On the Nature of Man 39–43

The discussion of free will, that is, of what is in our power, has as its first question whether there is anything in our power, for many oppose this; second, what the things in our power are, and over what we have authority; third, to examine the reason why God, who made us, made us free. Taking up the first question first, let us show that there is something in our power, from what is agreed even by our opponents. They say that the cause of everything that happens is either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or fortune, or chance. The work of God is substance and providence; of necessity, the movement of things that are always the same; of fate, that what happens through it is accomplished of necessity (for it too belongs to necessity); of nature, generation, growth and decay, plants and animals; of fortune, rare and unexpected things; for they define fortune as the meeting and concurrence of two causes that have their beginning from choice and bring about something other than what they naturally would, as when someone digging a ditch finds a treasure. For neither did the one who hid it hide it so that this man would find it, nor did the finder dig so as to find a treasure; but the one hid it so as to take it up when he wished, the other dug in order to dig a ditch; and something else fell out than either had chosen. Of chance, the accidents of soulless or irrational things, apart from nature and art. Under which of these shall we bring what happens through men, if man is not the cause and beginning of actions? It is not right to ascribe to God actions that are sometimes shameful and unjust; nor to necessity, for they are not among things always the same; nor to fate, for the things of fate are not contingent but necessary; nor to nature, for nature's works are animals and plants; nor to fortune, for men's actions are not rare and unexpected; nor to chance, for the accidents of soulless or irrational things belong to chance. It remains, then, that man himself, who acts and does, is the beginning of his own works and free.

Again, if man is the beginning of no action, deliberation is superfluous to him. For what use will he make of counsel, if he is master of no action? But to declare superfluous what is finest and most honourable in man would be most absurd. If, then, he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of action; for every counsel is for the sake of action and because of action. Again, where the activities are in our power, the actions according to the activity are in our power too; but the activities according to the virtues are in our power; therefore the virtues are in our power too. That the activities according to virtue are in our power is shown also by what Aristotle said well about the moral virtues: “What we learn by doing, we do when we have learned it”; for by learning to master pleasures we become temperate, and having become temperate we master pleasures. It may also be put thus: all agree that practice and exercise are in our power; and practice is master of states, for habit is an acquired nature. If practice is master of the state, and practice is in our power, the state too is in our power. And where the states are in our power, the actions according to the states are in our power too; for actions match states. The one who has a just state will do just things, and the one who has an unjust state unjust things; so it is in our power to be just [or unjust]. That some things are in our power is shown also by exhortations and [warnings]. For no one exhorts a man not to be hungry, nor thirsty, nor to fly, since these are not in our power. It is clear, then, that the things for which there are exhortations are in our power. Again, if nothing is in our power, laws are superfluous; but every nation naturally uses some laws, knowing that it has the authority to do what it legislates; and most nations ascribe their laws to gods as lawgivers, as the Cretans to Zeus and the Lacedaemonians to Apollo. So the knowledge of what is in our power has been sown by nature in all men. The same must be said about blame and praise and all the things that refute the claim that all things happen by fate.

That some things are in our power, and that we are masters of some actions, has been sufficiently shown. It remains to say what the things in our power are. We say, then, in general, that all things done voluntarily through us are in our power; for they would not be said to be done voluntarily if the action were not in our power. In short, those which praise or blame follows, and for which there is exhortation and law; for this too was shown earlier. In the strict sense, all the works of the soul are in our power, and the things we deliberate about; for we deliberate as though it were in our power to do or not to do what lies before us. It was shown earlier that counsel concerns things equally contingent, and that the equally contingent is what we can do, and its opposite too. Our mind makes the choice of this, and it is the beginning of action. These, then, are the things in our power, the equally contingent: for example, to move and not to move, to have impulse and not to have impulse, to desire unnecessary things and not to desire them, to lie and not to lie, to give and not to give, to rejoice in what one should and not to rejoice, and all such things, in which are the works of vice and of virtue; for in these we are free. The arts too are among the equally contingent. For every art concerns the production of things that can be and not be, whose beginning is in the maker and not in what is made. Nothing eternal and existing of necessity, nor anything that comes to be of necessity, is said to come to be by art; nor is anything said to come to be by art among the things that come to be in what is contingent and can be otherwise but have the efficient cause in themselves, as with animals and plants, for they come to be by nature and not by art. If, then, the efficient cause of things that come to be by art is outside them, what is the cause of things that come to be by art but the craftsman who makes them? For the making is in the craftsman. He, then, is the beginning and cause of the actions. So the activities according to art, the virtues, and all actions of the soul and of reason are in our power; and it was shown earlier which are the activities of the soul.

