On Adulterous Marriages 1.1–1.16

The first of the questions, dearest brother Pollentius, which you treated in writing to me as if consulting me, concerns what the apostle says: “To those who are married I command, not I but the Lord, that the wife not depart from her husband; but if she departs, she is to remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband; and the husband is not to put away his wife.” Is this to be taken to mean that he forbade to marry the woman who departed from her husband without the cause of sexual immorality (for that is your view), or, as I understood it in the books I wrote many years ago on the Savior's sermon on the mount according to Matthew, that he commanded those women to remain unmarried who had withdrawn from their husbands for the one cause that is permitted, namely sexual immorality? For it seems to you that a woman who then departs from her husband ought not to marry if she departed without being driven by any sexual immorality of her husband; and you do not notice that, if her husband has given no cause of sexual immorality, she is not to depart and remain unmarried, but is not to depart at all. For certainly, when a woman is commanded to remain unmarried if she departs from her husband, it is not freedom to depart that is taken away, but freedom to marry. If this is so, then permission is given to women who wish to be continent not to wait for any consent of their husbands, so that the words “that the wife not depart from her husband” would seem to be a command to those who can choose, not continence, but the kind of divorce by which they would be allowed to enter into marriage with others. Accordingly, women who have come to love wanting no intercourse and bearing no marriage will be allowed to leave their husbands even without any cause of sexual immorality and, according to the apostle, remain unmarried. And husbands likewise (since the rule is equal for both), if they wish to be continent, will abandon their wives even without their wives' consent and remain without any marriage. For then, as you think, they would be allowed to seek other marriages if the divorce arose from the cause of sexual immorality. But when this cause is absent, it remains, according to what you suppose, that either a spouse does not depart from a spouse, or, if he departs, remains without marriage, or returns to the former marriage. So, where no cause of sexual immorality exists, any spouse will be allowed to choose one of three things: either not to depart from the spouse, or, having departed, to remain so, or, if he does not remain so, not to seek another but to return to the former.

And where then is what the same apostle said, that spouses should not deprive each other of the carnal debt, not even for a time to be free for prayer, except by consent? How will his words remain intact: “But because of sexual immoralities, let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband. Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and likewise the wife to her husband. The wife does not have power over her own body, but the husband; likewise the husband does not have power over his own body, but the wife”? How will this be true, unless it is not permitted for a spouse to be continent against the other spouse's will? For if a woman may leave her husband in such a way as to remain unmarried, it is not her husband but she herself who has power over her body; and the same is understood of the husband. Then, when it is said, “Whoever puts away his wife, except for the cause of sexual immorality, makes her commit adultery,” how are we to understand it, unless a man is forbidden to put away his wife if no cause of sexual immorality has arisen? And it is said why: namely, so that he does not make her commit adultery; certainly because, even if she did not put him away but was put away, she will be an adulteress if she marries. Because of so great an evil, then, a man may not put away his wife except for the cause of sexual immorality. For then he does not make her an adulteress by putting her away, but puts away an adulteress. What then? If he says, “I am putting away my wife without any cause of sexual immorality, but I will remain continent,” shall we therefore say he did what he did with impunity? Who would dare to say this, who understands the will of the Lord who said these things? For he who excepted only the cause of sexual immorality did not want a spouse to be put away even for the sake of continence.

Let us return, then, to the very words of the apostle, who says, “But to those who are married I command, not I but the Lord, that the wife not depart from her husband; but if she departs, she is to remain unmarried,” and let us, as it were, question him and in a way consult him as if he were present: “Why did you say, apostle, ‘but if she departs, she is to remain unmarried’? Is it permitted to depart or not? If it is not permitted, why do you command the woman who departs to remain unmarried? But if it is permitted, there is surely some cause for which it is permitted.” When this is sought, none is found except the one the Savior excepted, namely the cause of sexual immorality. And therefore the apostle does not command a woman to remain unmarried if she departs, except the one who departs from her husband for that cause for which alone she is permitted to depart from her husband. For where it is said, “I command her not to depart; but if she departs, she is to remain unmarried,” far be it that a woman who departs so as to remain unmarried acts against this command. Unless, then, it is understood of the woman who is permitted to depart (and she is permitted only if her husband commits sexual immorality), how is she ordered to remain unmarried if she departs? Who is there who would say, “If a woman departs from a husband who does not commit sexual immorality, let her remain unmarried,” when she is not permitted to depart at all except from a husband who commits sexual immorality? How much this view of yours is opposed to the conjugal bond, where the Lord did not want even continence to be undertaken except by equal harmony and consent, I think you now understand.

