On First Principles 3.4.1–3.4.5

Latin text: Migne, PG 11 (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Graeca vol. 11 (1857), transcribed from library-scan OCR; words lost in the scan supplied, and 71 sections (68 disordered in the scan, and 1.4.3–5, absent from Migne) given, from Koetschau, GCS 22 (1913), via the archive.org scan).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0). Compare: Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4 (1885), De Principiis.

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On 3, chapter 4

3.4.1PG 11:319a–320a

Nunc ne de humanis quidem tentationibus silendum puto, quae nascuntur interdum ex carne et sanguine, vel ex prudentia carnis et sanguinis quae Deo dicitur esse inimica. Et utrum verum sit quod quidam dicunt, quasi binas animas esse persingulos (8-3), posteaquamdehistentationibus exposuimus,qum ριηέ quam Immanm dicuntur, id estquas adversum principatus et potestates et adversum mundi huius rectores tenebrarum et spiritalia nequitiae in caelestibus gerimus, vel quae nobis adversum spiritus malignos et inmundos daemones peraguntur. In qua re consequenter arbitror requirendum si in nobis, id est hominibus, qui ex anima constamus et corpore ac spiritu vitali, est etiam aliud aliquid quod Inritamentum habeat proprium (Si), et commutionent ad malum provocantem; sicut haberi a quibusdam quiestio solet hujusmodi, utrumnam velut duae animae in nobis dicendae sunt, una quaedam divinior et ctelestis, etalia inferior : an vero ex hoc ipso quod corporibus inhaeren'tus (quae corpora (‘secundum prOpriam quidem naturam mortua sunt et penitus exanima, quia ex nobis, id est, ex animabus corpus materiale vivitieatur, quod utique contrarium est et inimicutn Spiritui), trahimur et provocamur ad bare mala quae corpori grata sunt (8U) ; an vero tertium, quod quidam Grascorum arbitrati sunt, quia anima nostra cum una sit per substantiam,ex pluribus tamen constet, et una pars ejus rationabilis, pars vero alia irrationabilis dicatur, et ea quidem pars quam irrationabilem dicunt, in duos rursum dividatur alI‘ectus cupiditatis et iracundia. "as ergo "es quas supra animus anima opiniones a nonnullis haberi invenimus. Et quibus illud interim, quod quibusdam Grateorum philosophis visum diximus, quia tripartita sitanima, non valde confirmari ex divinae scripturae auctoritate pervideo; ad alia vero duo, quae reliqua sunt, inveniri possunt aliquanta quae ex divinis Litῑθτίε aPlari Posse Videam"?-

Now I think we should not be silent about human temptations either, which arise at times from flesh and blood, or from the wisdom of flesh and blood, which is said to be hostile to God. And whether what some say is true, that there are two souls in each person, [we must consider,] now that we have set out the temptations that are said to be more than human, that is, those which we wage against principalities and powers and against the rulers of the darkness of this world and the spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavenly places, or which are carried on for us against evil spirits and unclean demons. In this matter I think we must consequently inquire whether in us, that is, in human beings, who consist of soul and body and vital spirit, there is also something else which has its own incitement and motion provoking to evil. For some are accustomed to raise a question of this kind: whether there are, as it were, two souls in us, one more divine and heavenly and the other lower; or whether, from the very fact that we cleave to bodies (which bodies by their own nature are dead and wholly lifeless, since the material body is given life by us, that is, by souls, and the body is certainly contrary and hostile to the spirit), we are drawn and provoked to those evils which are pleasing to the body; or else, third, as some of the Greeks have thought, that our soul, though one in substance, is nevertheless made up of several parts, one part being called rational and the other irrational, and the part they call irrational being divided again into two affections, desire and anger. These, then, are the opinions about the soul which we have found held by some. Of these, the one we said seemed good to certain Greek philosophers, that the soul is threefold, I do not see to be much confirmed by the authority of divine Scripture; but for the other two that remain some passages can be found which might seem to fit them from the divine writings.

Textual problem in this passage: see the notes.

Rom 8:7 (allusion, high confidence) · Eph 6:12 (allusion, medium confidence) · Eph 6:12 (allusion, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Origen turns to temptations from flesh and blood and sets out three views of the soul: two souls in us, the influence of the body, or the Greek threefold soul, which Scripture does not support.

