On Free Choice of the Will 2.11–2.17

Latin text: Migne, PL 32 (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Latina, digitized by Open Greek and Latin (patrologia_latina-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0).

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Chapter 2

2.11PL 32:1247

E. Dubitare non possum. Sed pervellem scire uirum uno aliquo genere contineantur h;rc duo, sa­ pientia scilicet et numerus, quia conjuncta etiam in Scripturis sanctis hæc posita esse commemorasti; an alterum existat ab altero, aut alterum in altero con­ sistat, veluti numerus a. sapientia, vel in sapientia. Nam sapientiam existere a nuinero, aut consistere in numero, non ausim dicere: nescio enin quomodo, quia multos novi numerarios aut numeratores, vel si quo alio nomine vocandi sunt, qui summe atque mi­ rabiliter computans, sapientes autem perpaucos, aut forsitan ncmiucm, longe venerabilior mihi ocrurrit sap enlia quam numerus. A. Rem dicis quam ego quo­ que mirari soleo. Nam cum incommutabilem vcrita­ tem numerorum mecum ipse considero, et ejus quasi cubile ac pencarale vel regionem quamdam, vel st quod aliud nomen aptum inveniri potest, quo nomi­ nemus quasi habitaculum quoddam sedemquc nume. rorum; longe removeor a corpore: et inveniens for­ tasse aliquid quod cogitare possim, non tamen ali­ quid inveuicns quod verbis proferre sufficiam, redeo tanquam lassatus in hæc nostra, ut loqui possim, et ea quae ante oculos sita sunt dico, sicut dici solent. Hoc mihi accidit etiam cnm de sapientia quantum va­ leo, vigilantissime atque intentissime cogito. Eipro­ pterea multum miror, cum hæc duo sint in secretis­ sima certissimaque veritate, accedente etiani tes;imonio Scripturarum, quo commemoravi conjuncte illa posita; plurimum miror, ut dixi, quare nume­ i us vilis sit multitudini hominum, et chara sapien­ tia. S<d nimirum illud est, quod una quædam ca­ demque res ost; verumtamen quoniam nihilominus in divinis Libris de sapientia dicitur, qnod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter, ea potentia qua fortiter a fine usque ad finem attingit, numerus fortasse dicitur: ca vero qua disponit omnia suaviter, sapientia propric jam vocn­ tur; cum sit utrumque unius ejusdemque sapientæ. Sed quia dcdit numeros omnibus rebus etiam infimis, et in Hine rerum locatis; et corpora euim omnia quamvis in rebus extrema sint, habent nume­ ros snus; sapere autem non dedit corporibus, neque animis omnibus, sed tantum rationalibus, tanquam in eni sibi sedem locaverit, de qua disponat omnia illa etiam infinia quibas numeros dedit t itaque quoniam dc corporibus. facile judicamus, tanquam de rebus quæ infra nos ordinate sunt, quibus impressos nume­ ras infra nos esse cernimus; et eos propterea vilius ha­ bemus. Sed cum cœperimus tanquam sursum versus re­ currere, invenimus eos etiam nostras mentes transcen­ dere, atque incommutabiles in ipsa manere veritate. Et quia sapcre pauci possunt, numerare autem etiam stultis concessum est, mirantur homines sapientiam, numerosque contemnunt. Docti autem et studiosi, quanto remotiores sunt a labe terrena, tanto magis et numerum ct sapientiam in ipsa veritate contuentur, et utrumque charum habent: et in ejus veritatis coni­ paratione non cis aurum et argentum, et cætera de quibus homines dimicant, sed ipsi etiam vilescunt sibi. Nee mireris numeros ideo viluisse hominibus, et charam esse sapientiam, quia facilius possunt nu­ merare quam sapere, cum videas charius illos ha­ bere aurum qnam lumen lucernae, cui comparatum aurum ridetur. Sed honoratur amplius res longe infe­ rior, quia lucernam sibi et mendicus accendit, aurum vero pauci habent: quanqnam sapientia absit ut in comparatio:ic numeri inveniatur inferior, cum eadem sit; sed oculum quo cerni possit, inquirit. Sed quemadmodum in uno igne consubstantialis, ut iU dicam, sentitur fulgor et calor, nec separari ab invi­ cem possunt; tamen ad ea calor pervenit, quæ prope admoventur, fulgor vero etiam longius latiusque dir­ funditur: sic intelligentiæ potentia, qua inest sa­ pientiæ, propinquiora fervescunt, sicuti sunt ani­ mae rationales; ca vero quae remotiora sunt, sicuti corpora, non attingit calore sapiendi, sed perfundit lumine numerorum: quod libi fortassis obscurum est. Non enim ulla visibilis similitudo invisibili rei potest ad omnem convenientiam coaplari. Tantum illud ale tende, quod et quæstioni quam suscepimus satis est, et humilioribus etiam mentibus, quales nos sumus, sese manifestat, quia etsi clarum nobis essenon pot­ est utram in sapientia, vel ex sapientia numerus, an ipsa sapientia ex numero, an in numero sit, aD utrumque nomen unius rei possit ostendi; illud certe manifestum est utrumque verum esse, et incommu­ tabiliter verum.