Most people, thinking that free will is said of every action, possession and fortune, naturally reject the doctrine. The sharper ones, bringing forward the words of Scripture to refute it, “A man's ways are not in his own power,” say, “My good friends, how is man free, when his way is not in his own power?” and “The thoughts of men are vain,” as though we could not carry into action what we think; and they say many such things, not knowing in what sense free will is meant. For we have authority not over being rich or poor, or always healthy, or strong by nature, or ruling, or in general over the so-called instrumental or fortuitous goods, or the things that receive their end according to providence; but over actions, choices and movements according to virtue and vice, and over those whose opposites we can equally do; since choice precedes every action, and not only the action but also the choice is subject to judgment. This is shown by the saying in the Gospel: “He who looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.” And Job sacrificed to God for the sins of his children in their thoughts. For choice is the beginning of sin and of right doing. The deed is sometimes permitted by providence and sometimes prevented. Since there is both what is in our power and providence, what happens must happen according to both; for if it happened according to one only, the other would not exist. Since what happens is mixed, it will turn out sometimes according to what is in our power, sometimes according to the reason of providence, and sometimes according to both. And since providence is partly general and partly particular, particular things must suffer together with universal ones. When the surrounding air is dry, our bodies are dried, though not all equally; and when the mother has not lived well and has lived luxuriously, the children born are accordingly ill-constituted in body and unstable in impulses. It is clear from what has been said that it happens that one falls into an unhappy bodily temperament either through the common condition of the surrounding air, or from the voluntary way of life of the parents, or from their being corrupted by luxury; so that temperaments are sometimes made bad from a voluntary beginning, and providence is not in every case the cause of such things. When, then, the soul, yielding to the temperament of the body, gives itself over to desires or anger, and is cast down or puffed up by the things of fortune, such as poverty or wealth, it undergoes a voluntary evil. For the soul that does not yield sets right and overcomes the ill temperament, so as to change rather than be changed, and brings the dispositions of the soul to [a good state] by good upbringing and suitable way of life. It is clear, then, from those who succeed, that those who do not succeed sin voluntarily; for it is in our power either to go along with the bad temperaments or to resist and master them. Most people, putting forward bad temperament as the cause of the passions, ascribe vice to necessity and not to choice, and therefore say that the virtues are not in our power either; but they speak absurdly.

It remains to say for what reason we were made free. We say, then, that free will comes in at once with reason, and that change and alteration are inborn in things that come into being, especially those that come to be from underlying matter; for the beginning of coming into being is change, since coming into being is from the alteration of the underlying matter. One would understand what is said by looking at all plants and animals, those on land, in the air, and in the water, for their change is continual. That free will comes in with reason is quite clear, from what was said about there being something in our power, to those who have listened with attention. But perhaps there is nothing absurd in recalling the same things now, since the sequence requires them. Of reason, one part is contemplative, the other practical: the contemplative understands how things are; the practical deliberates and determines right reason for things to be done. They call the contemplative mind and the practical reason, and the one wisdom and the other prudence. Everyone who deliberates deliberates as though the choice of things to be done were in his power, so that he may choose what has been preferred by counsel and, having chosen, act. So whoever has the ability to deliberate must necessarily also be master of actions; for if he were not master of actions, deliberation would be superfluous to him. If so, free will necessarily accompanies reason: either a being will not be rational, or being rational it will be master of actions; and being master of actions it will certainly be free. It has also been shown that things that come to be from underlying matter are changeable. From both, then, it follows that man is of necessity free and changeable: changeable because he came into being, free because he is rational.

Those who blame God because he did not make man incapable of vice, but free, fail to notice that they are blaming God for making man rational and not irrational. For one of two things was necessary: either to become irrational, or, being rational and occupied with things to be done, to be free. Of necessity, then, every rational nature is free and changeable according to its own nature. But those that come to be from underlying matter have changeability in two ways, by their matter and by their very coming into being; those that did not come to be from underlying matter are changeable in one way only, by their coming into being. Again, of these immaterial natures, those that are among things on earth and are occupied with things to be done through their association with men are more changeable than the others; but those that by the height of their nature draw near to God by relation and enjoy blessedness in contemplating him, being turned toward themselves and God alone, having wholly estranged themselves from things to be done and from matter and made themselves at home in contemplation and with God, remain unchanged: free because they are rational, but not changing, for the reasons given. And this is no wonder; for … [those whom God] separated remained unchanged. I think it has been shown at the same time by what has been said that all rational natures were made excellently in the beginning, and that if they had remained as they were created they would have been free of all vice; vice comes to them by choice. So those that remained in their original creation have blessedness. Of the bodiless natures only angels have changed, and not all of them, but some, those who inclined downward, conceived a desire for earthly things, and departed from their relation to things above and to God.