  • Sources: Rom 8:7 ('the wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God'); Eph 6:12. The threefold soul (rational, desiring, spirited) is Plato's (Republic 4).
  • The sentence on whether there are two souls in each person, which Migne prints within the text, is a chapter heading in Koetschau's edition; the words in brackets are supplied to show the construction. Allusions: Rom 8:7; Eph 6:12.
  • Words lost in the Migne scan are supplied from Koetschau's edition.

Extrabiblical texts: Plato, Resp. 4 (Plato (works); allusion)

Cite (SBL): Origen, Princ. 3.4.1 (PG 11:319a–320a; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/origen-de-principiis/3-4-1/#p-3-4-1). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from Rufinus's Latin translation of Origen's lost Greek (Migne PG 11, from the library scan's OCR, slips corrected as logged), divided by Koetschau's sections (GCS 22, 1913); words lost in the scan are supplied from Koetschau, and sections that the scan gives disordered or mixed with Migne's parallel columns (and 1.4.3–5, absent from Migne) are translated from Koetschau's text, as noted; compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of F. Crombie in ANF 4 (1885).

3.4.2PG 11:320a–322b

Ex quibus primo illud discutiamus quod astruere solent quidam, quia una sit bona in nobis mima et caelestis, alia vero interior et terrestris, et quod ea quidem quae melior est, caelitus insera- :ur, qualis est illa quae et Jacob adversus Esau adhuc in utero posito palmam victoria: supplantati irrestitit fratris ; et quae in Jeremia sanctificatur :x vulva ’9, et Spiritu sancto repletur ex utero in JOanue. Illam vero inferiorem, quam dicunt ex corporali eam semine simul asserunt {90) cum corpore seminari, unde et praeter corpus vivere eam vel subsistere negant posse, propter quod et carnem eam frequenter appellari dicunt. Quod enim scriptum est : Caro concupiscit adversus spiritnni ο, ο non hoc de carne dictum accipiunt, sed de hac anima quae proprie carnis est anima. Sed et ex his student nihilominus confirmare haec quze in LeViliCO ila εονίριει sum: Attium omnis carnis. tua omnis carnis , sanguis ipsius est. Ex eo enim, quod per totam carnem sanguis diffusus vitam praestat carni, in sanguine inesse aiunt hanc animam, quae dicitur totius carnis esse anima. Hoc autem ipsum quod dictum est, carnem repugnare adversum spiritum, spiritum autem adversum carnem, et quod dictum est: Anima omnis carnis sanguis ipsius est, alio nomine iidem vocari dicunt sapientiam carnis , quod est spiritus quidam malerialis, qui legi Dei subjectus non est, sed nec potest esse subjectus, quia voluntates habet terrenas et desideria corporalia. De hoc putant etiam Apostolum dixisse illttd quod ait : \‘ideo autent aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis ntere,,et captivum me ducentem in lege peccati qure est in membris meis . Si vero quis objiciat eis hoc dici de natura corporis, quod vere secundum proprietatem quidem naturze suae mortuum est, habere autent dicitur sensum vel sapientiam quae inimica est Deo , vel qum repugnat adversus spiritum , pro eo veluti si quis dicat quodammodo carnis ipsius esse vocem quae clamet non esurientium , non sitiendum , non algendum, neque velle prorsus in aliquo molestiam pati sive ex almndantia, sive ex penuria; haec illi resolvere atqtte impugnare conabuntur, ostendentes quamplurimas alias esse passiones anima: qua: in nullo prorsus a carne originem trahant, et tamen his spiritus adversetur, sicut est ambitio, avaritia, aemulatio, invidia, superbia , et his similia : cum quibus pugnam quamdam esse humana: menti, vel spiritui videntes, ideo causam omnium horum malorum non ponunt aliud qttid nisi hanc de qua superius diximus, velut corporalem animam et ex seminis traduce generatam. Adhibere quoque ad assertionem horum etiam illud testimonium Apostoli solent, quod ait: Manifesta autem sunt Opera carnis, quae sunt foruicatio, itnmunditia. itnpudicitiae, idololatria, veneficia, illlllllCllliI‘, coutentiones, mntulationes , irze, rixae, dissensiones, hereses, secta}, invidiae, ebrietates, comessationes, et his similia«, dicentes non haec omnia de usu vel delectatione carnis originem trahere, ita ut putentur eius substantiae, quae animam non habet, id est carnis, hi omnes motus existere. Sed et illud, quod ait: »Videte, fratres, vocationem vestram, quoniam non multi inter vos sapientes secundum carnem«, ad hoc videbitur inclinandum, ut propria quaedam videatur esse carnalis ac materialis sapientia, alia vero sit sapientia secundum spiritum, quae utique non potest dici sapientia, nisi sit anima carnis, quae sapiat hoc, quod carnis sapientia nominatur. Ad haec addunt etiam illud: »Si caro repugnat adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem , t uti non quae volumus illafaciamus, quae sunt de quibus dicit ιιι non quae volumus , faciamus? Certum est, aiunt, de spiritu non dici : Non enim voluntas spiritus prohibetur. Sed neque de carne, quia si non habet animam propriam, sine dubio nec voluntatem habebit. Superest ergo ttt de hujus animae voluntate dicatur, qum habere potest propriam voluntatem, quae utique adversatur voluntati spiritus. Et si ita est, constat quod hujus animae voluntas quaadam media est inter carnem ct Spiritum, uni sine dubio e duobus serviens et ohtemperaus. cuicunque obtemperare delegerit. Quae cum se delectationibus carnis subdiderit, carnales homines facit; cum vero se spiritui iunxerit, in spiritu esse homines facit, et propter hoe spiritales nominari. Quod designare Apostolus videtur, cuin dicit : Vos autem in carne non estis, sed in spiritu . Requirendunt ergo est quae sit omnino hzec ipsa voluntas inter carnem et Spiritum, praeter eam voluntatem quae carnis esse vel spiritus dicitur. Pro certo namque habetur quod omnia quaso cunque spiritus esse dicuntur, voluntas sit spiritus; et quaecunque opera carnis esse dicuntur, voluntas sit carnis. Quae ergo ista est praeter hzec voluntas anima: quae extrinsecus nominatur, quam voluntatem nolens nos facere Apostolus dicit : σ [τι non quaecunque vultis illa faciatis . t lu quo hoc videtur designari, quod neutro ex his duobus, id est neque carni, neque spiritui debeat adhaerere. Sed ο dicet qtlis quia sient melius quidem est animm (l), si propriam faciat voluntatem, quant ttt voluntatem faciat carnis; sic iterum melius est facere volunta. tem spiritus magis quam propriam voluntatem. Quomodo ergo Apostolus ait, r ut non quae vultis, illa faciatis? Quoniam iit ea pugna quat inter carnem et spiritum geritur, non omnino spiritus certa victoria est. Manifestum est enim obtinere iu quan‘tplurimis carnem.