But let us state the matter itself a little more plainly and, as it were, set it before our eyes. Suppose continence has pleased a wife but does not please her husband. The wife has departed from him and begun to live in continence, she herself intending, of course, to remain chaste, but going to make her husband, what the Lord does not want, an adulterer; for since he does not contain himself, he will look for another woman. What shall we say to the wife, except what the sound teaching of the church says? “Render the debt to your husband, lest, while you seek the means of greater honor, he find the means of damnation.” We would say this to him too, if he had wished to be continent against your will. “For you do not have power over your own body, but he does; just as he does not have power over his body, but you do. Do not deprive one another except by consent.” When we have said these and many similar things that bear on this, would you like the wife to answer us according to this reasoning of yours: “I hear the apostle saying, ‘I command that the wife not depart from her husband; but if she departs, she is to remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.’ See, I have departed; I do not want to be reconciled to my husband, but I remain unmarried. For he does not say, ‘If she departs, she is to remain unmarried until she is reconciled to her husband,’ but ‘she is to remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.’ Let her do this, he says, or that. He allowed one of the two to be chosen, but did not compel either of them. I choose to remain unmarried, and so I fulfill the command. Reprove, rebuke, censure, use whatever severity you like, if I marry”?

What shall I say against her, except: “You do not understand the apostle rightly”? For he would not have commanded a wife, if she departs from her husband, to remain unmarried, unless she were one who had been permitted to depart, namely for that one cause which is left unspoken there because it is very well known, that is, sexual immorality. For God the teacher excepted this alone when he spoke of putting away a wife, and he gave it to be understood that the same rule is to be kept by the husband too, since not only does the wife not have power over her own body, but the husband, but likewise also the husband does not have power over his own body, but the wife. Since, then, you cannot accuse your husband of sexual immorality, how do you think you excuse your departing from him by not marrying, when you are not permitted to depart from him at all? When the woman hears this from us, I think you would not want her to answer that she remains unmarried because she departed without any sexual immorality of her husband; for if he had committed sexual immorality, she would have been permitted not only to depart but also to marry.

She would by no means say this, since you yourself were ashamed to give this freedom to women. For you said: “If a husband puts away an adulterous wife and marries another, only the woman will bear the reproach. But if a woman puts away her husband for the aforesaid cause and takes another, not only the husband but also the woman will bear reproach.” And giving the reason for this view of yours, you say: “For people will say that she departed in order to join herself to another husband, even if he should perhaps be like the one from whom she departed; for it is very easy for men to fall into the vice of this disease. And if she puts him away too and marries another, they will say all the more that she has sought a multitude of husbands.” Having given this reason, you conclude and say: “These things having been treated or even discussed, the wife ought to bear with her husband or remain unmarried.” You have certainly given good advice to women: that, although they know they are permitted to marry others if they put away adulterous husbands, they should not do so because of reproach, but should rather bear with even adulterous husbands, lest they seem to want to be joined to many on this occasion; because it is hard for a woman not to find a man to marry like the one she put away, since men are very prone to this disease. When, therefore, we say that even the woman who has put away a husband who commits sexual immorality is not permitted to marry another, and you say that she is permitted but that it is not expedient, we both undoubtedly say that she who puts away a husband who commits sexual immorality ought not to marry. But there is this difference: we say that, when both spouses are Christians, a woman who has departed from a husband who commits sexual immorality is not permitted to marry another, and that she is not permitted to depart at all from a husband who does not commit sexual immorality; whereas you say that, if a woman has departed from a husband who does not commit sexual immorality, she is not permitted to marry another because of the command, and if she has departed from one who does, it is not expedient for her to marry because of the reproach. And so a woman who will not marry is permitted, on your view, to depart from her husband whether he commits sexual immorality or not.

Moreover, since the blessed apostle, or rather the Lord through the apostle, does not permit a wife to depart from a husband who does not commit sexual immorality, it remains that he forbids to marry, if she departs, the one whom he permits to depart from a husband who does. For the woman of whom it is said, “If she departs from her husband, let her not marry,” is permitted to depart on this condition, that she not marry. If, then, she chooses not to marry, there is no reason why she should be forbidden to depart; just as the one of whom it is said, “If she does not contain herself, let her marry,” is certainly permitted not to be continent on this condition, that she marry. If, then, she chooses to marry, she cannot be forced to be continent. Just as, therefore, the incontinent woman is compelled to marry, so that her not being continent may not be damnable, so the woman who departs from her husband is compelled to remain unmarried, so that her departing may not be blameworthy. But she departs blamably from a husband who does not commit sexual immorality, even if she remains unmarried. So the woman commanded to remain unmarried, if she departs, is the one who departs from a husband who commits sexual immorality. Since this is so, if we understand the apostle in such a way as to say to women, “Do not leave your husbands, even chaste ones, except on condition that, if you wish to leave, you remain unmarried,” all women who are attracted by continence will think they are permitted to depart even when their husbands do not consent. Since we certainly must not allow this, it remains that we must teach that the words “if she departs, she is to remain unmarried” were said of the woman who, as we have learned, is permitted to depart, namely from a husband who commits sexual immorality; lest, if we teach otherwise, we disturb Christian marriages under the pretext of continence, and, against the Lord's most merciful command, drive into adultery incontinent husbands put away by continent wives, or incontinent wives put away by continent husbands.

