; the bracketed words supply the evident sense.
- “Ask … seek … knock”: Matt 7:7.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.20 (PL 32:1267–1268; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-14/#p-3-20).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.21

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-21
- Source: PL 32:1268–1269
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine declines to decide among the four accounts of the soul's origin: error about creatures is harmless if not held as certain, but error about the Creator, whose substance is the Trinity, is pernicious; what matters is where the soul is going, not where it began.

### Latin text

Harum autem quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibusque nascentibus novæ fiant, an in corpora nascentium jam alicubi existentes vel mittantur divinitus, vel sua sponte labantur, nullam temere affirmare oportebit. Aut enim nondum ista quæstio a divinorum Librorum catholicis tractatoribus pro merito suae obscuritatis et perplexitatis evoluta atque illustrata est; aut si jam factum est nondum in manus nostras hujuscemodi litterae pervenerunt. Tantum adsit fides nihil de sub­ stantia Creatoris falsum indignumque sentiendi. Ad illum enim tendimus itinere pietatis. Si ergo aliud de illo senserimus quam est, intentio nostra non in beati­ tatem, sed in vanitatem nos ire compellet. De creatura vero si quid aliter quam sese habet senserimus, dum­ modo non id pro cognito perceptoque teneamus, nul­ lum periculum est. Non enim ad creaturam jubemur tendere ut efficiamur beati, sed ad ipsum Creatorem: de quo si aliud quam oportet ac sese res habel, nobis persuadetur, perniciosissimo errore decipimur. Ad hoc enim pergendo, quod aut non est, aut, si est, non facit beatos, ad beatam vitam nullus pervenire potest. Sed ad contemplandam veritatis æternitatem, ut ea perfrui eique inhærere valeamus, infirmitati nostræ via de temporalibus procurata est, ut quantum itineri sufficit ad aeterna tendentium, præterita et fu­ tura credamus. Quoe fidei disciplina, ut auctoritate praepolleat, divina misericordia gubernatur. Praesen­ tia vero, quantum ad creaturam pertinet, in corporis ct animi mobilitate et mutabilitate, quasi transeuntia sentiuntur. In quibus quidquid non experimur, cogni­ tione qualicumque tenere non possumus Quæcumque ergo nobis de quibuscumque creaturis vel praeterita vel futura divina auctoritate credenda narrantur, quamvis partim priusquam ea sentire potuerimus præterierint, partim nondum in nostros sensus perve­ nerint; tamen quia plurimum valent ad roborandam spem nostram, et exhortandam dilectionem, dum no­ bis commendant per ordinatissimam seriem tempo­ rum quam non negligat liberationem nostram Deus, sine ulla dubitatione credenda sunt. Sed quisquis er­ ror personam sibi divinae auctoritatis assumit, ea maxime ratione refellitur, si aut aliquam vei mutabi­ lem speciem praeter creaturam Dei, aut aliquam mu­ tabilem speciem in substantia Dei credere aut anir­ mare convincitur, eamque substantiam Dei veI plus vel minus quam Trinitatem esse contendit: cui Tri­ nitati pie sobrieque intelligendæ omnis excubat vigi­ lantia christiana, et omnis ejus provectus intenditur. De cujus Trinitatis unitate et aequalitate, et singula­ rum in ea personarum quadam proprietate, non hic locus est disserendi. Nam commemorare quaedam de Domino Deo auctore et formatore et ordinatore re­ rum omnium, quæ ad saluberrimam fidem pertineant, et quibus lactens atque a terrenis in cælestia sese attollere incipiens, utiliter adminiculetur intentio, et factu facillimum ct a plerisque jam factitatum est: pertractare autem istam totam, atque ita versare quæstionem, ut perspicuæ rationi, quanlum in hac vita datur omnis humana intelligentia subjugetur, non modo cloquio, sed ne cogitatione quidem vel cuiquam hominum, vel certe nobis satis expe­ ditum et facile aggrediendum videri potest. Nunc ergo ut quod instituimus, quantum adjuvamur, et quantum sinimur peragamus: quæcumque nobis, quantum ad creaturam pertinet, vel narrantur præ­ terita, vel prænuntiantur futura, quæ ad commen­ dandam valeant integram religionem, excitando nos ad sincerissimam dilectionem Dei et proximi, sine dubitatione credenda suni: adversus incredulos au­ tem hactenus defendenda, ut vel mole auctoritatis infidelitas corum obteratur, vel eis ostendatur, quan­ tum potest, primo quam non sit stultum talia cre­ dere. deinde quam sit stultum talia non credere. Verumtamen falsam doctrinam non lam de praeteritis et futuris, quam de praesentibus et maxime de in­ commutabilibus oportet refellere, et quantum datur, perspicua ratione convincere. Sane in serie temporalium inquisitioni præ­ teritorum futurorum exspectatio praeferenda est: quandoquidem etiam in divinis Libris ea quæ praeter­ ita narrantur, vel præfigurationem futurorum, vel pollicitationem, vel testificationem præ se gerunt. Et revera in iis etiam quæ ad hanc vitam pertineat, prosperis adversUque rebus, quid quisque fuerit non satis curat: in id vero quod futurum speratur, sese omnis curarum æstus agglomerat. Nescio quo quippe intimo naturalique sensu, ea quæ nobis acciderunt, quoniam transacta sunt, sic habentur ad momentum felicitatis et miseriæ, quasi nunquam accidissent. Quid igitur mihi obest, si esse quando coeperim ne­ scio, cum esse me noverim, nec futurum esse despe­ rem? Non euim in præterita me attendo, ut tanquam errorem perniciosissimum verear, si aliter de iis sen­ sero quam fuerunt: sed in id quod futurus sum, cur­ sum dirigo duce misericordia Conditoris mei. De hoc igitur quod futurus sum,et de illo apud qnem futurus sum, si aliter quam veritas sese habet credidero aut seusero, vehementer cavendus est error; ne mihi aut necessaria non præparem, aut ad eum ipsum finem propositi mei, dum aliud pro alio mihi videtur, pervenire non possim. Quamobrem, sicut ad compa­ randam vestem nibil mihi obesset, si præteritæ hie­ mis oblitus essem, obesset autem si futurum frigus imminere non crederem: ita nibil oberit animae meæ, si oblita est quid forte pertulerit, si modo diligenter advertat et teneat quo se deinceps parare moneatur. Et sicut, verbi gratia, Romam naviganti nihil noce­ ret si excidisset animo, a quo littore navem solve­ rit, dum tamen ab eo loco ubi esset non ignoraret quo proram dirigeret; nihil autem prodesset memi­ nisse littoris unde iter exorsus sit, si de Romano portu falsum aliquid existimans, in saxa incidisset: ita neque si non tcnuero initium temporis vitae meæ, quidquam mihi oberit scienti quo fine requiescam; nec prodesset aliquid illa sive memoria sive conjcctura inchoaiæ vitæ, si de ipso Deo, qui unus laborum animæ finis est, aliter quam dignum est opinatus, in scopulos erroris irruerem Nec iste sermo ad id valuerit, ut quisquam nos prohibere arbitretur ut quærant qui potuerint secun­ dum Scripturas divinitus inspiratas, utrum anima de anima propagetur, an suo cuique animanti singulæ in ipso fiant, an ad regendum animandumque corpus divino nutu alicunde mittantur, vei propria voluntate se insinuent; si vel alicujus expediendae necessariæ quaestionis ratio flagitat ista considerare atque discu­ tere, vel a rebus magis necessariis otium ad haec quaerenda et disserenda conceditur. Verum ad id po­ tius ista dixerim, ne quis in re tali vel temere suc­ censeat ei qui suae opinioni humaniore fortasse dubi­ talione non cedit: aut eliam si quid hinc certi quis­ quam et liquidi comprehenderit, ideo putet alium spem perdidisse futurorum, quia præterita exorsa non recolit.