E. I cannot doubt it. But I would very much like to know whether these two, wisdom and number, are contained in some one class, since you mentioned that they are set side by side even in the holy Scriptures; or whether one arises from the other or consists in the other, for instance number from wisdom or in wisdom. For I would not dare to say that wisdom arises from number or consists in number. I do not see how it could, since I know many arithmeticians or calculators, or whatever else they should be called, who calculate supremely and wonderfully, but very few wise men, or perhaps none; wisdom strikes me as far more worthy of reverence than number. A. You speak of something at which I too often marvel. For when I consider within myself the unchangeable truth of numbers, and what is, so to speak, its lair and inner sanctuary, or a certain region, or whatever other fitting name can be found to name the dwelling, as it were, and seat of numbers, I am carried far from the body; and finding perhaps something that I can think, yet not finding anything that I am able to express in words, I return as if wearied to these things of ours so that I can speak, and I speak of the things placed before our eyes as they are usually spoken of. This happens to me also when I think about wisdom as alertly and intently as I can. And so I marvel greatly, since these two are in the most hidden and most certain truth, and the testimony of the Scriptures is added, in which, as I mentioned, they are set side by side; I marvel greatly, as I said, why number is cheap to the multitude of people and wisdom dear. But no doubt the reason is that they are one and the same thing. Yet, since in the divine books it is said of wisdom that it “reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly,” perhaps the power by which it reaches mightily from end to end is called number, and that by which it orders all things sweetly is properly called wisdom, though both belong to one and the same wisdom. But it has given numbers to all things, even the lowest and those placed at the end of things (for all bodies, though they are the last among things, have their numbers), while it has given the power to be wise not to bodies, nor to all souls, but only to rational ones, as if it had set its seat in them, from which to order all those things, even the lowest, to which it gave numbers. And so, since we judge easily about bodies, as things ordered below us, we see that the numbers impressed on them are below us, and so we hold them cheaper. But when we begin to run back upward, as it were, we find that they also transcend our minds and remain unchangeable in truth itself. And because few can be wise, while counting is granted even to fools, people admire wisdom and despise numbers. But the learned and studious, the farther they are from earthly stain, the more they behold both number and wisdom in truth itself and hold both dear; and in comparison with that truth, not only gold and silver and the other things for which people fight become cheap to them, but they even become cheap to themselves. Nor should you wonder that numbers have become cheap to people and wisdom dear because they can count more easily than they can be wise, when you see that they hold gold dearer than the light of a lamp, in comparison with which gold is laughable. Yet the far inferior thing is honored more, because even a beggar lights a lamp for himself, while few have gold. Far be it, though, that wisdom should be found inferior in comparison with number, since it is the same; but it requires an eye by which it can be seen. Just as in one fire brightness and heat are perceived as consubstantial, so to speak, and cannot be separated from each other, yet the heat reaches only the things brought near, while the brightness is spread farther and wider; so by the power of understanding that is in wisdom the nearer things, such as rational souls, grow warm, while the more distant things, such as bodies, it does not touch with the warmth of wisdom but floods with the light of numbers. This is perhaps obscure to you; for no visible likeness can be fitted to an invisible thing in every respect. Only attend to this, which is enough for the question we have taken up and shows itself even to humbler minds such as ours: even if it cannot be clear to us whether number is in wisdom or from wisdom, or wisdom itself from number or in number, or whether both can be shown to be names of one thing, this at least is evident, that both are true, and unchangeably true.

Notes and citation

Summary: Asked how wisdom and number are related, Augustine suggests they may be one thing, number reaching all things and wisdom ordering them, like the light and heat of one fire; at least both are unchangeably true.

  • Wis 8:1 (“reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly”); the Wisdom of Solomon is outside the 66-book canon and is tagged as an extrabiblical text.
  • “Consubstantial” is Augustine's own word here for the inseparable light and heat of fire, used of the comparison only.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip (humerus for numerus); OCR slips; footnote mark leaked into the text): humerus fortasse dicitur → numerus fortasse dicitur; sapcre nukm non dedit → sapere autem non dedit; cui comparaturi nurum ridetur → cui comparatum aurum ridetur; inquirit I. → inquirit.; fervescunt I, → fervescunt,.

Extrabiblical texts: Wis 8:1 (Wisdom of Solomon [in RC, EO, ETH canons]; quotation)

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.11 (PL 32:1247; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-11). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.

2.12PL 32:1248

Quapropter nullo modo negavcris esse incom­ mutabilem vcritatcm, hæc omnia quæ incomnutabi- I iter vera sunt continentem; qnam non possis dicere tuam vcl mcam, vel cujusquam bominis, sed otnni­ bus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen, pra sto esse ac se præbere communiter: omne autcm quod commu­ niter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque intelligentibus præsto est, ad ullius eorum proprie naturam perii­ nere quis dixerit? Meministi cnim, ut opinor, quid de sensibus corporis paulo ante tractatum sit; ea scilicet quæ oculornm vel aurium sensu communitcr tangi­ mus, sicuti sunt colores et soni, quos ego et tu simul videmus, vel simul audimus, non pertinere ad ocu­ lorum nostrorum auriumve naturam, sed ad sentien­ dum nobis esse communia. Sic ergo etiam illa quæ ego et tu communiter propria quisque mente conspi­ cimus, nequaquam dixeris ad mentis alicujus nostrum pertinere naturam. Duorum enim oculi quod simul vident, nec hujus nec illius oculos esse poteris dicere, sed aliquid tertium in quod utriusque conferatur aspe­ ctus. E. Apertissimum atque verissimum est. A. Hanc ergo veritatem, de qua jam diu loqui­ mur, et in qua una tam multa conspicimus, excellen­ tiorem pUtas esse quam mens nostra est, an æqualem mentibus nostris, an etiam inferiorem? Sed si esset inferior, non secundum illam, sed de illa judicaremus, sicut judicamus de corporibus, quia infra sunt, et di­ cimus ca plerumque non tantum iia esse vel non ita, sed ita vel non ita esse debere: sic et de animis no­ stris non solum ita esse animum novimus, sed plerum­ que etiam ita esse dcberc. Et de corporibus quidem sic judicamus, cum dicimus, Minus candidum est quam debuit; aul, minus quadrum, et multa similiter: de animis vero, Minus apius est quam debet; aut, mi­ nus lenis; aut minus vehemens, sicut nostrorum mo­ rum se ratio tulerit. Et judicamus hæc secundum illas interiores regulas vcritatis, quas communiter cernimus: de ipsis vero nullo medo quis judicat. Cum enim quis dixcril aeterna temporalibus esse po­ tiora, aut septem et tria decem esse, nemo dicit ita esse debuisse, sed cantum ita esse cognoscens, non examinator corrigit, sed tantum lætatur inventor. Si autcm esset æqualis menibus nostris hæc veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostræ ali­ quando eam plus vident, aliquando minus, et ex hoc fatentur sc esse mutabiles: cum illa in sc manens nee proficiat cum plus a nobis videtur, nec deficiat cum minus, sed integra ct incorrupta, et conversos lætificet lumine, et aversos puniat cæcitate. Quid, quod etiam de ipsis mentibus nostris secundum illain judicamus, cum de illa nullo modo judicare possimus? Dicimus enim, Minus intelligit quam debet, aut tan­ tum quantum debet intelligit. Tantum autcm mens debet iutelligcre, quantum propius admoveri atque inhærere potuerit incommutabili veritati. Quare si nec inferior, nec æqualis est, restat ut sil superior at­ que excellentior.