Of these let us first discuss what some are accustomed to maintain, that there is in us one soul that is good and heavenly and another that is lower and earthly; and that the better one is implanted from heaven, such as the one which in Jacob, while he was still in the womb, won the palm of victory in supplanting his brother Esau, and which in Jeremiah is sanctified from the womb, and in John is filled with the Holy Spirit from the womb. The lower one, they say, comes from bodily seed, and they assert that it is sown together with the body; hence they deny that it can live or subsist apart from the body, and for this reason they say it is often called flesh. For what is written, "The flesh lusts against the spirit," they take as said not of the flesh but of this soul, which is properly the soul of the flesh. From these words they also try to confirm what is written in Leviticus thus: "The soul of all flesh is its blood." For since the blood, spread through the whole flesh, gives life to the flesh, they say that this soul, which is called the soul of all flesh, is in the blood. And this very thing that is said, that the flesh fights against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, and what is said, "The soul of all flesh is its blood," they say is called by another name the wisdom of the flesh, which is a kind of material spirit that is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can it be, because it has earthly wills and bodily desires. Of this, they think, the apostle also spoke when he says: "But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which is in my members." If anyone objects to them that this is said of the nature of the body, which according to the property of its own nature is indeed dead, but is said to have a sense or wisdom that is hostile to God or wars against the spirit, as if one were to say that it is in a manner the voice of the flesh itself, crying out not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold, and not to want to suffer any discomfort at all whether from abundance or from want, they will try to refute and attack this by showing that there are very many other passions of the soul that draw their origin in no way from the flesh, and yet the spirit opposes them, such as ambition, avarice, rivalry, envy, pride and the like. Seeing that the human mind or spirit has a kind of battle with these, they therefore place the cause of all these evils in nothing other than this soul of which we spoke above, a bodily soul, as it were, and generated by transmission from the seed. They are accustomed also to add in support of their assertion the testimony of the apostle where he says: "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are sexual immorality, uncleanness, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, rivalries, anger, quarrels, dissensions, heresies, factions, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and the like," saying that not all these things draw their origin from the use or pleasure of the flesh, so that all these motions should be thought to arise from that substance which has no soul, that is, the flesh. And the saying, "See your calling, brothers, that not many among you are wise according to the flesh," will seem to point to this: that there appears to be a certain fleshly and material wisdom of its own, and another wisdom according to the spirit; and the former cannot be called wisdom unless there is a soul of the flesh which is wise in what is called the wisdom of the flesh. To these they also add this: "If the flesh wars against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that we do not do what we wish," what are the things of which he says "so that we do not do what we wish"? It is certain, they say, that this is not said of the spirit, for the will of the spirit is not prevented; nor of the flesh, because if the flesh has no soul of its own, it will certainly have no will either. It remains, then, that it is said of the will of this soul, which can have a will of its own, which certainly opposes the will of the spirit. And if this is so, it is established that the will of this soul is something intermediate between the flesh and the spirit, serving and obeying without doubt one of the two, whichever it has chosen to obey. When it subjects itself to the pleasures of the flesh, it makes people carnal; but when it joins itself to the spirit, it makes people to be in the spirit, and for this reason to be called spiritual. This is what the apostle seems to indicate when he says, "But you are not in the flesh but in the spirit." We must ask, then, what at all this will is between the flesh and the spirit, besides the will that is said to belong to the flesh or to the spirit. For it is held for certain that all things said to be of the spirit are the will of the spirit, and whatever are called works of the flesh are the will of the flesh. What, then, besides these, is this will of the soul that is named separately, which the apostle does not want us to do when he says, "so that you do not do whatever you wish"? By this it seems to be indicated that it ought to cleave to neither of these two, that is, neither to the flesh nor to the spirit. But someone will say: as it is better for the soul to do its own will than to do the will of the flesh, so again it is better to do the will of the spirit than its own will. How, then, does the apostle say, "so that you do not do the things you wish"? Because in the fight that is waged between the flesh and the spirit, the victory of the spirit is by no means certain; for it is plain that the flesh prevails in very many people.