It is clear, then, from what has been shown, that because we are by nature changeable we have changeable powers of choice; but no one can blame God for our being evil because we have changeable powers. For vices are not in the powers but in the states, and the states are by choice; so we become evil by choice and are not so by nature. One might understand what is said more exactly thus. We said earlier that a power is that by which we are able to do each of the things we do. Every power of choice is a power of opposites; for one and the same power is of lying and telling the truth, and one and the same power of being temperate and licentious. But a state is no longer of opposites, for instance of licentiousness and temperance, or of lying and telling the truth; contrary states are of contrary things: temperance belongs to the state of virtue, licentiousness to that of vice. So vices do not belong to the powers but to the states and to choice. For it is not the power that prepares us to be licentious or to lie, but choice; for it was in our power to tell the truth and not to lie. Since vice, then, is not a power but a state, the one who gave the power is not the cause of our evils, but the state that comes to us from us, through us and because of us. For it was possible to acquire the contrary state by exercise and not the bad one. A power differs from a state in that all powers are natural and states acquired, and in that powers are untaught, while states come by learning and habit. If, then, the power is something natural and untaught, and the state acquired and taught, nature is not the cause of evils, but our bad upbringing and, through it, our acquiring a bad state; for every state was shown to be acquired. That the powers are by nature is clear from the fact that all have the same powers, except the maimed; that the states are not natural is clear from the fact that not all have the same states, but different people different ones. For what is by nature is the same in all.

That man is free, over what he is free, and for what reason he was made free, has been sufficiently said in what precedes. But since not everyone who intends to murder actually murders, but sometimes he murders and sometimes not, his choice being hindered and not running to its aim, and we said that providence, not fate, is the cause of this, the discussion of providence follows on that of what is in our power. This too is divided into three: first, whether there is providence; second, what it is; third, of what it is.

A Jew would not be ignorant of providence even if he were mad, knowing the wonders in Egypt and having heard of those in the wilderness, in which providence appeared to men more clearly than visible things; and having understood many works of providence among the prophets and in Babylon, which admit no doubt at all. All these things teach Christians too that providence exists, but above all the most divine work of providence, the most incredible for its exceeding love for man, God's taking a body for our sake. But since the argument is not addressed to these alone but also to the Greeks, come, let us show that providence exists from other things which they believe. That there is providence one could show by the same arguments by which we showed that there is a God. The continuance of all things, especially of those in generation and corruption; the position and order of beings, always kept in the same way; the courses of the stars, never varying at all; the cycle of the year, the return of the seasons, and the yearly equality of nights and days, each growing and diminishing in turn by neither less nor greater measure: how could these have continued to be carried through alike if no one exercised providence? Moreover the punishment that follows sins, or rather the very disclosure of sins, when, though there is no one able to convict, they are brought to light by certain circumstances, shows that there is providence. The writings of the Hebrews and the literature of the Greeks are full of such stories. Of this kind is what Scripture tells of Susanna's suffering, and among the Greeks the story of Ibycus the poet. When he was being murdered by some men and had no ally or witness of the plot, he saw cranes and said, “You cranes, avenge my murder.” The city was searching for the murderers and could not find them; then, when a play was being performed and the people were seated, cranes flew over; and the murderers, seeing them, laughed and said, “Look, the avengers of Ibycus.” One of those sitting near heard and reported it to the magistrates, and the men were arrested and confessed the murder. A great many other such things are recorded among the ancients, and if anyone wished to collect them he would extend the discussion to infinite length. If the same kind of exposure is not brought on all sinners, but some seem to escape, let no one for this reason deny providence. For it does not take care of men in one way only, but in many and various ways.