So you will in no way deny that there is an unchangeable truth containing all these things that are unchangeably true, which you cannot call yours or mine or any human being's, but which is present and offers itself in common to all who discern unchangeable truths, like a light that is in wonderful ways both hidden and public. And who would say that anything present in common to all who reason and understand belongs properly to the nature of any one of them? For you remember, I think, what was discussed a little earlier about the senses of the body: that the things we touch in common by the sense of the eyes or ears, such as colors and sounds, which you and I see at once or hear at once, do not belong to the nature of our eyes or ears, but are common to us for perceiving. So too you would in no way say that the things which you and I behold in common, each with his own mind, belong to the nature of the mind of either of us. For what the eyes of two people see at once you cannot say is the eyes of this one or of that one; it is something third, toward which the gaze of both is directed. E. That is most plain and most true. A. This truth, then, of which we have been speaking for so long, and in which, though it is one, we behold so many things: do you think it more excellent than our mind, or equal to our minds, or even inferior? If it were inferior, we would judge not according to it but about it, as we judge about bodies, because they are below us, and we often say not only that they are so or not so, but that they ought to be so or not so. So too with our minds: we know not only that the mind is so, but often also that it ought to be so. We judge so about bodies when we say, “It is less white than it should have been,” or “less square,” and many such things; and about minds, “It is less fit than it ought to be,” or “less gentle,” or “less vigorous,” as the character of our conduct has led. And we judge these things according to those inner rules of truth which we discern in common; but about them no one in any way judges. For when someone has said that eternal things are better than temporal ones, or that seven and three are ten, no one says that it ought to have been so; knowing only that it is so, he does not correct it as an examiner but only rejoices as a discoverer. And if this truth were equal to our minds, it too would be changeable. For our minds see it sometimes more and sometimes less, and by this confess that they are changeable; whereas it, remaining in itself, neither gains when it is seen more by us nor fails when it is seen less, but, whole and incorrupt, it gladdens with its light those who are turned toward it and punishes with blindness those who are turned away. What of the fact that we judge even about our minds themselves according to it, while we can in no way judge about it? For we say, “He understands less than he ought,” or “He understands as much as he ought.” And a mind ought to understand as much as it has been able to draw near to the unchangeable truth and cleave to it. So if it is neither inferior nor equal, it remains that it is superior and more excellent.

Notes and citation

Summary: There is one unchangeable truth, common to all minds and belonging to none, by which we judge our minds and which we cannot judge; so it is higher than our minds.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip; OCR slips): E. Aportissimum → E. Apertissimum; vidctur r lice deficiat → videtur, nec deficiat.

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.12 (PL 32:1248; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-12). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-libero-arbitrio-2-12) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.

2.13PL 32:1248–1249

Promiseram autem, si meministi, me Libi demon­ straturum essealiquid qnod sit mente nostra atque ra­ tione sublimius. Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: amplectere illam si potes, et fruere illa, et delectare in Domino, et dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui. Quid enim petis amplius quam ut beatus sis? Et quid beatius eo qui fruitur inconcussa et incommutabili et excel­ lentissima veritate? An vero clamant homines beatos se esse, cum pulchra corpora magno desiderio con­ cupita, sive conjugum, sive etiam meretricum am­ plexantur; et nos in amplexu veritatis beatos esse du­ bilamus? Clamant homines se beatos esse, cum æstu aridis faucibus ad fontem abundantem salubremque perveniunt, aut esurientes prandium cœnamve orna­ tam copiosamque reperiunt; et nos negabimus bcatos esse, cnm irrigamur pascimurque veritate? Solemus audire voces clamantium se beatos, si jaceant in rosis et aliis floribus, vel eliam unguentis odoratissimis perfruantur: quid fragrantius, quidjucundius inspira­ tione veritatis? ct dubitamus nos cum ab illa inspira­ mur, dicere beatos? Multi beatam vitam in cantu vocum et nervorum et tibiarum sibi constituunt, et cum ea sibi dcsunt, se miseros judicant; cum autem adsunt, efferuntur lætitia: et nos cum mentibus no­ stris sine ullo strepitu, ut ita dicam, canorum et fa­ cundum quoddam silentium veritatis illabitur, aliam beatam vitam quærimus, et tam cet ta et præsente non fruimur? Luce auri et argenti, luce gemmarum etalio­ rum colorum, sive ipsius lucis qua; ad bos oculos per­ tinet, sive in ignibus terrenis, sive in stellis vel luna vcl sole, claritate et jucunditate delectati homines, cum ab ista lætitia nullis molestiis, nulla indigentia revo­ cantur, beati sibi videntur, et propter hæc semper volunt vivere: et nos in luce veritatis beatam vitam collocare metuimus? Imo vero quoniam in veritate cognoscitur ci tenetur summum bonum, caque veritas sapientia est, cernamus in ea, teneamusque summum bonum. eoque perfruamur. Beatus est quippe qui fruitur summo bono. Hæc enim veritas ostendit omnia bona, quæ vera sunt, quur. sibi pro suo captu intelligentes homi­ nes, vel singula, vcl plura eligunt, quibus fruantur. Scd quemadmodum illi qui in luce solis eligunt quod libenter aspiciant, ct eo aspectu lætificantur; in quibus si qui forte fuerint vcgetioribns sanisque et fortissimis oculis præditi, nihil libentius quam ipsum solem con­ tuentur, qui etiam caHera quibus infirmiores oculi delectantur, illustrai: sic fortis acies mentis et vegeta cum multa vera et incommutabilia certa ratione con­ spexeril, dirigit se in ipsam veritatem, qua cuncte monstrantur, eiqne inhærens tanquam obliviscitur cætera, et in ilia simul omnibus fruitur. Quidquid enim jucundum est in cæteris veris, ipsa utiquæ veri­ Late jucundum est. Hæc est libertas nostra, cum isti subdimur veritati: et ipse est Deus noster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a conditione peccati. Ipsa enim Veritas cHam homo cum hominibus loquens, ait credentibus sibi: Si manseritis in verbo meo, vere discipuli mei estis, et cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos. Nulla enim re fruitur anima cum liber­ tate, nisi qua fruitur cum secui italc.

