Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis 13–16

‘And let them be for signs and for seasons and for days and for years.’ It seems to me that by saying ‘for signs’ he made plain what he said by ‘and for seasons,’ so that signs and seasons would not be taken as different things. For here he calls seasons those which, by the distinction of intervals, signify that unchangeable eternity abides above them, so that time appears as a sign, that is, as a kind of trace of eternity. Again, when he adds ‘and for days and for years,’ he shows what seasons he meant: days come about by the turning of the fixed stars, while years are evident when the sun completes the circle of the zodiac, and more obscure when each of the wandering stars does so in its own orbit. For he did not say ‘and for months,’ perhaps because a month is a year of the moon, just as twelve years of the moon are a year of the star which the Greeks call Phaethon, and thirty years of the sun a year of the star which is called Phainon. And perhaps, when all the stars have returned to the same point, the great year is completed, about which many have said much. Or does he say ‘for signs,’ by which a sure course of sailing is indicated, and ‘for seasons,’ such as the season of spring and summer and autumn and winter, since these too vary with the revolution of the stars and keep their turns and order, while ‘for days and for years’ is to be taken as already explained? ‘And let them be for splendor in the firmament of heaven, to shine upon the earth.’ It had already been said above, ‘Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven, to shine upon the earth’; why do we think it was repeated? Or, just as it was said of plants that they bear seed and that their seed is in them according to their kind and likeness, so here, on the contrary, it is said of the lights, ‘let there be’ and ‘let them be,’ that is, let them come to be and not beget, but themselves be. ‘And so it was done.’ That order is kept. ‘And God made two lights: the greater light for the beginning of the day and the lesser light for the beginning of the night, and the stars.’ What ‘beginning of the day’ and ‘beginning of the night’ mean will soon appear. Whether ‘and the stars,’ which he added, belongs to the beginning of the night or not is ambiguous. Some hold that it is signified here that the moon was first made full, because the full moon rises at the beginning of the night, that is, soon after sunset. But it is absurd that we should take the beginning of the counting not from the first day of the moon but from the sixteenth or fifteenth. Nor let it trouble anyone that a light which was made should have been made complete. For it is complete every day; but its completeness is not seen by men except when it is placed opposite the sun on the contrary side. For even when it stands with the sun, since it is beneath it, it seems to be ended; but even then it is full, because it is lit on the other side and cannot be seen by those who are beneath, that is, who inhabit the earth. This can be taught not in a few words but by subtle discussions and the demonstration of certain visible figures. ‘And God set them in the firmament of heaven, to shine upon the earth.’ How did he say, ‘Let there be in the firmament,’ and how does he now say, ‘God made the lights and set them in the firmament,’ as if they were made outside and afterward set there, when it has already been said that they were to be made there? Or is it signified again and again by this that God did not make things as men are accustomed to, but that it was narrated as it could be to men — namely, that among men ‘he made’ is one thing and ‘he set’ another, but with God both are the same, who sets by making and makes by setting? ‘And let them rule the day and the night and divide between the day and the night.’ This is what had been said, ‘the beginning of the day and the beginning of the night,’ which he explains here by saying, ‘let them rule the day and the night.’ So we must understand that ‘beginning’ as rule, because in the day nothing among the things that are seen is more excellent than the sun, and at night nothing more than the moon or the stars. So that ambiguity need no longer trouble us, and let us believe that the stars were so set as to belong to the beginning, that is, the rule, of the night. ‘And God saw that it was good.’ The same order is kept. Let us remember, indeed, that God did not name these either, though it could have been said, ‘And God called the lights stars,’ since not every light is a star. ‘And evening came and morning came, a fourth day.’ If you consider these days which the rising and setting of the sun mark off, this is not the fourth but perhaps the first day — so that we may suppose that the sun rose at the time it was made, and set before the other stars were made. But whoever understands that the sun is elsewhere when it is night with us, and that it is night elsewhere when the sun is with us, will investigate the counting of these days at a higher level.