### English translation (Claude)

Of these four opinions about the soul, whether souls come by propagation, or are made new in each one who is born, or, already existing somewhere, are either sent by God into the bodies of those being born or slip into them of their own accord, none should be rashly affirmed. For either this question has not yet been unfolded and clarified by catholic commentators on the divine books as its obscurity and complexity deserve, or, if this has been done, such writings have not yet come into our hands. Only let faith be present, so that we think nothing false or unworthy about the substance of the Creator. For we are making our way toward him by the road of piety. If, then, we think of him otherwise than he is, our striving will drive us not toward happiness but toward vanity. But if we think something about the creature otherwise than it is, there is no danger, provided we do not hold it as known and perceived. For we are not commanded to make our way toward the creature in order to become happy, but toward the Creator himself; and if we are persuaded of something about him other than is fitting and other than the truth is, we are deceived by a most pernicious error. For no one can arrive at the happy life by making his way toward what either does not exist or, if it exists, does not make people happy.
But for contemplating the eternity of truth, so that we may be able to enjoy it fully and cleave to it, a way has been provided for our weakness through temporal things, so that, as far as suffices for the journey of those who are making their way toward eternal things, we may believe things past and future. This discipline of faith is governed by the divine mercy, so that it may prevail by authority. Present things, as far as the creature is concerned, are perceived as passing, in the movement and changeableness of body and mind. Whatever of these we do not experience, we cannot hold by any kind of knowledge. Whatever things, then, past or future, about any creatures, are told us by divine authority to be believed, although some passed away before we could perceive them and some have not yet come within our senses, are to be believed without any doubt, because they are of great value for strengthening our hope and encouraging our love, while they commend to us, through the most orderly sequence of the ages, how God does not neglect our liberation. But any error that assumes the mask of divine authority is refuted above all by this reasoning: if it is shown to believe or to affirm either some changeable form apart from the creation of God, or some changeable form in the substance of God, or contends that this substance of God is either more or less than the Trinity; the Trinity, to the pious and sober understanding of which all Christian vigilance keeps watch and all its progress is directed. Of the unity and equality of this Trinity, and of a certain property of the individual persons in it, this is not the place to speak. For to mention certain things about the Lord God, the author, former, and orderer of all things, which belong to the most wholesome faith, and by which the striving of one still nursing and beginning to raise itself from earthly to heavenly things is usefully supported, is very easy to do and has already been done by very many. But to treat that whole question thoroughly, and to turn it over so that all human understanding, as far as is granted in this life, is subjected to clear reason, cannot seem easy and simple to undertake, not only in speech but even in thought, for any human being, or at least for us.
Now, then, to complete what we have undertaken, as far as we are helped and allowed: whatever things concerning the creature are either told us as past or foretold as future, and serve to commend religion whole by stirring us to the most sincere love of God and neighbor, are to be believed without doubt; and they are to be defended against unbelievers in such a way that either their unbelief is crushed by the weight of authority, or it is shown to them, as far as possible, first how it is not foolish to believe such things, and then how foolish it is not to believe them. But false teaching is to be refuted not so much about things past and future as about things present, and above all about unchangeable things, and, as far as is granted, to be convicted by clear reason.
Certainly, in the sequence of temporal things, the expectation of things future is to be preferred to the investigation of things past; since even in the divine books the things narrated as past carry with them a prefiguration, or a promise, or a testimony of things to come. And indeed, even in the prosperity and adversity that belong to this life, no one cares much what he has been; the whole surge of cares gathers toward what is hoped for in the future. For by some inner and natural sense, the things that have happened to us, since they are over, count for as little in the balance of happiness and misery as if they had never happened. What harm is it to me, then, if I do not know when I began to exist, since I know that I exist and do not despair of existing in the future? For I do not attend to the past so as to fear, as a most pernicious error, thinking of it otherwise than it was; but I direct my course toward what I shall be, with the mercy of my Maker as my guide. About what I shall be, then, and about him with whom I shall be, if I believe or think otherwise than the truth is, I must greatly beware of error, lest I either fail to prepare what is necessary, or, taking one thing for another, be unable to reach the very end of my purpose. So, just as it would do me no harm in getting clothing if I had forgotten last winter, but it would harm me if I did not believe that cold was coming, so it will do my soul no harm if it has forgotten what it may perhaps have suffered, provided only that it notices carefully and holds fast that for which it is warned to prepare itself from now on. And just as, for example, it would not harm someone sailing to Rome if he had forgotten from what shore he set sail, provided that from where he was he knew where to direct the prow, while it would profit him nothing to remember the shore from which he began the journey if, thinking something false about the port of Rome, he ran onto rocks: so it will not harm me if I do not hold the beginning of the time of my life, provided I know in what end I shall rest; nor would that memory or conjecture of the beginning of life profit me at all if, thinking about God himself, who alone is the end of the soul's labors, otherwise than is worthy, I rushed onto the rocks of error.
Nor should this discourse be taken to mean that we forbid those who are able to inquire, according to the divinely inspired Scriptures, whether soul is propagated from soul, or souls are made individually in each living being, or are sent from somewhere by divine command to rule and animate the body, or enter by their own will; if either the needs of some necessary question demand that these things be considered and discussed, or leisure from more necessary matters is granted for inquiring into and discussing them. Rather, I would have said these things so that no one may rashly be angry, in such a matter, with one who, perhaps from a more human hesitation, does not yield to his opinion; or, if anyone has grasped something certain and clear about this, that he may not think that another has lost hope of the future because he does not remember the beginnings of the past.