I had promised, if you remember, to show you that there is something higher than our mind and reason. Here it is for you: truth itself. Embrace it if you can, and enjoy it, and “take delight in the Lord, and he will give you the requests of your heart.” For what more do you ask than to be happy? And who is happier than one who enjoys unshaken, unchangeable, and most excellent truth? People cry out that they are happy when they embrace beautiful bodies desired with great longing, whether of wives or even of prostitutes; and shall we doubt that we are happy in the embrace of truth? People cry out that they are happy when, with throats parched by heat, they come to an abundant and healthful spring, or, hungry, find a dinner or supper richly furnished and plentiful; and shall we deny that we are happy when we are watered and fed by truth? We often hear the voices of people crying out that they are happy if they lie among roses and other flowers, or enjoy most fragrant ointments; what is more fragrant, what more pleasant, than the breath of truth? And do we hesitate to call ourselves happy when we breathe it in? Many place the happy life in the music of voices and strings and pipes, and when these are lacking they judge themselves miserable, and when they are present they are carried away with joy; and when a certain melodious and eloquent silence of truth, so to speak, glides without any noise into our minds, shall we seek another happy life, and not enjoy one so sure and so present? People delight in the light of gold and silver, the light of gems and other colors, or in the brightness and pleasantness of the light itself that belongs to these eyes, whether in earthly fires or in the stars or the moon or the sun; and when they are called away from this delight by no troubles and no want, they think themselves happy and want to live forever for the sake of these things. And are we afraid to place the happy life in the light of truth? Rather, since the highest good is known and held in truth, and that truth is wisdom, let us discern the highest good in it, hold it, and enjoy it fully. For he is happy who enjoys the highest good. This truth shows all the goods that are true, from which people of understanding choose, according to their capacity, one or several to enjoy. Those who choose in the light of the sun what they like to look at are gladdened by that sight; and if some among them are endowed with more vigorous, healthy, and very strong eyes, they look at nothing more gladly than the sun itself, which also lights up the other things in which weaker eyes delight. So the strong and vigorous gaze of the mind, when it has beheld by sure reason many true and unchangeable things, directs itself to truth itself, by which all are shown, and cleaving to it, as it were forgets the rest, and in it enjoys all of them at once. For whatever is pleasant in the other truths is pleasant by truth itself. This is our freedom, when we are subject to this truth; and it is our God himself, who frees us from death, that is, from the condition of sin. For the Truth itself, speaking also as a man with men, says to those who believe in him: “If you abide in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” For the soul enjoys nothing with freedom except what it enjoys with security.

Ps 37:4 (36:4 Vulg.) (quotation, high confidence) · John 8:31 (quotation, high confidence) · John 8:32 (quotation, high confidence) · John 14:6 (allusion, medium confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Truth itself is higher than our mind; to enjoy it, more than any bodily pleasure, is the happy life, and our freedom lies in being subject to this truth, which is God.

  • Ps 37:4 (Ps 36:4 in the Latin numbering); John 8:31–32.
  • The identification of the Truth with God and with Christ (“speaking also as a man with men”) is Augustine's, stated here without further argument.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip; OCR slips; footnote number leaked into the text): pclitiones cordis tui → petitiones cordis tui; aliis floribus 1, → aliis floribus,; sic furtis acies → sic fortis acies; a inorte, id est a conditione peccai → a morte, id est a conditione peccati.

Topics: Christology

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.13 (PL 32:1248–1249; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-13). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-libero-arbitrio-2-13) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.

2.14PL 32:1249

Nemo autem securus est in iis bonis qux potest invitus amittere. Veritatem autem atque sapientiam nemo amittit invitus: non euim locis separari ab ea quisquam potest; sed ea quæ dicitur a veritate atque sapieutia separatio, perversa voluntas est, qua infe­ riora diliguntur. Nemo autem vult aliquid nolens. Ha­ bemus igitur qua fruamur omnes æqualiter atque communiter: null.c sunt angustiæ, nullus in ea de­ fectus. Omnes amatores suos nullo modo sibi invidos recipit, et omnibus communis est, et singulis casta est. Ncmo alicui dicit: Recede, ut etiam ego acce­ dani; remove manus, ut etiam ego amplectar. Omnes inhærent, idipsum omnes tangunt. Cibus ejus nulla ex parte discerpitur; nihil de ipsa bibis quod ego non possim. Non enim abejus communione in privatum tuum mutas aliquid; sed quod tu de illa capis, et mihi manet integrum. Quod te inspirat non exspecto ut reddatur abs te, et sic ego inspirer ex eo: non enim aliquid ejus aliquando fit cujusquam unius aut quorumdam proprium, sed simul omnibus tota est communis. Minus ergo ca quæ tangimus, vel quæ gustamus, vel quæ olfacimus, huic sunt veritati similia, sed magis ca quae audimus et cernimus: quia et omne verbum a quibus auditur, totum auditur ab omnibus, et simul a singulis totum; et species omnis quoe oculis adjacet, quanta videtur ab uno, tanta et ab alio simul. Sed multum longo intervallo sunt ista similia: nec tota enim simul sonat quælibet vox, quia per tempora tenditur et producitur, et alind rjus prius sonat, aliud posterius; et species omnis visibilis tanquam intume­ scit pcr locos, nec ubique tota est. Et certe omnia hæc aufiruntur invito, et quominus eis frui possimus, quibusdam impedimur angustiis. Nam et si posset esse cujusquam suavis cantus sempiternus, et studiosi ejus certatim ad eum aodicndum venirent, coarctarent sese, atque pugnarent de locis, quanto plures essent, at cantanti esset quisque propinquior, et in audiendo ni­ hil tenerent manere sccum, sed omnibus vocibus fu­ gientibus tangerentur. Solem autem istum si vellem, intueri, atque id pertinaciter possem; et in occasu me desereret, et subvelaretur nubilo, et multis aliis obstaculis voluptatem videndi eum invitus amitterem. Postremo etiam si adesset semper suavitas, et lucis videnti, et vocis audienti, quid magnum ad me perve­ niret, cum mihi csset comulunc cum belluis? At illa veritatis et sapientiæ pulehritudo, tantum adsit per­ severans voluutas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium constipata secludit venientes, nec peragitur tempore, nec migrat lccis, nee nocte intercipitur, nee umbra intercluditur, nee sensibus cerporis subjacct. De toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt eam, omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam deest; foris admonet, intusdocet; cernentes se commutat omnes in melius, a nullo in deterius cammutatur; nullus de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bcne. Ac per hoc cam manifestum est menti­ bus nostris, quæ ab ipsa una fiunt singul.c sapientes, et non dc ipsa, sed per ipsam de cæteris judices, sine dubitatione esse potiorem.