Gen 25:22–26 (allusion, medium confidence) · Jer 1:5 (allusion, high confidence) · Luke 1:15 (allusion, high confidence) · Gal 5:17 (quotation, high confidence) · Lev 17:14 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:7 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 7:23 (quotation, high confidence) · Gal 5:19–21 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:9 (quotation, high confidence) · 1 Cor 1:26 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: The view of two souls: a heavenly soul and a lower 'soul of the flesh' transmitted with the body, which is meant to explain Paul's war of flesh and spirit and a middle will between them.

  • Sources: Gen 25:22–26; Jer 1:5; Luke 1:15; Gal 5:17; Lev 17:14; Rom 8:7; Rom 7:23; Gal 5:19–21; Rom 8:9.
  • This section reports the opinion of others; Origen weighs it, and the opposing view, in the following sections without settling the question.
  • Words lost in the Migne scan are supplied from Koetschau's edition.

Topics: Ethics

Cite (SBL): Origen, Princ. 3.4.2 (PG 11:320a–322b; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/origen-de-principiis/3-4-1/#p-3-4-2). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from Rufinus's Latin translation of Origen's lost Greek (Migne PG 11, from the library scan's OCR, slips corrected as logged), divided by Koetschau's sections (GCS 22, 1913); words lost in the scan are supplied from Koetschau, and sections that the scan gives disordered or mixed with Migne's parallel columns (and 1.4.3–5, absent from Migne) are translated from Koetschau's text, as noted; compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of F. Crombie in ANF 4 (1885).