‘And God said: Let the waters bring forth creeping things of living souls, and flying things flying over the earth under the firmament of heaven. And so it was done.’ Are the swimming animals called creeping things because they do not walk on feet, or because there are others that creep on the ground under the water? For there are others in the waters that have fins, such as fish that have scales, or others that do not have them but still move by fins. Whether these are to be counted among the flying things in this place can be doubted. For why he assigned even the flying things to the waters, not to the air, is no small question. For we cannot take here only those birds to which the waters are familiar, such as divers and ducks and any of this kind. For if he had spoken only of these, he would not have failed to speak elsewhere of the other birds, among which some are so far removed from water that they do not even drink. Unless perhaps he called water this air which is next to the earth, since it shows itself to be moist even on the clearest nights by the dew, and because it is also condensed into cloud. And a cloud is water, as all perceive who have happened to walk among the clouds on mountains, or among the mists in the plains. It is in this air, indeed, that birds are said to fly. For in that higher and purer air, which is called air in the true sense by all, they cannot; for by its thinness it does not support their weight. In that air, it is asserted, neither do clouds form nor does anything stormy arise, since there is so little wind there that on the summit of Mount Olympus, which is said to rise above the region of this moist air, certain letters are reported to be customarily made in the dust and to be found a year later whole and undamaged by those who used to climb that mountain for solemn rites. Therefore it can, not absurdly, be supposed that the firmament of heaven in the divine scriptures is so called as far as these regions, so that that most tranquil and pure air too is believed to belong to the firmament. For by this name of firmament tranquility itself and a great part of things can be signified. Whence I think also what is said in several places in the Psalms: ‘And your truth reaches to the clouds.’ For nothing is firmer and more serene than truth. And the clouds form beneath that region of most pure air. Although this is taken as said figuratively, it is drawn from things that have a certain likeness to these, so that the more constant and purer bodily creation, which extends from the summit of heaven to the clouds — that is, to the misty, stormy, and moist air — seems rightly to bear the figure of truth. So the flying things flying over the earth under the firmament of heaven are fittingly assigned to the waters, because this air is not unfittingly called water. From this too we are given to understand that nothing was said of the air, how or when it was made, because this air is included under the name of waters and that other under the name of firmament; and so no element has been omitted. But perhaps someone may say: if from what was said, ‘Let the water be gathered,’ we understand that water was made from that confusion of matter, and God called this gathering sea, how can we understand that this air was made there, since it is not called sea, even if it can be called water? Therefore it seems to me that in what was said, ‘Let the dry land appear,’ not only the appearance of the earth but also that of this thicker air was presented. For through it the earth is lit so as to be visible to us. In the one word, then, by which it was said, ‘let it appear,’ all the things without which it could not appear were intimated: that is, its form, and its being laid bare of the waters, and the pouring over it of air, through which light is transmitted to it from the higher part of the world. Or rather, in what is written, ‘Let the water be gathered,’ is the form of this air presented, since this air, when condensed, seems to produce this water? Perhaps, then, he called the compression into density the gathering of the water, so that the sea would come to be, so that what is not gathered, that is, not thickened, and is spread above, would be water which could support flying birds, suited to both names, so that it can be called both thinner water and thicker air. But why is it not said when this was made? Or perhaps it is true, as some hold, that these breezes are produced by moist exhalations of sea and earth, so much thicker than that higher, clear air as to be suited to carrying flying birds, and so much finer than these waters in which the body is washed that by comparison with them they are felt to be dry and airy? And since he had already spoken of earth and sea, what need was there to speak of their exhalations, that is, of the waters of the birds, when you have understood that purest and most tranquil air to be assigned to the firmament? For neither was it said how springs and rivers were made. For those who inquire into and discuss these things more scrupulously say that a sweet vapor is drawn invisibly from the sea by an ethereal gliding above it, by ascents which we can in no way perceive; that from it the clouds are massed together, and so the earth, soaked with rains, trickles and sweats into its hidden caves as much as, gathered and flowing through various channels, bursts out into springs, either small or fit to produce rivers. As proof of this they cite that the vapor of boiled sea water, caught in a curved lid, offers a sweet moisture to those who taste it. And it is plain to almost everyone that diminished springs feel the lack of rains. Divine history also bears witness, when Elijah asked for rain in a time of drought; for while he himself prayed, he ordered Elisha to watch toward the sea. When he saw a very small cloud rising from it, he announced to the anxious king that rain was coming, by which he too was soon drenched as he fled. And David says: ‘Lord, who call the water of the sea and pour it out upon the face of the earth.’ So, the sea having been named, it would be superfluous to speak of other waters, whether these dewy ones which by their thinness give breezes to flying birds, or those of springs and rivers, if the former arise from exhalations and the latter flow from the returning rains which the earth absorbs.