But no one is secure in goods that he can lose against his will. Truth and wisdom no one loses against his will; for no one can be separated from it by places, but what is called separation from truth and wisdom is a perverse will, by which lower things are loved. And no one wills anything unwillingly. We have, then, something to enjoy, all of us equally and in common; there is no crowding, no deficiency in it. It receives all its lovers without their envying one another; it is common to all and chaste to each. No one says to another, “Step back, so that I too may come near; take your hands away, so that I too may embrace it.” All cleave to it, all touch the very same thing. Its food is torn into no parts; you drink nothing from it that I cannot. For you change nothing from sharing in it into your private property; what you take from it remains whole for me too. What it breathes into you I do not wait to have given back by you, so that I may then be breathed upon by it; for no part of it ever becomes the property of any one person or of a few, but it is wholly common to all at once. So the things we touch or taste or smell are less like this truth, and the things we hear and see are more like it; because every word is heard whole by all who hear it, and whole by each at once, and every appearance that lies before the eyes is seen as large by one as by another at once. But these are like it only at a very great distance. For no voice sounds whole all at once, since it is stretched out and drawn out through time, and one part of it sounds earlier and another later; and every visible appearance swells out, as it were, through space and is not whole everywhere. And certainly all these things are taken away from us against our will, and we are hindered by certain constraints from enjoying them. For even if someone's sweet singing could be everlasting, and its admirers came eagerly to hear it, they would crowd one another and fight over places, the more of them there were, so that each might be nearer the singer; and in hearing they would hold nothing that stayed with them, but would be touched by sounds that all flee away. And if I wanted to gaze at this sun and could do so steadily, it would desert me at its setting, it would be veiled by cloud, and through many other obstacles I would lose the pleasure of seeing it against my will. Finally, even if the sweetness of light for the one who sees and of voice for the one who hears were always present, what great thing would come to me, when I would have it in common with the beasts? But that beauty of truth and wisdom, provided only there is a persevering will to enjoy it, neither shuts out those who come because it is crowded by a throng of hearers, nor passes with time, nor moves from place to place, nor is cut off by night, nor shut off by shadow, nor subject to the senses of the body. To those from the whole world who are turned toward it and love it, it is nearest to all, everlasting for all; it is in no place, and nowhere absent; it admonishes outwardly, it teaches inwardly; it changes all who behold it for the better, and is changed by none for the worse; no one judges about it, and no one judges well without it. And so it is evident that it is beyond doubt superior to our minds, which by it alone become, each of them, wise, and judge not about it but through it about other things.

Notes and citation

Summary: Unlike bodily goods, truth and wisdom cannot be lost against one's will, are shared whole by all without crowding, and, being judged by none and judging all, are beyond doubt higher than our minds.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip (turis for foris); OCR slips; split word; stray footnote sign in the digital text): idipsum omnes tangunt'. → idipsum omnes tangunt.; ct in occasui ine desereret → et in occasu me desereret; turis admonet → foris admonet; sec ludit venientes → secludit venientes.

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.14 (PL 32:1249; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-14). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-libero-arbitrio-2-14) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.

2.15PL 32:1249–1250

Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstrarem. Si euim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum tamen esse, negare uon poteris: quæ nobis erat ad disserendum et tractandum quæstio constituta. Nam si te hoc movet quod apud sacrosanctam disciplinam Christi in fidem recepimus, esse Patrem Sapientiæ; memento nos etiam hoc in fidem accepisse, qnod æterno Patri sit æqualis quæ ab ipso genita est Sapientia. Unde nunc nihil quae. rendum est, scd inconcussa fide retinendum. Est enim Deus,et vere summeque est. Quod jam non so­ lum indubitatum, quantum arbitror, fide retinemus, sud etiam certa, quamvis adhuc tenuissima, forma cognitionis attingimus; quod quæstioni susceptæ suf­ ficit, ut cætera quæ ad rem pertinent, explicare pos­ simus: nisi quid habes adversus ista qnod opponas. E. Ego vero incredibili omnino, et quam tibi verbis explicare non possum, lætitia perfusus accipio ista, et. clamo esse certissima. Clamo autem voce interiore, qua exaudirt cupio ab ipsa veritate, et illi iuhærere: quod non solum bonum, sed etiam summum bonum, et beatificum esse concedo. A. Recte sane; etiam ego plurimum gau­ dco. Sed, quæso te, numquid jam sapientes et beati sumus? an adhuc tendimus eo, ut id nobis esse proveniat? E. Eo nos potius tendere cxistimo. A. Unde ergo ista comprehendis, quibus veris certisque gaudcre lc clamas, et hoc ad sapientiam pertinere concedis? an quisquam insipiens potest nosse sapien­ tiam? E. Quamdiu insipiens est, non potest. A. Tu ergo jam sapiens es, aut nondum nosti sapientiam. E. Non sum quidem adhuc sapiens, sed nec insipien­ tem me dixerim, in quantum novi sapientiam; quo­ niam et certa sunt ista quæ novi, et ad sapientiam pertinere, ncgare non possum. A. Dic, quæso te, nonne fateberis eum qui non est justus, injustum csse; et qni non est prudens, imprudentem esse; et qui non est temperans, intemperantem? an dubitari de his aliquid potest? E. Fatcor hominem, quando justus non est, injustum esse; boc ctiam de prudente ei temperante responderim. A. Cur ergo et quando sapiens non est, non sit insipiens? E. Hoc quoque fateor, quando quisque sapiens non est, eum esse insipientem.A. Nunc ergo tu quid horum es? E. Quodlibet bornm me appelles, nondum audeo me dicere sapientem; ei ex iis quae concessi, video esse consequens ut me insipientem non dubitem dicere. A. Novit crgo insipiens sapientiam. Nun cnim, sicut jam dictum est, certus esset velle sc esse sapientem, idque oportere, nisi notio sapientiæ menti ejus inhæ­ ievet, sicut carum rerum de quibus singillatim inter­ rogatus respondisti, quæ ad ipsam sapientiam perti­ nent, qnarum cognitione lætatus es: E. Ita est utdicis.

