On the Nature of Man 44

That there is providence, and what it is, has been said. It remains to say of what providence is: of universals, or of particulars, or of both universals and particulars. Plato holds that providence extends to both universals and particulars, dividing the account of providence into three. The first, he says, is that of the first God, who provides primarily for the Ideas, and then for the whole universal world, such as heaven, the stars, and all universals, that is, the genera, substance, quantity, quality and the like, and the species subordinate to them. Over the generation of mortal animals and plants and all things in generation and corruption the second gods, who go round the heaven, exercise providence (Aristotle too ascribes their generation to the sun and the zodiac). The third providence, Plato declares, is over the conduct and end of things to be done and the order of things in life, of natural goods and of the so-called material and instrumental goods, and of their opposites; and over this are set certain spirits stationed about the earth as guardians of human actions. The second and third providences, he says, have their being from the first, so that all things are governed by the power of the first God, who appointed both the second and the third providers. To refer all things to God and to say that all providence depends on his will deserves praise; but not so to call the gods who go round the heaven a second providence. For what happens through them is not providence but fate and necessity; for however they are configured, what happens must happen and cannot be otherwise; but it was shown long ago that nothing that is according to providence falls under necessity. The Stoic philosophers, honouring fate and what is in our power, leave no room for providence; and by the consequences of their view they abolish what is in our power too, as was shown earlier. Democritus, Heraclitus and Epicurus hold that there is providence neither of universals nor of particulars. Epicurus, at least, said: “What is blessed and imperishable neither has trouble itself nor gives it to another, so that it is held neither by anger nor by favour; for all such things are in weakness.” For anger is foreign to the gods, since it arises over what is unwanted, and nothing is unwanted to God. These men follow their own principles; for, thinking that this universe came together by chance, they naturally say that all things are without providence. Of things that have no maker, who could be the provider? For it is clear that things that came about by chance in the beginning must be carried along by chance. We must, then, oppose their first opinion; for when it is refuted, what was said before will suffice to prove that there is providence. Keeping their refutation for its proper place, let us come to the opinion of Aristotle and of the others who say that particulars are without providence. Aristotle holds that particular things are governed for us by nature, as he hinted in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics; for nature, being divine and present in all created things, naturally suggests to each the choice of what is advantageous and the avoidance of what is harmful. For each animal, as has been said, chooses the food suited to it, pursues what is advantageous, and naturally knows the cures of its affections. Euripides and Menander in some places say that the mind in each one provides for each, and for itself, and that none of the gods does. But the mind is concerned only with what is in our power, either things to be done and the arts, or contemplation; while providence is concerned with what is not in our power, such as being rich or not, and being healthy or not, none of which the mind can bring about; nor can nature, as Aristotle thinks, for the works of nature too are evident. What has it to do with mind or nature that sometimes the murderer is punished …