As for what the Lord said, not indeed in the sermon itself that I was expounding, but elsewhere, “Whoever puts away his wife except for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another commits adultery”: if it is to be understood in such a way that whoever puts her away for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another does not commit adultery, then in this matter the rule does not seem to be equal for husband and wife; since a wife, even if she departs from her husband for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another, commits adultery, but a husband, if he puts away his wife for the same cause and marries another, does not commit adultery. But if the rule is equal for both, both commit adultery if they join themselves to another, even when they have separated from a spouse who committed sexual immorality. That the rule is equal for husband and wife in this matter the apostle shows (as must often be recalled) where, having said, “The wife does not have power over her own body, but the husband,” he added, “likewise also the husband does not have power over his own body, but the wife.”

“Why, then,” you say, “did the Lord insert the cause of sexual immorality and not rather say generally, ‘Whoever puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery,’ if he too is an adulterer who puts away a wife who has committed sexual immorality and marries another?” I believe it is because the Lord wanted to stress what is greater. For who denies that it is a greater adultery to put away a wife who has not committed sexual immorality and marry another than if someone puts away one who has and then marries another? Not because the latter is not adultery, but because it is less, when another is married after one who has committed sexual immorality has been put away. For the apostle James too used a similar expression when he said, “To one who knows how to do good and does not do it, to him it is sin.” Is it therefore not sin also to one who does not know how to do good and so does not do it? Certainly it is sin; but this is more serious, if one both knows and does not do it; nor is the other nothing because it is less. So let us say both in the same way: just as whoever puts away his wife, except for the cause of sexual immorality, and marries another commits adultery, so whoever knows how to do good and does not do it sins. But just as here it cannot rightly be said, “So if he does not know, he does not sin” (for there are also sins of the ignorant, though lesser than those of people who know), so neither can it rightly be said there, “So if he puts her away for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another, he does not commit adultery.” For there is also adultery of those who marry others after leaving their former wives because of sexual immorality, though certainly less than that of those who put away their wives not for sexual immorality and marry others. For just as it was said, “To one who knows how to do good and does not do it, to him it is sin,” so it could be said in the same way, “To one who puts away his wife without the cause of sexual immorality and marries another, to him it is adultery.” Just as, then, if we say, “Whoever marries a woman put away by her husband apart from the cause of sexual immorality commits adultery,” we undoubtedly speak the truth, and yet we do not thereby acquit of this crime the one who marries a woman put away for the cause of sexual immorality, but have no doubt at all that both are adulterers; so we declare an adulterer the one who puts away his wife apart from the cause of sexual immorality and marries another, and yet we do not thereby defend from the stain of this sin the one who puts her away for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another. For we recognize that both are adulterers, though one more grievously than the other. Nor is anyone so absurd as to deny that the man who marries a woman whom her husband cast off for the cause of sexual immorality is an adulterer, while calling the man who marries a woman cast off apart from that cause an adulterer. Just as, then, both of these are adulterers (so that when we say, “Whoever marries a woman put away by her husband apart from the cause of sexual immorality commits adultery,” we speak of one of them, and yet we do not therefore deny that the one commits adultery who marries a woman whom her husband put away for the cause of sexual immorality), so, since both are adulterers, both the one who puts away his wife apart from the cause of sexual immorality and marries another, and the one who, having put away his wife for the cause of sexual immorality, joins himself to another, surely when we read of one of them we should not understand it as if the other were declared not to be an adulterer because the one was expressly mentioned.