You had granted that if I showed there was something above our minds, you would confess it to be God, provided there was nothing higher still. Accepting this concession of yours, I said that it was enough for me to show this. For if there is something more excellent, that rather is God; but if there is not, then truth itself is God. Whether that is so or not, then, you cannot deny that God exists, which was the question set for us to discuss and treat. And if you are troubled because in the most holy teaching of Christ we have received in faith that there is a Father of Wisdom, remember that we have also received in faith that the Wisdom begotten by the eternal Father is equal to him. About this, then, nothing is to be inquired now; it is to be held with unshaken faith. For God exists, and exists truly and supremely. This, I think, we not only hold by faith as undoubted, but we also reach by a certain, though still very slender, form of knowledge; and this is enough for the question we took up, so that we can explain the other things that bear on the matter, unless you have something to object against this. E. I accept these things filled with a joy altogether beyond belief, which I cannot explain to you in words, and I cry out that they are most certain. I cry out with the inner voice, by which I desire to be heard by truth itself and to cleave to it; for I grant that it is not only good, but the highest good and the giver of happiness. A. Quite right; I too rejoice greatly. But, I ask you, are we already wise and happy, or are we still tending there, so that it may come to be ours? E. I think rather that we are tending there. A. How then do you grasp these true and certain things in which you cry out that you rejoice, and which you grant belong to wisdom? Can any foolish person know wisdom? E. As long as he is foolish, he cannot. A. Then either you are already wise, or you do not yet know wisdom. E. I am not yet wise, indeed, but neither would I call myself foolish, insofar as I know wisdom; for the things I know are certain, and I cannot deny that they belong to wisdom. A. Tell me, please, will you not admit that one who is not just is unjust, one who is not prudent is imprudent, and one who is not temperate is intemperate? Or can anything be doubted about these? E. I admit that a man, when he is not just, is unjust; I would answer the same about the prudent and the temperate. A. Why, then, when he is not wise, should he not be foolish? E. This too I admit: when anyone is not wise, he is foolish. A. Now, then, which of these are you? E. Whichever of these you call me, I do not yet dare to call myself wise; and from what I have granted I see it follows that I should not hesitate to call myself foolish. A. So a fool knows wisdom. For, as was said, he would not be certain that he wants to be wise, and that he ought to be, unless the notion of wisdom were fixed in his mind, as are the notions of those things belonging to wisdom itself about which you answered when asked one by one, and in the knowledge of which you rejoiced. E. It is as you say.

1 Cor 1:24 (allusion, medium confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Augustine concludes that God exists, either as truth itself or as what is above it, adding that by faith the begotten Wisdom is equal to the Father; Evodius, not yet wise, already knows something of wisdom.

  • The equality of the begotten Wisdom (the Son) with the Father is stated as held by faith and not argued here.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip; OCR slip in the speaker mark; OCR slips (joined and garbled words)): si adhuc nihil essetsurerius → si adhuc nihil esset superius; disciplinam Christi i.. fidem → disciplinam Christi in fidem; numquid jiu sapientes → numquid jam sapientes; nisi nptio sapientiæ → nisi notio sapientiæ; non sit insipiens?£. Hoc → non sit insipiens? E. Hoc.

Topics: Trinity

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.15 (PL 32:1249–1250; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-15). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-libero-arbitrio-2-15) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.

2.16PL 32:1250–1251

A. Quid igitur aliud agimus cum studemus esse sapientes, nisi ut quanta possumus aLicritate, ad id quod mente contingimus, totam animam nostram quodammodo colligamus, ci ponamus ibi, atque sta­ biliter infigamus; ut nou jam privato suo gaudat quod implicavit rebus transcuntibus, sed exuta omni­ bus temporum et locorum affectionibus apprehendat id quod uuum atque idem semper est? Sicut euim tola vita corporis est anima, sic bcala vita animae Deus est. Quod dum agimus, donec pergamus, in via su- Mtus. Et quod istis veris ct certis bonis, quamvis ad­ huc in hoc tenebroso itinere coruscantibus, gaudere concessum cst, vide uirum hoc sit quod scriptum est de sapientia, quid agat cum amatoribus suis cum ad eam veniunt, ct cam quærunt: dictum cst enim, In viis ostendet se illis hiluriler, et omni providentia occur­ rel illis. Quoquo cnim te verteris, vestigiis quibusdam, quæ opcribus suis impressit, loquitur tibi, ct te in ceteriora relabentem, ipsis exteriorum formis intro rcvocal; ut quidquid te delectat in cor­ pore, et per corporcos illicit sensus, videas esse nu­ merosum, ct quæras unde sit, et in teipsum redeas, atquc intilligas te id quod attingis sensibus corporis, probare aut improbare non posse, nisi apud tc habeas quasdam pulchritudinis legcs, ad quas referas quaque pulchra sentis exterius. Intuere cælum et terram et mare, et quæ­ cumque in eis vel desuper fulgent, vel deorsum repunt vel volant vel nataut; formas babent, quia numeros habent: adime illis hæc, nihil erunt. A quo ergo sunt, nisi a quo numerus; quandoquidem in tantum illis est esse, in quantum numerosa esse? kt omnium quidem formarum corporearum artifi­ ces homines in arte habent numeros, quibus coaptant opera sua: et tamdiu. manus atque instrumenta in fabricando movent, donec illud quod formatur fo­ ris, ad eam quæ intus est lucem numerorum relatum, quantum potest impetret absolutionem, placeatque per interpretem sensum interno judici supernos numeros intuenti. Quære deinde artilicis ipsius membra quis moveat; numerus erit: nam moventur etiam illa nu­ merose. Et si detrahas de manibus opus, et de animo intentionem fabricandi, motusque ille membrorum ad delectationem refcratur, salt atio vocabitur. Quære ergo quid iu saltatione delectet; respondebit libi numerus: Ecce sum. Inspice jam pulchritudinem for. mali co poris; numeri tenentur in loco. Inspice put­ chritudinem mobilitatis in corpore; numeri versan­ tur in tempore. Intra ad artem unde isti procedunt, quære in ea tempus ct locuin; nunquam crit, nusquam crit; vivit in ea tamen numcrus: nee cjos regio spa­ torum est, nec ætas dierum; et discendæ arti tamcn cum se accommodant, qui se artifices fieri volunt, corpus suum per loca et tempora movent, animom vero per tempora: accessu quippe temporis peritiores fiunt. Transcende ergo et animum artificis, lit iui­ merum sempiternum videas; jam tibi sapientia de ipsa interiore sede fulgebit, ct de ipso secretario re­ ritatis: quæ si adhuc languidiorem aspectum tuum reverberat, refer oculum mentis in illum viam, ubi se ostendebat hilariter. Memento sane distulisse te visionem qnam fortior saniorquc rcpetas.. Væ qui derelinquunt tc duccm, et oberrant in vestigiis tuis, qui nutus tuos pro te aman!. ct oblivi­ scuntur quid innuas, o suavissima lux purgatæ mentis sapientia! non cnim cessas innuere nohis quæ ct quanta sis; ct nutus tui sunt omne creaturarum dccus. Et artifex enim quodammodo innuit spectatori operissuide ipsa operis pulchritudine, ne ibi totus b.crcat, sed speciem corporis fabricati sic percurrat oculis, ut in cum qui fabricaverit recurrat affectu. Similes autem sunt hominibus, qui ea quæ facis pro te amant, qui cum audiunt aliquem facundum sapicn­ tem, dum nimis suavitatem vocis ejus, et structuras syllabarum apte locatarum avidc audiunt. amittunt sententiarum principatum, cujus illa verba tanquam signa sonuerunt. Væ qni se avertunt a lumine tuo, ct obscuritati suæ dulciter inhærent Tanquam cnim dorsum ad te ponentes, in carnali opere velut in um­ bra sua defiguntur, et tamen ctiam ibi quod eos de­ lectat, adbuc habent de circumfugentia lucis tuæ Sed umbra dum amatur, languidiorem facit oculum animi, et iuvalidiorem ad perferendum conspectum tuum. Propterea magis magisque bomo tenebratur, dum sectatur libentius quidquid infirmiorem tolera­ bilius cxcipit. Ex quo incipit non posse videre quod summe est, et malum putare quidquid fallit impro­ vidum, aut illicit indigum, aut captum excruciat, cutI ea pro merito patiatur aversionis suae, et quid­ quid justum est, malum esse non possit. Si ergo quidquid mutabile aspexeris, vel sensu corporis, vel animi consideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numeroruin forma teneatur, qua detracta in nibil recidat; noli dubitarc, ut ista mutabilia non intercipiantur, sed dimensis motibus, et distincta va­ rietate formarum, quasi quosdam verus temporum peragant, esse aliquam formam aeternam et incommu­ tabilem; quæ nequc contine tur et quasi diffundatur locis, neque potendatur atque varietur temporibus, per qunm cuncta ista formari valeant, ct pro suo genere implere atque agere locorum ac temporum numeros.