3.4.3PG 11:322b–323c

Verum quoniam in disputationem incidimus profundam, iit qua necesse est ex singulis quibusque partibus quae possunt moveri, discutere; videamus ne forte in hoc loco tale aliquid tractari potest, quia sicut melius est animae sequi spiritum, tunc cum spiritus carnem vicerit, ita etiam si (ί) videtur ei esse deterius sequi carnem repugnantem adversum spiritum et ad se revocare animam volentem, tamen forte utilius videatur obtineri animam a carne, quam residere in suis propriis voluntatibus. Namque quoniam dum in suis voluntatibus manet, tunc est quando nec calida dicitur esse, nec frigida, sed in medio quodam tepore perdurans, tardam et satis dillicilem conversionem poterit invenire. Si vero carni adharreat, ex his ipsis interdum malis quae ex carnis vitiis patitur, satiata aliquando et repleta, velut gravissimis oneribus luxurire ac libidinis fatigata, facilius et velocius converti a materialibus sordibus ad caelestium desiderium et spiritualem gratiam potest. Et hoc arbitrandum est dixisse Apostolnm, idcirco pugnare spiritum adversus carnem, et carnem adversus spiritum, ut non quaecunque volumus, illa faciamus, sine dubio ea quae extra voluntatem spiritus et extra voluntatem carnis designata sunt; utsi aliis nominibus diceremus, quia melius est hominem aut in virtute esse, aut in malitia, quam in nullo horum; anima vero priusquam se convertat ad spiritum et unum efficiatur cum eo, dum adlueret corpori et de carnalibus cogitat, neque in bono Statu videtur esse, neque manifeste in malo, sed esse animali, ut ita dixerim, similis. Melius autem est ut si fieri potest adhaerens spiritui efficiatur spiritalis. Si vero fieri non potest, magis expedit eam vel carnis malitiam sequi, quam in suis positam voluntatibus, animalis irrationabilis statum tenere. nam autem tractavimus volentes singularum assertionum disserere Opiniones, ampliori quam volui- ε mus usi excursu, uti ne latere nos putarentur ea qum moveri solent ab his qui qumrunt, utrum sit alia anima in nobis praeter hanc cmlestem et rationabilem, quae huic naturaliter adversetur, et vocetur vel caro, vel sapientia carnis, vel anima carnis.

But since we have fallen into a deep discussion, in which we must examine every side that can be raised, let us see whether perhaps something of this kind can be treated in this place: that as it is better for the soul to follow the spirit when the spirit has conquered the flesh, so also, even if it seems worse for it to follow the flesh, which wars against the spirit and wishes to call the soul back to itself, it may nevertheless perhaps seem more useful for the soul to be held by the flesh than to remain in its own wills. For since, while it remains in its own wills, it is then said to be neither hot nor cold, but to continue in a kind of middle lukewarmness, it will find a slow and rather difficult conversion. But if it cleaves to the flesh, then from the very evils it suffers from the vices of the flesh, sated at last and filled, and as it were wearied by the heaviest burdens of luxury and lust, it can be turned more easily and quickly from material filth to the desire for heavenly things and to spiritual grace. And we must think the apostle said this: that the spirit fights against the flesh and the flesh against the spirit for this reason, that we may not do whatever we wish, meaning without doubt the things that are designated as outside the will of the spirit and outside the will of the flesh; as if we were to say in other words that it is better for a person to be either in virtue or in wickedness than in neither; but the soul, before it turns to the spirit and is made one with it, while it cleaves to the body and thinks of carnal things, seems to be neither in a good state nor plainly in a bad one, but to be like an animal, so to speak. It is better, if it can be, that it cleave to the spirit and become spiritual. But if this cannot be, it is more expedient for it to follow even the wickedness of the flesh than, placed in its own wills, to hold the state of an irrational animal. These things we have treated, wishing to discuss the opinions of each assertion, with a longer digression than we wished, so that we might not be thought unaware of the questions usually raised by those who ask whether there is another soul in us besides this heavenly and rational one, which is naturally opposed to it and is called the flesh, or the wisdom of the flesh, or the soul of the flesh.