### Translation notes

- Augustine leaves the origin of the soul undecided here, as he did to the end of his life (Retractations 1.1.3); the passage is translated as written.
- The Trinity is mentioned as the test of sound teaching; Augustine says this is not the place to discuss it.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.21 (PL 32:1268–1269; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-21).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.22

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-22
- Source: PL 32:1269–1270
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Sins are due to the will alone; if ignorance and difficulty are natural, they are a starting point like an infant's speechlessness, blameworthy only if one refuses to progress, and God is praised for every stage.

### Latin text

Quoquo modo autem se istud habeat, sive omni­ no omitlendum, sive nunc differendum et alias con­ siderandum sit, præsens tamen quaestio non impedi­ tur, quominus appareat integerrima et justissima et inconcussa atque incommutabili majestate et substan­ tia Creatoris, supplicia peccatorum suorum animas luere: quae peccata, ut jain diu disseruimus, non­ nisi propriæ voluntati earum tribuenda sunt, nee ulla ulterior peccatorum causa quaerenda. Ignorantia vero et difficultas si naturalis est, inde incipit anima proficere, et ad cognitionem et requiem, donec in ea perficiatur vita beata, promo­ veri. Quem profectum in studiis optimis atque pie­ tate, quorum facultas ei non negata est, si propria voluntate neglexerit; juste in graviorem, quae jam poenalis est, ignorantiam difficultatemque præcipi­ tatur, decentissimo et convenientissimo rerum mode­ ramine in inferioribus ordinata. Non enim quod na­ turaliter nescit et naturaliter non potest, hoc animæ deputatur in reatum; sed quod scire non studuit, et quod dignam facilitati comparandæ ad recte facien­ dum operam non dedit. Loqui enim non nosse at­ que non posse, infanti naturale est: quæ ignorantia difficultasque sermonis non modo inculpabilis sub grammaticorum legibus, sed etiam humanis affecti­ bus blanda ct grata est; non cnim ullo vitio illam facultatem comparare neglexit, aut ullo vitio quam compararat amisit. Itaque, si nobis in eloquentia esset beatitudo constituta, atque ita crimini duceretur cum peccatur in linguæ sonis, quemadmodum cum pec­ catur in actibus vitæ; nullus utique argueretur infantiae, quod ab ea esset exorsus ad consequcndam eloquea­ tiam: sed plane merito damnaretur, si suæ volunta­ tis perversitate vcl ad eam recidisset, vel in ea re­ mansisset. Sic etiam nunc, si ignorantia veri et dif­ ficultas recti naturalis est homini, unde incipiat in sapientiae quietisque beatitudinem surgere, nullus hanc ex initio naturali recte arguit: sed si proficere noluerit, aut a profectu retrorsum relabi voluerit, jure meritoque paenas luet. Creator vero ejus ubique laudatur, vel quod eam ab ipsis exordiis ad summi boni capacitatem in­ choaverit, vel quod ejus profectum adjuvet, vel quod impleat proficientem atque perficiat, vel quod pec­ cantem, id est aut ab initiis suis sese ad perfectionem attollere recusantem, aut jam ex profectu aliquo rela­ bentem, justissima damnatione pro meritis ordinat. Non enim propterea malam creavit, quia nondum tanta est, quanta ut proficiendo esse posset accepit; cum ejus exordio perfectiones omnes corporum longe inferiores sint, quas tamen in suo genere laudabiles esse judicat, quisquis de rebus sanissime judicat. Quod ergo ignorat quid sibi agendum sit, ex eo est quod nondum accepit: sed hoc quoque accipiet, si boc quod accepit, bene usa fuerit. Accepit autem ut pie et diligenter quærat, si volet. Et quod agnoscens quid sibi agendum sit, non continuo valet implere, hoc quoque nondum accepit: praecessit enim quædam pars ejus sublimior ad sentiendum quod recte faciat bonum: sed quædam tardior atque carnalis non con­ sequenter in sententiam ducitur; ut cx ipsa difficul­ tate admoneatur cumdem implorare adjutorem perfe­ ctionis suæ, quem inchoationis sentit auctorem; ut ex hoc ei fiat charior, dum non suis viribus, sed cujus bonitate habet ut sit, ejus misericordia sublevatur ut beata sit. Quanto autem charior illi est a quo est, tanto in eo firmius acquiescit, et tanto uberius æternitate ejus perfruitur. Si enim arboris novellum et rude vir­ gultum nullo modo recte sterile dicimus, quamvis aliquot aeStates sine fructibus trajiciat, donec oppor­ tuno tempore expromat feracitatem suam; cur non auctor animae debita pietate laudetur, si ei tale tri­ buit exordium. ut studendo ac proficiendo ad frugem sapientix justitiæque perveniat, tantumque illi prae­ stitit dignitatis, ut in ejus cHam potestate poneret, si vellet ad beatitudinem tendere?

### English translation (Claude)

However this question stands, whether it is to be omitted altogether or put off now and considered elsewhere, the present question is not hindered from appearing clearly: that souls pay the penalties of their sins while the majesty and substance of the Creator remain wholly intact, most just, unshaken, and unchangeable; and these sins, as we have long argued, are to be attributed only to their own will, and no further cause of sins is to be sought.
But if ignorance and difficulty are natural, the soul begins from there to make progress and to be advanced toward knowledge and rest, until the happy life is perfected in it. If by its own will it neglects this progress in the best pursuits and in piety, the capacity for which has not been denied it, it is justly cast down into a graver ignorance and difficulty, which is now penal, and is set in order among lower things by a most becoming and fitting governance of things. For what it does not know by nature and cannot do by nature is not counted to the soul as guilt; but that it did not strive to know, and did not give due effort to acquiring ease in acting rightly. For not to know how to speak and not to be able to is natural to an infant; and this ignorance and difficulty of speech is not only blameless under the laws of the grammarians but even charming and pleasing to human affection; for the infant did not neglect to acquire that ability through any fault, nor lose through any fault what it had acquired. So if our happiness lay in eloquence, and it were counted a crime to sin in the sounds of language as it is to sin in the actions of life, no one would be accused for his infancy, since from it he set out to attain eloquence; but he would plainly be condemned deservedly if by the perversity of his will he either fell back into it or remained in it. So too now, if ignorance of the true and difficulty in the right are natural to man, the point from which he is to begin to rise into the happiness of wisdom and rest, no one rightly reproaches this natural beginning; but if he refuses to make progress, or chooses to slip back from progress, he will justly and deservedly pay the penalty.
But his Creator is praised everywhere: whether because he began the soul from its very beginnings with a capacity for the highest good, or because he helps its progress, or because he fills and perfects it as it progresses, or because, when it sins, that is, either refuses to raise itself from its beginnings to perfection or slips back after some progress, he sets it in order by a most just condemnation according to its merits. For he did not create it evil because it is not yet as great as it received the power to become by progressing; for all the perfections of bodies are far inferior to its beginning, and yet whoever judges most soundly of things judges these praiseworthy in their kind. That it does not know what it ought to do, then, comes from its not yet having received this; but it will receive this too if it uses well what it has received. And it has received the power to seek devoutly and diligently, if it will. And that, knowing what it ought to do, it is not at once able to fulfill it, this too it has not yet received. For a certain higher part of it has gone ahead to perceive the good of acting rightly, but a slower and fleshly part is not drawn along into that judgment; so that by this very difficulty it is admonished to implore as the helper of its perfection the same one whom it perceives to be the author of its beginning, and so that he may become dearer to it, since it is raised to happiness not by its own strength but by the mercy of him by whose goodness it has its existence. And the dearer he is to it from whom it is, the more firmly it rests in him and the more fully it enjoys his eternity. For if we in no way rightly call the new and young shoot of a tree barren, though it passes some summers without fruit until at the right time it shows its fruitfulness, why should the author of the soul not be praised with due piety, if he has given it such a beginning that by striving and progressing it may come to the fruit of wisdom and justice, and has granted it such dignity as to place it in its own power to tend toward happiness if it wills?