A. What else, then, are we doing when we strive to be wise, but in some way gathering our whole soul, with all the eagerness we can, toward what we touch with the mind, placing it there and fixing it firmly, so that it may no longer rejoice in its own private good, which has entangled it in passing things, but, stripped of all attachments to times and places, may grasp that which is always one and the same? For as the soul is the whole life of the body, so God is the happy life of the soul. While we are doing this, until we reach the end, we are on the way. And that we are granted to rejoice in these true and certain goods, though they still only flash out on this dark journey: see whether this is what is written of wisdom, what it does with its lovers when they come to it and seek it. For it is said, “In the ways it will show itself to them cheerfully, and meet them with all providence.” For wherever you turn, it speaks to you by certain traces that it has impressed on its works, and when you are slipping back into outward things, it calls you back within by the very forms of outward things; so that you may see that whatever delights you in a body and lures you through the bodily senses is full of number, and may ask where it comes from, and return into yourself, and understand that you cannot approve or disapprove what you touch by the senses of the body unless you have within yourself certain laws of beauty to which you refer whatever beautiful things you perceive outside. Look at the sky and the earth and the sea, and whatever in them shines above or creeps below, or flies or swims: they have forms because they have numbers; take these away from them, and they will be nothing. From whom, then, are they, but from him from whom number is, since they have being only insofar as they are numbered? And human craftsmen of all bodily forms have numbers in their art, to which they fit their works; they move their hands and tools in making until what is formed outside, referred to that light of numbers which is within, attains completion as far as it can, and pleases, through the sense that interprets, the inner judge that beholds the numbers above. Then ask who moves the craftsman's limbs: it will be number, for they too move in measure. And if you take the work from the hands and the intention of making from the mind, and that motion of the limbs is directed to delight, it will be called dancing. Ask, then, what delights in dancing: number will answer you, “Here I am.” Look now at the beauty of a formed body: numbers are held in place. Look at the beauty of motion in a body: numbers turn in time. Enter into the art from which these come forth, and seek time and place in it: there will never be any time, nowhere any place; yet number lives in it, and its region is not of spaces nor its age of days. And yet those who want to become craftsmen, when they apply themselves to learning the art, move their body through places and times, and their mind through times; for with the passing of time they become more skilled. Go beyond, then, the craftsman's mind as well, so that you may see everlasting number; now wisdom will shine on you from its very inner seat and from the very sanctuary of truth. And if it still beats back your gaze as too weak, turn the eye of your mind back to that way where it showed itself cheerfully. Remember, of course, that you have only put off a vision which you may seek again when you are stronger and healthier. Woe to those who forsake you as their guide and wander among your traces, who love your signs instead of you and forget what you signify, O wisdom, sweetest light of a purified mind! For you do not cease to signal to us what and how great you are; and your signs are all the beauty of creatures. For even a craftsman in a way signals to the beholder of his work, by the very beauty of the work, not to cling to it wholly, but so to run his eyes over the appearance of the made body that he runs back in affection to the one who made it. And those who love the things you make instead of you are like people who, hearing some eloquent wise man, listen too eagerly to the sweetness of his voice and the arrangement of well-placed syllables, and lose the chief thing, the thoughts, of which those words sounded as signs. Woe to those who turn away from your light and cling sweetly to their own darkness! For as if turning their backs to you, they are fixed in fleshly work as in their own shadow, and yet even there what delights them they still have from the light of yours that shines around them. But the shadow, while it is loved, makes the eye of the mind weaker and less able to bear the sight of you. So a man is darkened more and more, as he more gladly follows whatever receives him more bearably in his weakness. From this he begins to be unable to see what supremely is, and to think evil whatever deceives him when he is unwary, or lures him when he is needy, or torments him when he is caught; though he suffers these things as the desert of his turning away, and whatever is just cannot be evil. If, then, whatever changeable thing you look at, you cannot grasp either by bodily sense or by the mind's consideration unless it is held by some form of numbers, and it falls back into nothing when that is taken away, do not doubt that there is some eternal and unchangeable form, so that these changeable things are not cut off but, by measured motions and a distinct variety of forms, complete, as it were, certain verses of times: a form which is neither contained and as it were spread out in places, nor stretched out and varied in times, through which all these things can be formed and, according to their kind, fill out and carry through the numbers of places and times.

Notes and citation

Summary: Wisdom meets its seekers in the numbered beauty of creatures and of human art, which points beyond itself to everlasting number and to an eternal, unchangeable form; those who love the signs instead of wisdom fall into darkness.

  • Wis 6:16 (“In the ways it will show itself to them cheerfully …”); the Wisdom of Solomon is outside the 66-book canon and is tagged as an extrabiblical text.
  • Numerus here covers number, measure, and rhythm; it is rendered “number” or “measure” as the context requires.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne paragraph number (43) leaked into the text; OCR slip; OCR slips; stray mark in the digital text): tutam animam nostrom → totam animam nostram; quid ngat cum amatoribus → quid agat cum amatoribus; fonnis intro → formis intro; aditne illis hac → adime illis hæc; 43. Væ qui derelinquunt → Væ qui derelinquunt; Sianilcs autem → Similes autem; obocurilali suæ → obscuritati suæ; illicit indigum It aut → illicit indigum, aut.

Extrabiblical texts: Wis 6:16 (Wisdom of Solomon [in RC, EO, ETH canons]; quotation)

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.16 (PL 32:1250–1251; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-16). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-libero-arbitrio-2-16) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.

