# On the Nature of Man - Author: [Nemesius of Emesa](https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/authors/nemesius-of-emesa/) - Latin title: *De natura hominis* - Date: ca. 390-400 (approximate) - Source: C. F. Matthaei, ed., Nemesius Emesenus De natura hominis, Graece et Latine (Halle, 1802) - Translation: Claude, from the original text, unless a passage says otherwise; each passage below gives the translator - Editions and translations: J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologia Graeca 40 (Paris, 1863), cols. 503-818; M. Morani, ed., Nemesii Emeseni De natura hominis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1987) - Work page: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/ - Passages: 44 ## Matthaei, chapter 1 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/1/#p-1 - Source: Matthaei, 35-66 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius sets man on the border of the intelligible and the sensible, the bond of all creation, made neither plainly mortal nor immortal, for whom the irrational world was made, and praises his dignity. ### Greek text Τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καὶ σώματος ἄριστα κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἐνεδέχετο ἄλλως γενέσθαι καὶ συνεστάναι, πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔδοξε. τοῦ δὲ νοερὰν λέγεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἔχοντος, πότερον προξελθων ὁ νοῦς τῇ ψυχῇ, ὡς ἄλλος ἀλλη, νοεροὶν αὐτὴν ἐποίησεν, ἢ τὸ νοερὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ Φύσει κέκτηται, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ καλλιστον μέρος, ὡς ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν σώματι" τινὲς μὲν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Πλωτῖνος, ἄλλην εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἄλλον τὸν νοῦν δογμα-. τίσαντες, ἐκ τριῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον συνεσταναι βούλονται, σώματος» καὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ νοῦ. οἷς ἠκολούθησε καὶ ᾽᾿ΑἈπολινάριος ὁ τῆς Λαοδικείας γενόμενος ἐπίσκοπος, τοῦτον γὰρ πηξάμενος τὸν θεμέλιον τῆς ἰδίας δόξης καὶ τοὶ λοιπὰ προςῳκοδόμησε κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον δόγμα. τινὲς δὲ οὐ διέστειλαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν νοῦν" ἀλλὰ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς Ζγεμονικὸν εἶναι τὸ νοερὸν ἡγοῦνται. ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ τὸν μὲν δυνάμει γοῦν συγκατεσκευάσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸν δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ θύραθεν ἡμῖν ἐπειείεναι δοξάζει, οὐκ εἰς τὸ εἶαι καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συνγελοῦντα ἀλλ᾽ εἰς προκοπὴν τῆς. χῶν Φυσικῶν γνώσεως καὶ θεωρίας συμβαλλόμενον. κομιδὴ γοῦν ὀλίγους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μόνους τοὺς Φιλοσοφησαντας τὸν ἐνεργείο γοῦν ἔχειν. διαβεβαιοῦται. Πλάτων δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι πὸ συναμφότερον, Ψυχὴν καὶ σῶς μα, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν σώματι τοιῷδε δε κρωμένῃ; ἀξιοπρεπέστερον φανταζόμενος τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρωπόν, καὶ αὐτόθεν ὑμᾶς ἐπιστρέφων ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς μόννς θειότητα καὶ ἐπιμέλείὰν, ἵνα τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι πιστεύοντες τὰ τὸς ψυχῆς ὠγαθὰ μόνα διώκωμεν, τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν, καὶ μὴ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμίας ἀγαπήσωμεν, ὡς οὐκ οὔσας ἀνθρώπου, ἥ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ ζώου μὲν προηγουμένως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἑπομένως, ἐπειδὴ καὶ δον ὁ ἀνθρωπος, καὶ ἄλλως δὲ κυριωτέρα τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι καθωμολόγηται. ὑπὸ ταύτης γὰρ» ὡς ὄργανον, κινεῖν. σαι τὸ σῶμα, δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ θάνατος.ς χωρισθείσης γὰρ τῆς Ψυχῆς ἀκήητον μένει τὸ σῶμα παντελῶς καὶ ἀνενέργητον, ὡς, τεχνίτου χωρισθέγτος, ἀκίνητα μένει τὰ ὄμγανα. γνώρίμον δὲ γν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ποινωνεῖ, καὶ τὸς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων μετέχει ζωῆς, καὶ τῆς τῶν λογικῶν μετείληφε νοήσεως. κονωνεῖ γῶρ τοῖς μὲν ἀψύχοις κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κρᾶσιν" τοῖς δὲ Φυτοῖς κατά τὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν. θρεπτικὴν καὶ σπερματικὴν δύναμιν" τοῖς δὲ ἀλόγοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν, ἐξ, ἐπιμέτρον δὲ κατά τε τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν κόησιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν αἰσθητιοὴν καὶ ἀναπνευστικὴν δύναμιν". ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντα κοινὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ὠλόγοις ἐστὶν. εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσι πάντα. συνάπτεται δὲ διὰ τοῦ λογικοῦ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ γοεραῖς φύσεσι, λογιζόμενος καὶ νοῶν καὶ κρύων ἕκαστα» καὶ τὰς ὠρετὰς μεταδιώκων, καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸν κολοφῶνα τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἀσπαζόμενος. δι᾽ ὃ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν. μεθορίοις ἐστὶ γοητὴς καὶ αἰσθητὴς οὐσίας. συναπτόμενος κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰς σωματικῶς δυνώμεις τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις, κατὰ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν «ταῖς ἀσωμώτοις οὐσίαις.» ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον. ὁ γὰρ δημιουργὸς ἐκ τοῦ καθ οἱ ὀλίγον ἔοικεν ἐπισυνώπτειν ἀλλήλαις τὰς διαφόρους φύσεις, ὥςτε μίαν εἶναι καὶ συγγενὴ τὴν πᾶσαν κτίσιν, - ἐ οὗ μώλιστα δείκνυται εἷς ὧν αὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δημιουργός. αὐ γὰρ μόνον ἥνωσε τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ὠτόμων, ἐλὰ καὶ ἕκαστα πρὸς ἄλληλα συνήρμιοσεν οἰκείως. ὥσπερ γὼρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὦψων ἡ ἥνωσε. τὰ ἀναίσθητα τοῖς αἰσθητινκοῖς, ὀστοῦν καὶ πιμελὴν καὶ τρίχας καὶ τὸ ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀναίσθητα «τοῖς αἰσθητοιοῖς νεύροις ( καὶ σαρξὶ καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις)» καὶ ἐποίησεν ἐξ εἰναισθήτων καὶ αἰσθητικῶν συγκείμενον τὸ ) ζῶον; καὶ οὐ Μόνον συγκείμενον» ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν ὃν ὠπέδειξεν᾽" οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἄλλης πατὶ εἶδος κτίσεως στεποίηκε συνάπτων ἀλλήλοις τῇ εκατ᾽ ὀλίγον οἰκείοτητι καὶ “παραλλαγῆ. τὺς Φύπεῶς, ὡς μὴ κωρὰ στολὺ διεστάναι τὰ "πάντη ἄψυχα τῶν ἐχόντων Φυτῶν πὴν θρεπτινὴν δύναμιν, μηδ᾽ αὖ ταῦτα τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ αἰσθητικμῶν ζθων, μήτε μὴν τὰ ἄλογα πῶν “λογικῶν ἀπηλλοτριῶσθαι πάντῃ καὶ ἀσύμβατα καὶ ἄνευ δεσμοῦ ρος εἶναι 'συυφυοῦς καὶ, Φυσικοῦ. διαλλάττει μὲν γὰρ καὶ λίθος λίθου δυνάμει τινὶ, ἀλλ). καὶ καγνῆτις λίθες ἐξεληλυθέναι δοκεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ᾿λίθων φύσιν τε καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τῷ προφανῶς ἕλκειν πρὸς ἑαντὴν καὶ κατέχειν τὸν σδηρονν ὥςπερ, τροφὴν αὐτὸν ποιήσασθαι βουλομένη, καὶ μὴ Μόνον ἐφ' ἑνὸς σιδήρου τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλον δι᾽ ἄλλου κατέχειν τῷ μοταδιδόναι τοῖς ἐχομένοις πῶσι τῆς δυναμως ἑαυτῆς. κατέχει γοῦν καὶ ὁ σίδηρος σίδηρον, ὃ ὅταν ὑπὸ τῆς μαγνήτιδος ε ἔχηται. εἶτα πάλιν ἑξῆς πὸ τῶν φυτῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ζῶα Μετιών, οὐκ ὠὡθρόως ἐπὶ τὴν μεταβατποὴν καὶ οἰσθητοοῖν ὥρμησε φύσιν" ολλ᾽ ἐκ τοὺ κατ ᾿ ὀλέγον ἐπὶ ταύτὴν ἐμμελῶς προῦλθε. τας γῶρ πίνας καὶ τοὺς οἶκα). ύφας ὥςπερ αἰσθητροιοὶ δένδρα κατεσκεύασεν. ἐῤῥίζωσε μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐν τὴ 'θαλώσσῃ δέον Φυτῶν, καὶ ὠςπερ. -ἔνλα τὼ ὄστρακα περιόθηκε, καὶ ἔστησεν ὥςπερ Φυτα. αἰσθησν δὲ αὐταῖς ἐνέθηκε τὸν ἀπτικὴν." τὴν κορνὴν πάντων ζώων τόσθησιν; ὡς κοπιωνεῖν τοῖς μὲν- Φυτοῖς κατὰ τὰ ἡ ὑῥιζῶσθθαι καὶ ἑσταῖναι, τὸϊς δὲ ζώοις κατα τὴν ἀφὴν (καὶ φ' αἰσθάγεσθαι), τῶ γοῦν ἐξέγην ἀβαξοι προςπεφυκότα ταῖς πέτραις καὶ συστἔλλεσθαι καὶ ονοίγεοθαι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκτείγεσθαι (καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι }. ὅταν προςιόντος αἰσθηταί τινος, ᾿Αριστοτέλης ἱστόρησε, Διὸ το τοιαῦτα πάντα ζωόφυτα καλεῖν ἔθος ἔχουσιν οἱ παλαοὶ τῶν σοφῶν, πάλιν δὲ ταῖς πίνναις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις συνῆψε τὴν τῶν μεταβατιιῶν μὲν ζώων γένεσιν, μακρὰν δὲ προελθεῖν μὴ δυναμένων, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτόθεν αὐτοῦ ποὺ κινουμένων. τοιαῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ πλεῖστα οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀθρόως κατεσκεύασεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις Φυσικάς τινας συνέσεις καὶ μηχανὰς καὶ πανουργίας πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἐνέθηκεν" ὡς ἐγγὺς λογικῶν αὐτὰ ᾧαίνεσθαι,) καὶ οὕτω τὸ: ᾿ἀληθῶς λογωκὸν ζῶον τὸν ἄνθρωπον προεβάλετο, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Φωνῆς (τὰ μέρος) ὑγτῶν εὑρήσεις » ἐξ ἁπλῆς καὶ μονοειδοὺς τῆς ἵππων καὶ βοῶν ἐκφωνήσεως κατὰ μέρος εἰς ποικίλην καὶ διάφορον παραχθεῖσαν τὴν τῶν κοράκων καὶ {ιμηλῶν ὀρνέων Φωνὴν, ἕως εἰς τὴν ἔναρθρον καὶ τελείαν τὴν ἀνθρώπου κατέληξε, σάλιν τε τὴν ἔναρθρὸν διάλεκτον ἐξὴψ ψνε τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἐξάγγελον ποιήσας αὐτὴν τῶν κατὰ νοῦν κνημάτων. καὶ οὕτω πᾶσι “πάντα μουσικῶς συνήρμοσε καὶ συνέδησε καὶ εἰς ἕν συνήγαγε τὰ τὸ νοητὰ καὶ τὼ ὁρωτὰ διὰ μέσου τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως. Διὸ καὶ παλῶς ὁ Μωύσῆς, τὴν δημιουργίαν ἐκτιθέμιενος, τελευταῖον ἔφησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεν γενῆσθαι» οὐ μόνον» ὅτι πάντων δέ αὐτὸν γενομένων, ἀκόλουθὸν ἢ ἣν» πρῶτον: τα πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτοῦ ὃ παρασκευασθῆναιγ καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν τὸν χρησόμενον παρακχ θῆναι » ἀλλ᾽» ὅτι νοητῆς γενομένης οὐσίας καὶ πάλιν ὁ ὁρατῆς.. ἔδει γενέσθαι τινα καὶ σύνδεσμον ἐμφοτέρων, ἵνα ἕν ἡ τὸ πᾶν καὶ συμπαθὲς ἑαυτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὶ ἀλλότριον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ. ἐγένετο οὖν τὸ συν»δέον ἀμφοτέρας τὰς Φύσεις ζῶον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τὰ κ μὲν οὖν τὴς σοφίας, τοῦ δημιουργοῦ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, τοιαῦτα. ἐν μεθορίοις οὖν τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ λογικῆς Φύσεως ὁ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ταχ,θεὶς» ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐῥέψη καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πλέον ἀγαπήσῃ τὸν τῶν ἀλόγων ἀσπάζεται βιον καὶ τούτοις συναν ριθιηθήσεται καὶ χοϊκὸς ἡληθύσεται κατὰ Παῦλον καὶ ἀκούσεται, “ΣΧ εἶ καὶ εἰς γὴν ἀπελεύση, καὶν παρασυνεβλίθη τοῖς κτάνεσι τοῖς ἀνοήτοις καὶ ὡμοιώθη αὐτοῖς" ἐὰν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ λο- “κὸν χωρήσῃ » καταφρονήσας τῶν σωματικῶν πασῶν ἡδονῶν, τὴν θείαν τε καὶ θεοφιλεστάτην ζωὴν μετέρχεται καὶ τὴν ὡς ἀνθρώπου προηγσυμένως ᾿ καὶ ἔσται, οἷος ὁ ἐπουράνιος, κατὰ τὸ εἰρχμένον. οἷος ὃ χοϊκὸς, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ χρικοὶ, καὶ οἷος ὃ ἐπουράνιος. τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ἐπουράνιοι. τῆς δὲ λογικῆς φύσεως τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι ᾧεύγειν μὲν καὶ ἀποστρέφεσθαὶ τὰ κακὰν μετιέναι δὲ καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰ καλά. Τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ “μέν ἐ ἐστι κατὰ κοινωνίαν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. ἐχόντων καὶ τούτων ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ἀναφορὰν, οἷον ψυχῆς προςχρωμένης σώματι; ὡς αἱ ὠρεταί". τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν μένης. μὴ προςδεομένης σώματος, ὡς ἡ εὐσέβεια καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄντων θεωρία. ὅσοι τοίνυν τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον. ὡς ἀνθρώπου, ᾧᾳν προαιροῦνται, καὶ μὴ ὡς ζώου μόνου, τὰς ἀρετὰς μετέρχονται καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν. τίνα δέ ἐστι τὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τίνα τὰ τῆς εὐσεβείας, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς διακριθήσεται, ὅταν τὸν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀποδῶ» μεν λόγον. οὐδέπω γὰρ ἐγνωσμένου τίποτε ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμόλουθον περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς διαλαμβάνειν. ἑβραῖοι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀρχὴς οὔτε ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μεθοριίοις ἑ ἑκατέρας Φύσεως, ἵνα, ἂν μὲν τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἀκολουθήση πάθεσι» περιτέση καὶ ταῖς σωματικαῖς μεταβολαῖς" ἂν δὲ τὰ τὴς ψυχῆς προτιμήσῃ καλὰ, τῆς ὠθανασίας ἀξιωθῆ. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ὠρχῆς αὐτὸν θνητὸν ἐπούχεεν ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτόντα θανάτῳ κατεδίκασε " τοῦ γὰρ θνητοῦ θνητότητα οὐδεὶς καταδικάει" εἰ δ᾽ αὖ πάμν ἀθάνωτον, οὐδ᾽ ὧν τροφῆς αὐτὸν ἐνδεᾶ κατεσκεύασεν" οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀθανάτων τροφῆς σωματικῆς δεῖται" οὐδ᾽ ὧν οὕτω ῥωδίως μετενόησε, καὶ τὸν γενόμενον ὀθαάνατον θγητὸν εὐθέως ἐποίησεν" οὐδὲ γῶὼρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὡμαρτησάντων οὐγγέλων τοῦτο Φαίνεται πεποιηκὼς ὠλλαὰ κατὸ τὴν ἐξ οἰρχῆς φύσιν ὠθανατοι διέμειναν», λλην τῶν ἡμαρτημένων οἰπεκδεχόμενοι δύτην, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν θώνατον. βῶτιον οὖν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον νοεῖν τὸ προκείμενον. ἢ ὅτι θνητὸς μὲν κατεσκεύασθη » δυνάμενος δὲ, ἐκ προκοπῆς τελειούμενος, ὐθανατος γενέσθαι,. τουτέστι, δυνάμει οὐθοίνατος. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ συνέφερεν αὐτῷ πρὸ τῆς τελειώσεως γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν ἑαυτοῦ, ἀπηγόρευσεν αὐτῷ μὴ. γεύσασθαι τοῦ ξύλου τῆς γνώσεως. ἦσαν γὰρ, μᾶλλον δέ εἶσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν δυνάμεις ἐν τοῖς Φυτοῖς μέγισται" τότε δὲ, εἰς ἐν ἰρχὴ τῆς κοσμοποιΐας. ἀκραιφνεῖς οὖσαι, ἰσχυροτοίτην εἶχον τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἣν οὖν καὶ ὠπόγεύσις τινος καρποῦ, γνῶσιν ἐμποιοῦσα τῆς οἰκείας Φύσεως. οὐκ γἡβούλετο δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς πρὸ τῆς τελειώσεως γγῶναι τὴν οἰκείαν (ύσιν... ἵνα μὴν γνοὺς ἑαντὸν ἐνδεᾶ πολλῶν ὄντα, τὴς σωματικῆς ἔπιμεληθὴ χρείας, καταλιπὼν τὴν τῆς ψυχὺς πρόνοιαν. καὶ διοὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκώλυσεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβεῖν τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γνώσεως. “παρακούσας δὲ καὶ γνοις ἑαυτὸν, τῆς μὲν τελειώσεως ἐξέπεσε, τὰς δὲ σωματικῆς χρείας ἐγένετο. σκέπασμα γοῦν εὐθέως ἐπεζήτει, (ησὶ γορ ὁ Μωύσης, ὅτι γυωνὸς ὧν ἔγνω. πρότερον δὲ ἐν ἐκστάσει αὐτὸν ἐποίησε καὶ ἐν ἀγνωσίῳ ἑαυτοῦ. ἐκπεσὼν οὖν τὴς τελειώσεως, ἐξέπεσεν ὁμοίως καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας, ἣν ὕστερον ἀναλήψεται χοριτι τοῦ ποιήσανε τὸς αὐτόν, μεταὶ δὲ τὴν ἔκπτωσιν καὶ καὶ τῶν κρεῶν ὠπόλαυ» σι: αὐτῷ συνε χωρήθη, πρότερον μὲν γορ τοῖς οἰπὸ τῆς ἧς μένοις ὀνοκευσεξὴ αὐτὸν ἀρκεῖσ' ΕΝ ταῦτα γορ Ἢ χν ἐν τῷ παρῶδείσῳ" πεγνωσμένης. δὲ τῆς τελειώσεως, τὴ συγκαταβάσει λοιπὸν συνεχωρθη τὰ πῆς ἀπολαύσεως. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ᾿ἄνθρωπος, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων συνέστηκεν, αναγκὴ τούτοις. τοῖς πάθεσι περιπέττειν αὐτὸν, οἷς καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, τομὴ καὶ μεταβολὴ καὶ ῥεύσει, ἀπέρ ἐστι μόνου τοῦ σώματος. μεταβολὴ μὲνν τῇ κατὰ ποιότητα" ῥεύσει δὲν τῇ κατὰ κένωσιν. κενοῦται γάρ, ἀεὶ τὸ ζῶον διά τὸ τῶν τ προδήλων πόρων καὶ " τῶν ἀδήλων, περὶ ὧν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ν ἡ τοῖς κενουμένοις ἀντειςφέρεσθαι τὰ ἴσα, ἢ διαλύεσθαι τὸ ζῶον ἐνδείῳ τῶν ἐπειςιόντων, ξηρῶν δὲ ὄντων καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ πνεύματος τῶν κενουμένων ». ἀναγκη καὶ ξηρᾶς καὶ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς δεῖσθαι τὸ ζῶον καὶ πνεύματος. ἐστι δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ τροφὴ καὶ τὸ ποτὸν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων, εξ ὧν καὶ συνέστημεν. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῷ μὲν οἰκείῳ καὶ ὁμοίῳ τρέφεται" τῷ δὲ ἐναντίῳ θεραπεύοται. -« ΓΙ τῶν δὲ στοιχείων τὰ μὲν προςεχῶς τε ἄμα, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ βε : μέσου τινῶν προς φερόμεθα, ὡς ὑδωρ ποτὲ μὲν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ δια μέσου τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τοῦ ἐλαίου καὶ πάντων τῶν καλουμένων ὑγρῶν καρπῶν. οὐδὲν γὰρ δτερόν ἐστιν αἶνος, ἢ ὕδωρ ὑπ᾽ ἀμπέλου πεποιωμένον᾽ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πυρὸς μετ ἄνομεν, ποτὲ μὲν προζεχῶς ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ θαλπόμενοι, στοτὲ δὲ δια μέσου ὧν ἐσθίομεν ἢ πίνομεν. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ ἡ πλείων ἢ ἐλώττων μοῖρα τοῦ πυρὸς ἐγκατέσπαρται. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπὸν καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος" προςεχῶς μὲν ἀναπνέοντες καὶ περριεχυμένεν ἡμῖν ἔχοντες, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἕλκον: τες διὰ μέσου δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ὧν προςφερόμεθα.᾿ τὴν δὲ γὴν προτεχῶς μὲν ἡμεῖς οὐδαμῶς διὰ μέσου δέ τινων. Ὑἢ μὲν γὰρ σῖτος γίνεται" σῖτον δὲ ἑμεῖς ἐσθίομεν. κόρυδοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ περιστεραὶ πολλάκις καὶ πέρδικες τὴν Ὑὴν σιπ τοῦνται' ἀνθρωπος δὲ διὰ μέσου τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ τῶν ἰκπροδρύων καὶ τῶν σαρκῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ μόνον δι᾿ εὐπρέθημεν, τῆς ἀναπληρούσης ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅπερ ἡ Φύσις τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδωρήσατο. διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τροφῆς καὶ ἐσθῆτος διόμεθα" οἰκήσεως δὲ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν, δι᾽ ἃ καὶ τροφῆς. καὶ ἐσθῆτος, ἐδεύθημεν, οὐχ, ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὰς τῶν θηρίων ἀποφυγαάς" διὰ δὲ τὰς δυςκρασίας τῶν ποιοτήτων καὶ τὴν λύσιν τὴς συνεχείας τοῦ σώματος ἰατρῶν καὶ εραπείας ἐν χρείᾳ κατέστημεν᾽ τῆς δὲ μεταβολὴς κατὰ στοιότητα γινομένης, ἀνάγκη διὰ τῆς ἀντικειμένης ποιότητος εἰς τὸ σύμμετρον ἀγαγεῖν τὴν κατάστασιν τοῦ σώματος. οὐ γῶὼρ» ὡς οἴονταί τινες, τὸ θερμανθὲν σῶμα καταψύξαε ἡ φτρόκειται τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ εὔκρατον μεταστῆσαι. οἱ γὰρ καταψύξειαν, εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν περιίσταται νόσον ἡ τῷ. διώθεσις. χρείας τούυν ἀνθρώπῳ τροφῆς μὲν καὶ ποτοῦ, διὼ τὰς κενώσεις καὶ διαφορήσεις" ἐσθῆτος δὲ, διὸ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν ἐκ Φύσεως ἰσχυρὰν περιβολήν" οἴκου δὲ, ἢ διά τε τὰς δυςκρασίας τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ δμὲ τὰ θηρίκ" θεραπείας δὲ, διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν ποιοτήτων καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν ἐνδοθεῖσαν τῷ σώματι, εἰ γὰρ μὴ προςὴν ἡμῖν αἰσθησις, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἡλγοῦμεν, οὔτ᾽ ἂν θεραπείας ἐδεήθημεν μὴ ὶ ἀλιγοῦντες, καὶ διεφθάρημεν ἃ ἂν, ἐν ἀγνωσίᾳ, τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἰώμενοι. διὰ δὲ τὸς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων χρείας ἀλλήλων δεόμεθα, διὰ δὲ τὸ δεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων» εἰς ταὐτὸ πολλοὶ συνελιθόντες κοινωνοῦμεν ἀλλύλοις κατὰ τὰς τοῦ βίου χρείας ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν., ἥντινα ὀύνοδον καὶ συνοικίαν πόλιν ὠνομάσαμεν, ἕνα ἐγγύθεν καὶ μὴ πόῤῥωθεν τὰς πὰρ ἀλλήλων ὠφελείας καρπώμεθα. Φύσει γὰρ συναγελαστικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῶον γέγονεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. εἷς γῶὼρ οὐδεὶς αὐτάρκης ἑχυτῷ πρὸς ἅπαντα. δῆλον οὖν, ὡς αἱ πόλεις διὰ τὰ συναλλάγματα καὶ τὰ μαθήματα συνέστησαν. δύο δὲ τούτων πρεσβείων ὁ ἀν» θρωπος ἑξαιρέτων ἔτυχρ. καὶ γὰρ μόνος οὗτος συγγνώμης τυγχάνει μετανοῶν, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τούτου μόνου θνητὸν ὃν ἀπαθανατίεται, καὶ τοῦ μὲν σωματικοῦ. δι τὴν ψυχὴ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχριοῦ, διὰ τὸ σῶμα. μόνος γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν λογρκῶν ἐξαίρετον ἔσχε τὸ συγγνώμης. ἐν τῷ μετανοεῖν ἀξιοῦσθαι, οὔτε γὰρ δαίμονες, οὔτε ἄγγελοι μετανοήσαντες συγγνώμης ὠξιοῦνται. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα καὶ δύιαιος καὶ ἐλεήμων ὁ Θεὸς δείκυυταί τε καὶ λέγεται. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀγγέλοις» μηδὲν ἔχουσιν ἐπαναάγκασμοι περιέλκον εἰς ἄμαρτίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλευθέροις. οὖσιν ἐκ Φύσεως τῶν σωματικῶν πὰ θῶν τε καὶ χρειῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, εἰκότως οὐδεμία δίδοται σνγ»" Ὑνωμὴ μετανοοῦσιν᾽ ὁ ὃ ἀνθρωπος, οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ λογικὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶον. αἱ δὲ χρείχι τοῦ ζώου καὶ τὰ πάθη πολλάκις περιέλκουσι τὼ λογισμόν. ὅταν οὖν ἀνανήψας ἀποφύγη μὲν ταῦτα, χωρήσῃ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἐλέου δικαίου τυγχάνει, τῆς συγγνώμης. καὶ ὠςπερ ἢ Ἰδιόν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τὸ γε) «στικὸν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόνῳ τούτῳ πρόςεστι καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί" οὕτως ἐν ποῖς κατὰ χάριν ἥδιον ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πᾶσαν τὴν λογικὴν κτίτιν, τὸ διὸ τὸς μετανοίας ἀποδύεσθαι τῶν προημαρτημένων τὰς αἰτίχς, καὶ γὰρ μόνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο δεδώρηται καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεὶ παρὸ τὸν καὶρὸν τῆς ἐγκοσμίου ζωῆς" μετὰ δὲ τὸν θάνατον οὐκέτι, οὕτω δέ τινες καὶ τοὺς ἀγγέλους βούλονται μηκέτι μετὰ τὴν ἔκπτωσιν τυγχάνειν τῆς ἐκ μετανοίας συγγνωμὴς " θάνατος γὰρ τούτων ἡ ἔκπτωσις" πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐκπτώσεως, καθ' ὁμοιότητα τὴς ζωῆς τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦσθαι συγγνώμης " ὅπερ μὴ ποιήσαντες, ἀσύγγνωστον καὶ διαιωνέφουσαν ε ἔχουσι τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς τιμωρίας τὴν προζήκουσαν δίκην. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὡς οἱ [ τὴν μετάνοιαν οἱ δεχό-μενοι τὴν ἐξαίρετον δωρεὰν καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀνθρώπου περιγράφουσιν. ἴδιον δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξαίρετον καὶ τὸ μόνον τῶν αἵ ἄλλων. ζῴων τὸ τούτου σῶμα μετὰ θάνατον ἀνίστεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἀθανωσίαν χωρεῖν" τυγχάνει δὲ τούτου, διὼ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασίαν, ὥςπερ ἐκείνου, δια τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀσθένειαν τε καὶ πολυπάθειαν. ἴδια δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν τὲ καὶ ἐπιστημῶν μαθήματα, καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας ταύτας ἐνέργειαι. δι᾽ ὃ καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁρίζον ται, ζῶον «λογικὸν, θνητὸν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν". ζῶον͵ μὲν» ὅτι καὶ ὀ ἀνθρωπὸς οὐσία ἐστὶν ἔμψυχος» αἰσθης. τικής οὗτος γὰρ ὅρος ζώου. λογικὸν δὲν ἃ ἵνα χωρισθῇ τῶν ἀλόγων" καὶ θυητὸν, ἥα χωρισθὴ τῶν ἀθανάτων λογικῶν. τὸ δὲν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν, ὅτι διὰ μαθύήσεως «ροφγίνοντιαι ἡμῖν αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἔχουσι μὲν δύναμιν δεκτικὴν καὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐνέρτ᾽ ἡείαν κτωμένοις ἐκ τῶν μαθημάτων, λέγουσι δὲ τοῦτο τῷ τούτου τὸν δρον᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ καὶ νύμφας καὶ ἀλλά τινα γἔνη δαιμόνων τινὲς εἰώγουσι, “τολυχρόνια μὲν» οὐ μὴν ἀθάνχτα, ἕα καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων διαστείλωσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, πρεςέθηκαν τὸ, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμος δεκτικόν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκείνων μανθάνει., ἀλλὰ Φύσει οἶδεν. ἃ οἶδεν. Ἑβραίων δὲ δόγμα, τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγενῆσθαι" προςεχῶς μὲν δὲ αὐτὸν. οἷον γωτοίόρα καὶ βόας τοὺς πρὸς γεωργίαν" χόρτον δὲ, διὰ ταῦτα. τῶν γὰρ γενομένων τοὶ μὲν δὲ ἑαυτὰ γέγονε» τὰ δὲ δὲ ἄλλα. δὲ ἑαυτὰ μὲν» «τοὶ λογικὰ πάντα" δι ἕτερα δὲ, τά τε ἄλογα καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα δ ἀλλα γέγονε, διὰ ποῖα γέγονε» σκοπήσωμεν. ἀρ’ ὧν δὲ ἀγγέλους; ἄλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν τις εὖ Φρονῶν εἴποι μὰ ἀγγέλους αὐτὰ γεγενῆσθαι. τὰ γὰρ δὲ ἄλλα γενόμενα, πρὸς σύστασιν ἐκείνων καὶ διαμονὴν καὶ ἄνεσιν γέγονεν. ἢ γὰρ τῆς διαδοχῆς τοῦ γένους ἕνεκεν, ἢ τροῷῆς, ἢ σκέπης, ἢ θεραπείας, ἢ διωγωγὴς αὶ ἀναπαύσεως. ἄγγελος δὰ τούτων οὐδενὸς δεῖται. οὔτε γὰρ διαδοχὴν ἔ ἔχει γένους, οὔτε τροφῆς ἐνδεής ἐστὶ σωματικῆς, οὔτε σκέπης. οὔτε τῶν ἀλλων" εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄγγελος, δῆλον, ὡς οὐδὲ ἄλλη τις Φύσις ὑπεραναβεβηκυῖε τὸν ἄγγελον. - ὅσῳ γάρ ὑπέρκειται» τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτὴ καὶ τὸ ἀνενδεὲς “τρόςεστι. ὀπητέον οὖν φύσιν, "λογοκὴν ἢ μὲν, ἐνδεῶ δὲ τῶν τ προειρημένων, τίς οὖν ἑτέρα τοιαύτη Φανείη παραλυπόντων ἡμῶν τὸν᾿ ἄνθρωπον; συκοῦν συνάγεται, διοὸὶ τοῦτον τά τε ἄλογα καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα γεγενῆσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν δὲ αὐτὸν, εἰς ἐδείχθη. γέγονε, διὼ τοῦτο καὶ ἄρχων αὐτῶν. κατέστη. ἄρχοντος δὲ᾽ εἰ ἐργον, πρὸς μέτρον χρείὰς τοῖς ἀρχομένοις κεχρῆσθαι, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ῥάέθεαν ἀκολάστως ἀρβρίν, μηδὲ φορτικῶς καὶ ὅσοι τοῖς ἀλόγοις οὐκ εὖ κέχρηνται. οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσιν ἂρ- Χοντος ἔργον, οὐδὲ δικαίου, κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον, δίκαιος οἰκτείρει ψυχὰς κτηνῶν αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ᾽ ἰ ἰσως ἐρεῖ τιν ὡς οὐδὲν δ ἀλλο, ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστον δὲ ἑαυτὸ γέγονεν, οὐκοῦν, χωρίσαντες πρῶτον τὰ ἔμψυχα ὠπὸ τῶν ἀψύχων; ἴδωμεν, εἰ δύναται τὰ ἄψυχα δι ἑαυτὰ γεγενῆσθαι. εἰ [] ταῦτα δὲ ἑαυτὰ, πῶς ἡ πόθεν τραφήσεται τὸ ζῶα; ὁρῶμεν γαρ τὴν Φύσιν ἐπιχορηγοῦσαν τοῖς ζωοις τροφὰς ἐκ τὴς γῆς καρπῶν τε καὶ ἱ φυτῶν, πλὴν ἐλαχίστων τῶν σαρκοφαγων. καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὼ σαρκοφάγα τροφὴν ποιεῖται τῶν ζώων τὸ τὴν Ὑν νεμόμενα» ὡς λύκοι μὲν καὶ λέοντες ἃ ἄρνας καὶ αἶγας καὶ σύας καὶ ἐλάφους" ἀετοὶ δὲ πέρδριας καὶ Φάσσας καὶ λωγωοὺς καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, ὥτνα τοὺς καρποὺς τῆς γὴς νέμεται.. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἰχθύων ἡ Φύσις, οἀλληλοζφώγος οὖσα ᾿ οὐ. μέχρι παντων διήκει σαρκοζφαγοῦσα, ἀλλὰ κατέληξεν ἐν τοῖς νεμομένοις Φυκία καὶ ἄλλα τινα ἐν τῷ ὕδατι Φυόμενα. εἰ γὰ ἦν πάντα τὰ γένη τῶν ἰχθύων σαρκοφάγα, καὶ μηδὲν ν ἐκφεῦγον τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς σίτησιν, οὐκ ὧν οὐδὲ ἐπ ᾿ ἀλῆγον ἐπήρκεσεν, οἰλλὰ διεφθαίρη, τὰ μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, τοὶ δὲ διὰ τροφῆς ἔνδειαν. ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο μὴ γένηται. τινὲς τῶν ἰχθύων κατεσκευάσθησαν σαρκῶν μὲν ἀπεχόμενοι, τὴν δὲ, ὡς ἂν τις εἴποι» θαλασσίαν βοτάνην νεμόμενοι, ἵνα ἐκ τούτῶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διωσώζγται. γίνεται γορ βορὰ, μὲν τούτων τὰ Φυκία, ἐκεῖνα δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ πάλιν ταῦτα τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς διὰ τὴν τῶν τελευταίων τροζὴν» εἰδιαλείττως ἐκ τοῦ γεώδους. τοῦ καταὶ τὴν θάλωσσαν παρεχο. καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόστασιν σώζεσθαι. ἀπέδειξεν οὺν ὁ λόγος», τὴν ! τῶν Φυτῶν γένεσιν μὴ δὲ ἑαυτὴν» ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τροφὴν καὶ σύστασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων γεγενημένην. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὰ ζῶα, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τὰ τῆς τούτων αὐξήσεως καὶ γενέσεως αἴτια διὰ ταῦτα γέγονεν. οὐκοὺν ἀστέρων κινήσεις καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ ὡραι καὶ ὄμβροι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διὼ ταῦτα γέγονεν, ἵνα τῶν τροφῶν, ὡς ἐν κύκλῳ, διηνεκῶς Χορηγουμένων ἀνελλιπὴς καὶ ἡ τῶν προςφερομένων τοὺς καρποὺς διαμείνῃ Φφώσις" εἰς εὐρίσκεσθαι, ταῦτα μὲν διὼ τοὺς καρποὺς, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διὰ τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. λοιπόν ἐστιν ἐπιδιασκέψασθαι, πὶ πότερον καὶ ἡἡὶ τῶν ἀλόγων Φύσις δὲ ἑαυτὴν γέγονεν, ἢ ἢ διὰ τὸν ἂνθρωπον. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἄτοπον, τὰ Φρονήσεως ἀμοίρα, καὶ καθ' ὁρμὴν Φυσικὴν μόνην ζῶντα, καὶ πρὸς γὴν κώτω κεκυᾧότα, καὶ τὴν δουλείαν διὰ τοῦ σχήματος ἐνδεικνύμενα, λέγειν δ ἑαυτὸ παρῆχθαι. πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἐνδεχομένων εἰς τοῦτο ῥηθῆναι. καὶ σχεδὸν ἰδίας συγγραφῆς διὰ τὸ πλῆθος δεομένων, μὴ Χωρούσης τῆς προκειμένης ὑποθέσεως τὸ μῆκος τῶν λόγων» ἐπὶ τὰ ὶ σύντομα μὲν» καίρια δὲ καταντῆσαι προζήπει., εἰ τοίνυν. ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι. τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐσσπτρισθείημεν, δξ αὐτῆς ἂν εἴημεν τῆς τῶν ᾧγταυμένων αὐσίας τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιούμενοι. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς ψυχὴ τὴν ἀλογίαν καὶ τὰ ταύτης μέρη, λέγω δὲ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν, πρὸς ὑπηρεσία» δεδομένα τῷ λογικῷ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον; τοὶ δὲ ἀρχόμενα, καὶ τὸ μὲν κελεῦον, τὰ δὲ κελευόμενα καὶ ὑπηρετούμενα ταῖς μένως τῶν δὲ ὑπηρεσίαν γενομένων, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ταὶ ἐνδεχόμενα κατεσκούασται, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐλλίπη τῇ κτίσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων γενόσθαι. οὐδὲ ταῦτα δὲ παντάπασιν ἐκπέ- Φευγα τὴν τῶν ἰνθρώπων ὁ ὄνησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δηλητηριώδη πρὸς οἰκείαν ὠφέλειαν ὃ λόγος καρποῦται, καταχρῆται γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς θεραπείαν τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων βλάβης, καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων αρῤῥωστημώτων ἰάσεως. τοιαῦταί τινές εἰσιν αἱ θηριοοιαὶ καλούμεναι κατασκευαὶ, ὃς ὃ «λόγος ἐπενόησεν, ἵνα καὶ τούτων κρατῇ δὲ αὐτῶν, καὶ ὶ ὡςπερ ὑ ὑπὸ πολεμίων κρατηθέντων ὠφελοῦτο. ἔχει δὲ μυρίας ὃ ἀνθρωπος ἀντιταθεῖς τούτων δυνάμεις, δεδομένας παραὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, εἴργειν καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ διορθοῦσθαι τὰς ἐπιβολοὶς αὐτῶν δυναμένας. ἄλλα μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαις ἀρμόδι χρείαις" ᾿κοιῆ δὲ πάντα πρὸς θεραπείαν ἀνθρώπου συντελεῖν πέφυκε, καὶ τὰ μὴ ταῖς ἄλλαις χρείαις, χρήσιμα. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν, ὡς πρὸς τὴν νῦν κατάστασιν τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς βίου λεγέσθω" ἐπεὶ, τό γε ἀρχαῖον οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐτόλμα καταβλάπτειν τὸν ἂνθρωπον" ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἣν αὐτῷ πάντα δοῦλα καὶ ὑποτεταγ μένα καὶ πειθήνια, ἕως ἐκράτει. τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν καὶ τῆς ἀλογίας τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ" μὴ κρατῶν δὲ τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν, ὠλλὰ κρατούμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἐκρατήθη καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν εὐλόγως Γ θηρίων. «συνειφῆλθε,γαρ τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ καὶ καὶ παρὰ τούτων βλάβη. “ὅτι δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀλ ηθὲς, ὅλον ἐκ τῶν τὸν ἄριστον μετελθόντων βών. κρείττους γὰρ (ἀδηρίτως) ὠῴθησαν οὗτοι τῆς τῶν θυηρίων ἐπιβουλῆς, ὡς λεόντων μὲν. ὃ Δανιὴλ, Παῦλος δὲ, τοῦ δήγματος τῆς ἐχίδνης. τίς οὖν ἀξίως θαυμάσειε τὴν εὐγένειαν τούτου τοῦ ζώου, τοῦ συνδέοντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ θνητὰ τοῖς ἀθανάτοις, καὶ τὼ λογικοὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις συνάπτοντας, τοῦ (έροντος ἐν τῇ καθ' ἑαυτὸν Φύσει τῆς πάσης κτίσεως τὴν εἰκόνα, δὲ ἃ καὶ μικρὸς κόσμος εἴρηται, τοῦ τοσαύτης ἠξιωμένου παροὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ προνοίας, δὲ ὃν πάντα καὶ τὰ νῦν καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, δὲ ὃν καὶ Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν τοῦ λήγοντος εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν διαφεύγοντοςν (δ) οὐρανῶν βασιλεύει, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν Θεοῦ γεγόνως, Χριστῷ συνδιώγει, Θεοῦ τέκνον ἐστὶ, πώσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας προκάθηται; τίς δ᾽ ἂν ἐξενπεῖν δύναιτο τα τούτου τοῦ ζώου πλεονεκτήματα; πελάγη διαβαίνει, οὐρανὸν ἐμβατεύει Τῇ θεωρίᾳ, ἀστέρων κίνησιν καὶ διαστής ματὰ καὶ μέτρα κατανοεῖ, γὴν καρποῦται καὶ θάλασσαν, θυηρίων καὶ κητῶν καταίφρονεῖ, “πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τέχνην καὶ μέθοδον κατορθοῖν ὑπερόριον διὰ τῶν γραμμάτων, οἷς βούλεται, προςομιλεῖ, μηδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐμποδιζόμενος προφητεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. “πάντων ἄρχει» σάντων κρατεῖ; πάντων ὠπολαύει, ἀγγέλοις καὶ Θεῷ διαλέγεται, τῇ κτίσει κελεύει, δαίμοσιν ἐπιτάττει, τὴν τῶν ὄντων Φύσιν ἐρευνᾷ, Θεὸν περιεργάφεται» οἶκος καὶ ναὸς γίνεται Θεοῦ" καὶ ταῦτα πάντα τῶν ἀρετῶν ὠνεῖται καὶ τὴς εὐσεβείας, ἀλλ᾽, ἵνα μὴ δόξωμέν τισιν ἀπειροκάλως ἀνθρώπου γράφειν ἐγκώμιον, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὴν φύσιν ἐκτίθεσθαι, καθα προεθέμεθα, αὐτοῦ που καταπαύσωμεν τὸν λόγον, εἰ καὶ μάλιστα, τὰ τῆς Φύσεως πλεονεκτήματα λέγοντες, τὴν (ύσιν αὐτὴν δεγγούμεθα. εἰδότες οὖν, ὅσης εὐγενείας μετεθήφαμεν» καὶ ὅτι Φυτέν ἐσμεν οὐράνιον, μὴ καταισχύνωμεν. τὴν φύσιν, μηδὲ τῶν τοσούτων δωρεῶν ἀποφανθῶμεν ἀνάξιοι, μηδὲ ἑαυτοὺς τοσαύτυς ἐξουσίας καὶ δόξης καὶ μακαριότητος ἀποστερήσωμεν, ὀλίγου καιροῦ καὶ βραχείας ἡδονῆς πάντων τῶν αἰωνίων καταπροδόντες τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν" ἀλλα διὰὴ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων κκὶ τῆς ἀποχὴς τῶν Φαύλων καὶ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ σκοποῦ, ᾧ μάλιστα, τὸ Θεῖον συνεργεῖν εἴωθεν, καὶ διὰ τῶν εὐχῶν τὴν εὐγένειαν διασώσωμεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τῶν» ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυ- «ὃς εἶναι καὶ σώματος, ὁ κοινὸς ὑποβάλλει λόγος, Φέρε διελόντες πρότερον περὶ ψυχῆς διαλάβωμεν, τὰ λίαν λεπτὰ καὶ περισκελὴ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δυςκατανόητα τῶν ᾧγτου- “ μένων παραλιπόντες. ### English translation (Claude) Many good men have held that man is excellently constructed of an intellectual soul and a body, and so well that he could not have come to be and been composed otherwise. But calling the soul “intellectual” is ambiguous: did mind come to the soul, as one thing to another, and make it intellectual, or does the soul possess the intellectual from itself and by nature, as its finest part, as the eye is in the body? Some, among them Plotinus, teach that the soul is one thing and the mind another, and hold that man is composed of three: body, soul, and mind. Apollinarius, who became bishop of Laodicea, followed them; he laid this as the foundation of his own opinion and built the rest on it according to his own doctrine. Others did not distinguish the mind from the soul, but consider the intellectual to be the ruling part of its substance. Aristotle holds that the potential mind was constructed together with man, but that the actual mind comes into us from outside, contributing not to man's being and existence but to the advance of knowledge and contemplation of natural things; indeed he affirms that very few men, only those who have pursued philosophy, have the actual mind. Plato seems to say that man is not the two together, soul and body, but a soul using such a body. He forms a more dignified notion of man and at once turns us toward the divinity and care of the soul alone, so that, believing ourselves to be the soul, we may pursue only the soul's goods, the virtues and piety, and not love the desires of the body, since they do not belong to man as man but to the living creature primarily and to man secondarily, because man too is a living creature. In any case all agree that the soul is more sovereign than the body. For the body is moved by it as an instrument, as death shows: when the soul is separated, the body remains wholly motionless and inactive, as the tools lie motionless when the craftsman has gone. It is well known that man shares something with soulless things, partakes of the life of the irrational animals, and has received the understanding of rational beings. He shares with soulless things through the body and its mixture of the four elements; with plants through these and through the nourishing and generative power; with the irrational animals in these and, besides, in movement by impulse, in appetite and anger, and in the powers of sensation and breathing; for all these are common to men and irrational animals, even if not all to all. Through reason he is joined to bodiless and intellectual natures, reasoning, understanding, judging each thing, pursuing the virtues, and embracing piety, the crown of the virtues. Therefore he stands, as it were, on the border between intelligible and sensible substance, joined by the body and the bodily powers to the irrational animals and to soulless things, and by reason to bodiless substances, as was said before. For the Creator seems to have joined the different natures to one another little by little, so that the whole creation is one and akin; and from this it is most clearly shown that the Creator of all things is one. For he not only united the existence of individual things, but fitted each to the others suitably. As in each living creature he united insensible parts with sensitive ones, bone, fat, hair and the like, which are insensible, with sensitive nerves and flesh and the like, and made the creature composed of insensible and sensitive parts, and showed it to be not only composite but one, so he did with the rest of creation, kind by kind, joining them to one another by a gradual kinship and variation of nature, so that wholly soulless things are not far removed from plants that have the nourishing power, nor these from irrational sensitive animals, nor are the irrational animals entirely estranged from the rational, without contact and without a natural bond of kinship. Stone differs from stone by some power, but the magnet seems to go beyond the nature and power of other stones in visibly drawing iron to itself and holding it, as if it wished to make it its food; and it does this not only to one piece of iron, but holds one through another, imparting its power to all that touch it; for iron holds iron when it is held by the magnet. Again, passing from plants to animals, he did not leap all at once to the nature that moves from place to place and has sensation, but advanced to it fittingly by degrees. He made the pinnae and the sea-nettles like sensitive trees: he rooted them in the sea like plants, put shells round them like wood, and set them fast like plants; but he gave them touch, the sense common to all animals, so that they share with plants in being rooted and fixed, and with animals in touch. Aristotle records that sponges, though grown fast to the rocks, contract and open and stretch out further when they perceive something approaching. Therefore the ancient wise men are accustomed to call all such things zoophytes. Next to the pinnae and the like he joined the race of animals that move from place to place but cannot go far, moving only about the spot where they are; such are most of the shellfish. Nor did he do this all at once either, but first put into the other animals certain natural intelligences, contrivances and cunning for their preservation, so that they appear close to rational beings; and so he brought forth the truly rational animal, man. In the same way you will find it with the voice: from the simple and uniform cry of horses and oxen it was led on by degrees to the varied and diverse voice of crows and of mimicking birds, until it ended in the articulate and perfect voice of man. And he joined articulate speech to thought and reasoning, making it the messenger of the movements of the mind. So he fitted all things to all harmoniously, bound them together, and brought into one the intelligible and the visible through the coming into being of man. Therefore Moses rightly, in setting out the creation, said that man came to be last. This was not only because, all things being made for him, it was fitting first to prepare what he would use and then to bring in the one who would use it, but because, when intelligible substance had come into being, and again visible substance, there had to be some bond of both, so that the whole might be one, in sympathy with itself and not estranged from itself. So the creature that binds both natures came into being: man. Such, to speak briefly, are the marks of the Creator's wisdom. Placed, then, on the border of irrational and rational nature, man, if he inclines to the body and loves the things of the body more, embraces the life of the irrational creatures and will be numbered with them; he will be called earthy, as Paul says, and will hear, “You are earth, and to earth you will depart,” and “He was compared to the senseless cattle and became like them.” But if he advances to reason, despising all bodily pleasures, he follows the divine life most dear to God, the life proper to man as man, and will be like the heavenly one, as it is said: “As is the earthy, so are those who are earthy; and as is the heavenly, so are those who are heavenly.” The chief thing of rational nature is to flee and turn away from evil things and to pursue and choose good ones. Of goods, some belong to soul and body in common, though these too refer to the soul, as when the soul makes use of the body, such as the virtues; others belong to the soul by itself, without need of the body, such as piety and the contemplation of beings. Whoever, therefore, chooses to live the life of man as man, and not merely as an animal, pursues the virtues and piety. What belongs to the virtues and what to piety will be distinguished in what follows, when we have given our account of soul and body; for while it is not yet known what the soul is in its substance, it is not consistent to treat its activities. The Hebrews say that from the beginning man was made neither plainly mortal nor immortal, but on the border of each nature, so that if he followed bodily passions he would also fall into bodily changes, but if he preferred the goods of the soul he would be counted worthy of immortality. For if God had made him mortal from the beginning, he would not have condemned him to death when he sinned, since no one condemns a mortal to mortality. If, on the other hand, he had made him wholly immortal, he would not have made him in need of food, for none of the immortals needs bodily food; nor would he so readily have changed his mind and at once made mortal the one who had been made immortal; for he is not seen to have done this with the angels who sinned, but they remained immortal according to their original nature, awaiting another penalty for their sins, not death. It is better, then, to understand the matter in this way, or else that he was made mortal but able, if perfected through progress, to become immortal, that is, immortal in potency. And since it was not to his advantage to know his own nature before he was perfected, God forbade him to taste of the tree of knowledge. For there were, or rather there still are, very great powers in plants; but then, at the beginning of the world's making, they were unmixed and had a very strong effect. So there was also the taste of a certain fruit that produced knowledge of one's own nature. God did not wish him to know his own nature before he was perfected, lest, knowing himself to be in need of many things, he should attend to bodily needs and abandon the care of the soul; for this reason he forbade him to partake of the fruit of knowledge. But having disobeyed and come to know himself, he fell from perfection and came into bodily need. At once he sought a covering, for Moses says that he knew he was naked; before, God had kept him in ecstasy and in ignorance of himself. Having fallen from perfection, he fell likewise from immortality, which he will regain later by the grace of his Maker. After the fall the enjoyment of meat too was granted him; before, God wished him to be content with what grows from the earth, for these were in paradise; but once perfection was lost, the things of enjoyment were then granted him by condescension. Since man is of a body, and every body is composed of the four elements, he must suffer what the elements suffer: cutting, change, and flux, which belong to body alone; change in quality, and flux by emptying. For the living creature is always being emptied through the visible pores and the invisible ones, of which we will speak later. So either equal amounts must be brought in to replace what is emptied, or the creature dissolves for want of what comes in; and since what is emptied is dry, moist, and breath, the creature needs dry and moist food and breath. Our food and drink come by way of the elements of which we are composed; for each thing is nourished by what is akin and like it, and healed by its contrary. Some elements we take directly, others through intermediaries: water sometimes by itself, sometimes through wine, oil, and all the so-called moist fruits (for wine is nothing but water given its quality by the vine). Likewise we partake of fire, sometimes directly, warmed by it, sometimes through what we eat or drink; for in all things a greater or lesser portion of fire is sown. In the same way we take air directly by breathing it and having it poured round us, and by drawing it in as we eat and drink, and indirectly through everything else we take. Earth we take in no way directly, but through intermediaries: earth becomes wheat, and we eat wheat. Larks, pigeons, and partridges often eat earth; man eats it through seeds, fruits and flesh. And since we were made not only … [, we need clothing as well]. For these reasons, then, we need food and clothing; and a dwelling both for the same reasons as food and clothing and not least to escape wild beasts. Through bad mixtures of the qualities and the breaking of the body's continuity we came to need physicians and treatment. When a change in quality occurs, the condition of the body must be brought back to balance by the opposite quality. For the physicians' task is not, as some think, to cool a heated body, but to bring it to a good temperament; for if they chill it, the condition turns into the opposite disease. Man therefore needs food and drink because of emptyings and evaporations; clothing because he has by nature no strong covering; a house because of the bad mixtures of the surrounding air and because of wild beasts; treatment because of the changes of the qualities and the sensation given to the body. For if we had no sensation, we would feel no pain; and not feeling pain we would not seek treatment, and would perish, not curing the disease in ignorance of the evil. Because of the arts and the sciences and the needs that arise from them we need one another; and because we need one another, many of us come together into one place and share with one another in the exchanges of life's needs. This assembly and dwelling together we have called a city, so that we may enjoy the benefits we give one another from near and not from afar. For man has come to be by nature a herding and political animal; no one by himself is sufficient for everything. It is clear, then, that cities were formed for exchanges and for learning. Man has received two special privileges: he alone obtains pardon when he repents, and his body alone, though mortal, is made immortal; the bodily privilege because of the soul, the soul's because of the body. For man alone among rational beings has the special gift of being counted worthy of pardon when he repents; neither demons nor angels are granted pardon when they repent. In this especially God is shown and called both just and merciful. To the angels, who have nothing compelling them and dragging them into sin, but are by nature free from bodily passions, needs, and pleasures, no pardon is reasonably given when they repent. But man is not only rational but also an animal, and the needs and passions of the animal often drag his reasoning away. So when he comes to his senses, flees these, and advances to the virtues, he obtains a just mercy: pardon. And as the ability to laugh is a property of his substance, since it belongs to him alone, to all of them, and always, so among the gifts of grace it is proper to man, beyond all rational creation, to put off through repentance the guilt of earlier sins; for this has been given to man alone, to all, and always, during the time of life in the world, but after death no longer. Some hold accordingly that the angels too no longer obtain pardon by repentance after their fall, since their fall is their death; but before the fall they too, as with the life of men, were counted worthy of pardon; and since they did not repent, they have henceforth an unpardonable and everlasting punishment as their fitting penalty. It is clear from this that those who do not accept repentance cut away the special gift that belongs to man. It is also proper and special to man, alone of the animals, that his body rises after death and passes into immortality. He obtains this because of the immortality of the soul, as the soul shared the other condition because of the body's weakness and many sufferings. Proper to him too are the learning of the arts and sciences and the activities that follow these arts. Therefore they define man as “a rational mortal animal, receptive of mind and knowledge”: “animal,” because man is an animate, sentient substance, for that is the definition of an animal; “rational,” to separate him from the irrational; “mortal,” to separate him from the immortal rational beings; and “receptive of mind and knowledge,” because the arts and sciences come to us by learning: we have the power to receive mind and the arts, but acquire the activity by learning. They say this last was added to the definition later; for since some posit nymphs and certain other kinds of spirits that are long-lived though not immortal, they added “receptive of mind and knowledge” to distinguish man from these too; for none of them learns, but each knows by nature what it knows. The doctrine of the Hebrews is that this whole universe came to be for the sake of man: some things directly for him, such as beasts of burden and oxen for farming, and grass for the sake of these. For of things that came to be, some came to be for their own sake, others for the sake of others: all rational beings for their own sake, the irrational and the soulless for the sake of others. If these came to be for others, let us consider for whom. For angels? No sensible person would say they came to be for angels. For things made for others are made for their constitution, continuance, and rest: for the succession of the race, or for food, or shelter, or healing, or recreation and rest. An angel needs none of these: it has no succession of race, needs no bodily food, nor shelter, nor any of the rest. And if not for angels, then clearly not for any other nature surpassing the angel; for the higher it is, the more freedom from need belongs to it. We must seek, then, a nature that is rational yet in need of the things named. What other such nature could be found if we leave man aside? It follows that the irrational and the soulless came to be for him. And since they came to be for him, as has been shown, he was appointed their ruler. It is a ruler's task to use those he rules according to the measure of need, not to abuse them licentiously for indulgence or oppressively, as do those who do not use the irrational creatures well. For they do not do the work of a ruler, nor of a just man, according to what is written: “The righteous man pities the lives of his beasts.” But perhaps someone will say that nothing came to be for another, but each for its own sake. Let us first separate the animate from the soulless and see whether soulless things can have come to be for their own sake. If these were for their own sake, how and from where will the animals be fed? We see nature supplying the animals with food from the fruits and plants of the earth, apart from the very few carnivores. And even these carnivores make their food of the animals that graze on the earth: wolves and lions of lambs, goats, pigs and deer; eagles of partridges, doves, hares and the like, which feed on the fruits of the earth. The nature of fish too, though they eat one another, does not go on eating flesh all the way down, but ends in those that feed on seaweed and other things growing in the water. If all kinds of fish ate flesh and none escaped the eating of flesh, they would not have lasted even a little while, but would have perished, some by one another, some for want of food. To prevent this, some fish were made that abstain from flesh and feed, so to speak, on the grass of the sea, so that by these the others might be preserved: the seaweeds become food for these, these for others, and those again for others, so that through the food of the last, supplied without interruption from the earthy matter in the sea, the existence of the others too is preserved. The argument has shown, then, that plants came to be not for their own sake but for the food and constitution of men and the other animals. And if these are for man and the animals, it is clear that the causes of their growth and generation came to be for them too. So the movements of the stars, the heaven, the seasons, the rains, and all such things came to be for these, so that, food being supplied continually as in a cycle, the nature of the things that bring forth fruit may continue without failing. So it is found that these are for the sake of the fruits, and the fruits for the sake of the animals and man. It remains to consider whether the nature of the irrational animals came to be for its own sake or for man. But perhaps it is absurd to say that beings without any share in understanding, living only by natural impulse, bent down toward the earth and showing their servitude by their very shape, were brought forth for their own sake. Many things could be said on this, enough almost to need a treatise of their own; but since the present subject does not allow lengthy discussion, we must come to what is brief but to the point. If, then, we look at man as an image of the things outside, we will draw our proofs from the very nature of the things in question. We see in our own soul the irrational part and its parts, I mean appetite and anger, given for the service of reason: the one rules and the others are ruled; the one commands and the others are commanded and serve … [So the irrational creatures were made for the service of the rational,] and all the other things that could exist were constructed as well, so that creation might lack nothing that could come to be. Nor have even these entirely escaped being of use to men; reason turns even poisonous creatures to its own benefit, using them to treat the harm done by those very creatures and to heal other diseases. Such are the preparations called theriacs, which reason devised in order to master even these and to benefit by them, as by enemies taken captive. Man has countless powers set against them, given by the Creator, able to ward off, repel, and correct their attacks; different powers fit different needs, but all together are by nature able to contribute to man's healing, even those that are of no use for other needs. Let this be said with respect to the present state of our life; for in the beginning none of the other animals dared to harm man, but all were his slaves, subject and obedient, as long as he mastered his own passions and the irrationality within him. But when he no longer mastered his own passions but was mastered by them, he was reasonably mastered also by the beasts outside him; harm from them came in together with sin. That this is true is plain from those who have lived the best life: they were shown, without a struggle, to be stronger than the plots of beasts, as Daniel was stronger than the lions and Paul than the bite of the viper. Who then could worthily admire the nobility of this creature, which binds together in itself mortal things with immortal and joins rational things to irrational; which bears in its own nature the image of all creation, for which reason it has been called a little world; which has been counted worthy of such providence from God that for its sake are all things, both present and to come, and for its sake God even became man; which ends in incorruption and escapes mortality, reigns in the heavens, is made after the image and likeness of God, lives with Christ, is a child of God, and sits above every rule and authority? Who could declare the advantages of this creature? He crosses seas; he walks the heavens by contemplation; he understands the motion, distances, and measures of the stars; he reaps the earth and the sea; he despises beasts and sea monsters; he succeeds in every science, art, and method; by letters he converses with whom he wishes beyond the frontiers, unhindered by the body; he foretells the future; he rules all, masters all, enjoys all; he converses with angels and with God, commands creation, gives orders to demons, searches the nature of beings, busies himself to know God, and becomes a house and temple of God; and all this he purchases by the virtues and by piety. But lest we seem to some to be writing a tasteless encomium of man, and not simply setting out his nature, as we proposed, let us stop the discussion here, although in stating the advantages of his nature we are in fact describing that nature itself. Knowing, then, of how great a nobility we have been made partakers, and that we are a heavenly plant, let us not shame our nature, nor show ourselves unworthy of such great gifts, nor rob ourselves of so much authority, glory and blessedness, betraying the enjoyment of all eternal things for a short time and a brief pleasure; but by good works, by abstaining from evil, by a right intention, with which the divine is especially wont to cooperate, and by prayers, let us preserve our nobility. Of man's nature in general this is enough. Since common reason suggests that man is of soul and body, come, let us first divide the subject and discuss the soul, passing over the questions that are very subtle, intricate, and hard for most to grasp. ### Scripture references - Gen 3:19: quotation, high confidence - Ps 49:12 (48:13 LXX): quotation, high confidence - 1 Cor 15:47: allusion, high confidence - 1 Cor 15:48: quotation, high confidence - Gen 3:7: allusion, high confidence - Gen 2:17: allusion, high confidence - Gen 9:3: allusion, medium confidence - Prov 12:10: quotation, high confidence - Dan 6:22: allusion, high confidence - Acts 28:3: allusion, high confidence - Gen 1:26: allusion, high confidence - Eph 1:21: allusion, medium confidence - 1 Cor 3:16: echo, medium confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Plotinus (Plotinus, Enneads): allusion, medium confidence - Aristotle (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence - Plato, Alc. 1.129e–130c (Plato (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Theophilus, Autol. 2.27 (To Autolycus): echo, medium confidence ### Translation notes - The text is a new OCR of Matthaei's edition (1802); the printed apparatus and Latin notes that the OCR ran into the Greek have been removed. Where lines of the Greek are lost or garbled in the OCR (e.g. after “we were made not only”, and after “commanded and serve”), the translation follows the sense of the passage and marks the gap with “…”; words in square brackets are supplied by sense. - Plotinus (e.g. Enn. 5.3) distinguishes mind from soul; Apollinarius built his Christology on a three-part man. Aristotle's mind “from outside” (θύραθεν): Gen. an. 2.3, 736b; cf. De an. 3.5. Plato: Alc. 1, 129e–130c. Sponges: Aristotle, Hist. an. 5.16. The view that man was made neither mortal nor immortal is also in Theophilus, To Autolycus 2.27. - “The ability to laugh” (τὸ γελαστικόν) is the stock example of a property (ἴδιον) in the logic textbooks. - “Hebrews” here means the biblical tradition (Scripture and its Jewish and Christian interpreters). ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 1 (Matthaei, 35-66; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/1). ## Matthaei, chapter 2 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/2/#p-2 - Source: Matthaei, 67-125 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius reviews the ancient opinions on the soul and argues that it is not a body, a harmony, a blending, an actuality, or a number, refutes Eunomius, traducianism, the Manichaeans and transmigration into animals, and concludes that the soul is a bodiless, immortal substance. ### Greek text Διαφωνεῖται σχεδὸν ἅπασι τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὃ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος. Δημόκριτος μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν στωϊμῶν Φθοσόφων σύστημα, σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνονται. καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ οὗτοι, οἱ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποᾧαινέμενοι, διαφέρονται περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ στωϊχοὶ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν αὐτὴν ἔνθερμον καὶ διάπυρον» Κριτίας δὲ, αἷμα, ἵππων δὲ ὁ Φιλέσοφος, ὑδωρν, Δυμόκρετος δὲ, πῦρ. τὰ γὰρ σφαιροειδῆ σχήματα τῶν ἀτόμων συγ" κρινόμενα γ πῦρ τε καὶ ἀέρα», ψυχὴν ἀποτελεῖν, Ἥ ρακλειτος δὲ, τὴν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν, ἀναθυμίχσιν ἐκ τῶν ὑγρῶν, σὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως » ὁμογενῆ πεφυκέναι, παλιν δὲ καὶ τῶν λεἡόντων ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἄπειρος γέγονεν ἡ δια- Φωνία, τῶν μὲν, οὐσίαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀθάνατον λεγόντων » τῶν δὲ ἀσώματον μὲν, οὐ μὴν οὐσίαν, οὐδὲ ἀθάνατον. Θαλῆς μὲν γὰρ πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφησεν ἀεικίνητον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον ᾿ Πυθαγόρας δὲ, ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν γυνοῦντα. Πλάτων δὲ, οὐσίαν νοητὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητὴν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἐναρμόνιον " ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ, ἐντελέχειαν πρώτην σώματος φυσικοῦ, ὁργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. Δικαίχρχος δὲ, ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, ἀντὶ τοὺ, κρᾶσιν καὶ συμῴωνίαν τῶν στοιχείων. οὐ γορ τὴν ἐκ τῶν φθέγγων συνισταμένην ᾽ ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον λρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. δῆλον δὲν ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν" ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Δριαίαρχος ἀνούσιον. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοῖς, οἱ μὲν, μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν πάντων ψυχν νενομιίκασι, κατακερματιζμένην εἰς τὸ χκαθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ “τάλιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν συνιοῦσαν, ὡς οἱ Μανιχαῖοι, καὶ ἄλλοι τινές" οἱ δὲ» πολλὰς καὶ διαφόρους κατ᾽ εἶδος" οἱ δὲ, καὶ μίαν καὶ πολλάς. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀναγκη μηκύναι τὸν λόγον τοσαύσταῖς δόξαις ἀντιλέγοντα. κοινὴ μὲν οὖν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς λέγοντας σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν, ὠρκέσει τὰ παρὰ ᾿Αμμωνίου ποὺ διδασκάλου Πλωτίνου καὶ, Νουμηνίου τοῦ πυθαγορικοῦ εἰρημένα. εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτα. τοὶ σώματα τῇ οἰκείο Φύσει τρεπτὰ ὄντα καὶ σκεδαστοὶ καὶ διόλου εἰς ὠπειρον τμητοὶ, μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς; ἀμεταβλήτου ὑπολειπομένου, δεῖται τοῦ συντι» θέντος καὶ συνάγοντος καὶ ὥςπερ συσφίγγοντος καὶ συγκρατοῦντος αὐτοὶ, ὅπερ ψυχὴν λέγομεν. εἰ, τοίνυν σῶμα ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ οἱονδήποτε, εἰ καὶ λεπτομερέστατον, τί πάλινηξοτὶ τὸ συνέχον ἐκείνην» ἐδείχθη γοὺρ, πᾶν σῶμα δεῖσθαι τοῦ συν» ἔχοντος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀπείρον, ἕως ἄν καταντήσωμεν εἰς ἀσώματον. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθαπερ οἱ στωϊκοὶν τονρκῆν, τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην» καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω, μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιοτήτων οποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ) ἔσω, ἑνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας, ἐρωτητέον αὐτοὺς, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσχ κίνησις ἀπὸ τινός ἐστι δυ- »άμεως. τίς καὶ δύναμις αὕτη καὶ ἐν τίνι οὐσίωται; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ δύναμις ( αὑτὴ} ὕλη τίς ἐστιν τοῖς αὐτοῖς πάλιν Χρησόμεθα λόγοις " εἰ ἰ δὲ οὐχ' ὕλη, εὐλλ' ἔνυλον" ἕτερον δέ ἐστι στὸ ἔνυλον παρὰ τὴν ὑλην" τὸ γὰρ μετέχον ὕλης» ἔγυλον λέγεται" τί ποτε ὥρα ἐστὶ πὸ μετέχον τῆς ὕλαν πότερον ὕλη καὶ αὐτὸ ἢ αὔλον; εἰ μὲν οὖν ὕλη, πῶς ἔνυλον «αἱ οὐχ' ὕλην εἰ δὲ οὐχ᾽ ὕλη, αὖλον ἄρα΄ εἰ δὲ οἀῦλον, οὐ σῶμα. πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἔνυλον. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, ὅτι τὰ σώμῶωτα τριχῇ διαστατά ἐστι, καὶ ἡὶ ψυχὴ δὰ, δὲ ὅλου διή- »ιουσα τοῦ σώματος» τριχῇ διασπατή ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως καὶ σῶμα" ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι πᾶν μὲν σῶμα τριχῆ διαστατὸν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν σῶμα. καὶ γάρ. τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καθ' ἑαυτὰ, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν ὄγκῳ πεσοῦται. οὕτως οὖν καὶ κι ψυχῇ, καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν πρόςεστι τὸ ἀδιάστατον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τῷ, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, τριχῇ διαστατῷ ὃ ὄντι, συνθεωρεῖται καὶ αὐτὴ τριχῇ διαστατή. ἔ ετὶγ πῶν σῶμα ἤτοι ἔξωθεν, κινεῖται ἢ ἔνδοθεν" ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἔξωθεν, ἄψυχον ἔσται" εἰ δὲ ἔ ὅοθεν, ἔμψυχον. εἰ δὲ σῶωα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, εἰ μὲν ἔξωθεν κινοῖτο, ἀψυχός ἐστιν" εἰ δὲ ἔνδοθεν, ἔμψυχος" ἄτοπον δὲ, καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον, καὶ πὸ ἔμψυχον, λέγειν τὴν ψυχήν" οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι, ἡ ψυχὴ, εἰ μὲν τρέφεται, ὑπὸ ἀσωμάτου τρέφεται" τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα τρέφει αὐτήν" οὐδὲν δὲ σῶμα ὑπὸ ἀσωμάτου τρέφεται" οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή. Ξενοκράτης οὕτω συνῆγεν " εἰ δὲ μὴ τρέφεται» πᾶν δὲ σῶμα ζώου τρέφεται, οὐ σῶμα ἡ “ψυχή. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν κοινῆ. πρὸς πάντας τοὺς λέγοντας σῶμα εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. ἰδία δὲ “τρὸς τοὺς δοξαώντας., αἷμα ἢ πνεῦμα εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αἴματος ἢ τοῦ πνεύματος χωριζομένου νεκροῦται τὸ ζῶον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον, ὅπέρ τινες τῶν οἰομένων εἶναί τι γεγραφήκασι λέγοντες " οὐκοῦν, ὅταν μέρος ἀποῤῥυὴ τοῦ αἵματος, μέρος ἀπερρύη τῆς ψυχῆς" κουζφολογία γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον " ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν καὶ τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον μέρος ταὐτὸν ἐστί τῷ παντί" ὕδωρ γοῦν, καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ βραχὺ, ταὐτόν" ὁμοίως καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ Χρυσὸς καὶ πάντα, ὧν τὰ μέρη οὐ διαλάττει ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν" οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὑπολειπόμενον αἷμα, ὅσον ἂν ἦ, ψυχή ἔστω, εἴπερ ψυχὴ τὸ αἷμα. ἐκεῖνο εὖν μᾶλλον ἑητέον, ὅτι εἰ τοῦτό ἐστι Ψυχὴ, ᾿οὗ ἐξαιρουμένου θυήσκει τὸ ζῶον, πάντως καὶ τὸ φλέγμα ψυχή ἐστι καὶ αἱ χολαὶ ἀμφότεραι, ὁποῖόν γὰρ ἄν τούτων ἐκλείπη, τέλος ἐπάγει τῇ ἢ (ζωῇ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἧπαρ καὶ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος καὶ ἡ καρδία καὶ ὁ στόμαχος καὶ οἱ νεφροὶ καὶ τὰ ἔντερα καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, τίνος γὰρ ἂν πούτων ἐξαιρεθέντος οὐ τεθνήξεται τὸ λ ζῶον; ἄλλως τεν πολλά ἐστιν ἄναιμα μὲν, ἔμψυχα δὲ, ὡς τὰ ὶ σελάχῃ καὶ μαλάκια, οἷον σηπίαι καὶ τευθίδες καὶ ὀσμύλοι καὶ πάντα τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα καὶ ἀπαλόστρακα, ὡς οἱ κάραβοι καὶ καρκίνοι καὶ ἀστακοί, εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἔμψυχα μὲν ἄναιμα δὲ, δῆλον, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν αἷμα ὴ ψυχή. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λέγοντας, ὕδωρ εἶναι τὴν ψυχ»»» ὅτι τὸ ὑδωρ ζωογονοῦν Φαίνεται πάντα, καὶ “χωρὶς ὕδατος βιοτεύειν ἀδύνατον; πολλὰ τὰ ἀντιπίν πτοντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τροφῆς χωρὶς αἷόν τε ζῶν" ψυχὴν αὶ ἄρα καὶ τὰς τροφὰς πάσας χαθ' ἑκάστην ῥητέον κατ᾽ αὐτούς. ἔπειτα πολλαὶ τῶν ζώων ἐστὶ μὴ πίνοντα, ὡς ἐπί τίνων ἀετῶν ἱστόρηται, καὶ πέρδιξ δὲ δύνατωι ζὴν χωρὶς τοῦ πίνειν. διατί δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ὕδωρ ψυχὴ, καὶ μὴ ὁ αὐρ; ὕδατος μὲν γα καὶ ἐπιπολὺ δυνατὸν ἀποσχέσθαι" τοῦ δὲ ἀναπνεῖν τὸν ἀέρα, οὐδὲ τὸ βραχύτατον" ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὁ ἀὴρ ψυχή. πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι ᾽ ζῶντα μὲν, μὴ ἀναπνέοντα δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, ὡς τὰ ἐντόμα παντὰ, οἷον μέλιτται καὶ σῴγκες καὶ μύρμηκες» καὶ τὰ ἄναιμα, καὶ τῶν θαλασσίων τὰ πολλαὶ, καὶ πάντα, ὅσα οὐκ ἔχει πνεύμονα. οὐδὲν γὰρ. μὴ ἔχον πνεύμονα, ἀναπνεῖ τὸν ἀέρα" καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οὐδὲν, μὴ ἀναπνέον τὸν ἀέρα, πνεύμονα ἔχεῖ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθους τοῦ στωϊκοῦ καὶ Χρυσίππου Φέρονται λόγοι τινὲς, οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητοι, ἐκπ θετέον καὶ τούτων τὰς λύσεις. ὡς ἐπέλυσαν οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος. ὁ Κλεάνθης τοιένδε πλέκει συλλογισμόν. οὐ μόνον, Φησὶν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ, ΕῚ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς στάθεσι, τοῖς ἡθεσιν ταῖς διαθέσεσι" σώματος δὲν τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου" σῶμα ἀρὰ ἡ ψυχή. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους τὰ καθόλου οὐ συγκατασκευάζεται. πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ καὶ τὸ, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου, ψεῦδός ἐστι. λέγομεν γὼρ ἀριθμοὺς ὁμοίους εἶναι, ὧν αἱ πλευραὶ ἀναλογοί εἰσιν, εἷς τὸν, ν ΠῚ ᾿ ἐξ καὶ πὸν εἰκοσιτέσσαρα. πλευρὰ γαρ τοῦ ἔξ ὁ δύο καὶ δύο διπλασίονα καὶ τὰ ἐξ τῶν τρία" ἀσώματοι δὲ οἵ ἐριθμοί. καὶ σχήματα δὲ σχήμασιν ὅμοιά ἐστιν, ὅσα τάς τε γωνίας ἧσας ἔχει, καὶ πὰς περὶ τὰς ἴσας γωνίας σλευρος ἀνάλογον" τὸ δὲ σχῆμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀσώματον ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι. ἔτι, ὡς τοῦ ποσοῦ ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον, οὕτω καὶ ποῦ ποιοῦ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον" «ἀσώματον δὲ ἡ ποίοτης. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτῳ ὅμοιον. ἔτι φησίν" οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα. σῶμα σώματι" συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῆ αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν, ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται, καὶ Ϊ φοβουμένης, ὠχρόν" σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχῆι ἐστι δὲ τὸ ἑτερον τῶν λημμάτων ψε ὕδος» κατὰ πρέτληψιν κείμενον.» τὸ λέγον, οὐδὲν ἀσώματον σώματι συμπάσχει. τί γῶρ. εἰ μόνη τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦτο πρόρεστιν; ὡςπέρ τις εἰ λέγοι, οὐδὲν ζῶον τὴν ἄνω γένυν τεινεῖτ" ὁ δὲ κροκόδειλος τὴν ἄνω γένυν κινεῖ" οὐ ζῶον ἃ ἄρα ὁ κροκόδειλος. ψευδὴς γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ πρότασις καὶ ἐνταῦθα,, κατὰ πρότληψιν, ἡ λέγουσα, οὐδὲν ζῶον τὴν ἄνω γένυν κινεῖ, ἰδοὺ γὰρ ὁ κροκόδειλος καὶ ζῶόν ἐστι καὶ τὴν ἄνω γένυν κινεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον, καὶ ὅταν λέγη, μηδὲν ἀσώματον σώματι συμπάσχειν. προζλαμβάνει γὰρ τὸ ἡτούμενον τῇ ἀποφάσει. εἰ δέ τις ὑπόθοιτο ἀληθὲς εἶναι, τὸ, μηδὲν ἀ ἀσώματον σώματι συμπάσχειν" αλλὰ τὸ ἐπαγόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμολογούμενον, ὅτι συμπάσχει ἡ ψυχὴ νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ τῷ σώματι. ὠμφιβάλλεται γἀρ» εἴτε τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀλγοῦν, λαβὸν παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν αἰσθησιν, αὐτὴ δὲ μένει ἀπαθὴ ἧς, εἴτε καὶ συναλγεῖ τῷ σώματι" καὶ κρατεῖ μᾶλλον παρα τοῖς ἐνδοξοτέροις τὸ πρότερον" οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀμζφιβαλλομένων συνάγειν τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ς, αλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων. ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ δείκνυται, καί τινὰ ἀσώματα συμπάσχοντα τοῖς σώμασιν. αἱ ποιότητες γοῦν, ἀσώματοι οὖσαι, πασχόντων πὧν σωμάτων καὶ αὐταὶ συμπάσχουσιν, ἕν τὸ τῇ φθορῷ, καὶ τὴ γενέσει συναλλοιούμεναι τῷ σώματι. Χρύσιππος δέ ζησιν, (ὅτι) ὃ θανατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς απὸ »σώμαν͵ τος" οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον. απὸ σώματος χωρίζεται" οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον" ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφαπτεται᾽ καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος " “σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. τούτων τὸ μὲν, τὸν θάνατον χωρισμὸν εἶναι ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, )ς ἀληθές ἐστι" τὸ δὲ, μὴ ἐφάπτεσθαι ἀσώματον σώματος, ψεῦδος μέν ἐστι καθόλου λεγόμενον» ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθές. ψεῦδος μὲν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ καὶ γραμμὴν ἀσώματος οὖσα, ἐφάπτεται σώματος καὶ χωρίξεται" ὁμοίως καὶ καὶ λευκότης " ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθές. οὐ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται τοῦ σωματὸς ἡ ψυχή" εἰ γὰ ἐφάπτεται, δηλονότι παράκειται αὐτῷ " εἶ δὲ ποῦτο, οὐχ, ὅλῳ παράκειται" ἀδύνατον γὰρ σῶμα σώματι ὅλον ὅλῳ παρακεῖσθαι " καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἔσται ὅλον ἔμψυχον τὸ ζῶον" ὥςτε, εἰ μὲν ἐφάπτεται, σῶυχ μὲν ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ» ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἔσται ἔμψυχον τὸ ὄζον" εἶ δὲ ὅλον ἐστίν ἔμψυχον, οὔτε ἐφάπτεται, οὔτε σῶμα ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή" τὸ δὲ ζῶον ὅλον ἐμψυχόν ἐστιν" οὔτε ἀι ἄρα ἐφάπτεται, οὔτε σῶμά ἐστι, καὶ χωρίζεται, ἀσώματος οὗσαν ὅτι μὲν ( οὖν) οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων " ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀνούσιος, ἑξῆς ῥητέον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ Δικαίαρχος ὠρμουἱὰν αἱρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν. καὶ Σιμμίας, ἀντιλέγων τῷ Σωκράτει, τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν Ἐφασκεν εἶναι, λέγων, ἐοικέναι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίᾳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα λύρα" ἐκθετέον τὰς λύσεις τούτου, τοὺς ἐν τῶ Φαίδωνι Πλάτωνος κειμένας. μία μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ τῶν προχποδεδειγμένων αὐτῷ, προαποδέδεικται γὰρ, ὅτι αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἰσί, τοῦτο οὖν λαβὼν, ὡς ὁμολογούμενον, κατασκευάζει τὸν λόγον οὗτως. εἰ αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἰσὶν, ἣν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι" εἰ δὲ ὡρμονία ἐστὶ, πρότερον μὲν οὐκ ἦν» ὕστερον δὲ ἐγένετο, ἀρμοσθέντος τοῦ σωματος. πᾶσα γοὶρ σύνθεσις οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς ἔχει τὸν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται. κοινωνία γάρ τις ἐστὶ τῶν συντιθεμένων,᾿΄, ἢ ἡὶ σύνθεσις, ἁρμονία οὐσα᾿ καὶ οὐ κωλύει τὸ μὴ ὑἡγεῖσθαι -.“ “ αὐτὴν ἐκείνων, αφ᾽ ὧν συνετέθη, ἀλλ ἔπεσθαι αὐτοῖς" μάχεται τοίνυν τὸ, ἑρμονίαν εἰναι τὴν ψυχὴν, τῷ, τὰς μα- Ε.,’ θήσεις ἀναμνίσεις εἶναι" τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀναμνήσεων ἀληθές ἐστι" “- ". εὴ ψεῦδος ἄρα τὸ, τὴν ψυχρὸν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, ἔτιγ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ κτὰ ἄρχουσα αὐτοῦ" ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία οὔτε ἡγεῖται, οὔτε ἐναν- “τιοῦτα!" οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία. ἔτι, ἁρμονίᾳ ρμιονίας μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἀρμιονία., τῷ ᾿χαλάφθαϊ καὶ ἐπιτεήεσθαι, οὐ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τῆς εἱρμονίας " ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι, λόγον τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔχειν" ἄλλ᾽ ἐν πῇ ὡρμογὴ" ἐὰν γὰρ κεκραμένος ὀξὺς φθόγγος καὶ βαρὺς. ἔπειτα ἀνεθῶσι, Ω τὸν λογὸν μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν σωζυσιν ἐν ταῖς μεγέθεσι τῶν Φθόγγων, παραλλαγὴν δὲ λαμίβάνει καὶ ἑρμονία κατὰ τὴν ρμογὴν, μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐπιτεινομένη" ψυχὴ δὲ ψυχὲς οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον" οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμονία ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι, ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίν ἐπιδέχεται" ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία ὧρμογίαν καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται" οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία ἐστίν. ἔτι, καὶ ψυχὴν τῷ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία παρὰ μέρος, οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπονείμενον " ἡ δὲ ὡρμονία ποιότης καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ" καὶ δὲ οὐσία ποιότητος ἕτερον" καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὡρμονίας ἕτερον. οἱρμονίας μέντοι μετέχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παροὶ τοῦτο ἁρμονία ἐστίν" οὐδὲ γὰρ» διότι ἀρετὴς μετέχει, ἀρετή ἐστιν ἡ ψυχῇ. Γαληνὸς δὲ ἀποφαίνεται μὲν οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαρτύρετῳι ἐν τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς λόγοις, ὡς ὡς οὐδὲν εἴη περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάς μενος " ἔοικε δὲν ἐξ ὧν λέγεις δοκιμάζειν μᾶλλο μᾶλλον» τὸ κρᾶσιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν" ταύτη γαὶρ ἐπακολουθεῖν τὴν τῶν ηθῶν διαφοράν" ἐκ τοῦ Ἱπποκρώτους κατασκευσίζων τὸν ἰλόγον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ θνητὴν αὐτὴν. εἶναι οἴεται" οὐ σῶσαν δὲν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλογον μόνην ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. σπερὶ δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ἀμφιβάλλει, λέγων οὕτως" ὅτι δὲ οὐ δύναται τοῦ σώματος ὶὶ κρᾶσις εἶναι ψυχὴν δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. σῶν σῶμα ἐμψυχῤν τε καὶ ἀψυχον ἐ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κέκραται, ἡ γὰρ τούτων κρᾶσις τὰ σώματα ἀπεργχξται.. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ τοῦ σώματος κρᾶσίς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐδὲν ἀψυχρν ἔστω, καὶ συνάγεται ὁ λόγος οὕτως" εἰ ἣ κρᾶσις τοῦ σώματος ψυχή ἐστι, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα κρῶσιν ἔχει, σῶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχει" εἰ δὲ πᾶν σῶμα Ψυχὴν ἔχει, Π -“ῸΦςΦ οὐδὲν σῶμά ἐστιν «ψυχον᾽ οὔτε λίθος ἄρα, οὔτε ξύλον, θΞ οὔτε σίδηρος, οὔτε ἄλλο τί ἄψυχον ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μὴ καθὅλου πᾶσαν κρᾶσιν σώματος λέγοι ψυχὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοιάνδε, ἐρωτητέον, ποίχ κρᾶσίς ἐστιν καὶ ποιοῦσα ζῶον καὶ ψυχῆς λόγον ἐπέχουσα; ὁποίαν γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὴν κρᾶσιν, τοιαύτην εὑρήσομεν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχρις. ἐννέα γὰρ οὐσῶν κράσεωνγ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ κράσεως ἔδειξεν, ὀκτῶ μὲν τῶν δυςκράτων, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς εὐκράτου, κατοὶ μὲν τὴν εὔκρα» τὸν λέγει μεκρᾶσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ πάντα δὲ, ἄλλα τὸν τῆς μέσης κράσεως, κατὰ δὲ τας ἄλλας δυςκρασίας, καὶ τὰς ὥρας, καὶ τὰς διαίτας, δ ψυχὴ ἐναλλάσσεται" εἰ δὲ ἐναλλάσσεται» οὐ "τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχομεν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ιἰρᾶσιν, ποτὲ μὲν λέοντος, ποτὲ δὲ προβάτου, “ποτὰ δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἔτι, ἡ κρᾶσις οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλοὶ καὶ συνεργεῖ" αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κινοῦσα" ἡὶ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐναντιοῦται" οὐκ ἄρα ἣ Ἀρᾶσίς ἐστι ψυχή. ἐτρς εἰ χρᾶσίς ἐστι ψυχὴ. ἡ ἡ δὲ κρᾶσις ποιότης » ποιότης δὲ καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα χωρισθήσοται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορῶς" τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές" οὐκ ἄρα κρᾶσις», οὐδὲ ποιότης ἐστὶν καὶ ψυχή. οὐ γὰρ δήπου στὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων Φυσικῶς προςεῖναι φήσουσι τῷ ζώῳ, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν. εἰ ετέθειων γὰρ τοῦτο. Φαίνεται. δὲ μετατιθεμένη ἡ ἡ κρᾶσις, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτοί εἰσιν οἱ διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης τὰς κράσεις μεταβάλλοντες. ἔ ἔτι» παντὸς σώματος αἱ ποιότητες αἰσθηταί εἶσιν" ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐκ αἰσθητὴ, ἀλλὰ νοητή " οὐκ ἄρα ποιότης σώματός ἐστιν αὶ ψυχή. ἔτι, ἡ τοῦ αἵματος καὶ πνεύματος μετὰ παραθέσεως σαρκῶν καὶ νεύρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὐκρασία, ἰσχύς ἐστι" καὶ ἡ τῶ» θερμῶν δὲ καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξὲ ἤρων καὶ ὑγρῶν εὐκρασία.» ὑγεία ἐστίν" καὶ δὲ συμμετρία τῶν Μελῶν μετὰ τῆς εὐχροίας τὸ κάλλος ποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος" εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ὡρμονία τῆς ὑγείας καὶ τὴς ἰσχύος καὶ τοῦ κάλλους ψυχή ἐστιν. ἀνάγκη ἦν, τὸν ἀἄνθρωπὸν ζῶντα μήτε νοσεῖν, μήτε ἀσθενεῖ,, (τε ἀμορίον εἰναι" συμβαδει δὲ πολλάκις, οὐ μίαν μόνην, αλλ᾽ ὁμοῦ τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας εὐκρασίας ἀπόλ.λυσθαιν καὶ ὦν τὸν ἀνθρωπον" συμβαίνει γαρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἄμορῷον εἶ εἶναι καὶ ἀσθενεῖν καὶ νοσεῖν" οὐκ ἄρα ἡ εὐκρασία, τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ἡ ψυχή. πῶς οὖν Φυσικαΐ τινες καὶ κακίαι καὶ ἀρεταὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἕπονται; τοῦτο ἐκ τὸς τοῦ σώματος κραύσεως ἐληθῶς γίνεται. ὡς γὰρ Φυσικῶς ὑγιεινοὶ καὶ νοσώδεις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῆς κρώσεως ἡ οὕτω τινὲς,Φυσικῶς πικρόχρλοι ὄντες, ὀργίλοι εἰσὶν, ἄλλοι δειλοὶ, ἄλλοι καταφερεῖς. ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιοι κρατοῦσι καὶ περιγίνονται" δῆλον δὲν ὅτι τῆς πράσεως κρατοῦσιν" ἄλλο δέ ἐστι τὸ κρατοῦν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ "ρατούμενον " ἄλλο ρα κρᾶσις καὶ ἄλλο ψυχή. Ὀργανον γοὶρ ὃν τὸ σῶμα. τῆς ψυχῆς» ἐὰν " μὲν ἐπιτηδείως - κατασκευασθὴ, συνεργεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ» καὶ αὐτὸ ἔχει ἐπιτηδείως " ἐὰν δὲ ἀνεπιτηδείως, ἐμποδίζει, καὶ τότε χρείχ τὴ ψυχὴ πραγμάτων, αἀπομαχομένη πρὸς τὴν ἀνεπιτηδειότητα τοῦ ὀργάνου" καὶ ἐὰν μὴ σφόδρα νήψη., καὶ συνδιαστρέφεται αὐτῷ, καθάπερ μσυσμοὸς συνεξαμαρτάνει τῇ τῆς λύρας διαστροφῆν ἐὰν μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν καταστήσῃ καλῶς. διὸ καὶ χρεία τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα καταρτίση αὐτὸ ὄργανον ἐπιτήδειον ἑαυτῇ. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ διά τε τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν ἡθῶν, ὡς ἐν οἱρμονίκ, τὰ μὲν χαλῶσα, τοὶ δὲ ἐπιτείνουσχ, να ἁρμόδιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῇ κατασκευάση καὶ χρήσηται ἐπιτηδείῳ ὀργάνῳ, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτὴ συνδιαστραφῆ αὐτῷ" συμβαίνει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲν, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν λέγων, οὐδὲν ἧττον συμφέρεται τοῖς ποιότητα λέγουσιν αὐτήν, διασα(ήσωμεν δὲ πρότερον, ἔντελέχειαν τίνα καλεῖ. τὴν οὐσίαν τριχῶς λέγει, τὸ μὲν» ὡς ὕλην ὑποκείμενον» ὃ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι» δύναμιν δὲ ἔχει πρὸς γένεσιν" ἕτερον δὲ, μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ᾽ ἣν εἰδοποιεῖται ἡ ὑλη" τρίτον δὲ, τὸ συναμφότερον, τὸ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους γεγενημένον, ὃ ἔστι λοιπὸν ἔμψυχον. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ μὲν ὕλη, δύναμις" τὸ δὲ εἶδος," ἐντελέχεια. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς (νοεῖται), τὸ μὲν, οἷς ἐπιστήμη" τὸ δὲ, ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην, τουτέστι, τὸ μὲν, ὡς διώθεσις, τὸ δὲ, ὡς ἐνέργεια. (ὡς) ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν. καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν. ἀνάλογος δὲ καὶ μὲν ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστι, τῷ θεωρεῖν (καὶ ἐνεργεῖν)" ὁ δὲ ὕπνος, τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. προτέρα δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὴς ἐνεργείας. διὸ πρώτην ἐντελέχειαν καλεῖ τὸ εἶδος" δευτέραν δὲ, τὴν ἐνέργειαν. οἷον, ὑφθαλμὸς ἐξ ὑποκειμένου ἐστὶ καὶ εἴδους" καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸς ὃ ὀφθαλμός᾽" τὸ δεχόμενον δὲ τὴν ὄψιν, ἤγουν, τὸ εἶδος, ὕλη ὀῷθαλιμοῦ, καλεῖται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ ὁμωνύμως ὀφθαλμός" εἶδος δὲ καὶ ἐντελέχειώ ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη ἮΝ εν ὦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, αὐτὴ ἡ οψις, ἡ τὸ δύνασθαι ὁρῶν αὐτῷ παρε- χομένη" δευτέρα δὲ ἐντελέχειά ἐστι τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ε-"ν ΓΙ ἐνέργεια, καθ' ἣν ὁρᾷ, ὥςπερ οὖν ὁ ἀρτι τεχθεὶς σκύλαξ οὐδετέραν μὲν ἔχει ἐντελέχειαν, δύναμιν δὲ τοῦ δέξασθαι τὴν ἐντελέχειαν" οὕτω δεῖ λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς. ὡς. ν». οὐ εἰν «ν᾿» ΠΕ γχ ἐκεῖ γεννηθεῖσα ἡ ὄψις τελειοῖ τὸν ὀζφθαλμόν" οὑτως ἐνταῦθα γεννηθεῖσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι τελειοῖ τὸ ζῶον, ε ω ἰω Η “ὡς μήτε ἄνευ σώματος εἶναί ποτε τὴν ψυχὴν, μήτε σῶμα δίχα ψυχῆς. σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχή" σώματος δέ ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει καὶ σώματι τοιῶδε᾽ καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ οὐχ, ὑπάρχει. αλλοὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ζωτικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ψυχὴν καλεῖν χωρίζων αὐτῆς τὸ λογικόν, ἔδει δὲ πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ψυχὰν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μέρους, καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἀσθενεστάτου, περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀποζφαίνεσθαι. ἔπειτα, τὸ σῶμα, Φνοὶ, δυνάμει τὸ ζῆν ἔχειν, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν ψυχήν. λέγει γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, δεῖ δὲ τὸ σὥμα, τὸ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον (ἐν ἑαυτῷ), πρότερον ἐνεργείᾳ σῶμα εἶναι" οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐνεργείον εἶναι σῶμα πρὸ τοῦ δέξασθαι τὸ εἶδος" ὕλη γάρ ἐστιν ἄποιος, καὶ οὐ σῶμα " ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐνεργείᾳ (σῶμα) δύναμιν ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὶ γύεσθαι. εἰ δὲ καὶ σῶμα δυνάμει ἐστὶ, πῶς τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα δυνάμει ἑωὴν ε ἐχεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύναται; ἄλλως τε, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατὸν, ἔχοντά τιν μὴ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ οἷον, ὄψιν ἔχοντα, βὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ" ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ καθεύδων ἄνευ ψυχικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐστί. καὶ γὰρ τρέφεται καὶ αὔξεται καὶ Φαντασιοῦται καὶ ἀναπνεῖ, ὅπερ μάλιστα τῆς ζωὶς ἐστι τεκαύριον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν Φανερὸν, ὅτι δυνάμει τὸ οὐ δύναται προςεῖναί τινι» ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐδρκίῳ: προηγουμιέἐπὴν γὰρ τὸ εἰδοποιοῦν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐδ ἐν ἀλλο ἐστὶν, αλλ᾽ ἡ ζωή. τῇ μὲν ἡ γαρ ψυχῇ σύμφυτές ἐστιν ἡ (ωή" τῷ δὲν σώματι» κατὰ ὶ μόθεξιν. ὁ λέγων τοίνυν, τὴν ὑγείαν αἀνάς λογον εἶχι τῇ ζωὴ, οὐ τὴν τὴς ψυχῆς ζωὴν λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος», καὶ οὕτω σοζιζεται. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σωματροὴ οὐσία παρὰ μέρος τῶν ἐναντίων ἐξὶ δεκτικύ" ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, οὐδχμῶς. ἐὰν Ὑχρ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος δι Φορὰ “μεταλλαγή, μεταλλάττεται καὶ τὸ ζῶον. ὡςτε οὐχ, ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσίχ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτι» ἀλλ᾽ ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον» τουτέστιν, αὶ σωματική. οὗ δύναται τοίνυν αὶ ψυχὴ κατ᾽ οὐδένα τρόπον ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος εἶναι" ἀλλ᾽ οὐσία αὐτοτελὴς, ἀσώματος. παρὰ μέρος γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὰ ἐναντία, κακίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἠδύνατο τὸ εἶδυς ἐπιδίξασθαι. ἔπειτά ᾧησιν» ἐντελέ- “χειαν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' ἑχυτὴν. κινεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ συμίβεβεκές. οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπεικὸς, ἀκένητον οὖσαν κινεῖν ἑαᾶς. καὶ τὸ κάλλος, ἀκίνητον ὄν, κινεῖ ἡμᾶς. ἄλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ τοῦτο, εὐκίνητον. ἐν, κωεῖ" ἀλλὼ τὸ φύσιν ἔχον κινεῖσθαι κινεῖ, καὶ οὐχὶ τὸ ἀκίητον. εἰ τοίνυν καὶ τὸ σῶμα καθ' ἑαυτὸ κύγσιν εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἦν ἄτοπον αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ ὠκινήτου" νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἀκίνητον ὑπὸ ἀκοήτου κινεῖσθαι" πόθεν οὖν τῷ σώματι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, εἰ μὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ψυχῆς; οὐ γὰρ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα. πρώτην οὖν γένεσιν κινήσεως βουλόμενος δεῖξαι, οὐ πρώτὴν» ἀλλὰ δευτέραν ἔδειξεν. εἰ μὲν Ἴαρ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον ἐκύει, “τρώτην ἐποίει κίνησιν" εἰ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλως κινεῖ, δευτέρας κινήσεως γένεσιν ἐξηγεῖται, σόθεν οὖν πρώτη ἡένεσις τῆς κινήσεως τῷ σώματι; τὸ γὰρ λέ ὝΕΙΝ» ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν κινεῖσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα, τὰ μὲν κοῦφα ὄντα Φύσει, τὰ δὲ βαρέα, ψεῦδός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ κου- Φότης καὶ βχρύτες κώγοίς ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε στήσεται τὰ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα " ἴσταται δὲ, τὸν οἰκεῖον καταλαβόνγα τόπον οὐκ ἀρὰ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης αἰτίωμ πρώτης,’ ΕῚ, κοησεώς εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες τῶν στοιχείων. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ων τοῦτο δοθῆ, πῶς τὸ λογίζξσθαι καὶ δοξάζειν καὶ κρίνειν δύναται κουφότητος καὶ βαρύτητος ἔργα εἶναι; εἰ δὲ μὲ τούτων, οὐδὲ τῶν στοιχείων" εἰ δὲ μὴ τῶν στοιχείων, ςς, “, ΠῚ ν οὐδὲ τῶν σωμάτων. ἔτι, εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὃ ἔλιος καὶ ἡὶ σελήνην κατὰ Φύσιν κινούμενοι, κατὰ Φύσιν ἠρεμεῖν οὐ δύνανται. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, κατα Φύσιν ἀεικίνητος εὗσα, κατὰ ζύσιν ἠρεμεῖν οὐ δύναται. ἡ γὰρ ἠρεμία,,φθυρὰ τῆς Ψυχῆς ἐστι καὶ παν »τὸς ἀεικινήτου. πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλυτον μένει, φόθεν τὸ σῶμα συνέχεται, ᾧύσει πεφυκὸς σκεδαννυσθαι. ἀρκεῖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ πολλῶν ἀποδεῖξαι, τὴν ψυχὴν μήτε ἐντελίχειαν οὖσαν, μήτε ἀκίνητονν μήτε ἐν σώματι γενομένην. -Πυθαγόρας δὲ συμβολικῶς εἰκάζειν ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν Θεὸν καὶ πάντα τοῖς ριθμοῖς εἰωθως, ἰρίσατο καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀριθμὸν ἑ ἑχυτὸν κινοῦντα, ῳ καὶ Ξενοχράτῆς ἠκολούθησεν. οὐχ ὅτι ἀριθιιός ἐστιν αὶ ψυχὴν αλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς αριθμητοῖς ἐστιν καὶ ἐν τεἰς πεπληθθυσμένοιςν καὶ ὅτι ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἦ διακρίνουσα τὰ πράγματα, τῷ μορφὰς καὶ τύπους ἑκάστοις ἐπιβάλλειν. αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ τὰ εἴδη ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδῶν χωρίζουσα, καὶ διάψο οα αὐτὰ ἀποῴφαίνουσα, τὴ τε ἑτερότητι τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ διὼ τοῦτο ἀριθιιγτὰ ποιοῦσα τὰ πράγματα. ὕθεν οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπήλλακται τῆς κατοὶ τοὺς ἀριθιοὺς κοινωνίας. τὸ δὲ αὐτοκίνητον καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτὴ προφεμαρτύρησεν. ὅτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς εὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ἐντεῦνθεν. ὁ οἰριθ' ὃς ποσόν ἐστιν ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ ποσὸν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐσία " οὐκ ἀρὰ ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχὴν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐν» τοῖς νοητοῖς οὐσίαν εἶναι βώλενται, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐροῦμεν. ἔτι» ἡ ψυχὴ συνεχής ἐστιν" ὁ δὰ ἀφιθμὸς οὐ συνεχής" οὐκ ἄρα ἀμθμὸς ἡ Ψυχη. ἔτι, ὃ ἀριθμὸς ἥτοι ἀρτιός ἐστιν ἢ,Τεμττές" αὶ δὲ ψυχὴ οὑτα ἀγτιος., οὔτε περιττή τ οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμὸς ἦ ψυχή. ἔτι, ὃ ριθιμὸς κατὰ προςθήκην αὐξεται" αὶ δὲ ψυχὴ κατὰ προςθγκηὴν οὐκ αὔξεται. ἔτι» ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητές ἐστιν" ὁ δὲ «οθμὸς ὁ ὡρισμένος ἀνένητος. ἔτι, ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς, μένων εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τὴν (φύσιν, οὐδὲ μίχν ποιότητα τὴν ἐν οὐριθμοῖς γινομένην ὑπαλλάξαι δύναται" ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ μένουσα κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν.» ὐσώλίστε τὰς ποιότητας» ἐξ ἀμαθίας εἰς ἐπιστήμην μεταπίπτουσα» καὶ ἐκ κακίας εἰς ἀρετήν" οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή. τοὶ μὸν οὖν τῶν παλαιῶν δόγματα περὶ ψυχῆς τοιαῦτα, Εὐνόμιος δὲ ὠρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐπίαν ἀσώματον ἐν σώματι κτιζον μένην. συμφρονήσας ὁμοῦ Πλάτωνι καὶ ᾿Αριστοτέλει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ, οὐσίαν ἀσώματον, ἐκ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰληῷε" δὲ, ἐν σώματι κτιζομένηνν ἐκ τὴς τοῦ ᾿Αριστοτέλους ἐν δασκαλίας" οὐκ ἐννοήσας, καί περ ὀξὺς ὦ ὧν, ὅτι συνάγειν εἰς ταὐτὸ πειρᾶται τὰ ἀσύμβατα. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γένεσιν ἔχον, σωματικὴν ὁμοῦ καὶ χρονικὴν, ᾧθαρτόν ἐστι καὶ θνητόν. συνάδει δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ Μωύσέως. τὴν γὰρ (υλην) τῶν αἰσθητῶν (πάντων ) γένεσιν ὑπογράφων, οὐκ ἐν »ὍὋ δὲ, αὐτῇ δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν ῥητῶς ἐζησεν ὑποστῆναι ζύυσιν ἀλλ, εἰκαζοντές τινες τοῦτο δοξαζουσιν, οἷς οὐ πάντες συ Φέρονται. εἰ δὲ τις ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν διάπλασιν τοῦ σώ- ΝΜ ΜΟΙ ν΄ " εν ματος ἐμβεβλῦῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κγοῖτο μετὰ τὸ σῶσα ἐνεβάλλετο" οὔτε κατὰ λόγον οὕτως ἔχει. ὃἣ τοίνυν θνητὴν αὐτὶν λεγέτω, ὡς ᾿Αριστοτέλης» ζήσας αὐτὴν ἐν σώματι γενᾶσθαι καὶ ὡς οἱ στωϊκοί" ἢ λέγων, οὐσίαν ἀσώματον, ς6 παραιτείσθω λέγειν, ἐν σώματι κτιζομένηνν ἢ να μὴ θνητῆς ψυχῆς ἔννοιαν μιν παραστήσῃ καὶ παντελῶς ἀλόγου. ἀλλως τεν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν οἴπω πλήρης ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος, αλλ ἑωιτελὴς ἔτι καὶ νῦν, καὶ προςθήκης αεὶ δεόμενος. πεν» τάκις μύριαι γοῦν τουλάχιστον καθ' ἑκώστην ἡμέραν οὐσίχι νοηταὶ προςγίνονται αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτατον, ὅταν τελεσιουργηθῆ, τότε διαλυυθύσεται κατ᾽ αὐτὸν, τῶν τελεὺπαίων ἀνθρώπων, τῶν πρὸς τὴ ἀναστάσει. τὸν ψυχικὸν ἀριθιιὸν ἀποπληρούντων" οὗ τί ὧν γένοιτο ἀλογώτερον» τότε ᾧχσκειν διαφθείρεσθαι τὸν κόσμον, ὅταν πληρωθῆ., ςε, κὸ, Ω κομιδὴ γὰρ νηπίων παίδων ὁ τρόπος οὗτος», ἐν ψάμμῳ τῆς παιδιᾶς εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸ πληρῶσαι συγχεόντων τὰ γενόμενα. τὸ γὰρ λέγειν, προνοίας λόγῳ νὼν τὰς ψυχαὶς γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐχὶ κτίσεως" οὐ γὰρ καινὴν οὐσίαν, οὐδὲ ὠλλην παρὰ τὴν οὖσαν εἰςάγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ πρόνοιαν πλειστηριάξεσθαι" ἀγνοούντων ἐστὶ διαφορὰν κτίσεως καὶ προνοίας, προνοίας μὲν Ὑχρ ἔργον ἐστὶ, τὸ ἐξ ἀλλολογονίας διασώζειν" τὴν τῶν φθαρτῶν ζώων οὐσίαν" λέγω δὲν τῶν μὴ κατὰ σηπεδένα γινομένων" ἐπειδὴ τὴν τούτων διαδοχὴν σγτεδὼν σάλιν ἑτέρα διαφυλώττει" κτίσεως δὲ τὸ κράτιστον ἔργον» τὸ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποιεῖν. εἰ τοίνυν ἐξ ἀλληλογονίας αἱ ψνχαὶ ἡίνονται, λόγω προνοίας γίνονται, καὶ Φθαρταί εἶσι, καθά- ΝΑ περ τὰ ἀλλα, τὰ ἐκ διαδοχῆς γένους γινόμενα" εἰ δὲ ἐξ " Ω οὐκ ὄντων παρώγονται, κτίσις ἐστὶ τὸ γινόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς τὸ τοῦ Μωύσέως, τὸ, κατέπαυσεν ὁ Θεὸς ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ" ατόπα δὲ αἰ ζεοτερα" διαδοχὴν τοῦ πρώτου ἀνθρώπου εἰς τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνου πάντας (τεχθέντας.) καθάπερ τὴν σωματικὴν διαδοχήν. μήτε γάρ ἀποκεῖσθαι ψυχαὶς» μήτε νῦν κτίζισθαιφ (Φησί, ) τοὺς γὰρ ταῦτα λέγοντας, συνεργὸν ποιεῖν τὸν Θεὸν τοῖς μοιχοῖς" καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τούτων παιδία τικτεται" ψεῦδος δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ, κατέπαυσεν ὁ Θεὸς ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὧν ἤρξατο ποιεῖν,» εἴπερ ἔτι καὶ γὺν ψυχὰς δημιουργεῖ. ἀλλ᾽. εἰ πᾶντα τὰ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἐξ ἀλληλογονίας γεν νώμενα δέδεικται θνητα" διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο γεννᾷ καὶ γεννᾶται» ἵνα τῶν φθαντῶν διαμείνῃ τὸ ἡἕνος" ἀνάγκην καὶ τοῦτον, ἢ θνητὴν εἶναι λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀλληλογονίας ΜΝ ἢ μ᾽ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γενᾶδθαι τὰς ψυχάς. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ μοιχείας γεννωμένων πῷ τῆς προνοίας λόγῳ καταλίπωμεν, ἀγνώστῳ παρ᾿ ἡμῖν ὄντι. εἶ δέ τι δεῖ καὶ τῆς προνοίας καταστοχάσασθαι, “πάντως οἶδε, τὸ τριτέμενον αὶ τῷ βίῳ, ἢ ἢ ἑχυτῷ χρήσιμον ἐσόμενον" ᾿ καὶ διὼ τοῦτο συγχωρεῖ τὴν ἐμψύχωσιν γίνεσθαι. ἱκανὸν δὲ τεκωήριον τούτου λαμβάνομεν, τὸν ἐκ τὴς τοῦ Οὐρίου (γυναικὸς) καὶ τοῦ Δαυὶδ τ ννήθέντα Σολομῶνα. ἑξῆς ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῶν Μανιχαίων, ἦν ἔχουσι τῆς μετέχειν, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττονος" πλείονος μὲν, τὰ ἔμψυχα" ἥττονος δὲ, τὸὶ ἁψυχα᾽ πολλῷ δὲ πλείονος, τὰ οὐράνια" ὡς τὸς καθόλου ψυχῆς μέρη τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον εἶναι ψυχάς. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀμερίστως μερίζεσθοι ταύτην ἐφασκον, ὡς τὴν Φωνὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούουσι, μέτριον ὧν ἥν τὸ κακόν" γὺν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν τῆς ψυχῆς καταμερίζεσθαι λέγουσι" καὶ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὅτι κυρίως αὐτὴν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις εἶναι βούλονται, καὶ συμμερίξεσθαι τούτοις ἐν τὴ τῶν σωμάτων γεν ἴσειγ καὶ πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸ συνιέναι διαλυομένων τῶν σωμάτων, ὡς ὕδωρ μεριζόμενον καὶ σράλιν σὺνἀγόμενον καὶ μιγνύμενον, καὶ τας μὲν καθαραὰς ψυχὰς χωρεῖν εἰς τὸ φῶς, φῶ; οὗσας, τὰς δὲ μεμολυσμένας ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης, χωρεῖν εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα, καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων εἰς τὰ ζυτὰ καὶ τὸ ζῶχ' καὶ οὕτω τὸν οὐσίαν αὐτὴς κατατέμνοντες, καὶ σωμχτικὲν ἀποφαίνοντες, καὶ πάθεσιν ὑποβάλλοντες, ἀξίνατον εἰναί ᾧασι. περιπίπτουσι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. (άσηποντες γὰρ, ἀνατρέχειν τὰς μεμολυσμένας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, καὶ, συγκαταμίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλαις, πάλιν αὐτὰς ἐν ταῖς μετενσωματώσεσι ᾧασι τιμωρεῖίσθαι, κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ὠμαρτημάτων, ἑνοῦντες αὐτὰς καὶ πάλιν χωρίώντες καθ ὑπόστασιν" καὶ γορ τὰς σκιὰς, Φωτὸς μὲν ὄντος, χωρίξσθαι, συννεφίας δὲ (καὶ νυκτὸς) ηενομένχςγ ἐνοῦσθαι" ὅπερ ἀδύνατοι ἐπὶ νοητῆς Φύσεως ἡύνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ αἱ σκιαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰσιν. εἰ καὶ δοίη τὶς αὐτὰς χωρίξεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἐνοῦσθαις Πλάτων δὲ, καὶ μέαν εἰναι καὶ πολλὰς τὰς ψυχᾶς, ἀποφαίνεται" μίαν μὲν γοὶρ εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ψυχὴν» εἶναι δὰ καὶ ἄλλας τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὡς ἰδίᾳ μὲν τὸ πᾶν ἐψυε χῶσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς Ψυχῆς» ἰδίῳ δὲ πάλιν τὸ κατα μέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἑκάστου ψυχὰς. λέγει γοῦν, σὴν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς διατετάσθαι ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέντρου τῆς γὴς ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ" οὐ τοπικῶς αὐτὴν διατετάσθαι ᾧασκων, αἰλλὲ νοητῶς ταύτην δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, τὴν περιάγουσαν σῷφαιροειδῶς τὸ πᾶν, καὶ συνέχρυσαν καὶ συσφίγγουσαν τὸ σωματοειδὲς τοῦ κόσμου" δεῖσθαι γαρ τὸ σώματα τοῦ συνέχοντος, ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν ἐδείχθη" ποιεῖν δὲ τοῦτο τὴν εἰδοποιὸν ψυχήν" ζῆν γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἰδίαν ζωΐν, καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὴν ἰδίαν φθοράν" ἕως μὲν γὰρ συνέχεται καὶ συσφίγγεται τὸ σῶμα. εἶναι λέγεται" διαλυέμενον δὲ, ᾧφθείρεσθαι" καὶ ζὴν μὲν πᾶντα, μὴ πάντα δὲ εἶναι ζῶα. διακρίνουσι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν «ψύχων τὰ Φυτὰ ν τῷ αὔξεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι, τουτέστι, τῇ θρεπτριῖ καὶ φυτικῇ δυνάμει" τῷ δὲ ἄλογα ζῶα απὸ τῶν Φυτῶν, τῇ αἰσθήσει" τὰ δὲ λογικὰ απὸ τῶν ἀλόγων, τῷ λογικῷ " καὶ οὅτω πάντα ἥν λέγοντες» διαστέλλουσι τὴν ζο ἑκάστου Φύσιν. (ἢν οὖν λέγουσι καὶ τὰ πάντῃ ἄψυχα ἐκτικὴν ζω, καθ' δ συνέχεται ὑπὸ τῆς τὸ παντὸς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ εἶναι μόνον καὶ μὴ διαλύεσθαι. ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν» τὸ διακυβερνῶσαν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὴν τὰς Μερικας ψυ- “ἰς» τὰς πρότερον παρὰ τῶν δυμιουργοῦ γενομένας» ἐπιπέμπουσαν, δηλαδὴ, αὐτοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ νόμους αὐτὴ δεδωκότος, καθ' οὕς διεξάγειν ὀφείλει τοῦτο τὸ πᾶν, οὖς καὶ εἱμαρμένην καλεῖ, καὶ χορηγοῦντος δύναμιν αἰ ἀρκοῦσαν τοῦ διόπειν ἡμᾶς. εἴρηται δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ εἰμαρμέγῆς " ποινὴ μὲν οὖν πάντες ἕλληνες» οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάναχτον ἀποφηνάμενοι, τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν δογματίζουσι. διαφέρόγται δὲ περὶ τὰ εἰδὴ τῶν ψυχῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕν εἶδος τὸ ἐν αὸν εἶναι λέγουσι" τοῦτο δὲ καὶ εἰς φυτὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ τῶν ἀλόγων σώματα μεταβαίνειν" οἱ μὲν κατά τινὰς ῥητὰς “χρόνων περιόδους, οἱ δὲν ὡς ἔτυχεν. ἄλλοι δὲν οὐχ' ἕν εἶδος ψυχῶν, ἀλλὰ δύο, λογικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον. τινὲς δὲ πολλὰ, τοσαῦτα, ὅσα τῶν ζώων τὰ εἰδὴ. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος περὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο διηνέχθησαν. εἰπόντος γὰρ Πλάτωνος, τας μὲν θυωριὰς : καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ἀρτπταλτι» κας ψυχαὶς λύκων καὶ λεόντων σώματα μεταμῴιέννυσθαι" τὰς δὲ περὶ τὴν οἰκολασίαν ἡἠσχολημένας, ὄνων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναλαμίβανειν σώματα" οἱ μὲν κυρίως ἥκουσαν τοὺς λύκους καὶ τοὺς λέοντας καὶ τοὺς ὄνους" οἱ δὲ τροπικῶς αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι διόγνωσαν, τὰ ἤθη διὰ τῶν ζώων παρεμ- Φαΐίνοντα. Κρόνιος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ περὶ παλιγγενεσίας, οὕτω γι δὲ καλεῖ τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν, λογικὰς πάσας εἶναι βούλεται" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Πλατωνικὸς ἐν τῷ, ὅτε ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ εἰδὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ Πορῴύριος ὁμοίως " Ἰώωβλιχος δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτοις δραμὼν, κατ᾽ εἶδος ζώων ψυχῆς εἶδος εἶναι λέγει, ἤγουν, ε εἴδη διάφορα. γέγραπται γοῦν αὐτῷ μονόβιβλον ἐπίγραφον, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων Μετενσωματώσεις ἡἶνονται, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ζώων εἰς ζῶα καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀνθρώπους. καί μοι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον οὗτος,. ἕνεκα τούτου, καλῶς κατεστοχᾶσθαι μὴ μόνον τῆς Πλα- “τωνὸς γνώμης, α ὰ καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτῆς, ὡς ἔστιν ἐκ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπιδεῖξαι, μάλιστα δὲ ἐκ τούτων. οὐδεμίαν γὰρ τῶν λογικῶν κινήσεων ἐμφαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀλόγοις ΠΝ οὔτε γὰρ τέχναι, οὔτε μαθήματα, οὔτε βουλαὶ, οὔτε ἀρεταὶ, οὗτε ἀλλό τι τῶν διχνοητικῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν" ἐξ ὦ ὧν δῆλον, ὡς οὐ μέτεστι λογνῶς ψνχῆς αὐτοῖς. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, λέγειν τὰ ἄλογα λογικά. εἶ γὰρ καὶ κομιδὴ γέοις οὖσι τοῖς βρέφεσιν ἡ ἄλογος μόνη κίνησις πρόςεστιν, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν λογικὴν Φαμὲν ἔχειν αὐτὰς ἐπειδήπερ αὐξαγόμεγα τὴν λογικὴν ἀναδείκνυσιν ἐνέργειαν" τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, κατ' οὐδεμίαν ἡλικίαν ἐμζαῖνον τὸ λογικὸν, περιττῶς ἂν ἔσχε λογικὴν ψυχὴν, ἀχρήστου παντελῶς μελ λούσης ἐσεσθαι τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως. καὶ γὲρν οὐδὲν περιττὲν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι, συμφώνως σσι συνωμολόγηται" εἰ δὲ τοῦτο. περιττῶς ἂν καὶ λογικὶ ψυχὴ τοῖς κτήνεσι καὶ τοῖς θυρίοις ἐηκατεβάλλετο : μηδέποτε δυναμένη τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον ἐπιδείξασθαι" καὶ ἣν ἂν ἔγκλημα τοῦ δόντος εἰνάρμοστον ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι" οὔτε γὴρ τεχνίτου τοῦτο ἔργον, οὔτε τάξιν ἢ ἡ οἱρμονίαν εἰδότος" εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, κινεῖσθαι μὲν κατὰ διώθεσιν λογικῶς τὰ ζῶα, τὴν δὲ διάπλασιν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων᾽ περιχιρεθέντων γὰρ μόνων τῶν δακτύλων τῶν χειρῶν, τὰς πλείστας τόχνας παραπόλλυσθαι" οὐ λύει τὸ ζγτούμενον" μένει γὰρ ἔτι τοὶαὐτὸ ἄτοπον» ὡς τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ πρόςζορον Ψυχὴν ἐναρμόσαντος τῷ σώματι, ἄλλα. περιττὴν καὶ ἀνόνητον καὶ ἀνενέργητον, ἐμποδιζομένην διὰ πάσης τῆς ἡλικίας αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας» πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτοὺς κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀδήλων καὶ οὐχ, ὁμολογουμένων. πόθεν γὰρ, ὅτι κατὰ διάθεσιν λογικῶς κινεῖται τὰ βέλτιον οὖν, ἡγεῖσθαι πρόςζῷορον ἑκάστω σώματι ψυχὴν ἐνηρμόσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν πλέον ἔχειν κατὰ; ἐμίθεοιν τοὶ ἡ ζῶα τῆς ἐμφαινομένης ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῶν ι(Φυσιρῶς οπλότητος" ἕκαστον γὰρ εἶδος τῶν ἀλόγων κατ᾽, Ω ᾿ οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν κινεῖται, πρὸς ἣν γέγονεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς χρείαν τα καὶ ἐνέργειαν" καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὴν διάπλασιν ἐπιτηδείαν ἔσχεν. οὐ μὴν ἀβοηθητα παντάπασιν αὐτὰ καταλέλοιπεν ὁ δημιουργὸς, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστῳ (υσικὴν, οὐ λογικὴν, ἐνέβαλε σύνεσιν" τισὶ δὲ καὶ πανουργίας ἐνέθηκεν, ὡςπερ τέχνης εἰκόνα καὶ σκιὰν λογικὴν, δυεῖν τούτων ἕνεκεν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐνεστώσας ἐπιβουλὰς ἐκκλίνειν καὶ τὰς μελλούσας προφυλάττεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ συνάψαι τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἑαυτῇ» ὡς ἤδη εἴρηται. ὅτι δὲ οὐ λογικὼς ταῦτα ποιεῖ" δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ εἶδος ἕκαστον ζῶον ὁμοίως τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν, μὴ κατὰ τὸ δ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ὩΣ κατὰ μίαν δρμὴν ὅλον τὸ εἶδος κινεῖσθαχι. πᾶς γὰρ λαγωὸς ὁμοίως τεχνάζεται, καὶ πᾶς λύκος ὁμοίως πανουργεῖν καὶ πᾶς πίθηκος ὁμοίως μεμεῖτιαι ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπου. μυρίαι γὰρ ὁδοὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πράξεων. ἐλεύθερον γέρ τι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸ λογικόν" ὅθεν οὐχ, ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν ἔργον ἂνθρώποις, ὡς ἑκάστῳ εἶδει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων. Φύσει γὰρ μόνη ταῦτα κινεῖται" τὸ δὲ Φύσει, ὁ ὁμοίως παρὰ στῶσιν ἐστιν. αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ πράξεις ἄλλαι τ παρ᾽ ἄλλοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ αὐταὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, ἐπὶ τιμωρίν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν προημαρτημένων ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ βίῳ εἰς τοιαῦτα σώματα καταπέμπεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον ποιοῦνται τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. διατί γαρ εἰς τὰ πρῶτα γενόμενα σώματα τῶν ζώων, ἐνεβλήθησαν λογικαὶ ψυχαί; οὐ γὰρ δήπου, ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ἀνθρωπείοις ἑμερτήσασαι, πρὶν καὶ εἰς σῶμα γεγέσθαι ἀνθρώπειον. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτη τὴ δόξη τίθεσθαι καὶ Γαληνὸς, ὁ. οθαυμάσιος ἰατρὸς. καὶ καθ' ἕχαστον εἶδος ζώου διάφορον εὗχι δοξάδειν καὶ ψυχῆς εἶδος. λέγει γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ πρώτου βιβλίου τῆς περὶ χρείας μορίων πραγματείας οὕτω" »καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, “πολλὰ τῶν ζώων Ε ἔσται » μόρια, τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ παντάπασιν » εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος ἃ ἄτμητα" χρεία δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ἐστι τῇ »Ψυχῆ. ἣ Σὸ γὰρ σῶμα ταύτης ὄργανον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολὺ διενήνοχεν ἀλλλλῶν τὰ μόρια τῶν ζώων, ὅτι καὶ αἱ. ψυχαί, «πάλιν δὲ, προκόπτων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ; βίβχῳ, προςτίθησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ πιθήκου καὶ τοῦτο" καὶ μὴν, ὦ σοφώτατε κατήγόρε, λέξειεν ἄν ἡ Φύσις πρὸς σὲγ γελοίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐώῳ γελοίαν ἐχρὴν δοθῆναι σιώματος κατασκευήν" οὕτως οἶδε τοῖς διαφόροις κατ᾽ εἶδος σώμασι διαφόρους ἐνούσας ψυχάς. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τούτων. εἰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ὠπεδείξαμεν μήτε σῶμα οὖσαν, μήτε ἀρμμονίαν» μήτε κρᾶσιν, μήτε ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα, ὄχλον ἐκ τούτων, ὡς οὐσίκ τις ἐστὶν ἀσώυατος ἡ ἱ ψυχή. ὃ ὅτι μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ὠὡμολέγηται πᾶσιν" εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα, μήτε συμβεβηκὸς, δῆλον, ὅτι ἀσωματὸός ἐστιν οὐσίχ καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ εἶναι. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ γύνεται καὶ ἀπογίεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορας᾽ τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς χωριζομένης τὸ σῶμα πάντως φθείρεται. τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ χ' χρησώμενόν ἔστιν ἀἅποδεῖξαι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐθάνατον οὖσαν, εἶ γὰρ μήτε σῶμά ἐστιν, σπτερ Φύσει διαλυτὸν ἀπεδείχθη, καὶ φθαρτὸν, μήτε ποιότης» μήτέ ποσότης, μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν φθειρομένων, δῆλον, ὅτι ἀθανατός ἐστι. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τῆς ἐθανασίας ςς αὐτὴς ἀποδείξεις παρά τε Πλάτωνι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις" ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖναι μὲν περισκελεῖς καὶ δυςκατανέητοι καὶ μόλις τοῖς ἐντεθραμμένοις ἐκεήναις ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις γνώριμοι" ἡμῖν δὲ ὠρκεῖ πρὸς ὠπόδειξιν τῆς αθανασίας αὐτῆς, ἡ τῶν θείων λογίων διδασκαλία.» τὸ πιστὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα, διὰ τὸ θεόπνευστος εἶναι" πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μὴ καταδεχομένους τὰ τῶν Χριστιανῶν γράμματα ἀρκεῖγ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν φθειρομόνων ἀποδεῖξαι. εἰ γὰρ μηδέν ἐστι πῶν φθειρομένων, ἔστι δὲ ἀφθαρτος» ἔστι καὶ ἀθάνατος. ὥςτε τοῦτο μὲν ἀρκούντως ἔχον παραλειπτέον. ### English translation (Claude) Almost all the ancients disagree in their account of the soul. Democritus, Epicurus, and the whole school of the Stoic philosophers declare the soul to be a body. And even those who declare the soul a body differ about its substance. The Stoics call it a warm and fiery breath; Critias, blood; Hippon the philosopher, water; Democritus, fire, for the spherical shapes of the atoms, combining with fire and air, make up the soul. Heraclitus says the soul of the universe is an exhalation from moist things, and that the soul in living creatures is of the same kind, arising from the exhalation outside them and within them. Again, among those who say the soul is bodiless the disagreement has become boundless: some call it a substance and immortal, others bodiless but neither a substance nor immortal. Thales first said the soul is ever-moving and self-moving; Pythagoras, a number moving itself; Plato, an intelligible substance moving itself according to harmonious number; Aristotle, the first actuality of a natural, organic body having life potentially; Dicaearchus, a harmony of the four elements, that is, a blending and concord of the elements; for he means not the harmony made of sounds, but the harmonious blending and concord of hot, cold, moist and dry in the body. It is clear that of these the others say the soul is a substance, but Aristotle and Dicaearchus deny it substance. Further, some have held that the soul of all things is one and the same, cut up into individuals and coming together again into itself, as the Manichaeans and some others; others that souls are many and differ in kind; others that they are both one and many. So the discussion must be lengthy, since it must answer so many opinions. Against all who say the soul is a body it will be enough, in common, to state what was said by Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, and by Numenius the Pythagorean. It is this. Bodies, being by their own nature changeable, dispersible, and divisible throughout to infinity, with nothing unchangeable left in them, need something that puts them together, gathers them, and as it were binds and holds them together; this we call soul. If, then, the soul is any kind of body, even the most finely divided, what in turn holds it together? For it has been shown that every body needs something to hold it together, and so on to infinity, until we come to something bodiless. If they say, like the Stoics, that there is a certain tensile motion in bodies, moving inward and outward at once, the outward producing magnitudes and qualities, the inward producing unity and substance, we must ask them, since every motion comes from some power, what this power is and in what it subsists. If this power too is some matter, we shall use the same arguments again. If it is not matter but something material, then the material is different from matter, for what partakes of matter is called material. What then is that which partakes of matter? Is it itself matter, or immaterial? If matter, how is it material and not matter? If not matter, then immaterial; and if immaterial, not a body, for every body is material. If they say that bodies are extended in three dimensions, and the soul too, since it passes through the whole body, is extended in three dimensions and therefore must be a body, we shall say that every body is extended in three dimensions, but not everything extended in three dimensions is a body. For quantity and quality, which are bodiless in themselves, are incidentally measured in a bulk. So too with the soul: by itself it is unextended, but incidentally, along with that in which it is, which is extended in three dimensions, it too is viewed as extended in three dimensions. Again, every body is moved either from outside or from within. If from outside, it will be soulless; if from within, ensouled. If the soul too is a body, then if it is moved from outside it is soulless, and if from within it is ensouled; but it is absurd to call the soul either soulless or ensouled; therefore the soul is not a body. Again, the soul, if it is nourished, is nourished by something bodiless, for learning nourishes it; but no body is nourished by something bodiless; therefore the soul is not a body. So Xenocrates reasoned: and if it is not nourished, while every body of a living creature is nourished, the soul is not a body. This is said in common against all who say that the soul is a body. In particular, against those who think the soul is blood or breath, because when the blood or the breath is removed the creature dies, we should not use the argument that some who think themselves clever have written: “So when part of the blood flows away, part of the soul has flowed away.” That is frivolous; for in things of like parts the remaining part is the same as the whole: water, much or little, is the same; so are silver and gold and everything whose parts do not differ from one another in substance; so the remaining blood, however much it is, would be soul, if the blood is soul. Rather we should say this: if that is soul whose removal kills the creature, then phlegm too is soul, and both kinds of bile; for whichever of these fails brings life to an end. So too the liver, the brain, the heart, the stomach, the kidneys, the intestines and many other things; for which of these could be taken away without the creature dying? Besides, many creatures are bloodless yet ensouled, such as the cartilaginous fishes and the soft-bodied creatures, like cuttlefish, squid, and octopus, and all the hard-shelled and soft-shelled creatures, such as crayfish, crabs, and lobsters. If, then, they are ensouled but bloodless, clearly the soul is not blood. Against those who say the soul is water, because water appears to give life to all things and it is impossible to live without water, there are many objections. Nor can one live without food; so by their account all foods, each one, must be called soul. Next, many animals do not drink, as is recorded of certain eagles, and the partridge too can live without drinking. And why should water be the soul rather than air? One can do without water for a long time, but not even for the shortest time without breathing air. But neither is air the soul. For there are many creatures that live but do not breathe air, such as all insects, like bees, wasps and ants, and bloodless creatures, and most sea creatures, and all that have no lungs; for nothing that lacks lungs breathes air, and conversely nothing that does not breathe air has lungs. Since certain arguments of Cleanthes the Stoic and of Chrysippus are reported which are not to be despised, we must set out their solutions too, as the Platonists solved them. Cleanthes weaves this syllogism: “We are like our parents not only in body but also in soul, in passions, characters, dispositions. But likeness and unlikeness belong to body, not to the bodiless. Therefore the soul is a body.” But first, universals are not established from particulars. Further, “not to the bodiless” is false. For we say numbers are similar whose sides are proportional, such as 6 and 24: the sides of 6 are 2 and 3, of 24, 4 and 6, double them; yet numbers are bodiless. Figures too are similar to figures when they have equal angles and the sides about the equal angles proportional; and they themselves admit that figure is bodiless. Again, as equal and unequal are proper to quantity, so like and unlike are proper to quality; but quality is bodiless. So the bodiless can be like the bodiless. Again he says: “Nothing bodiless suffers along with a body, nor a body with the bodiless, but body with body. But the soul suffers along with the body when it is sick and cut, and the body with the soul: when the soul is ashamed the body turns red, and when it is afraid, pale. Therefore the soul is a body.” But one of the premises is false, laid down by assumption: that nothing bodiless suffers along with a body. What if this belongs to the soul alone? It is as if someone said, “No animal moves its upper jaw; the crocodile moves its upper jaw; therefore the crocodile is not an animal.” Here too the premise, “No animal moves its upper jaw,” is false, laid down by assumption; for see, the crocodile is an animal and moves its upper jaw. In the same way when he says that nothing bodiless suffers along with a body, he assumes the point in question in the denial. And if someone should grant that it is true that nothing bodiless suffers along with a body, still the next premise is not agreed, that the soul suffers along with the body when it is sick and cut. For it is disputed whether the body alone feels the pain, having received sensation from the soul, while the soul itself remains unaffected, or whether it shares the body's pain; and among the more reputable thinkers the former prevails. Syllogisms must be drawn not from disputed premises but from agreed ones. And it can be shown besides that some bodiless things do suffer along with bodies: qualities, being bodiless, suffer along with bodies when they are affected, changing along with the body in its corruption and its generation. Chrysippus says: “Death is the separation of soul from body. But nothing bodiless is separated from a body, for the bodiless does not even touch a body. But the soul both touches and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is a body.” Of these, that death is the separation of soul from body is true; that the bodiless does not touch a body is false as a universal statement, but true of the soul. False, because a line, being bodiless, touches a body and is separated from it, and likewise whiteness; true of the soul, because the soul does not touch the body. For if it touches it, clearly it lies beside it; and if so, it does not lie beside the whole of it, for it is impossible for a body to lie beside a body whole to whole; and so the creature will not be ensouled throughout. So if it touches, the soul will be a body, but the creature will not be wholly ensouled; and if the creature is wholly ensouled, the soul neither touches nor is a body. But the creature is wholly ensouled. Therefore the soul neither touches nor is a body, and it is separated being bodiless. That the soul is not a body, then, is clear from what has been said. That it is not without substance either must be stated next. Since Dicaearchus defined the soul as a harmony, and Simmias, contradicting Socrates, said the soul is a harmony, comparing the soul to a harmony and the body to a lyre, we must set out the solutions given in Plato's Phaedo. One comes from what he had shown earlier. He had shown that learning is recollection. Taking this as agreed, he builds the argument thus: if learning is recollection, our soul existed before it came into human form; but if it is a harmony, it did not exist before but came to be later, when the body was fitted together; for every composition is posterior to the things of which it is composed, since a composition, which a harmony is, is a kind of association of the components, and nothing prevents it from not leading the things of which it is composed but following them. So the claim that the soul is a harmony conflicts with the claim that learning is recollection. But the account of recollection is true; therefore the claim that the soul is a harmony is false. Again, the soul leads the body and rules it, and often opposes it; but a harmony neither leads nor opposes; therefore the soul is not a harmony. Again, one harmony is more or less a harmony than another by being slackened or tightened, not in the ratio of the harmony (for a ratio cannot admit more and less) but in the tuning: if a high and a low note blended together are then slackened, they keep the same ratio in the sizes of the sounds, but the harmony is varied in its tuning, more or less tightened; but one soul is not more or less a soul than another; therefore the soul is not a harmony. Again, the soul admits virtue and vice; but a harmony does not admit harmony and disharmony; therefore the soul is not a harmony. Again, the soul, by admitting contraries in turn, is a substance and a subject; but a harmony is a quality and in a subject; and substance is different from quality; therefore the soul too is different from harmony. That the soul partakes of harmony is not absurd, but it is not on that account a harmony; for neither is the soul virtue because it partakes of virtue. Galen declares nothing; indeed in his demonstrative works he protests that he has declared nothing about the soul. But from what he says he seems rather to favour the view that the soul is a blending, since difference of character follows upon it, building the argument from Hippocrates. If so, clearly he thinks it mortal too, not the whole of it, but only the irrational soul of man; about the rational he is in doubt, speaking thus: … That the blending of the body cannot be the soul is clear from this. Every body, ensouled or soulless, is blended from the four elements, for their blending produces bodies. If, then, the blending of the body is the soul, nothing will be soulless. The argument runs: if the blending of the body is soul, and every body has a blending, every body has a soul; if every body has a soul, no body is soulless; so neither stone nor wood nor iron nor anything else will be soulless. If he says not that every blending of a body is soul, but such and such a one, we must ask what kind of blending it is that makes a living creature and holds the place of soul; for whatever blending he names, we shall find it also in soulless things. There are nine blendings, as he himself showed in his work On Blendings, eight ill-balanced and one well-balanced. He says man is blended according to the well-balanced one, not every man, but the man of the middle blending; and according to the other ill-balanced blendings, and the seasons, and the ways of life, the soul changes. But if it changes, we do not have the same soul, but according to the blending now that of a lion, now of a sheep, now of something else, which is absurd. Again, the blending does not oppose the desires of the body but cooperates with them, for it is what moves them; but the soul opposes them; therefore the blending is not the soul. Again, if the blending is soul, and the blending is a quality, and a quality comes and goes without the destruction of its subject, then the soul too will be separated without the destruction of its subject; but this is not true; therefore the soul is neither a blending nor a quality. For surely they will not say that one of the contraries belongs to the creature by nature, as heat to fire; for then it would not change; but the blending clearly does change, and indeed they themselves are the ones who change blendings by the art of medicine. Again, the qualities of every body are perceptible by sense; but the soul is not perceptible but intelligible; therefore the soul is not a quality of the body. Again, the good blending of blood and breath, together with the arrangement of flesh, sinews and the rest, is strength; the good blending of hot, cold, dry and moist is health; and the symmetry of the limbs with good colour makes the body's beauty. If, then, the harmony of health, strength and beauty is the soul, a living man would necessarily be neither sick, nor weak, nor ugly; but it often happens that not one only but all three of these good blendings are lost while the man is alive; for the same man may be at once ugly, weak and sick; therefore the good blending of the body is not the soul. How, then, do certain natural vices and virtues attend men? This truly comes from the blending of the body. As men are naturally healthy or sickly from their blending, so some, being naturally bilious, are irascible, others cowardly, others lustful. But some master and overcome these; clearly they master the blending; and what masters is one thing and what is mastered another; so the blending is one thing and the soul another. For the body, being the soul's instrument, if it is suitably constructed, cooperates with the soul and is itself in a good state; but if unsuitably, it hinders it, and then the soul has trouble, fighting against the unsuitability of its instrument; and unless it is very watchful, it is perverted along with it, as a melody goes wrong along with a lyre that is out of tune, unless the lyre is first set right. Therefore the soul needs to take care of the body, to make it a suitable instrument for itself. This it does by reason and by habits, as in tuning, slackening some things and tightening others, to make it fit for itself and use a suitable instrument, unless it too is perverted along with it; for this also happens. Aristotle, calling the soul an actuality, agrees no less with those who call it a quality. Let us first make clear what he calls actuality. He speaks of substance in three ways: one as matter, the subject, which by itself is nothing but has a capacity for coming to be; another as shape and form, by which matter is given form; the third as the combination of both, what comes to be from matter and form, which is then ensouled. Matter is potentiality, and form actuality. This too is understood in two ways: one as knowledge, the other as contemplating according to knowledge, that is, one as a disposition, the other as activity. The soul is actuality as knowledge is, because in the existence of the soul there are both sleep and waking: waking is analogous to contemplating and acting, sleep to having and not acting; and knowledge is prior to activity. Therefore he calls the form the first actuality and the activity the second. For example, the eye consists of a subject and a form: the subject is the eye itself, which receives sight, that is, the form; it is the matter of the eye and is itself also called eye, by the same name. The form and first actuality of the eye is sight itself, which gives it the ability to see; the second actuality of the eye is the activity by which it sees. As a newborn puppy has neither actuality, but the capacity to receive the actuality, so we must understand it with the soul. As there sight, coming into being, perfects the eye, so here the soul, coming into being in the body, perfects the living creature, so that neither is the soul ever without a body, nor a body without a soul. For the soul is not a body, but it belongs to a body, and therefore exists in a body, and in such a body, but does not exist by itself. But first, he calls only the life-giving part of the soul soul, separating the rational part from it; but he should have taken the whole soul of man together, and not pronounced on the whole from a part, and that the weakest part. Next, he says the body has life potentially even before the soul comes into being. For he says the body has life in itself potentially; but the body that has life in itself potentially must first be a body actually, and it cannot be a body actually before receiving the form, for matter is without quality and not a body; it is impossible, then, for what is not actually a body to have a capacity for something to come to be from it. And if it is a body potentially, how can a body that is only potential have life in itself potentially? Besides, with other things it is possible to have something and not use it, for instance to have sight and not use it; but with the soul this is impossible. For not even one who sleeps is without the activity of soul: he is nourished, grows, has images, and breathes, which is the surest sign of life. From this it is clear that living potentially cannot belong to anything, but always actually; for what gives form to the soul is primarily nothing else but life. Life is inborn in the soul, but in the body by participation. So whoever says that health stands in the same relation to life speaks not of the life of the soul but of the life of the body; and in that way he is saved. For bodily substance can receive contraries in turn, but the substance according to form by no means; for if a change of form occurs, the creature itself is changed. So it is not the substance according to form that admits contraries, but that according to the subject, that is, the bodily. The soul, then, can in no way be the actuality of the body, but a self-complete, bodiless substance; for it admits contraries in turn, vice and virtue, which the form could not admit. Next, he says that the soul, being an actuality, is unmoved in itself and moved incidentally. There is nothing strange in its moving us though it is unmoved; beauty too, being unmoved, moves us. But even if so, it moves what is movable; what is by nature able to be moved is moved, not what is unmoved. If, then, the body had motion by itself, there would be nothing absurd in its being moved by something unmoved; but as it is, it is impossible for the unmoved to be moved by the unmoved. Where then does the body get its motion, if not from the soul? For the body is not self-moving. Wanting to show the first source of motion, he showed not the first but the second. If what is not moved moved something, it would produce the first motion; but if what is moved by itself moves something else too, he explains the origin of a second motion. Where then is the first origin of motion for the body? To say that the elements move by themselves, some being light by nature and others heavy, is false. For if lightness and heaviness were motion, light and heavy things would never come to rest; but they do come to rest when they reach their proper place; so heaviness and lightness are not causes of the first motion, but qualities of the elements. And even if this is granted, how can reasoning, opining and judging be the works of lightness and heaviness? If they are not their works, then not of the elements; and if not of the elements, not of bodies either. Again, if the soul is moved incidentally … [it is not ever-moving; but] as the sun and the moon, which move by nature, cannot by nature be at rest, so the soul, which is by nature ever-moving, cannot by nature be at rest; for rest is the destruction of the soul and of everything ever-moving. Besides, the question raised at the beginning remains unsolved: how the body, which is by nature apt to be dispersed, is held together. These arguments, out of many, suffice to show that the soul is neither an actuality, nor unmoved, nor something that comes into being in a body. Pythagoras, accustomed always to compare God and all things symbolically with numbers, defined the soul too as a number moving itself, and Xenocrates followed him: not that the soul is a number, but that it is in what is numbered and in the many, and that the soul is what distinguishes things by imposing shapes and patterns on each. For it is the soul that separates forms from forms and shows them to be different, by the otherness of the forms and by the multitude of number, and so makes things numerable; hence it is not entirely free of association with numbers. Its self-motion he himself bore witness to. That it is not a number is clear from this: number is a quantity; the soul is not a quantity but a substance; therefore the soul is not a number, even though they especially want number among intelligibles to be a substance, as we shall say later. Again, the soul is continuous, but number is not continuous; therefore the soul is not number. Again, number is either even or odd, but the soul is neither even nor odd; therefore the soul is not a number. Again, number grows by addition, but the soul does not grow by addition. Again, the soul is self-moving, but a definite number is unmoved. Again, number, remaining one and the same in nature, cannot change even one of the qualities found in numbers; but the soul, remaining one and