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.22 (PL 32:1269–1270; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-22).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.23

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-23
- Source: PL 32:1270–1271
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine answers objections about infants who die or suffer (no one is created in vain; baptized infants are helped by the faith of those who present them; the Holy Innocents are honored as martyrs) and about animal pain, which shows the soul's desire for unity and points to the Creator's unity.

### Latin text

Huic autem disputationi objici ab imperitis so­ let quaedam calumnia de mortibus parvulorum, et de quibusdam cruciatibus corporis, quibus eos saepe vi­ demus affligi. DicUnt enim: Quid opus erat ut nasce­ retur, qui antequam iniret ullum vitae meritum, ex­ cessit e vita? aut qualis in futuro judicio deputabitur, cui neque inter justos locus est, quoniam nihil recte fecit; ncque inter malos, quoniam nihil peccavit? Quibus respondetur: ad universitatis complexum, et totius creaturæ vel per locos vel per tempora ordi­ natissimam connexionem, non posse superfluo creari qualemcumque hominem, ubi folium arboris nullum superfluo creatur; sed sane superfluo quæri de meri­ lis ejus qui nihil meruerit. Non enim metuendum est ne vita esse potuerit media quaedam inter recte fa­ ctum atque peccatum, et sententia judicis media esse non possit inter praemium atque supplicium. Quo loco etiam illud perscrutari homines so­ lent, sacramentum baptismi Christi quid parvulis pro­ sit, cum eo accepto plerumque moriuntur, priusquam ex eo quidquam cognoscere potuerint. Qua in re satis pie recteque creditur, prodesse parvulo eorum fidem a quibus consecrandus offertur. Et hoc Ecclesiæ corn­ mendat saluberrima auctoritas, ut ex eo quisque sen­ tiat quid sibi prosit fides sua, quando in aliorum quo­ que beneficium, qui propriam nondum habent, potest aliena commodari. Quid enim filio viduæ profuit fides sua, quam utique mortuus non habebat; cui tamen profuit matris ut resurgeret? Quanto ergo potius fides aliena potest consulere parvulo, cui sua perfidia non potest imputari? De cruciatibus autem corporis, quibus affigun­ tur parvuli, quorum per aetatem nulla peccata sunt, si animae quibus animantur, non prius quam ipsi homi­ nes esse coeperunt, major querela et quasi misericors deponi solet, cum dicitur: Quid mali fecerunt ut ista paterentur? Quasi possit esse innocentiae meritum, antequam quisque aliquid nocere possit. Cum autem boni aliquid operatur Deus in emendatione majorum, cum parvulorum suorum qui eis chari sunt, dolori­ bus ac mortibus flagellantur; cur ista non fiant, quando cum transierint, pro non factis erunt, in qui­ bus facta sunt: propter quos autem facta sunt, aut meliores erunt, si temporalibus incommodis emen­ dati, rectius elegerint vivere, aut excusationem in futuri judicii supplicio non habebunt, si vitae hujus angoribus ad æternam vitam desiderium convertere noluerint? Quis autem novit quid parvulis, de quorum cruciatibus duritia majorum contunditur, aut exerce­ tur fides, aut misericordia probatur; quis ergo novit quid ipsis parvulis in secreto judiciorum suorum bo­ næ compensationis reservet Deus, qui quanquam nihil recte fecerint, tamen nec peccantes aliquid ista per­ pessi sunt? Non enim frustra etiam infantes illos, qui cum Dominus Jesus Christus necandus ab Herode quaereretur, occisi sunt, in honorem martyrum receptos commendat Ecclesia. Quanquam isti calumniosi, et talium quaestio­ num non studiosissimi examinatores, sed loquacissimi ventilatores, eliam de pecorum doloribus et laboribus solent minus eruditorum sollicitare fidem, cum di­ cunt: Quid eliam pecora vel meruerunt mali, ut tanta patianlur incommoda, vel sperant boni, quia tantis exercenlur incommodis? Sed haee dicunt vel sentiunt, quia iniquissime de rebus existimant, qui cum summum bonum quod et quanlum sit aspicere nequeant, talia volunt esse omnia, quale putant esse summum bonum præter enim summa corpora quoe cælestia sunt, minusque corruptioni subjacent, sum­ num bonum cogitare non possunt; ideoque inordi- MItissime flagitant, ut nec mortem nec ullam corru­ ptionem patiantur corpora bestiarum, quasi non sint mortalia, cum sint infima; aut ideo mala sint, quia sunt coelestia meliora. Dolor autem quem bestiæ sen­ num, animarum etiam bestialium vim quamdam in suo genere mirabilem laudabilemque commendat. Hoc ipso enim satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint appetentes unitatis. Quid est euim aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens? Unde luce clarius appa­ rel quam sit illa anima in sui corporis universitate avida unitatis et tenax, quæ nec libenter, nec indif­ ferenter, sed potius renilenler et reluctanter intendi­ tur in eam passioncm corporis sui, qua ejus unitatem atque integritatem labefactari moleste accipit. Non ergo appareret quantus inferioribus creaturis anima­ libus esset appetitus unitatis, nisi dolore bestiarum. Quod si non appareret, minus quam opus esset admo­ neremur ab illa summa et sublimi et ineffabili unitate Creatoris esse omnia ista constituta. Et revera si pie ac diligenter attendas, omnis crcatura: species et motus qui in animi humani consi­ derationem cadit, eruditionem nostram loquitur, di­ versis motibus et affectionibus, quasi quadam va­ rietate linguarum, undique clamans atque increpans cognoscendum esse Creatorem. Nulla enim res est earum quae nec dolorem nec voluptatem sentiunt, quæ non aliqua unitate decus proprii generis asse­ quatur, vel omnino naturæ suæ qualemcumque sta­ bilitatem. Nulla item res est earum quæ vel doloris molestias, vel blanditias sentiunt voluptatis, quæ non eo ipso quo dolorem fugit, voluptatemque appetit, di­ remptionem se fugere, unitatemqne appetere, fatea­ tur. Inque ipsis rationalibus animis omnis appetitus cognitionis qua illa natura lætatur, et ad unitatem re­ fert omne quod percipit, et in errore nihil fugit aliud quam incomprehensibili ambiguitate confundi. Omne autem ambiguum unde molestum est, nisi quia certam non babet unitatem? Ex quo apparet omnia, sive cum offendunt vel offenduntur, sive cum delectant vel de­ lectantur, unitatem insinuare atque praedicare Crea­ toris. Si autem ignorantia ct difficultas, a quibus istam vitam necesse est incipere, non sunt animis naturales; restat ut aut officio susceptæ sint, aut irrogatae sup­ plicio. De quibus jam satis esse arbitror dispu­ talum.