But if the evangelist Matthew made this hard to understand because, having expressed one case, he was silent about the other, have not the others embraced the same thing so generally that it can be understood of both? For according to Mark it is written thus: “Whoever puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery against her; and if a wife puts away her husband and marries another, she commits adultery”; according to Luke thus: “Everyone who puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery; and he who marries a woman put away by her husband commits adultery.” Who are we, then, to say, “There is one who commits adultery by putting away his wife and marrying another, and there is one who does this and does not commit adultery,” when the gospel says that everyone who does this commits adultery? Accordingly, if whoever does this, that is, everyone who does this, putting away his wife and marrying another, commits adultery, then without doubt both are included there, the one who puts away his wife apart from the cause of sexual immorality and the one who puts her away for that cause. For this is what “whoever puts away” means; this is what “everyone who puts away” means.

Nor did I (for some reason you thought so), when I quoted the words of the gospel according to Matthew, leave out what is written, “and marries another,” and so say, “commits adultery”; rather, I set down the words that are read in that long sermon which the Lord gave on the mountain, for that was what I had undertaken to treat. These words are read there as I set them down, namely: “Whoever puts away his wife, except for the cause of sexual immorality, makes her commit adultery; and he who marries her when released from her husband commits adultery.” Although some copies there have rendered the same sense in different words, they do not differ in what is understood. For some have “whoever puts away,” others “everyone who puts away”; again some “except for the cause of sexual immorality,” others “apart from the cause of sexual immorality,” others “unless on account of the cause of sexual immorality”; again some “he who marries her when released from her husband commits adultery,” others “he who marries her when put away by her husband commits adultery.” I think you see that this makes no difference to one and the same meaning. However, some manuscripts, both Greek and Latin, do not have that last clause, that is, “he who marries her when put away by her husband commits adultery,” in the sermon the Lord gave on the mountain. I believe this is because this meaning could be thought to be made plain there by what was said above, “makes her commit adultery”; for how does a woman who has been put away become an adulteress unless the man who marries her becomes an adulterer?

The words that you yourself set down, from which it seemed to you that the one who puts away his wife for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another does not commit adultery, are indeed put obscurely. So I am not surprised that the reader struggles to understand them; but they are not in that sermon of the Lord which I was then treating when I wrote the things that troubled you when you read them. For the same Matthew relates elsewhere that the Lord said them, not when he gave that long sermon on the mountain, but when he was asked by the Pharisees whether it was lawful to put away a wife for any cause whatever. But what is less understood in Matthew can be understood in the other evangelists. Therefore, when we read in the gospel according to Matthew, “Whoever puts away his wife except for sexual immorality” (or, as is rather read in the Greek, “apart from the cause of sexual immorality”) “and marries another commits adultery,” we should not at once suppose that the one who puts her away for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another does not commit adultery, but should still be in doubt until we consult the gospel according to the other evangelists by whom this is related. For what if, in Matthew, not everything relating to this matter was said, but a part was said in such a way that the whole might be understood from the part, and Mark and Luke, as if explaining it, preferred to say the whole so that the full meaning might be clear? So, when, first of all not doubting that what is read in Matthew is true, “Whoever puts away his wife apart from the cause of sexual immorality and marries another commits adultery,” we have asked whether only he commits adultery by marrying another wife who put away the first apart from the cause of sexual immorality, or everyone who puts away his wife and marries another, so that the one who puts away a wife who commits sexual immorality is also included there, will it not be answered us according to Mark: “Why do you ask whether this one is an adulterer and that one is not? Whoever puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery”? Will it not also be said to us according to Luke: “Why are you in doubt whether the one who puts away his wife for the cause of sexual immorality and marries another does not commit adultery? Everyone who puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery”? And so, since it is not right to say that the evangelists, speaking of one thing in different words, disagree in meaning and judgment, it remains for us to understand that Matthew wished to signify the whole by a part, yet held the same judgment: not that of those who put away a wife and marry another some commit adultery (those who put her away apart from sexual immorality) and some do not (those who put her away for sexual immorality), but that there should be no doubt at all that everyone who puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery.

For how is what follows in Luke also true: “He who marries a woman put away by her husband commits adultery”? How does he commit adultery, unless because the woman he married is still another man's wife while the one who put her away is alive? For if he is having relations with his own wife, not another's, he certainly does not commit adultery; but he does commit adultery. So she with whom he has relations belongs to another. Moreover, if she belongs to another, that is, to the one who put her away, then even if she was put away for the cause of sexual immorality, she has not yet ceased to be the wife of the one who put her away. But if she has ceased to be his, she is now the wife of this other man whom she married; and if she is his, he is to be judged not an adulterer but a husband. But since Scripture calls him not a husband but an adulterer, she will still be the wife of the one by whom she was cast off, even for the cause of sexual immorality. And therefore whatever woman he himself marries after putting her away is an adulteress, because she lies with another woman's husband. And how can it be that he himself is not an adulterer, when it is clear that he commits adultery with the woman he has married?