‘Let the waters bring forth creeping things of living souls.’ Why was ‘living’ added? Can there be souls unless they live? Or did he wish to point to that more evident life which is in sentient animals, since plants lack it? ‘And flying things flying over the earth under the firmament of heaven.’ If flying things do not fly in that purest air where no clouds arise, it is plain from this that that air belongs to the firmament, since it is said that flying things fly over the earth under the firmament of heaven. ‘And so it was done.’ That order is kept, and therefore it is added as in the rest, except for the light, which was made first. ‘And God made great sea monsters and every soul of creeping animals which the waters brought forth according to their kind, and every winged flying thing according to its kind.’ Let us remember indeed that ‘according to its kind’ is said of those creatures which are renewed by propagation from seed; for this was already said of grasses and trees. ‘And every winged flying thing.’ Why was ‘winged’ added? Can there be a flying thing which has no wings? But if there can be, did God not make this kind, since it is not found where it was made? Or can anything at all fly without wings? For bats and locusts and flies, and anything of this kind which lacks feathers, does not lack wings. But ‘winged’ was added lest we understand birds alone, since fish have fins and fly over the earth beneath the waters; therefore it was not said ‘birds,’ but generally ‘winged flying thing.’ ‘And God saw that it was good.’ This too is to be understood as in the other places. ‘And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply and fill the waters of the sea; and let the flying things be multiplied upon the earth.’ He meant the blessing to serve fruitfulness, which appears in the succession of offspring, so that by that blessing those creatures which were created weak and mortal might preserve their kind by being born. But since plants too keep the likeness of those that pass away by being born, why did he not bless them? Is it because they lack sense, which is close to reason? For perhaps it is not without purpose that God uses the second person in blessing, so as in a way to address these animals as if they heard, saying: ‘Increase and multiply and fill the waters of the sea.’ Yet he is not found in the same person to the end of the blessing; for there follows: ‘And let the flying things be multiplied upon the earth’; he did not say, ‘Multiply upon the earth.’ Unless perhaps by this very fact it is signified that the sense of animals is not so close to reason that it can perfectly receive one who addresses it, as those beings can which understand and can use reason. ‘And it was done so.’ Here plainly anyone, however slow, ought now to wake up and understand what kind of days these are that are counted. For since God gave animals fixed numbers in their seeds, keeping a wonderful constancy by a fixed ordering, so that each according to its kind carries what it has conceived in the womb, and warms the eggs it has laid, for a fixed number of days — an ordinance of nature preserved by the Wisdom of God, who reaches mightily from end to end and orders all things sweetly — how could they in one day both conceive and grow heavy in the womb and warm and nourish what was born and fill the waters of the sea and multiply upon the earth? For so it is added: ‘and so it was done,’ before the coming of evening. But surely, when he says, ‘evening came,’ he refers to formless matter; and when he says, ‘morning came,’ to the form which was impressed on matter by the working itself. For in this way, after the working, he concludes the day as completed. Yet God did not say, ‘Let there be evening,’ or ‘Let there be morning’; for it is a very brief recalling of the things made, matter and form being signified by evening and morning, which it had already been said that God made; whereas the defect itself — when there is a tending from form to matter and to nothing — if we rightly think it is presented by the name of night, he did not say was made, but only ordered by God, when he said above, ‘God divided between the light and the darkness.’ So by the word evening formless matter is signified, which, although it was made from nothing, nevertheless is and has the capacity for appearances and forms. By the name of darkness can also be understood that very nothing which God did not make and from which he made whatever he deigned to make in his ineffable goodness, since he is almighty, who made so great things even from nothing. ‘And evening came and morning came, a fifth day.’ Here, after he said, ‘And so it was done,’ he did not add, as he usually does, the execution, as if they were made again; for it had already been said above. Nor by that blessing which concerns the begetting of offspring was any new nature being fashioned; rather, the things that had been made were preserved by succession. And therefore it was not said either, ‘And God saw that it was good’; for the thing itself had already pleased him, which only had to be preserved in its offspring. So nothing is repeated here except his saying, ‘And it was done so’; and at once evening and morning are added, by whose naming it has been said that the completed works are signified, from formless matter and the form imposed on it — unless perhaps something better and loftier occurs to those who inquire. ‘And God said: Let the earth bring forth the living soul according to its kind: of four-footed animals and serpents and beasts of the earth according to kind, and cattle according to kind. And it was done so.’ Why ‘living’ was added when ‘soul’ had been said, and what ‘according to kind’ means, and the usual conclusion in which it is said, ‘And it was done so,’ must be considered and taken as discussed above. But although in the Latin language every irrational animal is generally signified by the name of beasts, here the species must be distinguished, so that by four-footed animals we understand all beasts of burden, by serpents all creeping things, by beasts or wild animals all untamed four-footed animals, and by cattle the four-footed animals which do not help by working but give some produce to those who pasture them.