### English translation (Claude)

Against this discussion the unskilled usually bring a certain cavil about the deaths of little children and about certain bodily torments by which we often see them afflicted. For they say: “What need was there for him to be born who left life before he entered on any merit of life? Or how will he be counted in the future judgment, who has no place among the just, since he did nothing rightly, nor among the wicked, since he committed no sin?” The answer to them is that, in the whole scope of the universe and the most orderly connection of all creation through places and times, no human being whatever can be created superfluously, where not a leaf of a tree is created superfluously; but it is indeed superfluous to inquire about the merits of one who has merited nothing. For we need not fear that there could be a life midway between right action and sin, while the judge's sentence could not be midway between reward and punishment.
At this point people also usually examine what the sacrament of the baptism of Christ profits little children, since after receiving it they often die before they could know anything of it. In this matter it is piously and rightly enough believed that the faith of those by whom the child is offered for consecration profits it. And the most wholesome authority of the Church commends this, so that each may perceive from it how much his own faith profits him, when even another's faith can be lent for the benefit of others who do not yet have their own. For what did the widow's son's own faith profit him, which, being dead, he certainly did not have? Yet his mother's faith profited him so that he rose again. How much more, then, can another's faith provide for a little child, to whom no unbelief of its own can be imputed?
But about the bodily torments by which little children are afflicted, who because of their age have no sins (if the souls by which they are animated did not begin to exist before they themselves began to be human beings), a greater complaint, and as it were a compassionate one, is usually raised, when it is said: “What evil have they done to suffer these things?” As if there could be a merit of innocence before anyone could do any harm! But since God works some good in correcting adults when they are scourged by the pains and deaths of their little children, who are dear to them, why should these things not happen? When they have passed, they will be as if they had not happened for those in whom they happened; while those for whose sake they happened will either be better, if, corrected by temporal troubles, they choose to live more rightly, or will have no excuse in the punishment of the future judgment, if they would not turn their desire to eternal life through the anguish of this life. And who knows what good compensation God reserves in the secret of his judgments for these little children themselves, by whose torments the hardness of adults is crushed, or faith is exercised, or mercy proved; for though they have done nothing rightly, yet they have suffered these things without having sinned? For not in vain does the Church commend, as received into the honor of martyrs, even those infants who were killed when the Lord Jesus Christ was sought by Herod to be put to death.
Yet these cavilers, not most careful examiners of such questions but most talkative airers of them, also often try to unsettle the faith of the less learned about the pains and labors of animals, saying: “What evil have animals deserved, that they suffer such troubles, or what good do they hope for, that they are exercised by such troubles?” But they say or think this because they judge most unfairly about things: unable to see what and how great the highest good is, they want all things to be such as they think the highest good is. For beyond the highest bodies, the heavenly ones, which are less subject to corruption, they cannot conceive the highest good; and so, most disorderedly, they demand that the bodies of beasts suffer neither death nor any corruption, as if they were not mortal, though they are the lowest; or as if they were evil because heavenly bodies are better. But the pain that beasts feel commends a certain power, wonderful and praiseworthy in its kind, even of animal souls. For by this very thing it appears clearly enough how eager for unity they are in ruling and animating their bodies. For what is pain but a certain feeling that cannot bear division or corruption? Hence it is clearer than light how eager for unity, and how tenacious of it, that soul is in the whole of its body, which neither willingly nor indifferently, but rather resisting and struggling, faces that suffering of its body by which it is distressed that its unity and soundness are being shaken. It would not appear, then, how great a desire for unity there is in the lower living creatures, except by the pain of beasts. And if it did not appear, we would be reminded less than we need that all these things were established by that supreme, sublime, and ineffable unity of the Creator.
And indeed, if you attend devoutly and diligently, every beauty and motion of creation that falls under the consideration of the human mind speaks to instruct us, crying out and calling on every side by various motions and dispositions, as by a variety of tongues, that the Creator must be known. For there is none of the things that feel neither pain nor pleasure that does not attain by some unity the beauty of its own kind, or at least some stability of its nature. Nor is there any of the things that feel the distresses of pain or the allurements of pleasure that does not confess, by the very fact that it flees pain and seeks pleasure, that it flees division and seeks unity. And in rational souls themselves, every desire for knowledge, in which that nature delights, refers all it perceives to unity, and in error flees nothing but being confused by incomprehensible ambiguity. And why is every ambiguity troublesome, unless because it has no certain unity? From this it appears that all things, whether they offend or are offended, delight or are delighted, suggest and proclaim the unity of the Creator. But if ignorance and difficulty, with which this life must begin, are not natural to souls, it remains that they were either taken up as a duty or imposed as a punishment. About these, I think, enough has now been discussed.

### Scripture references

- Luke 7:12: allusion, high confidence
- Matt 2:16: allusion, high confidence

### Translation notes

- The widow's son: Luke 7:12–15; the infants killed by Herod: Matt 2:16.
- The benefit of infant baptism through the faith of those who present the child is stated as the Church's teaching; translated as written.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.23 (PL 32:1270–1271; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-23).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.24

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-24
- Source: PL 32:1271–1272
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: The first man was made neither foolish nor wise but rational, able to receive and keep a command and so to attain wisdom; his fall through pride was a voluntary passage, neither foolish nor wise, from wisdom to folly.