Rev 3:15–16 (allusion, high confidence) · Gal 5:17 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: On this view a lukewarm soul in the middle is worse off than one that follows the flesh, which may tire of its evils and turn more quickly to the spirit.

  • Sources: Rev 3:15–16 (neither hot nor cold); Gal 5:17.
  • The suggestion that it may be 'more expedient' for the soul to follow the wickedness of the flesh than to stay lukewarm is put forward tentatively, as one side of the discussion; it is translated as written.
  • Words lost in the Migne scan are supplied from Koetschau's edition.

Topics: Ethics

Cite (SBL): Origen, Princ. 3.4.3 (PG 11:322b–323c; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/origen-de-principiis/3-4-1/#p-3-4-3). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from Rufinus's Latin translation of Origen's lost Greek (Migne PG 11, from the library scan's OCR, slips corrected as logged), divided by Koetschau's sections (GCS 22, 1913); words lost in the scan are supplied from Koetschau, and sections that the scan gives disordered or mixed with Migne's parallel columns (and 1.4.3–5, absent from Migne) are translated from Koetschau's text, as noted; compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of F. Crombie in ANF 4 (1885).

3.4.4PG 11:323c–325b

Nunc videamus quid etiam adversum haec responderi suleat ab his qui defendunt unum esse in nobis motum, et unam vitam unius ejusdemque animae, cujus sive salus, sive perditio secutidum actus suos ipsi proprie ascribatur. Et primo videamus cujusmodi sint passiones animi quas patimur cum sentimus intra nosmetipsos velut in partes nos rapi per singula; cum pugna quaedam fit cogitationum in cordibus nostris. et quaedam nobis verisimilitudines suggeruntur, quibus nunc in hoc, nunc in aliud inclinantur, quibusque nunc quidem arguimur, nunc vero nosmetipsos amplectimur. Nihil autem magnum est si mala ingenia dicamus beanteta semetipso discordans, cum etiam in omnibus hominibus ita inveniatur, si quando deliberatio incertae rei ad consilium venerit, etprospicitur, vel consulitur quid rectius vel utilius eligatur. Nihil ergo mirum si duae verisimilitudines sibi invicem occurrentes et contraria suggerentes, in diversas partes animum rapiunt. Verbi causa, si cogitatio invitet aliquem ad fidem et timorem Dei, tunc non potest dici quia caro adversum spiritum pugnet; sed dmn incertum est quod verum et utile est, animus in diversa rapitur. ita et cum putatur caro ad libidinem provocare, consilium vero melius hujuscemodi incitamentis resistit, non putandum est vitam esse aliquam aliam quae adversus aliam resistat , sed naturam corporis quae repleta sativi humoris loca evacuare gestit {atque defluere; sicut nec contraria aliqua virtus, nec vita alterius animae putanda est quae nobis excitat sitim et provocat ad bibendum, vel quze esurire facit, et irritat ad eibum. Sed sicut haec naturalibus motibus corporis vel appetuntur, vel evacuantur, ita et naturalis seminis congregatus per tempus in suis locis humor expelli gestit, et abjiei : quod in tantmn nequaquam impulsu alterius cujusquam provocationis eflicitur, ut etiam sponte interdum soleat egeri. Cum ergo dicitur, quia caro pugnat adversus spiritum , › ita intelligunt isti, quia usus, vel necessitas, vel delectamentum carnis provocanshominem abstrahit et abducit a divinis et spiritalibus rebus. Pro necessitate etenim corporis abstracti. divinis et in aeternum profuturis rebus vacare non sinimur. Sic rursus divinis et spiritalibus anima 148 vacans, et spiritui conjuncta, impugnare dicitur carnem, dum resolvi eam deliciis non sinit et voluptatibus fluitare, quibus naturaliter delectatur. Hoc modo etiam illud asserunt quod dictum est : :Sapientia carnis inimica est Deo", › non quod vere animam habeat caro, vel sapientiam propriam, sed sicut abusive dicere solemus et sitire terram et Velle eam bibere aquam, hoc utique quod dicimus velle, non proprie, sed abusive proferimus, velut si dicamus iterum quia domus recomponi vult, et alia multa his similia; ita et sapientia carnis accipienda est, vel quod dictum estquia (caro concupiscit adversus spiritum.) Adjicere solent etiam illud quod dictum est : Vox sanguinis fratris tui clamat ad me de terra ο. Quod enim claeiTusus e51, sed abusive sanguis clamare dicitur, dum ejus qui sanguinem effudit vindicta depascitur. Sed et illud quod Aposrolus ait : «Video autem aliam legem” in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae “, ita intelligunt tanquam si dixisset, quod is qui verbo Dei vacare vult, pro necessitatibus et usibus corporalibus, quae velut lex quaedam corpori inest, distrahitur atque divellitnr atque impeditur ne sapientia: vacans intentius possit divina contueri mysteria.