‘And God made the beasts of the earth according to kind, and the cattle according to kind, and all the serpents of the earth according to kind.’ This repetition, in that it was said, ‘And God made,’ when it had already been said, ‘And it was done so,’ should be considered according to the earlier rule. Here, indeed, I think that by the name of cattle all four-footed animals are signified which live under the care of men. ‘And God saw that it was good’: to be taken in the usual way. ‘And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness.’ Here too a certain joining and distinguishing of living things must be noticed. For he says that man was made on the same day as the beasts; for all earthly living things belong together. And yet, because of the excellence of reason, according to which man is made to the image and likeness of God, he is spoken of separately, after the conclusion about the other earthly animals has been made in the usual way by saying, ‘And God saw that it was good.’ We must also consider that in the other cases God said, ‘Let there be, and it was made,’ but here God said, ‘Let us make,’ so that in this way too the Holy Spirit wished to convey the pre-eminence of human nature. And to whom was ‘Let us make’ said now, if not to the one to whom ‘Let there be’ was said in the other cases? For ‘all things were made through him, and without him nothing was made.’ But why do we think ‘Let there be’ was said in one way, unless that he should make at the Father's command; and ‘Let us make’ in another, unless that both should make together? Or does the Father make all that he makes through the Son, and was ‘Let us make’ said now so that it might be shown to man himself, for whose sake scripture itself was made, in himself, that what the Son makes at the Father's word the Father himself also makes — so that what was said in the other cases, ‘Let there be, and it was made,’ is explained here: that the speaking was not separate and the making separate, but both together, when it is said here, ‘Let us make’? ‘And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness.’ Every image is like that of which it is the image; yet not everything that is like something is also its image. As in a mirror and a painting, because they are images, they are also like; yet if one was not born of the other, neither of them can be called the image of the other. For it is an image when it is expressed from something. Why, then, when it had been said ‘to the image,’ was ‘and likeness’ added, as if there could be an unlike image? It would therefore be enough to say ‘to the image.’ Or is ‘like’ one thing and ‘likeness’ another, as ‘chaste’ is one thing and ‘chastity’ another, ‘brave’ one thing and ‘bravery’ another, so that, just as whatever things are brave are brave by bravery, and whatever things are chaste are chaste by chastity, so whatever things are like are like by likeness? But our image is not quite properly said to be our likeness, though it is properly said to be like us; so that that likeness by which whatever things are like are like is there where chastity also is, by which whatever things are chaste are chaste. And chastity is chaste by participation in nothing, but by participation in it whatever things are chaste are chaste. This surely is in God, where also is that Wisdom which is not wise by participating, but by participation in which every soul that is wise is wise. Therefore the Likeness of God too, through whom all things were made, is properly called Likeness, because he is like not by participation in some likeness, but is himself the first Likeness, by participation in whom whatever things God made through him are like. So perhaps it is an explanation that ‘to the likeness’ was added when ‘to the image’ had already been said: to show that what was called the image is not like God as participating in some likeness, but is itself the Likeness in which all things participate that are said to be like. Just as chastity is there, by participation in which souls are chaste, and wisdom, by participation in which souls are wise, and beauty, by participation in which whatever things are beautiful are beautiful. For if he said only ‘likeness,’ he would not signify that it was begotten of him; but if he said only ‘image,’ he would signify that it was begotten of him, but would not signify that it was so like as to be not only like but Likeness itself. And as nothing is more chaste than chastity itself, nothing wiser than wisdom itself, and nothing more beautiful than beauty itself, so nothing more like than Likeness itself can be said or thought or be at all. Whence it is understood that his Likeness is so like the Father as to fill his nature most fully and most perfectly. But how much the Likeness of God, through whom all things were made, avails for imposing form on things — although it surpasses human thoughts most deeply — may nevertheless be estimated in some way if we consider that every nature, whether it presents itself to those who sense or to those who reason, preserves the image of the universe in parts like one another. For rational souls are called wise from the Wisdom of God, and this name is not extended further; for we cannot call any cattle, and much less trees or fire or air or water or earth, wise, although all these too exist, insofar as they exist, through that Wisdom of God. But we call stones and animals and men and angels like one another. And indeed in each single thing: the earth, because it has its parts like one another, comes to be earth; and water, any