### Latin text

Quapropter ipse primus homo qualis factus sit, magis quærendum est, quam quomodo ejus posteritas propagata sit. Multum enim sibi videntur acute propo­ nere quæstionem qui dicunt: Si sapiens factus est primus homo, cur seductus est? si aulcm stultus fa­ ctus est, quomodo non est Deus auctor vitiorum, cum sit stultitia maximum vilium? Quasi vero natura hu­ mana praeter stultitiam et sapientiam nullam mediam recipiat affectionem, quæ nec stultitia, nee sapientia dici possit. Tunc enim homo incipit aut stultus esse aut sapicns, ut alterum horum necessario appelletur, cum jam posset, nisi negligeret, habere sapientiam, ut vitiosae stultitiæ sit voluntas rea. Non enim quis­ quam ita desipit, ut stultum appellet infantem, quam­ vis sit absurdior si velit appellare sapientem. Ut ergo infans nec stultus nec sapiens dici potest, quamvis jam homo sit; ex quo apparet naturam hominis reci­ pere aliquid medium, quod neque stultitiam, neque sapientiam recte vocaveris: ita etiam si quisquam tali affectione animatus esset, qualem habent illi qui per negligentiam sapientia carent, nemo eum stultum re­ cte diceret quem non vitio, sed natura talem videret. Est enim stultitia, rerum appetendarum et vitandarum non quaelibet, sed vitiosa ignorantia. Unde neque ani­ mal irrationale stultum dicimus, quia non accepit ut sapiens esse posset. Appellamus tamen plerumque ex similitudine aliquid non proprie. Nam et Cæcitas cum maximum vitium sit oculorum, non tamcn in catulis nascentibus vitium est, nee proprie cæcitas dici potest. Si ergo ita factus est homo, ut quamvis sapiens nondum esset, præceptum tamen posset accipere, cui utique obtemperare deberet; nec illud jam nii­ rum est, quod seduci potuit; nec illud injustum, quod præcepto non obtemperans poenas luit; nec Creator ejus auctor vitiorum cst, quia non habere sa­ pientiam, nondum erat vitium hominis, si nondum ut habere posset, accepcrat. Sed tamen habebat aliquid quo si bene uti vellet, ad id quod non habebat ascen­ deret. Aliud est enim esse rationalem, aliud esse sa­ pientem. Ratione fit quisque præcepti capax, cui fidem debet, ut quod præcipitur, faciat. Sicut autem natura rationis præceptum capit, sic præcepti observatio sa­ pientiam. Quod est autem natura ad capiendum præ­ ceptum, hoc est voluntas ad observandum. Et sicut rationalis natura tanquam meritum est præcepti acci­ piendi, sic præcepti observatio meritum est accipiendae sapientiæ. Ex qno autem incipit homo præceptiesse ca­ pal, ex illo incipit posse peccare. Duobus autem modis peccat antequam fiat sapiens; si aut se non accommo­ del ad accipiendum præceptum, aut cum acceperit non observet. Sapiens autem peccat, si se averterit a sapien­ tia. Sicut enim præceptum non est ab illo cui præcipi­ tur, sed ab illo qui præcipit; sic et sapientia non est ab illo qui illuminatur, sed ab illo qui illuminat. Quid crgo est unde non laudandus sit hominis Creator? Bonum est enim aliquod homo, et melius quam pecus, ex eo quod præcepti capax. Et hoc melius, cum præceptum jam cepit. Rursus, hoc melius, cum præcepto paruit. Et his omnibus melius, cum æterno lumine sapientiæ beatus est. Peccatum autemmalum est in negligen­ tia. • vet ad custodiendam contemplationem sapientiæ. Ex quo intelligitur, etiamsi sapiensprimus homo factus est, potuisse tamen seduci. Quod peccatum cum csset in libcro arbitrio, justa, divina lege, pœna con­ sccuta est V Ita dicit ctiam apostolus Paulus: Dicen­ tes se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt. Superbia enim avertit a sapientia: aversionem autem stultitia conse­ quitur. Stultitia quippe cæcitas quædam est, sicut idem dicit: Et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum.Unde autem hæc obscuratio, nisi ex aversione a lumine sapientiae? unde autem hæc aversio, nisi dum ille cui bonum est Deus, sibi ipse vult esse bonum suum, sicuti sibi est Deus? Itaque, Ad meipsum, in­ quit, conturbata est anima mea: et, Gustate, et eritis sicut dii. Turbat autem considerantes, quod ita quærunt: Stultitiane primus homo recessit a Deo? an recedendo stultus factus est? Quia si responderis eum stultitia rccessisse a sapientia, videbitur stultus fuisse ante­ quam recederet a sapientia, ut stultitia illi causa esset recedendi. Item si responderis eum recedendo stul­ tum esse factum, quærunt utrum stulte, an sapienter fecerit quod recessit. Si enim s: pienter fecit, recte fecit, nihilque peccavit: si stulte, jam erat, inquiunt, in eo stultitia, qua factum est ut recederet. Non enim stulte aliquid sine stultitia facere poterat. Ex quo apparet esse quiddam medium, quo ad stultitiam a sapientia transitur, quod neque stulte, neque sapien­ ter factum dici potest, quod ab hominibus in hac vita constitutis non nisi ex contrario datur intelligi. Sicut enim nullus mortalium fit sapiens, nisi ab stultitia in sapientiam transeat; ipse autem transitus si stulte fit, non utique bene fit, quod dementissimum est dicere; si autem sapienter fit, jam erat sapicntia in homine antequam transisset ad sapientiam, quod nihilomi­ nus absurdum est; ex quo intelligitur esse medium, quod neutrum dici possit: ita et ex arce sapientiae, ut ad stultitiam primus homo transiret, nec stultus, nec sapiens transitus ille fuit. Velut in somno et vi­ giliis, neque id est dormire quod obdormiscere, neque id est vigilare quod expergisci, sed transitus quidam ex altero in alterum. Verum hoc interest, qnod sine voluntate plerumque ista fiunt: illa autem nunquam nisi per voluntatem; unde justissime retributiones consequuntur.