Not least does the construction and proportion of the bodies in generation and corruption, always kept alike, show that there is providence. For in every part of the body the forethought of providence appears, which the diligent can gather from various writings. The variety of colours in animals, always keeping the same beauty, cries out that there is providence. And what is commonly agreed among all men, that one should pray and serve the divine with offerings and sacred precincts, is evidence of providence; for if the universe were without providence, how, or to whom, would anyone pray? The zeal for doing good, naturally cultivated by those not perverted, shows providence too; for expecting the reward from it, we choose to do good even to those who cannot repay. If providence is abolished, injustice is permitted to those able to do wrong, and almsgiving and the fear of God are abolished, and with them virtue and piety. For if God exercises no providence, he neither punishes, nor gives prizes to those who do well, nor keeps harm from the wronged. Who then would still worship a God who contributes nothing to us in anything? Prophecy too and all foreknowledge are abolished. But these things do not agree with what happens almost every day. There are many appearances of the divine in times of need; much help is given to the sick through dreams; many foreknowledges have been brought forth in each generation; and many who have committed murder or done something lawless are terrified by night and by day. Besides, God is good; being good, he is beneficent; and if beneficent, provident.

Why need we speak of the works of creation, its proportion, harmony, position, order, and the use each part provides to the whole; how it could not be well otherwise than it is now; and how it neither admits addition nor can any of the things that are be lacking, but all are perfect and good, made wisely and providently? But let us put off the account of these to the discussion of creation, so as not to suffer what many who have written about providence have suffered. They praise creation instead of providence; creation leads us to the discussion of providence, but differs greatly from it. Providence and creation are not the same. It belongs to creation to make well the things that come to be, to providence to take good care of the things that have come to be; and these do not always exist together, as can be seen from the men of each art and method. Some of them go no further than making well and take no further thought, such as builders, painters and sculptors; others only take care and provide, such as cowherds and shepherds. So in the discussion of creation we would properly show that the things made were made well, and in the discussion of providence that after their making they also receive due care. How, then, is man always born of man and ox of ox, and each thing growing from its own seed and not from another, if providence is absent? If someone says that the matter proceeds in sequence from its original creation, he would be saying that providence always exists together with creation; for that what was created proceeds in sequence shows that providence was laid down together with creation. For the conduct of things after creation belongs to providence; and so he would be saying nothing else than that the same one is both maker and provider of beings.

Who, seeing the forms of men differing among so many tens of thousands and nowhere coinciding in everything, would not admire the work, and, reckoning the cause, find that the difference of form in individuals has been varied for the sake of providence? Consider: if all kept the same character without variation, how great a confusion of affairs there would be! How great an ignorance and darkness would hold man, recognizing neither his own nor distinguishing the stranger, the enemy or the wicked from the friend and the good! Truly “all things would be together,” as Anaxagoras says. If it were so, nothing would prevent one from having intercourse with sisters and mothers, from robbing, or from doing any other wrong openly, if only he escaped at the moment; for if seen he would not be recognized afterward. No law or polity would be established, fathers and children would not know one another, nor would anything else human hold together; for man would be blind with respect to men, sight giving him little benefit; for apart from age and size he would distinguish nothing else. Of so many goods has providence been the cause for us, varying the form of men always and everywhere and never ceasing to do so; which is also the greatest proof that providence extends to individuals, if each is recognized even down to the shape of his bodily form, his character and his voice, even if such features are not preserved exactly, the form being enough. For providence added this besides, the difference of colours, so that the weakness of human nature might be helped in many ways. I think that many animals too of the same shape in kind, such as the crow and the raven, have certain differences in appearance by which they recognize one another in pairs. Crows and ravens often fly together in flocks, but they separate in pairs, each female and each male recognizing its mate. How would they know one another unless there were in each some mark, not clear to us, but naturally easy to discern for those of the same kind? And signs, omens, voices and portents (for the argument is with Greeks), according to their own account, as they themselves say, preserving the outcomes of what they signify, surely give signs by way of providence and confirm the outcomes for those who receive the signs.

That there is providence is clear from these things and from what will be said next. Let us say what providence is. Providence, then, is the care that comes from God to the things that are. They define it also thus: providence is the will of God by which all things that are receive their suitable conduct. If providence is the will of God, it is altogether necessary that the things that come about should come about according to right reason, most excellently and most worthily of God, and as alone they could well be, so as to admit nothing better. It is necessary too that the same one be maker and provider of the things that are; for it is neither consistent nor fitting that one should make and another take care of what has been made, for such a thing is seen only in weakness. There is a clear indication of this in animals too: every creature that begets takes care of the feeding of its offspring; and man provides for all other things of life too, as far as he can; and those that do not provide fail to provide through weakness. It has been shown, then, that God is the provider, and that providence is his will.