part of which is like the other parts, could not otherwise have been water; and any amount of air, if it were unlike the rest, could in no way have been air; and a particle of fire or light, because it is not unlike the remaining parts, comes to be what it is. So it can be discerned and understood of each of the stones or trees or of the body of any animal, that they would not exist, not only together with other things of their kind but in their single selves, unless they had parts like one another. And a body is the more beautiful, the more alike its parts are to one another. Further, among souls not only does the friendship of some with others come about through like characters, but also in each soul like actions and virtues, without which there can be no constancy, indicate the happy life. All these things we can call like, but not Likeness itself. Therefore, if the universe consists of things like one another, so that each single thing is whatever it is and all together complete the universe itself, which God both founded and governs, then surely through the supereminent, unchangeable, and undefilable Likeness of him who founded all things, such things were made that they are beautiful by parts like one another; yet not all things were made to that Likeness itself, but only the rational substance. Therefore all things were made through it, but not all to it. The rational substance, then, was made both through it and to it; for no nature is interposed, since the human mind — which it does not perceive except when it is most pure and most blessed — cleaves to nothing but the Truth itself, which is called the Likeness and Image of the Father and his Wisdom. Rightly, then, ‘Let us make man to our image and likeness’ is taken according to what is inner and principal in man, that is, according to the mind. For man as a whole is to be judged from that which holds the rule in man, which separates him from the beasts. The other things in him, although they are beautiful in their own kind, are nevertheless shared with the cattle and are therefore to be little regarded in man. Unless perhaps the fact that the shape of the human body is upright for looking at heaven also counts for something, so that the body itself may be believed to have been made to the likeness of God: that, just as that Likeness is not turned away from the Father, so the human body is not turned away from heaven, as the bodies of other animals are turned away, since they lie prone on their bellies. Yet this is not to be taken in every respect; for our body differs very greatly from heaven, whereas in that Likeness, which is the Son, there can be nothing unlike him to whom he is like, since whatever other things are like one another are also unlike in some respect, but Likeness itself is not unlike in any respect. The Father is only Father, and the Son is nothing other than Son; for even when he is called the Likeness of the Father, although this shows that no unlikeness intervenes, yet the Father is not alone, if he has a Likeness. ‘And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness.’ What has been said above sufficiently explains these words of scripture, in which we read that God said, ‘Let us make man to our image and likeness,’ in the sense that the Likeness of God to which man was made can be taken as the Word of God himself, that is, the only-begotten Son; not, of course, that man himself is that same Image and Likeness equal to the Father. Yet man too is the image of God, as the apostle shows most plainly, saying: ‘A man ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God.’ But this image, made to the image of God, is not equal and coeternal with him whose image it is; nor would it be, even if it had never sinned at all. But that sense is rather to be chosen in these divine words, that we understand that ‘Let us make man to our image and likeness’ was said not in the singular but in the plural because man was made not to the image of the Father alone, or of the Son alone, or of the Holy Spirit alone, but of the Trinity itself. This Trinity is a Trinity in such a way that it is one God, and is one God in such a way that it is a Trinity. For he did not say, speaking to the Son, ‘Let us make man to your image,’ or ‘to my image,’ but he said in the plural, ‘to our image and likeness’; and who would dare to separate the Holy Spirit from this plurality? Since this plurality is not three gods but one God, we must therefore understand that scripture afterward continued in the singular and said, ‘And God made man to the image of God,’ so that it should not be taken as though God the Father made man to the image of God, that is, of his Son; otherwise, how is what was said, ‘to our image,’ true, if man was made to the image of the Son alone? And so, because what God said, ‘to our image,’ is true, it was said, ‘God made man to the image of God,’ as if it were said, ‘to his own image,’ which is the Trinity itself. But some think that ‘likeness’ was not repeated, and it was not said, ‘And God made man to the image and likeness of God,’ because then he was made only to the image, while the likeness was kept for him afterward, in the resurrection of the dead — as though there could be some image in which there is no likeness. For if it is not like at all, without doubt it is not an image either. But lest we seem to treat this by reason alone, the authority of the apostle James too must be brought in, who, speaking of man's tongue, said: ‘With it we bless God, and with it we curse men, who were made to the likeness of God.’