### English translation (Claude)

So it is rather to be asked what the first man himself was made like than how his posterity was propagated. For those think they put the question very sharply who say: “If the first man was made wise, why was he seduced? But if he was made foolish, how is God not the author of vices, since folly is the greatest vice?” As if human nature admitted no intermediate state besides folly and wisdom, one that could be called neither folly nor wisdom. For a man begins to be either foolish or wise, so that he must necessarily be called one of these, only when he could already have wisdom if he did not neglect it, so that the will is guilty of faulty folly. For no one is so senseless as to call an infant foolish, though he would be still more absurd if he wanted to call it wise. So, just as an infant can be called neither foolish nor wise, though already a human being (from which it appears that human nature admits something intermediate which you would rightly call neither folly nor wisdom), so too, if anyone had been endowed with such a disposition as those have who lack wisdom through negligence, no one would rightly call him foolish whom he saw to be so not by fault but by nature. For folly is not just any ignorance of what to seek and what to avoid, but faulty ignorance. Hence we do not call an irrational animal foolish, since it has not received the power to be wise. Yet we often name something by likeness, not properly. For blindness, though it is the greatest fault of the eyes, is not a fault in newborn puppies and cannot properly be called blindness.
If, then, man was made such that, though not yet wise, he could yet receive a command which he certainly ought to obey, it is neither surprising that he could be seduced, nor unjust that he paid the penalty for not obeying the command; nor is his Creator the author of vices, since not to have wisdom was not yet a fault in man, if he had not yet received the power to have it. Yet he had something by which, if he willed to use it well, he would rise to what he did not have. For it is one thing to be rational, another to be wise. By reason one becomes capable of a command, to which he owes fidelity, so as to do what is commanded. As the nature of reason grasps the command, so the keeping of the command grasps wisdom. What nature is for grasping the command, the will is for keeping it. And as rational nature is, as it were, the merit of receiving the command, so the keeping of the command is the merit of receiving wisdom.
From the time a man begins to be capable of a command, he begins to be able to sin. He sins in two ways before he becomes wise: if he does not make himself fit to receive the command, or if, having received it, he does not keep it. But the wise man sins if he turns away from wisdom. For just as the command is not from the one commanded but from the one who commands, so wisdom is not from the one enlightened but from the one who enlightens. What is there, then, for which man's Creator is not to be praised? For man is a good, and better than cattle, because he is capable of a command; better still when he has received the command; better again when he has obeyed it; and better than all these when he is happy in the eternal light of wisdom. Sin, then, is an evil that lies in negligence, either in receiving the command, or in keeping it, or in guarding the contemplation of wisdom. From this it is understood that, even if the first man was made wise, he could still be seduced. And since that sin lay in free choice, a just penalty followed by divine law. So too the apostle Paul says: “Claiming to be wise, they became fools.” For pride turns one away from wisdom, and folly follows the turning away. For folly is a kind of blindness, as the same Apostle says: “And their foolish heart was darkened.” And where does this darkening come from, but from turning away from the light of wisdom? And where does this turning away come from, but from this, that he whose good is God wants to be his own good to himself, as God is to himself? So it is said, “My soul is troubled toward myself,” and, “Taste, and you will be like gods.”
But those who consider this are troubled when they ask: Did the first man depart from God through folly, or did he become foolish by departing? For if you answer that he departed from wisdom through folly, he will seem to have been foolish before he departed from wisdom, so that folly was the cause of his departing. Again, if you answer that he became foolish by departing, they ask whether he acted foolishly or wisely in departing. If wisely, he acted rightly and sinned not at all; if foolishly, they say, there was already folly in him, by which it came about that he departed; for he could not do anything foolishly without folly. From this it appears that there is something intermediate through which one passes from folly to wisdom or from wisdom to folly, which can be said to be done neither foolishly nor wisely, and which people living in this life can understand only from its contrary. For no mortal becomes wise unless he passes from folly to wisdom; and if the passage itself is made foolishly, it is certainly not made well, which is most senseless to say; but if it is made wisely, there was already wisdom in the man before he passed to wisdom, which is no less absurd; from which it is understood that there is something intermediate which can be called neither. So too, when the first man passed from the citadel of wisdom to folly, that passage was neither foolish nor wise. It is as in sleep and waking: falling asleep is not the same as sleeping, nor is waking up the same as being awake, but each is a kind of passage from one to the other. But there is this difference, that these usually happen without the will, while those never happen except through the will; and so most just retributions follow.

### Scripture references

- Rom 1:22: quotation, high confidence
- Rom 1:21: quotation, high confidence
- Ps 42:6 (41:7 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Gen 3:5: quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Rom 1:22, 1:21; Ps 42:6 (Ps 41:7 in the Latin numbering, “toward myself”); Gen 3:5 in the Old Latin form “Taste, and you will be like gods.”
- The sentence defining sin as negligence is garbled in the digital text (“Peccatum autemmalum est in negligentia … vel ad custodiendam contemplationem sapientiæ”); it is translated by sense.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.24 (PL 32:1271–1272; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-24).

## On Free Choice of the Will 3.25

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-25
- Source: PL 32:1272–1273
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: The will is moved only by what it perceives, from higher things (God's command) or lower (the serpent's suggestion); the devil fell through pride, envied man into the same pride, and Christ gave an example of humility; one day in the light of truth is worth more than all the years of this life.