2.17PL 32:1251

Otnnis enim res mutabilis, etiam formabilis sit necesse est. Sicut autem mutabile dicimus quod mu­ tari potest, ita formabile quod formari potest appel­ laverim. Nulla autcm res formare seipsam potest: quia nulla res potest dare sibi quod non habct; et utique ut habeat formam, formatur aliquid. Quapro­ pter quaelibet res si quam habet formam, non ei opus est accipere quod habct; si qua vero non habet for­ mam, non potest a se accipere quod non habui. Nulia ergo res, ut diximus, formare se potest. Quid autem amplius de mutabilitate corporis et animi dicamus? superius enim satis dictum est. ConfIcitur itaque, ut et corpus et animus forma quadam incommutabili et semper manente formentur. Cui formæ dictum cst: Mutabis ea et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient. Annos sine defectu, pro æternitate posuit prophetica locutio. De bac itcm forma dictum est, quod in scipsa manens innovet omnia. Hinc etiam comprehen­ ditur omnia providentia gubernari. Si enim omnia quæ sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt, furma ipsa incommutabilis, per quam mutabilia cuncta sub­ sistunt, ut formarum suarum numeris impleantur et agantur, ipsa est corum providentia: non enim ista essent, si illa non esset. intuens ergo et consiJe­ rans universam creaturam, quicumque iter agit ad sapientiam, sentit sapicntiam in via se sibi ostendere hilariter, et in omni providentia occurrere sihi: et tanto alacrius ardescit viam istam peragere, quanto et ipsa via per illam pulchra est, ad quam exæstuat pervenire. Tu autem si præter id qnod est et non vivit, et id quod cst et vivit noque intelligit, et id quod cst et vivit et intelligit, inveneris aliquod aliud creaturarum genus; tunc ande dicere aliquod bonum esse, quod non sit ex Dco. Tria enim bxc duobus etiam nomini­ bus enuntiari possunt, si appellentur corpus et viia: quia cL illa quae tantum vivit, neque intelligit, qualis est pccorunl, et hæc quæ intelligit, sicuti est homi­ num, rectissime vita dicitur. Hæc autcm duo, id est, corpus et vita, quæ quidem creaturæ deputantur (nam et Creatoris ipsius vita dicitur, et ea summa vita esl): istæ igitur duæ creaturæ corpus et vita quoniam formabilia sunt, sicuti suprius dicta docuerunt, amissa lue omnino forma in nihilum recidunt, satis ostendunt se ex illa forma subsistere, qunc semper ejusmodi est. Quamobrem quantacumque bona, quam­ vis magna, quamvis minima, nisi ex Deo esse non possunt. Quid enim majus in creaturis quam vita in­ telligens, aut quid minus potest esse quam corpus? Quæ quantumlibet deficiant, et co tendant ut non sint, tamen aliquid formas illis remanet, ut quoquo nodo sint. Quidquid autem formæ cuipiam rei defi­ cienti remane t; ex illa forma est quæ nescit deficere, motusque ipsos rerum deficientium vel proficientium excedere numerorum suorum leges non sinit. Quid­ quid igitur laudabile advertitur in rerum natura, sive exigua sive ampla laude dignum judicetur, ad ex­ cellentissimam ct ineffabilem laudem referendum est Conditoris: nisi quid habes ad hæc.

For every changeable thing must also be formable. Just as we call changeable what can be changed, so I would call formable what can be formed. But nothing can form itself, because nothing can give itself what it does not have; and surely a thing is formed so that it may have form. So if any thing has some form, it does not need to receive what it has; and if any thing does not have form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not have. So nothing, as we said, can form itself. What more shall we say about the changeableness of body and mind? Enough was said above. It follows, then, that both body and mind are formed by a certain form that is unchangeable and always abiding. To this form it was said: “You will change them, and they will be changed; but you are the same, and your years will not fail.” The prophetic speech put “years without failing” for eternity. Of this form too it is said that, remaining in itself, it renews all things. From this it is also understood that all things are governed by providence. For if all things that are will be nothing when form is wholly taken away, the unchangeable form itself, through which all changeable things subsist, so that they are filled out and carried through by the numbers of their forms, is itself their providence; for they would not exist if it did not exist. Whoever, then, is making his way toward wisdom, beholding and considering the whole creation, feels that wisdom shows itself to him cheerfully on the way and meets him with all providence; and he burns the more eagerly to complete that way, as the way itself is beautiful through that wisdom which he longs to reach. But if, besides that which exists and does not live, that which exists and lives but does not understand, and that which exists, lives, and understands, you find some other class of creatures, then dare to say that there is some good that is not from God. For these three can also be expressed by two names, if they are called body and life; for both the life that only lives and does not understand, such as that of cattle, and the life that understands, such as that of human beings, are most rightly called life. These two, body and life, considered as creatures (for the life of the Creator himself is also spoken of, and that is the highest life), these two creatures, then, body and life, since they are formable, as what was said above has taught, and fall back into nothing if form is wholly lost, show clearly enough that they subsist from that form which is always the same. Therefore all goods, however great, however small, can only be from God. For what is greater among creatures than understanding life, or what can be less than body? However much these fail and tend toward not being, yet some form remains to them, so that they exist in some way. And whatever form remains to any failing thing is from that form which does not know failing, and which does not allow even the motions of things failing or advancing to exceed the laws of their numbers. Whatever, then, is noticed as praiseworthy in the nature of things, whether it is judged worthy of slight or of ample praise, is to be referred to the most excellent and ineffable praise of the Maker, unless you have something to say to this.

Ps 102:26 (101:27 Vulg.) (quotation, high confidence) · Ps 102:27 (101:28 Vulg.) (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Since nothing can form itself, all changeable things, body and life alike, are formed by an unchangeable form that is their providence; so every good, great or small, is from God.

  • Ps 102:26–27 (Ps 101:27–28 in the Latin numbering).
  • “Remaining in itself, it renews all things” is Wis 7:27, tagged as an extrabiblical text.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip; OCR slips): It. autcm idem ipse es → tu autem idem ipse es; nisi quid hales ad hæc → nisi quid habes ad hæc.

Extrabiblical texts: Wis 7:27 (Wisdom of Solomon [in RC, EO, ETH canons]; quotation)

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Lib. arb. 2.17 (PL 32:1251; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-libero-arbitrio/2-11/#p-2-17). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); no public-domain English translation exists, so each batch was checked afterwards privately against a modern translation (never quoted or copied); the Latin decides.