the same in substance, changes its qualities, passing from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue; therefore the soul is not a number. Such, then, are the doctrines of the ancients about the soul. Eunomius defined the soul as a bodiless substance created in a body, agreeing at once with Plato and Aristotle: “bodiless substance” he took from Plato, “created in a body” from the teaching of Aristotle; not realizing, sharp as he is, that he is trying to bring together things that cannot be reconciled. For everything that has a coming into being, bodily and temporal at once, is corruptible and mortal. The writings of Moses agree with this. For in describing the coming into being of all sensible things he did not expressly say that the nature of the intelligibles came into being at that time; some hold this by conjecture, but not all agree with them. If someone concludes, from the soul's being put in after the body was formed, that it was created then, … [this does not follow: Moses does not say that the soul was then created, but that it was put] into the body after it, nor is it reasonable so. Either let him call the soul mortal, as Aristotle does, who says it comes into being in the body, and as the Stoics do; or, if he calls it a bodiless substance, let him refrain from saying “created in a body,” lest he suggest the notion of a mortal and wholly irrational soul. Besides, on his view the world is not yet full but is still unfinished even now and always in need of addition: at least fifty thousand intelligible substances, they say, are added to it every day. And worst of all, when it has been completed, then, on his view, it will be dissolved, when the last men, those at the resurrection, have filled up the number of souls. What could be more irrational than to say that the world is destroyed when it is filled? This is exactly the way of little children, who as soon as they have finished building in the sand of their play knock down what they have made. And to say that souls now come into being by way of providence and not of creation, since no new substance, other than the one that exists, is introduced, but the existing one is multiplied according to providence, is the mark of those who do not know the difference between creation and providence. The work of providence is to preserve the substance of perishable living things by generation from one another (I mean those that do not come from putrefaction, since another providence preserves their succession too); the supreme work of creation is to make things from what is not. If, then, souls come into being by generation from one another, they come by way of providence and are perishable, like other things that come into being by succession of kind; but if they are brought forth from what is not, what comes to be is a creation, and the word of Moses is not true, that “God rested from all his works.” Both are absurd. [Some say] the succession passes from the first man to all born of him, like the bodily succession. For, they say, souls are neither stored up beforehand nor created now: those who say so make God a fellow-worker with adulterers, since children are born from them too; and it would be false that “God rested from all his works which he had begun to make,” if he still creates souls even now. But if everything that comes into being by succession, by generation from one another, has been shown to be mortal (for things beget and are begotten for this reason, that the race of perishable things may continue), he too must either call the soul mortal, born by generation from one another, or not say that souls come into being by succession from one another. As for the question of those born of adultery, let us leave it to the reason of providence, which is unknown to us. If we must make some guess about providence, it surely knows that what is born will be useful either to life or to itself, and for this reason permits the ensoulment to take place. We take a sufficient proof of this from Solomon, born of the wife of Uriah and David. Next let us examine the opinion of the Manichaeans which they hold about the soul. [They say the soul is one, immortal and bodiless, the soul of the universe, divided into individual bodies, some of which] partake of more of it, some of less: ensouled things of more, soulless things of less, the heavenly bodies of much more; so that individual souls are parts of the universal soul. If they said that it is divided without division, as a voice is among its hearers, the evil would be moderate; but in fact they say the very substance of the soul is cut up. Worst of all, they hold that it is properly in the elements, is divided along with them in the generation of bodies, and comes together again into one when bodies are dissolved, like water divided and gathered and mixed again; and that pure souls go to the light, being light, while those defiled by matter go into the elements, and again from the elements into plants and animals. Thus, cutting up its substance, declaring it bodily and subjecting it to passions, they still say it is immortal. And they fall into contradictions. Saying that the defiled souls run back to the elements and are mixed with one another, they again say that they are punished in reincarnations according to the size of their sins, uniting them and again separating them as individuals. For they say that shadows are separate when there is light, but united when there is cloud or night; which is impossible to happen with an intelligible nature; for shadows belong to sensible things, even if one grants that they are separated and united again. Plato declares that souls are both one and many. There is one soul of the universe, but there are also other souls of the individual beings, so that the universe as a whole is ensouled by the soul of the universe, and each individual in turn by its own soul. He says that the soul of the universe is stretched from the centre of the earth to the ends of heaven, not stretched spatially, but intelligibly; and that this is the soul that carries the universe round in a sphere and holds together and binds the bodily part of the world; for bodies need something to hold them together, as was shown earlier; and this the form-giving soul does. For each thing lives its own life and perishes by its own perishing: as long as the body is held together and bound, it is said to exist; when it is dissolved, to perish. All things live, but not all are living creatures. They distinguish plants from soulless things by growth and nourishment, that is, by the nourishing and vegetative power; irrational animals from plants by sensation; rational beings from irrational by reason; and so, while saying that all things live, they distinguish the nature of each one's life. They say that even wholly soulless things have a cohesive life, by which they are held together by the soul of the universe merely to exist and not to be dissolved. This, they say, is the soul that governs the universe and that sends down the individual souls, which were made earlier by the Creator; the Creator himself, that is, gave it laws according to which it must conduct this universe, which he also calls fate, and supplies it with power sufficient to govern us. This has been said also in the discussion of fate. All the Greeks in common who declared the soul immortal teach reincarnation; but they differ about the kinds of souls. Some say there is one kind, the rational, and that it passes into plants and into the bodies of irrational animals, some at fixed periods of time, others at random. Others say there are not one but two kinds of souls, rational and irrational; others many, as many as the kinds of animals. The Platonists especially disagreed about this doctrine. Plato said that savage, irascible and rapacious souls change into the bodies of wolves and lions, and those given to licentiousness take on the bodies of asses and the like; some understood him literally of wolves, lions and asses, others judged that he spoke figuratively, indicating characters through the animals. Cronius, in his book On Rebirth (this is what he calls reincarnation), holds that all souls are rational; so too Theodorus the Platonist in his work That the Soul Is All the Forms, and Porphyry likewise. Iamblichus, running the opposite way, says that there is a kind of soul for each kind of animal, that is, different kinds. He wrote a single book entitled That Reincarnations Do Not Happen from Men to Irrational Animals nor from Irrational Animals to Men, but from Animals to Animals and from Men to Men. And on this point he seems to me to have guessed rightly not only Plato's mind but the truth itself, as can be shown from many other things and especially from these. No rational movement appears in the irrational animals: there are no arts in them, no learning, no deliberation, no virtues, nor anything else of thought; from which it is clear that they have no share in a rational soul. And it is absurd to call the irrational rational. For although only irrational movement is present in very young infants, we say they have a rational soul, since as they grow they display rational activity; but the irrational animal, which at no age shows the rational, would have a rational soul to no purpose, since its rational power would be wholly useless. And all agree that nothing has come into being from God to no purpose. If so, a rational soul would have been put into cattle and wild beasts to no purpose, never able to show its proper work; and it would be a charge against the one who gave a soul unsuited to the body; for this is not the work of a craftsman, nor of one who knows order and harmony. If someone says that animals move rationally in disposition but that their bodily form keeps them from it (for if only the fingers of the hands were taken from men, most arts would be lost), he does not solve the question. The same absurdity remains: that God fitted to the body a soul not suited to it but superfluous, useless and inactive, hindered throughout the animals' life from its proper activities; besides the fact that they build their argument on what is unclear and not agreed. For how do we know that animals move rationally in disposition? It is better, then, to hold that a soul suited to each body was fitted to it, and that animals have nothing more in disposition than the natural simplicity that appears in their works. For each kind of irrational animal moves by its own impulse toward the use and activity for which it was made from the beginning, and for these it has a suitable bodily form. Yet the Creator has not left them wholly without help, but has put into each a natural, not a rational, intelligence; and into some he has put cunning as well, like an image of art and a shadow of reason, for two reasons: so that they may avoid present attacks and guard against future ones, and so that he might join the whole creation to itself, as has already been said. That they do not do these things rationally is clear from the fact that each animal of a kind does the same things in the same way, not more or less, the whole kind being moved by one impulse. Every hare uses the same tricks, every wolf the same cunning, every ape the same mimicry; which is not so with man. There are countless ways of human action; for the rational is something free and self-determining. Hence there is not one and the same work for all men, as there is for each kind of irrational animal; for these move by nature alone, and what is by nature is alike in all; but rational actions differ from one man to another and are not of necessity the same in all. If they say that the soul is sent down into such bodies as punishment for sins committed earlier in human life, they draw their proof from later things. For why were rational souls put into the first bodies of animals that came into being? Surely not because they had sinned in human bodies before they had even come into a human body. Galen too, the admirable physician, seems to adopt this opinion and to hold that there is a different kind of soul for each kind of animal. For right at the beginning of the first book of his treatise On the Use of the Parts he says: “If so, many of the parts of animals will be some larger, some smaller, some not divisible at all into another form; and all of them are of use to the soul. For the body is its instrument, and for this reason the parts of animals differ much from one another, because their souls do too.” And again, going on in the same book, he adds this about the ape: “Indeed, most wise accuser, Nature would say to you, a ridiculous body had to be given to a ridiculous soul.” So he knows that different souls are in bodies different in kind. So much on these matters. If we have shown that the soul is neither a body, nor a harmony, nor a blending, nor any other quality, it is plain from this that the soul is a bodiless substance. That it exists, all agree; and if it is neither a body nor an accident, it is clear that it is a bodiless substance and not one of the things that have their being in another; for these come and go without the destruction of the subject, but when the soul is separated, the body perishes entirely. Using the same arguments one can show that the soul is immortal. For if it is neither a body, which has been shown to be by nature dissoluble and perishable, nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor any other of the things that perish, it is clear that it is immortal. There are many proofs of its immortality in Plato and others, but they are intricate, hard to grasp, and scarcely known even to those trained in those sciences. For us the teaching of the divine oracles is enough as proof of its immortality, since it carries its credibility in itself, being inspired by God. For those who do not accept the writings of the Christians, it is enough to show that the soul is none of the things that perish; for if it is none of the things that perish, it is imperishable, and so also immortal. So this point, being sufficiently established, may be left. ### Scripture references - Gen 2:2: quotation, high confidence - Gen 2:7: allusion, medium confidence - 2 Sam 12:24: allusion, high confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Democritus (Democritus (fragments)): allusion, medium confidence - Epicurus (Epicurus (sayings and fragments)): allusion, medium confidence - Numenius (Numenius of Apamea): allusion, medium confidence - Cleanthes (Cleanthes (fragments)): quotation, medium confidence - Chrysippus (Chrysippus): quotation, medium confidence - Plato, Phaed. 85e–95a (Plato (works)): allusion, high confidence - Aristotle, De an. 2.1 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence - Galen (Galen (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - The OCR text is damaged in several places; gaps and garbled lines (e.g. Galen's words on the rational soul after “speaking thus”, a line in the argument about the soul being moved incidentally, the Eunomius passage, and the opening of the Manichaean section) are marked “…” or have words supplied in square brackets by sense. Matthaei's apparatus after “both kinds of bile” has been removed. - Ammonius Saccas and Numenius: the argument that bodies need something bodiless to hold them together. Cleanthes and Chrysippus: Stoic arguments for a bodily soul. Plato, Phaedo 85e–95a (Simmias's harmony objection). Aristotle, De an. 2.1, 412a–b. Galen, On Blendings 1, and On the Use of the Parts 1.2 and 1.22 (the ape); the quotations are given as Nemesius cites them. Iamblichus's book on reincarnation is lost. Cronius and Theodorus of Asine were Platonists. - Eunomius, the Anomoean bishop, is cited for his definition of the soul. Nemesius treats the view that souls are passed on from the first man (traducianism) and the objection from children born of adultery; he answers from the birth of Solomon (2 Sam 12:24). - The Manichaean doctrine of the world soul is reported polemically, as written. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 2 (Matthaei, 67-125; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/2). ## Matthaei, chapter 3 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/3/#p-3 - Source: Matthaei, 125-144 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius explains, following Ammonius, how the bodiless soul is united to the body without confusion, applies the account more purely to the union of God the Word with the man, cites Porphyry, and rejects the Eunomian union of powers and union by good pleasure. ### Greek text Ἄπορον δὲ, πῶς ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀψύχου γήεται ἕνωσις. ἄπορον γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον ἐκ τού- 3, " ει. των, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ νοῦ συνέστηκεν ὁ ἄνθρωπὸς, ὡς βού- κι, Ν ᾿ λονταί τινεξῖν ετί πλέον ἀπορώτεμον" εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ -ῤφ"-ῃ εν» « ξ» ταῦτά ἐστιν ὃ ἀνθρωπὸς, ὡἧς εἰπόν τινες, οὐδεμία λύσις ᾿ ν ΙΝ,. τούτων. πάντα γὰρ τὰ συνιέντα εἰς μιᾶς οὐσίχς ὑπόστασιν,,. “πάντως ἑνοῦται" πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐνούμενα ἀλλοιοῦται, καὶ οὐ ματος οὗπτα καὶ οὐσιώδης καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν, ( πῶς) ἑνοῦται σώματι καὶ μέρος ἡίνεται τοῦ ζώου, σώζουσα τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν ἀσύγχυτον καὶ ἀδιαφθορον; ἀνγκὴ γᾶρο ἦ ἡἀνῶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ συνγλλοιῶσθαι καὶ συνεφθάρθαι ἀμφότερα» ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα" ἢ μὴ ἐνῶσθαι μὲν, διὰ τὰς προειρημένας ἀτοπίας, παρακεῖσθαι δὲν ὡς χορευτὰς ἐν χορῷ, ἡ ψῆφον ψήφῳ" ἢ πεκράσθαι, ὡς οἶνον καὶ ὕδωρ. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὲν οὐ δύναται παρακεῖσθαι τῷ σώματι ἡ ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποδέδεικται. Ἦν γὰρ ἂν μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἔμψυχον, τὸ πλησιάζον τὴ ψυχὴ, τὸ δὲ μὴ συνημμένον, «ψυχον" πρὸς τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν λέγειν εἰναι τὰ κατὰ παράθεσιν, ὡς ἐῶα, Φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἣ σίδηρον, ἢ ἢ τὶ τοιοῦτον. καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις δὲ τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τοῦ ὑδατος ἀμφότερα συνδιαφ θείρει. οὔτε γὰρ ὕδωρ ἐστὶ καθαρὸν τὸ κρᾶμα, οὔτε οἶνος καίτοι τῆς τοιαύτης κράσεως κατὰ παράθεσιν γινομένης, λανθάνουσαν τὴν αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ λεπτομερὲς τῶν κεκρχμένων" δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πάλιν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων δύνασθαι χωρίζεσθαι' σπόγγος γοῦν ἐλαιωθεὶς ἀνιμᾶται καθαρὸν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ πάπυρος" αἰσθητῶς δὲ χωεἰσαι τοὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐνωμένα παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἥνωται» μήτε παράκειται, μἦτο κέκραται, τίς ὁ λόγος τοῦ τὸ ζῶον ἕν λέγεσθαι; Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ ὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν οὐ βούλεται τὸ ζῶον ἐκ ψυχῆς εἶναι καὶ σώματος" ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν σώματι κεχρημένην» καὶ ὥπερ ἐνδεδυμένην τὸ σῶμα. ἔχει δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀπορόν τι. πῶς γὰρ ἕν εἶναι δύναται μετὰ τοῦ ἐνδύματος ἡ ἡ ψυχή; οὐ γὰρ ἕν ὃ χιτὼν μετὰ τοῦ ἐνδεδυμένου, ᾿Αμαώνιος δὲ ὁ διδάσκαλος Πλωτίνου, το ζγτούμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπελύετο. ἔλεγε (γὰρ) τὰ νοητὰ τοιαύτην ἔχειν Φύσιν, ὡς καὶ ἐνοῦσθαι τοῖς Δα αὐτὰ δέξασθαι, καθάπερ τὰ συνεφθαρμένα, καὶ ἑνούμενα μένειν ἀσύγχυτα καὶ ἀδιάφῷθορα, ὡς τὰ παραπείμενα. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων ἡ ἕνωσις ἀλλοίωσιν τῶν συνιόντων πάντως ἐργχῴται, ἐπειδήπερ εἰς ἄλλα σώματα μεταβάλλεται») ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα εἰς τὰ συγκρίματα, καὶ αἱ μ τροφαὶ εἰς αἷμα, τὸ δὲ αἷμα εἰς σάρκα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος" ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν Ἔνωσις μὲν γίνεται; λοίωσις δὲ οὐ παρακαλουθεῖ. οὐ γὼρ πέφυκε τὸ νοητὸν κατ᾽ οὐσίχν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι" ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐξίσταται, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὃν φθείρεται, μεταβολὴν. δὲ οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται" ἀλλ' οὔτε εἰς τὸ μὴ, ὃν φθείρεται. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀθάνατον. καὶ αὶ ψυχὴν ζωὴ οὖσα. εἰ ἐν τῇ κράσει μετεβαλλετον ἠἸλλοιώθη ἂ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἣν ζω. τί δὲ συνεβάλλετο τῷ σώματι » εἰ μὴ παρεῖχεν αὐτῷ τὴν ζωήν; οὐκ ἄρα ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ ψυχὴ ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει. δεδεη μένου τοίνυν τούτου, ὅτι τὰ νοητὰ ἀναλλπτε, πατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ἀναγκαίως τ παρακολουθεῖ, τὸ καὶ ἑνούμενα αὐτὰ μὲ συνδιαφ»θείρεσθαι, οἷς ἥνωνται. καὶ ἥνωται τοίνυν καὶ ἀσυγχύτως ἥνωται τῶ σώματι ἡ ψυχή. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἥνωται ν ἡ συμπάθεια δείκνυσι" συμπαθεῖ γὰρ ὅλον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ζῶον, εἷς ἕν ὄν" ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀσύγχυτος Μένει, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ πὲν ψυχὴν τρόπον τινὰ χωριζομένην τοὺ σώματος ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, καὶ ὥςπερ νεκρὸν αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι καταλείπουσαν, μόνον δὲ ἐξατμίζουσαν αὐτῷ τὴν ζωὴν, ἵνα μὴ παντελῶς ἀπόληται, καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐν τοῖς ὀνείροις ἐνεργεῖν, θεσπίζουσαν τὸ μθλον, καὶ τοῖς νοητοῖς πλησιάζουσαν. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ ὅταν καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐπισκέπτηταί τῇ ΕΣ » τ' τῶν νοητῶν. καὶ τότε γὰρ, ὡς οἷον τε, τοῦ σώματος ἑαυτὴν ᾽ «ωρίζει καὶ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν γίνεται, ἵν᾿ οὕτως ἐπιβάλη τοῖς οὖσιν. ἀσώματος γὰρ οὖσα, δι᾽ ὕλου κεχώρηκεν. ὡς τὰ συνεφθαρμένα, μένουσα αἀδιαφζθορος, ὡς τὰ ἀσύγχυτα, Π ᾿ ΕῚ ΓῚ, ᾿ τ.. καὶ τὸ καθ' ἑχυτὴν ἐν διασωζυσα, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἂν γένηται, τρέπουσα ἐκεῖνα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτὴς ζωὴν ν καὶ μὴ τρεπομένη ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος τῇ παρουσίῳ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀέρα εἰς Φῶς μεταβάλλει, ποιῶν αὐτὸν Φωτοειδὴ, καὶ ἑνοῦται τῷ ἀέρι τὸ Φῶς, ἀσυγχύτως ἄμα καὶ κεχυμένως" τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡαὶ ψυχὴ, ἑνουμένη τῷ σώματι, μένει παντελῶς ἀσύγχυτος, κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον διαλλαάττουσα, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἥλιος, σῶμα ὧν καὶ τέπῳ περιγραφόμενος, οὖν ἔστι πανταχοῦ» ἐνθὰ καὶ τὸ Φῶς αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ" μένει γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις ἢ ἐν τῇ θρυαλλίδι δεδεμένον, ὡς ἐν τόπῳ" καὶ δὲ ψυχὴ, ἀσώματος οὖσα καὶ μὴ περιηραφομένη τόπῳ, ὅλη δι᾿ ὅλου χωρεῖ καὶ τοῦ Φωτὸς ἑαυτῆς, καὶ τοῦ σώυατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μέρος Φωτιζόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς, ἐν ᾧ μὴ ὅλη πάρεστιν. οὐ γὰρ κρατεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, αλλ᾽ αὐτὴ κρατεῖ τὸ σῶμα, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ σώμχτι ἐστὶν, ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ ἢ ἀσκῷ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τι σῶμα ἐν αὐτὴ. μὴ κωλυόμενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοὶ νογταὶ» ἀλλὰ διὰ παντὸς σώματος χωροῦντα καὶ ὶ διαφοιτῶντὰ καὶ διεξιόντα. οὐχ' οἷ οἷά τε ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τόπου σωματικοῦ κατε ὄχεσθαι. νοητὰ γαρ ὄντα, ἐν νογτοῖς καὶ τόποις ἐστὶν, ἣ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἡ Σ ἐν σοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις γοητοῖς. ὡς ἡ ψυχὸ; «οτὲ (μὲν ἐν ἑαυτὴ ἐστιν, ὅταν λογίόγται» ποτὲ δὲ, ἐν τῷ νῶ, ὅταν νοὴ. ἐπὰν οἷν ἐν σώματι λέγηται εἶναι, οὐχ᾽ ὡς ἐν τέπω τῷ σώματι λέγεται εἶλχι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν σχέσει» καὶ τῷ παρεῖναι. ὡς λέγεται ὁ Θεὸς ἐν καὶ ἡμῖν. καὶ ἄρ τὴ σχέσεϊ καὶ τῇ πρός τι ῥοπὴ καὶ διαθέσει, δεδέσθαι Φαμὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς λέγομεν ὑπὸ τὸς ἐρωμένης δεδέσθαι τὸν ἐραστὴν, οὐ σωματικῶς, οὐδὲ τοπικῶς, ἀλλὰ ( ψυχὴ πρᾶγμα.) τῆς κατὰ μέρος τοιτιτῆς περιγραφῆς κρεῖττόν ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον μέρος, ποίῳ δύναται τόπῳ περιγράφεσθαι; ἔγκῳ γὰρ τόπος συνυψίσταται. τόπος ἐ γάρ ἐστι πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθ' ὃ περιέχει τὸ περιε- Χόμενον. εἰ δὲέ τις λέγοι" οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ᾿Αλεξανδρείῷῳ αἱ ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἐστὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ ἢ ἐμὴ Ψυχὴν λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν πάλιν τόπον λέγων. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾿Αλεξανδρείῳ καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐν τῷδε, τόπος ἐστίν. ἐν τόπῳ δὲ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν σχέσει. δέδεριται γὰρ μὲ δύνασθαι περιληφθῆναι τόπῳ. ὅταν οὖν ἐν σχέσει γένηται τὸ νοητὸν τόπου τινὸς ἢ πράγ ματος» ἐν τόπῳ ὄντος, καταχρηστριώτερον λέγομεν» ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι, διὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὸν ἐκεῖ, τὸν τύ- “τὸν ἀντὶ πῆς σχέσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας λαμβάνοντες. δέον γὰ λέγειν, ἐκεῖ ἐνεργεῖ, λέγομεν, ἐκεῖ ἐστιν. ρμόσε!ξ δ᾽ ἂν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ᾿καθαρώτερον καὶ μάλιστα τὴ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἑνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου» κωθ' ἦν ἑνωθεὶς ἔ ἐμεῖνεν ἀσύγχυτος καὶ ὠπερίλγετος. οὐ κατα τὸν τῆς ψυχὰς τρόπον. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ, τῶν πεπληθυσμένων οὖσα. δωωῖ καὶ συμπάσχειν πὼς δι᾽ οἰκείσοτητα τῷ σώματι, καὶ κρατεῖν ἐσθ᾽ ὅτε, καὶ κρατεῖσθαι" ὁ δὲ Θεὸς λόγος, οὐδὲν αὐτὸς οἰπὸ τὴς κοινωνίας τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶσα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλοιούμενος ν οὐδὺ μετέχων τῆς ἐκείνων ἀσθενείας, μεταδιδοὺς δὲ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐχυτοῦ θεότητος. γένεται σὺν αὐτοῖς ἕν, μένων ἐν ᾧπερ ἣν καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως " ᾿χαινότερος οὗτός ὃ τρόπος τὴς κράσεως ἡ ἐνωσεως" καὶ κιρνῶται καὶ μένει πὰντάπασω ἄμικτος καὶ ἀσύγχυτος καὶ ἀδιάφθορος καὶ ἀμεσαάβλητος, οὐ συμπάσχων» ἀλλὰ συμπράττων μόνον, οὐδὲ συνφθειρόμενος καὶ συναλλοιούμενος, ἀλλὰ συναυξάνων μὲν ἐκεῖνα» αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ μειούμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, πρὸς τῷ μένειν ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀσύγχυτος, ἐπειδὴ (καὶ) καθαρῶς “πάσης ἀλλοιώσεως ἀμέτοχός ἐστι. μάρτυς ( δὲ) τούτου ἐστὶ Πορ- Φύριος, ὃ κατὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ κινήσας τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γλῶσσαν. ἰσχυραὶ δὲ τῶν ἐχθοῶν αἱ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν μαρτυρίαι, καὶ μὴδεμίαν ἀντιλογίαν ἐπιδεχόμεναι. οὗτος τοίγυν ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ λόγῳ (τῷ περὶ )) γῶν συμμίκτων ὠγτηματων γράφει κατοὶ λέξιν οὕτως" οὐκ ἀπογνωστέον οὖν. ἐνδέχεσθαί τινὰ οὐσίαν παραλη φθῆναι εἰς συμπλήρωσιν ἑτέρας ουσίχς» καὶ εἶναι μέρος οὐσίας, μένουσαν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς (φύσιν, ει μετὰ τὸ συμπληροῦν ἄλλην οὐσίαν, ἣν τε σὺν ἄλλῳ Ὑενον μένην, καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἕν διασωζουσαν" καὶ τὸ μεῖζον" αὐτὴν μὲν μὴ τρεπομένην, τρύπουσαν δὲ ἐκεῖνα, ἐν οἷς ὧν γίγνηται, εἰς τὴν ἑαυτὴς ἐνέργειαν τῇ παρουσίᾳ. λέγει δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἑνώσεως τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος. εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴς ψυχῆς ἀλγθὴς ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὸ ἀσώματον, σολλῷ πλέον ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου» τνῶ μᾶλλον ἀσυγκρίτως καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὄντος ἀσωμάτου. ὅπερ ἀντικρὺς ἄἀπος Φράττει τὰ στόματα τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων κατηγορεῖν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἑνώσεως πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἑλλήνων οἱ πολλοὶ γέλωτα ποιοῦνται, ᾧασκοντες, ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀπίθαγον καὶ ἀπρεπὲς εἶναι, συγγενέσθαι θνητῆ Φύσει τὸ θεῖον κατὰ κρᾶσιν καὶ ἔνωσιν᾽ αλλ᾽ ἐμεῖς τοῖς εὐδοκίμοις αὐτῶν χρησάμενοι μάρτυσν ἀποδυόμεθα τὴν αἰτίαν. λέγεται δὰ παρά τισι, καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ τοῖς Ἑὐνομιανοῖς, ἡνῶσθαι ΑῚ ΕῚ τὸν (θεὸν λόγον τῷ σώματι, οὐ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, ἀλλο κατὰ τὰς ἑκατέρου δυνάμεις, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὰς οὐσίας, τὰς ἑνω- Ὡ θείσας ἢ πραθείσας, ἀλλὼ τοὺς δυνάμεις τοῦ σώματος ταῖς δυνάμεσι ταῖς θείαις συγκεκρῶσθαι" δυνάμεις δὲ τοῦ σώσυγιειρνώμεναι » τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀπειργάσαντο κατ᾽ αὐτούς. οὐδεὶς δὲ ἃ ἂν αὐτοῖς » οἶμαι, συγχωρήσειε, ταὶς αἰσθήσεις σωματικας δυνάμεις" ἀποζξαινομένοις. διώρισται γῶρ ἐν τοῖς ἕωπροσθεν σαφῶς, τίνα μὲν ἴδια σώματος, τίνα δὲ ψυχῆς,» τήνα δὲ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου " καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τὰς δι᾿ ὀργάνων αἰσθήσεις ἐτίθεμεν" αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ὄργανα,. τοῦ σώματος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι. βώστιον οὖν, ὡς προείρηται, κατὰ τὴν οἰκδίαν Φύσιν τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐσυγχύτως τὴν ἕνωσιν ἡίνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν, μηδὲν πταραβλαπτομένης τῆς θειοτέρας ἐκ τῆς ὑποδεεστέρας" ἀλλὰ ταύτης μόνον ὠφελουμένης ἐκ τῆς θειοτέρας" ἐπείπερ ὶ καθαρῶς ἀσώματος Φύσις, χωρεῖ μὲν ἀκωλύτως διὰ πάντων, δι᾿ αὐτῆς δὲ οὐδέν ὥςτε τῷ μὲν χωρεῖν αὐτὴν διὰ πάντων, ἐνῶσθαι" τῷ δὲ μηδὲν δὲ αὐτῆς» μένειν ἅμιιτον καὶ ἀσύγχντον. οὐκ εὐδοκία τοίνυν ὁ τρόπος τὴς ἑνώσεως, ὡς τισι τῶν ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν δοκεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ καὶ φύσις αἰτία. τὸ μὲν γὰρ Ἰαναλαβεῖν σῶμα, κατ᾽ εὐδοκίαν εἴποι τις ἂν εὐλόγως γεγενέσθαι" τὸ δὲ ἑνούμενον μὴ συγχυθῆναι, κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν, οὐ κατ᾽ εὐδοκίαν γίνεται. ποὺς γὰρ βαθμοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ τὰς ἀναβάσεις καὶ καταβάσεις, ὡς ᾿Ωριγένης εἰςάγει, μηδὲν προςηκούσας ταῖς θείαωις γραφαῖς, μηδὲ συνῳδούσας τοῖς τῶν «ριστιανῶν δόγμασι, παραλειττέον. ### English translation (Claude) It is hard to see how the union of the soul with a soulless body comes about, for the matter is perplexing. And if man is composed not only of these but of mind as well, as some hold, it is still more perplexing; and if man is something else besides these, as some have said, there is no solving it. For all things that come together into the existence of one substance are wholly united, and all things united are altered and do not remain what they were before, as is seen with the elements: when they are united they become something else. How then can the soul, which is bodiless and a substance in its own right, be united to a body and become part of the living creature while keeping its own substance unconfused and incorrupt? Either soul and body must be united and both altered and corrupted together, like the elements; or, because of the absurdities just mentioned, they are not united but lie side by side, like dancers in a chorus or a pebble beside a pebble; or they are blended, like wine and water. But it was shown in the discussion of the soul that the soul cannot lie side by side with the body; for then only the part of the body next to the soul would be ensouled, and the part not in contact with it soulless; besides, things set side by side cannot be called one, such as pieces of wood, say, or iron, or anything of the kind. And the blending of wine and water destroys both together: the mixture is neither pure water nor wine. Yet even such a blending happens by juxtaposition, though it escapes the senses because of the fineness of what is blended. This is clear from the fact that they can be separated again: a sponge soaked in oil draws up the water pure, and so does papyrus. But it is wholly impossible to separate perceptibly things exactly united. If, then, they are neither united, nor set side by side, nor blended, what is the reason for calling the living creature one? Because of this difficulty Plato will not have the living creature consist of soul and body, but holds it to be a soul using a body and, as it were, clothed with the body. But this account too has a difficulty. How can the soul be one with its clothing? A tunic is not one with the person who wears it. Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus, solved the question in this way. He said that intelligible things are of such a nature that they are united with what can receive them, like things that are corrupted together, and yet when united remain unconfused and incorrupt, like things set side by side. With bodies, union always produces alteration of the things that come together, since they are changed into other bodies, as the elements into compounds, foods into blood, and blood into flesh and the other parts of the body. But with intelligible things union occurs, but alteration does not follow. For the intelligible is not of a nature to be altered in its substance; it either withdraws or perishes into non-being; it does not admit change. But neither does it perish into non-being, for then it would not be immortal. And the soul, being life, if it were changed in the blending, would be altered and would no longer be life; and what would it contribute to the body if it did not give it life? So the soul is not altered in the union. Since it has been shown that intelligibles are unalterable in substance, it necessarily follows that when they are united they are not corrupted together with the things to which they are united. The soul, then, is united to the body, and united without confusion. That it is united, sympathy shows, for the whole living creature is in sympathy with itself, being one. That it remains unconfused is clear from the way the soul, in a manner, separates from the body in sleep, leaving it lying like a corpse and only breathing life into it so that it does not perish entirely, while by itself it is active in dreams, foretelling the future and drawing near to intelligible things. The same happens when it contemplates by itself some intelligible thing; for then too, as far as it can, it separates itself from the body and comes to be by itself, so as to apply itself to the things that are. Being bodiless, it has passed through the whole, like things corrupted together, while remaining incorrupt, like things unconfused, preserving its own unity, changing the things in which it comes to be according to its own life, and not changed by them. As the sun by its presence changes the air into light, making it luminous, and the light is united with the air, at once unconfused and poured through it, so the soul, united to the body, remains wholly unconfused. It differs only in this: the sun, being a body and bounded in place, is not everywhere its light is, as neither is fire, for fire too stays bound in the wood or in the wick, as in a place; but the soul, being bodiless and not bounded by place, passes whole through the whole, both of its own light and of the body, and there is no part lit by it in which it is not wholly present. For it is not held by the body; rather it holds the body. Nor is it in the body as in a vessel or a wineskin; rather the body is in it. For intelligibles are not hindered by bodies, but pass through, pervade, and go through every body, and cannot be confined by bodily place. Being intelligible, they are in intelligible places, either in themselves or in the intelligibles above them: so the soul is sometimes in itself, when it reasons, and sometimes in the mind, when it understands. When it is said to be in the body, then, it is not said to be in the body as in a place, but as in a relation and by being present, as God is said to be in us. For we say the soul is bound by the body by relation, inclination and disposition toward something, as we say the lover is bound by the beloved, not bodily nor spatially, but by relation. Being without magnitude, mass, or parts, the soul is superior to bounding by parts. For what has no parts, by what place can it be bounded? Place exists together with bulk; for place is the limit of the container, by which it contains what is contained. If someone says, “Then my soul is in Alexandria and in Rome and everywhere,” he fails to notice that he is speaking of place again; for “in Alexandria,” and in general “in this or that,” is a place. But the soul is not in a place at all, but in a relation; for it has been shown that it cannot be contained by a place. So when an intelligible comes into relation with some place or with some thing that is in a place, we say by a looser use of words that it is there, because of its activity there, taking the place in place of the relation and the activity. For when we ought to say “it acts there,” we say “it is there.” This account would fit even more purely and above all the union of God the Word with the man, in which, united, he remained unconfused and uncircumscribed; though not in the manner of the soul. For the soul, being among the things that are multiplied, seems also to suffer somehow along with the body because of their kinship, and sometimes to master it and sometimes to be mastered; but God the Word, in no way altered by the communion with the body and the soul, nor sharing in their weakness, but imparting to them his own divinity, becomes one with them, remaining in what he was before the union. This manner of blending or union is new: he is blended and yet remains altogether unmixed, unconfused, incorrupt and unchanged, not suffering with them but only acting with them, not corrupted or altered with them, but increasing them while himself not diminished by them; besides remaining unchangeable and unconfused, since he has no share in any alteration at all. Porphyry is a witness to this, he who moved his tongue against Christ; and the testimonies of enemies on our behalf are strong and admit no contradiction. This Porphyry, then, in the second book of his Miscellaneous Questions, writes word for word as follows: “We must not despair, then, of the possibility that some substance is taken up to complete another substance and becomes part of a substance while remaining in its own nature after completing another substance, becoming one with another while preserving its own unity; and, what is more, not itself changed, but changing those things in which it comes to be into its own activity by its presence.” He says this about the union of soul and body. If the account is true of the soul because it is bodiless, much more is it true of God the Word, who is incomparably and truly bodiless. This directly stops the mouths of those who attempt to accuse the union of God with man. For many of the Greeks make it a laughing-stock, saying that it is impossible, incredible and unfitting for the divine to come together with a mortal nature by blending and union. But we, using their own reputable men as witnesses, rid ourselves of the charge. Some, and especially the Eunomians, say that God the Word was united to the body not in substance but according to the powers of each; for it was not the substances that were united or blended, but the powers of the body were blended with the divine powers; and the powers of the body, they say, are the senses, which, blended [with the divine powers], produced the union. But no one, I think, would grant them that the senses are bodily powers. For it was clearly distinguished earlier what is proper to the body, what to the soul, and what to both together; and among the things proper to both together we placed the senses that work through organs, while the organs themselves we said belong to the body. It is better, then, as was said before, to hold that the union of the substances takes place without confusion according to the proper nature of bodiless things, the more divine being in no way harmed by the inferior, but the inferior only benefited by the more divine. For a purely bodiless nature passes unhindered through all things, but nothing passes through it; so that by passing through all things it is united, and by nothing passing through it, it remains unmixed and unconfused. The manner of the union, then, is not good pleasure, as some men of reputation think; nature is the cause. That he took a body one might reasonably say happened by good pleasure; but that what was united was not confused happens according to the proper nature of God, not by good pleasure. As for the ranks of souls and their ascents and descents, which Origen introduces, they have nothing to do with the divine Scriptures and do not agree with the doctrines of the Christians; so they must be passed over. ### Scripture references - 2 Cor 6:16: echo, low confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Plato, Alc. 1.129e–130c (Plato (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Origen, Princ. (Origen, On First Principles): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Matthaei's apparatus and Latin note, which the OCR ran into the text after “so that it does not”, have been removed. - Ammonius Saccas, teacher of Plotinus. Porphyry, Miscellaneous Questions (Σύμμικτα ζητήματα), book 2; the work is lost, and this fragment is known from Nemesius. - Christological passage, translated as written: the union “without confusion” and the rejection of union “by good pleasure” (εὐδοκία) are generally taken to be aimed at Theodore of Mopsuestia's language; Nemesius names no one. “The man” translates τὸν ἄνθρωπον, the assumed human nature. - Plato: Alc. 1, 129e–130c (the soul using the body). The soul's ascents and descents: Origen, On First Principles. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 3 (Matthaei, 125-144; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/3). ## Matthaei, chapter 4 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/3/#p-4 - Source: Matthaei, 145-150 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius describes the body as composed of the elements and the four humours, distinguishes parts of like and unlike substance, and notes differences among animals. ### Greek text Πᾶν σῶμα τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἐστὶ σύγκριμα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων γέγονε᾽ προζεχῶς δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐνχίμων ζώων, ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων χυμῶν, αἵματος, Φλέγματος, ξανθῆς τε χολῆς, καὶ μελαίνης" τὰ δὲ τῶν οαἰναίμων, ἐκ τὲ τῶν ἀλλων χυμῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αναλογοῦντος ἐν ἀὐτοεῖς τῷ αἴματι, προςεχῶς δὲ λέγεται, ὅταν ἀμέσως ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τί γίύνγται. ὡς εἶναι τῶν μὲν τεσσάρων στοιχείων σύγκριμα, τοὺς τέσσαρας χυμούς" τῶν δὲ χυμῶν, τὰ ὁμοιομερὴ» ἅ ἐστι μόρια τοῦ σώματος. εἰκάζουσι δὲ, τῇ μὲν γἢν τὴν μέλαιναν χολήν᾽ τῷ δὲ ὕδατι, τὸ φλέγμα" τῷ δὲ ἀέρι, τὸ αἷμα" τῷ δὲ πυρὶ, τὴν ξανθὴν ἀρὰς πᾶν δὲ σύγπριμα στονχείων ἢ στερεόν ἐστιν. ὑγρὸν, ἥ πνεῦμα. ᾿λριστοτέλης δὲ προςεχῶς ἐξ αἵματος Ἰμίαν βούλεται γινεσθαι τὰ σώματα τῶν ζώων. ἐκ τούτου γὰρ καὶ τρέφεσθαι προζεχῶς καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι πάντα τὰ τοῦ ζώου μέρια" καὶ τὸ σπέρμα δὲ τὴν γένεσιν ἐξ αἵματος ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείπερ ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐδόκει καλῶς ἔχειν τά τε σκληρότατα ὀστέα καὶ τὴν ὡπαλωτάτην σάρκα τε καὶ πιμελὴν γύεσθαι" ἤρεσεν Ἱπποκράτει πρώτῳ, τὰ σώματα τῶν ζώων ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων χυμῶν συμπήγνυσθαι προςεχῶς " ν ἐκ μὲν τῶν γεωδεστέρων καὶ παχυμερεστέρων τὰ στερεώτερα ἡγωνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν μαλακωτέρων τὰ μαλιά, εὑρίσκονται δὲ πολλάκις οἱ τέσσαρες ἐν τῷ αἵματι, χυμοὶ, ὡς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐν ταῖς φλεβοτομίαις., ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ ὀῤῥώδους φλέγματος πλεονάζοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, ποτὲ δὲ τῆς μελαίνης ἢ ξανθῆς χολῆς" ὅθεν δοκοῦσί πως ( ἐν τούτω) ἀλλήλοις συμῴωνενν οἱ ἄνδρες. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, μερῶν, ταὶ μὲν ὁμοιομερῆ, τοὶ δὸ εἰνομοιομερῆ" ( οἷον) ὁμοιομερῆ μὲν, ἐγκέφωλος μήνεγε ἡξξν νεῦρον» μυελὸς, ὀστέον, ὀδοὺς. χόνδρος, ἀδένες. σύνδέσμοι, ὑμένες,», ἶνες, τρίχες» ὄνυχες» σάρκες» φλέβες, ὁς ἀρτηρία!» πόροιγ πιμελὴ, δέρμα, καὶ τὼ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα φροςεχὴ τούτων, αἷμα, καθὸ αἷμα καθαρὸν, Φλέγωα, χολὴ μέλαινα καὶ ξανθή. ὁ γὰρ τένων σύνθετός ἐστιν ἔκ τε συνδέσμων καὶ νευρωδῶν ἰνῶν" ἀνομοιομερῆ δὲν κεζαλχ, θώραξ, χεῖρες, πόδες, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. οὐ γὰρ εἰς κεφαλὴν δικιρεῖται ἡὶ κεφαλὴ, ὥςπερ τὸ νεῦρον εἰς νεῦρον, καὶ καὶ φλὲψ εἰς φλέβα, καὶ καὶ σὰρξ εἰς σάγκα" πᾶν δὲ ἀ ἀνομοιομερὲς ἐξ ὁ ὁμοιομερῶν συνέστηκεν ν ὡς αὶ κεζαλὺ, ἐκ νεύρων καὶ σαρκῶν καὶ ἱ ὀστέων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων " καλοῦσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὀργανικαί. ὅρος δὲ ὁμοιομερῶν οὗτος" ὧν τὰ μόρια τῷντε ὅλῳ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν δμοια" τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον ἣν ἀντὶ τοῦ ταυτὸν δεῖ λαμβάνειν. οὐ πᾶν δὲ ζῶον πάντα τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος κέκτηται " ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἔνια ῥελοβα" τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀποδα, ὡς ἰχθύες καὶ ὄζεις" τὰ δὲ ἁ ακέῴαλα, ὡς καρκίνοι καὶ κάραβοι καὶ τῶν νηκτῶν να ἐν γὰρ τῷ στήθει τὰ αἰσθητύρια ἔχουσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχει» πες φυλήν" τὰ δὲ πνεύμονος ἐστέρηται, ὅσα μὴ ἀναπνεῖ σὸν ἀέρα" τὰ δὲ κύστιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὡς ἔρνιθες καὶ πάντα τὰ μὴ οὐροῦντα " χὰ δὲ ὀστρακόδερμα τῶν πλείστων οὐμοιρεῖ μελῶν" ἐν ὀλίγοις γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι ζώοις ὑπάρχει" δοκεῖ δέ τινας καΐ τοὶ ἔχοντα,γ μὲὴ ἔχειν" εἷς ἐλαζξοι δοκοῦσι ἔχειν. τὴν ξανθὴν χολὴν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐντέροις ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν διεσπαρμένην καὶ ἀφανῆ" ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπο;, καὶ πάντα, καὶ τἕλεια, καὶ, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐνδέχοιτο καλῶς, ἔχει παντα. οὕτω δὲ καὶ κατὰ σὴν θέσιν τῶν μορίῳν, “πολλὴ καὶ δια- Φορὰ τοῖς ζώοις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοὺς μαστοὺς ἐν τῷ στήθει" τὰ δὲ, ἐν τὴ κοιλία" τὰ δὲ, ὑπὸ τοὺς μηρούς" καὶ τὰ μὲν δύο, τὰ δὲ τέσσαρας, τὰ δὲ πλείους. σχεδὸν τγοὶρ συνεμέτρησεν ἡ Φύσις τῷ τῶν χαεννωκίνον ἀριθμῷ τὸ πρῦθος τῶν μαστῶν. εἰ δὲ" τὶς ἀεριβῶς ἐκλέγειν ταῦτα βούλοιτο, τὴν περὶ ζώων ἱοτορίαν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀνχγινωσκέτω. οὐ γὰρ τῆς προκειμένης γραφῆς ἀκριβοὺν ἐστι ταῦτα" ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ὑπογραφας τινὰς καὶ τύπους ἐκτίθεσθαι. μετέλθωμεν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν στοιχείων λόγον, ἐξ ἀκολουθίας ἐπὶᾧπούμενον. ### English translation (Claude) Every body is a compound of the four elements and has come to be from them. Directly, the bodies of blooded animals come from the four humours, blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile; those of bloodless animals from the other humours and from what corresponds in them to blood. “Directly” is said when a thing comes to be immediately from those very things; so that the four humours are compounds of the four elements, and the parts of like substance, which are parts of the body, are compounds of the humours. They compare black bile to earth, phlegm to water, blood to air, and yellow bile to fire. Every compound of elements is either solid, liquid, or breath. Aristotle holds that the bodies of animals come directly from blood alone; for from it all the parts of the animal are directly nourished and grow, and the seed too has its origin from blood. But since it did not seem right that the hardest bones and the softest flesh and fat should come from one and the same thing, Hippocrates was the first to hold that the bodies of animals are put together directly from the four humours, the harder parts from the more earthy and coarser humours, the soft from the softer. And the four humours are often found in the blood, as can be seen in blood-letting, sometimes the watery phlegm abounding in it, sometimes black or yellow bile; so that on this point the men seem in a way to agree with one another. Of the parts in animals, some are of like substance, others of unlike substance. Of like substance are brain, membrane, sinew, marrow, bone, tooth, cartilage, glands, ligaments, membranes, fibres, hairs, nails, flesh, veins, arteries, ducts, fat, skin, and their immediate elements, as it were: blood (pure blood, that is), phlegm, and black and yellow bile. (The tendon is compound, made of ligaments and sinewy fibres.) Of unlike substance are the head, the chest, the hands, the feet, and the other limbs of man. For the head is not divided into heads, as a sinew is into sinews, a vein into veins, and flesh into flesh; and every part of unlike substance is composed of parts of like substance, as the head of sinews, flesh, bones and the like; these they also call organic parts. The definition of parts of like substance is this: those whose parts are like the whole and like one another; and “like” here must be taken to mean “the same.” Not every animal has all the parts of the body; some are defective. Some are footless, like fish and snakes; others headless, like crabs, crayfish and some swimming creatures, which have their sense organs in the breast because they have no head; others lack lungs, those that do not breathe air; others have no bladder, like birds and all that do not pass urine. The hard-shelled creatures lack most limbs, for their being alive consists in a few parts. Some seem not to have parts which they do have, as deer seem not to have yellow bile, because they have it scattered in the intestines and invisible. But man has all the parts, and complete, and so arranged that they could not well be otherwise. There is great difference among animals in the position of the parts too: some have the teats on the chest, some on the belly, some under the thighs; some two, some four, some more; for nature has made the number of teats roughly match the number of the young. Whoever wishes to gather these matters precisely should read Aristotle's History of Animals; for it is not the task of the present writing to treat them exactly, but to set out some sketches and outlines. Let us pass, then, to the account of the elements, which follows in order. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Hist. an. (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Hippocrates (Hippocrates, Hippocratic Corpus): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle on blood as the direct source of the body (e.g. Part. an. 2.3); Hippocrates, Nature of Man 4; the parts of like and unlike substance follow Aristotle, Hist. an. 1.1, to which Nemesius refers the reader. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 4 (Matthaei, 145-150; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/4). ## Matthaei, chapter 5 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/5/#p-5 - Source: Matthaei, 150-171 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius defines the four elements and their paired qualities, shows how they are bound by intermediate elements and change into one another, reviews Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics and Apollinarius on the elements, cites Hippocrates against a single element, and turns to the body as the soul's instrument. ### Greek text Ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον τὸ κοσμικὸν, ἔστι μέρος ἐλάχιστον τοῦ συγστοιχεῖν ὁμογενές ἐστι τοῖς ὧν ἐστι στοιχρῖον. ἡ μὲν “γὰρ ἀρχὴ οὐχ, ὁμογενὲς τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῆς" τὸ δὲ στοιχεῖον πάντως ὁμσγενές. ἀλλ᾽, ὅτι μὲν γὴ καὶ ἐ ὕδωρ,. «ήρ τὸ καὶ πὺρ ἐστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, δῆλον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἄκραι αἱ ποιότητες δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ Φαίνονται " οὐ μὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τί τούτων στοιχείων ἄκρατον καὶ ἀνεπίμικτόν ἐστιν ἑτέρου στοιχείου" νενόθευται γὰρ ἡρόμα πως ἅπαντα ταῦτα, καὶ μετείλυχῷεν ἀλλήλων μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον" ἀλλοὶ καὶ ἐν τὴ ἐς μίξει καταδηλός ἐστιν ἡὶ Φύσις αὐτῶν. ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων κατὰ συζυγίαν δύο ποιότητας ἔχει τὰς εἰδοποιούσας αὐτό. ἔστι γορ ἢ μὲν ] ξηρὰ καὶ ψυχρά" τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν" ὁ δὲ ἀὴρ. ὑγρὸς καὶ θερμὸς κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ζύσιν᾽ τὸ δὲ πῦρ. θερμὸν καὶ ξηρόν. οὐ μὴν αἱ ποιότητες καθ' ἑαυτὰς ναι δύνανται στοιχεῖα. οὐ γοὶρ ἐκ ποιοτήτων ἀσωμώτων οἷόν τὸ συστῆναι σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ σάλλα σώματα, μὴ ἄκραν ἔχοντα καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν τὴν στοιχεῖα, πάντων σῶν ὄντων τὴν κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ποιότητα κεκτημένων, καὶ οὐ δυνχωμένων ἀμωιριθῆναι “τοῖα “ποίων ἐστὶ στοιχοῖκ. ἀνάγκη τοίων εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ σῶ-, μα, καὶ ἁπλοῦν σῶμα, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἔχιν ἄκρας τὰς ποιό- | σητας, λόγω δὲν θεραότητα, ψυχρότητα, ὑγρότητα καὶ ξερόταὐτὰ. αὗται γὰρ μέναι σῶν ποιοτήτων ὅλην δ᾽ ὅλου μσταθαλ-. λουσι τὴν οὐσίαν᾽ τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ποιοτήτων οὐδὲ μία τοῦτο δρῷ. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν, πλησιάζον σώματι λευκαίνει αὐτὸ διόλου, ὦ εἷς τὸ θερμὸν θέρμαδνει καὶ τὸ » ψυχρὸν ψύχει,οὗτε δὲ τῶν ἀν λων οὐδέν. ἐναντία δὲ ἀλλύλοις ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, τὰ κατὰ τὰς ὄυο ποιότητας ἐναντίαν ὡς τὸ ὕδωρ τῷ πυρὶ» ψυχρὸν ὃ ὃν καὶ ὑγρὸν, θεραῷ ὄντι καὶ ξηρῷ" καὶ ἡ γὴ τῷ ἀέρι. ψυχρὰ οὖσα καὶ ξηρὰ, τῶ θερμῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία συνάπτεσθαι κλλήλεις οὐ γόύνατον μὴ ἐεέσου τινὸς δεσμοῦ τεταγμένου, τοῦ ὐνδέοντος αὐτὰ ἔταξεν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐν μέσῳ μὲν τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος» ἐναντίων ὄντων; τὸ ὕδωρ, δοὺς αὐτῷ. δύο ποιοτητας» ψυχρότητα καὶ ὑγρότητα, καθ' ἃς ἠδύνατο τοῖς ἄκροις συνατπττόμενον συνδεῖν αὐτά. τῷ μὲν γρ ψυχρῷ. συνοικειοῦται τῇ. ὙΠ τῷ δὲ ὑγρῷ συνάπτεται τῷ φἰόρις “πάλιν μέσον: τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ πρρὸς, ἐναντίων ὄντων. καὶ αὐτῶν, ἔταξε τὸν ἀέραν τῇ μὲν ὑγρῷ ποιότητι οἰκειούμενον πῷ ὑδατι, τῇ δὲ θέρμη τῷ πυρί". καὶ οὕτω τὰ ἐναντία συνῆψεν ἀλλήλοις δεὶ μέσων τονῶν,, τῶν συνδεόντων καὶ ῥαυτὰ καὶ σὰ ὶ συνδούμενα,᾿ ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος δεσμὸς ὦ ὥριστος ἐστιν ἕκαστον οὖν αὐτῶν. κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἑτέραν ποιότητα συνῆψε τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἑτέραν, τῷ μετ᾽ αὐτό" οἷον' τὸ ὕδωρ Ψυχρόν ἐστι καὶ ὑγρόν" ἀλλὰ κατιὰ μὲν τὸ ψυχρὸν τὴ γῇ συνάπτεται, οὕση πρὸ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἄνοδον" κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν, τῷ ἀέρι, ὄντι μετ᾽ αὐτό. ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἀρ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὑγρὸν συνἅπτεται τῷ ὕδατι, πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὄντι" κατὰ δὲ τὸ θερμὸν, τῷ πυρὶ, ὄντι μετ᾽ αὗτον. καὶ τὸ πῦρ δὲ κατὰ μὲν πὴν θερμότητα συνάπτεται τῷ ἀέρι, πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὄντι" ματὰ δὲ τὴν ξηρότητα τῇ ΚΑΙ κατ᾽ ἐπίκλασιν καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀκρον᾽ οὕτω δὲ καὶ καὶ γὴ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ψυχρὸν τῷ ὑδατι" κατὰ δὲ τὸ ξηρὸν τῷ πυρὶ κατ᾽ ἐπῤίλασιν. ἵνα δι γὰρ μὴ μόνον τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω κάθοδον τε καὶ ἄνοδον τὴν σχέσιν ἔχῃ τὰ στοιχεῖς, αλλὰ καὶ τὴν κατὰ κπύηλον, ἐπέκαμψέ πῶς καὶ ἐπέστρεψε τὰ ἄκρα πρὸς ἀλληλα" λέγω δὲ, τὸ πὺρ καὶ τὴν γῆν" καὶ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἀποβαλὸν τὴν θερμότητα μόνην, γίνεται Ὑ7᾽ τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν κεραυνῶν᾽ καταφερόμενον γὰρ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ψυχόμένον ἐκ τῆς ὑπεροπτήσεως ἀπολιθοῦται. διὸ πᾶς κεραυνὸς μετὰ λύθου καὶ θείου Φέρεται" ἔστι δὲ τὸ θεῖονν ὥςπερ πὺρ ὠπεψυγμένον, οὐκ ἔτι θερμὸν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, ξηρὰν δὲν, καὶ ἐνεργοίοι. μόνα δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἔχει τος ποιότητας" τὰ δὲ ἀλλα πάντα» δυνά- Μμειν ἐὰν μὴ πλησιάσῃ στοιχείῳ. ἵνα δὲ μηδέποτε ἐπιὺ εἴπη μήτε τὰ στοιχεῖχ, μήτε τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγιρίματαιν σοφῶς ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐτεχνάσατο, ὥττε τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὰ συγκρίματα, καὶ πάλιν τὰ συγκρίματα εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖχ ἀναλύεσθαι. καὶ οὕτως ἐξ ἀλληλογονίας διαρκοὺς συνιστάμενα σώζεται διαπαντός. γῆ μὲν γὰρ πηωθεῖσα γίνεται ὕδωρ ὕδωρ δὺ πυκνωθθὲν καὶ πηλωθὲν γίνεται γ᾽ θερμανθὲν δὲ καὶ ἐξατμισθὲν γίνεται ἀήρ᾽ ἀρ δὲ συναχιθεὶς μὲν καὶ πυκνωθεὶς γίνεται ὑδωρ" ξηρανθεὶς δὲ, εἰς πῦρ μεταβάλλεται" οὕτω «δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ, σβεσθὲν μὲν καὶ ἀποβαλὲν τὴν ξηρότητα, ἐξαεροῦται. ἔστε γαρ αὐρι, σβέσις πυρὸς καὶ ἀτμὶς ὕδατος ᾿"θερμανθέντος. ἐξ ομψφοτέρων οὖν δῆλον, ὡς ἐκ θέρμίστητος ἡ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῷ" καὶ γοὶρ θερμανθὸν τὸ ὕδωρ, καὶ σβεσθὲν τὸ πῦρν οὴρ γένεται. ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ μὲν τὴν οἰκείαν Φύσιν θερμός" ψύχεται δὲ τῇ γειτνιάφει τῇ πρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ» καὶ τὴν γῆν" ὡς τὰ μὲν κάτω μέρη αὐτοῦ» τὰ πρὸς τὴ γἣν ψυχρὰ εἶναι" τὰ δὲ ἄνω. καὶ πρὸς τῷ πυρὶ, θερμώ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὼ τὸ μαλακὸν καὶ εὐπαθὲς τοῦ ἀέρος" τῶχέως γὰρ ἐξίσταται τὴς οἰκείας Φύσεως καὶ μεταβάλλεται. ᾿Αριστοτές λης δὲ δυο γένη εἶναι τοῦ ἀέρος ζησί" τὸ μὲν ἀτμῶδες, τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως τοῦ ὑδατος" τὸ δὲ καπνῶδες, τὸ ἐκ τῆς σβέσεως τοῦ πυρός" καὶ τὸ μὲν καπνῶδες, θερμὸν εἶναι" πὸ δὲ ἀτμῶδες, ἔνθα μὲν τόκτεται, θερμὲν καὶ αὐτὸ, προϊὸν δὲ κατὰ μέρος ψύχεσθαι, καὶ πρόκοπτον ἐξυδατοῦσθαι. να δὲ καὶ ἀλλα τινὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι ἀτοπα ἐκδια- Φύγη. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, τὸ τοὶ ὑψηλότερα καὶ πολὺ τὸς ηἧς ἀφεστῶτα Ψυχρύτερα Φαίνεσθαι, διττὴν ὑπέθετο τὴν ᾧυσιν αὐτοῦ. πάντα δὲ τὰ σώματα τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τὴς συνόδου τῶν τεσσάρων τούτων στοιχείων ἔχει, τά τὸ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ταατῶν ζώων" τῆς Φύσεως τὰ καθαρώτατα τῶν στοιχείων εἰς τὴν γένεσιν τούτων τῶν σωμάτων ἑλκούσης. καλεῖ δὲ ταῦτα τὰ σώματα Αριστοτόλης Φυσικώ" οὐ κατὰ, ο σωρείαν συντιθεμένων αὐτῶν, αλλ᾽ ὅλων δέ ὅλου εἰς ἕνωσιν ἀνακιρναμένων, καὶ ἕν τι καὶ ἀλλὸ παρ᾽ αὐτὰ ποιούντων τὸ σῶμα" οὕτω γὰρ ἥνωται, ὡς μὴ οἷόν τὰ εἶναι διακρίναι αὐτά" μηδὲ ἰδίᾳ μὲν θεάσασθαι τὴν γ»ν» ἰδία δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ πῦρ, τῷ ἐν τι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς συνόδου τῶν τεσσάρων γεγενῆσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸς τες αρμάπου.. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀλλο ἡ τετραφάρμακος παρὰ τὸ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, οὐχ, ὁμοίως μέντοι. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ παράθεσιν. τὴν τῶν λεπτομερεστώτων, ὡς ἐν τὴ τετραφαρο μάκῳ, τὰ στοιχεῖχ ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα αλλὰ κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ ἑνότητα. πάλιν δὲ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀναλύεται τὰ σώματα: φθειρόμενα " καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τῷ τρόπῳ διαμένει δονεκῶς τὸ πάντα, καὶ διαρκεῖ πρὸς τ» τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν; μήτε ᾿πλεονάζοντα ποτὲ, μήτε, μειούμενα" ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἄλλου γένεσιν, ἄλλου φθοραν. εἶναί ᾧησι, καὶ τὴν ἄλλου φθοραν, ἄλλου γένεσιν, ς οὐ μόνον κατὸ τὴν ψυχὴν. ὡς προείρηται» αλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶωα. Πλάτωνι δὲ δοκεῖν τὰ μὲν τρία στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλειν. εἰς ἀλληλαν τὴν δὲ ΥΝ ἀμετάβλητον μένειν. ἀπεικάζων γὰρ ἑκάστῳ στοιχείῳ τὰ στερεώματα τῶν εὐθυγράμμων σχημάτων" τῇ. μὲν γἣν τὸ κυβικὸν σχῆμα" ἐπειδὴ ἀκινητότατον τῶν λοητῶν ἐστιν" ὑδατι δὲ, τῶν λοιπῶν τὸ δυςκινητότατον τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον" τὸ δὲ εὐκινητότατον, τὸ πυραμοειδὲς, τῷ πυρί" τὸ δὲ ὀκτάεδρον, τῷ ἀέρμ' ἧπερ ἐστὶν εὐκινητότερον, μὲν ὕδατος» δυςκινητότερον δὲ πυρές" ἐκ τούτων τῶν σχῃημάτων ποιεῖται τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ τὼ μὲν τρία εἰς ἀλληλα μεταβαλλειν" τὴν δὲ γῆν τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν. τὼ μὲν γὰρ τρία, τήν τε πυραμίδα καὶ τὸ ὀκτάεδρον καὶ τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον ἐκ σκαληνῶν τριγώνων συνίστασθαι" τὸν δὲ κύβον, ἐξ ἰσοπλεύρων τριγώνων. ὅσα τοίνυν ἐκ. τῶν σκαληνῶν συνέστη τριγώνων, ταῦτα δύνασθαι διαλυόμενα, καὶ πάλιν συνιόντα εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλειν" μήτε δὲ τὸν κύβον διαλυθέντα εἴς τι τῶν ἄλλων, τριῶν σχημάτων δύνασθαι μεταβάλλειν. ἐξ ἰροπλεύρων, γὰρ τριγώνων συνέστηκεν, ἐξ ὧν οὐδὲν ᾿ τῶν, ἄλλων τριῶν συστῆναι δύναται" μήτ᾽ αὖ τι τῶν τριῶν σχημώτων εἰς κύβον. ἀνάγκη οὖν, καὶ τὰ εἰδοποιηθέντα σώματα κατὰ τὰ εἴδη ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς ἐκεῖνα εἶχεν. οὐ μὴν ἀπαθὶς ἔσνεινεν ἡ 5, αλλιξ διαιρεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λεπτομερεστέρων σωμάτων αναστογχειουμένη μὲν, οὐ μὲν ν᾿ Αἱ καὶ μεταβαλλομένη, εἰς τὰ διαιροῦντα αὐτήν. πάλιν γαρ συνιοῦσα εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀποκαθίσταται, ὅπερ Φαίνεται ἐν τῷ ΓΙ ὑδχτι. ἐὰν γὰρ εἰς ὕδωρ γὴν ὀλίγην βαλων ταράξης, δια-. “ ω λύεται εἰς ὕδωρ καὶ γ᾽ ἐὰν δὲ παύση ταράττων, στάσιν ὁ ἀὴρ αὐτὴν, διαλύσῃ, ἢ ἢ ἐν ὕδατι, ὁ ὅταν ὑφ᾽ ὕδατος λυθῆ, λέγει δὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον διαιρῶν, ἕ ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων πρεῖς ποιότητας ἔχειν" τὸ μὲν πῦρ. ὀξύτητα, μανότχτα, κύησιν" τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῶν στοιχείων», τουτέστι τὴν “ γδν. τὰς ἐναντίας ταῦταις ποιότητας» ἀμβλύτητα, πυπνά.-.,. τ τητὰ, στάσιν" ὡς εἶναι κωτὰ ταύτας τὰς ποιότητας ἐναντία ΨΦ τὸ πὺρ καὶ τὸν γῆν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν κατὰ τὰς ἀλλὰς τὰς ἐν συώ,γίω ποιότητας" εἰλῆφθαι δὲ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων τῶν ἄκρων ται ὁ ἀδρ εἰδοποιοὺς ἔχων τρεῖς μόνας ποιότητας, ἀμβλύτητὰ, μανότητα, κίνησιν. πάλιν δύο λαμβάνονται ποιότητες τῆς γῆς». ἀμβλύτης καὶ πυκνότης" τοῦ δὲ πυρὸς, μίχ μόνη ἡ κίνησις" καὶ γίνεται τὸ ὕδωρ εἰδοττοιούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ ἀμβλύτητι, πυκνότητι, κινήσει" ἔστιν οὖν ὡς ὀξύτης πρὸς ἀμβλύτητα, οὕτω πῦρ πρὸς ἀέρα" ὡς δὲ μανότης πρὸς πυκνότητα, οὕτως ἀδ πρὸς ὕδωρ' ὡς δὲ κίνησις πρὸς στάσιν» οὕτως ὕδωρ πρὸς γῆν. ὡς ἄρα πῦρ πρὸς ἀέρα, οὕτως ἀὴρ πρὸς ὑδωρ᾽ καὶ ὡς ἀὴρ πρὸς ὕδωρ, οὕτως ὕδωρ πρὸς γῆν. πέφυκε γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἐπίπεδα ὑπὸ μιᾶς μεσότητος συνἔχεσθαι, τουτέστιν, ἀναλογίας" τὰ δὲ στερεὰ, ὑπὸ δυο μεσοτήτων. κατ᾽ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον λέγουσι ποιότητας ἔχειν τὰ στοιχεῖχλ" τὴν μὲν γὰρ γὴν καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, βαρύτητα ἔχειν, καθ' ἣν κάτω Φύσει ᾧΦέρονται᾽" τὸν δὲ ἀέρα καὶ τὸ πῦρ, κουφότητα, καθ' ἣν ἄνω Φύσει Φέρονται. λέγουσι δὲ οἱ στωϊκοὶ, τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὰ, τὰ δὲ παθητικά" δραστικὰ μὲν, ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ᾽ παθητικὰ δὲ, γὴν καὶ ὕδωρ, ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ πέμπτον εἰςώγει σῶμα, τὸ αἰθέριον καὶ κυκλοφορικὸν, μὴ βουλόμενος τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων γεγενῆσθαι" κυκλοζφορικὸν δὲ λέγει τὰ πέμπτον σῶμα, ὅτι ἐν κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν γὴν Φερεται" τοῦ Πλάτωνος διαρρύδην φάσκοντος, ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς αὐτὸν συνεστάναι. λέγει δὲ οὕτως" υσωματοειδὲς καὶ "ὁρατὸν, ἁπτόν τε δεῖ τὸ γενόμενον εἶναι, χωρὶς δὲ πυρὸς ο»δυδὲν ὧν ποτθ ὁρατὸν. γένοιτο. οὐδὲ ὡπτὸν ἄνευ τινὸς στος ρεοῦ" στερεὸν δὲν οὐκ. ἄνευ γῆς" ὅθεν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς »»τὸ τοῦ; παντὸς συνεστάναι σῶμα ὁ Θεὸς ἀρχόμενος ἐποίει, »»θύο δὲ μόνα καλῶς συνίστασθαι τρίτου χωρὶς, οὐ δυνατόν" ᾿ πευμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ -δεῖ ἀμῷοϊν συναγωγὸν γίνεσθαι" »θεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος, ὃς ἂν ἑαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ ξυνδούμενα »ἷν ποὴὲ ὅτι μάλιστα" τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία καλλιστα ἀποτελεῖν" δεσμὸν λέγων, τὰ μέσα δύο στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἀναλογίας εἰλημμένα τῆς προῤῥηθείσης. οἱ δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἑβραίων πρεσβεύοντες διαφέρονται περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὴς Ὑ2. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι σχεδὸν πάντες. ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς προὺποκειμένης ὕλης Φάσκουσι γεγενήσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν» ἐπειδὴ. Μωύσης ᾧησιν" ἐν ἀρχὴ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ σὴν γὴν" ᾿Απολινάριος δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀβύσσου πεποιηκέναι τὸν Θεὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γὴν βούλεται" τῆς γὰρ ἀβύσσου Μωὺῦσὴῆς οὐκ ἐμνημόνευσεν ἐν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ κόσμου, ὡς γενομένης ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἰωβ εἰρηται" ὁ ποιήσας τὴν ἀβυσσον" ἐκ ταύτης. οὖν,. ὡς ἐξ ὕλης, βούλεται τὰ ἀλλα πάντα γενῆσθαι" οὐ μὴν ὠγένητον » οἰλλιὶ γενητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι, πρὸ πάντων τῶν σωματικῶν προκαταβειβλημένην ὑπὸ τοῦ δγμμν ουργοῦ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόστασιν". δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα τὴς ἀἰθύ βύσσου τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἄπειρον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν, ὅπως ἃ ἂν ἔχον οὐδὲν διχφέρει. ναὶ οὕτω γάρ, πάντων: δ θεὸς θεὸς καὶ δημιουργὸς δεύννυται, καὶ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων πε- γᾷ “ποιηκὼς τὰ πάντα. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐν μένον. λέγοντας εἶναι «τοιχεῖον, ἢ τὸ οἰ ἢ τὸν ἀέρανγ ἡ τὸ ὕδωρ, ὠρκέσει τὰ … »πότε ἄν ἤλγεεν" οὐδὲ ἋΣ ἂν ἦν, ὑφ᾽ οὗ ἀλγήσειεν», ἕν ρῶν" εἰ δὲ καὶ ἤλγεεν, ἕν ὧν ἣν τὸ ἰώμενον. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ »μέλλον ἀλγεῖν» ἐν μεταβολὴ γενέσθαι μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως " »εἶ δὲ ἕν μόνον Ἦν τὸ στοιχεῖον, οὐκ ἣν, εἰς ὃ »»θείη" μὴ τρεπόμενον δὲ, ἀλλὰ μένον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν νἤλγησενν εἰ καὶ αἰσθητὸν ἣν" ᾿ ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὸ πάσχον »οὗπό τριὸς πάσχειν" εἰ δὲ μόνον ἃ ἕν ἣν τὸ στοιχεῖον, οὐκ »ἦν ἄν ἑτέρα ποιότης παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς στογχείου, ὑφ᾽ »ἧἦς ἔπαθεν ἂν τὸ ζῶον" εἰ δὲ μήτε μεταβληθῆναι, μὐτα υ ταθεῖν ἠδύνατο, πῶς ἂν ἤληησε;" δείξας οὖν τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, κατὰ συγχώρησιν ἐπάγει" εἰ δὲ καὶ ἤλγεεν» ἕν ὧν Ἶν τὸ ἰώμενον" γὺν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕν τὸ ἰώμενον, ᾿ἀλλι πολλά" οὐκ ἄρα ἕν ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλὰ καὶ» ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ πεῖς ρῶνται τὸ ἴδιον ἕκαστος κατασκευάζειν δόγμα, ἐκ τούτων μάλιστα δείενυται τέσσαρα ὄντα τὰ στοιχεῖχ. καὶ γὲρ Θαλῆς τὸ ὕδωρ βόνεν λύγων εἶναι στοιχεῖον, πειρᾶται δειινύειν τάλλα τρία ὑπὸ τούτου γινόμενα. τὴν μὲν γον ὑποστάθμην αὐτοῦ γὴν γίνεσθαι" τὸ δὲ λεπτομερέστερον ἀέρα" τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος τὸ λεπτομερέστερον πῦρ. ᾿Αναξιμένης δὲ εἰέρα μόνον λέγων» καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμοίως πειρᾶται δεικνύναι, τὰ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀποτελούμενα" Ἡράκλειτος δὲ καὶ Ἵππασος, ὁ μευτατοντίμοτῳ τὸ τὸ λέγοντες, ταῖς᾽ αὐταῖς σπανταις εἰποδείξεσι κέχρηνται. ἐξ ὧν τοίνυν καὶ ὀὗται φασὶ, τὸ πῦρ εἶνχι τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων γεννητικὸν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ μὲν, τὸ δ ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲν τὸν αἴφρας ἐκ τούτων δείπουτοίε, ὅτι πάγτα τὰ στοιχεῖα εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλεται" πάντων δὲ εἰς ἄλληλα τρεπομένων» ἀνάγκη, τὰ πᾶντα στοι εἴα εἶναι. ὅπερ γὰρ ἂν λάβης τῶν τεσσάρων, εὐρεθήν σεται καὶ τοῦτο ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου γινόμενον. τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῆς ψυ- «ῆς ὄργανον ὑπάρχον, ταῖς ψυχικαῖς δυνάμεσι συνδιαιρεῖται. ταύταις γὰρ πρός σρόν τε καὶ ἐπιτήδειον κατεσκεύασται, πρὸς τὸ «μηδεμίαν. ἀπὰς δύναμιν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐμποθιζεσθαι. ἑκάστη γὰρ Ψψυχριῆ δυσίμει πρὲς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἴδια μέρη τοὺ σώματος ἀποκεκλέρωται, ὡς προϊων ὁ λόγος ἀποδείξει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τάξιν ἐπέχει τεχνίτου". τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὀργάνου" ὕλη δέ ἐστι, περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις" τὸ δὲ ἀποπέλεσμα, καὶ πρᾶξις αὐτή, (οἷον, ὡς ὑλὴ μὲν ὑπόκειται ἡ γυνή" περὶ ταύταν γαρ ἡ πρῶξις" ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις, μοιχεία δ σορνεία.. κ᾽ γάμος.) διχιροῦνται δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις εἷς τε τὸ (ανταστικὸν καὶ διανοητικὸν καὶ μνημονευτικόν. “" ### English translation (Claude) An element of the world is the smallest part of the compound of bodies. … [An element differs from a principle, for] an element is of the same kind as the things of which it is an element; a principle is not of the same kind as what comes from it, but an element is always of the same kind. That earth, water, air and fire are the elements is clear; for in them the qualities appear in their extreme form, both in potentiality and in actuality. Yet none of the perceptible forms of these elements is unmixed and free of admixture with another element; all of them are in some way adulterated and have received some share of one another, more or less; but even in the mixture their nature is evident. Each of the elements has two qualities in combination which give it its form. Earth is dry and cold; water cold and moist; air moist and hot by its own nature; fire hot and dry. The qualities by themselves cannot be elements, for bodies cannot be composed of bodiless qualities; nor can other bodies be elements that do not have the qualities in their extreme and actual form, since all things that exist have quality in greater or less degree and cannot be counted as elements of anything. So the element must be a body, and a simple body, having the qualities in their extreme form and in actuality, I mean heat, cold, moisture and dryness. For these alone of the qualities change the substance wholly through and through; none of the other qualities does this. White does not whiten a body through and through when it comes near it, as the hot heats and the cold cools; nor does any of the others. Elements are contrary to one another when they are contrary in both qualities: water to fire, being cold and moist against the hot and dry; earth to air, being cold and dry against the hot and moist. Since contraries cannot be joined to one another unless some middle bond is placed between them to bind them, the Creator set water in the middle between earth and air, which are contraries, giving it two qualities, coldness and moisture, by which, joining the extremes, it could bind them together: by its coldness it is akin to earth, by its moisture it is joined to air. Again, between water and fire, which are also contraries, he set air, akin to water by the moist quality and to fire by heat. So he joined the contraries to one another through the middle terms, which bind both themselves and the things bound; for such a bond is the best. He joined each of them, then, by one quality to the element before it and by the other to the one after it. For example, water is cold and moist: by its coldness it is joined to earth, which comes before it in the ascent, and by its moisture to air, which comes after it. Likewise air is joined by its moisture to water, which comes before it, and by its heat to fire, which comes after it. And fire is joined by its heat to air, which comes before it, and by its dryness to earth, by a bending back and return toward the extreme; and so earth too is joined by its coldness to water and by its dryness to fire by a bending back. For so that the elements might be related not only by descent and ascent, upward and downward, but also in a circle, he bent and turned the extremes, I mean fire and earth, toward each other in some way. For fire, losing only its heat, becomes earth. This is clear from thunderbolts: fire falling downward and being cooled from its over-heating turns to stone; therefore every thunderbolt comes with stone and sulphur. Sulphur is a kind of cooled fire, no longer hot in actuality but in potentiality, while dry in actuality too. The elements alone have their qualities in actuality; all other things in potentiality, unless they come near an element. So that neither the elements nor the compounds made from them should ever fail, the Creator wisely contrived that the elements change into one another and into the compounds, and that the compounds are resolved again into the elements; and so, composed by continual generation from one another, they are preserved for ever. Earth made into mud becomes water; water thickened and turned to mud becomes earth, and heated and evaporated becomes air; air gathered and thickened becomes water, and dried changes into fire; so too fire, extinguished and losing its dryness, becomes air. For air is the extinguishing of fire and the vapour of heated water. From both it is clear that air comes into being from heat; for both water when heated and fire when extinguished become air. By its own nature, then, air is hot, but it is cooled by its nearness to water and earth, so that its lower parts, near the earth, are cold, and its upper parts, near fire, hot. This happens because of the softness and impressionability of air, for it quickly departs from its own nature and changes. Aristotle says there are two kinds of air: one vaporous, from the exhalation of water; the other smoky, from the extinguishing of fire; the smoky is hot, and the vaporous is hot where it is produced but gradually cools as it advances, and as it goes on turns to water. To escape certain other apparent absurdities, and in particular that the higher regions, far removed from the earth, appear colder, he supposed its nature to be twofold. All bodies, both of plants and of animals, have their origin from the coming together of these four elements, nature drawing the purest of the elements into the generation of these bodies. Aristotle calls these bodies natural, since they are not put together by heaping but mixed wholly through and through into a unity, and make the body something one and other than themselves. For they are so united that they cannot be distinguished, nor can one see earth by itself, and water, air and fire by themselves, because something one and other than these has come to be from the coming together of the four, as with the fourfold drug; for there too the fourfold drug is something other than the things it is composed of, though not in the same way. For the elements do not make bodies by juxtaposition of the finest particles, as in the fourfold drug, but by change and unity. And again, when bodies perish, they are resolved into the elements; and in this way the universe endures continually and suffices for the generation of beings, neither ever increasing nor diminishing. Hence he says that the generation of one thing is the destruction of another, and the destruction of one the generation of another, not only as regards the soul, as was said before, but also as regards the body. Plato holds that three of the elements change into one another, but that earth remains unchangeable. He likens the solids of the rectilinear figures to each element: to earth the cube, since it is the least mobile of the rest; to water, the least mobile of the remainder, the icosahedron; the most mobile, the pyramid, to fire; the octahedron to air, since it is more mobile than water but less mobile than fire. From these figures he proves that the three change into one another but earth does not suffer this. For the three, the pyramid, the octahedron and the icosahedron, are composed of scalene triangles, but the cube of equal-sided triangles. Whatever is composed of scalene triangles can be dissolved and, coming together again, change into one another; but the cube when dissolved cannot change into any of the other three figures, since it is composed of equal-sided triangles, from which none of the other three can be composed; nor again can any of the three figures change into a cube. So the bodies given form according to these figures must stand toward one another as those figures do. Yet earth did not remain unaffected; it is divided by the finer bodies, broken into its elements but not changed into the things that divide it; for it comes together into itself again and is restored, as appears in water. If you throw a little earth into water and stir it, it is dissolved into water and earth; but if you stop stirring, the earth settles … [whether] air dissolves it, or it is in water, when it is dissolved by water. He also divides in another way, saying that each element has three qualities: fire, sharpness, rarity, and motion; the other extreme of the elements, that is earth, the contrary qualities, bluntness, density, and rest; so that by these qualities fire and earth are contraries, which they were not by the other qualities taken in pairs. Air is formed by taking from each extreme, having only three formative qualities, bluntness, rarity, and motion. Again, two qualities of earth are taken, bluntness and density, and of fire one only, motion; and water is formed, given its form by bluntness, density, and motion. As sharpness is to bluntness, so is fire to air; as rarity to density, so air to water; as motion to rest, so water to earth. As fire, then, is to air, so is air to water; and as air to water, so water to earth. For planes are naturally held together by one mean, that is, by a proportion, and solids by two means. In another way they say the elements have qualities: earth and water have heaviness, by which they move downward by nature; air and fire lightness, by which they move upward by nature. The Stoics say that some of the elements are active and some passive: air and fire active, earth and water passive. Aristotle introduces a fifth body too, the ethereal and circular, not wishing heaven to have come from the four elements; he calls the fifth body circular because it moves in a circle around the earth. Plato, on the contrary, says expressly that heaven is composed of fire and earth. He speaks thus: “What has come to be must be bodily, visible, and tangible; but without fire nothing could ever be visible, nor tangible without something solid, nor solid without earth. Hence, beginning to construct the body of the universe, God made it of fire and earth. But two things alone cannot be well joined without a third; there must be some bond between them to bring them together. And the finest of bonds is the one that makes itself and the things it binds as fully one as possible; and proportion is by nature best able to accomplish this.” By “bond” he means the two middle elements taken according to the proportion described above. Those who hold to the teaching of the Hebrews disagree about heaven and earth. Nearly all the others say that heaven and earth came to be from no pre-existing matter, since Moses says, “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth.” But Apollinarius holds that God made heaven and earth from the abyss; for Moses did not mention the abyss as having come into being in the making of the world, but in Job it is said, “who made the abyss.” From this, then, as from matter, he holds that all other things came to be; not that it is uncreated, but created, laid down beforehand by the Creator before all bodily things for the existence of the rest. The very name “abyss” shows the boundlessness of matter. But however this may be, it makes no difference; for in this way too God is shown to be the God and Creator of all, having made all things from what is not. Against those who say there is one element only, earth, or air, or water, what [Hippocrates] says will suffice: … “… he would never have felt pain; nor would there have been anything by which, being one, he could feel pain; and even if he felt pain, the cure too would be one. For what is to feel pain must undergo a change with sensation. If there were only one element, there would be nothing into which it could change; and not changing, but remaining by itself, it would not feel pain, even if it were sensitive. What suffers must also suffer by something; but if the element were one only, there would be no quality besides that of the one element by which the creature could suffer. If it could neither change nor suffer, how could it feel pain?” Having shown that this is impossible, he adds by way of concession: “And even if he felt pain, the cure would be one.” But in fact the cure is not one but many; therefore man was not one. And from the very arguments by which each of them tries to establish his own doctrine it is shown most clearly that the elements are four. Thales, saying that water alone is the element, tries to show that the other three come from it: its sediment becomes earth, its finer part air, and the finer part of air fire. Anaximenes, saying air alone, likewise tries to show that the other elements are produced from air. Heraclitus and Hippasus of Metapontum, saying fire, use the same proofs. From the very arguments by which these men say that fire is the generator of the other elements, and the others, one water, the other air, they show that all the elements change into one another; and since all change into one another, all must be elements; for whichever of the four you take, it too will be found to come from another. The body, being the soul's instrument, is divided along with the soul's powers; for it has been constructed to fit and suit them, so that none of them is hindered by the body. For to each power of the soul particular parts of the body have been allotted for its activity, as the argument will show as it proceeds. The soul holds the rank of a craftsman, the body that of an instrument; the matter is that with which the action is concerned; and the result is the action itself (for example, a woman is the subject matter, for the action concerns her; the action is adultery, or sexual immorality, or marriage). The powers of the soul are divided into imagination, thought, and memory. ### Scripture references - Gen 1:1: quotation, high confidence - Job 38:16: echo, low confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Plato, Tim. 31b–32c (Plato (works)): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Hippocrates, Nat. hom. 2 (Hippocrates, Hippocratic Corpus): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Two blocks of Matthaei's apparatus and Latin notes have been removed. The second also swallowed the opening of the Hippocrates quotation (Nature of Man 2): the gap is marked “…” and the source is supplied in square brackets by sense; the first sentence after the definition is also damaged and is given by sense. - Plato, Tim. 31b–32c (the bond of proportion; quoted) and 53c–57c (the regular solids). Aristotle on the fifth body: De caelo 1.2–3; on two kinds of exhalation: Meteor. 1.4; on generation and destruction: Gen. corr. 1.3. The fourfold drug (τετραφάρμακον) was a common salve. - Apollinarius's view that heaven and earth were made from the abyss is known only from this passage. “Who made the abyss”: no such phrase stands in Job; cf. Job 38:16, 30 and Ps 104:6 (LXX 103:6). - The example of a woman as the subject matter and adultery, sexual immorality, or marriage as the action is a stock illustration of matter and act; translated as written. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 5 (Matthaei, 150-171; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/5). ## Matthaei, chapter 6 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/5/#p-6 - Source: Matthaei, 171-178 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius defines imagination and the Stoic terms for presentation, places its organs in the brain, explains the five senses by their affinity to the elements, defines sensation, and divides the soul's powers into ruling and serving. ### Greek text (ὃ... μὲν οὖν ἐστι δύναμις τὴς ἀλόγου ψυχὴς διὰ … Φάντασμα δὲ πάθος διάκενον ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις τὺς ψυχῆς μέρεσιν π᾿ οὐδενὲς (ανταστοῦ γινόμενον. οἱ δὲ στωϊκοὶ τέσσαρα ταῦτά ᾧασι, (αντασίαν, Φανταστὸν, ᾧανταστικὸν, Φάντασμα' (αντασίαν μὲν λέγοντες, τὸ παάθος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐνδεικνύμενον αὐτὸ τὸ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς Φαντωστόν. ὅταν γὰρ λευκὸν ἴδωμεν, ἐγγίνεταί τι πάθος τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τῆς λήψεως αὐτοῦ. ὡς γαρ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐγγίνεται πάθος, ὅταν αἰσθάνηται" οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅταν ἐννοήση. εἰκόνα γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ δέχεται τοῦ νοητοῦ. Φανταστὸν δὲ " τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὴν Φαντασίαν αἰσθητὸν, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ πᾶν διτι δύνωται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν". ᾧανταστικὸν δὲ, τὸν διάκενον διελκυσμὸν ἄνευ Φανταστοῦ" αν», τασμα δὲ, ᾧ ἐφελκόμεθα κατα τὸν Φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμὸν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μεμνηνότων καὶ μελαγχρλώντων. ἡ δὲ διαφωνία. τούτοις περὶ τὴν ἐναλλαγὴν μένην γέγονε τῶν ὀνομάτων. ὄργανα δὲ αὐτοῦ αἱ πρόσθιοι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοῆίαι, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐταῖς ψυχριὸν πνεῦμα, καὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν νεῦρα, τὰ διάβροχα τῷ ψυχικῷ πνεύματι, καὶ καὶ κατασκενὴ “ὧν αἰσθητηρίων. ἔστι δὲ ἀἰοθητήρια μὲν “πέντε αἴσθησις δὲ μία, ἡ ψυχικὴν ἡ γνωρίζουσα διὰ τῶν αἰσθ θητηρίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοὶς γνόμενα παθη" καὶ τῷ μὲν γεωδεστάτῳ καὶ σωματριωτάτῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἕπερ ἐστὴν καὶ ἁφὴ, τῆς γεώδους Φύσεως αἰσθάνεται" τῷ δὲ αὐγοειδεστάτῳ, ὃ ὁπέρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, τῶν αὐγοειδῶν᾽ ὡς καὶ τῷ ἰὠεροειδεῖ τῶν τοῦ ἀέρος παθημοίτων" αὴρ γάρ. ἐστιν ἡ τὴς (ωνῆς οὐσίκ ἢ οἰέρος πληγή" ᾿ καὶ τῷ σπογγοειδεῖ δὲ καὶ ὑδατοειδεῖ. τῷ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν. τῶν χυμῶν ἀντελαμίβάνεται. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διὰ τοῦ οἰκείου ἡνωρίεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἔδει τοίνυν κατοὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, τέσσαρας εἶναι καὶ τὰς αἰσθύσεις ". ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδήπερ, ὁ αἀτμὸς. καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐσυῶν γένος μεταξὺ τὴν ᾧύσιν ἐστὶν ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος" ἀέρος μὲν γάρ ἐστι παχυμερέστερος, ὕδατος δὸ λεπτομερέστερος " ὄχλον δὲ γίνδται τὸ τοιοῦτον. διὰ τῆς μο-. ρύζης. τοῦ πάθους" οἱ κορυζῶντες ἕλκουσι μὲν τὸν ἰέρα διὰ τὴς οὠνχπνοὴς " ἕλκοντες ᾿δὲ σοῦτον, τῶν ἀτμῶν οὑκ ἐντιλαμβάνονται " διὼ γὰρ τὴν ἔμφραξιν τὸ παχυμερέστερον οὐκ αζφοινεῖται πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν᾽ τούτου χάριν πέμπτον αἰσθητήριον. ὶ ὀσῷρησις, ὑπὸ τῆς ζύσεως ἐξεύρητω, ἔχ μηδὲν τῶν δυναμένων εἰς γνῶσιν ἔχθεῖν διχφυγη τὴν αἰσθησιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αἰασθησις οὐκ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλὰ διάγνωσις ἀλλοιώσεως. ἀλλοιοῦται μὲν γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητήριαι, διακρίνει δὲ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἡ αἴσθησις. καλεῖται δὲ πολλάκις. αἰσθησις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια. ἔστι δὲ αἰσθησις, ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν. δοκοῖ δὲ. οὗτος ὁ ὄρος οὐκ αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλα τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς. διὸ καὶ οὕτως ὁρίζονται τὴν αἴσθησιν» πνεῦμα νοερὸν απὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα τπεταμένον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὕτω. δύναμιν ψυχῆς ἀντίληττικὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν" αἰσθητήριον δὲ, ἃ ὄργανον τῆς ἀντήψεως τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Πλάτων δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν λέγει, ψυχῇς καὶ, σώματος κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκτύς. ἡ γὰρ δύναμις, ψυχῆς" γ ΡῚ Γ Η͂, τὸ δὲ ὄργανον, σώματος" ἀμῴω δὲ διὰ ζαντασίας ἀντι- ΕἼ “ῸὦὋ ληπτικὰὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. τῶν δὲ ψυχικῶν τὰ μέν ἐστιν ὑπουργικά τὲ καὶ δορυφορικά" τὰ δὲ ἀρχικὼ καὶ ἡγεμονικά. ἀρχικὼ μὲν,» τόχτε διανοητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστημονικόν" ὑπουρ-. « γκὰ δὲν τὰ αἰσθητικὰ καὶ ἡ καθ' ὁριὴν κύησις καὶ τὸ ᾿ ΙΕ] (ᾧωνητικόν. καὶ ηἱρ καὶ κύησις καὶ καὶ Φωνὴ ὀξύτατα καὶ ὍὩ. υ σχεδὸν ἀχρόνως ὑπακούει τῇ βουλήσει τοῦ λογισμοῦ" ἅμα γαὶρ καὶ κατὸ τὸ αὐτὸ θέλομέν τε καὶ κινούμεθα οὐδενὸς ΝΝΝ ᾽ ἐπιδεόμενοι μεταξὺ χρόνου τὴς τε βουλήσεως καὶ τῆς κινήσεως, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς κινάσεως τῶν δακτύλων ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν" καὶ στῶν Φυσικῶν δὲ ἔνια ὑπὸ τὴν ἐγεμονίαν ἐστὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, ὡς τὰ καλούμενα πάθη. ### English translation (Claude) [Imagination], then, is a power of the irrational soul, [working] through … A phantasm is an empty affection in the irrational parts of the soul, arising from nothing that is imagined. The Stoics speak of four things: imagination (or presentation), the presented, the imaginative, and the phantasm. They call presentation the affection of the soul that shows both itself and what produced it, the presented object. When we see something white, an affection arises in the soul from the reception of it; for as an affection arises in the sense organs when they perceive, so too in the soul when it understands, for it receives in itself an image of the object understood. The presented is the perceptible thing that produced the presentation, such as the white and everything that can move the soul. The imaginative is the empty attraction without anything presented. The phantasm is that by which we are drawn in the imaginative empty attraction, as with the mad and the melancholic. Their disagreement here lies only in the exchange of names. The organs of imagination are the front ventricles of the brain, the psychic breath in them, the nerves that issue from them, soaked in the psychic breath, and the structure of the sense organs. There are five sense organs, but one sense, the psychic one, which by means of the sense organs recognizes the affections arising in them. By the earthiest and most bodily of the organs, which is touch, it perceives earthy nature; by the most luminous, which is sight, luminous things; so by the airy one it perceives the affections of the air, for the substance of sound is air, or a stroke of air; and by the spongy and watery one, that of taste, it apprehends flavours. For each perceptible thing is naturally known by what is akin to it. On this reasoning, since the elements are four, the senses should be four as well. But since vapour and the class of odours are midway in nature between air and water (being coarser than air and finer than water, as becomes plain from the affection of a cold in the head: people with a cold draw in air by breathing, but drawing it in they do not perceive odours, because the blockage keeps the coarser element from reaching sensation), for this reason nature devised a fifth sense organ, smell, so that nothing that can come to be known should escape sensation. Sensation is not alteration but the discernment of alteration. The sense organs are altered, and sensation discerns the alteration. The sense organs too are often called senses. Sensation is the apprehension of perceptible things; but this definition seems to be not of sensation itself but of its works. Therefore they also define sensation thus: an intellectual breath stretched from the ruling part to the organs; and again thus: a power of the soul that apprehends perceptible things; and the sense organ as the instrument of the apprehension of perceptible things. Plato calls sensation a partnership of soul and body toward external things; for the power belongs to the soul, the instrument to the body, and both together, through imagination, apprehend external things. Of the soul's powers, some are serving and attendant, others ruling and governing. The ruling are thought and knowledge; the serving are the senses, movement by impulse, and the power of speech. Impulse, movement and voice obey the will of reason most quickly and almost without lapse of time; for we will and move at the same time and moment, needing no time between the willing and the movement, as can be seen in the movement of the fingers. And some of the natural functions too are under the governance of thought, such as the so-called passions. ### Extrabiblical texts - Chrysippus (Chrysippus): allusion, medium confidence - Plato (Plato (works)): allusion, low confidence ### Translation notes - The opening line is damaged in the OCR; the first sentence is given by sense and the lost words are marked “…”. - The Stoic distinction of φαντασία, φανταστόν, φανταστικόν and φάντασμα follows Chrysippus (cf. Aetius, Plac. 4.12). Plato on sensation: cf. Tim. 43c, 64a–c. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 6 (Matthaei, 171-178; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/6). ## Matthaei, chapter 7 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-7 - Source: Matthaei, 178-189 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius reviews theories of vision (Hipparchus, the geometers, Plato, Galen, Porphyry) and explains what sight perceives by itself and with memory and thought, and how it is deceived. ### Greek text Ὄψις ὁμωνύμως λέγεται, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἡ αἰσθητικη. Ἵππαρχος δέ ᾧησιν, ἀκτῖνας ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀποτεινομένας τοῖς πέρασιν ἑαυτῶν, καθασπτερ χειρῶν ἐπαζφαῖς, καθαπτούσας τοῖς ἐκτὸς σώμασι, τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρατικὸν ἀναδιδόναι. οἱ δὲ γεωμέτραᾶι κωνους τινὰς ἀναγράφουσιν, ἐκ τῆς συνεμπτώσεως τῶν ἀκτίνων γινομένους, τῶν ἐκπτεμπομένων διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. … πέμπειν γὰρ ἀκτῖνας, τὸν μὲν δεξιὸν ὀφθαλμὸν, ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ, τὸν δὲ ἀριστερὸν, ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιά" ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς … παραγίνεσθαι, Πλάτων δὲ, κατὰ συναύγειαν,, τοῦ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. Φωτὸς ἐπὶ πεσὸν ἀποῤῥέοντος εἰς τὸν ὁμοιοεν ἀέρα. τοῦ δὲ οὐπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἐντιζερομένου, τοῦ δὲ περὶ τὼ μεταξὺ ἀέρα, εὐδιάχυτον ὄντα καὶ εὔτρετστον, συνεκτεινομένου τῷ πυροειδεῖ τῆς ὄψεως. Γαληνὸς δὲ, συμφώνως τημλάτωνι, “περὶ τὴς ὄψεως ἐν τῷ ἑβδόμῳ τῆς συμφωνίας λέγει, γράφων οὕτω πως σποράδην" εἴπερ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἀφικνοῖτο μοῖρα τις ἥ δύναμις ἢ ἢ εἴδωλον ἣ ποιότης τῶν ὁρωμένων. σωμάτων, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ βλεπομένου τὸ μέγεθος ἔγνωμεν, οἷον ὄρους, εἰ τύχοι, μεγίστου, τηλικούτου γοὶρ εἰδωλον ἐμπήττειν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν παντάπασιν ἀλογον" ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ὀπτικὸν οὐχ, οἵόντε τοσαύτην ἰσχὺν ἐκκχρινέμενον λαυβάνειν, ὡς περιχεῖσθαι παντὶ τῷ βλεπομένω" λείπεται οὖν, τὸν πέριξ ἀέρα τοιοῦτον ὄργανον ἐμῖν γίνεσθαι, καθ' ὃν ὁρῶμεν χρό- γον, ὁποῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ νεῦρον ὑπάρχει τὸ ὀπτικόν. τοιοῦτον γΐο. τι πάσχειν ἔοιχεν ὁ περιέχων ἡμᾶς ἀήρ᾽ ἢ τε γλρ αὐγὴ τοῦ ἡλίου, ψαύουσα τοῦ ἄνω Τέρατος τοῦ ἀέρος, διαδίδωσιν εἰς ὅλον τὴν δύναμιν" ὅτο διὰ τῶν ὀπτικῶν νεύρων αὐγὴ Φερομένη, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν ἔχει π’εὺματικὴν» ἐμπίπτουσα δὲ τῷ περιέχοντι καὶ τὴ πρώτη προς βολὴ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐργαζομένη, διχδίδωσιν ἄχρι πλείστοῦ συνέχουσα ἑαυτὴν, ἄχρις ἄν εἰς ἀντιτυπὲς ἐμπέση σῶμα. ἡΐνεται γὰρ ὃ ἀὴ᾿ ὄργανον τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ πρὲς τὸν τῶν ἐρωμένων διάγνωσιν τοιοῦτον», οἷόνπερ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸ νεῦρον" ὥςτε ὃν ἔχει λόγον ὁ ἐὴ κέφαλος πρὸς τὸ νεῦρὸν, τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα ἐψυχωμένον ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλιακῆς αὐγῆς. ὅτι δὲ. πέφυκεν ὁ ἀὴρ τοῖς πλησιάφουσι σώμασι συνεξομοιοῦσθαι, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ καὶ πυῤῥοῦ τινὸς ἢ κυανοῦ ἢ καὶ ἀργύρου λαμπροῦ διαφερομεένου, Φωτὸς ὄντος, ὑπὸ τοῦ διενεχθέντος οἰλλοιοῦσθαι τὸν ἀέρα. Πορφύριος. δὲ ἐν τῷ στερὶ αἰσθήσεως, οὔτε κῶνον; οὔτε εἴδωλον, οὔτε ἄλλο τί, Φησὶν, αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ ὁρᾷν" ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν, ἐντυγχάνουσαν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς, ἐπηινώσπειν ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν τὰ ὁρατὰ; τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν συνέχειν πάντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ εἶναι τὰ παντὰ ψυχὴν συνέχρυσαν σώματα διάφορα. μίαν γοὺρ βυνλόμονος εἶναι πάντων ὠυχὴν τὴν λογικὴν» εἰκότως Φησὶ γνωρίζειν ἑαυτὴν ἐν πᾶσι τοὶς ουσιν. ὁρῷ δὲ ἡ ὄψις κατ' εὐθείας ἡραμμὰς, αἰσθανεται δὲ, κατὰ πρῶτον μὲν λόγον, τῶν χρωμάτων, συνδιαγινώσπει δὲ αὐ- κε τοῖς καὶ τὸ κεχρωσμένον σῶμα, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἔνθα ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ὁ διάστημα, καὶ τὸν αριθμὸν, κὐηπί τὸ ναὶ στάσιν» καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ λεῖξν καὶ ὁμαλὸν καὶ ἀνώμαλον καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμθλὺ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν, εἶτε ὑδατῶδες, εἴτε γεῶδές ἐστιν, οἷον, ὑγρὸν ἢ ξηρόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴδιον αὐτῆς αἰσθητόν ἐστι, τὸ χρῶμχ᾽ διὰ μόνης γὰρ τῆς ὄψεως τῶν χρωμάτων ἄντίλαμβανόμεθα" εὐθέως δὲ σὺν τῷ χρώματι καὶ τὸ πεχρωσμένὸν σῶμα καὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ τυ γχάνει ὃν τὸ ὁρώμενον» καὶ τὸ διάστημα, πὸ μεταξὺ τοῦτε ὁρῶντος καὶ τοῦ ὁρω- Μένου. ὁπόσαις γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεων συνεμφαίεται καὶ τὸ οἰἶμα, ταύταις εὐθέως καὶ ὁ τύπος συνδιαγινώσκεται, ὡς τὴ ἀφῇ καὶ τὴ γεύσει" αλλ᾽ αὑται μὲν τότε μόνον, ὅταν προςπελάσωσι τῷ σώματι, αἰσθάνονται, πλὴν τῶν ἑξῆς διορισθησομένων" οψις δὲ καὶ πόῤῥωθεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πόῤῥωεν ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν, ἀναγκαίως ἐπηκολούθησε, τὸ μόνην ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ διάστημα, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τότε μόνην διαγινώσκειν, ὅταν τὸ άνω δύνηται διὰ μιᾶς προςβολῆς περιλαβεῖν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι τὸ ὁρώμενον ἣ κατὰ μίαν προςβολὴν περλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐν τούτοις (ἑ ὄψις) δεῖται καὶ τὸς μνήμης καὶ τῆς διανοίας. κατα μέρος γὰρ αὐτὸ “θεωμένη καὶ οὐχ, ὑφ᾽ ἕν ὅλον, ἀναγκαίως εἰς ἕτερον ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου μεταβαίνει, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐμπίπτον ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν μετάβασιν, αἰσθητόν ἐστι" τα δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἑωραμένα αὶ μνήμο) διαφυλάττει, συνάγει δὲ ἀμφέτερα ἡ ἡ διάνοια τό ΤῈ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸ μνημονευτέν. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους διχῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ποτὲ μὲν μόνην ποτὲ δὲ μετὰ μοήμης. καὶ διανοίας" τοῦ δὲ ἀριθυοῦ τῶν ὁρωμένων, τοῦ ὑπὲρ τρία ἦ τέσσαρα, τοῦ κατὰ μίαν προς βολὴν μὴ ὁρωμένου, καὶ τῶν κινήσεων καὶ τῶν σχημάτων τῶν πολυγώ ὠνων» οὐδέποτε μόνη, ἀλλ᾽ οἰεὶ μετὰ μνήμης καὶ διανοίας. οὐ γὰρ δύγαται τὰ πέντε καὶ ἐξ καὶ ἑπτὰ καὶ πλείω χωρὶς μνήμης συναγαγεῖν. οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ ἐξάγωνα καὶ ὀκταγωνα καὶ πολύγωνα σχήματα. καὶ καὶ Ἶ κίνησις δὲ κατὰ μετάβασιν γινομένη, τὸ μὲν ἔχει “πρότερον, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον. ἔνθα δὲ πρότερον ἐστὶ καὶ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον. τοῦτο μνήμη μόνη διαφυλάττει" τὸ δὲ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τὸ ἀνώμαλον καὶ ὁμαλὸν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῶν καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ,κἀυβλὺ κοινὰ τῆς ἐφὴς καὶ τῆς ὀψεώς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόναι τὸν τόπον διαγινώσκουσι. χρήζουσι δὲ καὶ διανοίας. μόνον γὲρ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ κατὰ μίαν προς βολοὴν προςπέπτον τὴ αἰσθήσει, μόνης αἰσθήσεως ἔργον ἐστί" τὰ δὲ κατὰ “πλείους οὐ μόνης» ολλὰ καὶ μνήμης μετὰ διανοίας, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείχθη. τῶν δὲ διαφανῶν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ βάθους διμνεῖσθαι πέζυκεν ἡ ὄψις, ἀέρος μὲν πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα" ὅλον γὰρ διεξέρ- Χχεται" δεύτερον δὲ ὕδατος ἡρεμοῦντός τε καὶ καθα οὔ" τοὺς ἰχθὺς γοῦν νηχομένους ὁρῶμεν" ἧττον δὲ διὰ ὑέλευ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τρρθεοτεζδνν» δὴν δὲ, ὅτι “πεί(φωτισμένων" καὶ τῶν θερμῶν καὶ ἀντίλχψις ὀψεώς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πῦρ ὁρῶντες, ἴσμεν εὐθέως, ὅτι καὶ θερμόν ἐστιν" ὧν ΚΟ ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην ὄψιν ἀναγ ἧς τὸν λέγον, εὑρήσεις, ὡς τότε, ὅτε πρῶτον ἡ ὄψις ἐθεάσατο τὸ πῦρ, μένου τοῦ χρώματος καὶ σχήματος ἔσχε τὴν ἀντίληψιν. προςελιθούσης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀφῇς» ἐγνωρίσαμεν, ὅτι καὶ θερα ὄν ἐστιν, ὅπερ διεφυλαξεν ἥ μνήμην παραλαβοῦσα παρὰ τὺς ἀφῇς" νῦν οἷν, ὅταν θεασώμεθα πῦρ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέπομεν, ἢ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ πυρός" αὶ δὲ διετδι συμπαρφαλαμβάνει τοῖς ἐρωμένοις διὰ τὴς μνήμης καὶ τὴν θερμότητα. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μήλου. εἰ γὰρ οὐχ, ὑπὸ μόνου τοῦ χρώματος καὶ σχήματος εἰδοποιεῖται τὸ μῆλον, ἀλλα καὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν γεῦσιν ποιότητος, οὐχὶ, εἰὐὰ καὶ τούτων ἡ ὄψις ἀντιλαμίβανομένη, οἶδεν, ὃ ὅτι ε μῆλέν ἐστιν" αλλ καὶ ψυχὴ τὴν μνήμην ἀποσωζει, τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἐσφρ᾽σεώς τε καὶ γεύσεως, ἅμα τε τῷ θεάσασθαι συνεπινοεῖ. καὶ ταῦτα τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι. ὅταν οὺν κύρινον μῆλον νομίσωμεν ἀληθινὸν εἶναι μῆλον, οὐχ, ἡὶ ὄψις ἐστὶν καὶ ἐξαπατωμένη, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ διάνοια. ἡ γὰρ ὄψις “ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις αἰσθητοῖς οὐ διεσφαλη" τόντε γὰρ. χρῶμα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα συνεῖδεν. αἱ μὲν οὖν τρεῖς τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἥτε ὄψις καὶ αὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ ὄσζρησις τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ μὴ προςπελαζόντων ἀντιλαμβάνονται, διὸ μέσου τοῦ ἀέρος" ἢ δὲ γεῦσις οὐκ λλ αὶ αἰσθάνεται. ἐὰν μὴ στροτομιλύση τῶ αἰσθητῷ" ἡ δὲ ἀφὴ ἐπαμφοτερίζει" καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζουσα τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ξς διὰ μέσης ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε ῥάβδου. ποτὲ μὲν οὖν καὶ ὄψις τῆς ἐπιμαρτυρίας χρήζω τῆς τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν ἡ τὸ Φαινόμενον ἐπιτετεχνημένον πρὸς ἀπάτην, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς γρα- Φῆς" γραφικῆς γδρ ἔργον, ἀπατῆσαι τὴν ὄψιν ἐξοχαῖς οὐκ οὖσαις καὶ κοιλώμασιν, εἰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιαύτην ἔχε! τὴν φύσιν" ἔνθα χρεία πρὸς διάγνωσιν, μάλιστα μὲν τὸς ὠἀφὴςν ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε δὲ καὶ τῆς γεύσεως ἢ ὀσφρήσεως; ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ κηρίνου μήλου" ποτὲ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐναργῶς παρίστησι τὰ φαινόμενα, ὅταν μὴ πόῤῥωθεν ὁρῷ᾽ τὸν γοῦν πύργον, τὸν τετράγωνον» στρογγύλον ὁ ὁρᾷ π πόρῥωθεν" σφαλλεται δὲ καὶ, ὅταν δέ ἀχλύος ἢ καπνοῦ βλέπωμεν, ἢ ἡ τινος τῶν παραπτληοσίων τῶν ἐπιθολούντων τὴν ὄψιν. ὁ ὁμοίως καὶ, ὅταν δὲ ὕδατος κινουμένου " καὶ γὰρ ἐν κε θαλάσση τὴν κώπην ὡς κεκλασμέγὴν ὁρᾷ" ὁμοίως: καὶ, ὅταν διά τινος διαφανοῦς ὕλης βλέπη, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐσόπτρων καὶ τῆς ὑέλου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν «οιουτοτρόπων" ἢ ὅταν ὀξέως κιῆται τὸ ὁρώμενον" συνταράσσει γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ ταχεῖα κίνησις. ὡς στρογὴ λα τὰ μὴ στρογγύλα βλέπειν, καὶ εἰς ἐπ ῴης τὰ κρούμενα " ἡ ὅταν καὶ διάνοια “πρὸς ἄλλοις ἀσχολῆται, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ προθεμένου μὲν συντυχεῖν. φίλῳ, καὶ συντυχόντος μὲν» παρελθόντος δὲ αὐτὸν, τῷ τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑτέροις εἶναι. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο διαμάρτημα τῆς ὄψεως, αλλαὶ τοῦ νοῦ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ εἶδε, καὶ ἀπηγγειλεν" ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ προςέσχε τοῖς ἀπαγγελθεῖσ!. τεσσάρων δὲ μάλιστα πρὸς ἐναργἢ διά- Ἴνωσιν ἡ ὄψις χρήξει, ἀβλαβοῦς αἰσθητηρίου, συμμέτρου κοήσεως, καὶ διαστήματος, ἀέρος καθαροῦ καὶ λαμπροῦ, ### English translation (Claude) “Sight” is used in two senses, both for the sense organ and for the sensitive power. Hipparchus says that rays stretched out from the eyes, touching external bodies with their ends as with the contact of hands, convey the apprehension of them to the power of seeing. The geometers draw certain cones, formed by the meeting of the rays sent out through the eyes; for they say the right eye sends rays to the left and the left eye to the right, and from [their meeting a cone is formed] … [Epicurus says that images of what is seen] come [into the eyes]. Plato says that seeing happens by a co-shining, the light from the eyes flowing out to a certain distance into the air akin to it, and the light from bodies being carried toward it, while the air between, being easily diffused and changed, stretches out together with the fiery element of sight. Galen, agreeing with Plato, speaks about sight in the seventh book of his On the Agreement [of Hippocrates and Plato], writing in scattered places roughly as follows: “If some portion, power, image, or quality of the bodies seen reached the eye, we should not know the size of what is seen, for instance of a very great mountain; for it is wholly unreasonable that an image of such a size should fall upon our eyes. Nor can the visual breath, when sent out, acquire such strength as to spread round everything that is seen. It remains, then, that the surrounding air becomes for us, while we see, the same kind of instrument as the optic nerve is in the body. The air around us seems to be affected in some such way: the light of the sun, touching the upper limit of the air, passes its power through the whole; and the light carried through the optic nerves has a breath-like substance, and falling on the surrounding air and producing the alteration by its first impact, it passes on as far as possible, holding itself together, until it falls on a solid body. For the air becomes an instrument for the eye in the discernment of visible things, of the same kind as the nerve is in the brain; so that the relation of the brain to the nerve is the relation of the eye to the air, ensouled by the light of the sun.” That air is apt to be made like the bodies near it is clear from the fact that when something red or blue or even bright silver is carried across, while there is light, the air is altered by what is carried across. Porphyry, in his work On Sensation, says that neither a cone nor an image nor anything else is the cause of seeing, but that the soul itself, meeting the visible things, recognizes itself as being the visible things, because the soul holds together all beings and all things are a soul holding together various bodies. For since he holds that the rational soul is one soul of all things, he reasonably says it recognizes itself in all beings. Sight sees along straight lines. It perceives colours in the first place, but together with them it also discerns the coloured body, its size, its shape, the place where it is, the distance, the number, motion and rest, rough and smooth, even and uneven, sharp and blunt, and its constitution, whether watery or earthy, that is, moist or dry. Its proper object of perception is colour, for we apprehend colours by sight alone; but at once, together with the colour, we apprehend the coloured body, the place where what is seen happens to be, and the distance between the one who sees and what is seen. For with whatever senses shape is also shown, with them place too is discerned at once, as with touch and taste; but these perceive only when they come near the body, except for those to be distinguished below, while sight perceives even from afar. Since it apprehends its proper objects from afar, it necessarily followed that it alone sees distance too; and it discerns size alone only when it can take in what is seen in one glance. Where what is seen is too large to be taken in at one glance, sight needs memory and thought as well. For viewing it part by part and not all at once, it must pass from one part to another, and what meets it at each step is perceived, while memory keeps what was seen before, and thought brings both together, the perceived and the remembered. Sight apprehends size, then, in two ways, sometimes alone and sometimes with memory and thought. But the number of things seen, beyond three or four, which is not seen at one glance, and motions and many-sided figures, it never apprehends alone, but always with memory and thought. For it cannot gather five, six, seven or more without memory; so too with hexagonal, octagonal and many-angled figures. And motion, which takes place by passage, has a first and a second; and where there is a first, a second and a third, memory alone keeps it. Up and down, uneven and even, likewise rough and smooth, sharp and blunt are common to touch and sight, since these alone discern place too. But they also need thought. For only what falls on the sense at one glance is the work of sense alone; what needs more than one is the work not of sense alone but also of memory with thought, as was shown above. Sight is able to pass through transparent things even to their depth: through air first and most, for it passes through the whole of it; second, through still and clear water, for we see fish swimming; less through glass and other such transparent things. … [It sees the things] that are lit. It also apprehends hot things, since when we see fire we know at once that it is hot. But if you trace the account back to the first sight, you will find that when sight first beheld fire it apprehended only colour and shape; when touch came in, we learned that it was also hot, which memory kept, having received it from touch. Now, then, when we see fire, we see nothing but the shape and colour of the fire; but thought, through memory, takes the heat along with what is seen. The same account holds for an apple. For since the apple is given its form not only by colour and shape but also by smell and its quality of taste, sight does not know that it is an apple by apprehending these too; but the soul keeps the memory from smell and taste, and at the moment of seeing thinks of these along with the shape and colour. So when we take a wax apple for a real apple, it is not sight that is deceived but thought; for sight was not mistaken in its proper objects, since it saw both the colour and the shape correctly. Three of the senses, sight, hearing and smell, apprehend things outside and not in contact, through the medium of air; taste perceives nothing unless it comes into contact with what is perceived; touch does both, perceiving by coming near bodies and sometimes through a stick. Sometimes, then, sight needs the confirming witness of the other senses, when what appears has been contrived for deception, as in painting; for it is the work of painting to deceive sight with projections and hollows that are not there, as if the thing had such a nature; there touch especially is needed to discern it, and sometimes taste or smell, as with the wax apple. Sometimes sight by itself presents appearances clearly, when it does not see from afar; for it sees a square tower as round from afar. It is also mistaken when we look through mist or smoke or something similar that clouds sight; likewise through moving water, for in the sea it sees an oar as if broken; likewise when it looks through some transparent material, as with mirrors and glass and other such things; or when what is seen moves swiftly, for swift motion confuses sight, so that it sees things that are not round as round and things at rest as moving; or when thought is busy with other things, as when someone intends to meet a friend and, though the friend meets him, passes him by, because his thought is on other things. But this is not a mistake of sight but of the mind; for sight saw and reported, but the mind did not attend to the report. For clear discernment sight needs especially four things: an unharmed sense organ, moderate motion, moderate distance, and air that is clear and bright. ### Extrabiblical texts - Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. 7.5 (Galen (works)): quotation, high confidence - Plato, Tim. 45b–46a (Plato (works)): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - The OCR has lost the end of the geometers' theory and the view of Epicurus (images entering the eyes); the gap is marked “…” and supplied in square brackets by sense. Another line is lost before “that are lit.” - Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 7.5, quoted as Nemesius gives it. Plato, Tim. 45b–46a. Porphyry's On Sensation is lost. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 7 (Matthaei, 178-189; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/7). ## Matthaei, chapter 8 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-8 - Source: Matthaei, 189-195 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius explains why the sense organs are double, why touch extends over the whole body and is necessary to life, how the nerves carry sensation, and what touch perceives alone and in common with sight. ### Greek text Ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων διπλοῦν ὁ δημιουρἐς κατεσκούασε, καὶ τόπῳ τινὶ καὶ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος περιέγραψε καὶ γὼρ ὀφθαλμοὺς δύο, καὶ ὦτα δύο, καὶ δύο πέρους τῆς αἰσθύσεως ἐν τῇ ῥινὶ πεποίηκε» καὶ γλωῶτο τὰς δὲ δύο πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις ἐνέφυσεν" ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν διηρημένας» ὡς τοῖς ὀφισι" τοῖς δὲ συνημμένας καὶ συνηνωμένας » ἧς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις" διὰ τοῦτο καὶ δύο τὰς προσθίους κοιλίας μένας τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πεποίηκεν, ἵνα ἐξ ἑκατέρας κοιλίας τὰ αἰσθητικὰ νεῦρα καταπεμπόμενα, διπλᾶ ποιὴ τὰ αἰσθητήρια. διπλᾶ δὲ αὐτὰ πεποίηκε, δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσαν κηδεαν" ἵνα τοῦ ἑτέρου παθόντος, τὸ περιλειπόμενον σώῤη τὴν αἰσθησιν. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλείστων αἰσθγητηρίων διαφθειρομένων, οὐδὲν εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ζωὴν καταβλάπτεται τὸ ὁ ζῶον" «φὴς δὲ ὠπολλυμένης » συναπόλλυται καὶ τὸ ζῶον. ἁφὴ γὰρ μόνη τῶν αἰσθήσεων κοινὴ πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων. πᾶν γὰρ ζῶον ἁφὴν ἔχει" τὰς δὲ ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις οὐ πᾶντα πάσας, αλλ᾽ ἐνίας ἔνια" πάσας δὲ ἔχειν, τὰ τελειότερα. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ ζῶον ἐκινδύνευε ζῶον εἶναι, ἢ μὴ εἶναι. οὐχ, ἕν μόριον ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπεκλήρωσε τῇ ἀφη" ἀλλὰ πᾶν σχεδὸν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζώου" πλὴν γὰρ ὀστῶν καὶ ὀνύχων καὶ κεράτων» συνδέσμων τε καὶ τριχῶν, καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν τοιούτων, πᾶν μόριον τοῦ σώματος τῆς αἀφῆς ἀντιλαμβάνεται. συμβέβηκεν οὖν ἕ ἑκαστὸν τῶν αἰσθητχρίων διπλᾶς ἔχειν αἰσθήσεις " τὸν μὲν, τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν" τὴν δὲ» τῆς ἀφῇς, ὡς ἡ ὄψις" καὶ γὰρ τὰ χρώματα διακρίνει, καὶ τῶν θερμῶν καὶ ' ψυχρῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται" ἄλλα τούτων μὲν, ὡς σῶμα, τῶν δὲ χρωμάτων, ὡς ὄψις. ὡσαύτως ὲ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις καὶ σζρησις καὶ ἀκοή. πῶς οὖν παντός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀφὴ, εἴπερ ἀπὸ τῶν προσθίων κοιλιῶν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις; ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι νεύρων καταπεμτομένων ἐξ ἐγκεφάλου καὶ διασπειρομένων εἰς πᾶν μόριον τοῦ σώματος ἡ τῆς ἀφῆς αἴσθησις προτγίνεται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλάκις ὑπ᾽ ὠκάνθης πλγγέντες τὸν πέδα, τὴς κεφαλῆς εὐθέως τὰς τρίχας Φρίττομεν" ὠζθησάν τινες» τὸ πάθος, ἢ τὴν αἰσθησιν τοῦ πάθους, εἰς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀναπέμπεσθαι, καὶ οὕτως αἰσθάνεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἦν ἀληθὴς οὗτος ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἂν ἤλγει τὸ τεμνόμενον μόριον, ἄλλ᾽ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος. βῶσιον οὗ οὖν λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ νεῦρον ἐγκέ- Φαλός ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ μοῖρ τις ἐστὶν ἐγκεφάλου, δι παν- } τὸς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ψυχικὸν ἔχον πνεῦμα», ὡς ὃ πεπυρακτως μένος σίδηρος ἔχει τὸ πῦρ" διά τοι τοῦτο, ἔνθα ἂν νεῦρον ν νι» αἰσθητικὸν ἐμφύηται; ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος αἰσθήσεως ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει: καὶ γύεται αἰσθητικόν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως ἄτοπον λέγειν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν νεύρων, τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, ἀναπέμπεσθαι, οὐ τὸ πάθος» ἀλλοὶ συναίσθησιν τινα καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν τοῦ πάθους" ἔστι δὲ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀφῇς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, τὸ τε μαλακὸν, καὶ σκληρὸν, καὶ γλίσχρον. γκαἱ κραῦρον, βαρύ τε καὶ κοῦφον" διὰ μόνης Ὑρ τῆς «φὴς ταῦτα γνωρίζεται. κοινὰ δὲ οἱψῆς καὶ ὄψεως, τὸ τε ὀξὺ καὶ ἀμβλὺ καὶ τὸ πραχὺ καὶ λεῖον» τὸ τε ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν » παχύ τε καὶ λεπτὸν, ἄνω καὶ κάτω" καὶ γὰρ ὁ τόπος, τόγτε μέγεθος » ὅταν ἣ τοιοῦτον, εἰς κατὰ μίαν προςβολὴν τῆς φὴς περιλαμβάνεσθαι, "καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν δὲ “καὶ τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον, ὅταν ἥ ἢ μικρὸν, ὡς καὶ ἀλλα τινὰ σχήματα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς κινήσεως τοὺ πλησιαζοντος αὐτῇ σώματος αἰσθάνεται σὺν τῇ μνήμη καὶ Κι διανοίᾳ, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἰριθμοῦ" ἀλλὰ μέχρι δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν καὶ τούτων ᾿μυιρῶν καὶ ῥῳδίως περιλαμβανομένων" μᾶλλον δὲ τὸς ἀζφῆς ἡ ὄψις τούτων ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ὥςπερ καὶ τοῦ ὁμαλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνωμάλου. τοῦ γαῖρ γένους ἐστὶ τοῦ τὸ λείου καὶ τραχέος " σκληρότητι μὲν γὰρ ἀνωμαλία μιχθεῖσα τραχύτητα, ὁμαλότης δὲ πυκνότητι λειότητα ποιεῖ. δῆλον οὖν ἔκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὡς πολλὴν κοινωνίαν αἱ αἰσθύήσεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλέλας ἔχουσι. καὶ γὰρ. τὰ τῆς ἑτέρας, διαμαρτήματα ὴ ἑτέρα διασαφεῖ. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῆς γραφῆς ἡ μὲν ὄψις ἐξοχάς τινας ὁρᾷ, ῥινὸς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων" ἡ δὲ ὠζὴ προςελιθοῦσα διήλεγξεν αὐτῆς τὸ διωμάρτημα. ὥςπερ δὲ ἡ ἡ ὄψις ἀεὶ καὶ πάντα διὰ μέσου" τοῦ ἀέρος ὁρᾷ" οὕτω καὶ κἢὶ ᾿ἀφὴ διὰ μέσου τῆς βακτηρίας τῶν σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν αἰσθάνεται» ἀλλὰ συλλογιστικῶς καὶ μετοὶ διανοίας " ἀκριβεστάτὴν γὰρ ἔχει ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ταύτῃ γοῦν καὶ τὴ γεύσει πλέον ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, καί τοι ταῖς ἄλλαις τρισὶν ἡττώμενος. ἄλλο μὲν γᾶρ ζῶον κατ᾽ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν τῶν τριῶν πλεονεκτεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον" ὁ δὲ κύων, ἐν ταῖς τρισὶν ἀμα" ὀξύτερον γὰρ καὶ ἀκούει καὶ βλέπει καὶ ἐσφραίνεται,, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἰχνευόντων κυνῶν. καὶ πᾶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁφῆς ἐστιν αἰσθητήριον, ὡς καὶ ὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται" μάλιστα δὲ τῶν χειρῶν τὰ ἔσωθεν, καὶ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον τὰ ἄκρα τῶν δακτύλων" ταῦτα γὰρ ὥςπερ γνώμονάς τινὰς τῆς ἀφῆς ἀκριβεῖς Ε' ἔχομεν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄντιληπτικὸν ὄργανον ὁ δημισυργὸς τὰς χεῖρας κατεσκεύασεν" ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπτικὸν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δέρμα λεπτότερον ἔχουσι, καὶ μῦς αὐταῖς ὅλαις ἔσωθεν ὑπέστρωται.. καὶ τριχῶν ἀμοιροῦσιν, ἵνα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀπτῶν ἀντιλαμβάνωνται. τοῦ δὲ τρίχας αὐτὰς μὴ Φύειν, ὁ ὑπεστορεσμένος μῦς γέονεν αἴτιος, τῶν δὲ χειρῶν αἱ μὲν σκληρότεραι πρὸς ἀντίληψίν εἰσιν ἰσχυρότεραι" αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι πρὸς τὴν ἀφὸὴν ἀκριβέστεραι" ὡςπὲρ καὶ τῶν νεύρων τὰ μὲν σκληρὰ πρὸς κόησιν, τὰ δὲ μαλακὰ πρὸς αἰσθησίν εἶσιν ἐπιτηδειότερα. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἀφὴς ἐστὶν ὄργανα" διὰ τούτων γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἁφῆς αἰσθησις γίνεται. ### English translation (Claude) Each of the other sense organs the Creator made double and bounded by some place and part of the body: he made two eyes, two ears, and two passages of sensation in the nose; and he implanted two tongues in all animals, divided in some, like snakes, joined and united in others, like men. For this reason he also made the front ventricles of the brain two, so that the sensory nerves sent down from each ventricle make the sense organs double. He made them double out of exceeding care, so that if one is damaged the one remaining may preserve the sense. But when most of the sense organs are destroyed, the animal is not harmed as regards life itself; when touch perishes, the animal perishes with it. For touch alone of the senses is common to all animals: every animal has touch, but not all have all the other senses, but some have some; the more perfect have all. Since, then, on this depended whether the animal was an animal or not, the Creator allotted to touch not one part but nearly the whole body of the animal; for apart from bones, nails, horns, ligaments, hair and some other such things, every part of the body apprehends touch. So it happens that each of the sense organs has two senses: one of its proper objects, the other of touch. Sight, for example, discerns colours and also apprehends hot and cold; but these as body, colours as sight. Likewise taste, smell and hearing. How then does touch belong to the whole body, if we say the senses come from the front ventricles of the brain? Clearly because nerves are sent down from the brain and spread into every part of the body, and so the sense of touch arises. Since often when we are pricked in the foot by a thorn the hair of our head bristles at once, some have thought that the affection, or the sensation of the affection, is sent up to the brain, and so we perceive. But if this account were true, the part that is cut would not feel pain, but the brain. It is better, then, to say that the nerve is brain. For it is a portion of the brain, having the psychic breath throughout itself, as red-hot iron has fire; and for this reason, wherever a sensory nerve is implanted, that part receives a share of sensation from it and becomes sensitive. Perhaps it is not absurd to say that what is sent up to the beginning of the nerves, the brain, is not the affection but a kind of joint awareness and report of the affection. The proper objects of touch are hot and cold, soft and hard, viscous and brittle, heavy and light; for these are known by touch alone. Common to touch and sight are sharp and blunt, rough and smooth, dry and moist, thick and thin, up and down; and place, and size when it is such as to be taken in at one contact of touch; and dense and rare and round, when it is small, as also some other shapes. Likewise it perceives the motion of a body near it, with memory and thought; and likewise number, but up to two or three, and these small and easily taken in. But sight apprehends these better than touch, as also even and uneven, which are of the same class as smooth and rough: unevenness mixed with hardness makes roughness, evenness with density makes smoothness. It is clear from what has been said that these senses have much in common with one another; for one makes clear the mistakes of the other. In a painting sight sees certain projections, of the nose and other features; but touch, coming in, exposes its mistake. As sight always sees all things through the medium of air, so touch perceives hard, soft and moist things through the medium of a staff, but by inference and with thought. Man has this sense most exact; by it and by taste he has the advantage over the other animals, though he is outdone in the other three. One animal surpasses man in one of the three senses, another in another; but the dog in all three together, for it hears, sees and smells more sharply, as is clear from tracking dogs. The whole body is the organ of touch, as was said above, but especially the inner side of the hands, and still more the tips of the fingers; for these we have as exact gauges, as it were, of touch. For the Creator made the hands not only an instrument for grasping but also for touching. For this reason they have thinner skin, a muscle is spread under them on the inside, and they have no hair, so that they may better apprehend what they touch. The underlying muscle is the reason they grow no hair. Harder hands are stronger for grasping, softer ones more exact for touch; as also of the nerves, the hard are better suited for movement, the soft for sensation. For these are the organs of touch; through them the sense of touch takes place. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 8 (Matthaei, 189-195; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/8). ## Matthaei, chapter 9 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-9 - Source: Matthaei, 195-197 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius describes taste, its organs, and the simple and compound qualities of flavour. ### Greek text Τὴν μὲν ὄψιν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν κατ᾽ εὐθείας γραμμὰς ὁρᾷν" ἡ δὲ ὀσζρησις καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ οὐ καθ' εὐθείαν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πανταχόθεν. οφὴ δὲ καὶ γεῦσις οὔτε κατ᾽ εὐθείας γραμμὰς, οὔτε πανταχόθεν γνωρίζουσιν" ἀλλα τότα μόνον, ὅταν αὐτοῖς πλησιάσωσι τοῖς ἰδίοις αἰσθητοῖς γ πλὴν τῶν ἤδη διωρισμένων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ γεῦσις τῶν χυμῶν ἀντιληπττικη" ὄργανα δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ γλῶσσα, καὶ ταύτης μᾶλλον τὸ ἄκρον, ἔτι τὲ σὺν τούτοις ἡ ὑπερῶχ, ἐν οἷ: ἐστι τὰ ἐξ ἐγκεζφαλου Φερόμενα νεῦρα πεπλωτυσμένα καὶ ἀπαγγέλλοντα τὴν γενομένην ἀντίληψιν πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονριόν. τῶν δὲ χυμῶν αἱ γευστικαὶ καλούμεναι ποιότητές εἰσιν αὗται, γλυκύτης, ὀξύτης, δριμύτης » στρυφνότης, αὐστηρότης, πικρότης» ἀλμυρότης» λιπαρότης. τούτων γορ ἐστιν ἡ γεῦσις διαγνωστική. κατὰ ταύτας δὲ τὰς ποιότητας "αὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἄποιον λέγεται, τῷ μηδεμίαν τούτων ἐμφαδειν ἐν τῇ γεύσει ποιοἴτητα. κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας » οἷον ψυχρότητα καὶ ὑγρότητα ᾿ σύμῷυτον ἔχει τὴν ποιότητα. στρυφνέτης δὲ καὶ αὐστηρότῆς» τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον στύφειν, ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἁπλαῖ γευστικαὶ ποιότητες αὗται βέναι σχεδόν εἰσι" σύνθετοι δὲν μυρίαι. καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ εἶδος ζώου ταὶ φυτοῦ ἰδιάζουσαι ποιότητές εἰσιν. ἄλλης γὰρ» ἂν οὕτω; τύχῃ» χοιρδίου ποιότητος ἀντιλαμιβανόμεθα καὶ ἄλλης αἰγείου. διὸ καὶ μὴ μαθόντες, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ προζενεχθὲν κρέας, ἐν τῇ γεύσει ἡνωρίζομεν" τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἣν» εἰ μὴ διάφορος ἣν ἣν ἑκάστου τῶν γευστῶν ἡ ποιότης. ὁθεν οὐκ ἂν τις αὐτὰς γενικῶς περιλάβοι, εἰπείρους οὔσας, καὶ πάντως ἀλλήλων διαφερούσας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἐπικρατεῖ μία τις τῶν ὡπλῶν ποιοτήτων, καὶ ἐν τούτοις γνώριμος αὶ κατ᾿ εἰδος τῶν γευστῶν διαφορά. ἰσχάδος γοῦν καὶ ᾿ἀσταζίδος καὶ Φούνικος. τούτων μέλ μὲν ἐπριρατεῖ ποιότης, ἡ κατὰ γλυκύτητα, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ γεῦσις διωκρύει τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ διάφορον. ### English translation (Claude) We said earlier that sight sees along straight lines; smell and hearing perceive not only along a straight line but from all sides; touch and taste discern neither along straight lines nor from all sides, but only when they come near their proper objects, except for what has already been distinguished. Taste apprehends flavours. Its organs are the tongue, especially its tip, and with these the palate, in which are the nerves coming from the brain, spread flat, which report the apprehension that has occurred to the ruling part. The so-called tasting qualities of flavours are these: sweetness, sourness, pungency, astringency, harshness, bitterness, saltiness, oiliness; taste discerns these. By these qualities water is called without quality, since it shows none of them to the taste; by the other qualities, such as coldness and moisture, it has an innate quality. Astringency and harshness differ from each other by puckering more or less. These are practically the only simple tasting qualities; the compound ones are countless. For each kind of animal and plant has its own particular qualities: we apprehend one quality in pork, say, and another in goat's flesh. So even without being told what meat has been served, we recognize it by taste; which would not be so if the quality of each thing tasted were not different. Hence no one could take them all in by kinds, since they are without number and differ entirely from one another. Even where one of the simple qualities prevails, the difference in kind of the things tasted is recognized: in dried figs, raisins and dates the quality of sweetness prevails, yet taste discerns the difference of the kinds. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 9 (Matthaei, 195-197; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/9). ## Matthaei, chapter 10 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-10 - Source: Matthaei, 197-198 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius briefly describes hearing and its organs. ### Greek text Ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ τῶν φωνῶν καὶ τῶν ψόφων ἐστὶν αἰσθητική" διαγνώσκει δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ τὴν βαρύτητα, λειότητά τε καὶ τραχύτητα καὶ μέγεθος. ὄργανα δὲ καὶ ταύτῆς τὰ γεῦρα, τὰ ἐξ ἐγκεφάλου, τὰ μαλακὰ, καὶ τῶν ὦτων ἡ πατασκευή᾽ μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν τὸ χονδρῶδες γένος. πρὸς γὰρ ψόφους καὶ ἤχους ἐπιτήδειός ἐστιν ὁ εἸόνδρος. μόνος δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πίθηκος οὐ κινοῦσι τὰ ὦτα, Τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ζώων, τῶν ἐχόντων ὦτα, κινούντων αὐτά, ### English translation (Claude) Hearing perceives voices and sounds; it discerns their sharpness and depth, smoothness and roughness, and loudness. Its organs are the soft nerves from the brain and the structure of the ears, especially their cartilaginous part; for cartilage is suited to sounds and echoes. Man and the ape alone do not move their ears; all the other animals that have ears move them. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 10 (Matthaei, 197-198; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/10). ## Matthaei, chapter 11 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-11 - Source: Matthaei, 199-200 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius briefly describes smell, its organ, and the kinds of odour. ### Greek text Ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις, γίνεται μὲν διὰ τῶν ἑνῶν, περαίνεται δὲ εἰς τὰ πέρατα τῶν προσθίων τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοιλιῶν. αὗται γὰρ ἀτμοειδέσταται τὴν Φύσιν οὖσαι τῶν ἀτμῶν ῥαδίως ἀἰντιλαμίβανονται. λέλεκται γὰρ καὶ πρόσθεν, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καθ' ὁμοιότητα τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα τῶν ἐδίων αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται. οὐ αὴν, θπῳ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθητηρίοις νεῦρον αἰσθητικὸν κατέπεμψεν ὁ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος; οὕτω "καὶ τὴ ὀσφρήσει" ἄλλὰ τοῖς πέρασιν ἑαυτοῦ τῶν νεύρων ἀναπληροῖ τὴν,Χρείαν, καὶ τὴν τῶν ατμῶν ἀνάδοσιν δέχεται. τῶν δὲ α ατμῶν αὶ γενικωτάτη διαφορὰ εὐωδία τέ οι ἐστι καὶ δυφωδία., καὶ τὸ μέσον τούτων, ὃ μήτε εὐῶδές ἐστι, μῆτε δυτῶδες. γύεται δὲ εὐωδίκ, τῶν ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἀκριβῶς πεφθέντων" μέσως δὲ, ἡὶ μέση διάθεσις" καταδεέστερον δὲ ἡ μηδόλως, δυςωδία, ### English translation (Claude) Smell takes place through the nostrils and is completed at the ends of the front ventricles of the brain; for these, being most vapour-like in nature, easily apprehend vapours. For it was said earlier that each sense organ apprehends its proper objects by a certain likeness and kinship. The brain did not send down a sensory nerve to smell, as it did to the other sense organs, but it supplies the need with the ends of its own ventricles and receives the rising of the vapours. The most general difference among vapours is fragrance and foul smell, and what is between, neither fragrant nor foul. Fragrance arises when the moisture in bodies is thoroughly concocted; the middle condition when it is moderately concocted; foul smell when less, or not at all. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 11 (Matthaei, 199-200; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/11). ## Matthaei, chapter 12 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-12 - Source: Matthaei, 200-201 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius lists the activities of thought and places its organ in the middle ventricle of the brain. ### Greek text Τοῦ δὲ διανοητικοῦ εἰσὶ γενικῶς μὲν, αἷ΄ τε κρίσεις καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ἀποφυγαὶ καὶ ὁρμαί" εἰδικῶς δὲ αἴ τε νοήσεις τῶν ὄντων καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οἱ λόγοι, καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὲν, καὶ προαιρετικόν" τοῦτο δέ ἐστι», τὸ καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀνείρων θέσπίζον ἡμῖν τὸ μέλλον, ἥνπερ μόνην ἀληθἢ μαντείαν οἱ πυθαγορειοι λέγουσιν εἶναι, τοῖς Ἑβραίοις ἀκολουθήσαντες" ὄργανον δὲ καὶ τούτου ἡ μέση κοιλία τοῦ ἐγκεφχλου, καὶ τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα τὸ ἐν αὐτῆ.. ### English translation (Claude) To the power of thought belong, in general, judgments, assents, avoidances and impulses; in particular, the understanding of beings, the virtues, the sciences, the principles of the arts, deliberation and choice. This is also what foretells the future to us through dreams, which alone the Pythagoreans, following the Hebrews, say is true divination. Its organ too is the middle ventricle of the brain and the psychic breath in it. ### Translation notes - Matthaei's apparatus and Latin notes at the end of the chapter have been removed. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 12 (Matthaei, 200-201; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/12). ## Matthaei, chapter 13 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-13 - Source: Matthaei, 202-207 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius defines memory and recollection, places imagination, thought and memory in the front, middle and back ventricles of the brain, and proves it from injuries and from a case of phrenitis recorded by Galen. ### Greek text Τὸ δὲ μνημονευτικόν ἐστι μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως αἵτιόν τε καὶ ταμιεῖον" ἔστι δὲ μνήμη, ὡς μὲν ᾿Ωρεγένης Φηὶν, Φαντασία ἐγκαταλελειμμένη ἀπό τινος αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν φαινομένης " ὡς δὲ Πλάτων, σωτηρία αἰσθήσεώς τε καὶ νοήσεως. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν δια τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἀντι) αμββάνεται, καὶ γίνεται δόξα" τῶν δὲ νοητῶν, διὰ τοῦ νοῦ, καὶ γίνεται νόησις. ὅταν οὖν τοὺς τύπους, ὧν τὸ ἐδόξασεν, ὧν τε ἐνοήσε διασώῤη, μνημονεύειν λέγεται. ἔοικα δὲ νόησιν λέγειν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις, οὐ τὴν κυρίως νόησιν, ἀλλα τὴν διανόησιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθηταὰ μνημονεύεται καθ' ἑαυτὰ » τὰ ὶ δὲ νοητὰ κατα συμβεβηκὸς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῶν διανοητῶν ἡ μνήμη ἐκ προλαβούσης Φαντασίας πεν ρνγίνεται " τὰ δὲ κυρίως νοητὰ ὅτι μὲν ἐμάθομεν ἢ ᾿ ἠκούσαμεν» μεμνήμεθα" τὸς δὲ οὐσίχς αὐτῶν μνήμην͵ οὐκ ἔχομεν" οὐ κε ἐκ προηγησαμένης Φαντασίας καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀνάληψις, λ᾽ ἐκ μωθήσεως ἢ Φυσικῆς ἐννοίας. εἰ δὲ μνημονεύειν λεγόμεθα, ὡὧ πρότερον εἴδομεν ἢ ᾿ ἡκούσαμεν ἥ ἄλλως πως ἔγνωμεν" τὸ δὲ πρότερον τὴν ἀναζοραν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν παρελθόντα “ρόνον, δῆλον, ὡς μνημονευτά ἐστι τοὶ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα, τὰ ἐν χρόνω συνισταίμενα" καὶ ἔστι μὲν τῶν ἀπόντων ἡ μνήμην. οὐ μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπόντων γίνεται. εἰνώμνησις δὲ λέγεται» ὅταν λύήθη μεσο) αβήση τὸν μνήμην. ἔστι γὰρ ἀνάυνησις μνήμης ἐξιτήλου γενομένης ἀνάκτησις " γίνεται δὲ ἐξίτηλος ὑπὸ τῆς λήθης᾽ λήθη δέ ἐστι ᾿ μνήμης εἰποίβολή" ἄλλ᾽ ἡὶ μὲν δωνεκὴς» ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν, ἧς ἐστιν ἡ ἀνάμνησις. ἑτέρα δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις» ἥτις οὐκ ἔστι λήῴθη τῶν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοήσεως, ἀλλὰ τῶν Φυσικῶν ἐννοιῶν" Φυσριὰς δὲ λέγομεν ἐννοίας, τὰς ἀδιδάκτως πᾶσι προζούσας, ὡς τὸν εἶναι Θεόν" ταύτην δὲ ὁ Πλάτων ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι λέγει τῶν ἰδεῶν" τί δέ ἐστιν καὶ ἰδέα, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐροῦμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν Φανταστικὸν παραδίδωσι τῷ διανοητικῷ τὰ φαινόμενα" τὸ δὲ διανοητικὸν ἢ διαλογιστικὸν παραλαβὸν καὶ κρίναν παραπέμπει τῷ μνημονευτικῷ. ὄργανον δὲ καὶ τούτοὺ καὶ ὅπισθεν κοιλία τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, ἣν καὶ παρεγκεῷαλίδα καὶ “ταρεγκρανίδα παλοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν μὲν αἰσθήσεων. ἀρχὰς καὶ ῥίζας», τὰς ἔμπροσθεν εἶναι κοιλίας Φαμὲν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, τοῦ δὲ διανοητικοῦ, τὴν μέσην, τοῦ δὲ ᾿βνημονευτικοῦν πὴν ὄπισθεν, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἐπιδεῖξαι, εἰ ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον», ΐνα μὴ δόξωμεν ἀλόγως πιστεύειν τοῖς λεγομέγοῖςζ. ἱκχανωτάτη δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἡ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν μορίων ἐνεργείας λαμβανομένη. τῶν μὲν γὰρ προσθίων ποιλιῶν καθ' ὄγτινα δήποτε τρόπον βλαβεισῶν, αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις “ταραποδίζονται γ) τὸ δὲ διανογτιιὸν ἔτι μένει σωζόμενον" τὴς δὲ μέσης κοῦ ίας μένης παθούσης., ἡ μὲν διάνοια σφάλλεται, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητήρια μένει φυλάττοντα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν αἴσθησιν" ἐὰν δὲ καὶ αἱ πρόσθιοι καὶ ἡ μέση κοιλία πάθωσιν, ὁ λογισμὸς ἅμα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι παρακέπτει" τῆς δὲ σπταρεγο κεφαλίδος παθούσης, ἡ μνήμη μόνη παραπόλλυται, τὴς αἰσθύσεως καὶ τῆς διανοίας εἰς οὐδὲν καταβλαπτομένων " ἐὰν δὲ σὺν τοῖς προσθίοις καὶ ἡ μέση καὶ ἡ ὄπισθεν σπώθη τίς καἱ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν καὶ τὴν μνήμην ὁμοῦ φᾳ πκραφθείρονται, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸ πᾶν κινδυνεύειν ἀπολέσθαι ζῶον. γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο δῆλον καὶ δ ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν παν θῶν τε καὶ συμπτωμάτων, μάλιστα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Φρενίτιδος. τῶν γὰρ Φρενιτιζόντων, οἱ μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις διασώζουσι, τῆς διανοίας μόνης βλαβείσης. τοιοῦτον ἀναγράψει Γαληνὸς Φρενιτίσανται, ὃς, ἐριουργοῦ τινὸς ἐργαζομένου παρ αὐτῷ, διαναστὰς καὶ λαβὼν ὑέλινα σκεύη, ἐπί τε τὰς θυρίδας ὁρμήσας, ἠρώτα τοὺς παριόντας, ἕκαστον τῶν σκευῶν ἐξ ὀνὸματος ὧν, εἰ θέλουσιν αὐτὸ ῥιφῆναι κάτω" τῶν δὲ παρεστώτων βούλεσθαι φησάντων, πρῶτον ἠκόντισε τῶν σκευῶν ἕκαστον" εἶτα ἤρετο τοὺς παρόντας, εἰ καὶ τὸν ἐριουργὸν βούλοιντο ῥιφῆναι" τῶν δὲ, παιδιὰν νομισάντων εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θέλειν ζησάντων, λαβὼν ὥθησεν ἄνωθεν κάτω τὸν ἐριουργόν. οὗτος τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὑγίαἰνεν" ἥδει γὰρ.» ὅτι σκεύη ταῦτα καὶ ἐριουργὸς οὗτος" ἐνέσει δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἄλλοι δὲ διώκενον ἕλκουσι (φαντασίαν, ὁρῶν οἰόμενοι τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα" τὰ δὲ ἄλλα Φρονοῦσι κωτὼ λόγον", οὗτοι τὰς προσθίους μόνας κοιλίας ἐβλάβησαν, τῆς μέσης ἀπαθοῦς μεινάσης. ἐκ δὲ τῶν παθῶν τῶν παρακολουθούντῶν ἑκάστῳ μορίῳ τα τῆς ἐνεργείχς αὐτῶν ἐμποδίζεται" εἰς ἐκείνην γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καταβλάπτεται τὸ ζῶον, ἣν πέζυκεν ἐνεργεῖν τὸ πεπονθὸς μόριον, ὡἧς. καὶ τοῦ ποδὸς σταθόντος» εἰς τὸ περιπατεῖν ἐμποδιζόμεθα. ταύτην γὰρ ὁ ποὺς ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ο ### English translation (Claude) The power of memory is the cause and storehouse of memory and recollection. Memory, as Origen says, is an image left behind by some sensation that has appeared in actuality; as Plato says, it is the preservation of sensation and of understanding. For the soul apprehends perceptible things through the sense organs, and opinion arises; intelligible things through the mind, and understanding arises. When, then, it preserves the impressions of what it has opined and of what it has understood, it is said to remember. Plato seems to mean by understanding here not understanding in the strict sense but discursive thought. For perceptible things are remembered in themselves, intelligible things incidentally, since memory even of objects of thought comes from a preceding image. Things intelligible in the strict sense we remember to have learned or heard; but of their substance we have no memory; for the apprehension of intelligibles does not come from a preceding image, but from learning or natural notion. If we are said to remember what we earlier saw or heard or knew in some other way, and “earlier” refers to past time, it is clear that what is remembered is things that come to be and perish, things that exist in time. Memory is of things absent, but it does not arise from things absent. It is called recollection when forgetting has interrupted memory. For recollection is the recovery of a memory that has faded; it fades through forgetting; and forgetting is the loss of memory, either lasting or for a time, and of the latter there is recollection. There is another recollection, which is not of things forgotten from sensation and understanding, but of natural notions. By natural notions we mean those present in all without teaching, such as that God exists. Plato says this is recollection of the Ideas; what an Idea is we shall say later. The power of imagination hands over appearances to the power of thought; the power of thought or reasoning receives them, judges them, and passes them on to the power of memory. Its organ is the back ventricle of the brain, which they call the cerebellum and parencranis, and the psychic breath in it. Since we say that the front ventricles of the brain are the beginnings and roots of the senses, the middle one of thought, and the back one of memory, we must show that this is so, lest we seem to believe what is said without reason. The most sufficient proof is the one taken from the activity of the parts themselves. When the front ventricles are harmed in any way, the senses are impeded, but thought remains intact. When the middle ventricle alone is affected, thought fails, but the sense organs keep their natural sensation. If both the front and the middle ventricles are affected, reason goes astray together with the senses. When the cerebellum is affected, memory alone is lost, while sensation and thought are not harmed at all. If the middle and back ventricles are affected together with the front ones, sensation, reason and memory are destroyed together, and besides the whole creature is in danger of perishing. This becomes clear from many other affections and symptoms, but especially from phrenitis. Of those with phrenitis, some keep their senses, and only thought is harmed. Galen records such a patient: when a wool-worker was working in his house, he got up, took glass vessels, rushed to the windows, and asked the passers-by, naming each vessel, whether they wanted it thrown down. When those standing there said yes, he first hurled each of the vessels; then he asked those present whether they wanted the wool-worker thrown too. They, thinking it a jest, said yes, and he took the wool-worker and pushed him down from above. This man was sound in his senses, for he knew that these were vessels and this a wool-worker; but he was affected in his thought. Others draw empty images, thinking they see what is not seen, but otherwise think rationally; these were harmed only in the front ventricles, the middle one remaining unaffected. From the affections that befall each part, its activity is hindered; for the creature is harmed in the activity which the affected part naturally performs, as when the foot is affected we are hindered in walking, for that is the foot's activity. ### Extrabiblical texts - Plato, Phileb. 34a (Plato (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Galen, Loc. aff. 4.2 (Galen (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - The definition of memory attributed to “Origen” is often taken to be Aristotle's (cf. Mem. 1, 450a); Matthaei prints Ὠριγένης. Plato: Phileb. 34a; recollection of the Ideas: Meno 81c–d, Phaed. 72e–76e. Galen, On Affected Parts 4.2 (the patient with phrenitis). ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 13 (Matthaei, 202-207; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/13). ## Matthaei, chapter 14 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-14 - Source: Matthaei, 208-210 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius distinguishes inner from uttered speech and lists the organs of voice and articulation. ### Greek text ἐν τοῖς ᾿ ὀνείροις διαλεγόμεθα" κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα λογία κοὶ πάντες ἐσμέν. οὐ Ὑ οὕτω κατα τὸν προφορικὸν λόγον, ὡς κατὰ τοῦτον. καὶ γαρ οἱ ἐκ γενετὸς κωφοὶ καὶ οἱ διοὲ πάθος ἢ ἥ νόσημα τὴν (φωνὴν ἀποβαλόντες, οὐδὲν ἢ ἧττον λογικοί εἰσν. ὁ δὲ προζορικὸς λόγος ἐν τὴ Φωνῇ καὶ ταῖς δια» λέκτοις τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει" ὄργανα δὲ τῆς φωνῆς πολλά. οἵ τε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεσοπλεύροις ἔσωθεν μύες καὶ ὁ θώραξ καὶ ὁ πνεύμων ἦτε τραχεῖα ἀρτηρία καὶ ὁ λάρυγξ καὶ τούτων μάλιστα τὸ χονδρῶδες, καὶ τὰ παλινδρομοῦντα νεῦρα καὶ ἡ γλωττὶς καὶ πάντες οἱ κινοῦντες ταῦτα τὰ μόρια ΘΝ τῆς ἐκφωνήσεως εἰσιν ὄργανα" τῆς δὲ διαλέκτου, τὸ ἣν στόμα. ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ διαπλάττεται καὶ σχηματίζεται καὶ οἱονεὶ μορῷφοῦται ἡ διάλεκτος" τὴς μὲν γλώσσης καὶ τοῦ γαργαρεῶνος πλήκτρου λόγον ἐπεχόντων᾽ τῆς δὲ ὑπερώας, ἠἐχείου" τῶν δὲ ὀδόντων καὶ τῆς ποιᾶς τοῦ στόματος διανοἰξεως» ὡς ἐν λύρα, τὴν τῶν χορδῶν αναπληρούντων χρείαν» ### English translation (Claude) … [inner speech, by which] we converse in dreams; and it is chiefly by this that we are all rational, not so much by uttered speech as by this. For those deaf from birth, and those who have lost their voice through some affection or disease, are no less rational. Uttered speech has its activity in the voice and in dialects. The organs of the voice are many: the muscles inside between the ribs, the chest, the lungs, the windpipe, the larynx and especially its cartilage, the recurrent nerves, the glottis, and all the muscles that move these parts are organs of utterance; the organ of articulate speech is the mouth. For in it speech is moulded, shaped, and as it were given form: the tongue and the uvula hold the place of the plectrum, the palate that of the sounding-board, and the teeth and the particular opening of the mouth fill the need of the strings, as in a lyre. ### Translation notes - The beginning of the chapter, which distinguished inner speech (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) from uttered speech (λόγος προφορικός), is lost in the OCR; the first words are supplied in square brackets by sense. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 14 (Matthaei, 208-210; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/14). ## Matthaei, chapter 15 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/7/#p-15 - Source: Matthaei, 211-213 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius reports the divisions of the soul of Zeno, Panaetius and Aristotle and turns to the irrational part. ### Greek text Διαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως εἰς δυνάμεις ἢ εἴδη ἢ μέρη τὴν ψυχὴν, εἷς τε τὸ Φυτριὸν, ὃ καὶ θρεπτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν καλεῖται, καὶ εἰς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ λογικόν, τῶν δὲ ὀγγάνων ἑκάστου τούτων τοὶ μὲν εἴρηται, τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ᾧ;θήσεται.- Ζήνων δὲ ὁ στωϊαὸς ὀκταμερὴ Φγυσὶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, διαιρῶν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ τὸ ἐγεμονικὸν, καὶ εἰς “ὡς πέντε αἰσθήσεις, καὶ εἰς τὸ Φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν. Παναίτιος δὲ ὃ φιλόσοζος τὸ μὲν ζωνντικὸν τῆς καθ' ἑρμὴν κινήσεως μέρος ἔλα βούλεται" λέγων ἐορβότοσ τὸ δὲ σπερματικὸν, οὐ τὴς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλὰ τῆς Φύσεως. ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς πέντε εἶναι λέγει τὼ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς» τό τὸ φυτικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν ματὰ τέπον, καὶ τὸ ὁρεκτριὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν. Φυτικὸν λέγων τὸ τρέφειν καὶ αὐξεῖν καὶ γεννᾷν ποιοῦν καὶ, ᾿ ".» ΑΙ ᾿ " διαπλάσσον τὰ σώμχτα᾽ καλεῖ δὲ τὸ ζυτικοὸν καὶ θρεστι- ΙῚ “- κὸν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου μέρους καλῶν, τοῦ τρέ- "ὦν ἢ νὺΝ τῆν ᾧοντος, ἀφ᾽ οὐ καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ μέρη τοῦ ζυτικοὺ τὴν ὑταρἔν ἔχει. οὕτω μὲν ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖξ" ἐν δὲ τοῖς γθικοῖς ΙΝ -, ΨῬ εἰς δύο τὰ πρῶτα καὶ γενικώτατα διχιρεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰς, σε τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀλογον" ὑποδικιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀλογον» εἰς ΑΞ.., Ω σε τὸ ἱἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ κατήκοον λόγου. ΤΩΝ Ψ' “ “ΜΠ περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ λογικοῦ ἐν τοῖς πτρολχίφουσιν εἰρηταν" πτερι δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου νῦν διαληψόμεθα. ### English translation (Claude) They divide the soul in another way too, into powers or kinds or parts: into the vegetative, which is also called nourishing and passive, the sensitive, and the rational. Of the organs of each of these, some have been spoken of, and others will be spoken of in what follows. Zeno the Stoic says the soul has eight parts, dividing it into the ruling part, the five senses, the power of speech and the generative power. Panaetius the philosopher holds that the power of speech is part of movement by impulse, and rightly; and the generative power not a part of the soul but of nature. Aristotle, in his works on nature, says the parts of the soul are five: the vegetative, the sensitive, the power of moving from place to place, the appetitive, and thought; by vegetative he means what makes the bodies nourish, grow and reproduce, and shapes them; he calls the vegetative also nourishing, naming the whole from its most important part, that which nourishes, from which the other parts of the vegetative have their existence. So in his works on nature; but in his ethical works he divides the soul into two first and most general parts, the rational and the irrational, and subdivides the irrational into what is obedient to reason and what does not listen to reason. Of the rational we have spoken earlier; now we shall discuss the irrational. ### Extrabiblical texts - Zeno of Citium, Zeno (Zeno of Citium): allusion, medium confidence - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.13 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, De an. 2.3, 414a–b; Eth. nic. 1.13, 1102a–1103a. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 15 (Matthaei, 211-213; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/15). ## Matthaei, chapter 16 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-16 - Source: Matthaei, 213-218 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius discusses whether the irrational is a separate soul or a part, divides it into desire and anger with their organs, and defines passion and its relation to activity. ### Greek text … καθ' ἕαυτὲὴν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν ἀλογίαν, ὡς ἅλομὴ " ΩΝ ΩΣ “Ὁ γον ψυχὴν οὖσαν, καὶ οὐ μέρος τῆς λογικῆς. πρῶτον μὲν» ὅτι καὶ καθ' ἑχυτὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις εὑρίσκεται" ἐξ οὗ δῆλον, ὃ ὅτι τελεία τις ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐ μέρος ἄλλης" εἶθ᾽, ὅτι τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἐστὶ, τῆς λογικῆς μέρος εἶναι τὸ ὅλο. γον. ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ αὶ μέρος εἶναι λέγοι καὶ δύναμιν, καί ἱ διαιρεῖ εἰς δύο, ὡς ἔφαμεν" καλεῖ δὲ ταῦτα κοινῶς, καὶ ὀρεκτικόν" τούτου δέ ἐστι καὶ καὶ καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησις. ἡ γὰρ ὄρεξις. κιγήσειός ἐστιν ἀρχή. ὀρεχθέντα γὰρ τὰ ὶ ζῶα ἐπὶ τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν ἀττει κίνησιν. τοῦ δὲ ἀλόγου τὸ μὲν οὐ πείθεται λόγῳ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιπειθές ἐστι λόγῳ" πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο, εἴς τὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμικόν. ἔστι δὲ ὄργανα τοῦ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ αἰσθήσεως, τὸ. ἧπαρ τοῦ δὲ θυμριοῦς ἡ καρδία, σκληρὸν μόριον καὶ κίνησιν εὐτόνον ἐπιδεχόμενον, εἰς σκληρὰν ὑπηρεσίαν καὶ σύντονον ὁρμὴν τεταγμένον, ὥςπερ τὸ ἧπαρ, παλὸν σπλάγχνον, τῆς ἁπαλῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὄργανον γέγονε. καλεῖται δὲ ταῦτα ἐπιπειθῆ λόγῳ. ὅτι πέφυκε πείθεσθαι λόγῳ καὶ ὑποτάσσεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι, εἰς ὧν ὁ ὁ λόγος κελεύη, ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ Φύσιν ἐχόντων ἀνθρώπων. ἔστι. δὲ καὶ ταῦτα τὼ πάθη συστατικὰ τὴς ζωώδους οὐσίας. ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συστῆναι! τὴν ζωήν. ἐπεὶ δ τὸ πάθος ὁμωνύμως λέγεται, διασταλτέον πρότερον τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν. οᾷ λέγεται γὰρ πάθος καὶ τὸ σωματικὸν, ὡς τὰ νοσήματα καὶ τὰ ἕλκη" λέγεται πάθος, καὶ τὸ Ψυχυιὸνγ περὶ οὗ νῦν ἐστιν ὃ λόγος, ὅτε ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὁ θυμός" ἔστι δὲ κοινῶς μὲν καὶ γενικῶς ζώου πάθος, ᾧ ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ ἢ λύπη. ἔπεται γὰρ τῷ πάθει λύπη, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἐστὶ λύπη. εἶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν, πᾶν τὸ πάσχον καὶ γλγει" νῦν δὲ τὰ ἀναίσθητα πάσχει μὲν, οὐκ ἀλγεῖ δέ" οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πάθος ἐστὶν ἄλγημα Ν ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τοῦ πάθους αἴσθησις. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀξιόλογον εἶναι, ἵνὰ τῇ αἰσθύσει ὑποπέση. τῶν δὲ ψυχικῶν παθῶν ὅρος οὗτος" σεάθος ἐστὶ κίνσις τὴς ὀρεκτικῆς δυνάμεὼς αἰσθητὴ ἐπὶ Φαντασίῳ, ἀγαθοὺ ἢ κακοῦ. καὶ ἄλλως" σάθος ἐστὶ κίνησις ἄλογος “«ῆς ψυχὲς δί' ὑπόληψιν καλοῦ ἢ κακοῦ. τὸ δὲ γενικὸν πάθος οὕτως ὁρίζονται" στάθος ἐστὶ κύησις ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἐξ ἑτέρου. ἐνέργεια δέ ἐστι κίνησις δραστικὴ κατὰ Φύσιν" δραστικὸν δὲ λέγεται, τὸ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμεγον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ὁ θυμὸς, ἐνέργεια μέν ἐστι τοῦ πα δοῦς" πάθος δὲν τῶν δύο μερῶν τὴς ψυχῆς, καὶ προςέτι τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν παντὸς, ὅταν ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ βιαίως ἀγηται πρὸς τὰς πράξεις. ἐξ ἑτέρου γαρ ᾿ ἑτέρῳ γέγονεν ἡ κίνησις,» ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι πάθος. ειαὶ καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον, ἡ Ἶ ἐνέργεια “«ταθος λέγεται, ὅταν μ παραὶ Φύον. ἐνέργεια μὲν γάρ ἐστι κατα Φύσιν κίνησις" πάθος δὲ παραὶ φύσιν. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον ΚΙ ἐνέργεια, ὅταν μὲὴ κατὰ Φύσιν κρῆται, λέγεται πάθος, εἴτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινοῖτο, εἴτε ἐξ ἑτέρον. τῆς γοῦν καρδίας ἡ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς σφυγμοὺς κίνησις» ἐνέργειώ ἐστιν" ἡ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παλμοὺς, πάθος. ἐξ αὐτῆς μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοὺς παλμοὺς κίνησις αλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ Φύσιν". ἐξ αὐτὴς δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν σφυγμῶν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φῶνν. οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν, ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ πάθος καὶ ἐνέργειαν ὀνομαίζεσθαι. καθ ὃ μὲν γὰρ κινήσεις εἰσὶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τὸς ψυχῆς, ἐνέργειαί τινές εἶσι" καθ' ὃ δὲ ἃ αμετροι. καὶ οὐ κατὰ ᾧύσιν, οὐκ ἐνέργειαι, ἀλλὰ πάθη. οὕτως οὖν καὶ κύησις τοῦ ἀλόγου φάθος ἐστὶ κατ᾽ ἄμῴω τὰ σημαινόμενα. οὐ πᾶσα δὲ κύησις τοῦ παθητικοῦ, πάθος καλεῖται" οἰλλ᾽ αἱ σφοδρότεραι καὶ εἰς αἰσθησιν προβαύνουσαι. αἱ γρ μικραὶ καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητοι οὐδέπω πάθη. δεῖ γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ πάθος καὶ μέγεθος ἀξιόλογον. διὸ τ πρόφκειται τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ πάθους, τὸ κίνησις αἰσθησή. αἱ γὰρ μικραὶ κιγήσεις.» λανθάνουσαι τὴν αἰσθησιν, οὐ “ποιοῦσι πάθος, ὡς εἴρηται. ### English translation (Claude) [Some] say that the irrational is by itself an irrational soul, and not part of the rational soul: first, because it is found by itself in the irrational animals, from which it is clear that it is something complete and not part of another; second, because it is most absurd that the irrational should be part of the rational. Aristotle says it is a part and a power, and divides it into two, as we said; he calls these together the appetitive. To it belongs also movement by impulse; for appetite is the beginning of movement, since animals, when they desire, rush into movement by impulse. Of the irrational, one part does not obey reason, the other is obedient to reason; and again what is obedient to reason is divided into two, desire and anger. The organ of desire is the liver; of anger, the heart, a hard part capable of vigorous movement, appointed for hard service and intense impulse, as the liver, a soft organ, has become the instrument of soft desire. These are called obedient to reason because they naturally obey reason, are subject to it, and move as reason commands, in men who are in their natural state. And these passions are constitutive of the substance of a living creature; for without them life cannot hold together. Since “passion” is used in more than one sense, the ambiguity must first be distinguished. Bodily things are called passions, such as diseases and wounds; and so is the psychic, of which we are now speaking, such as desire and anger. Generally and in common, a passion of a living creature is what pleasure or pain follows. For pain follows the passion; the passion itself is not pain. If it were, everything that is affected would feel pain; but insensible things are affected and do not feel pain; so passion is not pain, but the perception of the passion is. And it must be considerable, so as to fall under perception. The definition of the passions of the soul is this: passion is a perceptible movement of the appetitive power upon the image of something good or bad. And again: passion is an irrational movement of the soul through the supposition of good or evil. Passion in general they define thus: passion is a movement in one thing from another. Activity is a movement that acts according to nature; that is called active which moves of itself. So anger is an activity of the spirited part, but a passion of the two parts of the soul, and moreover of our whole body, when it is driven violently to actions by anger; for the movement has come about in one thing from another, which we said is passion. In another way too activity is called passion, when it is contrary to nature. For activity is movement according to nature, passion movement contrary to nature. On this account too activity, when it is not moved according to nature, is called passion, whether it is moved by itself or by another. The movement of the heart in pulses is activity, but in palpitations passion; for the movement in palpitations also comes from the heart itself, but not according to nature, while that of the pulses comes from it according to nature. It is not surprising, then, that one and the same thing is called both passion and activity. In so far as they are movements from the passive part of the soul itself, they are activities; in so far as they are immoderate and not according to nature, they are not activities but passions. So movement of the irrational part is passion in both senses. But not every movement of the passive part is called passion, only the more violent ones that reach perception; for small and imperceptible ones are not yet passions. A passion must have a considerable size; therefore “a perceptible movement” is added in the definition of passion; for small movements, escaping perception, do not make a passion, as has been said. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - The opening words are lost in the OCR; “Some” is supplied by sense. - Aristotle, De an. 3.9–10; Eth. nic. 1.13. The definitions of passion are Stoic and Peripatetic. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 16 (Matthaei, 213-218; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/16). ## Matthaei, chapter 17 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-17 - Source: Matthaei, 218-220 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius divides desire into the four passions of desire, pleasure, fear and pain and names their causes and cures. ### Greek text Διαιρεῖται μὲν οὖν» ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ ἀλογον τῆς ψυχῆς, σὸ ἐπιτειθὲς λόγῳ, εἰς “δύο, τόντθ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμικόν" πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμγτικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο, εἰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας" ἐπιτυγχάνουσα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ" ἀποτυγχάνουσα δὲ, λύπεν. πάλιν δὲ καθ᾽ ἕτερον Τρόπον ἡ ἡ ἐπιθυμία διαιρουμένη τέσσαρα σὺν ἑαυτῇ τὸ πάντα εἰδὴ ποιεῖ. ἐπεὶ γα τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ φαῦλα" καὶ τὰ μὲν ἤδη πάρεστι, τὰ δὲ τοὸ προςδοκᾶται" κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τρόπους, τῶν δύο εἰς δύο πολυπλασιαζομένων, τὰ τῆς ἐπιθυαίας εἰς τέσσαρα διαιρεῖν ΕἾ Ε] ται. ἔστι γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν" καὶ πάλιν παρὸν καὶ ᾿ ᾿,, προςδοκώμενον. προςδοκώμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐπιθυμία ἐστίν" ες γδὴ δὲ παρὸν, ἡδονή. πάλιν προφόσκώμενον μὲν κακὸν, Φόα βος" παρὸν δὲ, λύπη. περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ μὲν γὰρ στρέφεται ἡδονὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμίχ᾽" περὶ τὰ φαῦλα δὲ, Φόβος καὶ λύπη. διό τινες τὸ πάθος εἰς τέσσαρα διαιροῦσιν, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἠδονὴν, Φόβον καὶ λύπην. ἀγαθὰ δὲ καὶ φαῦλα λέγομεν, ἢ ΓΙ τὰ Ὄντως ὄντα, ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα. ἐγγίνεται δὲ τὰ Φαῦλα πάθη τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ "τριῶν τούτων" διὰ κακῆς ἀγωγῆς, ἐξ Π με πὸ, νιν, ἀμαθίας, ὑπὸ καχεξίας. μὴ αχθέντες γὰρ καλῶς ἐκ παίδων, ὡς δύνασθαι κρατεῖν τῶν παθῶν, εἰς τὴν ἀμετρίαν αὐτῶν ἐκπίπτομεν᾽ ἐκ δὲ τὴς ἀμαθίας, Φαῦλαι κρίσεις τῷ λογισσικῷ τὸς ψυχῆς ἐμῴφύονται, ὡς οἴεσθαι τὰ φαῦλα χρηστὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ Φαῦλα᾽ γίνεται δέ τινα καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος καχεξίας. ὀργίλοι ὙΑρ εἰσιν οἱ πικρέχολοι" καὶ καταψφερεῖς εἰ θερμιοὶ καὶ ὑγροὶ τὴν κρᾶσιν" 9εραπευτέον δὲ τὸ μὲν κακὸν εθὸς ξθιι καλῷ τὴν δὲ ὦμαθίχν μαθήσει καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ" τὴν δὲ καχεξίαν ἢ ἰατέον σωματοιῶξη, μεθιστάντας αὐτὴν, ὡς εἶδντε εἰς τὴν μέσην πρᾶσιν ἀρμοζούση διαίτῃ καὶ γυμνασίᾳ, καὶ ζαρμάκοις, ἐὰν καὶ τούτων δεηθῶμεν. ### English translation (Claude) The irrational part of the soul that is obedient to reason is divided, as we said, into two, desire and anger. Desire again is divided into two, pleasures and pains; for desire, when it attains its object, produces pleasure, and when it fails, pain. Again, divided in another way, desire makes four kinds in all, itself included. Since of things some are good and others bad, and some are already present while others are expected, by these modes, two multiplied by two, the things of desire are divided into four. There is good and evil, and again present and expected. Expected good is desire; present good, pleasure. Again, expected evil is fear; present evil, pain. Pleasure and desire are concerned with goods, fear and pain with evils. Therefore some divide passion into four: desire, pleasure, fear and pain. By good and bad we mean either what truly are so or what are thought to be. Bad passions arise in the soul through three things: bad upbringing, ignorance, and bad bodily condition. Not being brought up well from childhood so as to be able to master the passions, we fall into excess of them; from ignorance, bad judgments grow in the reasoning part of the soul, so that we think bad things good and good things bad; and some come from the bad condition of the body, for the bilious are irascible, and those hot and moist in temperament are lustful. Bad habit must be treated by good habit, ignorance by learning and knowledge, and bad bodily condition must be cured bodily, bringing it as far as possible to the middle temperament by suitable diet and exercise, and by drugs, if we need these too. ### Translation notes - The fourfold division of the passions is Stoic (e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.110–111). ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 17 (Matthaei, 218-220; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/17). ## Matthaei, chapter 18 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-18 - Source: Matthaei, 220-229 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius distinguishes pleasures of soul and body, classes bodily pleasures as necessary, natural, or neither, commends true pleasures of contemplation and virtue, and argues against defining pleasure as a coming-to-be. ### Greek text Τῶν δὲ ἡδονῶν, αἱ μέν εἰσι ψυχικαΐ, αἱ δὲ σωματιιαΐ, ψυχικαὶ μὲν, αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν, ὡς αἱ περὶ τ ν τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τὴὴἪ θεωρίαν. αὗται γὰρ καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται μόνης εἰσὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. σωματικαὶ δέ εἶσιν, αἱ μετα κοισωματικαὶ καλούμεναι» ὡς αἱ περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ τὰς συνουσίας. μένου δὲ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν εὖροι τις ἰδίας ήδονας, ἀλλὰ πώθυ, οἷον τομαὶς καὶ ῥεύσεις καὶ τὰς κατὰ κρᾶσιν ποιότητας. πᾶσα γὲρ Ἀδονὴ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως. ψυχικὴν δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐδείξαμεν. καὶ δῆλον, ὡς τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων ἐστὶν καὶ πἀσο,. ὑφ᾽ ἕτερον γῶρ καὶ ἕτερον γένος εἰσὶν, ὡς αἱ σπουδαῖκι ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι" καὶ αἱ μὲν ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς " καὶ αἱ μὲν τῆς διανοίας μόνης, κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην εἰσίν" αἱ δὲ μετὰ σώματος» κατ᾿ αἴσθησιν" καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν, αἱ μέν εἶσι Φυσικα" αἱ δὲ οὐ καὶ τῇ μὲν ἡδονῇ, τῇ ἐν τῷ πίνειν, ἀντίκειται ἡ ἐν τῷ διψῆν λύπη" τὴ δὲ κατὰ θεὼρίαν οὐδέν. ταῦτα οὖν πάντα δείκνυσι τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁμωνυμον. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καλουμένων ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖχι ἅμα καὶ Φυσβεαὶ, ΝΥ͂ χωρὶς ζὴν ἀδύνατον" εἷς αἱ ἱ τροφαὶ, αἱ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀναπληρωτικαὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνδύματα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα" αἱ δὲ φυσιιαὶ μὲν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖχι δὲ, ὡς αἱ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατοὶ νέμον μίξεις. αὗται “)αρ εἰς μὲν τὸν διαμονὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένους συντελοῦσι" δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτῶν ἐν παρθενία ζῆν" αἱ δὲ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι» οὔτε Φυσικαὶ, ὡς ἡ μέθη καὶ καὶ λαγνεία (καὶ ἡ Φιλαργυρία ) καὶ αἱ πλησμοναὶ τὴν χρείαν ὑπερβαίνουσαι. οὗτε γὰρ εἰς διαδοχὴν τοῦ γένους ἡμῖν συμβάλλονται, ὡς καὶ κατὰ νόμον συνουσία, οὗτε εἰς σύστασιν τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ προςβλάπτουσι. τῷ τοίνυν κατα Θεὸν ὥντι μόνας μεταδιωκτέον τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἅμα καὶ Φυσικὰς ἡδονάς" τῷ δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνον, ἐν δευτέρῳ τάξει τῶν οὐρετῶν τεταγμένῳ, ταύτας τε καὶ τὰς Φυσικας μὲν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίας δὲ μετιτέον μετὰ τοῦ προζήκοντος καὶ μέτρου καὶ τρόπου καὶ καιροῦ καὶ τόπου" τοῖς δὲ ἄλλας Φευκτέον “παντὶ τρόπως ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡγητέον, ταύτας εἶναι καλὰς ἡδονὰς, τὰς μὴ συμπεπλεγμένας λύπη» μήτε μεταμέλειαν ἐμποιούσας, μήτε βλάβης ἑτέρας γεννητικαὶς,, μήτε τοῦ μετρίου πέρα χωρούσας, μήτε τῶν σπουδαίων ἡμᾶς ἔργων ἀφελκούσας ἐπὶ πολὺ ἢ κωταδουλούσας. κυρίως δέ εἰσιν ἡδοναὶ, αἱ τὴ κατανοήσει τοῦ θείου καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐπιγινόμεναί πῶς ἢ συμπεπλεγμέναι, ἄςπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον περισπουδάστοις θετέον, οὐκ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἑπλῶς, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν διαμονὴν τοῦ γένους, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ εὖ εἶναι, καὶ σπουδαίοις καὶ θεοφιλέσιν εἶναι συντελούσας, καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν κατὰ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ γοερὸν τελειότητα, αἵπερ οὔτε θεραπείαι τινῶν παθῶν εἰαὶν, ὡς αἱ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀναπληρωτικαὶ, οὐθ᾽ ὅλως λύπην ἔχουσι στροηγουμένην. ἑπομένην» ἢ ἀντυιειμόνηνν ἀλλ᾽ εἰσὶ καθαραὶ καὶ ἄμικτοι πάσης ὑλικῆς συμπλοκῆς » ψυχριαὶ μόνον οὖσαι. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ Πλάτωνα, τῶν δονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς. ψευδεῖς μὲν, ὅσαι μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως γίνονται «αὶ δόξης οὐκ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ λύπας ἔχουσι συμπεπλεγμένας" ἀληθεῖς δὲν ὅσαι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσὶ μόνης αὐτῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ Φρονήσεως, καθαραὶ καὶ ἀνεπίμικτοι λύπης ν αἷς οὐδὲ μία μετάνοια παρακολουθεῖ ποτέ. καλοῦσι δὲ τὰς ἐπακολουθούσας τῇ θεωρίῳ καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν ἡδονὰς, οὐ παθὴη;, ἀλλὰ πείσεις. τινὲς δὲ κυρίως τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν, χαρὰν λέγουσιν. ὁρίζονται δὲ τὴ ἦδονὴν» γένεσιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητήν. ἔοικδ δὲ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος» πῆς σωματικῆς μόνης ἡδονῆς εἶναι. αὕτη γὰρ ἀναπλήρωσίς τὶς ἐστὶ καὶ ἰατρεία τῆς σωματικῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ τῆς προςγενομένης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν λύπης. ῥνγοῦντες γὰρ ἡ διψῶν: τες, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ῥΐγους καὶ τῆς δίψης θεραπεύοντες λύπην, ἐν τῷ θάλπεσθαι καὶ πίνειν ἡδόμεθα. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν εἰσὶν ἀγαθαὶ, καὶ οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὰς, οὐδὲ Φύσει. ὡς γὰρ τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν Φύσει καὶ καθ'᾽ ἑαυτό" οὕτω καὶ αὗται κατὰ συμβεβηκός εἶσιν αγαθαὶ, ἰατρεῖαί τινες οὖσαι" αἱ δὲ τῆς θεως ἡδοναὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς εἰσιν ἀγωθαὶ καὶ Φύσει. οὐ γάρ ἐπ᾽ ἐνδείου γίνονται. δῆλον οὖν ἐντεῦθεν, ες οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ τῆς ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἀναπληρωτική. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ, ὑγιὴς ὁ ὅρος, ὁ λέγων, γένεσιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὼρ πάσας περιλαμβάνει τὰς ἡδονὰς, ἀλλὰ παραλείπει τοί «τὴν ἐκ τῆς θεωρίαις. καὶ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ, τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁριζό- {μενος, παντὸς τοῦ λυποῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν, τὸ αὐτό ᾧησι τοῖς λέγουσι, γένεσιν εἰς ᾧύσιν αἰσθητήν. τὴν γορ ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ λυποῦντος, ἡδονὴν εἶναί ᾧησιν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδεμία γένεσις τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀποτελέσμασιν ὁμογενής ἐστιν ἢ συγγενὴς, οὐδὲ τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἡδονὴν ἡγητέον, ἀλλὰ παροὺ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἄλλο τι" ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι μὲν γαρ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστιν" οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν γινομένων ἅμα γίνεται καὶ γέγονεν" ἀλλὰ δὴλον» ὅτι κατὰ μέρος" τὸ δὲ ἡδόμενον ἀθρόως ἤσθη" οὐκ ἄρα «γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή. ἔτι, πᾶσα γένεσις οὐκ ὄντος ἐστίν" ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ τῶν ἤδη ὄντων" οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα γένεσις καὶ ἡδονή, ἔτι» γένεσις μὲν, ταχεῖα καὶ βραδεῖα λέγεται" ἡδονὴ δὲ οὔ. ἔτι, τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰ μὲν ἕξις ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ ἐνέργεια, τα δὲ ὀργανα. ἕξις μὲν, ὡς ἀρετή" ἐνέργεια δὲς εἷς καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν πρᾶξις. καὶ πάλιν, ἕξις μὲν, καὶ ὁρατικὴ" ἐνέργεια δὲ, τὸ ὁρᾷν" ὄργανα δὲν δ ὧν ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὡς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ ποῦτος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ περὶ τὼ ἀγαθὰ καὶ Φαῦλα ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις.» ἔξεων τινῶν εἰσι δυνάμεις. εἶπε οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ ἢ ἢ Φαῦλον» ἐν τούτοις ἔσται μόνως" ἀλλ᾽ ἕξις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε γὰρ» ὡς ἀρετή" οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω ῥᾳδίως μετέπιπτεν εἰς πὴν ἐναντίαν ἑαυτὴ λύπην" οὔτε, οἷς ἡ ἀντικειμένη τῇ στερήσει" κατοὶ ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἕξιν καὶ στέρησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι" ἅμα δέ τινες ἥδονται καὶ λυποῦνται, ὡς οἱ κνώμενοι " οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἕξις ἡ ἡ ἡδονή. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ δι δργανον. τὰ γὰρ ὄργανα καὶ δέ ἄλλα, καὶ ου ) δ᾽ ἑαυτά" καὶ δὲ ἡδονὴ. οὐ δ ἀλλο, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἑαυτήν" οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ὃ ὄργανον. λεέπεται δὴ ἐνέργειαν αὐτὴν εἶναι. ὅθεν ᾿Αριστονέλης αὐτὴν ὁρίζεται, ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ (φύσιν ἕξεως ἀνεμιτόδιστον. τὰ γὰρ ᾿ἐμπόδια τὺς κατὰ Φύσιν ἐνεργείας, λύπη" αλλὲὰ καὶ κα εὐδαιμονία. ἐνέργεια ἐστιν ἀνεμπόδιστος τῆς κατὰ (ύσιν ἕξεως" συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ τὸν ὅρον τοῦτον, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ διεσφάλθαι τὸν ὁρον" διορθούμενος οὖν ὡρίσατο τὴν ἡδονὴν, τέλος εἶναι τῶν τοῦ ζώου κατὰ Φύσιν ἐἰνεμποδίστων ἐνεργειῶν, ὡς συμπεπλέχθαι καὶ συνυπώρχεν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. τὴν ἡδονὴν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ᾽ ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ πᾶσα “δὲ ἐνέργεια κίνησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τις καὶ δ ἀκινησίας ἐνέργειαι καθ ἣν ὁ πρῶτος ἐνεργεῖ Ἐπ Θεός" τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ καὶ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐνέργεια. διὰ γὰρ ἀκουσίως " καὶ γὰρ τὸ θεωρούμενον ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ δικίνοιος «τοῦ θεωροῦτος ἔ ἐστημδ᾽ περὶ ἕν γὰρ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ καταγίνεταί. εἶ δὲ τῆς θεωρίας ἡ ἡδονὴ, μεγίστη τε οὖσα καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ ἀληθὴς, δὲ ἀκινησίας γίνεται, δῆλον, ὡς αἱ δὲ ἐλαττόνων κινήσεων γινόμεναι » ὅσῳ δι ἐλαττόνων, τοσούτῳ καὶ κρείττους καὶ μείζους εἰσί. ᾿συνδιαιροῦνται δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἡδοναὶ κατ᾽ εἶδος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐνεργειῶν εἶ εἴδη, ποσαῦτα καὶ ἡδονῶν" καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν καλαὶ, τῶν δὲ Φαύλων φαῦλαι" καὶ δῆλον, ὡς καθ' ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν ἔτεαι τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἡδοναί. ἕτεραι γὰρ φὴς καὶ γεύσεως καὶ ττεραι τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τὴς ἀκοὺς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως " καθατού Ῥώτεραι δέ εἰσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων; ὅσαι μὴ προςπελαΐζουσαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἥδουσιν, ὡς ὄψις καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὀσῴρησις. καὶ τῶν διανοητικῶν δὲ εἴδη δύο, καὶ τούτων τὸ μέν ἐστε πρακτικὸν, τὸ δὲ θεωρητριόν. δῆλον οὖν, ὃ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν παρεπομένων ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταύταις εἴδη δύο. καὶ τούτων δὲ κωθαρώτερον τὸ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ πρακτικοῦ. τοῖ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἰδίαι, καθ' ὃ ἄνθρωπος, αἱ διανοητικαί. κοιναὶ Α ΓΙ γῶρ» καθ᾿ ὃ ζῶον, αἱ αἰσθητικαὶ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν αἰςθητικῶν ὑδονῶν οἱ μὲν ἄλλαις, οἱ δὲ ἀἄλ- λαις ἥδονται, οὐχ, αἱ τοῖς φαύλοις, αλ). αἱ τοῖς σπουδαίοις,,. ᾿. ΕῚ, ΕῚ πᾶλλι ψαινόμεναι, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσι καλαί. κριτὴς γὰρ ἐρθὸς ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος οὐχ, ὁ τυχών, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἐπιστήτ᾽ ᾿ Α μὼν καὶ κατὰ (ύσιν διακείμενος. ### English translation (Claude) Of pleasures, some are of the soul, others of the body. Those of the soul belong to the soul itself by itself, such as those concerned with learning and contemplation; for these and the like belong to the soul alone. Those called bodily are the ones that come with the participation of the body, such as those concerned with food and sexual intercourse. One would not find pleasures belonging to the body alone, but passions, such as cuttings, fluxes, and the qualities that come from the blending; for every pleasure is with perception, and we have shown that perception belongs to the soul. It is clear that pleasure is among the things spoken of in many senses; for pleasures fall under different kinds, as good pleasures and bad; some false, some true; some of thought alone, by knowledge, others with the body, by perception; and of those by perception some are natural and others not. To the pleasure in drinking the pain of thirst is opposed, but to the pleasure of contemplation nothing. All this shows that pleasure is a word of many senses. Of the so-called bodily pleasures, some are both necessary and natural, without which life is impossible, such as foods that fill up want and necessary clothing; others are natural but not necessary, such as intercourse according to nature and according to law, for these contribute to the continuance of the whole race, but one can live without them in virginity; others are neither necessary nor natural, such as drunkenness, lust, love of money, and surfeits beyond need. These neither contribute to the succession of the race, as lawful intercourse does, nor to the support of life, but do harm besides. One who lives according to God must pursue only the pleasures that are both necessary and natural; one who comes after him, ranked in the second order of the virtues, must pursue these and also those natural but not necessary, with the fitting measure, manner, time and place; all others must be shunned in every way. In short, those pleasures must be considered good which are not entangled with pain, neither produce regret nor give rise to other harm, do not go beyond the moderate, and do not draw us away for long from good works or enslave us. Pleasures in the strict sense are those that come upon or are joined with the knowledge of God, the sciences and the virtues, which must be placed among the things to be pursued in the first rank, as contributing not simply to being, nor to the continuance of the race, but to well-being, to being good and dear to God, and to man's very perfection in soul and intellect. These are not cures of certain affections, as are those that fill up want, nor do they have any pain preceding, following, or opposed to them; but they are pure and unmixed with any material entanglement, being of the soul alone. For according to Plato too some pleasures are false and others true: false, those that arise with perception and untrue opinion and have pains entangled with them; true, those of the soul alone by itself, with knowledge, mind and wisdom, pure and unmixed with pain, never followed by any regret. The pleasures that follow contemplation and good actions they call not passions but experiences; some call such pleasure in the strict sense joy. They define pleasure as a perceptible coming into the natural state. This definition seems to be of bodily pleasure only; for that is a kind of filling up and cure of bodily want and of the pain that arises from the want. When we are cold or thirsty and cure the pain of cold or thirst, we feel pleasure in being warmed and drinking. Such pleasures, then, are good incidentally, not in themselves nor by nature. As being cured is good incidentally, while being healthy is good by nature and in itself, so these too are good incidentally, being cures; but the pleasures of contemplation are good in themselves and by nature, for they do not arise from want. It is clear from this that not every pleasure fills up a want. If so, the definition that says pleasure is a perceptible coming into the natural state is not sound; for it does not include all pleasures, but leaves out that from contemplation. Epicurus too, defining pleasure as the removal of all that causes pain, says the same as those who call it a perceptible coming into the natural state; for he says that release from what causes pain is pleasure. Since no coming-to-be is of the same kind or akin to its results, the coming-to-be of pleasure must not be considered pleasure, but something other than pleasure. Coming-to-be is in the process of coming to be; and nothing that comes to be has at the same moment come to be, but clearly by parts; but one who is pleased has been pleased all at once; so pleasure is not a coming-to-be. Again, every coming-to-be is of what is not; but pleasure is of what already is; so pleasure is not a coming-to-be. Again, coming-to-be is called quick and slow, but pleasure is not. Again, of goods, some are states, others activities, others instruments: a state, such as virtue; an activity, such as the action according to it; again, a state, the power of sight, an activity, seeing; instruments, those through which we act, such as the eye and the like. All the powers of the soul concerned with good and bad are powers of certain states. If, then, pleasure is good or bad, it will be only among these. But it is not a state: not as virtue, for it would not so easily turn into its contrary, pain; nor as what is opposed to privation, for a state and its privation cannot exist at the same time; but some feel pleasure and pain at once, as those who scratch; so pleasure is not a state. Nor is it an instrument; for instruments are for the sake of other things, not for their own sake; but pleasure is not for the sake of another but for its own sake; so it is not an instrument either. It remains, then, that it is an activity. Hence Aristotle defines it as the unimpeded activity of a natural state; for impediments to natural activity are pain. But happiness too is the unimpeded activity of a natural state; so by this definition happiness would be pleasure, and the definition is faulty. Correcting it, he defined pleasure as the completion of the unimpeded natural activities of the living creature, so that pleasure is entangled with happiness and exists together with it, but happiness is not pleasure. Not every activity is movement; there is also an activity of unmovedness, by which the first God acts, for the first mover is unmoved. Such too is the activity of contemplation among men; for it is without movement, since what is contemplated is always one and the same, and the thought of the one contemplating is steady, being always occupied with one and the same thing. If the pleasure of contemplation, being greatest, most proper and true, comes from unmovedness, it is clear that the pleasures that arise through fewer movements are the better and greater the fewer the movements. Pleasures are divided in kind along with activities: as many kinds of activities as there are, so many of pleasures; of good activities good pleasures, of bad ones bad. Clearly the pleasures of each sense differ in kind: those of touch and taste differ from those of sight, hearing and smell; purer are those of the senses that give pleasure without coming into contact with their objects, such as sight, hearing and smell. Of the powers of thought there are two kinds, the practical and the contemplative. Clearly, then, there are two kinds of the pleasures that follow these activities too, and of these the contemplative is purer than the practical. The pleasures of thought are proper to man as man; those of perception are common to him as an animal with the other animals. And since some take pleasure in some sensible pleasures and others in others, those that appear good not to the base but to the good are good in themselves. For the right judge in every matter is not anyone at random but the one who has knowledge and is in a natural condition. ### Extrabiblical texts - Epicurus (Epicurus (sayings and fragments)): allusion, medium confidence - Plato, Phileb. 36c–53c (Plato (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 10.4 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - The classification of desires as natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and neither, is Epicurean (Ep. Men. 127); Plato on true and false pleasures: Phileb. 36c–53c; Aristotle on pleasure as unimpeded activity: Eth. nic. 7.12–13, 10.4; the unmoved first mover: Metaph. 12.7. - Lawful intercourse is called “natural but not necessary,” since one can live in virginity; translated as written. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 18 (Matthaei, 220-229; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/18). ## Matthaei, chapter 19 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-19 - Source: Matthaei, 229-230 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius names four kinds of pain, calls all pain evil, and contrasts the passionlessness of the contemplative with the moderation of the good man. ### Greek text Τῆς δὲ λύπης εἰδὴ τέσσαρα, ἄχος, ἄχθος, ᾧθόνος, ἔλεος. ἔστι δὲ ἄχες, λύπη ἀφωνίαν ἐμποιοῦσα" ἄχθος δὲ, λύπη βαρύνουσα" ᾧθόνος δὲ, λύπη ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς ΟΝ Η ’ ΙῚ ἔλεος δὲ, λύπη ἐπ᾽ αλλοτρίοις κακοῖς. πᾶσχ δὲ λύπη κακὸν “. τῳ, ΠΩ τῇ ἑαυτῆς Φύσει. εἰ ηχρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος λυπηθήσεταί ποτε, χρηστῶν ἀνδρῶν διαφθειρομένων, ἢ τέκνων, ἢ πόλεως πορθουμένης " ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προηγουμένως, οὐδὲ κατοὶ πρόθεσιν, ΝῚ αλλα κατα περίστασιν. καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὲ ὁ μὲν θεωρχτικὸς ἀπαθὴς ἔσται παντάπασιν, ἀλλοτριώσας ἑαυτὸν τῶν τῆδες καὶ συνάψας Θεῷ" ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος, μετριοπαθὴς ἐν αὐταῖς, καὶ οὐχ, ὑπερβάλλων, οὐδὲ αἰχμαλωτιζόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν" ἄλλα μᾶλλον κρατῶν αὐτῶν. ἀντίκειται δὲ καὶ λύπη, ὡς μὲν κακὸν καλῷ, τῇ μετρίᾳ ἡδονῇ " ὡς δὲ κακὸν κακῷ, τῇ ὑπερβαλλούση ἡδονῇ. ἐν ταῖς σωματικαῖς δὲ μόναις αἱ ὑπερβολιαὶ γίνονται" αἱ γὰρ θεωρητικαὶ, ἄκραι τινὲς οὖσαι, καὶ τὸ τέλειον ἔχουσαι, τὴν ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἐπιδέχονται. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀντίκειται αὐταῖς λύπη, οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ θεραπείῳ προηγησαμένης λύπης γίνονται. ### English translation (Claude) There are four kinds of pain: grief, vexation, envy, and pity. Grief is pain that causes speechlessness; vexation, pain that weighs one down; envy, pain at others' goods; pity, pain at others' evils. Every pain is evil by its own nature. For even if the good man will sometimes feel pain, when good men are destroyed, or children, or a city is sacked, it is not as his primary aim nor by intention, but by circumstance. And in these things the contemplative man will be wholly free of passion, having estranged himself from things here and joined himself to God; the good man will be moderate in his passions in them, not going to excess nor taken captive by them, but rather mastering them. Pain is opposed, as evil to good, to moderate pleasure, and as evil to evil, to excessive pleasure. Excesses arise only in bodily pleasures; the contemplative pleasures, being extremes in a sense and having perfection, do not admit excess. For no pain is opposed to them, nor do they arise as the cure of a preceding pain. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 19 (Matthaei, 229-230; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/19). ## Matthaei, chapter 20 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-20 - Source: Matthaei, 231-233 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius divides fear into six kinds, explains its bodily cause, and places the organ of pain in the mouth of the stomach, citing Galen and Thucydides. ### Greek text Διαιρεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ (φόβος εἰς ἕξ, εἰς ὄκνον» εἰς αἰδὼ, εἰς αἰσχύνην, εἰς κατάπληξιν, εἰς ἐκπληξν» εἰς ἀγωνίαν " ἔστι δὲ ὄκνος μὲν, Φόβος μελλούσης ἐνεργείας" κατάπληξις δὲ, Φόβος ἐκ μεγάλης φαντασίας" ἔκπληξις δὲ, Φέβος ἐξ ἀσυνήθους φαντασίας" ἀγωνία δὲν Φόβος διαπτώσεως, τοῦτα ἐστιν ὠποτυχίας᾽ Φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐποτυχεῖν τῆς πράξεως» "ἀγωνιῶμεν᾽ αἰδὼς δὲν Φόβος ἐπὶ προςδοκίῳ ψόγου" καὶλιστον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος᾽ αἰσχύνη δὲ, Φόβος ἐπ᾽ αἰσχρῷ, πεπραγμένῳ. οὐδὲ τοῦτο δὲ ἀνέλπιστον εἰς σωτηρίαν" ταύτη δὲ διαφέρει αἰδὼς αἰσχύνης, ὅτι ὁ μὲν αἰσχυνόμενος, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔπραξε, καταδύεται" ὃ δὲ αἰδούμενος Φοβεῦται περίτεςσεῖν ἀδοξίῳ τινί. καλοῦσι δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ πολλάκις καὶ τὴν αἰδὼ αἰσχύνην, καὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην αἰδῶ, καταχρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασι. γίνεται δὲ ὁ φόβος κατὰ περέψυξιν», τοῦ θεραοῦ παντὸς συντρέχρντος εἰς τὴν καρδίαν, ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχικὸν» καθἅπερ καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ὅταν ᾧοβῆται, καταφεύγει πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας. «ὃς δὲ λύπης ὅ ὀργανον, τὸ στόμα τὸς κοιλίας. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ τὴς δήξεως αἰσθανόμενον ἐν ταῖς λύπαις» »Ὡὡς ὁ Γαληνὸς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ πὺς ὠποδεικτικῆς φησὶν οὕτώ ηπως" τοῖς λυπουμένοις οὐκ ὀλέγον εἰς τὴν γαστέρα καταῤῥεῖ ο»ζξανθὴς χολῆς, ὃ τὴν δῆξιν αὐτοῖς παρέχει!» καὶ οὐ πρό- »» ΤΈρον παύονται,λυπούμενοι καὶ δακνόμενοι, πρὶν ἐξεμέσαι »τὴν χολήν." γίνεται γὰρ ἡ δῆξις αὐτοῖς ὑποκάτω τοῦ κατὰ τὰ μέσα στέρνα χόνδρου, τοῦ ξιφοειδοῦς ὀνομαζομένου. πολὺ δὲ ἀνωτέρω κεῖται ἡ καρδία". Ῥοῦ γὰρ διαφράγματος ἡ μὲν γαστὴρ κατωτέρω ἐστίν" ἡ δὲ καρδία ἀνωτέρω. συνήθὼς δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ καρδίαν καὶ τὸ στόμα τῆς ρὸς και λοῦσιν, ὡς Ἱπποκράτης καὶ ὶ Θουκυδίδης ἐν τῷ λοιμῷ λέγων οὕτως" »Ἀαὶ ὁπότε εἰς τὴν καρδίαν στηρίξαι. ἀνέστρεφέ τε »»αὐτὴν καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι, ἑπόσαι ἀπὸ ἰατρῶν »»ὠνομασμέναι εἰσὶν, ἐπήεσαν. ἢ τὸ γὰρ ἀναστρεφόμενον, τὸ στόμα τῆς γαστρὸς ἐστιν, ἀναγεαζ Ὄμενον ἐμεῖν, οὐ τὸ σπλαγχνον, καὶ καρδία. ### English translation (Claude) Fear too is divided into six: hesitation, modesty, shame, consternation, panic, and anxiety. Hesitation is fear of a coming activity; consternation, fear from a great image; panic, fear from an unaccustomed image; anxiety, fear of failure, that is, of miscarrying, for when we fear to fail in an action we are anxious; modesty, fear in expectation of blame, and this is the finest passion; shame, fear over a disgraceful thing done, and even this is not without hope of salvation. Modesty differs from shame in this: the one who is ashamed sinks down over what he has done, while the one who is modest fears falling into some disgrace. The ancients often call modesty shame and shame modesty, using the words loosely. Fear arises by chilling, when all the heat runs together to the heart, to the ruling part, as the people, when they are afraid, flee to their rulers. The organ of pain is the mouth of the stomach; for this is what feels the gnawing in pains, as Galen says in the third book of his Demonstrations, roughly as follows: “In those who are grieved not a little yellow bile flows down into the stomach, which causes them the gnawing; and they do not stop being grieved and gnawed until they have vomited the bile.” For the gnawing occurs in them below the cartilage in the middle of the breastbone, called the xiphoid. But the heart lies much higher; for the stomach is below the diaphragm and the heart above it. The ancients customarily call the mouth of the stomach the heart too, as Hippocrates does, and Thucydides in the plague, speaking thus: “And when it settled in the heart, it turned it over, and every kind of discharge of bile that has been named by physicians came on.” For what is turned over, being forced to vomit, is the mouth of the stomach, not the internal organ, the heart. ### Extrabiblical texts - Galen (Galen (works)): quotation, medium confidence - Hippocrates (Hippocrates, Hippocratic Corpus): allusion, low confidence - Thucydides, 2.49.3 (Thucydides, History): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Galen's Demonstrations (Περὶ ἀποδείξεως) is lost; the quotation is given as Nemesius cites it. Thucydides 2.49.3 (the plague at Athens). ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 20 (Matthaei, 231-233; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/20). ## Matthaei, chapter 21 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-21 - Source: Matthaei, 234-235 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius defines anger, its three kinds, and its role as the bodyguard of reason. ### Greek text Θυμὸς δέ ἐστι, ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρὸ ν αἵματος» ἐξ ἄναθυμιάσεως τῆς χολῆς ἡ Ω ἄνα θολώσεως γοομένη. διὸ καὶ χολὴ λέγεται καὶ χόλος. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ ὁ θυμός ἐστιν, ὄρεξις ἐντιτιμωρίσεως. ἀδικούμενοι γάρν ὴ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαιν θυμούμεθα, καὶ γίνεται τότε μικτὸν τὸ πάθος ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ θυμοῦ. εἴδη δὲ τοῦ θυμοῦ τρία, ὀργὴ» ἡ καὶ χολὴ καὶ χόλος καλεῖται, μῆνις» καὶ κότος. θυμὸς μὲν γὰρ» ἀρχὴν καὶ κύησιν ἔχων, ὀργὴ καὶ χολὴ καὶ χέλος λέγεται" μῆνις δὲν χολὴ εἰς παλαίωσιν ἀγομένὴ" εἴρηται γὰρ παρὰ τὸ μένειν καὶ τῇ μνήαη παραδεδόσθαι" κότος δὲ, ὀργὴ ἐπιτηροῦσα καιρὸν εἰς τιμωρίαν" εἴρηται δὰ καὶ οὗτος παρὰ τὸ κεῖσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ὁ θυμὸς τὸ δορυφορικὸν τοῦ λογισμοῦ. ὅταν γὰρ οὗτος ἄξιον κρένη τὸ γενόμενον οἶγαγακτήσεως, τότε ὁ θυμὸς ἐπεξέρχεται» ἐὰν κατὰ Φύσὴ τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν Φυλάττωσιν. ### English translation (Claude) Anger is a boiling of the blood around the heart, arising from the exhalation or stirring up of the bile; therefore it is also called bile and gall. Sometimes anger is also a desire for retaliation; for when we are wronged, or think we are wronged, we become angry, and then the passion is mixed of desire and anger. There are three kinds of anger: wrath, which is also called bile and gall; rancour; and resentment. Anger, when it has a beginning and movement, is called wrath, bile and gall; rancour is bile brought to long duration, so called from remaining and being handed over to memory; resentment is wrath watching for an opportunity for revenge, so called from lying in wait. Anger is the bodyguard of reason. When reason judges that what has happened deserves indignation, then anger goes forth, if they keep their proper order according to nature. ### Translation notes - The etymologies (μῆνις from μένειν, κότος from κεῖσθαι) are given as written. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 21 (Matthaei, 234-235; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/21). ## Matthaei, chapter 22 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-22 - Source: Matthaei, 236 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius names the powers of the part of the soul that does not obey reason. ### Greek text Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πειθομένου λόγῳ, ἔστι τὸ τε θρεπτικὸν καὶ γεννητικὸν καὶ σφυγμικόν. καλεῖται δὲ φυσικὸν μὲν, τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ γεννητικόν" ζωτικὸν δὲγ τὸ σῴφυγμωιόν. ### English translation (Claude) The part obedient to reason, then, is like this. To the part that does not obey reason belong the nourishing, the generative, and the pulsating powers. The nourishing and generative are called natural; the pulsating, vital. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 22 (Matthaei, 236; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/22). ## Matthaei, chapter 23 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-23 - Source: Matthaei, 236-240 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius describes the four natural powers of nourishment, the excretions, and the organs and course of digestion and the making of blood. ### Greek text Τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ ζυσικαὶ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ τέσσαρες, ἐλκτικὴ, καθεκτροὶν αλλοιωτικὴ, ὠποκριτουή" ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων τοῦ ζώου Φυσικῶς ἕλκει πρὸς ἑαντὰ τὸν οἰκείαν τροφὴν, καὶ ἑλκύσαν κατέχειν καὶ κατασχὸν εἰς ἑαυτὸ μεταβάλλει, καὶ οὕτως τὸ πεῷ τὸν ἐξωθεῖ." καὶ αὐταί εἰσιν αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ τὴ τροῷὴν τῶν μορίων τοῦ σιίματος διοικοῦσαι, ἐξ ὦ ὧν ἢ αὔξησις. ἅτε κατὰ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος» ἡίνεται. ἐκκρίνε. ται δὲ τὰ περιττὰ διὰ γαστρὸς, δ οὔρων, δὲ ἐμέτων, δὲ δρώτων, διὰ στόματος, διὰ ῥινῶν, δὲ ὦτων, δέ ὀῷθαλμῶν, διοὶ τῆς ἐκπνοῖς., διὲ τῶν ἀδήλων πόρων. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι ἐκκρίσεις πρύδηλοι" δὲ ὦτων δὲ, ἡ ἥ καλουμένη κυψέλη, ἥτις ἐστὶ ῥύπος τῶν ὠτων" διὰ δὲ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, δάκρυα καὶ λῆμαι" διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐκπνοὺς, τὸ λιγνυῶδες τῆς θερμότήτος τῆς καρδίας. ἀδήλους δὲ πόρους Φασὶ, τὴν διατενοὴν “παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, καθ' ἥν ἐκ τοῦ βάθους καὶ τὺς συστολῆς τῶν ἀρτηρίων ἀτμοὶ πλεῖστοι διὼὶ τῆς μανότητος τοῦ δέρματος ιλεξήτονταις ἔγμα δὲ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ, τό τα στόμα καὶ ὁ στόμαχος παὶ ἡ γαστὴρ καὶ “τὸ ἡταρ, αἵ τε φλέβες πᾶσα!" τά τε ἔντερα καὶ αἱ χολαὶ ἀμφότεραι, καὶ οἱ γεῴροί. τὸ γὰρ στόμα πρῶτον προκατασκευάφε τῇ γαστρὶ τὴν τροφὴν εἰς λεπτὼ κατατέμνον αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων καὶ τῆς γλώττης. μεγίστην γὰρ καὶ αὶ γλῶττα χρείαν παρέχεται τὴ διαμασῆσει, συνάγουσα τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τοῖς ὀδοῦσιν ὑποβάλλι ουσα,. καθάπερ αἱ ἀλετρίδες διὰ πῆς χειρὲς τὸν σίτον ταῖς ωύλαις. τρόπον γάρ τινὰ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα χείρ ἐστι τῆς διαμασήσεως. οὕτω δὲ κατεργασθεῖσα ἡ ἡ τροφὴ, παρατέμπεται τῇ κολία διὰ τοῦ στομάχου " ὁ γὰρ στόμαχος οὐ μόνον αἰσθητήριόν ἐστι τῆς ἐνδείας τ᾽ ἀλλὰ καὶ δίο-. δὸς τῶν σιτίων. ἀνατρέχει γαρ ἐν τῇ καταπέσει καὶ ἐπισπᾶται τὴν τροφὸν, καὶ παραπέμπει τῇ κοίλῴῳ. ἡ δὲ κοιλία παραλαβοῦσα χωρίζει τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ τὸ τρόφιμον ἀπὸ τοῦ λιθώδους καὶ ξυλώδους καὶ ἀτρόζου" καὶ τὸ μὲν χρηστὸν, εἰς χυμοὺς μεταβάλλουσα, ἀναπέμπει τῷ ὕπατι διὰ τῶν φλεβὼν τῶν ἑλκουσῶν ἀπ΄. αὐτῆς καὶ διοχετευουσῶν εἰς τὸ τι ἡπαροι αἵτινες φλέβες ῥίζαις ἐοίκασι τοῦ ἥπατος, ἑ ἑλκούσαις απὸ τῆς ἡαοερὰς τὴν τροφὴν» ὡς ἀπῷ τῆς ΚΩ͂Ν ἕλκουσιν αἱ τῶν Φυτῶν ῥίζαι. ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν ποθ τὴ γ}» τὴ παρεχρύφῃ τὴν τροφὴν, τοῖς Φυτοῖς" ῥίζαις δὲ, αἱ φλέβες, αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς σύλας καὶ τὰ σιμὰ τοὺ ἥπατος ἀνάγουσαι τὸν χὺμὸν ὠπὸ τε τῆς γαστρὸς καὶ τῶν ἐντέρων διὰ τοῦ μεσαραίου" πρέμνῳ δὲ, τὸ ἧπαρ αὐτό" κλάδοις δὲ καὶ ὠκρέμοσιν, αἱ φλέβες αἱ κατασχιζέμεναι τὴς κωύλης φλεβὸς, τῆς ἀποζυομένης ἐκ τῶν κυρτῶν τοῦ ἥπατος. τὸ γὰρ ἧπαρ. δεξώμενον ἐκ τὴς οἱριλίας τὸν χυμὸν συμπέσσει τὸ καὶ ἑξομοιοῖ ἑωυτῷ, ὁμοιοτάτην δὲ ἔχον τὴν σάρκω τῷ αἴματι, εἰκότως εἰς αἷμα μεταβάλλει τὸν χυμόν. τὸ δὲ αἷμα καθαίρεται διά τὸ τοῦ σπληνὸς καὶ τὴς χρληδόχου κύστεως καὶ τῶν νεφρῶν" τοῦ ἐν σπληνὸς τὸ τρυγῶδες ἕλκοντος καὶ τροφὴν οἰκείαν ποιουμένου" τὴς δὲ χοληδόχου κύστεως τὸ δριμὺ, τὸ ἐναπομεῖναν ποῖς χυμοῖς, ἐκ τὴς τροφῆς" σῶν δὲ νεφρῶν, τὸ ὀρῥῶδες μετὰ τοῦ περιλειπομένου δριμέος, ὡς καθαρὸν λριπὸν καὶ χρηστὸν τὸ εἷμα γενόμενον, εἰς τροφὴν διανέμεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι μορίοις τοῦ σώματος διὰ τῶν κατασπειρομένων εἰς αὐτὰ φλεβῶν" καὶ οὕτως ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ἕλκον τὸ αἷμα καὶ κατέχον καὶ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἰδιαν ᾧυσιν, τὸ στεριττὸν παραπέμπει “τοῖς γειτνιῶσι μορίοις τροφὴν ἐπιτής δειον ἐκείνοις γενόμενον. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πᾶντα τὰ μόρια ἐξ αἵματος τρέφεται καὶ αὔξει καὶ διαμένει, χρρη- ᾿γοῦντος αὐτὸ τοῦ ἥπατος. λέγεται δὲ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος. τοῦ οἰλόγου μὴ πείθεσθαι λόγῳ, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ κατὰ γνώμην ἡμῶν, οὐδὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀλλα Φυσικῶς τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον ἀποτελεῖ. ### English translation (Claude) The natural powers of the nourishing part are four: attractive, retentive, alterative, and excretive. For each part of the animal naturally draws its own food to itself, retains what it has drawn, changes what it has retained into itself, and so expels the residue. These are the powers that manage the nourishment of the parts of the body, from which growth in length and breadth comes. The superfluities are excreted through the belly, through urine, vomiting, sweat, through the mouth, the nostrils, the ears, the eyes, through breathing out, and through the invisible pores. The other excretions are obvious; through the ears comes the so-called cerumen, which is the dirt of the ears; through the eyes, tears and rheum; through breathing out, the sooty part of the heat of the heart. By invisible pores they mean the transpiration of the whole body, by which very many vapours are breathed out from the depth and from the contraction of the arteries through the porousness of the skin. The organs of the nourishing part are the mouth, the gullet, the stomach, the liver, all the veins, the intestines, both biles, and the kidneys. The mouth first prepares the food for the stomach, cutting it small by the teeth and the tongue; for the tongue gives very great help in chewing, gathering the food and putting it under the teeth, as women grinding at the mill put the grain under the millstones with the hand; for in a way the tongue is the hand of chewing. Food so worked is sent on to the belly through the gullet; for the gullet is not only the sense organ of want but also the passage of food. It runs up in swallowing, draws the food down, and sends it on to the belly. The belly receives it and separates what is useful and nourishing from what is stony, woody and without nourishment; the useful part it changes into juices and sends up to the liver through the veins that draw from it and channel to the liver. These veins are like roots of the liver, drawing food from the belly as the roots of plants draw from the earth. The belly, which supplies the food, is like the earth to plants; the veins that carry the juice up to the gates and the concave part of the liver from the stomach and the intestines through the mesentery are like roots; the liver itself is like the trunk; the veins branching from the vena cava, which springs from the convex part of the liver, are like branches and twigs. For the liver, receiving the juice from the belly, concocts it and assimilates it to itself, and since its flesh is very like blood, it naturally changes the juice into blood. The blood is purified through the spleen, the gall bladder and the kidneys: the spleen draws off the dregs and makes them its own food; the gall bladder the pungent part left in the juices from the food; the kidneys the watery part together with what remains of the pungent; so that the blood, now pure and useful, is distributed as food to all the other parts of the body through the veins sown through them. And so each part, drawing the blood, retaining it and changing it into its own nature, passes the surplus on to the neighbouring parts, for which it has become suitable food. In this way all the parts are nourished by blood, grow and endure, the liver supplying it. This part of the irrational is said not to obey reason because it performs its own work not by our judgment or choice but naturally. ### Extrabiblical texts - Galen (Galen (works)): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - The four powers follow Galen, On the Natural Faculties. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 23 (Matthaei, 236-240; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/23). ## Matthaei, chapter 24 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/16/#p-24 - Source: Matthaei, 240-242 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius describes the vital power of the heart and arteries and the cooperation of vein, artery and nerve. ### Greek text Ἡ δὲ σφυγμιοὶ κίνησις καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζωτικὴ δύναμις. ἔχουσα δὲ τὴν καρδίαν ἀρχὴν. καὶ μάλιστα τὴν ἀριστερὰν αὐτῆς κοιλίαν) τὴν πνευματικὴν καλόυμένην» τὴν ἔμψυτον καὶ ζωτικὴν θερμότητα διανέμει παντὶ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος δὰ τῶν ἀρτηρίων, καθάπερ τὸ ἧπαρ διὰ τῶν φλεβῶν τὴν τροζήν. θερμαινομιένης γοῦν τῆς καρδίας (παρὰ Φύσιν,) εὐθέως καὶ τὸ ζῶον ὅλον ( παρὰ φύσιν) θερμιαίνεται, καὶ ψυχομένης ψύχεται. τὸ γὰρ ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα παρ αὐτὴς διὰ τῶν ἀρτηρίων εἷς πᾶν τὸ σῶμα κατασπείρεται. συγκατασχίζεται δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλοις τὰ τρία ταῦτα, φλὲψ, ἀρτηρία, νεῦρον, ἐκ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν διοικου» σῶν τὸ ζῶον" ἐξ ἐγκεφάλου μὲν ἀρχῆς ὄντος κινήσεώς τὸ καὶ αἰσθήσεως γ τὸ νεῦρον" ἐξ ἥπατος δὲ ἀ ἀρχῆς ὄντος αἶματός τε καὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ, ἡ Φλὲψ, τὸ ἀγγεῖόν τοῦ αἱἷματος" ἐκ δὲ τῆς καρδίας ἀρχῆς οὗσης τοῦ ζωτριοῦ, ἡ ἀρτηρία, Τὸ αγγεῖον τοῦ πνεύματος" συνόντα δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰς παρ ἀλλήλων ὠφελείας καρποῦγτω. ἡ μὲν γὰρ Φλὲψ τροζὴν χορηγεῖ τῷ νεύρῳ καὶ τὴ ἀρτηρίῳ" καὶ δὲ ἀρτηρία μεταδίδωσι τῇ φλεβὶ θερμασίας ζυσικῆς καὶ πνεύματος ζωτικοῦ. τὸ δὲ νεῦρον αἴσθησιν παρέχει αὐταῖς τε καὶ τῷ παντὶ σώματι. ὅθεν οὔτε ἀρτηρίαν ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν “«ωρὶς αἵματος λεπτοῦ, οὗτε φλέβα χωρὶς πνεύματος ἀτωώδους, οὔτε νεῦρον χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως᾽ διαστέλλεται δὲ σζοδρῶς καὶ συστέλλεται ἡ ἀρτηρία καθ᾽ ὡρμονίαν τινὰ καὶ λόγον, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα τῆς κινήσεως ἐκ τῆς καρδίας" ἀλλὰ διαστελλομένη μὲν. ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων Φλεβῶν ἕλκει τῇ βίᾳ τὸ λεπτὸν αἶωα" δπτερ αναθυμιώμενον τροφὴ γίεται τῷ ζωτικῷ πνεύματι" συστνλλομένη δὲ τὸ αἰθαλῶδες τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ κενοῖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων πόρων, ὡς διὰ τοῦ στόματος καὶ τῆς ῥινὸς ἡ καρδίχ τὸ λιγνυῶδες ἐν ταῖς ἐκπνοαῖς ἀνωθεῖται. ### English translation (Claude) The pulsating movement is also called the vital power. Having its beginning in the heart, and especially in its left ventricle, called the pneumatic, it distributes the innate and vital heat to every part of the body through the arteries, as the liver distributes food through the veins. When the heart is heated contrary to nature, at once the whole animal is heated contrary to nature, and when it is cooled, the animal is cooled; for the vital breath is sown from it through the arteries into the whole body. These three, vein, artery and nerve, for the most part branch out together, from the three principles that govern the animal: the nerve from the brain, which is the principle of movement and sensation; the vein, the vessel of the blood, from the liver, which is the principle of blood and of nourishment; the artery, the vessel of breath, from the heart, which is the principle of the vital power. Being together, they enjoy the benefits they give one another: the vein supplies food to the nerve and the artery; the artery imparts natural heat and vital breath to the vein; the nerve gives sensation to them and to the whole body. Hence one cannot find an artery without fine blood, nor a vein without vaporous breath, nor a nerve without sensation. The artery expands and contracts vigorously according to a certain harmony and ratio, having the beginning of its movement from the heart. When it expands, it draws by force the fine blood from the adjacent veins, which, evaporated, becomes food for the vital breath; when it contracts, it empties the sooty matter in it through the whole body and the invisible pores, as the heart drives out the smoky matter through the mouth and nostrils in breathing out. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 24 (Matthaei, 240-242; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/24). ## Matthaei, chapter 25 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-25 - Source: Matthaei, 243-248 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius explains that the generative power is natural but the act is in our power, describes the generation of seed, and reports the dispute over the woman's seed between Aristotle and Galen. ### Greek text Καὶ τὸ γεννητικὸν δὲ τοῦ μέρους ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ κατηκόου λόγῳ" ἀβουλήτως γὼρ ἐν ταῖς ὀνειρώξεσι προΐεμεν τὴν γονὴν, καὶ ἡὶ ἐπεθυμία δὲ τῆς συνουσίας ᾧυσική. ἄκοντες γορ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν κινούμεθα. ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις ὁμολογουμένως ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ ψυχική. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τῶν καθ' ὁρμὴν ὀργάνων συντελεῖται», καὶ ἀποσχέσθαι καὶ κρατῆσαι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστιν. ὄργανα δὲ τὴς σπερματικῆς δυνάμεως πρῶτον μὲν αἱ φλέβες καὶ αἱ ὠρτηρίαι. ἐν ταύταις γὼρ τὸ θορῶδες πρῶτον ὑγρὸν τύϊτεταιγ, μεταβληθέντος τοῦ αἵματος, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς τιτθοῖς τὸ γάλα. τροφὴ γὰρ τῶν ἀγγείων τούτων ἐστὶν ὁ χυμὸς οὗτος. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ σπέρματος καὶ ἡ ἕνεσις αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ἐκπέσσουσι μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρτηρίαι καὶ αἱ Φλέβες τὸ αἷμα εἰς τὸ θορῶδες ὑγρὸν, ἵνα τρέφωνται" τὸ δὲ περιττεῦον τῆς τροζῆς αὐτῶν γίνεται γονή, ἀναφέρεται γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν διὰ περιόδου πολλῆς εἰς τὴν κεφαλήν πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ τὸς κεφαλῆς καταφέρεται διὰ δύο φλεβῶν καὶ δύο ἀρτηριῶν. ὅθεν, ἐάν τις ἐκτέμη τὰς Φλέβας τὰς παρὰ τὰ ὦτα καὶ τὰς παρὰ τὰς καρωτίδας, ἄγονον ποἰεῖ τὸ ζῶον. ε αὐται δὲ αἱ φλέβες καὶ ἀρτηρία! γίνονται τὸ ἑλικοειδὲς καὶ »ιρσοειδὲς πλέγμα παρὰ τὸν ὄσχεον, ἔνθα τὸ θορῶδες ὑγρὸν ἐμπίπτει εἰς ἑκάτερον τῶν διδύμων" (μία ἀρτηρία καὶ μία φλέψ, πλήρεις σπέρματος") ἐν τούτοις δὲ τελέως ἀποσπερματοῦται, καὶ διὰ τοῦ κιρσοειδοῦς παραστάτου τοῦ μετὰ τοὺς διδύμους ἐκκρίνεται μετὰ πνεύματος, διότι καὶ ἀρτηρία ἐπτὶν ἡ παραπέμπουσα. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ φλεβὸς Φέρεται, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς λαγνείας. ὅταν γὰρ ἐπὶ πολὺ συνουσιασωσι καὶ καταναλ, ὡσωσι τὸν σπερματικὸν καὶ θορωδὴ χυμὸν, πότε ὑπὸ τῆς βιαίας ὁλκῆς αἷμα καθαρὸν ἐκαρίνουσι. καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες δὲ πάντα τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔχρυσι μόρια, αἰλλ᾽ ἔνδον καὶ οὐκ ἔξω. ᾿Αριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν καὶ Δημόκριτος οὐδὲν βούλονται συντελεῖν τὸ τῆς γυναικὸς σπέρμα πρὸς γένεσιν τέκνων. τὸ γὰρ προϊέμενον ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ἱδρῶτα τοῦ μορίου μᾶλλον ἢ γονὴν εἶναι βούλονται" Ταληνὸς δὲ, καταγινώσκων ᾿Αριστοτέλους, λέγει σπερμαίνειν μὲν ταὶς γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν μίξιν ἀμζοτέρων τῶν σπερμάτων ποιεῖν τὸ κύημα" διὸ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν μίξιν λέγεσθαι" οὐ μὴν τελείαν γονὴν, ὡς τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς. αλλ' ἔτι ἄπεπτον καὶ ὑγροτέραν. τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ γονὴν τροφὴ τις γίνεται τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρός. ἐξ αὐτὴς δὲ καὶ μέρος τι τοῦ χορίου» τοῦ περὶ τὰς κεραίας τὴς μήτρας συμπήγνυται, καὶ ὁ καὶλούμενος ἀλαντοειδὴς, δοχεῖον ὧν τῶν περιττωμάτων τοῦ ἐμβρύου. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ γένος ζώου τότε “προςίεται ἡ θήλεια τὸν ἄῤῥενα, ὅταν δύνηται κυίσκεσθαι. ταὶ τοίνυν ἀεὶ δυνάμενα κυΐσκεσθαι ἀεὶ προςίεται τὴν συνουσίαν, ὡς ἀλεκτορίδες καὶ περιστεραὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κύοντα, τὴν σύνοδον ἀποφεύγει " γυνὴ δὲ ἀεὶ προςδέχεται. αἱ γὸρ ἀλεκτορίδες, τῷ καθ' ἑκάστην σχεδὸ ἡμέραν τίκτειν, καθ' ἑκάστην σχεδὸν προςίενται τὴν συνουσίαν" αἱ δὲ γυναῖκας. ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τὴ συνουσίᾳ τῇ μετὰ τὴν σύλληψιν. τὰ γὰρ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων οὐκ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς Φύσεως κανονίζεται, καὶ μέτρα καὶ καιρὸν ὠρισμένον δέχεται. ### English translation (Claude) The generative power too belongs to the part that does not listen to reason; for we emit seed involuntarily in dreams, and the desire for intercourse is natural, since we are moved toward it against our will. But the act is admittedly in our power and belongs to the soul; for it is accomplished through the organs of impulse, and it is in our power to abstain and master the impulse. The organs of the generative power are first the veins and the arteries; for in these the seminal moisture is first produced, when the blood is changed, as milk in the breasts. This juice is the food of these vessels; for their beginning and generation too are from seed. The arteries and veins, then, concoct the blood into the seminal moisture so that they may be nourished; and the surplus of their food becomes seed. It is carried first by a long circuit to the head, and again from the head it is carried down through two veins and two arteries. Hence if one cuts the veins beside the ears and those beside the carotids, he makes the animal sterile. These veins and arteries form the coiled and varicose network beside the scrotum, where the seminal moisture falls into each of the testicles (one artery and one vein, full of seed); in these it is perfected into seed and is excreted through the varicose epididymis that follows the testicles, with breath, because it is an artery that conveys it. That it comes from a vein too is clear from lust: when men have intercourse for a long time and have used up the seminal juice, they sometimes emit pure blood because of the violent drawing. Women too have all the same parts as men, but inside and not outside. Aristotle and Democritus hold that the woman's seed contributes nothing to the generation of children; for they hold that what women emit is sweat of the part rather than seed. Galen, finding fault with Aristotle, says that women do produce seed and that the mixture of both seeds makes the embryo; for which reason intercourse is also called mixture. Yet it is not perfect seed, like the man's, but still unconcocted and more moist; being such, the woman's seed becomes a kind of food for the man's. From it a part of the chorion around the horns of the womb is formed, and the so-called allantois, the receptacle of the embryo's waste. In each kind of animal the female admits the male when she can conceive. Those that can always conceive admit intercourse always, such as hens, pigeons and human beings. But the other animals, when pregnant, avoid copulation, while woman always admits it. Hens, because they lay almost every day, admit intercourse almost every day; but women, as they have free will in other things, so also in intercourse after conception. For the irrational animals are regulated not by themselves but by nature, and receive measures and a fixed time. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Gen. an. 1.19–20 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence - Democritus (Democritus (fragments)): allusion, medium confidence - Galen (Galen (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Gen. an. 1.19–20, 727a–729a; Galen, On Seed 2.1–2. Nemesius's anatomy is that of his sources and is translated as written. - On human freedom in sexual intercourse, as contrasted with animals ruled by nature; translated as written. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 25 (Matthaei, 243-248; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/25). ## Matthaei, chapter 26 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-26 - Source: Matthaei, 249-250 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius divides the powers into psychic (by choice) and natural or vital (without choice). ### Greek text Διαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὰς κατὰ τὸ ζῶον δυνάμεις. καὶ τὰς μὲν λέγουσι ψυχικὰς, τὰς δὲ Φυσικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτι» κάς. “ψυχικὰς μὲν» τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν᾽ Φυσικὰς δὲ καὶ ὠτικᾶς, τὰς ἀπροαιρέτους. καὶ εἰσὶ ψυχικαὶ μὲν», δύω, ἥντε καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησις καὶ καὶ αἴσθησις. - τῆς δὲ καθ' ὁρμοὴν κινήσεως εἴδη τρία, τό, τε μεταβατικὸν καὶ κινητικὸν τοῦ. σώματος παντὸς καὶ τὸ Φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀναπνευστριόν. ἐν ἡμῖν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. φυσικαὶ δὲ καὶ ζωτικαὶ, αἱ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντῶν γινόμεναι, ὡς ἡ θρεττικὴ καὶ αὐξητικὴ καὶ σπερματικοὴ, Φυσικαὶ οὖσαι" καὶ κα σᾷῴυγμικὴ, ζωτροὶ οὖσα. τὰ δὲ δι 0ῃγανα τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται" τῆς δὲ κατὰ στροκίρεσιν κινήσεως νῦν ἐροῦμεν.. ### English translation (Claude) They divide the powers in the animal in another way too, calling some psychic, others natural, others vital: psychic, those that act by choice; natural and vital, those that act without choice. The psychic are two, movement by impulse and sensation. Movement by impulse has three kinds: moving from place to place and moving the whole body, speaking, and breathing; for it is in our power both to do these and not to do them. Natural and vital are those not in our power, which occur whether we will or not, such as the nourishing, the growing and the generative, which are natural, and the pulsating, which is vital. The organs of the others have been spoken of earlier; we shall now speak of those of movement by choice. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 26 (Matthaei, 249-250; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/26). ## Matthaei, chapter 27 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-27 - Source: Matthaei, 250-253 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius describes the organs of voluntary movement, nerves, tendons and muscles, the hands and feet, and the Creator's joining of natural and voluntary functions. ### Greek text αὐτοὺς αἰσθητικοὺς εἶναι) διὰ τὴν γινομένην, ἐκ τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων αὐτοῖς νεύρων αἴσθησιν. ἔστιν οὖν ὁ τένων σύνθεέτος ἔκ τὸ συνδέσμου καὶ νεύρων λεπτῶν. διαφέρει δὲ νεύρου τένων, ὅτι πᾶν μὲν νεῦρον αἰσθητικόν ἐστι καὶ στρογγύλον καὶ ὡπαλώτερον καὶ ἀπ᾿ ἐγκεψάλου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει" ὁ δὲ τένων καὶ σκληρότερος καὶ ἐξ ὀστέου καὶ ἀναίσθητὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν. καὶ ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε πλατύς. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν «χεῖρες ἀντιλυγττικὸν ὄργανον καὶ πρὸς τὰς τέχνας ἐπιτηδειότατον. ἐᾶν γάρ τις ἀφέλη τὰς χεῖρας, ἣ τῶν χειρῶν μόνους τοὺς δακτύλους, εἰς πάσας σχεδὸν πὰς τέχνας χρηστότατον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. διὸ καὶ μόνος ἄνθρωπος, ἐπειδὴ λογικόὸς ἐστι καὶ τεχνῶν δεκτικὸς » χεῖρας ἔσχε, παρὸὰὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. οἱ δὲ πόδες μεταβατικὸν ὁ ὄργανον. τὸν γὰρ κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν διὰ τούτων ποιούμεθα. μόνος δὲ ἄνθρωπος καθέζεται, μηδενὸς ἐρείσματος δεόμενος. Μόνος γῶρ πρὸς δύο γωνίας ὀρθας κάμπτει τὰ σκέλη, κατά τε τὸ ἰσχίον καὶ τὴν ἰγνύν᾽ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τοὶ ἔνδον, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω. ὅσα τοίνυν διὰ νεύρων καὶ μυῶν κινεῖται, ταῦτα πάντα ψυχικά τε ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀποτελεῖται. τούτων δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν Φωνὴν ἐδείξαμεν εἶναι. αὕτη οὖν ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ λόγον τῶν τε ψυχριῶν καὶ φυσικῶν ἔργων διάγνωσις. ὁ δὲ δημιουργὸς κατὰ τὴν ἄκραν ἑαυτοῦ “τρομήθειαν συνέπλεξε τοῖς Φυσικοῖς τὰ ψυχικαὶ, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ ἔκκρισις τῶν περιττωμάτων τῆς ἀπὸκριτιῶς ἐστι δυνάμεως, ἥτις μία τῶν Φυσικῶν ἐστι δυνάμεων, ἵνα μὴ ἀπροαιρέτως ἀσχημονῶμεν, ἔνθα οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν οὐ δεῖ προϊέμενοι, πυλωρούς τινας ἐπέστησε ταῖς ἐκκρίσεσι τοὺς μῦς, καὶ οὕτως ἐποίησε, τὰ τῆς Φύσεως ἔργα ψυχικά. τὰς γοῦν ἐκκρίσεις ἐπέχειν διὰ σοῦτο δυνάμεθα, καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ ἐπὶ πολύ. καταπέμ- “εται δὲ τὰ μὲν αἰσθητικαὰ καὶ μαλακὰ νεῦρα ἀπὸ τε τὴς μέσης καὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν κοιλιῶν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου" τοὶ δὲ σκληρότερα καὶ κινητικὰ, ἀπὸ τῆς ὁπισθὲν κοιλίας καὶ τοῦ νωτιαίου μυελοῦ" σκληρότερα δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὰ ἐκ τοῦ νωτιαΐίου, καὶ τούτων δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον, το ἐμ τῶν κάτωθεν μερῶν τοῦ νωτιαίου. ὅσω γὰρ πλέον ἀποχωρεῖ τοῦ ἐγκε- Φάλου ὃ νωτιαΐὸς, τοσούτῳ “πλέον αὐτὸς τε σκληρότερος γίνεται, καὶ τὰ νεῦρα τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ Φυόμενα. ὥςπερ δὲ τὰς αἰσθύσεις διπλᾶς ἐλάβομεν" οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἐκφύσεις τῶν γεύρων διπλᾶς ἔχομεν. ἕκαστος γὰρ σῴόνδυλος τοῦ νωτιαίου συζυγίαν ἐκπέμπει νεύρων» ἧς τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος χωρεῖν θάτερον δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερά. σχεδὲν γὰρ ὅλον ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα εἰς δύο μεμέρισται» εἰς δεξὶ καὶ ἐριστερά. οὕτω καὶ πόδες καὶ χεῖρες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστον, ὡς καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων. ### English translation (Claude) … [Tendons are said to be] sensitive because of the sensation that comes from the nerves woven into them. The tendon, then, is composed of a ligament and fine nerves. A tendon differs from a nerve in that every nerve is sensitive, round, softer, and has its beginning from the brain, whereas the tendon is harder, comes from a bone, is insensitive in itself, and is sometimes flat. The hands are an instrument for grasping and most suited to the arts. If one takes away the hands, or only the fingers of the hands, he makes a man useless for almost all the arts. Therefore man alone, since he is rational and receptive of the arts, received hands from the Creator. The feet are the instrument for moving from place to place; for by them we make movement in place. Man alone sits without needing any support; for he alone bends his legs at two right angles, at the hip and at the knee, the one inward and the other outward. All that is moved by nerves and muscles, then, belongs to the soul and is done by choice; and we have shown that the senses and the voice belong to these. This, then, is the reasoned distinction of the works of soul and of nature. But the Creator in his supreme forethought wove the works of the soul together with those of nature, and the reverse. Since the excretion of superfluities belongs to the excretive power, which is one of the natural powers, so that we might not disgrace ourselves without choice, emitting them where we ought not, when we ought not, and before whom we ought not, he set the muscles as a kind of gatekeepers over the excretions, and so made works of nature works of the soul. For this reason we can hold back the excretions, often and for a long time. The sensitive and soft nerves are sent down from the middle and the front ventricles of the brain; the harder and motor nerves from the back ventricle and from the spinal marrow; those from the spinal marrow are harder, and harder still those from its lower parts. For the further the spinal marrow goes from the brain, the harder it becomes, and the nerves that grow from it. As we found the senses double, so we have the outgrowths of the nerves double; for each vertebra of the spine sends out a pair of nerves, one of which goes to the right parts of the body and the other to the left. For nearly our whole body is divided into two, right and left: so the feet, the hands, and each of the other parts, as also the sense organs. ### Translation notes - The opening of the chapter, on muscles and tendons as organs of movement by choice, is lost in the OCR; the first words are supplied in square brackets by sense. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 27 (Matthaei, 250-253; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/27). ## Matthaei, chapter 28 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-28 - Source: Matthaei, 253-263 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius shows that breathing belongs to the soul though it never ceases, describes the organs of breathing, and classifies the body's parts as made for their own sake, for others, or incidentally. ### Greek text Καὶ ἡ ἀναπνοὴ δὲ τῶν ψυχριῶν ἐστιν ἔργων. καὶ γὰρ μὺές εἰσιν οἱ διαστέλλοντες τὸν θώρακα, τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ἀναπνοὴς ὄργανον, καὶ ἡὶ ἀθρόα καὶ στεναγμώδης ἀναπνοὴ, ἐπὶ ταῖς μεγάλαις. λύπαις γινομένη » ψυχικὴν δείκνυσι τὴν ἐνέργειαν" ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν τῆς ἀναπενοῆς μεταβολαί. ἀλγοῦντες γοίρ τι τῶν αναπυευστικῶν μορίων» ἢ τῶν συγκινουμιένων αὐτοῖς. οἷον τοῦ διαφράγματος, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἥπατος, ἣ τοῦ σπληνὸς, ἣ τῆς κοιλίας καὶ τῶν λεπτῶν ἐντέρων καὶ τοῦ κώλου» μικρὸν καὶ πυκνὸν ἀναπνέομεν" μικρὸν μὲνν να μὴ σφοδρότερον πλήττω μεν τὸ ἀλγοῦν μέριον" πυκνὸν δὲ, ἵνα τὸ λεῖψαν κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἡ πυκνότῆς ἀναπληρώσῃ. καὶ γῶρ ὅταν ἀλγῶμεν τὸ σκέλος. ἐπὶ ὀλίγον ἐκτείνομεν αὐτὸ βαδίζοντες. δὼ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, δι᾿ ἣν καὶ τὴν ἀναπνοήν. ὡςπερ οὖν καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν ψυχικὸνν οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς εἰναπνοὺς. ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχαάζοντες μὲν ΓΝ καὶ μὴ βαδίζοντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον Χρόνον φὴν δυνάμεθα" τὴν δὲ ἀναπνοὴν οὐδὲ δέκατον ὦ ὥρας μέρος ἐπισχεῖν οἷόν τε. κα- “ταπνιγόμένον γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θερμὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰθάλης καταςσβέννυται, καὶ παραχρῆμα θάνατον ἐπώγει. καὶ γὰρ εἰ Φλόγα τις σκεπάσει ἐν ἀγγείῳ τινὶ διαπνοὴν οὐκ ἔχοντι, ἀποσβέσειν ἃ ἄν αὐτὴν καταπενιη εἶσαν ἀπὸ τῆς ληνύος. διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ κοιμωμένων ὑμῶν οὐδὲν ἢ ὕττον ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἡ ψυχὴ» εἰδυῖα, ὡς» εἰ τὸ βραχύτατον ῥαθυμύσειε, διαφθείρεται τὸ ζῶον. πάλιν οὖν ἢ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ψυχικὸν συνεπλοίκη τῷ φυσικῷ. δὲ ἀρτηρίας ὦ γὰρ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς ἀναπνοῆς » ὀργάνου Φυσικοῦ καὶ αεὶ κινουμένου, ἵνα μηδέποτε ἐπιλίπη τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς, ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὠρτηριῶν. ὅθεν τρὶς, οὐ συνιέντες» Φυσικὴν ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν. τρία δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοὴς ἐστιν αἴτια, χρεία» δύμαϊως: ὄργανα, χρεία μὲν διττὴ, ι : φυλακή τε τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμασίας, καὶ θρέψις τοῦ ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος. αλλ ἡ μὲν Φυλακὴ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν θερμότητος διά τε τῆς εἰςπνοὴῆς καὶ τῆς ἐκπνοὴς συνίσταται" σῆς μὲν εἰςπνοῆς ψυχούσης καὶ μετρίως ἀναρῥιπιούσης τὸ θερμόν" τὴς δὲ ἐκπνοὴς τὸ λιγνυῶδες τῆς καρδίας ἐκχεούσης. ἡ δὲ θρέψις τοῦ ψυχρνοῦ πνεύματος διὰ μόνης τῆς ἀναπνοῆς. ξἔλκεται γάρ σις ἀέρος μοῖρα κατὰ τὰς διαστολας τῆς καρδίας, εἰς αὐτήν. δύναμις δὲ, ἡ ψυχική. αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κινοῦσα τὰ ὄργανα τῆς αναπνοὴς δια τῶν μυῶν, καὶ πρῶτον τὸν θώρακα. τούτῳ δὲ συγκινεῖται ὁ πνεύμων καὶ αἱ τραχεῖχι ἀρτηρίαι, μέρος οὖσαι τοῦ πνεύμονος. τῆς γὰρ τραχείας ἀρτηρίας τὸ μὲν χονδρῶδες τῆς φωνῆς ἐστιν φργανον" οἱ δὲ ὑμενώδεις αὐτῆς δεσμοὶ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς " τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, αὐτὴ ἡ ἄρτη αν Φωνητικόν τε μα καὶ αἀναπνευστικὸν ὄργανον. ἔστιν οὖν ὁ πνεύμων, πλέγμα συγκείμενον ἐκ τεσσάρων, ἔκ τε τῆς τραχείας ἀρτηρίας, καὶ τῆς λείας, καὶ Φλεβὸς, καὶ τῆς αἰφρώδους σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύμονος, ἥτις σὰρξ ἀναπληροῖ, δίκην στοιβῆς, τὰς μεταξὺ χώρας τοῦ πλέγματος. τῶν τὰ δύο ἀρτηριῶν καὶ τῆς φλεβὸς, ὡςτε τούτων ἕδραν αὐτὴν καὶ δεσμὸν. γενέσθαι. συμπέσσει δὲ ἡ σὰρξ τοῦ πνεύμονος (φυσικῶς τὸ πνεῦμα, καθάπερ τὸ ἧπαρ τὸν ἐκ τὸς κοιλίας χυμόν᾽ καὶ διοὶ τοῦτο, ὥςπερ τὸ ἧπαρ ἄκροις τοῖς λοβοῖς ἑαυτοῦ περιέχει τὴν γαστέρα, θερμασίας δεομένην" οὕτω καὶ ὃ πνεύμων μέσην περίλαμβάνει τὴν καρδίαν, δεομένην τῆς ἐκ τὴς ἀναπνοὴς περιψύξεως. συνάπτεται δὲ τῇ τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίῳᾳ κατιὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὁ βρόγχος» συγκείμενος ἐκ μεγάλων τριῶν “όνδρων " τούτῳ δὲ ὁ φώρυξ᾽ εἶτα τὸ στόμα καὶ ἡ ρίς. δί' ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἕλκομεν εξωθεν τὸν ἀέρα" χωρεῖ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν διὰ τοῦ ἐθμοειδοῦς ἢ ἡ σπογγοειδοὺς ὀστοῦν ὅπερ κατετρήθη, ἕνα ἐν ἱταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς, ταῖς κατὰ ποιότητα, τοῦ ἀέρος μηδὲν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος βλάπτηται, ἀθρόου τοῦ πνεύματος ἐμπήττοντος εἰς αὐτόν. συνεχ, ἦσατο δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῇ ῥινὶ στρός τε τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν ὀσῴρησιν ὁ ὁ δημμουργὸς, ὡς τὴ γλώττῃ πρός τε τὴν φωνὴν. καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διαμάσησιν.. τὰ μὲν οὖν κυριώτατα μόρια πρός τε τὴν ὕπαρξιν αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὼς ἀναγκαίας σοῦ βίου χρείας ταῖς ψυχριαῖς συνδρήρηται δυνά-. μεσιν. εἰ δέ τι καὶ παραλέλειπται, ἐκ τῶν ἤδη λεχ,θέντων εὐσύνοπτον ἔσται. ὥςπερ δὲ πάντων τῶν γενομένων, το μὲν δὲ’ ἑαυτὼ γέγονε, τὰ δὲ καὶ δὲ ἑαυτὰ καὶ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ, δὲ ἕτερα μόνον, τὼ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς παρυπέστη" οὕτω κοὐπὶ τῶν μορίων τοῦ ζώου τὴν αὐτὴν εὑρήσεις ἀκολουθίαν. σὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰρημένα πάντα τῶν τριῶν ἀρχῶν ὄργανα, τῶν διοιν κουσῶν τὸ ζῶον, δὲ ἑαυτὰ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ προηγουμένως καὶ κατὼ πρῶτον λόγον κατεσκεύασται, ἃ καὶ κατὰ Φύσιν κυρίως λέγεται, καὶ ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σπέρματος λαμβάνει τὴν γένεσιν, ὡς καὶ τὰ ὀστία. ὃ ἡ δὲ ξανθυη χολὴ καὶ ἱ δ ἑαυτὴν. καὶ ὶ δέ ἄλλο. καὶ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς πέψιν. συντελεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὴν ἔκκρισιν, καὶ γίνεται κατὰ ταῦτα πρόπον τινὰ πῶν θρεπτικῶν εν τι μόριον" οὐ μὴν ἀλλοὶ καὶ θερμασίαν τοὰ παρέχει τῷ σωματι» καθάπερ ἡ ζωτοιὴ δύναμις. τούτων μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα δ ἑαυτὴν δοκεῖ γεγονέναι" τῷ δὲ κωθαίρειν τὸ αἷμα, δὲ ἄλλο πὼς δοκεῖ γθγονέναι. καὶ ὁ σπλὴν δὲ οὐ μριρὰ πρὸς πέψν συμβάλλεται. ὀξώδης γὰρ ὧν καὶ στρυζῴνὸς τὴν ᾧύσιν. καὶ τὴν ξιοιρίσιν τοῦ περεγγεύοντὸς χυμοῦ τοῦ μέλανος εἰς τὴν γαστέρα προχέων, στύζει τε αὐτὴν καὶ τονοῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰς πέψεις διεγείρει. πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ καθαίρει τὸ ὕπαρ. διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ πὼς διὰ τὸ αἷμα, γθγονέναι. καὶ οἱ νεφροὶ δὲ ποῦ τε αἵματος καθάρσιόν εἰσι καὶ τὸς ὀρέξεως τῆς κατὰ τὴν συνουσίαν αἴτιοι. αἱ γὼρ φλέβες, ἃς ἐλέγομεν ἐμπίπτειν εἰς τοὺς διδύμους, διοὶ τῶν νεφρῶν δωξόρχονται" κακεῖθεν ἀρύονται; δριμύτητά τινα, τὴν ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὥςπερ καὶ τὸν. κνησμὸν ἡ δριμύτης ὑπὸ τὸ. δέρμα γενομένη ποιοῖ. ὅσῳ δὲ: τῶν διδύμων καὶ σὰρξ! ὡπαλωτέραω τοῦ δέρματός ἐστιν τοσού-" τῳ πλέον ὑπὸ τῆς δριμύτητος δακνόμενοι, ἐμμανῆ “οιοῦσε.." τῆς ἐκκρίσεως τῆς γενῆς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τρόπον τινὰ καὶ δι ἑαυτὰ καὶ δὲ ἀλλα γέγονεν. εἱ δὲ αἰδένες καὶ ἡ σωρξ΄ δὲ ἀλλα Μόνον. οἱ μὲν γὴρ ἀδένες ὄχημα καὶ στήρεγμα τῶν ἀγγείων εἰσὶν, ἵνα μὴ διαῤῥαγὴ μετέωρα Φερόμενα ἐν ταῖς βιαίοις κινήσεσιν, εἡ δὲ σὰρξ, σκέπασμα γέγονθ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, ἵνα καὶ. «θέρους ἄνα. ὕχῃ τὸ ζῶον, νοτίαν ἔσωθεν ἐκτέμπουσα,, καὶ χειμῶνος. “τὴν τῶν πὴογτῶν ἐρίων αὐτοῖς παρέχῃ χρεῖαν. καὶ τὸ δέρμα δὲ σκέπασμα γέγονε καὶ τῆς οὐ παλῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ἐντοσθίων" ἔστι δὲ τὸν φύσιν σὰρξ ᾽ ὑπό τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ τῶν προςομιλούντων σωμάτων τυλωθεῖσα. τὰ δὲ ὀστὰ, στύρεγμα τοῦ παντὸς σώματός ἐστιν καὶ μάλιστα ἡ βάχις, ἣν καὶ τρόπιν τοῦ ζώου ᾿Φασὶν εἶναι. οἱ ὄνυχες δὲ, καὶ κοινὴ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔχουσι παρέχονται χρείαν. τὴν τοῦ κνήθεσθαι, καὶ ἰδίαν δὲ παρὰ ταύ- τὴν ἄλλην ἄλλῳ." πολλοῖς μὲν γλρ τῶν ζώων ἀαυντήριον ἐδέθησαν, ὡς τοῖς γαωμψώνυξι" καὶ εἰσὶν ὥςπερ ὄργανον τοῦ θυμικοῦ, πολλοῖς δὲ ἀμυντύήριόν τε ἄμα καὶ στήριγμα τῆς βάσεως, ὡς τοῖς ἵπποις καὶ ταντὶ μονώνυχι" καὶ ἀνθρώποὶῖς δὲ, οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ μνήθεσθαι καὶ διαφορεῖν τὴν δριμύτητα τοῦ δέρματος, αλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν λεπτῶν ἀντίληψιν" τῷ γὰρ πάνυ λεπτὰ δ αὐτῶν ἐπαίρομεν" καὶ τοῖς ἄκροις δὲ τῶν δχκτύλων ὅπισθεν ἀντιβαίνοντες, στηρίᾧνσι τὴν λαβὴν αὐτῶν. αἱ δὲ τρίχες κατὰ συμβεβνκὸς παρυἱνέστησαν. τῶν γὰρ ατμῶν τῶν καπνωδεστάτων; Ῥῶν᾽ ἀναπεμπομένων ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, πῆξιν τινα λαμβανέντων, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς συνίστανται. οὐδὲ ταύτας δὲ παντάπασιν ἀχρήστους ἐποίησεν ὁ δημιουργός" αλλαὰ, καίτοι κατὰ" συμβεβηκὸς γενομένας, εἷς σκέπην τε καὶ κάλλος συντελεῖν᾽' τοῖς ζώοις παρεσκεύασε" σκέπην μὲν, αἰξὶ καὶ προβάτοις, κόσμον δὲ, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις" τισὶ δὲ ζώοις, κόσμον τε ἅμα" καὶ σκέπην» ὡς τῷ λεόντι. 3: ### English translation (Claude) Breathing too is among the works of the soul. For it is muscles that expand the chest, the chief organ of breathing; and the sudden and groaning breath that comes in great griefs shows that the activity belongs to the soul; and the changes in breathing according to need are in our power. When we feel pain in one of the breathing parts or in those that move with them, such as the diaphragm, the liver, the spleen, the belly, the small intestines or the colon, we breathe short and fast: short, so as not to strike the painful part too violently; fast, so that frequency may make up what is lacking in size. So too when our leg hurts we stretch it only a little as we walk, for the same reason as with breathing. As walking, then, belongs to the soul, so does breathing. But we can live for a very long time resting and not walking, while we cannot hold our breath even for a tenth part of an hour; for the heat within us, choked by the soot, is extinguished and brings death at once. If one covers a flame in a vessel that has no vent, he will put it out, choking it with its smoke. Because of this necessity the soul is no less active in this part even while we sleep, knowing that if it slackened for the shortest time the creature would perish. So here again the soul's work is woven together with nature's. For it performs the activity of breathing through the artery, a natural organ always in motion, so that its work may never fail, as neither does that of the other arteries. Hence some, not understanding, thought breathing was natural. There are three causes of breathing: need, power, and organs. The need is twofold: the preservation of the innate heat and the nourishment of the psychic breath. The preservation of the natural heat is effected by breathing in and out: breathing in cools the heat and fans it moderately, breathing out pours out the soot of the heart. The nourishment of the psychic breath comes through breathing in alone; for a portion of air is drawn into the heart as it expands. The power is the psychic one; for it is this that moves the organs of breathing through the muscles, and first the chest; with it the lungs move, and the rough arteries, which are part of the lungs. Of the windpipe, the cartilaginous part is the organ of voice, its membranous bands of breathing, and the windpipe as a whole, made of both, is an organ both of voice and of breathing. The lung, then, is a network composed of four things: the rough artery, the smooth artery, the vein, and the frothy flesh of the lung itself, which like stuffing fills the spaces between the network of the two arteries and the vein, so that it becomes their seat and bond. The flesh of the lung naturally concocts the breath, as the liver the juice from the belly; and therefore, as the liver embraces the stomach, which needs warmth, with the tips of its lobes, so the lung embraces the heart in its midst, which needs the cooling from breathing. Continuous with the windpipe is the bronchus, made of three large cartilages; next to it the pharynx; then the mouth and the nose. Through both we draw the air from outside, and from there it passes through the ethmoid or sponge-like bone, which was perforated so that in excesses of the air's qualities the brain might not be harmed by the breath striking it all at once. Here too the Creator used the nose both for breathing and smelling, as he used the tongue for voice, taste and chewing. The most important parts, then, for existence itself and for the necessary needs of life have been divided among the powers of the soul; if anything has been omitted, it will be easy to see from what has been said. As of all things that come to be, some came to be for their own sake, some both for their own sake and for others, some only for others, and some came about incidentally, so you will find the same order among the parts of the animal. All the organs named of the three principles that govern the animal came to be for their own sake; for these were constructed primarily and in the first intention; they are the ones properly called natural, and they take their origin in the womb from the seed itself, as the bones also do. Yellow bile is both for its own sake and for another: it contributes to digestion and stimulates excretion, and in this respect it becomes in a way one of the nourishing parts; and besides it gives warmth to the body, like the vital power. For these reasons it seems to have come to be for its own sake; but by purifying the blood it seems to have come to be in a way for another. The spleen too contributes not a little to digestion: being acid and astringent in nature, it pours the excess of the black juice that it draws into the stomach, contracts and tones it, and rouses it to digestion. Besides, it purifies the liver; so it too seems in a way to have come to be for the sake of the blood. The kidneys too purify the blood and are the causes of the desire for intercourse. For the veins that we said fall into the testicles pass through the kidneys, and from there draw a certain pungency that excites desire, as pungency under the skin causes itching. And since the flesh of the testicles is softer than the skin, the more they are bitten by the pungency, the more frantic they make the desire to emit seed. These and the like, then, came to be in a way both for their own sake and for others. The glands and the flesh are for others only: the glands are a support and prop for the vessels, so that they may not burst when they swing in violent movements; the flesh became a covering for the other parts, so that in summer it may cool the creature, sending out moisture from within, and in winter supply the use of felted wool. The skin too became a covering for the soft flesh and all the inner parts; by nature it is flesh made callous by the surrounding air and the bodies that come into contact with it. The bones are the support of the whole body, especially the spine, which they call the keel of the animal. The nails provide a use common to all that have them, scratching, and besides that each a different particular use. To many animals they were given for defence, as to animals with curved claws, and they are like an instrument of anger; to many both for defence and as a support for the foot, as for horses and every animal with an undivided hoof; and for men not only for scratching and dispersing the pungency of the skin, but also for grasping small things, for by them we pick up very small things, and pressing from behind against the tips of the fingers they steady their hold. Hairs came about incidentally; for they are formed incidentally when the smokiest vapours sent up from the body acquire some solidity. But the Creator did not make even these wholly useless; though they came about incidentally, he arranged that they contribute to covering and to beauty in animals: covering for goats and sheep, ornament for men, and for some animals both ornament and covering, as for the lion. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 28 (Matthaei, 253-263; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/28). ## Matthaei, chapter 29 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-29 - Source: Matthaei, 263-265 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius introduces the voluntary and the involuntary and sets out tests for distinguishing them. ### Greek text Ἐπεὶ πολλάκις ἐμνημονεύσαμεν ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου» ΓΗ » ἃ αἰνάγκη καὶ περὶ τούτων διαλαβεῖν, ἵνα τὴς ἀκριβοῦς αὐτῶν ἡνώσεως μὴ διασφαλλώμεθα. δεῖ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ ἀκουσίσυ καὶ ἑκουσίου λέγειν, πρότερον ἐκθέσθαι κανόνας τινοὶς καὶ γνώμονας, δὲ ὧν γνώριμον ἔσται, εἴτε ἑκούσιον, εἴτε ἀκούσιόν ἐστι τὸ γνόμενον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πᾶν ἑκούσιον ἐν πράξει τινί ἐστι, καὶ τὸ νομιζόμενον δὲ ἀκούσιον καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν πράξει ἐστί" δειχθήσεται τοῦτο μετ᾽ οὐ πολύ τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄντως ἀκούσιον, οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ πράττειν τίθενται " δριστέον πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, τί ἐστι πρᾶξις. πρᾶξις ἐστιν ἐνέργεια λογική. ταῖς δὲ πράξεσιν ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος ἕπεται" καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν μεθ᾽ ἡδογνὴςγ αἱ δὲ μετὰ λύπης πρώττονται" καὶ αἱ μέν εἶσιν αἷρεταὶ τῷ πράττοντι, αἱ δὲ ζευκταί" " καὶ τῶν αἱρετῶν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ αἱρεταὶ, αἱ δὲ κατὰ τινα χρόνον" ὁμοίως δὲ, καὶ τῶν Φευκτῶν. καὶ πάλιν, αἱ μὲν τῶν πράξεων ἐλέοῦνται καὶ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦνται, αἱ δὲ μισοῦνται καὶ κολαζνται.. ἔστωσαν οὖν γνώμονες τοῦ μὲν ἑκουσίου, τὸ πάντως ἐπὰκολουθεῖν ἐπανον ἢ ἢ ψόγον, μοὶ τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς πράττεσθαι,» καὶ τὸ αἱρετὰς εἶναι τὰς πράξεις τοῖς πράττουσιν. ἢ ἀεὶ, ἥ. “τότε ὅτε πράττονται. τοῦ δὲ αἰμουσίου; νώμονες, τὸ συγ-' γνώμης ἢ ἐλέους ἀξιοῦσθαι» καὶ τὸ μετὰ λύπης πρώτγτεαθαις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αἱρετάς... τούτων οὕτω διορισθέντων, λέγω-. μὲν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου. ε" ### English translation (Claude) Since we have often mentioned the voluntary and the involuntary, we must also discuss these, so as not to go astray in exact knowledge of them. Whoever is going to speak of the involuntary and the voluntary must first set out certain rules and tests by which it will be known whether what is done is voluntary or involuntary. Since everything voluntary lies in some action, and what is thought involuntary lies in action too (this will be shown shortly; some place even the truly involuntary not only in suffering but also in acting), we must first of all define what action is. Action is rational activity. Praise or blame follows actions; some of them are done with pleasure, others with pain; some are choiceworthy to the doer, others to be avoided; and of the choiceworthy some are always so, others for a certain time; likewise of those to be avoided. Again, some actions are pitied and thought worthy of pardon, others are hated and punished. Let these, then, be the tests of the voluntary: that praise or blame always follows, that it is done with pleasure, and that the actions are choiceworthy to the doers, either always or at the time when they are done. Of the involuntary: that it is thought worthy of pardon or pity, that it is done with pain, and that the actions are not choiceworthy. These being so defined, let us speak first of the involuntary. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.1 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Matthaei's apparatus and Latin notes on the beginning of the chapter (Morani's chapter on the voluntary) have been removed. The discussion of the voluntary in chapters 29–33 follows Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.1–5. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 29 (Matthaei, 263-265; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/29). ## Matthaei, chapter 30 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-30 - Source: Matthaei, 265-269 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius defines the involuntary by force, treats mixed actions done under constraint, and denies that acts of desire or anger are involuntary. ### Greek text Τοῦ ἀκουσίου τὸ μὲν, κατὰ Σ βίων, τὸ ὸ δὲν δ α' ᾿ἀγνοιάν ἐστι. σῶν τοίνυν κατὰ βίαν ἀκουσίων" τὴ,πριητὶκὴ ἀρχὴ ἐξωθέν ἐστι. ἄλλο γάρ τι τὴς Βίας αἴτιόν ἐστι καὶ οὐχ ἡμεῖς ᾽ ἔρος τοίνυν τοῦ κατὰ ᾿βίαν ἀκουσίου ᾿ἐστὶν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐξω-ἡ εν, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου νατ᾽ οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν τοῦ ᾿βιααθέν-, σὸς. ἀρχὴ δὲ εἰ εἴρηται ἐνταῦθα,, ἡ ποιητικὴ αἰτία. φγτεῖται δὲ, εἰ καὶ ταῦτα ἀκούσια ἐστιν, οἷον αἱ ἀποβολαὶ τῶν Φορ-. “τίων, ὡς ποιοῦνται οἱ ναῦται χειμῶνι περιπεσόντες, ἢ ὅταν τὸς τις αἰσχρὸν πρᾶγμα καταδέζηται παθεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι, ὑπὲρ τοῦ σῶσαι Φίλους ἢ πατρίδα. ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἑκούσοι. διο τοῦτο γὰρ πρόζκενγαι. τῷ ὅρῳ, τὸ μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου. κατ᾽ οἰκείαν. ὁρμὴν τοῦ βιασθέντος. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντες αὐτοὶ δί. ἑαυτῶν κινοῦσι τὰ ὀργανικαὶ μόρια. καὶ οὕτω ῥήττουσιν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν τὰ (ορτία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ αἰσχρὸν ἢ δεινόν τι ὑπομένοντες δινὲ μεῖζον καλὸν, ὡς Ζήνων, ὃ ἀποφαγωὼν ἑαυτοῦ τὺν γλῶτταν καὶ ἀποπτύσας Διονυσίῳ τῷ τυράννῳ, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδόλως αὐτῷ ἐξειπεῖν τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ᾿Ανάξαρχος ὁ Φιλόσοζος ὑπομείνας πτίσσεσθαι ὑπὸ Νικοκρέσντος τοῦ τυράννου ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐὴ προδοῦναι τοὺς Φίλους. καθόλου οὖν, ὅταν ἢ δικὺὰ Φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν ἔληταί τις τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν, ΕῚ δ ἐλπίδα μείζονος καλοῦ καταδέξηταί τις τὰ λατνπὸν καοὶ κὸν, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως κατορθῶσαι, οὐκ ἀκούσιον ὑπομένει πάθος ἢ ἥ πρᾶξιν" ποιεῖ γὰρ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκλο-" γὴν» καὶ τότε εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ, ὅταν πράττωνται» καθ' ἑαυ..3 τὰς οὐκ οὖσαι αἰρεταί. εἰσὶν οὖν μενπαὶ ἐξ ἀκουσίου..καὶ ἑκουσίου " οὐκουσίου μὲν, καθ' ἑαυτὰς, ἑκουσίου δὲ τότε, διὰ περίστασιν. ἄνευ γὰρ περιστάσεως οὐδεὶς ὧν “ἄν ἕλοντσ ταῦτα πρᾶξαι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ. ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσε γενόμενος ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος, ὅτι ἑκουσίχι εἰσίν. ἀκουσίων γαὰρ ἔργων οὐδεὶς ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος ἔσται. οὐκ ἐὐτι δὲ ῥοαὶ διον διακρίναι, «τοῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρέτέον, δεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ, ΕῚ,.«ὦ τὸ πολὺ πρὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν αἱρεῖσθαι τὰ λυπηρὰ, εἰς Σω-» σάνναι καὶ Ἰωσὴᾧ ἐποίησαν, οὐκ αεἰ μέντοι. Ὠριγένης γοῦν, τοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τῇ αἰσχύνη τῇ τῶν Αἰθιόπων, ἐπι" θύσας, τοῦ παντὸς ἐξέπεσεν. οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν εὔκολος ἧ: τῶν ποιούντων διάγνωσις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτου χαλεπωώτερόν. ἐστι. τὸ ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς δόξασιν.. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐκπλήσσει ἐπί τινων συμβέβηκεν ἐν τῷ μαρτυρεῖν. τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ καρτερήφαγτες,» περὶ τὰ τέλος ἐνέδωκαν, ἐν τὴ πείρῳ τῶν χαλεπῶν ἀἰπομαλακισθέντες. μηδεὶς δὲ νομίσῃ τῆς ἄμκολας σίας τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τὸν θυμὸν, τῶν ἀκουσίων εἶναι πλημμελημάτων» ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔξωθεν ἔχει τὴν ποιχτικήν. τόγτε γὰρ καλλος τῆς πόρνης ἐξοίστρησεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν τὸν ἑωρακότα. καὶ ὁ παροξύνας ἐκίνησε τὸν θυμόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔξωθεν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ δ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ὀργανικῶν μορίων ἐνεργοῦσι: καὶ οὐχ, ὑποπίπτουσι τῷ ὁρῳ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ὁπότε καὶ τὴς οἰρχῆς τὴν αἰτίαν παύνοῖς παρέχονται ν διὼ Φαύλην ἀγωγὴν ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ῥαδίως αἰχμαλωτκόμενοι. ψέγονται γοῦν οἱ ταῦτα πράττοντες» ὡς ἑκούσιον κακὸν ὑπομένοντες. ὅτι δὲ ἑκούσίον ἐστι, δῆλον. ἥδονται γορ ἐπὶ τὴ πράξει" τὸ δὲ ἀκούσιον λυπηρὸν ἐδείχθη. περὶ μὲν οἷν τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ ταῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δὲ ἄγνοιαν. εἰπεῖν ὑπολέλειπται. ### English translation (Claude) Of the involuntary, one kind is by force, the other through ignorance. In what is involuntary by force the efficient principle is from outside; for something else, and not we, is the cause of the force. The definition of the involuntary by force, then, is that whose principle is from outside, the one forced contributing nothing by his own impulse; “principle” here means the efficient cause. It is asked whether such things as these are involuntary: the jettisoning of cargo, as sailors do when caught in a storm, or when someone consents to suffer or do something disgraceful to save friends or country. They seem rather to be voluntary; for this is why the definition adds, “the one forced contributing nothing by his own impulse.” For in such cases they themselves willingly move their organic parts by themselves, and so throw the cargo into the sea. So too those who endure something disgraceful or terrible for a greater good, like Zeno, who bit off his own tongue and spat it at Dionysius the tyrant, so as not to tell him the secrets at all; and likewise Anaxarchus the philosopher, who endured being pounded by Nicocreon the tyrant rather than betray his friends. In general, when someone either chooses the lesser evil for fear of greater evils, or accepts a lesser evil in hope of a greater good which cannot be achieved otherwise, he does not undergo an involuntary suffering or action; for he acts by choice and selection, and the actions are choiceworthy at the time they are done, though not choiceworthy in themselves. They are mixed, then, of involuntary and voluntary: involuntary in themselves, voluntary at that time because of the circumstance; for without the circumstance no one would choose to do them. The praise or blame that follows such actions also shows that they are voluntary; for there will be no praise or blame for involuntary deeds. It is not easy to decide what should be chosen in place of what. As a rule, painful things should be chosen before disgraceful ones, as Susanna and Joseph did; but not always. Origen, for instance, sacrificing so as not to fall into the shame at the hands of the Ethiopians, fell from everything. So the decision of those who act is not easy. Still harder than this is to abide by what one has decided; for [the terrible things] do not strike one alike [when foreseen and when present]. This has happened to some in martyrdom: they held out at the beginning, but gave way toward the end, softened in the experience of hardships. Let no one think that the desire of licentiousness or anger belongs to involuntary faults because these too have their efficient principle from outside. For the beauty of the prostitute drove the one who saw her to licentiousness, and the one who provoked him stirred his anger. Though they have their principle from outside, they act by themselves and their organic parts, and do not fall under the definition of the involuntary, since they themselves supply the cause of the principle, being easily taken captive by the passions through bad upbringing. Those who do such things are blamed as enduring a voluntary evil. That it is voluntary is clear, for they take pleasure in the action; but the involuntary was shown to be painful. So much on the involuntary by force; it remains to speak of the involuntary through ignorance. ### Scripture references - Gen 39:12: allusion, high confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Sus 22–23 (Susanna): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Zeno of Elea, who bit off his tongue before the tyrant (Diogenes Laertius 9.27); Anaxarchus, pounded in a mortar by Nicocreon of Cyprus (Diogenes Laertius 9.59). The Zeno here is not Zeno of Citium, so no tag is given. - Susanna (Sus 22–23) and Joseph (Gen 39) chose suffering rather than sin. The story that Origen sacrificed to avoid being violated by an Ethiopian is told by Epiphanius, Pan. 64.2; reported here as Nemesius gives it. - A few words are lost in the OCR after “to abide by what one has decided”; supplied in square brackets by sense. - The example of the prostitute's beauty is a stock illustration; translated as written (πόρνη, “prostitute”). ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 30 (Matthaei, 265-269; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/30). ## Matthaei, chapter 31 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-31 - Source: Matthaei, 270-274 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius distinguishes acting through ignorance from acting in ignorance, holds that self-caused ignorance does not excuse, and lists the particular circumstances whose ignorance makes an act involuntary. ### Greek text … πράττομεν δὲ ἄγνοιαν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς μετὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν χαίρομεν, ὡς ὅταν τίς ἄκων μὲν ἐχθρὸν Φονεύση. χαίρῃ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φόνῳ. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦσιν οὐχ, ἑκούσια, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἀκούσια. καὶ πάλιν πράττομέν τινα δέ ἄγνοιαν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς γενομένοις λυπούμεθα. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκώλεσαν ἀκούσια» ὅσος πραχθεῖσιν ἐπακολουθεῖ λύπη. τῶν οὖν δὲ ἀγνοιαν, δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη" ἕν μὲν, τὸ οὐχ ἑκούσιον, ἕτερον δὲ, τὸ ἀκούσιον. πρόκειται δὲ νῦν εἰπεῖν περὶ μόνου τοῦ ἀκουσίου. τὸ γὰρ οὐχ, ἑκούσιον τοῖς ἑκουσίοις μᾶλα λον ὑπάγεται, μικτὸν ὑπάρχον. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἀκούσίον ἔχει" τὸ δὲ τέλος, ἑκούσιον. ἐξ ὠποβάσεως γὰρ ἑκούσιον γέγονε τὸ ἀκούσιον... διὸ καὶ οὕτως ὁρίδονται τὸ ἀκούσιον. ἀκούσιόν ἐστι, τὸ, πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἑκούσιον εἶναι, ἐπίλυπον ὃν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείῳ. πάλιν, ἄλλο μέν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀ ἀγνοιάν τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο δὲν αἰγνοοῦντα.. ΓΙ γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἥ τῆς ἀγνοίας τὸ αἴτιον, ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν ποιοῦμεν » οὐ δὲ ἄγνοιαν δέ. ὁ γὰρ μεθύων καὶ θυμούμενος καὶ ποιῶν τι Φαῦλον, ὁ μὲν τὴν μέθην, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀργὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει. τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ γινομένων, ἅπερ ἑκούσια ἦν. ἐξὴν γὰρ αὐτῷ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι. αὐτὸς οὖν ἑαυτῷ τὴς ἀγνοίας γέγονεν αἴτιος. ταῦτα οὖν οὐ δὲ ἄγνοιαν λέγεται ποιεῖν, οἰλλ'᾽ ἀγνοῶν πράττειν» ἅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκούσια, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκούσια. διὰ καὶ ψέγονται παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν οἱ ταῦτα πράττοντες. εἶ γὰρ μὴ ἐμεθύσθη, οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησεν" ἑκὼν δὲ ἐμεθύσθη, ἑκὼν ἄρα ταῦτα. ἐποίησε. δὲ ἄγνοιαν. δὲ ταῦτα πράττομεν, ὅταν μὴ αὐτοὶ παρέχωμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς αγνοίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω συνέβη" οἷον», ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τις τῷ συνήθει τοξεύων, τὸν πατέρα παριόντα κατὰ τυχὴν βαλὼν, απέκτεινεν. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων οὖν ἀποδείκνυται, ὅτι οὐχ, ὁ ἀγνοῶν τὰ συμφέροντα, οὐδ᾽ ὁ νομίζων εἶναι τὰ Φαῦλα χρηστοὶ, πάθος ἀκούσιον ὑπομένει. τῆς γὰρ αὐτοῦ μοχθηρίας ἐστὶν ἡὶ ἄγνοια" ψέγεται γοῦν καὶ οὗτος " τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων ὁ ψόγες. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν καθόέλου καὶ γενικῶν, ἦ τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν» ἀκού» αίος ἐστιν ὶ ἄγνοια" ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν μέρει. τα μὲν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστα ἄκοντες, τὰ δὲ καθόλου ἑκόντες ἀγνοοῦμεν. τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ῥητέον, ποῖζ ἐστι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν, ἃ καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι περιστατικὰ μόρια" τίς, τίνα, τί. τόνι, ποῦ, πότε, πῶς, διατί. οἷον; πρόσωπον» πρᾶγμα, ὄργανον» τόπος ᾿ Χρόνος, τρόπος» αἷτία. πρόσωπον μὲν, τὸ ποιοῦν, ἢ περὶ τόα ἡ πρᾶξις" οἷον, εἰ πατέρα υἱὸς ἐτύπτησεν ἀγνοῶν" πρᾶγμα δὲ, αὐτὸ τὸ πραχθὲν, εἰ ῥαπίσαι θέλων ἐτύφλωσεν" ὄργανον δὲ, εἰ λιθον ἠκόντισεν, νομίσας εἶναι κισσηριν" τόπος δὲ, εἰ ἐν τῷ περικλᾷν στενωπὸν, ἔκρουσεν ἀγνοῶν τὸν ἀπαντήσαντα" χρόνος δὲ, εἰ ἐν νυκτὶ νομίσας πολέμιον τὸν φίλον, ἐφόγευσεν" τρόπος δὲ, εἰ ᾿ πλήξας ἐρέμα καὶ μὴ ῥαγδαίως, ἐφόνευσεν. ἠγνόησε γὰρν εἰ πληγεὶς ἠρέμα τελευτήσει" αἰτία δὲ, εἰ ὃ μὲν ἔδωκε Φαάρμαμον, ὡς ὑγιάζον., ἀπέθανε δὲ ὁ λαβων, τῷ τὸ φάρμακον εὐὑρεθῆναι δηλητήριον. ταῦτα μὲν ἅμα πάντα οὐδ᾽ ἂν μαινόμενός τις αγνοήσειεν" ὁ δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τούτων ἢ τὰ κυριώτερα ἀγνοήσας» οὗτος δὲ ἄγνοιαν φρεποίηκε. κυριώτατα δέ ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις τὸ, οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ τί τὸ πραττόμενον, τουτέστιν; ἡ αἰτία καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ### English translation (Claude) … [There are things that] we do through ignorance over which we rejoice after the action, as when someone unwillingly kills an enemy but rejoices at the killing. These and the like they call not voluntary, yet not involuntary either. Again, we do some things through ignorance and are grieved over what has happened; these they called involuntary, those which are followed by pain when they have been done. Of what is through ignorance, then, there are two kinds: one the not voluntary, the other the involuntary. We now propose to speak only of the involuntary. For the not voluntary is rather to be classed with the voluntary, being mixed: its beginning is involuntary, but its end voluntary; for by the outcome the involuntary has become voluntary. Therefore they define the involuntary thus: the involuntary is what, besides not being voluntary, is painful and accompanied by regret. Again, it is one thing to do something through ignorance, another to do it in ignorance. If the cause of the ignorance is in our power, we act in ignorance, but not through ignorance. The man who is drunk, or angry, and does something base has as the cause of what he does the drunkenness in the one case, the anger in the other, and these were voluntary; for he could have avoided getting drunk. He himself, then, became the cause of his own ignorance. Such a man is said not to act through ignorance but to act in ignorance, and these acts are not involuntary but voluntary. Therefore those who do them are blamed by good men. For if he had not got drunk, he would not have done it; but he got drunk willingly, so he did these things willingly. We act through ignorance when we ourselves do not supply the cause of the ignorance, but it happened so; for instance, someone shooting arrows in his usual place hits his father, who happens to be passing, and kills him. From what has been said it is shown that the man who does not know what is advantageous, or who thinks base things good, does not undergo an involuntary suffering; for the ignorance comes from his own wickedness, and he is blamed for it; but blame belongs to the voluntary. So ignorance of universals and generalities, or of what concerns choice, is not involuntary, but ignorance of particulars is; for we are ignorant of particulars unwillingly, of universals willingly. This being so defined, we must say what the particulars are. They are what the orators call the circumstantial parts: who, whom, what, with what, where, when, how, why; that is, person, thing, instrument, place, time, manner, cause. The person is the agent, or the one with whom the action is concerned, as if a son struck his father in ignorance; the thing is the deed itself, if wishing to slap he blinded; the instrument, if he threw a stone thinking it pumice; the place, if turning a corner in a narrow lane he struck someone coming the other way without knowing; the time, if at night he killed his friend, thinking him an enemy; the manner, if he struck gently and not violently and killed, for he did not know that one struck gently would die; the cause, if he gave a drug as healing, and the one who took it died because the drug turned out to be poisonous. No one, unless he were mad, would be ignorant of all these at once; but whoever was ignorant of most of them, or of the most important, has acted through ignorance. The most important among them are the end for which, and what is being done, that is, the cause and the thing. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.1 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - The first words of the chapter are lost in the OCR; supplied by sense. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.1, 1110b–1111a. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 31 (Matthaei, 270-274; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/31). ## Matthaei, chapter 32 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/25/#p-32 - Source: Matthaei, 274-277 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius defines the voluntary, excludes natural processes, and argues that acts done through anger and desire are voluntary. ### Greek text Τοῦ ἀκουσίου ὄντος διττοῦ, τοῦ τε δί ἄγνοιαν καὶ. τοῦ κατὰ βίαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον ἀμφοτέροις ἀντύιειται. ἔστι ορ τὸ μήτε βίᾳ, μήτε δὲ ἄγνοιαν γινόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐ βίᾳ μὲν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς" οὐ δί ἄγνοιαν δὲ, εἰ μὴ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τί εἴη ὠγνοούμενον, δὲ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς καὶ πρᾶξις. συνθέντες οὖν ἑκάτερον ὁρι(ό μεθα τὸ ἑκούσιον, οὗ ἡ ἀρχ» ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰδέτι τὰ καθ'᾿ ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ πρᾶξις. ᾿ ὀγτεῖται δὲ, εἰ τὰ Φύσει γινόμενα ἑκούσιά ἐστιν" οἷον, ἡ πέψις καὶ ἡ αὐξησις. δείινυται δὲ ταῦτα μήτε ἑκούσια, μῆτε ἀκούσια. τὸ γαρ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἐν τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ πέψις καὶ ἡ αὔξησις οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. ὅθεν, εἰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα μὴ ὦ ἀγνοοῦμεν» τῷ μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὔτο ἑκούσιά ἐστιν, οὔτε ἀκούσια. τὰ δὲ διαὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐδείχθη ἑκούσια. καὶ γὰρ κατορθούμενα ἐπαινεῦαι; καὶ ἁμαρτανέμενα ψέγεται ἢ ἦ μισεῖται" καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη αὐτοῖς ἐπακολουθεῖ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν. ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἣν τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ῥαδίως ὁλίσκεσθαι. διὰ γὼρ τῶν ἐθῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα καξορθοῦται: ἄλλως τε, εἰ ταῦτα ἀκούσια, οὐδὲν τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἑ ἑκουσίως τὶ πράττειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία " νῦν δὲ οὐχ' οὕτως ἔχει" ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἑκουσίως αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐρχόμενα, καὶ οὔτε βία" αὐτὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ δί ἑχυτῶν ὁρμῶντα " οὔτε δὴ ἀγνοοῦντα " τὴν γὰρ τροζρὴν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ. “θεωρήσαντα γοῦν σροφην» ἥδεται καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα γνώριμον ὁρμᾷ, καὶ ἀποτυγχίνοντα λυπεῖται. ἑκουσίου δὲ γνώμονες, ἐπιτνγ- ᾿χάνοντος μὲν,. ἡδονὴ, ἀποτυγχάνοντος δὲ, λύπη" ἐξ ὦ ων δῆλον, αἷς ἑκούσιον ἔχει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν θυμόν" καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς μεθ' ἡδονῆς γίνεται. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐάν τις τὰ διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσια μὴ λέγην ἀναιρεῖ τας ἦθικας ἀρετάς. ἐν μεσότητι γὰρ αὗται τῶν παθῶν ὦ εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ ἀκούσια τὰ πάθη,. ἀκούσιοι. καὶ αἱ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἐρετάς.. καὶ γὰρ αὗται κατοὸ πώθος γένονται. οὐδεὶς δὲ τὸ κατὰ λογισμὸν. καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ κατ᾽ οἰκείαν ὑρμὴν καὶ ἔφεσιν, μετα τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἀμούσιον λέγει. ἐδείχιθη δὲ καὶ καὶ ἀρχὴὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς" ἑκούσια ἄρας ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλαχοῦ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἐμνημονεύσαμεν, καὶ τοῦ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, διαληπτέον καὶ περὶ προαιρέσεως. ### English translation (Claude) Since the involuntary is twofold, that through ignorance and that by force, the voluntary is opposed to both; for it is what happens neither by force nor through ignorance. It is not by force when its principle is in the agents themselves; not through ignorance, if none of the particulars through which and in which the action takes place is unknown. Putting both together, we define the voluntary as that whose principle is in the agent, who knows the particulars in which the action takes place. It is asked whether what happens by nature is voluntary, such as digestion and growth. It is shown that these are neither voluntary nor involuntary; for the voluntary and the involuntary are among the things in our power, but digestion and growth are not in our power. Hence, even though we are not ignorant of the particulars, because these are not in our power they are neither voluntary nor involuntary. What is done through anger and desire has been shown to be voluntary. For when done rightly such acts are praised, and when done wrongly they are blamed or hated; pleasure and pain follow them; and the principle is in the agents. For it was in their power not to be easily taken by the passions; such things are set right by habits. Besides, if these were involuntary, none of the irrational animals would do anything voluntarily, nor would children; but this is not so. We see them going to their food voluntarily, neither by force (for they are the ones moving by themselves) nor in ignorance (for they are not ignorant of the food); when they see food they are pleased and rush to it as to a known thing, and when they fail to get it they are grieved. The tests of the voluntary are pleasure when one succeeds and pain when one fails. From this it is clear that they have desire and anger as voluntary; for anger too comes with pleasure. Besides, if one does not call what is done through anger and desire voluntary, he abolishes the moral virtues; for these are in the mean of the passions. If the passions are involuntary, the actions according to the virtues are involuntary too, for they too take place according to passion. But no one calls involuntary what is done by reasoning, choice, and one's own impulse and aim, with knowledge of the particulars. And it has been shown that the principle is in the agents; so they are voluntary. Since we have often mentioned choice and what is in our power, we must also discuss choice. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.1 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.1, 1111a–b. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 32 (Matthaei, 274-277; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/32). ## Matthaei, chapter 33 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/33/#p-33 - Source: Matthaei, 277-282 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius shows that choice is not the voluntary, appetite, wish, opinion or deliberation, and defines it as deliberative appetite for things in our power. ### Greek text Τί ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις; ἄρα τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ κατὸ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀντιστρέ- Φει, ὅπερ ἐγένετο ἂν, εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἑκούσιον καὶ προαίρεσις νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον εὑρίσκομεν τὸ ἑκούσιον. πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ στροαίρεσις ἑκούσιος" οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἑκούσιον ἐν προαιρέσει. καὶ γὰρ τὰ παιδία καὶ τοὶ ἀλογα ἑκουσίως μὲν ποιεῖ, οὐ μὴν καὶ προοιρούμονα. καὶ ὅσα δὲ διὰ θυμὸν πράττομεν, μὴ προβουλευσώμενοι, ταῦτα ἑκουσίως μὲν ποιοῦμεν, οὐ μὴν αἱ κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἀλλα καὶ ὃ Φίλος ἡμῖν ἐξαίφνης ἐπέστη" ἑκουσίως μὲν, ὡς χδεσθαι" οὐ μὴν δὲ προηρημέγοὶς. καὶ ὁ θησαυρὸν «προςδοκήτως εὑρὼν, ἑκουσίως μὲν ἑρμαίῳ περιέτυχενν οὐ προαιρουμένως δέ. ἐκ πάντων οὖν συνάγεται, τὸ μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι πὸ ἑκούσιον τῇ προαιρέσει. ἄρ᾽ οὖν δρεξίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις; αλλ οὐδὲ τοῦτο. δια!» ρεῖται γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ βούλαν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὲν οὔτε θυμὸς ξῳ οὔτε ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν αὶ προαίρεσις, Φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώει" ποις πρὸς τὰ ἄλογω κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν καἱ θυμόν. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτα μὲν κοινωνοῦμεν, καταὶ προαίρεσιν δὲ διαφέρομεν, δῆλον, ὡς ἀλλο μέν τι προαίρεσις», ἄλλο δὲ βιμὸ καὶ ἐπιθυμία. δείνινυσε δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρα» τὴς» "ῥναίσωε μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ πράττων κατ᾽ αὐτὴν, μὴ μέντοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἀντιβαίνει γαὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἡ προαίρεσις τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳῳ. εἰ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἦσαν, οὐκ ἐμάχοντο. καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δὲν πράττων κατα προαίθέσιν, οὐ πράττει κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν. ὅτι δὲ οὔτε βούλησίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. οὐ πᾶσιν, οἷς ἁρμόζει τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι, τούτοις ρμόζει καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι. φαμὲν γὰρ βούλεσθαι ὑ ὑγιαίνειν» προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ ὑ ὑγιαίνειν.» οὐδεὶφ ὧν εἴποι" καὶ βούλεσθαι πλουτεῖν, οὐκ ὅτι δὲ καὶ πρθαιβεῖσθαι πλουτεῖν λέγεται. ἔτι τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων τάττεται" τὸ δὲ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. οὕτω γοῦν Φαμὲν, βούλομαι ἀθάνατος γε- »έσθαι" φροχιροῦμαι δὲ ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι; οὐ Φαμέν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν" ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, κατοὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν. ἣν ἔχει τὸ βουλητὸν πρὸς τὸ βουλευτόν. βουλητὸν μὲν γὰρ» τὸ τέλος" βουλευτὰ δὲ, τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔτι ταῦτα μόνα προαι-᾿ ρούμεθα, ὦ δὲ ἡμῶν οἰόμεθα δύνασθαι γενέσθαι" βουλόμεθα δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ δὲ ἡμῶν οἵἴάτε γενέσθαι, ὡς πὸ νρῶσαΐ τινα στρατηγόν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε θυμὸς, οὗτε ἐπιθυμία, οὔτε βούλησίς ἐστιν καὶ προαίρεσις, αὐτάρκως ἀποδέδεικται. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ δόξα, δῆλον γίνεται καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποδείξεων, καὶ δ ἑτέρων. καὶ γὰρ δόξα οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐστὸ. ἔτι, δόξαν μὲν ἀληθὴ λέγομεν. καὶ ψευδῆ" προαίρεσιν δὲ σὺ λέγομεν αληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. καὶ καὶ μὲν δύξα, τῶν καθόλου" ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν καθ᾽ ξκαστα᾽ περὶ γὰρ τῶν πρακτῶν ἡ προαίρεσις " σχῦτα δὲ, τὰ καθ' ἔκαστὰ. αλλ ουδὲ βουλευσίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, οἷον βουλή. βούλευσις μὲν γάρ ἐστι, ᾧτησις,. περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν. προαρετὸν δὲ, τὸ ἐκ τῆς βου. λεύσεως προκρεθέν. δῆλον οὖν, ὅτε ἡ μὲν βούλευσις, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔτι ὑπουμένοις " - δὲ προαίρεσις Δα τοῖς ἤδη προκε- Ἀριμένοιᾳ.ν τί μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, εἴρηται". τί ἐστὶν,: εἴπωμεν. ἔστιν μικτόν τὶ ἐμ βουλῆς, καὶ κρίσεως, »αἱ ὀρέξεως". καὶ οὔτε ὀρεξις καθ' ἑαυτὴν; οὔτε: κρίσις, οὔτε βουλὴ μόνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τούτων τὸ συγκείμενον. ὡς γὰρ λέγομεν, πὸ δ ζῶον ἐκ ψυχῆς: καὶ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι, μήτε δὲ σῶμα εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ ζῶν.. μὖτε ψυχὴν μόγὴν» ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφότερον. οὕτω καὶ τὴν. πρδωΐίρεσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν βουλή τις ἐστὶ καὶ ᾿βούλευσις μετ᾽ ἐπικρίσεως. εἶ καὶ μὴ αὐτοβουλὴ, Φανερὸν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐτυμολογίας. προαἱρετὸν γάρ ἐσῦιν τὸ ἕτερον πρὸ ἑτέφου αἰῤετόν. οὐδεὶς δὲ τρόκρύει τιν μὴ βυιλένεάμβες. «θὲὶ Ε ἀΤ μὴ κρῖ νας. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ πάντα, τοὶ δόξαντα ἡμῖν εὖ ἔχριν, εἰς ἔργον ἀγαγεῖν προθυμούμεθα " τότε προαίρεσις μαὶ προαιρ6- “τὸν γίνεται τὸ προκριθὲν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, ὅταν προςλάβὴ τὴν “ὄρεξιν. ἀναγκαίως οὖν ἡὶ προαίρεσις περὶ ταὐτά 'έστι». περὶ ἃ καὶ ἡ βουλή. συνάγεται δὴ ἐκ τούτων, προρέρεσεν εἶναι, ὀρεξιν βουλευτικὴν τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἢ βούλευσιν ὀρεκτι» κὴν τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.. τοῦ γὰρ προιριθέντος ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἐφιέμεθα προαιρούμενοι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἔφαμεν περὶ ταὐτὰ εἶναι, περὶ ἅ καὶ ἡ βουλὴ, διασαφήσωμεν, περὶ τίνα καταγίνεται. ἡ βουλὴ, καὶ περὶ τίνων βουλευόμεθα. ### English translation (Claude) What, then, is choice? Is it the voluntary, since everything done by choice is also voluntary? But the converse does not hold, as it would if the voluntary and choice were the same; in fact we find the voluntary wider. Every choice is voluntary, but not everything voluntary is by choice. Children and irrational animals act voluntarily, but not by choice. Whatever we do through anger without forethought we do voluntarily, but not by choice. A friend comes upon us suddenly: voluntarily, so that we are pleased, but not by choice. One who unexpectedly finds a treasure comes upon a windfall voluntarily, but not by choice. From all this it follows that the voluntary is not the same as choice. Is choice, then, appetite? Not this either. For appetite is divided into three, desire, anger and wish. That choice is neither anger nor desire is clear from the fact that men share with irrational animals not in choice but in desire and anger. If we share in these but differ in choice, clearly choice is one thing and anger and desire another. The incontinent man shows it too, being conquered by desire and acting according to it, but not according to choice; for in him choice opposes desire. If they were the same, they would not fight. And the continent man, acting by choice, does not act according to desire. That choice is not wish either is clear from this: not everything to which choosing applies does wishing apply to. We say that we wish to be healthy, but no one would say that he chooses to be healthy; and we say we wish to be rich, but not that we choose to be rich. Again, wishing applies even to impossibilities, choosing only to what is in our power. Thus we say, “I wish to become immortal,” but we do not say, “I choose to become immortal.” For wish is of the end, choice of the means to the end, in the same proportion as the object of wish stands to the object of deliberation: the object of wish is the end, the objects of deliberation the means to the end. Again, we choose only what we think can come about through us; but we wish also for what cannot come about through us, such as that some general should win. That choice is neither anger, nor desire, nor wish has been sufficiently shown. That it is not opinion either becomes clear by the same proofs and others. For opinion concerns not only what is in our power but also what is not. Again, we call opinion true and false, but we do not call choice true and false. And opinion is of universals, choice of particulars, for choice concerns things to be done, and these are particulars. Nor is choice deliberation, that is, counsel. Deliberation is inquiry about things to be done by oneself; the object of choice is what has been preferred as a result of deliberation. It is clear, then, that deliberation concerns things still being inquired into, and choice things already decided. What choice is not, then, has been said; let us say what it is. It is something mixed of counsel, judgment and appetite: neither appetite by itself, nor judgment, nor counsel alone, but what is composed of these. As we say that the living creature is composed of soul and body, and that the living creature is neither body by itself nor soul alone, but both together, so too with choice. That it is a kind of counsel and deliberation with a decision, though not counsel itself, is clear also from the etymology; for what is chosen (προαιρετόν) is what is taken (αἱρετόν) before (πρό) another. And no one prefers anything without having deliberated, nor chooses without having judged. But since we are not eager to put into action everything that seems good to us, what has been preferred as a result of counsel becomes choice and object of choice when it takes appetite to itself. Necessarily, then, choice concerns the same things as counsel. It follows from this that choice is deliberative appetite for things in our power, or appetitive deliberation of things in our power; for when we choose, we aim at what has been preferred as a result of counsel. Since we said that choice concerns the same things as counsel, let us make clear what counsel is concerned with, and about what we deliberate. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.2–3 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.2–3, 1111b–1113a; the final definition follows Eth. nic. 3.3, 1113a10–12. A few words near the end (“no one prefers … nor chooses without having judged”) are garbled in the OCR and are translated by sense. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 33 (Matthaei, 277-282; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/33). ## Matthaei, chapter 34 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/33/#p-34 - Source: Matthaei, 283-288 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius distinguishes counsel from inquiry and shows that we deliberate only about things in our power, through us, of unclear outcome, and equally contingent. ### Greek text Πρὶν εἰπεῖν περὶ τίνων βουλευόμεθα, βέλτιον διορίσαι, σίν διαφέρει βουλὴ ζγτήσεως. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι βουλὴ καὶ ὀγτησις, εἰ καὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος, ζγτῶν τι, βουλεύοται" ἀλλα πολὺ διαφέρει. ᾧγτοῦμεν γὰρ. εἰ μείζων ἐστὶ τῆς γῆς ὁ ἥλιος" οὐδεὶς δὲ λόγει". βουλεύομαι, εἰ μείζων ἐστὶ τῆς γὴς ὁ ἥλιος. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ὦ τησις, γένος τῆς βουλῆς. ᾿καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται. πᾶσα μὲν γαρ βουλὴ, ᾧτηεἷς τις ἐστίν" οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ζίτησις, βου). δέδεικται δὲ εν τοῦτο. τὸ δὲ σκέπτεσθω ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι λέγομεν» ὡς σκέπτομαι, εἰ δεῖ πλεῦσαι!" “τοτὲ δὲ, ἐπὶ τοῦ πατανοεῖν, ὡς σκέπτοιιαι τὰ μαθήματα,, οὐ βουλεύομαι τὰ μαθήματα. ταρασσόμεθα δὲ πολλούκις, ἀδιακρίτως ἀκού. οντες τῶν ὄνοι Ἢ ἰζοντες ταὐτὸν τὸ μὴ ταὐτόν. τῆς οὖν διαφορᾶς τούτων φυνερῶς γενομένης ῥητέον λοιπὸν. περὶ τίνων βουλευόμεθα. βουλευόμεθα οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ καὶ δὲ ἡμῶν δυναμένων γενέσθαι, καὶ ἄδηλον ἐχόντων τὸ τέλος, τουτέστι. δυναμένων καὶ οὕτως καὶ ἄλλως γεγέσθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐφ᾽ ἑων εἴρηταιν ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν 'μόνον βουλευόμεθα. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. οὐ ἡναρ περὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς καλουμένης Φιλοσοφίας βουλενόμεθα. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ Θεοῦ, οὗτο περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενομένων ἐξ ἃ ἀνάγκης δὲ λέγω ν. τὰ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμεναι, οἷον, τοῦ κύκλου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ" οὔτε περὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ μὲν ὄντων, ἀεὶ δὲ ὁμοίως γινομένων, οἷον, δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς ἡλίου, οὔτε περὶ τῶν Φύσει μὲν» οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ δι ιοίως γινομένων» ἄλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, οἷον, περὶ τοῦ ’πολιοὔσθαι τὸν ἑξηκοντούτην ἢ γενειάσκειν τὸν εἰκοσαετῆ" ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν Φύσει μὲν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλως οἰορίστως; γινο- Μένων, οἷον, περὶ ὁ ὄμβρων ἢ ἢ αὐχμῶν, ἢ χαλαῤις" ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης γίνεσθαι λεγομένων» ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον ἐνδεχομένων. δια ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, εἴρηται" τὸ δὲ, δι᾽ ἡμῶν» ἐπειδήπερ οὐ περὶ ποίντων ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ περὶ παντὸς πράγματος βουλευόμεθαν αλς λὼ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μόνον καὶ ἐ δὲ ἑμῶν γινομένων. σὰ γὰρ βουλευόμεθα, πῶς αἱ πολέμιοι ἢ οἱ μαμρᾶν απηρικσμένοι ΕΞ λῶς πομτεύοιντο" καίτοι τοῦτο πὰρ ᾿ ἐκείνοις βουλευτόν ἐστιν. ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ πάντων τῶν δὲ ἐμῶν γινομένων, καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὄντων βουλευόμεθα" ἀλλὰ δεῖ προςκεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ, ἄδηλον ἐχόντων. τὸ τέλος. ἐὰν γάρ ἥ Φανερὸν καὶ ὅμολοἡούμενον. οὐκ ἔτι βουλευόμεθα. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην ἢ ἥ τέχρην ἔργων ἢ πράξεων καὶ ἡ βουλή. ὡρισμένοι "ἀρ τούτων οἱ λόγοι, πλὴν ὀλέγων τοχνῶν, τῶν καλουμένων στοχαστριῶν, οἷον, ἰατρικῆς, καὶ γυωναστικῆς, καὶ ἱ κυβερνητεκῆς.. οὐ περὶ τούτων γὰρ βουλευόμεθα μένον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν καὶ δὲ ἡμῶν, ἄδηλον δὲ τὸ τέλος ἐχόντων καὶ δυναμένων καὶ οὗτως καὶ ἄλλως πραχθῆναι. ἐδείχθη δὲ, ὡς οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ τέλους» ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἡ βουλή. βουλενόμεθα γὰρ, οὐ πλουτῆσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως καὶ δι ὧν πλουτήσωμεν" συνελόντι, δὲ εἰπεῖν, περὲ τούτων «κ᾿ βουλευόμεθα, περὶ τῶν ἐπίσης ὀνδιναμένενεν καὶ περὶ τούτου δεῖ διαλαβεῖν, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐλλείτη τῷ λόγῳ στρὸς σαφήνειαν... δυνάμεις ὁ δὲ λέγονται» καθ' ἃς δυνάμιθά σι ποιεῖν. παντὸς γὰρ», οὗ ποιοῦμεν» δύναμιν ἔ ἔχομεν" ὧν δὲ δύναμιν οὖν ἔχομεν, τούτων οὐδὲ τὰς πράξεις. ἔχεται οὖν καὶ μὲν πρᾶξις δυνάμεως, ἡ δὲ δύναμις οὐσίας" ἥτε γὰρ πρᾶξις ὠπὸ δυνάμεως, καὶ ἡ δύναμις, ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ ἐν οὐσία. τρία οὖν ταῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ἀλλήλων ἐχόμενα, δυνάμενον, δύναμις, δυνατόν. δυνάμενον μὲν. ἣ οὐσία" δύναμις δὲ, ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἔχομεν τὸ δύνασθαι' δυνατὸν δὲ, τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πεφυκὸς γίγνεσθαι. τῶν δὲ δυνατῶν, τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖα, τοὶ ὁ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενα. ἀναγκαῖα μὲν, ἅπερ ἀδύνατον κωλυθῆναι, ἢ ὧν καὶ τὸ ἀντριείμενον ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν" ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ, τὸ ὁ δυνάμενον κωλυθῆναι, ἢ οὗ, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δυνατόν ἐστιν. οἷον, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἀναπνεῖν ἄνθρωπον ζῶντα" τούτου καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀδύνατόν ἐστι, τὸ μὴ ἀναπνεῖν ζῶντα" ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ, τὸ σήψμερον ὄμβρον γενέσθαι" ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ δυνατὸν, τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι σήμερον ὄμβρον.. πάλιν δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, τὰ μὲνν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ λέγεται, το δὲς ὡς ἐπὶ ἔλαττον». τὰ δὲν ὡς ἐπίσης. ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν» ὡς τὸν ἐξην κογτούτην πολιοῦσθαι" ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον δὲ, ὡς τίνα. ἐξηκονταιτῆ μὴ πολιοῦσθαι" ἐπίσης δὲ, τὸ περιπατῆσαι καὶ μὴ περιπατῆσαι, καὶ ἁπλῶς πρᾶξοι τὶ καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι. περὶ τούτων οὖν, τῶν ἐπίσης ἐνδεχομένων, μόνον βευλευόμεθα. ἔστι δὲ ἐπίσης ἐνδεχόμενον. ὃ αὐτό τε δυνάμεθα καὶ τὸ εἰντικρέμιενον, αὐτῷ " εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμφότερα ἐδυνώμεθαιν αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον » οὐκ ἄν ἐβουλευόμεθα. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, οὗτε περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὶς βουλεύεται. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἔτέρον μόνον τῶν εἰντιιειμιένων ἐδυνάμεθα, τοῦτο μὲν ἣν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀμφέβο-. λον" τὸ δὲ ἀντικείμενον» ἄδωμασον ### English translation (Claude) Before saying what we deliberate about, it is better to determine how counsel differs from inquiry. For counsel and inquiry are not the same, even if one who deliberates deliberates by inquiring into something; they differ greatly. We inquire whether the sun is larger than the earth, but no one says, “I am deliberating whether the sun is larger than the earth.” Inquiry is the genus of counsel, for it is said of more things: every counsel is a kind of inquiry, but not every inquiry is counsel; this has been shown. “To consider” we use sometimes of deliberating, as “I am considering whether I should sail,” and sometimes of studying, as “I am considering my lessons”; I do not deliberate about my lessons. We are often confused when we hear words without distinguishing them, and take what is not the same as the same. The difference among these having been made plain, it remains to say what we deliberate about. We deliberate, then, about things that are in our power, that can come about through us, and whose outcome is unclear, that is, which can happen this way or otherwise. “In our power” has been said because we deliberate only about things to be done, for these are in our power. We do not deliberate about what is called contemplative philosophy: neither about God, nor about things that happen of necessity (by necessity I mean what always happens in the same way, such as the cycle of the year), nor about things that do not always exist but always happen alike, such as the setting and rising of the sun, nor about things that happen by nature but not always alike, but for the most part, such as a man of sixty going grey or a man of twenty growing a beard; nor about things that happen by nature but now one way and now another without definition, such as rain, drought or hail; nor about things said to happen by chance, which are among the things that seldom happen. For these reasons, then, “in our power” has been said. “Through us” was added because we do not deliberate about all men nor about every matter, but only about what is in our power and comes about through us. We do not deliberate how enemies, or people far removed from us, may be well governed, though that is a subject of deliberation for them. Nor do we deliberate about everything that comes about through us and is in our power; “whose outcome is unclear” must be added. For if it is plain and agreed, we no longer deliberate. Nor is there counsel about works or actions done by knowledge or art, for their principles are fixed, except for a few arts, called conjectural, such as medicine, gymnastics and navigation. We deliberate, then, not only about these but about things in our power and through us, whose outcome is unclear and which can be done this way or otherwise. It has been shown that counsel is not about the end but about the means to the end; for we deliberate not about being rich but how and by what means we may become rich. In short, we deliberate about things equally possible. We must discuss this too, so that the account may lack nothing in clearness. Powers are so called by which we are able to do something; for of everything we do we have the power; and of what we have no power, we have no actions either. Action depends on power, and power on substance; for action comes from power, and power from substance and in substance. These three, then, as we said, depend on one another: the one able, the power, the possible. The one able is the substance; the power is that from which we have the ability; the possible is what is naturally apt to come about according to the power. Of possible things some are necessary, others contingent. Necessary are those that cannot be prevented, or whose opposite is impossible; contingent is what can be prevented, or whose opposite is also possible. For example, it is necessary that a living man breathe; its opposite, a living man not breathing, is impossible. It is contingent that it rain today; but its opposite, that it not rain today, is also possible. Again, of contingent things, some are said to happen for the most part, some seldom, some equally. For the most part, as a man of sixty going grey; seldom, as a man of sixty not going grey; equally, walking and not walking, and in general doing something and not doing it. About these, then, the equally contingent, alone we deliberate. The equally contingent is what we can do, and its opposite too. For if we could not do both, the thing and its opposite, we would not deliberate; no one deliberates about things agreed or about impossibilities. If we could do only one of the opposites, that one would be agreed and in no way doubtful, and its opposite impossible … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.3 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.3, 1112a–b. The end of the chapter is lost in the OCR after “impossible”; marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 34 (Matthaei, 283-288; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/34). ## Matthaei, chapter 35 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/33/#p-35 - Source: Matthaei, 289-294 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius argues that astral fatalism destroys law, praise, prayer, providence and piety, and that the Stoic compatibilism of Chrysippus and Philopator in fact makes all things fated. ### Greek text Οἱ τῇ περιφορᾷ τῶν ἄστρων τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γνομένων πάντων ἐπιγράφοντες., οὐ μόνον ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίχις ἀπομάχονται" ἀλλο καὶ πᾶσαν πολιτείαν ἄχρηστον ἀποζαίνουσιν. ἄτοποι μὲν γὰρ οἱ νόμοι» περιττὰ δὲ τὰ δικαστήρια κολάζοντα τοὺς μηδὲν. αἰτίους, παράλογοι δὲ οἱ ψόγοι καὶ οἱ ἔπαινοι" ἀνόνητοι δὲ καὶ αἱ εὐχαὶ, πάντων καθ' εἴμαρμένην γινομένων ἐξορίζεται δὲ καὶ πρόνοια μετὰ τῆς εὐσεείας.» πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ ὀργανον μόνον εὐρίσκεσθαε “τῆς ἄνωθεν περιφορᾶς" ὑπὸ ταύτης γὸὲρ κινεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς πράξεις, οὐ μόνον τὰ μέρη τοῦ φωματος, ἄλλα καὶ τα τῆς ψυχῆς διανοήματα" καὶ ὅλως, οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες, τῷ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν συναναιροῦσι καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου ᾧύσιν" καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἄλλον ἢ τῷ παντὶ λυμαίνονται. ἄδικοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀστέρες» τοὺς μὲν μοιχοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ({ονέας ἀπεργαζμενοι" καὶ πρόγε τούτων ὁ δημιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεὸς τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτῶν ἀποφέρεται, εἰ τοιαῦτα κατεσκεύασεν, ἃ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν τὴν ἐπιφορών ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπιτίθησιν" ὡς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἴστασθαι τὴν τούτων ἀτοπίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν αἴτιον ἀποφαίνειν τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην σώζεται" ( ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τῶν γενομένων δεδόσθαι τι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ὡς τῷ ὕδατι τὸ ψύχειν, καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν φυτῶν τὸ τοιένδε καρσὸν Φέρειν, καὶ τῷ λίθῳ τὸ κατωφερὲς, καὶ τῷ πυρὶ τὸ ἀνωφερὲς, οὕτω καὶ τῷ ἀώῳ τὸ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ ὁ μᾶν᾽ ὅταν δὲ ταύτη τῇ ὁρμὴ μηδὲν οἰντιπέση τῶν ἔξωθιν καὶ καθ εἱμαρμένην, τότε τὸ περητατεῖν τέλεον ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ πάντως περιπατήσομεν") οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες, εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν στωϊκῶν, Χρύσιππὸός τὸ καὶ Φιλυπώτωρ, καὶ τς ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ λαμπροὶ, οὐδὲν ἔτέερον ἀποδερούουσιν, ἢ πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι. εἶ γὰρ καὶ τὰς ὁρμὸς παρὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης Φαοὶν ἡμὴν δεδόσθαι, καὶ ταύτας ποτὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἐμποδίζεσθαι, “ποτὲ δὲ μ᾽ δῆλον, ὡς πᾶντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι. καὶ πάλιν τοῖς αὐτοῖς λόγοις χρησόμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς, δεικνῦντες τῆς δόξης τὴν ἀτοπίαν. εἰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων περιεστηκότων, ὡς φασιν αὐτοὶ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκὴ, τὰ αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι, καὶ σὐχ, οἷόν τε, ποτὲ μὲν οὕτω, φοτὲ δὲ ἄλλως γενέσθαι, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αἰῶνος οὕτως ἀπομεκληρῶσθαι αὐτά" ἀνάγνη καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν τὴν τοῦ ζώου πάντη καὶ πάντως τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων περιεστηκότων οὕτω γενέσθαι " εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθεῖ, ποῦ λοιπὸν τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν; ἐλεύθερον γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν" ἥν δὰ ἂν ἐλεύθερον, εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν περιεστηκότων» ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἣν τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ὁρμᾶν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὁρμᾷν. εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθεῖ καὶ τὸ ὁρμᾶν» δῆλον, ὡς καθ᾽ δἰ μαρμένην καὶ τὰ τῆς ὁρμῆς γενήσεται, εἰ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν γίνεται καὶ ατὰ :ν ἡμετέραν Φύσιν καὶ ὁρμὴν καὶ πρίσιν. εἰ γὰρ οἷόν τα ἦν αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι» ψευδὴς ὦ ἂν ἣν ἡ πρότασις ἡ λέγουσα» ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν περιεστηκότων αἰτίων, ἀνάγκη τοὶ αὐτὰ ἔπεσθαι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὑρεθήσεται. εἶ γὰρ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τάττουσιν, ὅτι Φύσει ταύτην ἔχομεν, τί κωλύει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ σφυρὶ λέγειν εἶναι τὸ καίειν» ἐπειδὴ Φύσει καίει τὸ πῦρ; ὡς τῴο “του καὶ παρεμφαίνειν ἔοικεν ὃ Φιμοπάτωρ ἐν τῷ περὶ εἶμαρμένης- οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δὲ ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἡμαρμθης γινόμενον ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐστι. τῷ γὼρ αὐτῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐπὶ λύρῳ καὶ αὐλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις καὶ πᾶσιν ἀλόγοις τὸ καὶ «ψύχοις ξ ἔσται τι, ὅταν τινὲς δ αὐτῶν ἐνεργῶσι. τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον, ### English translation (Claude) Those who ascribe the cause of everything that happens to the revolution of the stars not only fight against common notions but make all civic life useless. Laws become absurd, law courts superfluous in punishing those who are guilty of nothing, blame and praise unreasonable, prayers too without profit, since all things happen by fate; and providence is banished along with piety; besides, man is found to be merely an instrument of the revolution above, since by it, they say, not only the parts of the body but also the thoughts of the soul are moved to their actions. In general, those who say this abolish, together with what is in our power, the nature of the contingent as well, and so they do nothing else than ruin the universe. The stars themselves are unjust, making some adulterers and others murderers; and still more their Creator, God, bears the blame for them, if he made such things as lay the infliction of evils on us of necessity; so that the absurdity of their view does not stop at civic life but even declares God the cause of the greatest evils. [Others say that] both what is in our power and fate are preserved: for to each thing that comes into being something is given by fate, as to water cooling, to each plant bearing such and such fruit, to stone moving downward and to fire upward; so too to the living creature it is given to assent and to have impulse; and when nothing external and fated opposes this impulse, then walking is wholly in our power, and we shall certainly walk. Those who say this (they are among the Stoics, Chrysippus and Philopator and many other distinguished men) prove nothing else than that all things happen by fate. For if they say that impulses too are given us by fate, and that they are sometimes hindered by fate and sometimes not, it is clear that all things happen by fate, even those that seem to be in our power. And again we shall use the same arguments against them, showing the absurdity of the opinion. If, as they themselves say, when the same causes are present it is altogether necessary that the same things happen, and it is impossible for them to happen now in one way and now in another, because they have been so allotted from eternity, then the impulse of the living creature too must necessarily, in every way and always, happen in the same way when the same causes are present. And if the impulse too follows of necessity, where then is what is in our power? What is in our power must be free; and it would be free only if, the same circumstances being present, it were in our power sometimes to have impulse and sometimes not. If having impulse follows of necessity, it is clear that the things of impulse too will happen by fate, even though they happen through us and according to our nature, impulse and judgment. For if it were possible for the impulse not to occur, the premise would be false that says that when the same causes are present the same things must follow. So it will be found with irrational and soulless things too. If they place impulse in our power because we have it by nature, what prevents us from saying that burning is in the power of fire, since fire burns by nature? Philopator seems to suggest this in his work On Fate. So what happens through us by fate is not in our power. By the same reasoning, lyres, flutes and other instruments, and all irrational and soulless things, will have something in their power, when certain things act through them. But this is absurd. ### Extrabiblical texts - Chrysippus (Chrysippus): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - The transition to the Stoic view (“Others say that”) is lost in the OCR and is supplied by sense. Chrysippus's example of the cylinder and his doctrine of “co-fated” things lie behind the Stoic position reported here; Philopator was a Stoic of the second century AD whose On Fate is lost. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 35 (Matthaei, 289-294; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/35). ## Matthaei, chapter 36 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/33/#p-36 - Source: Matthaei, 294-298 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius refutes the Egyptian astrologers who hold that fate by the stars can be averted by prayer and rites. ### Greek text Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, λέγοντας ἀλη» θεύεσθαι μὲν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἄστρων εἰμαρμένηνν τρέπεαθας ᾿ δὲ αὐτὴν εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀποτροπιασμοῖς " (εἶναι γάρ τινας καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν τῶν ἀστέρων θεραπείας, τὰς ἐκμείλισσομένας αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερκειμένας Ἢ δυνάμεις τὰς τρέπειν αὐτοὺς δυναμένας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰς εὐχῥς καὶ τοὺς θερατείας τῶν Θεῶν, καὶ τοὺς ὠποτροπιασμοὺς ἐπίνεν νοῆσθαι" ) ἐροῦμεν, ὅτε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ οὐχὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ποιοῦσι τὴν εἰμαρμιέ γην" τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον: οἰδριστον" τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον, αγνωστον.. ἀναιρεῖται οὖν διὼ τούτου πᾶσα μὲν μαντεία, μάλιστα δὲ ἡ τῶν καλουμένων γενεθλιαλόγων, ἣν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβεύευσιν, εἰς ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀληθὲς πρᾶγμα. ἐὰν δὲ λέγωσιν, ὅτι τὰ. “τῶν σχημάτων ἀποτελέσματα πρόδηλα, καὶ τος ἐπιστήμοσι ἡνωρίζται" ὅταν δὲ τὸ σχῆμα μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἀποβαίη, θεὸς ἐκώλυσεν" ἐροῦμεν. εἰς καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον) (τ πρῶτον, ὅτι τὴν εὐχὴν μόνην ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τίθενται καὶ τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν. εἶτα διαμφισβητήσύμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς, πῶς, τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν ἐθεώπθων πράξεων τε καὶ προαιρέσεων ἐν τῇ “οι σχέσει τῶν ἄστρων κειμένων, τὸ τῆς εὐχῆς μόνης ἐφ᾽ ἡμῇ ἐστιν. ἄπορον γλρν διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὕτως ἔχει σποῦτο, καὶ τίς ἡ εἰναι. ἔπειτα, εἰ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὶ μέθοδος τῶν ἀποτροπιασμῶν, ἡ κωλύουσα τὰ παρὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης. πότερον πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ μέθοδός ἐστιν ἐφικτὴ, ἢ τισὶ μὲν» τισὶ δ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν κωλύει, τῷ λόγῳ παντάπασιν ἀνατραπῆναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην» πάντων μαθόντων τήν τέχνν πὴν κωλύουσαν αὐτῆς τὰ ἰποτελέσματα εἰ δὲ τισὶ μὲν ἔστιν το ἐφιιτὴ» τισὶ δὲ οὖ, ποίοις ἄρα, καὶ τίς ὃ τοῦτο διορίζων; εἰ μὲν γαρ αὐτὴ ὴ εἱμαρμένη τοὺς μὲν ποιεῖ θεραπευτεὶς τοῦ θείου, τοὺς δὲ οὐ ποιοῖ». εὐρεθήσεται πάντα πάλιν κατὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην. τὸ γὰρ τῆς εὐχῆς καὶ τῆς θεραπείχς, ὃ μόν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖνγ οὐκ ἔλαττον γὺν ἀνεζανη τῆς εἱμαρμένης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεῖζον. εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰμάρμένη, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτερόν τὶ τούτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον εἱμαρμένη φανήσεται. ἐν γὰρ τῷ δύνασθαι δ᾽ εὐχῆς κατορθοὺῦν, ἥ μὴ δύνασθαι, τὸ πᾶν τῆς εἱμαρμένης περιέχοται. κράτος. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δυναμένοις, οὐδὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη" τοῖς. δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις, πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην. καὶ εὐρεθήσεται., τισὶ μὲν ἀνθρώποις. πάνπα καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην, τισὶ δὲ, οὐδὲν καθ' εἱμαρμένην" καὶ δῆλον. ὅτι ὁ τοῦτο ὁρίζων. αὐτός ἔστιν ἡὶ κυριωτάτη εἱμαρμένη, καὶ οὕτω πολιν πάντα κωθ' εἰμαρν μένην εὑρεθήσεται, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι τὸν διανέμιον-. ταν εἴτε δαίμων τις εἶη, εἴτε καὶ ἀλλη τις εἱμαρμένη. οὐ γὰρ σρὸς ἀξίαν νέμει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τὸς θεραπιίας σφῶν θεῶν μέθοδον. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον οὗτος ἀξιος ἢ ἢ ἐκεῖνος, πάντων ὀργάνων ὄντων τὴς εἱμαρμένης. καὶ μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἐξ οἰκείας προαιρέσεως πράττοντος, μᾶλλον δὸ μηδὸ προῦν- Βουμένου ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οὕτω γινομένοις οὐδεὶς οὔτε δόιαιος,, οὔτε ἄδικος. οὐκοῦν οὔτε. ἄξιος, σύτε ἀνάξιος χάριτος" ὅ δὲ τοῖς ἴσοις ἄνισα νέμων, ἄδικος. ### English translation (Claude) Against the wise men of the Egyptians, who say that fate through the stars is true but is turned aside by prayers and averting rites (for there are, they say, certain services of these very stars which propitiate them, and certain other powers above them that can turn them, and for this reason prayers, services of the gods and averting rites have been devised), we shall say that they make fate a matter of the contingent and not of the necessary; but the contingent is indefinite, and the indefinite unknowable. By this all divination is abolished, and especially that of the so-called casters of nativities, which they honour above the others as something firm and true. If they say that the effects of the configurations are evident and known to the experts, but that when a configuration does not turn out according to its proper power, a god has prevented it, we shall say that this too is absurd. First, because they place only prayer and the service of the gods in our power, and nothing else. Next, we shall dispute with them how, when all other human actions and choices lie in the relation of the stars, prayer alone is in our power. It is hard to see for what cause this is so, and what that cause is. Then, if there is an art and method of averting rites that prevents the effects of fate, is the method attainable by all men, or by some and not by others? If by all, nothing prevents fate from being entirely overturned, since all have learned the art that prevents its effects. If it is attainable by some and not by others, by which, and who determines this? If fate itself makes some servants of the divine and does not make others, all things will again be found to be by fate; for prayer and service, which alone is in our power, now appears to be no less, but even more, a matter of fate. If not fate but something else is the cause of these, that will rather appear to be fate; for in being able or unable to succeed by prayer the whole power of fate is contained. For those who are able, fate is nothing; for those who are unable, all things are by fate. So it will be found that for some men all things are by fate, for others nothing; and clearly whatever determines this is itself the most sovereign fate; and so again all things will be found to be by fate. Besides, the one who distributes this, whether some spirit or some other fate, is unjust; for he does not distribute to men according to worth the method of serving the gods. Why is this man more worthy than that, when all are instruments of fate and no one does anything by his own choice, or rather no one even deliberates? Among things that happen so, no one is just or unjust, and so no one is worthy or unworthy of favour; but one who distributes unequal things to equals is unjust. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 36 (Matthaei, 294-298; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/36). ## Matthaei, chapter 37 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/33/#p-37 - Source: Matthaei, 299-303 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius criticizes those who place choice in our power but outcomes under fate, ascribing outcomes instead to providence. ### Greek text Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὴν μὲν αἵρεσιν τῶν πρακτῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡων εἶναι" τὴν δὲ τῶν αἱρεθέντων ὠπόβασιν ἐπὶ τῇ εἱμαρμένη" (εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἔλλγνων οἱ σοφώτατοι" ) τὸ μέν τί κατορθοῦσι, τὸ δὲ σφάλλονται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τιθέναι τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν πρακτῶν, μὴ πάντως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὠποβάσεις, ὀρθότατα λέγουσι" τὸ δὲ τῇ εἱμαρμένη περιάπτειν ταύτας, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ἐλεγχθήσονται γα πρῶτον μὲν, ἰτελὴ ποιοῦντες τὴν εἱμαρμένην, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἔχει, τὸ δὲ σὺκ ἔχει" ἔπειτα παρακολούθημα «οἰοῦντες αὐτὴν τῆς ἡμετέρας )νώμης" ταύτῃ. γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν Φασὶ τοὶ τὸς εἱμαρμένης ἔργα καὶ οὕτως εὐρεθήσεται κινουμένη μᾶλλον ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἢ νινοῦσα ἡμᾶς" καὶ κυριώτερος ὁ ἀἄνθρωπος τὴς εἱμαρμέγῆς ἡ ὁ τυπῶν αὐτὴν διὰ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτοῦ" δέον, πρόνοιαν λέγειν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκβάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων" προνοίας, γὰρ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἔργον ἢ εἰααρμένης. τὴς γὰρ προνοίας ἴδιον, τὸ ἑκάστῳ νέμειν κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἑκάστῳ" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν αἱρεθέντων ἡ ἔκβασις κατὼ τὸ συμῷέρον ποτὰ μὲν ἔσται, ποτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἡ εἱμαρμένη εἰρμός τις οὖσα αἰτιῶν ἀπαράβατος" οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζνται" τουτέστι, τάξις καὶ ἐπισύνδεσις ἀπαράλλακτος " οὐ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν καὶ ἀνάγκην ἐπάγει τὰ τέλη. τί δ᾽ ὧν εἴποιεν ἐπὶ τῶν παντελῶς ἡλιθίων καὶ μωρῶν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπροαιρέτων; πότερον κωθ' εἱμαρμένην αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιούτους εἶναι πρόφεστιν, ἢ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, θξω σεσοῦνται τῆς εἷμαρμένης" εἰ δὲ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μηδὲ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ τὸ ἀπροαίρεσὸν ὑπὸ τὴν εἰμαρμένηνν ἐξ ὠνάγκης καὶ τὸ προαιρετόν" καὶ οὕτως ἀναδραμοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς πρώτους, τοὺς λέγοντας, πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἶναι. περιττὴ δὲ καὶ ἡὶ μάχη τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυωίας ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὥρισται, τὸν μὲν πρᾶξαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πρᾶξαι, τίς ἡ χρεία τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ στάσεώς τε καὶ Φιλονεικίας; ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ συγκαθείμαρται μὴ μόνον «ρᾶξαιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιῶςδε πρᾶξαι. τί δ᾽ ἀλλο Φησὶν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, ἢ ὅτι καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις τῶν πεπρωμένων ἐστίν; ᾿ ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐστιν, ἡ μαϊχομένη τὴ ἐπιθυμώι, καὶ νικῶσα μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγκρατῶν, ἡττωμένη 'δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. οὐκοῦν ἀνήρηται τὰ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτοῖς ὑποθέσεως. οὐκ ἔτι γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. ### English translation (Claude) Those who say that the choice of things to be done is in our power, but the outcome of what is chosen depends on fate (they are the wisest of the Greeks), are partly right and partly wrong. They are quite right to place the choice of actions in our power and not in every case their outcomes; but not right to attach these to fate. They will be refuted, first, for making fate incomplete, if it has one thing and not the other; next, for making it a consequence of our decision, since they say the works of fate follow this; and so fate will be found to be moved by us rather than moving us, and man more sovereign than fate, since he shapes it by his choice. They ought rather to say that providence is the cause of the outcome of things; for this is the work of providence rather than of fate. It is proper to providence to distribute to each according to what is advantageous to each; and for this reason the outcome of what is chosen will sometimes come about, according to what is advantageous, and sometimes not. But fate, being an inviolable chain of causes (so the Stoics define it), that is, an unchangeable order and connection, brings about the ends not according to what is advantageous but according to its own movement and necessity. What would they say about the wholly foolish and stupid, who for this reason have no choice? Is their being so present to them by fate or not? If not by fate, they will be outside fate; if by fate, it follows necessarily that choice is not in our power either. For those who put what lacks choice under fate must necessarily put what has choice there too; and so they will run back to the first group, those who say that all things are by fate. The battle of reason and desire in the continent and the incontinent man is superfluous too. For if it has been determined of necessity that one will act and the other will not, what need is there of the strife and contention within him? But it has also been co-fated for him not only to act, but to act in such a way. What else does one who says this say, but that choice too is among the things decreed by fate? For it is choice that fights with desire, winning in the continent, defeated in the incontinent. So the premise they started from is abolished; for choice is no longer in our power. ### Extrabiblical texts - Chrysippus (Chrysippus): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - The Stoic definition of fate as “an inviolable chain of causes” (εἱρμὸς αἰτιῶν ἀπαράβατος): cf. Chrysippus, SVF 2.917–918. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 37 (Matthaei, 299-303; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/37). ## Matthaei, chapter 38 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/33/#p-38 - Source: Matthaei, 303-311 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius reports Plato's account of fate as subordinate to providence and contingent on our choices, insists against it that providence acts contingently and that God is lord of necessity, and rejects the Stoic doctrine of endless cosmic restoration. ### Greek text Πλάτων δὲ διχῶς λέγει τὴν εἱμαρμένην τὴν μὲν, κατ' οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ, κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. κατ᾽ οὐσίαν μὲν, τὴν τοῦ «ταντὸς ψυχήν" κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ, θεῖον νόμιον ἀπαράβασὸν δ αἰτίαν ἀναπόδραστον. καλεῖ δὲ τοῦτον, 'θεσμὸν ἀδραστείας. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν νόμον δεδόσθαι παρὰ τοῦ πρώτοῦ καὶ ανωτάτου Θεοῦ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς "ψυχὴ εἰς διωκόσμησιν τῶν ὅλων; καθ' ὃν διεξάγεται τὰ γινόμενα " ταύτὴν δὲ τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν εἱμαρμένην, καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν λέγει. πὸ γὰρ τῆς προνοίας ἐμπεριέχεσθαι. τὴν εἰμαρμέγην" πᾶν γὰρ τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην.» καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεσθαι" οὐ μὴν πᾶν τὸ κατὰ πρόνοιαν, καὶ καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἶναι. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ θεῖὸς νόμος,» ὃν Φησιν πρόνοιαν εἶναι ὁμοῦ καὶ εἱμαρμένην, πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχει" τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. τὰς μὲν γὰρ προηγουμένας αἰτίας, ὡςπέρ τινας ἀρχὰς, καὶ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν “τεριέχει» ἅπὴς ἐστὶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν συγκαταθέσεις καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ὁρμαί" τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταύταις ἑπόμενα, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν αἵρεσις τῶν πρακτῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν. ὑποκειμένων δὲ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων» ὥςπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως γ ἀκολουθεῖν τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης. οἷον, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν κεῖται τὸ πλεῦσαι" τοῦτο καθ᾿ ὑπόθεσίν ἐστιν" ὑποκειμένου τοίνυν τοῦ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐπακολουθεῖ τὰ ἐκ ταύτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως. τὸ ναυαγῆσαι,» ἢ μή. διὸ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καλεῖ τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα καὶ ἑπόμενα ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὑποθέσεσι, τουτύστιν. ἀρχαῖς καὶ πράξεσιν" ὡς εἶναι, τὰ μὲν ἡγούμενα» καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, καθ' ὑπόθεσιν" τὰ δὰ ἑπόμενα» ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν» ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀΐν κῆς. μὴ γὰρ ἐξ αἰδίου ὡρίσθαι τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλ, ἐπισυμβαίνειν, προηγγησαμένοις τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν. πούτῳ δὲ συμφωνεὶ καὶ τὸ, αἰτία ἑλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος » καὶ τὸς ἀδέσποτον εἶναι τὸ ὠρετὴν, καὶ, τὸ εἶναι μαντείας. συν-. τείνει δὲ αὐτῷ πᾶς ὃ λόγος εἰς τὸ τὰς προαιρέσεις καί τινας τῶν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πράξεων ἐφ᾽ ἡ ἡμῖν εἶναι" τὰ δὲ ἐπακο- χουθοῦντα ταύταις καὶ τὰ τέλη ἐπὶ τὴ εἰμαρμένη ἐξ ἀναγκῆς. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐδείχθην μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν ᾿ καθ ὃ μὲν οὖν καλεῖ θεοῦ διάταξιν καὶ ὶ βούλησιν τὴν,δίμαρς μένην» καὶ καθ' ὃ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὑπάγει τῇ προνοίᾳ, μικρόν τι διαλλαττει πρὸς τὰ θεῖα λόγια, τὰ λέγοντα πρὸς γοιαν μόνην διοικεῖν τὰ πάντα" κατὰ πολὺ δὲ διαφέρεται, Φάσκων, ἐξ ἃ ἀνάγκης τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑωϊν ἕπεσθαι σὰ τέλη. ἡμεῖς γάρ» οὐ κατ᾽. ἀνάγκην ἐπάγεσθαι τα τῆς προνοίας.» Φαμὲν» ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδεχομένως. εἰ γὰρ κατ' ἀναγκὴν» πρῶτον μὲν, τὸ σολὺ τῆς εὐχῆς μέρος περικόπτεται" 'περὶ μένων γρ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν πράξεων τὰ τῆς εὐχῆς ἔσται κατ᾿ αὐτὸν, ὥςτε τὰ πρείττω ἐλέσθαι" μετὰ δὲ τὸ προελέσθαι, μώταια λοι» πὸν τὰ τὴς εὐχῆς, τῶν ἑπομένων πάντως ἐξ ἀνώγκης ἐπαἕνων. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις μάλιστα δύνασθαι τὴν εὐχὴ» διοριζόμεθα. ἐπὶ τῇ προνοίᾳ, γὰρ εἶναι, τὸ ναυαγῆς σαι τὸν πλέοντα, καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέντοι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδεχομένως. οὐ γὰρ ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκην ὃ θεὸς, οὐδὲ τὴν βούλησιν αὐτοῦ δουλεύειν ἀνάγκη» θεμιτὸν εἰπεῖν» καὶ γαρ τῆς ἀνάγκης δημιουργός ἐστιν. ἀνάγκην μὲν γὰρ ἐπέθηκε τοῖς ἄστροις» ὥςτε ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὶ αὐτὰ ὑινεῖσθαιν καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν περιώρισε, καὶ τοῖς καθόλου καὶ γενικοῖς ὅρον ἀναγκαϊὸν ἔθηκεν, ὃν, εἰ ἰ βούλονται καλεῖν εἱμαρμένην, διὰ τὸ πάντη καὶ πάντως οὕτω γίνεσθαι κατὰ ἀνάγκην» εἷς πάντα τὰ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἐν γενόσει φθείρεσθαι., λόγος οὐδείς" περὶ γὰρ ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς" ᾿αὐτὸς δὲ πάσης ἀνάγκης οὐ μόνον ἐκτὸς καθέστηκεν “ἀλλὰ καὶ κύριος καὶ ποιητής ΠΕ ἐξουσία γὰρ ὧν καὶ Φύσις ἐξουσιωστροὴ, οὐδὲν οὔτε Φύσεως ἀνάγκη, οὔτε θεσμῷ νόμου ποιεῖν πάντα δέ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἕνα τοῦτο δειχθῆ. ἔστησέ πότε τὸν δρόμον ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης» τῶν ἀνάγκη Φερομένων καὶ ἀεὶ υἱσαύτως ἐχόντων" ἵνα δείξη, μηδὲν αὐτῷ κατ᾽ ἀναγκὴν γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατ᾽ ἐξουσίαν ἐνδεχομένως. ἀπαξ δὲ τοιαύτην ἡμέραν ἐποίησεν. ὡς ἐπεσημήνατο καὶ ἡ γραφὴ ἵνα μόνον ἐνδείξηται καὶ μὴ διαλύση τὸν θεσμὸν, τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ τεθέντα τῆς ἀναγκαίας τῶν ἄστρων Φορᾶς. οὗτω καί τινας τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν τὴ οὴ διαφυλάττει, εἷς τὸν Ἦμαν καὶ τὸν Ἑνωώχ, θνητοὺς ὄντας καὶ ὑποκειμένους φθορῷ, ἵνα διὰ πάντων τούτων τὴν ἐξουσίαν. αὐτοῦ καὶ σὴν ἀκαταναγκαστον βούλησιν κατανοήσωμεν. οἱ δὲ στωϊκοί ᾧασιν, ὠποκωθισταμένους τοὺς πλάνητας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σὴ" μεῖόν. κατά τε μῆκος καὶ πλώτος, ἔνθα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἕκαστος ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ὃ κόσμος συνέστη» ἐν ῥηταῖς,Ζἀρόνων «περιόδοις ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ φθορὰ ἐν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργώφεσθαι» καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν κόσμον ἀποκαθί- της στασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἀστέρων ὁμοίως πάλιν Φερομένων, στον, ἐν τὴ προτέρῳ περιόδῳ γενόμενον.» ἐΑννλάενας ὠποτελεῖσθαι. ἔσεσθαι γὰρ “πάλιν Σωκράτην, καὶ Πλώτωνα» καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ Φίλοις καὶ πολίταις » καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι. καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντεύξεσθαι, καὶ τὰ αὐτὼ μεταχειριεῖσθαι, καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν, καὶ κώϊον» καὶ ἀγρὸν ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι" γίνεσθαι δὲ “Τὴν ὠποκατάστασιν τοῦ παντὸς οὐχ ἅπαξ μ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις " μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ ἀτελευτήτως τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποκαθίστασθαι" τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς, τοὺς μὴ ὑποκειμένους τὴ φθορᾷ ταὐτὴν παρακολουθήσαντας μιᾷ περιόδῳ, γινώσκειν ἐκ ταύτῆς πάντα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἑξῆς περιόδοις", εὐδὲν γὼρ ξένον ἔσεσθωμ παρὰ τα γενόμενα πρότερον, ἀλλὰ φάντα ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων. καὶ διὰ ταύτην την ἀποκατάστασιν, ᾧασί τινες, τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς τὴν ἀνάστασιν φανταξσθαι, πολὺ πλανηθέντες. εἰς ἁπαξ γορ τὰ τὴς ἀναστάσεως, καὶ οὐ κατὰ περίοδον ἔσεσθαι, τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ δοξάζει λόγια. ### English translation (Claude) Plato speaks of fate in two ways: one in substance, the other in activity. In substance, it is the soul of the universe; in activity, a divine law that cannot be transgressed, because of a cause that cannot be escaped. He calls this the ordinance of Adrasteia. This law, he says, was given by the first and highest God to the soul of the universe for the ordering of all things, and by it what comes to be is carried out. This fate in activity he also says is according to providence; for fate is contained in providence: everything that is by fate also happens according to providence, but not everything according to providence is by fate. The divine law itself, which he says is at once providence and fate, contains all things in itself, some by hypothesis and some from hypothesis. It contains the leading causes, as certain principles, by hypothesis, namely those that are in our power, assents, judgments and impulses; and what necessarily follows these, from hypothesis. The choice of things to be done that is in our power is by hypothesis; and when what is in our power is laid down, the things of fate follow from them as from a hypothesis. For example, it lies in our power to sail; this is by hypothesis. When our sailing is laid down, what follows from this hypothesis follows: being shipwrecked or not. Therefore he calls “from hypothesis” what attends and follows the hypotheses in our power, that is, the principles and actions; so that the leading things, in our power, are by hypothesis, and the things that follow are from hypothesis and not in our power but of necessity. For what is by fate has not been determined from eternity, but follows upon what is in our power going before. With this agrees also the saying, “The blame is the chooser's; God is blameless,” and that virtue has no master, and that there is divination. His whole argument tends to this, that choices and some of the actions done by choice are in our power, but what follows them, and the ends, depend on fate of necessity. But this was shown earlier not to be right. In so far as he calls fate God's ordinance and will, and puts fate under providence, he differs little from the divine oracles, which say that providence alone governs all things; but he differs greatly in saying that the ends follow of necessity upon what is in our power. For we say that the things of providence are brought about not by necessity but contingently. If by necessity, first, a large part of prayer is cut away; for on his account prayer will concern only the beginnings of actions, so that we may choose the better; after the choice, prayer is vain, since what follows comes on of necessity in any case. But we hold that prayer avails most of all in these very things. For it is a matter of providence whether the one who sails is shipwrecked or not, but neither of these of necessity, rather contingently. For God is not under necessity, nor is it right to say that his will is a slave to necessity, for he is the Creator even of necessity. He imposed necessity on the stars, so that they always move in the same way; he bounded the sea; and he set a necessary limit to universal and general things, which they may call fate if they wish, since it always and in every way happens so of necessity, as that all things in succession perish in coming to be; there is no argument about this, for we do not dispute with them about names. But he himself not only stands outside all necessity but is its lord and maker. For being authority and a nature with authority, he does nothing by necessity of nature or by ordinance of law; all things are contingent for him, even the necessary ones. To show this, he once stopped the course of the sun and the moon, which are carried by necessity and are always the same, to show that nothing happens to him by necessity, but all things by authority and contingently. He made such a day only once, as Scripture noted, only to show this and not to dissolve the ordinance he had laid down from the beginning for the necessary course of the stars. So too he keeps some men alive, such as Elijah and Enoch, though they are mortal and subject to corruption, so that through all these things we may perceive his authority and his will, which is under no compulsion. The Stoics say that when the planets return to the same sign, in longitude and latitude, where each was at the beginning when the world was first formed, at fixed periods of time they bring about a conflagration and destruction of all things, and again the world is restored anew to the same state; and as the stars move again in the same way, everything that happened in the former period is brought about without variation. For there will again be Socrates and Plato and each man, with the same friends and fellow citizens; they will suffer the same things, meet the same people, and handle the same affairs; and every city, village and field will be restored likewise. The restoration of the universe happens not once but many times, or rather to infinity, and the same things are restored without end. The gods, who are not subject to destruction, having followed one period, know from it everything that will be in the following periods; for there will be nothing strange compared with what happened before, but all things alike and unchanged down to the least. And some say that because of this restoration the Christians imagine the resurrection, greatly mistaken; for the words of Christ teach that the resurrection will happen once, and not by periods. ### Scripture references - Josh 10:13: allusion, high confidence - 2 Kgs 2:11: allusion, high confidence - Gen 5:24: allusion, high confidence - Job 38:10: allusion, medium confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Plato, Resp. 10.617e (Plato (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Matthaei's apparatus and Latin notes, which the OCR ran into the text after “With this agrees,” have been removed. - Plato: the ordinance of Adrasteia, Phaedr. 248c; “The blame is the chooser's; God is blameless,” and “virtue has no master,” Resp. 10.617e (quoted). The account of “by hypothesis” and “from hypothesis” is Middle Platonist (cf. Alcinous, Didasc. 26). - The sun and moon stopped: Josh 10:12–14. Elijah (2 Kgs 2:11) and Enoch (Gen 5:24) kept alive. The sea bounded: Job 38:10–11. - The Stoic doctrine of the periodic conflagration and restoration (ἀποκατάστασις) is reported as Nemesius gives it. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 38 (Matthaei, 303-311; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/38). ## Matthaei, chapter 39 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/39/#p-39 - Source: Matthaei, 311-316 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius proves that some things are in our power, since human actions cannot be ascribed to God, necessity, fate, nature, fortune or chance, and since deliberation, the virtues, exhortations and laws presuppose it. ### Greek text Ὁ περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίον λόγος, τουτέστι, τοῦ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, πρώτην μὲν ἔχει ζγτησιν, εἰ ἔστι τι ἐφ' ἡμῖν. πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιβαίνοντες" δευτέραν δὲ, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, καὶ τίνων ἐξουσίαν ἔχομεν" τρίτην, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξετάσαι, δὲ ἣν ὁ ποιήσας ἡμᾶς Θεὸς αὐτεξουσίους ἐποίησε. ἀναλαβόντες οὖν περὶ τοῦ πρώτου πρῶτον εἴπωμεν, ἀποδεικνῦντες, ὅτι ἔστι τι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἐκ τῶν καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις ὁμολογουμένων. τῶν ἡ νομένων πάντων ἢ θεὸν ᾧασιν αἴτιον εἶναι, ἢ ἀνάγκην» η εἱμαρμένην. ἥ φύσιν, ἥ τύχ»» ἣ τὸ αὐτόματον. ὠλλὰὼ τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ ἔργον, οὐσία καὶ πρόνεια " τῆς δὲ ἀνάγκης, τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων ἡ κίνησις" τὰς δὲ εἱμαρμένης» τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δ αὐτῆς ἐπιτελεῖσθαι" (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἐστί") τῆς δὰ Φύσεως, γένεσις, αὔξησις, φθορὰ, φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα" τῆς δὲ τύχης, τὸ σπάνια καὶ ἀπροιδέκητα " ᾿ρίβονται γὰρ τὴν τύχην, σύμπτωσιν καὶ ρομὴν δύο αἰτίων, ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχόντων, καὶ ἀλλο τιν παρ᾽ ὃ πέφυκεν» ἀποτελούντων" ὡς τάφρον ὀρύσσοντα θησαυρὸν εὑρεῖν. οὔτε γδρ ὃ θεὶς οὕτω τέθεικεν, ὡς τοῦτον εὑρεῖν, οὔτε ὁ εὐρων οὕτως ὥρυξεν, ὡς εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν. ἄλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν» ἵν, ὅταν θῶη, ἐἰνέληται" ὁ δὲ, ἶνα τάζρον ὀρύξη" συνέπεσε δὲ ἀλλό τι» παρ ὃ προήρηντο ἀμφότεροι" τοῦ δὲ αὐτομάτου, τὰ τῶν «ψύχων ἥ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα, ἄνεν Φύσεως καὶ τέχνης. τήν ποίγυν τούτων ὑπαγάγωμεν τὰ διὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (γνόμενα)» εἶπερ ὁ ὁ ἀἄνθρωπὸς οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων; ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε θεῷ θειωτὸν ἐπιγράᾷειν αἰσχρὰς. ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε πράξεις καὶ ἀδίκους " οὔτε ἀναγχη" οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντῶν ἐστίν᾽ οὔτε εἱμαρμένη" οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τοὶ τὺς εἱμαρμένης. οὔτε Φύσει" Φύσεως γὰρ ἔργα ζῶα καὶ ᾧυτά' οὔτε τύχη" οὐ. γὰρ σπάνιοι καὶ ἐπροςδόκητοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ πράξεις" οὗτε αὐτομάτω" ἀψύχων γάρ ἐστιν ἢ ἢ ἀλόγων τὰ συμπτώματα. λείπεται δὴ, αὐτὸν τὸν πράττοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα ἄνθρωπον ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ἰδίων ε ἔργων, καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. ἔτι, εἰ μηδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἀρχὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. εἰς τί γὰρ καὶ χρήσεται τῇ βουλὴ, μηδεμιᾶς ὧν κύριος πράξεως; τὸ δὲ κάλλιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περιττὸν ἀποφαίνειν, τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἂν εἴη. εἰ τοίνυν βουλεύεται,, πράξεως ὃ ἕνεκα βουλεύεται" πᾶσα γὰρ βουλὴ, πράξεως ἔ ἕνεκᾳ καὶ διὰ πρᾶξιν. ἔτι, ὧν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐζ᾽ ἡμῖν, τούτων καὶ αἱ πράξεις, αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν» ἐφ' ἡμῖν" ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ αἱ κατὰ στὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνέργειαι" ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν ὥρα καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. ι δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἑωΐ αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι. δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ μανῖς ὑπὸ ᾿Αριστοτόλους λεχθὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν" ἃ γὰρ ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν» ταῦτα μωθόντες ποιοῦμεν" κβατεῖν γὰρ ἡδονῶν μανθάνοντες σωζρονες γινόμεθα" καὶ γενόμενοι σώφρονες, κρατοῦμεν ἡδονῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως εἰπεῖν. τὸ μελετᾶν καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι παρὰ πᾶσὶν ὡμολόγηται ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι" αἱ δὲ μελέται τῶν ἐξεών. εἶσι κυρίαι" τὸ γὰρ ἔθος, Φύσις ἐπίκτητος " εἰ δὲ κυρία τῆς ξξεώς ἐστιν ἡ ἥ μελέτη, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ ἡ μελέτη, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ ἡ ἕξις. ὧν δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν αἱ ἕξεις, τούτων ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ αἱ πράξεις, αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις. ταῖς ἡἂρ ἔξεσιν αἱ πράξεις πρός φοροι. ὁ ὥρα δοιαίαν ἕξιν ε ἔχων, δικαία καὶ. πράξει" καὶ ὁ ἔμμεν. ἀδικα᾿ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἱκαίους εἶναι καὶ νὰ δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστί τινα, δηλοῦσιν αἱ προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ταν τ κα οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπὼν προτρόπε! μὴ περῆν. μυδὲ διψῆν. μηδὲ ἵππασθαι" οὐ γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ταῦτα. δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι ἐφ᾽ οἷς αἱ προτροπαὶν ταῦτα ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστιν. ἔτι, εἰ μηδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. στεριττοὶ οἱ νόμοι" Φυσνιῶς δὲ πᾶν εθνος νόμοις χρῆταί τισιν» ἐπιστάμενον, ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει πράττειν» ἃ νομοθετεῖ" καὶ τὸ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐθνῶν θεοὺς ἐπιγράφεται νομοθέτας. ὡς Κρῆτες μὲν» τὸν Δικὲ, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, ᾿Απόλλωνα. φυσικῶς ἄρα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν συγκατέσπαρται. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ τούτοις ῥητέον ἐπὶ τῶν ψόγων καὶ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην πάντα γίνεσθαι. ### English translation (Claude) The discussion of free will, that is, of what is in our power, has as its first question whether there is anything in our power, for many oppose this; second, what the things in our power are, and over what we have authority; third, to examine the reason why God, who made us, made us free. Taking up the first question first, let us show that there is something in our power, from what is agreed even by our opponents. They say that the cause of everything that happens is either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or fortune, or chance. The work of God is substance and providence; of necessity, the movement of things that are always the same; of fate, that what happens through it is accomplished of necessity (for it too belongs to necessity); of nature, generation, growth and decay, plants and animals; of fortune, rare and unexpected things; for they define fortune as the meeting and concurrence of two causes that have their beginning from choice and bring about something other than what they naturally would, as when someone digging a ditch finds a treasure. For neither did the one who hid it hide it so that this man would find it, nor did the finder dig so as to find a treasure; but the one hid it so as to take it up when he wished, the other dug in order to dig a ditch; and something else fell out than either had chosen. Of chance, the accidents of soulless or irrational things, apart from nature and art. Under which of these shall we bring what happens through men, if man is not the cause and beginning of actions? It is not right to ascribe to God actions that are sometimes shameful and unjust; nor to necessity, for they are not among things always the same; nor to fate, for the things of fate are not contingent but necessary; nor to nature, for nature's works are animals and plants; nor to fortune, for men's actions are not rare and unexpected; nor to chance, for the accidents of soulless or irrational things belong to chance. It remains, then, that man himself, who acts and does, is the beginning of his own works and free. Again, if man is the beginning of no action, deliberation is superfluous to him. For what use will he make of counsel, if he is master of no action? But to declare superfluous what is finest and most honourable in man would be most absurd. If, then, he deliberates, he deliberates for the sake of action; for every counsel is for the sake of action and because of action. Again, where the activities are in our power, the actions according to the activity are in our power too; but the activities according to the virtues are in our power; therefore the virtues are in our power too. That the activities according to virtue are in our power is shown also by what Aristotle said well about the moral virtues: “What we learn by doing, we do when we have learned it”; for by learning to master pleasures we become temperate, and having become temperate we master pleasures. It may also be put thus: all agree that practice and exercise are in our power; and practice is master of states, for habit is an acquired nature. If practice is master of the state, and practice is in our power, the state too is in our power. And where the states are in our power, the actions according to the states are in our power too; for actions match states. The one who has a just state will do just things, and the one who has an unjust state unjust things; so it is in our power to be just [or unjust]. That some things are in our power is shown also by exhortations and [warnings]. For no one exhorts a man not to be hungry, nor thirsty, nor to fly, since these are not in our power. It is clear, then, that the things for which there are exhortations are in our power. Again, if nothing is in our power, laws are superfluous; but every nation naturally uses some laws, knowing that it has the authority to do what it legislates; and most nations ascribe their laws to gods as lawgivers, as the Cretans to Zeus and the Lacedaemonians to Apollo. So the knowledge of what is in our power has been sown by nature in all men. The same must be said about blame and praise and all the things that refute the claim that all things happen by fate. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.1 (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Matthaei's apparatus and Latin notes have been removed after “what the things”. A few words are lost in the OCR near the end (“or unjust,” “warnings”); supplied in square brackets by sense. - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.1, 1103a32–b2; Phys. 2.5–6 (fortune and chance). ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 39 (Matthaei, 311-316; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/39). ## Matthaei, chapter 40 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/39/#p-40 - Source: Matthaei, 317-323 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius explains what is in our power, namely voluntary actions, the works of the soul, the arts and the virtues, answers objections from Scripture, and shows how providence, bodily temperament and choice combine. ### Greek text Ὅτι μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τινα, καὶ ὅτι κύριοι πραξεών τινών ἐσμεν, αὐτάρκως ἀποδέδεικται. λοιπὸν δὲ εἴπωμεν, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. λέγομεν τοίνυν γενικῶς, πάντα τοὶ δέ ὑμῶν ἑκουσίως πραττόμενα ἐφ᾽ ἐμῖν εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τ ἑκουσίως ἐλέγετο πρώττεσθαι, τῆς προξεως οὐκ οὔσης ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν" καὶ ἁπλῶς, οἷς ἔπεται ψόγος ἢ ἔπαινος» καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐστι προτροπὴ καὶ νόμος" καὶ τοῦτο γῶὼρ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείχθη. κυρίως δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι τὰ ψυχριὰ πάντα, καὶ “«ερὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα. ὡς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἐμῖν ὄντος τοῦ πρᾶξαι τὸ προκείμενον καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι, βουλευόμεθα. ἐδείχθη δὰ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν, ἡ βουλὴ τῶν ἐπίσης ἐνδεχομένων οὕσα. ἐπίσης δὲ ἐστιν ἐνδεχόμενον, ὃ αὐτό τε δυνάμεθα καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ. ποιεῖται δὲ τούτου τὴν αἵρεσιν "ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἡμέτερος, καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πράξεως" καὶ ταῦτα ἐστε τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ ἐπίσης ἐνδεχόμενα οἷον, τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ κενεῖσθαι, ὁρμᾷν καὶ μὴ ἑρμῶν,, ἐρέγεσθαι τῶν μοὶ ἀναγ καίων καὶ μὴ ἐρέγεσθαι, ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μὴ Ψεύδεσθαιν διδόναι, καὶ μὴ διδόναι, χαίρειν » οἷς δεῖ, καὶ μὴ χαίρεινν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἐστι τὰ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργα" τούτων γάρ ἐσμεν αὐτεξούσιοι. τῶν δὲ ἐπίσης ἐνδεχομένων εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τέχναι. πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη περὶ ἡένεσίν ἐστι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν καὶ ἀρχὶ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ. οὐδὲν γνὴρ οὔτε τῶν αἰδίων καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὗτε τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης γινομένων, κατὰ τέχνην Ὑγίνεσθαι λέγεται " ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τῶν γινομένων ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ ἐχόντων τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον» ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ Φυτῶν, κατὰ πέχνην. τι λέγεται γένεσθαι. Φύσει γὰρ καὶ οὐ Ξέχνη. εἰ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην γινομένων ἔξωθεν ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον, τίς ἄρα αἰτιος τῶν κατώ τέχνην 1" νομένων» ἢ ὁ ποιῶν τεχνίτης) ἐν γαρ τῶ τεχνιτὴ τὸ ποιεῖν. ΓΙ] οὗτος ἄρα ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιος πρώξεών ἐστιν. ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἄρα } καὶ αἱ κατὰ τέχνην ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ πᾶσαι πράξεις ψυχικαί τὸ καὶ λογικαί, ἐδεύχθη δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, στοαί εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ψυχικαί. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ, νομίζοντες λέγεσθαι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐπὶ πάσης πράξεως τε καὶ κτήσεως καὶ τύχης, ἀποδομιμαάζουσιν εἰκύτως τὸν λόγον" οἱ δὲ δριμύτεροι καὶ τὸ τῆς γραφῆς εἰς ἔλεγχον Φέροντες τὸ, οὐκ ἐπ ἀνθρώπῳ αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ, ὦ βέλτιστοί, ᾧασι, πῶς «ὐτεξούσιος ὃ ἄνθρωπος » ὁπότε οὐκ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁδὸς αἰτοῦ, καὶ, μάταιοι οἱ διαλογισμοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν εἰς ἔργον ἄγεν, ἃ διανοούμεθα, καὶ τοιαῦτα πολλά ᾧασιν, εἰγνοοῦντες, ὕπως λέγεται τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ πλουτεῖν ἢ πένεσθαι ἢ διαὶ παντὸς ὑγιαίνειν, ἢ ῥωμαλέους εἶναι κατὰ Φύσιν ἢ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἡ ὅλως τῶν ὁρ- “ανικῶν ἢ τυχχρῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν, ἥ τῶν κατὰ πρόγοιαν τὸ τέλος λαμβανόντων, ἐξουσίαν ἔχομεν ἀλλὰ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν πράξεων καὶ προαιρέσεων καὶ κινήσεων, καὶ ὧν ἐξίσης καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρᾶξαι δυνάμεθα, ἐπειδὴ πάσης πράξεως προαίρεσις ἡγεῖται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἡ πρᾶξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ὑπόδικος ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτο δηλοῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ" ὁ ἐμβλέψας γυναικὶ “τρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν, ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τὴ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ". καὶ ὁ Ἰὼβ ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ διάνοιαν τῶν τέκνων αὐτοῦ τ ποήρί να ἔθυε τῷ θεῷ. ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἁμαρτίας καὶ δικαμοιτραγίας ἡ Π προαΐρεσις. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ποτὲ μὲν συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῆς “τρονοίας » ποτὲ δὲ κωλύεται" ὄντος [ω] καὶ τοῦ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, οὐσης δὲ καὶ τῆς προνοίας, ἀνάγκη κατ᾽ ἀμῴω τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθιμ" εἱ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μόνον ἐγίνετο», οὐκ ἦν ἂν τὸ ἕτερον. μικτῶν δὲ ὄντων τῶν γινομένων» ποτὲ μὲν κατα τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀποβήσεται» ποτὲ δὲ κατα τὸν τὴς προνοίας λόγον, ποτὲ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα. τῆς δὲ προνοίας πὴ μὲν κοινῆς οὐσης, πὴ δὲ ἰδιαζούσης, ἀνάγκη τοῖς καθόλου τὰ καταὶ μέρος ὁμοιοπωθεῖν" τοῦ γὰρ περιέχοντος ξηροῦ δ᾽ ἡμὼ ξηραίνεται τὰ »σώματα, εἰ καὶ μὴ παν τὰ ομδίως " καὶ τρὸς δὲ οὐκ εὖ δεδιαιτηριένης καὶ τρυφώσης, ἀκολούθως τὰ τικτόμενα καὶ τοῖς σώμασι δύφιρατα, καὶ ταῖς ὁρμαῖς σὰ»ράφορα γεννᾶται. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων», ὅτι συμβαίνει, καὶ κράτει σώματος οὐκ εὐτυχεῖ περητεσεῖν, ἢ τῷ μοινῷ τοῦ περιέχοντος »" ἢ ἐξ ἔκουσίαις διαίτης τῶν γείνησάντων, ἢ καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἀπὸ τρυφῆς διεφθαρμένων᾽" ὥςτε “τὰς κράσεις ἐξ ἑκουσίας ἀρχὴς ἐσθ᾽ ὅτε φαύλας κατασκευάὥσθαι, ἃ καὶ μὴ τὴν πρόνοιαν πάντως αἰτίαν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτῶν. ὅταν οὖν ψυχὴ κράσει, σώματος ἐνδοῦσα, ἐπιθυμίαις ἢ θυμοῖς ἑαυτὴν ἐκδῷ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν τυχηρῶν καταπωσθὴ, χός ἦ χαυνωθῆ, οἷον πενίας ἢ πλούτου, ἑκούσιον κακὸν ὑφίσταται. ἡ γὰρ μὴ ἐνδοῦσα κατορθοῖ καὶ νικᾷ τὸ δύριρατον, ὡς ἀλλοιῶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἣ ἀλλοιωθῆναι" καὶ καθίστησι τὰς ψυχικὰς διαθέσεις εἰς ΡΝ ἀγωγῇ χρηστῇ καὶ διαίτη προς φόρῳ. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν κατορθούντων, ὡς οἱ μὴ κατοῤθώσαντες ἑκουσίως ἁμαρτάνουσιν. ἐφ' καὶ ἡμῖν γᾶρ, ἣ συνδραμεῖν ταῖς δυτκρασίας, ἢ ἢ ἀντιβῆναι καὶ κρατῆσαι. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὴ δυςκρασίαν ὡς αἰτίαν τῶν καθῶν πρὸ μένοι.» ἀνάγκῃ καὶ οὐ προαιρέσει τὴν καμίαν ᾿ἐπιγράφουσι" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Φασὶ, μηδὲ τὰς ὠρετὰς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι, ὠτόπως λέγοντες. ### English translation (Claude) That some things are in our power, and that we are masters of some actions, has been sufficiently shown. It remains to say what the things in our power are. We say, then, in general, that all things done voluntarily through us are in our power; for they would not be said to be done voluntarily if the action were not in our power. In short, those which praise or blame follows, and for which there is exhortation and law; for this too was shown earlier. In the strict sense, all the works of the soul are in our power, and the things we deliberate about; for we deliberate as though it were in our power to do or not to do what lies before us. It was shown earlier that counsel concerns things equally contingent, and that the equally contingent is what we can do, and its opposite too. Our mind makes the choice of this, and it is the beginning of action. These, then, are the things in our power, the equally contingent: for example, to move and not to move, to have impulse and not to have impulse, to desire unnecessary things and not to desire them, to lie and not to lie, to give and not to give, to rejoice in what one should and not to rejoice, and all such things, in which are the works of vice and of virtue; for in these we are free. The arts too are among the equally contingent. For every art concerns the production of things that can be and not be, whose beginning is in the maker and not in what is made. Nothing eternal and existing of necessity, nor anything that comes to be of necessity, is said to come to be by art; nor is anything said to come to be by art among the things that come to be in what is contingent and can be otherwise but have the efficient cause in themselves, as with animals and plants, for they come to be by nature and not by art. If, then, the efficient cause of things that come to be by art is outside them, what is the cause of things that come to be by art but the craftsman who makes them? For the making is in the craftsman. He, then, is the beginning and cause of the actions. So the activities according to art, the virtues, and all actions of the soul and of reason are in our power; and it was shown earlier which are the activities of the soul. Most people, thinking that free will is said of every action, possession and fortune, naturally reject the doctrine. The sharper ones, bringing forward the words of Scripture to refute it, “A man's ways are not in his own power,” say, “My good friends, how is man free, when his way is not in his own power?” and “The thoughts of men are vain,” as though we could not carry into action what we think; and they say many such things, not knowing in what sense free will is meant. For we have authority not over being rich or poor, or always healthy, or strong by nature, or ruling, or in general over the so-called instrumental or fortuitous goods, or the things that receive their end according to providence; but over actions, choices and movements according to virtue and vice, and over those whose opposites we can equally do; since choice precedes every action, and not only the action but also the choice is subject to judgment. This is shown by the saying in the Gospel: “He who looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.” And Job sacrificed to God for the sins of his children in their thoughts. For choice is the beginning of sin and of right doing. The deed is sometimes permitted by providence and sometimes prevented. Since there is both what is in our power and providence, what happens must happen according to both; for if it happened according to one only, the other would not exist. Since what happens is mixed, it will turn out sometimes according to what is in our power, sometimes according to the reason of providence, and sometimes according to both. And since providence is partly general and partly particular, particular things must suffer together with universal ones. When the surrounding air is dry, our bodies are dried, though not all equally; and when the mother has not lived well and has lived luxuriously, the children born are accordingly ill-constituted in body and unstable in impulses. It is clear from what has been said that it happens that one falls into an unhappy bodily temperament either through the common condition of the surrounding air, or from the voluntary way of life of the parents, or from their being corrupted by luxury; so that temperaments are sometimes made bad from a voluntary beginning, and providence is not in every case the cause of such things. When, then, the soul, yielding to the temperament of the body, gives itself over to desires or anger, and is cast down or puffed up by the things of fortune, such as poverty or wealth, it undergoes a voluntary evil. For the soul that does not yield sets right and overcomes the ill temperament, so as to change rather than be changed, and brings the dispositions of the soul to [a good state] by good upbringing and suitable way of life. It is clear, then, from those who succeed, that those who do not succeed sin voluntarily; for it is in our power either to go along with the bad temperaments or to resist and master them. Most people, putting forward bad temperament as the cause of the passions, ascribe vice to necessity and not to choice, and therefore say that the virtues are not in our power either; but they speak absurdly. ### Scripture references - Jer 10:23: quotation, high confidence - Ps 94:11 (93:11 LXX): quotation, medium confidence - Matt 5:28: quotation, high confidence - Job 1:5: allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Jer 10:23; Ps 94:11 (LXX 93:11); Matt 5:28; Job 1:5. A word is lost in the OCR in the sentence on the soul's dispositions; supplied in square brackets by sense. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 40 (Matthaei, 317-323; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/40). ## Matthaei, chapter 41 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/39/#p-41 - Source: Matthaei, 324-331 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius explains that free will comes with reason and changeability with created being, defends God against blame for human vice, and shows that vice lies not in our powers but in states acquired by choice. ### Greek text Λοιπόν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν αὐτεξούσιοε, εγόναμεν. (Φαμὲν τοίνυν εὐθέως τῷ λογικῷ συνειςέρχεσθαι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, καὶ τοῖς γενητοῖς συμπεφυκέναι μεταβολὴν καὶ τροπὴν, μάλιστα τοῖς ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης γενομένοις ἀρχοὶ γὰρ γενέσεως, τροπή. ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως γὰρ τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὑλῆς αὶ γένεσις. κατανοήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις τὸ λεγὸμένον) ἀποβλέπων εἰς τε τὰ Φυτὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ ζῶα, τά τε “ερσαῖς καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ ἔνυδρα. συνεχὴς γὰρ ἡ τούτων μεταβολή. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τῷ λογικῷ ᾿ συνειζέρχεται τὸ αὐτεξούσιὸν. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων περὶ τοῦ, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναί τι, τοῖς τεῦ μὴ παρέργως αἰκηκούσιν εὐδηλόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως ἄἅτο- “πον, καὶ νῦν ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν αὐτῶν, τῆς ὠκολουθίας ἐπιζ,τούσης αὐτά. τοῦ λογικοῦ, τὸ μέν ἐστι θεωρητικὸν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν" θεωρητικὸν μὲν, τὸ κατανοοῦν. ὡς ἔχει τοὶ ὄντα" πρακτικὸν δὲ, τὸ ὁ βουλευτικὸν, τὸ ὁρίζον τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸ ὀρθὸν λόγον. καὶ καλοῦσι τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν» νοῦν" τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν, λόγον" καὶ τὸν μὲν, σοφίαν, τὸν δὲ, Φρόνησιν. πᾶς δὲ ὁ βουλευόμενος, ὡς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῆς αἷρέ» σεως οὔσης τῶν πρακτέων, βουλεύεται, ἅ ἵνα τὸ προκριθὲν ἐκ τῆς τῆς βουλῆς ἕληται καὶ ἑλόμενος πράξη. πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀνάγκὴ» τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ κύριον εἶναι πράξεων. εἰ γὰρ μὴ κύριος εἴη πράξεων, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ ὁ βουλεύεσθαι" εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀναγκὴς παρυφίσταται, τῷ λογικῷ τὸ αὐταξούσιον" ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται λογικὸν, ἢ λογικὸν ὃν» κύριον ἔσται πράξεων" κύριον δὲ ὃν πράξεων» πάντως αὐτεξούσιον ἔσται. ἐδείχθη δὲ καὶ τὼ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης γενητοὶ τρεπτὼ ὄντα. ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἄρα συνάγεται. τὸ τὸν ἂνθρωπον ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτεξούσιον καὶ πρειττὸν εἶναι" τρεπτὸν μὲν» ἐπειδὴ γενητὸς " αὐτεξούσιον δὲ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λογικόςσοι ποΐυν αἰτιῶνται τὸν θεὸν, ὁτι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἐποίησε καμίας ἀνεπίδεκτον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτεξούσιον, λανθανουσιν ἑαντοὺς αἰτιώμενοι τὸν θεὸν » ὅτι λογικὸν ἐ ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλογον. ἀνάγκη, γοὶρ τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ἄλογον γενέσθαι, ἢ ἡ λογικὸν (' ὄντα καὶ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ στρεφόμενον, αὐτεξούσιον εἶν. ἐξ ἃ ἀνάγκης οὖν πᾶσα Φύσις λογοιὴ αὐτεξς. οὐσιός ἐστι καὶ τρεπτὴ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ᾧυσιν. ἀλλ᾽ αἱ ἐν αἱν ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης γενόμεναι κατὰ δύο. τρόπους τὸ τρεπτὸν ἔχουσι, κατά τε τὴν ὕλην» καὶ κατ αὐτὸ τὸ γεῖ νέσθαι" ὅσαι δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἐγένοντο, καθ' ἕνα μόνον τρόπον τὸν τῆς γενέσεώς εἰσι τρεπταί. πάλιν δὲ “τούτων τῶν αἰὔλων ὅσαι μὲν. ἐν τοῖρ περγγείοις εἰσὶ, τὴ οι“ νωνίῳ. τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πρακτέα καταγ!γόμεναι, μᾶλλόν εἶσι τῶν ἄλλων τρέπταί" ὅσαι δὲ δὲ ἀκρός, τα Φύσεως τῷ θεῷ κατὰ σχέσιν πλησιάζουσι," καὶ τῇ τούτου κατανοήσει τὸ μαμᾶριον᾽ ᾿καρποῦνται, «ρὸς ἑαυτὰς καὶ τὸν θεὸν μόνον ἐστ βοιμμιέναι.» τῶν “μὲν πρακτῶν αὶ τῆς ὕλης παντάπασιν ἑαυτὰς ἀπηλλοτρίωσαν, τὴ δὲ θεωρί τ καὶ τῷ θεῷ προςῳκείωσαν» μένουσιν ἄτρεπτοι" αὐτεξούσιον μὲν οὖσαι, διὰ τὸ λογικαὶ εἶναι, οὐ μὴν πρεπόμεναι, διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας. καὶ θαῦμα γε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ ΙῚ τοὺς ἐχωρισαν, ἐμεῖναν ἀτρεπτοι. οἶμαι συναποδεδεῖχθαε τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν αἱ λογικαὶ πᾶσαι Φύσεις ἄριστα δεδημιούργηνται, καὶ εἴπερ οὕτω διέμειναν, ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκτίσθησαν, πάσης ἄν κακίας ἐκτὸς ἦσαν". γίνεται δὰ αὐταῖς ἡ κακία κατὰ προαίρεσιν᾽ οὕτω γοῦν αἱ μείνασαε κατοὺ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχὴς γένεσιν, τὸ μακάριον ἔχουσι. μόνοι δὲ ἄγγελοι τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐτράπησαν, καὶ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ πάντες, ἀλλὰ τινὲς ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅσοι ῥέψαντες πρὸς τὰ κάτω τῶν ἐπιγείων ἔφεσιν ἔσχον, τῆς πρὸς να ἄνω καὶ τὸν θεὸν σχέσεως ἀποχωρήσαντες. οὐκοῦν ἐνς τῶν δεδειγμένων δῆλόν σ ἐστιν. ὡς ενεκα μὲν τοῦ Φύσει τρεπτοὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι, τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς προαιρετριὰς τρεπτὰς ἔχομεν, οὐ μὴν διὲ τὸ ἔχειν τρεπτὰς δυνάμεις, τοῦ οιακοὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι, τὸν θεὸν ὧν τις αἰτιάσαιτο. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσίν εἶσιν αἱ κα’ κίαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσιν᾽ αἱ δὲ ἕξεις, κατα προαίρεσιν" κατοὶ προαίρεσιν ἄρα κακοὶ γνόμεθα, καὶ οὐ κατὰ ᾧυσιν ἐσμέν. μάθοι δ᾽ ἂν τις ἀκριβέστερον τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτως. ἂν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν δύναμιν ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἕκαστον; ὧν ποιοῦμεν, ποιεῖν δυνάμεθα. πᾶσα δὲ προαιρετηο) δύναμις καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστί" μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀὐτὴ δύγαμις τοῦ ψεύδεοθαι καὶ ἀληθέδεν, καὶ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τοῦ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν; οὐμέτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ ἕξις τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οἷον τοῦ ἀκολασταίνειν καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἢ τοῦ Ψψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἀληθεύειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ ἐναντίαι" τὸ μὲν γὰρ σωφρονεῖν, τὴς κατ᾽ ὠρετήν ἐστὶν δξεως" τὸ δὲ ἀκολασταίνειν, τῆς κακίας.. οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄρα τῶν δυνάς μεων αἱ κακίκι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως. οὐ γαρ ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν καὶ παρασκενάζουσα ἡμᾶς ἀχπολασταίνειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι!, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ προαίρεσις. ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν γὰρ ἦν ἐληθεύειν καὶ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, εἴπερ οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν καὶ κακία δύναμις, ἀλλ᾽ ἕξις, οὐχ ὁ τὴν δύναμιν δοὺς αἴτιος ἡμῖν τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ αὶ ἕξις ἡ παρ᾿ ἡμῶν καὶ δὲ ἑωῶν καὶ δ ἡμᾶς προςγιγομένη. ἐξὴν γαρ τὴν ἐναντίαν εξιν ἐκ τῆς γυμνασίας κτήσασθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν Φαύλην. διαφέρει δὲ δύναμις ἕξεως, τῷ πάσας μὲν τὰς δυγώμεις Φυσμιαὶς εἶναι" τας δὲ ἕξεις ἐπεικάκτους᾽ καὶ τῷ τὰς μὲν δυνώμεις ἀδιδάκτους εἶναι, τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ἐκ μωθήσεως καὶ ἔθους προςγίνεσθαι. εἰ τοίγυν ἡ δύναμς Φυσροῇ τις καὶ ἀδίδακτος" ἡ δὲ ἕξις ἐπίκτητὸς καὶ διδακτή᾽ οὐχ' ἡ Φύσις αἰτία τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κακῶς ἡμᾶς ἤχθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κακὴν ἔξιν. κτήσασθαι» πᾶσα γὰρ ἕξις ἐπίκτητος ἐδείχιθη. ὅτι δὲ (Φύσει εἰσὶν αἱ δυνάμεις, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ πάντας τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχειν δυνάμεις, « «πλὴν τῶν ποπηρωμένων. ὅτι δὲ αἱ ἕξεις οὐ φυσικαὶ, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ πάντας τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχειν ἕξεις, ἄλλους δὲ ἄλλας. τὰ γὰρ Φύσει, τὰ αὐτὸ παρὰ πᾶσιν.. ### English translation (Claude) It remains to say for what reason we were made free. We say, then, that free will comes in at once with reason, and that change and alteration are inborn in things that come into being, especially those that come to be from underlying matter; for the beginning of coming into being is change, since coming into being is from the alteration of the underlying matter. One would understand what is said by looking at all plants and animals, those on land, in the air, and in the water, for their change is continual. That free will comes in with reason is quite clear, from what was said about there being something in our power, to those who have listened with attention. But perhaps there is nothing absurd in recalling the same things now, since the sequence requires them. Of reason, one part is contemplative, the other practical: the contemplative understands how things are; the practical deliberates and determines right reason for things to be done. They call the contemplative mind and the practical reason, and the one wisdom and the other prudence. Everyone who deliberates deliberates as though the choice of things to be done were in his power, so that he may choose what has been preferred by counsel and, having chosen, act. So whoever has the ability to deliberate must necessarily also be master of actions; for if he were not master of actions, deliberation would be superfluous to him. If so, free will necessarily accompanies reason: either a being will not be rational, or being rational it will be master of actions; and being master of actions it will certainly be free. It has also been shown that things that come to be from underlying matter are changeable. From both, then, it follows that man is of necessity free and changeable: changeable because he came into being, free because he is rational. Those who blame God because he did not make man incapable of vice, but free, fail to notice that they are blaming God for making man rational and not irrational. For one of two things was necessary: either to become irrational, or, being rational and occupied with things to be done, to be free. Of necessity, then, every rational nature is free and changeable according to its own nature. But those that come to be from underlying matter have changeability in two ways, by their matter and by their very coming into being; those that did not come to be from underlying matter are changeable in one way only, by their coming into being. Again, of these immaterial natures, those that are among things on earth and are occupied with things to be done through their association with men are more changeable than the others; but those that by the height of their nature draw near to God by relation and enjoy blessedness in contemplating him, being turned toward themselves and God alone, having wholly estranged themselves from things to be done and from matter and made themselves at home in contemplation and with God, remain unchanged: free because they are rational, but not changing, for the reasons given. And this is no wonder; for … [those whom God] separated remained unchanged. I think it has been shown at the same time by what has been said that all rational natures were made excellently in the beginning, and that if they had remained as they were created they would have been free of all vice; vice comes to them by choice. So those that remained in their original creation have blessedness. Of the bodiless natures only angels have changed, and not all of them, but some, those who inclined downward, conceived a desire for earthly things, and departed from their relation to things above and to God. It is clear, then, from what has been shown, that because we are by nature changeable we have changeable powers of choice; but no one can blame God for our being evil because we have changeable powers. For vices are not in the powers but in the states, and the states are by choice; so we become evil by choice and are not so by nature. One might understand what is said more exactly thus. We said earlier that a power is that by which we are able to do each of the things we do. Every power of choice is a power of opposites; for one and the same power is of lying and telling the truth, and one and the same power of being temperate and licentious. But a state is no longer of opposites, for instance of licentiousness and temperance, or of lying and telling the truth; contrary states are of contrary things: temperance belongs to the state of virtue, licentiousness to that of vice. So vices do not belong to the powers but to the states and to choice. For it is not the power that prepares us to be licentious or to lie, but choice; for it was in our power to tell the truth and not to lie. Since vice, then, is not a power but a state, the one who gave the power is not the cause of our evils, but the state that comes to us from us, through us and because of us. For it was possible to acquire the contrary state by exercise and not the bad one. A power differs from a state in that all powers are natural and states acquired, and in that powers are untaught, while states come by learning and habit. If, then, the power is something natural and untaught, and the state acquired and taught, nature is not the cause of evils, but our bad upbringing and, through it, our acquiring a bad state; for every state was shown to be acquired. That the powers are by nature is clear from the fact that all have the same powers, except the maimed; that the states are not natural is clear from the fact that not all have the same states, but different people different ones. For what is by nature is the same in all. ### Translation notes - A few words are lost in the OCR in the sentence about the immaterial natures that “remained unchanged”; the gap is marked “…” and the sense supplied in square brackets. - The fall of some angels by inclining toward earthly things is stated as Nemesius gives it. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 41 (Matthaei, 324-331; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/41). ## Matthaei, chapter 42 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/39/#p-42 - Source: Matthaei, 331-343 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius proves that providence exists from the order of the world, the exposure of crimes (Susanna, Ibycus), prayer, beneficence and prophecy, distinguishes providence from creation, and finds providence over individuals in the endless variety of human faces. ### Greek text Ὅτι μὲν αὐτεξούσιός ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τίνων ἐστὶν αὐτεξούσιος, καὶ διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν αὐτεξούσιος γέγονεν, αὐτ- ΥΣ ““ »ὦ Νν ᾿ ᾿Ὶ φιῳ ὃ ἄρκως ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἴρηται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ πᾶς “τροθέμενος ζονεῦσαι, πάντως ζονεύει" ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ᾧο- γεύει, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ, τῆς προαιρέσεως παρεμποδισθείσης, καὶ μὴ δραμούσης κατὰ σκοπόν" πρόνοιαν δὲ τούτων τινὰ ἔφαμὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι καὶ οὐχ, εἱμαρμένην" ἀμόλουθος τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τῆς προνοίας λόγος. διαιρεῖται δὲ καὶ οὗτος εἰς τρία" πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἔστι πρόνοια" δεύτερον, τί ἐστι" τρίτον, τίνων ἐστ. ἀλλ' Ιουδαῖος μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν μαιγόμενος ἀγνοήσειε πρόνοιαν, εἰδὼς μὲν τὼ κατ᾽ Αἴγυπτον »θαύματα, ἐπακούσας δὲ τῶν κατοὶ τὴν ἔρημον, ἐν οἷς νη» λαυγεστόέρα τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐζφξάνη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ πρόνοια" στολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν προφήταις καὶ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι: κατανοήσας ἔργα τῆς προνοίας, μηδὲ μίαν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐπιδεχόμενα" Κριστιανοὺς δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα διδάσκει πρόνοιαν εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ θειότατον καὶ δὲ ὑπερβολὴν Φιλαν- Ξθρωπίας ἀπιστότατον ἔργον τὴς προνοίας, ἡ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐνσωμώτωσις τοῦ θεοῦ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ πρὸς τούτους μόνους ὃ λόγος, αλλὰ καὶ πρὸς Ἕλληνας, Φέρε καὶ δὲ ἄλλων, οἷς ἐκεῖνοι πιστεύουσιν, ἀποδείξωμεν πρόνοιαν οὖσαν, ὅτι τοίνυν ἐστὶ πρόνοια διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἂν τις ἐπιδείξειε, δ᾽ ὧν, ὅτι καὶ θεός ἐστιν, ἐδείξαμεν. ἡ γὰρ διαμονὴ τῶν ἁπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, καὶ καὶ θέσις καὶ ἡ τάξις τῶν ὄντων, ἀεὶ Φυλαττομένη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, καὶ καὶ τῶν ἄστρων Φοραὶ;, μηδὲν μηδέποτε διαλλάττουσαν καὶ ὁ κύκλος τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, καὶ καὶ τῶν ὡρῶν ἀποκατάστασις, τῶν τε νυκτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν καὶ κατ᾽ ἔτος ἰσότης, παροὶ εόι μέρος ἑκατέρας αὐξανομένης τε καὶ μειουμένης οὔτε ἐλάττόνι, οὔτε πλείονι μέτρῳ, πῶς ἂν διετέλεσεν ὁμοίως διεξαι ομένη, μηδενὸς περονοοῦντος; οὐ μὴν ἀλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄμαρτήμασιν ἡ παρεπομένη τιμωρία. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ κἡὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημώτων αὐτῶν ἀποκάλυψις, ὅταν, μηδενὸς ὄντος τοῦ διελέγξαι δυναμένου, κατά τινας περιστάσεις ἐμφανίζηταις δείκνυσι πρόνοιαν εἶναι. γέμουσι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἱστοριῶν αἴ τε τῶν Ἑβραίων γραφαὶ καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι γράμματα. τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐῤ ᾿έθη τὴ ὙραΦῇ τὸ κατοὶ Σωσαννγαν πάθος" ἐν δὲ τοῖς παρ᾽ Ἕ λλησιν τὸ κατὰ κατὰ Ἴβυκον τὸν ποιητήν. Φονευόμενος γὰρ οὗτος ὑπό τινων, καὶ μηδένα μήτε σύμμαχοῦν, μήτε μάρτυρα τῆς ἐπιβουλὴς ἔ ἔχων, θεωρήσας γεραγοὺς., ὑμεῖς, ἔφηκεν» δι γέρανοι, τιμωρήσατέ μοι τὸν Φό: νον. τῆς δὴ πόλεως ζγτούσης τοὺς (ονεύσαντας, καὶ μὴ δυναμένης εὑρεῖν, ἐπιτελουμένου θεάτρου καὶ τοῦ δήμου καθεζομένου » γέρανοι διέπτησαν" θεασάμενοι δὲ οἱ φονεῖς ἐγέλασαν. καὶ ἰδοὺ, εἶπον» αἱ τιμωροί τοῦ Ἰβύκου" τῶν δὲ πλησίον κωθεζομένων τις ἀκούσας ἀπήγγειλε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καὶ συλληφθέντες ὠωμολόγησαν τὸν (όνον, πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐστὶ πλῆθος ἀναγεγραμμένον ἐν Τοῖς παλαιοῖς» ὅπερ εἶ τις βουληθείη συναγαγεῖν» εἰς ἄπειρον ἂν μῆκος ἐκτείνειε τὸν λέγον. εἰ δὲ μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῶν ἐλέγχων ἐπάγεται, ἀλλ᾽ ε ἔνιοι τό «αἱ διαφεύγειν δοκοῦσι,, μηδεὶς ἀρνείσθω δια τοῦτο τὴν “πρόνοιαν. οὐ γὰρ καθ᾿ ἕνα μόνον τρόπον ποιεῖται τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ᾿ἐπιμέλειοιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους. οὐχ, ἥκιστα δὲ τὸ εἶναι φρόνοιαν δείκνυσιν ἡ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορῷ. κατασκευὴ καὶ ἀναλογία» διαὶ σταντὸς ὁμοίως Φυλαττομένη. παντὶ γὰρ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος ἐμφαίνεται τῆς προνοίας ἡ προμήθεια» ἅτινα τοῖς Φιλοπόνοις ἔξεστιν ἐκ δικφόρων συγγραμμάτων αναλέγεσθαι. καὶ ἡ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ πορειλία., τῶν ἐν τοῖς ᾧδοις, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ κόσμον φυλώττουσα, κέκραγε πρόνοιαν εἶναι» καὶ τὸ κοινὴ δὲ παρὰ στᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμολογούμενον, τὸ δεῖν εὖ χεσθαι καὶ ᾿Θεραπεύειν τὸ θεῖον ἀναθήμασί τε καὶ περιβόλοις» προνοίας ἐστὶ δηλωτιιόν. ἀπρονοήτου. γαρ ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς, πῶς ἂν, ἢ ἢ τίνι τις εὐξαιτο; καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ δὲ, ἡ «ερὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας» Φυσικῶς ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαστρόφοις σπουδαᾧμένη, τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐμφαίνει. τὸν γὰρ ἐκ ταύτης μισθὺν ὠπεκδεχόμενοι.» καὶ τοὺς μὶ δυναμένους ἀμείψασθαι ποιεῖν εὖ προαιρούμεθα. φτρογοίας δὲ εἰναιρουμένης συγκεχώρηται μὲν ἀδικία τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖν. ἀναιρεῖται δὲ ἐλεημοσύνη καὶ θεοῦ Φόβος, συναναιρεῦῖται δὲ τούτοις ὠρετὴ καὶ εὐσέβεια" εἰ γὰρ μὴ προνοεῖ θεὸς, οὐδὲ τιμωρεῖται» οὐδὲ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσιν ἔπαθλα γέμει, οὐδὲ τῶν ἀδικουμένων ταὶς βλάβας ἀπείργει. τίς ἂν οὖν ἔτι προςκυνήσειε θεὸν, μηδὲν εἰς μηδὲν ἡμῖν συμβαλλόμενον; ἀναιρεῖται δὲ καὶ προῷητείχ καὶ πᾶσα πρόγνωσις. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ συμφωνεῖ ταῦτα τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστην σχεδὸν ἡμέραν γὙνομένοις. πολλαὶ μὲν Ὑ ἐν ταῖς χρείαις ἐπιζφάνειαι τοῦ θείου, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ δὲ ὀνεῖρὼν τοῖς κάμνουσι διδσται βοηθήματα, πολλαί τε προγνώσεις καθ' ἑκάστην ᾿ γενεοὶν ἐξηνέχθησαν, πολλοὶ δὲ μιαιφονήσαν» τες καί τι τῶν αθεμίτων πράξαντες ἐκδειματοῦνται νύκτωρ τε καὶ ἱ μεθ᾽ ἡμέρας. ἄλλως τὸ ἀγωθός ἐστιν ὁ θεός". ἄγαν θὺς δὲ ὧν, εὐεργετριός ἐστιν" εἶ δὲ εὐεργετικὸς, καὶ προνοήτικός. τί δεῖ λέγειν τὰ τῆς κτίσεως ἔργα καὶ τὴν ἄνα» λογίαν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ τὴν θέσιν καὶ τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὴν χρείαν, ἥν ἑκαστον παρέχεται " τῷ παντὶ, καὶ ὡς οὐχ, οἷόν τε ἄλλως καλῶς ἔχειν, παρ᾽ δ νῦν ἔχει, καὶ ὡς οὔτε προςθύκην ἐπιδέχοται, οὔτε τῶν ὄντων ἐπιλείπειν τι δύναται; ἀλλὰ τέλεια πάντα καὶ καλοὶ, σοφῶς τε καὶ στρογοητικῶς δεδημιούργηται. ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸν τῆς δημιουργίας λόγον ἀναβα). ὦμεθα τὴν τούτων ἔκθεσιν, ἵνα μὴ πάθωμεν, ὅπερ «ολλοὶ τῶν περὶ προνοίας γραψάντων πεπόνθασι. τὴν." γὰρ κτίσιν ἀντὶ τῆς προνοίας ανυμνοῦσι, ποδηγοῦσαν μὲν ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς προνοίας λόγαν, κατοὶ πολὺ δὲ δια- Φέρουσαν. οὐ γὰρ “ταὐτέν ἐστι πρόνοια, καὶ κτίσις. κτίσεως μὲν γὰρ» τὸ καλῶς ποίῆσαι τὰ γινόμενα" προνοίας δὲ, τὸ καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν γινομένων" οὐ συνυπάρχει δὲ τόᾳ ταῦτα πάντως ἀλλήλοις, ὡς ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην καὶ μέθοδον, ἰδεῖν. οἱ μὲν γὼρ αὐτῶν ἄχρι μόνου. τοῦ ποιῆσαι καλῶς ἰ ἵστανται» Ὁ καὶ ὶ οὐδὲν δτι Φροντίζουσιν, ὡς τέκτονές τε καὶ γραφεῖς καὶ πλάσται" οἱ δὲ μόνον ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ,ππρονοοῦσιν, ὡς βουκόλοι τε καὶ ποιμένες. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ τῆς κτίσεως λόγω δεόντως ἂν ἐπιδεικνύοιμεν» ὅτι καλῶς ἡόγονε τὰ γενόμενα" ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ προνοίας.» ὅτι καὶ πῆς δεούσης ἐπιμελείας συγχάνει μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι. πῶς οὖν ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ βοῦς ἐκ βοὸς ἀεὶ γεννᾶται καὶ ἕκαστον ἐκ τοῦ οἰκείου σπέρματος φύεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου, προνοίας ἀπούσης; εἰ γᾶρ λέγοι πἰς, ὅτι κατὰ σὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν εἰρμῷ προβαίνει τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο ἂν εἴη λέγων, ὅτι τὴ κτίσει συγυπάρχει “πάντως ἡ πρόνοια. τὸ γὰρ εἱρμῷ προβαίνειν τὸ κτισθὲν, δηλοῖ τῇ κτίσει συγκαταβεβλῆσθαι τὴν πρόνοιαν. «προνοίας γαὶρ ἡ μεταὶ τὴν κτίσιν διξαγωγὴ τῶν ἔντων" καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἃ ἂν ἄλλο λέγοι, ᾿ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι στοιητὴν ἅμα καὶ προνοητὴν τῶν ὄντων. τίς δὲ ὁρῶν τὰς μορφας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐν τοσαύταις μυριάσι διαλλαττού- σας καὶ μηδαμοῦ κατὰ πάντα συνεμπιπτούσας δ᾽ οὐ θαυμάσεια μὲν τὸ ἔργον» ἀναλογιζόμενος δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν, εὑρήσει «προνοίας ἕνεκα τὴν διαφοραν τῆς μορφῆς παρηλλαγμένην ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐμαστῶς σκόπει γὰρ» εἰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἅπαντες ἔσωζον ἀπαραλλάκτως χαρακτῆρα, πέση σύγχυσις τῶν πραγμάτῶν ἐγίνετο; πόση δὲ ἄγνοια καὶ σκότος κατεῖχε τὸν ἀνθρω- “τον οὔτε τὸν οἰκεῖον Ὑνωρίζοντα, οὔτε τὸν ἀλλότριον ἢ πολέμιον ἢ ἣ Φαῦλον ἃ ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου καὶ χρηστοῦ διακρίνοντα " πάντα δὲ ἦν ἀληθῶς ὁμοῦ χρήματα, κατὰ ᾿λναξαγόραν. τούτου γὰρ οὕτως ὄντος, οὐδὲν, ἐκώλυεν ἀδελφαῖς καὶ μητρᾶσι συγγίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ ἀρπαίζειν, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ἀδικεῖν ἐμφανῶς. εἰ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν μόνον διέφυγεν" οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὀφθεὶς ἐγνωρίσθη μετὰ ταῦτα. οὐδ᾽ ἂν νόμος ἢ πολιτεία συνετάττετο" οὐδὲ πατέρες καὶ παῖδες ἀλλήλους ἐγίνωσκον " οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι συνέστη τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὠνθρωπον" τυφλὸς γὰρ ἂν ἣν ἕνεκα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁ ὄ ἄνθρωπος» μικρὰ τοῦ βλέπειν ΠῚ, Φ Α, γλ., 8, ἰδὲ αὐτῷ παρεχομένου" πλὲν γὰρ ἡλικίας καὶ μεγέθους οὐδὲν ἰὼ ἄλλο διεγίνωσιε. τοσούτων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία γέγονεν σερόνοια, ποικίλλουσα τὴν μορφὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ παντὸς καὶ πανταχῆ» καὶ μηδένα χρόνον τοῦ ποιεῖν τοῦτο παραλείπουσα, ὃ καὶ μέγιστέν ἐστι τεκμήριον τοῦ τυγχάνειν προγοίχς καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, εἰ μέχρι καὶ τοῦ τύπου τῆς “. διαπλάσεως τοῦ χαρακτῆρος καὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἕκαστος γνωρίς ὦται, εἰ καὶ μὴ. ὶ δ᾽ ἀκριβείας τὸ τοιοῦτον ᾿Φυλωσανται, ὡς τῆς μορφῆς αρπούσης. ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο προςέθηκὲν ἡμῖν ἡὶ πρόνοια, τὴν τῶν χρωμάτων διαφορὰν, ἵνα πολυτρόπως βοηθῆται τῆς; ἀνθρωπίνης Φύσεως ἡ ἡ ἀασθένειαι. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τὰ πολλὲ τῶν ζώων, τῶν κατ᾽ εἶδος ὁμόσχη- μένων, οἷόν ἐστι κορώνη καὶ κόραξ, ἔχειν τινὰς κατὰ τὴν πρόζοψιν διαφορὰς» αἷς γνωρίζει κατὰ συωγίαν ἀλληλα. κορῶναι μμ καὶ κόρακες φυγῆι θνναι μὲν πολλοὶ πολ» λάκις" χωρίζονται δὲ κατὰ συζυγίαν, ἑκάστης καὶ ἑκάστου γνωριζόντων τὸν σύζυγον. πῶς δ᾽ ἄν ἐγίνωσκον ἀλλήλους, εἰ ἰ μή τις » ἐν ἑκάστῳ χαρακτὴρ αν ν» ἤμνν μὲν οὐκ εὐκριγὴς, εὐσύνοπτος δὲ Φυσριῶς τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι; καὶ τὰ σύμβολα δὲ καὶ φῆμαι καὶ κληδόνες καὶ διοσημοῖχι γ (πρὸς ἕλ-. ληνας γὰρ ὁ λάγος») κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον λόγον, εἷς αὐτοί {ασὶ, τῶν δηλουμένων ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν τὰς ἐκβάσεις διασώδουσαι, παν- 'σὼς ποὺ προνοίας λόγῳ κατασημαίμουσιγ καὶ τοῖς σήμαιῖνδο “μένοις τας ἐκβάσεις ἐπαληθεύουσιν.,. ### English translation (Claude) That man is free, over what he is free, and for what reason he was made free, has been sufficiently said in what precedes. But since not everyone who intends to murder actually murders, but sometimes he murders and sometimes not, his choice being hindered and not running to its aim, and we said that providence, not fate, is the cause of this, the discussion of providence follows on that of what is in our power. This too is divided into three: first, whether there is providence; second, what it is; third, of what it is. A Jew would not be ignorant of providence even if he were mad, knowing the wonders in Egypt and having heard of those in the wilderness, in which providence appeared to men more clearly than visible things; and having understood many works of providence among the prophets and in Babylon, which admit no doubt at all. All these things teach Christians too that providence exists, but above all the most divine work of providence, the most incredible for its exceeding love for man, God's taking a body for our sake. But since the argument is not addressed to these alone but also to the Greeks, come, let us show that providence exists from other things which they believe. That there is providence one could show by the same arguments by which we showed that there is a God. The continuance of all things, especially of those in generation and corruption; the position and order of beings, always kept in the same way; the courses of the stars, never varying at all; the cycle of the year, the return of the seasons, and the yearly equality of nights and days, each growing and diminishing in turn by neither less nor greater measure: how could these have continued to be carried through alike if no one exercised providence? Moreover the punishment that follows sins, or rather the very disclosure of sins, when, though there is no one able to convict, they are brought to light by certain circumstances, shows that there is providence. The writings of the Hebrews and the literature of the Greeks are full of such stories. Of this kind is what Scripture tells of Susanna's suffering, and among the Greeks the story of Ibycus the poet. When he was being murdered by some men and had no ally or witness of the plot, he saw cranes and said, “You cranes, avenge my murder.” The city was searching for the murderers and could not find them; then, when a play was being performed and the people were seated, cranes flew over; and the murderers, seeing them, laughed and said, “Look, the avengers of Ibycus.” One of those sitting near heard and reported it to the magistrates, and the men were arrested and confessed the murder. A great many other such things are recorded among the ancients, and if anyone wished to collect them he would extend the discussion to infinite length. If the same kind of exposure is not brought on all sinners, but some seem to escape, let no one for this reason deny providence. For it does not take care of men in one way only, but in many and various ways. Not least does the construction and proportion of the bodies in generation and corruption, always kept alike, show that there is providence. For in every part of the body the forethought of providence appears, which the diligent can gather from various writings. The variety of colours in animals, always keeping the same beauty, cries out that there is providence. And what is commonly agreed among all men, that one should pray and serve the divine with offerings and sacred precincts, is evidence of providence; for if the universe were without providence, how, or to whom, would anyone pray? The zeal for doing good, naturally cultivated by those not perverted, shows providence too; for expecting the reward from it, we choose to do good even to those who cannot repay. If providence is abolished, injustice is permitted to those able to do wrong, and almsgiving and the fear of God are abolished, and with them virtue and piety. For if God exercises no providence, he neither punishes, nor gives prizes to those who do well, nor keeps harm from the wronged. Who then would still worship a God who contributes nothing to us in anything? Prophecy too and all foreknowledge are abolished. But these things do not agree with what happens almost every day. There are many appearances of the divine in times of need; much help is given to the sick through dreams; many foreknowledges have been brought forth in each generation; and many who have committed murder or done something lawless are terrified by night and by day. Besides, God is good; being good, he is beneficent; and if beneficent, provident. Why need we speak of the works of creation, its proportion, harmony, position, order, and the use each part provides to the whole; how it could not be well otherwise than it is now; and how it neither admits addition nor can any of the things that are be lacking, but all are perfect and good, made wisely and providently? But let us put off the account of these to the discussion of creation, so as not to suffer what many who have written about providence have suffered. They praise creation instead of providence; creation leads us to the discussion of providence, but differs greatly from it. Providence and creation are not the same. It belongs to creation to make well the things that come to be, to providence to take good care of the things that have come to be; and these do not always exist together, as can be seen from the men of each art and method. Some of them go no further than making well and take no further thought, such as builders, painters and sculptors; others only take care and provide, such as cowherds and shepherds. So in the discussion of creation we would properly show that the things made were made well, and in the discussion of providence that after their making they also receive due care. How, then, is man always born of man and ox of ox, and each thing growing from its own seed and not from another, if providence is absent? If someone says that the matter proceeds in sequence from its original creation, he would be saying that providence always exists together with creation; for that what was created proceeds in sequence shows that providence was laid down together with creation. For the conduct of things after creation belongs to providence; and so he would be saying nothing else than that the same one is both maker and provider of beings. Who, seeing the forms of men differing among so many tens of thousands and nowhere coinciding in everything, would not admire the work, and, reckoning the cause, find that the difference of form in individuals has been varied for the sake of providence? Consider: if all kept the same character without variation, how great a confusion of affairs there would be! How great an ignorance and darkness would hold man, recognizing neither his own nor distinguishing the stranger, the enemy or the wicked from the friend and the good! Truly “all things would be together,” as Anaxagoras says. If it were so, nothing would prevent one from having intercourse with sisters and mothers, from robbing, or from doing any other wrong openly, if only he escaped at the moment; for if seen he would not be recognized afterward. No law or polity would be established, fathers and children would not know one another, nor would anything else human hold together; for man would be blind with respect to men, sight giving him little benefit; for apart from age and size he would distinguish nothing else. Of so many goods has providence been the cause for us, varying the form of men always and everywhere and never ceasing to do so; which is also the greatest proof that providence extends to individuals, if each is recognized even down to the shape of his bodily form, his character and his voice, even if such features are not preserved exactly, the form being enough. For providence added this besides, the difference of colours, so that the weakness of human nature might be helped in many ways. I think that many animals too of the same shape in kind, such as the crow and the raven, have certain differences in appearance by which they recognize one another in pairs. Crows and ravens often fly together in flocks, but they separate in pairs, each female and each male recognizing its mate. How would they know one another unless there were in each some mark, not clear to us, but naturally easy to discern for those of the same kind? And signs, omens, voices and portents (for the argument is with Greeks), according to their own account, as they themselves say, preserving the outcomes of what they signify, surely give signs by way of providence and confirm the outcomes for those who receive the signs. ### Scripture references - Exod 7:3: allusion, medium confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Sus 44–62 (Susanna): allusion, high confidence - Anaxagoras, fr. 1 (Anaxagoras): quotation, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Matthaei's apparatus and Latin notes have been removed after “differing among so many tens of thousands”. - The wonders in Egypt and in the wilderness (Exod 7–17); the prophets and Babylon (e.g. Dan 3, 6). Susanna: Sus 44–62. The story of Ibycus and the cranes is told also by Plutarch (De garr. 14). Anaxagoras, fr. 1 (“all things were together”). - The argument that without distinct faces one could not avoid intercourse with sisters and mothers is given as written. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 42 (Matthaei, 331-343; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/42). ## Matthaei, chapter 43 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/39/#p-43 - Source: Matthaei, 343-344 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius defines providence as God's care and will for all things and shows that the Maker is also the Provider. ### Greek text Ὅτι μέν ἐστι πρόνοια, διὰ τε τούτων ὁῆλον καὶ διᾺὶ σῶν ἑξῆς ῥηθησομένων. εἴπωμεν δὲ, τί ἐστι πρόνοια. πρόγοια τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένη ἐπιμέλεια. ὁρίζνται δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ οὕτω. πρένοιά ἐστι, βούλησις θεοῦ, δ ἦν πάντα τὰ ὄντα τὸν πρόςῷορον διεξαγωγὴν λαμβάνει. εἰ δὲ θεοῦ βούλησίς ἐστιν καὶ πρόνοιοι» πᾶσα ἀνκγκὴ, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ θεοπρεπέστατα καὶ ὡς ἄν μόνως καλῶς ἔ ἔχοι τὰ γινόμενοι γήνεσθαι, ὡς τὴν κρείττω ταῖν μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι. ἐνάγκη δὲ καὶ, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ποιητὴν τῶν ὄντων καὶ προνοητήν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀκόλονθον, οὔτε πρέπον, ἄλλον μὲν ποιεῖν, ἄλλον δὲ τῶν γενομένων «ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πάντως ὁρῶται τὸ τοιοῦτον. πολλὴ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ἐμῷασις, ἐναπόκειται τῶν εἰρημέγων, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ γεννηθέντος " ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, καθ᾽ ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστι» προνοεῖ" τὰ δὲ μὴ προνοοῦντα., δὲ ἀσθένειαν οὐ προνοεῖ. δέδεικται οὖν θεὲς μὲν ὧν ὁ προνοητὴς, πρόνοιω δὲ καὶ βούλησις αὐτοῦ. ### English translation (Claude) That there is providence is clear from these things and from what will be said next. Let us say what providence is. Providence, then, is the care that comes from God to the things that are. They define it also thus: providence is the will of God by which all things that are receive their suitable conduct. If providence is the will of God, it is altogether necessary that the things that come about should come about according to right reason, most excellently and most worthily of God, and as alone they could well be, so as to admit nothing better. It is necessary too that the same one be maker and provider of the things that are; for it is neither consistent nor fitting that one should make and another take care of what has been made, for such a thing is seen only in weakness. There is a clear indication of this in animals too: every creature that begets takes care of the feeding of its offspring; and man provides for all other things of life too, as far as he can; and those that do not provide fail to provide through weakness. It has been shown, then, that God is the provider, and that providence is his will. ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 43 (Matthaei, 343-344; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/43). ## Matthaei, chapter 44 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/nemesius-natura-hominis/44/#p-44 - Source: Matthaei, 344-349 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Nemesius reports Plato's threefold providence, rejects the second providence of the heavenly gods as fate, and begins to refute the Stoics, the Epicureans, Aristotle, Euripides and Menander, who deny providence over individuals. ### Greek text τί μὲν (οὖν) ἐστι πρόνοια, καὶ τί ἐστιν, εἴρηται" λεί- “πεται δὲ εἰπεῖν, τήγων ἐστὶ πρόνοια ν πότερον τῶν καθόλσυ, ἢ τῶν καθ' ε ἑκάστα, ἡ τῶν καθόχου καὶ τῶν καθ'᾿ ἕκαστα. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ καθύλου, καὶ τοὶ κωθ' ἕκαστα πρόνοιαν διοριθῖν βούλεται, διαιρῶν τὸν τῆς προνοίας λόγον εἰς τρία. πρώτην μὲν γάρ. εἶναι» τὴν τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ" φρονοεῖν δὲ τοῦτον προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἰδεῶν, ε ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμπαντος τοῦ καθόλου κόσμου, οἷον, οὐρανοῦ Ὁ καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάντων τῶν καθόλου, τουτέστι, τῶν γενῶν, οὐσίας τὰ καὶ ποσότητος καὶ ποιότητος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὑποτεταγμένων εἰδῶν" τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τῶν ἀτίμων ζώων τε καὶ Φυτῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, τοὺς δευτέρους θεοὺς, τοὺς τὸν οὐρανὸν περιπον λοῦντας, προνοεῖν. καὶ ᾿Αριστοτέλης δὲ τὴν τούτων γένεσιν ἐἀνατίθησιν ἡλίῳ καὶ τῷ ζωδιακῶ κύκλῳ. - τῆς δὲ διεξαγωἧς καὶ τοῦ τέλους τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν κατ τὸν βίον, τῶν τε φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν τε καὶ ὀργανι» κῶν καλουμένων ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀντικειμένων. πὴν τρίτην εἶναι πρόνοιαν Πλάτων ἀποφαίνεται. ττροΐστασθαν δὲ ταύτης τινὰς τεταγμένους δαίμονας "τερὶ τὴν γὴν. Φύλακας τῶν ἀνθρωπύων πράξεων. “εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴ δευτέρου καὶ τὴ τρίτη προνοίᾳ τὸ εἶναι παροὶ τῆς τιρώτης, οἷς δυνάμει σαντα παρὰ ποὺ πρώτου θεοῦ διοικεῖσθαι, τοῦ τάξαντος καὶ τοὺς δευτέρους καὶ τοὺς τρίτους πτρονοητάς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναφέρειν εἰς θεὸν τὰ πάντα καὶ τῆς ἐκδίνου βουλήσεως λέγειν διερτῆσθαι πᾶσαν πρόνοιαν, ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν" οὐκότε δὲ καὶ τὸ δευτέραν λέγειν πρόνοιαν, τοὺς τὸν οὐρανὸν πτερίπολοῦντας. οὐ γὰρ πρόνοια τὸ γοόμενον, ἀλλ᾿ εἱμαρμένη καὶ ἀνάγκη. ὅπως γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι συσχηματίζωνται» ἀναγκὴ καὶ τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι" τῶν δὲ κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὐδὲν ὑποπίπτειν ἀνάγκη» πάλαι δέδεικται. οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ Φιλόσοφοι τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν πρεσβεύοντες, οὐδὲ μίαν χώραν τῇ προνοίο, καταλείπουσιν" ἀλλὰ ταῖς ὠλογθείαις καὶ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀναιροῦσιν, ὡς ἐδείχ,θη στρότερον. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἡραηλειτος καὶ ᾿Επίκουρος οὔτε τῶν καθόλου, οὔτε τῶν κωθ' ἕπαστα πρόνοιαν εἶναι βούλονται. ᾿Επίκουρος γοῦν ἔλεγε, τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρ-. τὸν οὔὗτο αὐτὸ πρώγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει. ὡςτε οὔτε ὀργαῖς, οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται" ἐν ἀσθενείῳ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὀργὴ (γὰρ) θεῶν ἀλλότριον. ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀβουλήτῳ γίνεται" θεῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀβούλητον. οὗτοι μὴν οὖν ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς ἰδίαις ὠρχαῖς. ἐξ αὐτομάτου γὰρ ἡγούμενοι τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο συστῆναι; εἰκότως ἀπρονόητα Φάσκουσιν εἶναι τὰ πάντα. ὧν γαρ οὐδείς ἐστι δημιουργὸς » τοῦτῶν τίς ἂν εἴη προνοητής; δῆλον γὰρ» ὡς αὐτομώτως ἀνάγκη Φέρεσθαι τὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτομάτως γενόμενα. δεῖ τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν πρώτην αὐτοῖς ἐνστῆναι δόξαν. ταύτης γὰρ δναιρουμένης,ν ἀρκέσει τὰ προῤῥηθέντα εἰς ἀπόδειξιν. τοῦ πρόγοιαν εἶναι Φυλάξαντες οὖν ποῖς οἰκείοις καιροῖς τὸν τούτων ἔλεγχον, ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὴν ᾿Αριστοτέλους δόξαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τῶν ἀπρονόητα λεγόντων τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. καὶ γὰρ ᾿Αριστοτέλης ὑπὸ τῆς Φύσεως ἡμῖν διοικεῖσθαι βούλεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος. ὡς ἐν τῷ ἔκτῳ τῶν νικομαχείων ἠθικῶν ὑπηνίξατο. ταύτην γὰρ θείαν οὖσαν καὶ τοῖς γενητοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχουσαν, ἑκάστῳ Φυσικῶς ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν τῶν συμ- Φερόντων αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν βλαπτόντων Φυγήν. ἕκαστον γὰρ, ὡς εἴρηται, τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν κατάλληλον ἑαυτῷ τροφΦν ἐκλέγεται, καὶ τὸ συμῴέρον μεταδιώκει, καὶ ταῖς ἰωτρείςς τῶν παθῶν Φυσικῶς ἐπίσταταιν Εὐριπίδης δὲ καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν ἐνίοις τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ Φασὶ προνοεῖν ἑκάστου (καὶ ἑαυτοῦ.) θεῶν δὲ μηδένα. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν νοῦς τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστε μόνων" ἢ γὰρ τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, ἢ τῆς θεωρίας" καὶ δὲ πρόνοια, τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖνν ὡς τοῦ πλουτεῖν καὶ μὴ, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ μὴ» ὧν οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ὁ νοῦς δύναται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ καὶ Φύσις, ὡς ᾿Αριστοτέλης δοκεῖ, εὔδηλα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τὴς Φύσεως ἔργα. τί δὲ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὴν Φύσιν, τὸ ποτὲ μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι τὸν (ονέα» ### English translation (Claude) That there is providence, and what it is, has been said. It remains to say of what providence is: of universals, or of particulars, or of both universals and particulars. Plato holds that providence extends to both universals and particulars, dividing the account of providence into three. The first, he says, is that of the first God, who provides primarily for the Ideas, and then for the whole universal world, such as heaven, the stars, and all universals, that is, the genera, substance, quantity, quality and the like, and the species subordinate to them. Over the generation of mortal animals and plants and all things in generation and corruption the second gods, who go round the heaven, exercise providence (Aristotle too ascribes their generation to the sun and the zodiac). The third providence, Plato declares, is over the conduct and end of things to be done and the order of things in life, of natural goods and of the so-called material and instrumental goods, and of their opposites; and over this are set certain spirits stationed about the earth as guardians of human actions. The second and third providences, he says, have their being from the first, so that all things are governed by the power of the first God, who appointed both the second and the third providers. To refer all things to God and to say that all providence depends on his will deserves praise; but not so to call the gods who go round the heaven a second providence. For what happens through them is not providence but fate and necessity; for however they are configured, what happens must happen and cannot be otherwise; but it was shown long ago that nothing that is according to providence falls under necessity. The Stoic philosophers, honouring fate and what is in our power, leave no room for providence; and by the consequences of their view they abolish what is in our power too, as was shown earlier. Democritus, Heraclitus and Epicurus hold that there is providence neither of universals nor of particulars. Epicurus, at least, said: “What is blessed and imperishable neither has trouble itself nor gives it to another, so that it is held neither by anger nor by favour; for all such things are in weakness.” For anger is foreign to the gods, since it arises over what is unwanted, and nothing is unwanted to God. These men follow their own principles; for, thinking that this universe came together by chance, they naturally say that all things are without providence. Of things that have no maker, who could be the provider? For it is clear that things that came about by chance in the beginning must be carried along by chance. We must, then, oppose their first opinion; for when it is refuted, what was said before will suffice to prove that there is providence. Keeping their refutation for its proper place, let us come to the opinion of Aristotle and of the others who say that particulars are without providence. Aristotle holds that particular things are governed for us by nature, as he hinted in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics; for nature, being divine and present in all created things, naturally suggests to each the choice of what is advantageous and the avoidance of what is harmful. For each animal, as has been said, chooses the food suited to it, pursues what is advantageous, and naturally knows the cures of its affections. Euripides and Menander in some places say that the mind in each one provides for each, and for itself, and that none of the gods does. But the mind is concerned only with what is in our power, either things to be done and the arts, or contemplation; while providence is concerned with what is not in our power, such as being rich or not, and being healthy or not, none of which the mind can bring about; nor can nature, as Aristotle thinks, for the works of nature too are evident. What has it to do with mind or nature that sometimes the murderer is punished … ### Extrabiblical texts - Plato (Plato (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Epicurus, Rat. sent. 1 (Epicurus (sayings and fragments)): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Euripides (Euripides (plays and fragments)): allusion, low confidence - Menander (Menander (fragments)): allusion, low confidence ### Translation notes - The staged text breaks off in the middle of a sentence; the rest of the chapter is not in this OCR text and is marked “…”. - Plato's threefold providence follows Middle Platonist interpretation (cf. Ps.-Plutarch, De fato 9). Epicurus, Ratae sententiae 1 (quoted). Aristotle, Eth. nic. 6 (Nemesius's reference). Euripides and Menander: lines on the mind as one's god (cf. Euripides, fr. 1018 Nauck; Menander, Monost. 434). ### Citation (SBL) Nemesius, Nat. hom. 44 (Matthaei, 344-349; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/p/nemesius-natura-hominis/44).