### Latin text

Sed quia voluntatem non allicit ad faciendum quodlibet, nisi aliquod visum; quid autem quisque vel sumat vel respuat, est in potestate, sed quo viso lan­ gatur, nulla potestas est: fatendum est et ex supe­ rioribus et ex inferioribus visis animum tangi ut ratio­ nalis substantia ex utroque sumat quod voluerit, et ex merito sumendi vel miseria vel beatitas subsequatur. Velut in paradiso visum ex superioribus, præceptum Dei; visum ex inferioribus, suggestio serpentis. Nam neque quid sibi præciperetur a Domino, neque quid a serpente suggereretur, fuit in hominis potestate. Quam sit autem liberum et ab omnibus difficultatis vinculis expeditum, in ipsa sapientiæ sanitate constituto, non cedere visis inferioris illecebrae, vel hinc intelligi pot­ est, quod eliam stulti ca superant ad sapientiam transituri, etiam cum molestia carendi perniciosarum consuetudinum pestilentiosa dulcedine. Quxri autem hoc loco potest, si homini præ­ sto fuerunt ex utraque parie visa, unum ex precepto Dei, alterum ex suggestione serpentis; unde ipsi dia­ bolo suggestum sit appetendae impietatis consilium, quo de sublimibus sedibus laberetur. Si enim nullo viso tangeretur, non eligeret facere quod fecit: nam si non ei aliquid venisset in mentem, nullo modo in­ tentionem convertisset in nefas. Unde igitur venit in mentem, quidquid illud est quod venit in mentem, ut ea moliretur quibus ex bono angelo diabolus fieret? Qui enim vult, profecto aliquid vult: quod nisi aut extrinsecus per sensum corporis admoneatur, aut occultis modis in mentem veniat, velle non potest. Discernenda igitur sunt genera visorum, quorum unum est quod proficiscitur a voluntate suadentis, quale illud est diaboli, cui homo consentiendo pec­ cavit; alterum a subjacentibus rebus vel intentioni animi, vel sensibus corporis. Intentioni animi subja­ cel, excepta incommutabilitate Trinitatis, quae quidem non subjacet, sed eminet potius; subjacet ergo inten­ doni animi prius ipse animus, unde nos etiam vivere sentimus: deinde corpus quod administrat; unde ad quodlibet operandum, membrum quod opus est, cum opus est movet. Subjacent autem sensibus corporis quæcumque corporea. Ut autem in contemplatione summæ sapientiæ ( quæ utique animus non est; nam incommutabilis est), etiam seipsum, qui est commutabilis, animus in­ tueatur, et sibi ipse quodammodo veniat in mentem, non fit nisi differentia qua non est quod Deu:, ei ta­ men aliquid est quod possit placere post Deum. Melior est autem cum obliviscitur sui prae charitate incom­ mutabilis Dei, vel seipsum penitus in illius compara­ tione contemnit. Si autem tanquam obvius placet sibi ad perverse imitandum Deum, ut potestate sua frui velit, tanto fit minor, qnanto se cupit esse majorem. Et hoc est, Initium omnis peccati superbia; et, In­ itium superbiæ hominis apostatare a Deo. Superbiae autem diaboli accessit malevolentissi­ ma invidia, ut hanc superbiam homini persuaderet, per quam sentiebat se esse damnatum. Unde factum est ut poena hominem susciperet emendatoria potius quam interfectoria, ut cui se diabolus ad imitationem superbiæ præbuerat, ei sc Dominus ad imitationem humilitatis præberet, per quem nobis æterna vita pre­ mittitur: ut prærogato nobis. Christi sanguine, post labores miseriasque ineffabiles tanta charitate libera­ tori nostro adhaereamus, et tanta ejus in eum clarita­ te rapiamur, ut nulia nosvisa ex infermus acon­ spectu superiore detorqueant; quanquam et si aliquid huic intentioni nostræ suggereretur ab appetitu infe­ riorum, sempiterna nos diaboli damnatio cruciatus­ que revocarent. Tanta est autem pulchritudo justitiae, unta jo­ cunditas lucis æternæ, hoc est incommutabilis veri­ tatis atque sapientiæ, ut etiamsi non liceret amplius in ea manere quam unius diei mora, propter hoc so­ lum innumerabiles anni hujus vitæ pleni deliciis et circumfluentia temporalium bonorum recte merito­ quo contemnerentur. Non enim falso aut parvo affe­ ctu dictum est: Quoniam melior est dies unus in atriis tuis super millia. Quanquam et alio sensu possit intelligi, ut millia dierum in tempo­ ris mutabilitate intelligantur; unius autem diei nomi­ ne incommutabilitas æternitatis vocetur. Nescio me aliquid prætermisisse quod ex nostra responsione, quantum Dominus præbere dignatus est, uus interro­ gationibus desit: quanquam et si tibi aliquid occurrit, modus libri nos jam finem facere, et ab hac disputa­ tione requiescere aliquando compellit.

### English translation (Claude)

But nothing draws the will to do anything except something seen; and what anyone takes or rejects is in his power, but by what sight he is touched is in no one's power. So we must admit that the mind is touched by sights both from higher and from lower things, so that the rational substance may take from either what it wills, and from the merit of its taking misery or happiness follows. Thus in paradise the sight from higher things was the command of God; the sight from lower things was the suggestion of the serpent. For neither what was commanded him by the Lord nor what was suggested by the serpent was in man's power. But how free it is, and unhindered by all the bonds of difficulty, for one set in the very health of wisdom not to yield to the sights of lower allurement can be understood even from this, that even fools overcome them when they are passing over to wisdom, though with the distress of giving up the pestilent sweetness of pernicious habits.
Here it can be asked: if sights from both sides were present to man, one from the command of God, the other from the suggestion of the serpent, from where was the counsel of seeking impiety suggested to the devil himself, by which he fell from the lofty seats? For if he were touched by no sight, he would not choose to do what he did; for if something had not come into his mind, he would in no way have turned his intention to wickedness. From where, then, did it come into his mind, whatever it was that came into his mind, to undertake the things by which from a good angel he became a devil? For one who wills certainly wills something; and unless it is suggested from outside through the bodily sense, or comes into the mind in hidden ways, he cannot will it. So two kinds of sights must be distinguished: one that proceeds from the will of one who persuades, such as that of the devil, by consenting to whom man sinned; the other from the things that lie before either the attention of the mind or the senses of the body. Before the attention of the mind there lies (apart from the unchangeableness of the Trinity, which does not lie below it but rather stands above it) first the mind itself, by which we perceive that we live; then the body, which it governs, so that for any work it moves the member needed when it is needed. And before the senses of the body lie all bodily things.
But that in the contemplation of the highest wisdom (which is certainly not the mind, for it is unchangeable) the mind, which is changeable, should also behold itself and in a way come into its own mind, happens only through the difference by which it is not what God is, and yet is something that can please it next after God. But it is better when it forgets itself for love of the unchangeable God, or utterly despises itself in comparison with him. If, however, meeting itself, as it were, it pleases itself so as to imitate God perversely, wanting to enjoy its own power, it becomes the less the greater it wants to be. And this is: “The beginning of all sin is pride,” and, “The beginning of man's pride is to apostatize from God.”
To the pride of the devil was added a most malevolent envy, so that he persuaded man to that pride through which he knew he himself had been condemned. Hence it came about that man received a punishment corrective rather than destructive, so that, as the devil had offered himself to man as an example of pride, the Lord, through whom eternal life is promised us, offered himself to man as an example of humility; so that, Christ's blood having been paid out for us, after labors and ineffable miseries, we may cling to our liberator with such love, and be so carried away by his brightness, that no sights from lower things may twist us away from the higher vision; although, even if something were suggested to this intention of ours by desire for lower things, the everlasting condemnation and torment of the devil would call us back.
But so great is the beauty of justice, so great the delight of eternal light, that is, of unchangeable truth and wisdom, that even if one were not permitted to remain in it longer than the space of a single day, for this alone countless years of this life, full of delights and of an abundance of temporal goods, would rightly and deservedly be despised. For not falsely, nor with small feeling, was it said: “For one day in your courts is better than thousands.” Although it can also be understood in another sense, so that the thousands of days are understood as the changeableness of time, while the unchangeableness of eternity is called by the name of one day. I do not know that I have omitted anything that our answer owed to your questions, as far as the Lord has deigned to grant; although, even if something occurs to you, the measure of the book now compels us to make an end and at last to rest from this discussion.

### Scripture references

- Ps 84:10 (83:11 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence
- Gen 3:1: allusion, high confidence

### Extrabiblical texts

- Sir 10:13 (Sirach): quotation, high confidence
- Sir 10:12 (Sirach): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- “The beginning of all sin is pride” and “The beginning of man's pride is to apostatize from God”: Sir 10:13 and 10:12 (Vulgate 10:15, 10:14), tagged as an extrabiblical text; Ps 84:10 (Ps 83:11 in the Latin numbering).
- How the devil first came to will evil is raised and left as a question; translated as written.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Lib. arb. 3.25 (PL 32:1272–1273; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/3-21/#p-3-25).