Now let us see what is usually answered to these things by those who maintain that there is in us one motion and one life of one and the same soul, whose salvation or perdition is properly ascribed to it according to its own acts. And first let us see what kind of passions of the mind we suffer when we feel ourselves as it were torn into parts over each matter, when a kind of battle of thoughts takes place in our hearts, and certain probabilities are suggested to us by which we incline now to this and now to that, and by which we are now reproved and now approve ourselves. It is nothing remarkable if we say that bad characters are at variance with themselves, since this is found in all people whenever deliberation on an uncertain matter comes to be weighed, and it is considered or consulted what may be chosen more rightly or more usefully. It is no wonder, then, if two probabilities meeting each other and suggesting contrary things draw the mind in different directions. For example, if thought invites someone to faith and the fear of God, it cannot then be said that the flesh is fighting against the spirit; but while it is uncertain what is true and useful, the mind is drawn in different directions. So too, when the flesh is thought to provoke to lust, but better counsel resists such incitements, we must not think there is some other life resisting another, but the nature of the body, which, when the places of the seminal humour are filled, longs to empty them and let them flow away; just as it is not some contrary power, or the life of another soul, that must be thought to excite thirst in us and provoke us to drink, or to make us hungry and stir us to food. But as these things are sought or discharged by the natural motions of the body, so also the humour of natural seed, gathered over time in its places, longs to be expelled and cast out; and this is so far from coming about by the impulse of any other provocation that it is sometimes discharged even of its own accord. When it is said, then, that "the flesh fights against the spirit," these people understand it thus: that the use, or necessity, or pleasure of the flesh, provoking a person, draws him away and leads him off from divine and spiritual things. For, drawn away by the necessity of the body, we are not allowed to give our time to divine things that will profit us for ever. So again the soul, giving its time to divine and spiritual things and joined to the spirit, is said to fight against the flesh, when it does not allow it to grow slack with delights and to drift in pleasures, in which it naturally takes delight. In this way they also explain the saying, "The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God": not that the flesh truly has a soul or a wisdom of its own, but as we are accustomed to say, by a loose use of words, that the earth is thirsty and wants to drink water, where we say "wants" not properly but loosely, or again that a house wants to be rebuilt, and many other things like these; so also "the wisdom of the flesh" must be taken, or the saying "the flesh lusts against the spirit." They usually add also the saying, "The voice of your brother's blood cries to me from the ground." For what cries to God is not properly the blood that was shed; but blood is said loosely to cry out, while vengeance is demanded on the one who shed it. And what the apostle says, "But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind," they understand as if he had said that whoever wishes to give his time to the word of God is distracted, torn and hindered by bodily necessities and uses, which are in the body like a kind of law, so that, giving his time to wisdom, he cannot contemplate the divine mysteries more intently.

Gal 5:17 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:7 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 4:10 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 7:23 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: The opposing view holds that there is one soul: inner conflict is ordinary deliberation, and 'flesh against spirit' means the body's needs and pleasures distracting us from divine things.

  • Sources: Gal 5:17; Rom 8:7; Gen 4:10; Rom 7:23. The frank physiological explanation of sexual desire is part of the argument that desire need not come from a second soul or a demon.

Topics: Ethics

Cite (SBL): Origen, Princ. 3.4.4 (PG 11:323c–325b; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/origen-de-principiis/3-4-1/#p-3-4-4). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from Rufinus's Latin translation of Origen's lost Greek (Migne PG 11, from the library scan's OCR, slips corrected as logged), divided by Koetschau's sections (GCS 22, 1913); words lost in the scan are supplied from Koetschau, and sections that the scan gives disordered or mixed with Migne's parallel columns (and 1.4.3–5, absent from Migne) are translated from Koetschau's text, as noted; compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of F. Crombie in ANF 4 (1885).

3.4.5PG 11:325b–325c

Quod vero inter "carnis opera descriptae sunt esse etiam luereses, et invidize, et contentiones, vel caetera, ita accipiunt, quod anima cum crassioris sensus fuerit effecta, ex eo quod corporis sese passiouibus subdit, oppressa vitiorum molibus, et nihil subtile ac spiritale sentiens. caro dicitur effecta, et inde nomen trahit, in quo plus studii vel propositi gerit. Addunt etiam haec requirentes : quis invenietur, vel quis dicetur conditor mali hujus sensus qui dicitur sensus carnis? Quia alium nullum creatorem anima: et carnis quam Deum credendum esse defendunt. Et si dicamus quia bonus Deus in ipsa conditione sua aliquid sibi creavit inimicum, utique absurdum videbitur. Si ergo scriptum est, quia «sapientia carnis inimica est Deo δ’, et hoc factum ex conditione dicetur, videbitur ipse Deus naturam sibi aliquam fecisse inimicam, quae ei non potest esse subjecta nec legi ejus; quippe si animale esse putabitur, de quo haec dicuntur. Quod si ita recipiatur, quid jam differre videbitur ab his qui diversas naturas animarum dicunt esse creatas, quae naturaliter vel peritura: sint, vel salvandaz? Quod utique solis lmreticis placet, qui dum justitiam Dei pia ratione adseverare non possunt, huiuscemodi impietatis figmenta componunt. Et nos quidem, prout potuimus, ex singulorum personis quae dici possent disputationis modo de singulis dogmatibus in medium protulimus; qui autem legit, eligat ex his quae magis amplectenda sit ratio.

As for heresies, envies, contentions and the rest being listed among the works of the flesh, they take it thus: that the soul, when it has become coarser in perception from subjecting itself to the passions of the body, being weighed down by the mass of its vices and perceiving nothing subtle or spiritual, is said to have become flesh, and takes its name from that on which it spends more zeal or purpose. They also add this question: who will be found, or who will be called, the creator of this evil sense that is called the sense of the flesh? For they maintain that no other creator of soul and flesh is to be believed in but God. And if we say that the good God in his very creation created something hostile to himself, it will certainly seem absurd. If, then, it is written that "the wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God," and this is said to have come about by creation, God himself will seem to have made a nature hostile to himself, which cannot be subject to him or to his law; that is, if the thing of which these words are said is thought to be a living being. And if this is accepted, how will it seem to differ from those who say that different natures of souls were created, which by nature are either to perish or to be saved? This certainly pleases only the heretics, who, since they cannot maintain the justice of God by pious reasoning, compose fictions of impiety of this kind. We, for our part, have set forth as well as we could, in the manner of a discussion, what could be said on each doctrine in the person of each side; let the reader choose from them which account is rather to be embraced.

Gal 5:19–21 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 8:7 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Those who hold to one soul explain the 'works of the flesh' as a soul grown coarse, and argue that a hostile 'soul of the flesh' would make God the creator of an enemy, as the heretics' fixed natures do.

  • Sources: Gal 5:19–21; Rom 8:7.
  • Words lost in the Migne scan are supplied from Koetschau's edition.

Topics: Heresy

Cite (SBL): Origen, Princ. 3.4.5 (PG 11:325b–325c; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/origen-de-principiis/3-4-1/#p-3-4-5). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-origen-de-principiis-3-4-5) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from Rufinus's Latin translation of Origen's lost Greek (Migne PG 11, from the library scan's OCR, slips corrected as logged), divided by Koetschau's sections (GCS 22, 1913); words lost in the scan are supplied from Koetschau, and sections that the scan gives disordered or mixed with Migne's parallel columns (and 1.4.3–5, absent from Migne) are translated from Koetschau's text, as noted; compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of F. Crombie in ANF 4 (1885).