Now let us look at what the apostle says: “But to the rest I say, not the Lord,” about to speak, of course, of mixed marriages, that is, where the two had not both been Christians. It seemed to me that he said this by way of advice. For since a believing spouse could lawfully leave an unbelieving spouse, it is not the Lord but the apostle who forbids this to be done. For what the Lord forbids is not permitted to be done at all. The apostle therefore advises, because it could be an occasion of winning many, that believing spouses should not use the freedom granted them to leave unbelievers. But it seems to you that it is not permitted for unbelievers either to be put away by believers, because the apostle forbids it; whereas I say it is permitted, because the Lord does not forbid it, but that it is not expedient, because the apostle advises that it not be done. And he gives the reason why it is not expedient to do it, although it is permitted: “For how do you know, wife,” he says, “whether you will save your husband? Or how do you know, husband, whether you will save your wife?” Having said above, too, “For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother” (that is, in the Christian), “otherwise,” he says, “your children would be unclean, but now they are holy.” So he seems to have urged them to win their spouses and children for Christ even by examples that had already occurred. Why, then, it is not expedient for even unbelieving spouses to be put away by believers is clearly stated as the reason. For the apostle forbids withdrawing from unbelieving spouses, not in order to keep the conjugal bond with such people, but so that they may be won in Christ.

Many things are to be done, not because the law commands them, but from free charity; and those services of ours are more pleasing which, though we could have left them undone, we nevertheless perform for love's sake. So the Lord himself first, when he had shown that he did not owe the tax, still paid it, so as not to scandalize those whose eternal salvation he was caring for, as he bore our humanity. And how the apostle commends such things his words testify, where he says, “For though I am free from all, I have made myself the servant of all, that I might win the more,” having said a little earlier, “Do we not have the right to eat and drink? Do we not have the right to take along a sister as a wife, as do the other apostles and the brothers of the Lord and Cephas? Or do only Barnabas and I not have the right to do this? Who ever serves as a soldier at his own expense? Who plants a vineyard and does not eat of its fruit? Who tends a flock and does not get of the milk of the flock?” And a little later: “If others share in this right over you, do not we still more? But we have not used this right, but we endure all things, lest we put any obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ.” Then, after a little: “What then will my reward be? That in preaching the gospel I may present the gospel free of charge, so as not to abuse my right in the gospel.” And he at once adds what I mentioned a little before: “For though I am free from all, I have made myself the servant of all, that I might win the more.” Likewise in another place, concerning certain matters of food: “All things are lawful for me, but not all things are expedient; all things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of anything. Food is for the belly and the belly for food, but God will destroy both the one and the other.” Likewise elsewhere on this very matter: “All things are lawful, but not all things are expedient; all things are lawful, but not all things build up. Let no one seek his own good, but that of another.” And to show what he was speaking about, he says, “Eat whatever is sold in the market, asking no questions for conscience' sake.” And yet elsewhere he says, “I will never eat meat, lest I scandalize my brother,” and likewise elsewhere, “All things indeed are clean, but it is evil for the man who eats with offense.” What “all things are lawful” means is the same as “all things indeed are clean”; and what “but not all things are expedient” means is the same as “but it is evil for the man who eats with offense.” So he shows that the things which are lawful, that is, are forbidden by no command of the Lord, are to be handled as is expedient, not by the prescription of law but by the counsel of charity. These are the things spent over and above on the wounded man who, by the mercy of that Samaritan, was brought to the inn to be cared for. And therefore they are said not to be commanded by the Lord, although they are advised to be offered to the Lord, so that they may be understood to be the more pleasing the more they are shown to be not owed.

But of those things among these which are such that, though lawful, they are not expedient, it cannot be said, “This is good, but that is better,” as it was said, “He who gives her in marriage does well, and he who does not give her in marriage does better.” For there both are lawful, and sometimes this, sometimes that is expedient. For those women who do not contain themselves it is certainly expedient to marry, and what is lawful is expedient; but for those who have vowed continence it is neither lawful nor expedient. Moreover, to depart from an unbelieving spouse is lawful but not expedient; but to remain with him, if he consents to live together, is both lawful and expedient, because, if it were not lawful, it could not be expedient. So something can be lawful and not expedient; but what is not lawful cannot be expedient. And therefore not all things that are lawful are expedient, but all things unlawful are not expedient. For just as everyone who has been redeemed by Christ's blood is a human being, yet not everyone who is a human being has also been redeemed by Christ's blood, so everything that is not lawful is not expedient, and yet not everything that is not expedient is also not lawful. For there are lawful things that are not expedient, as we have learned on the apostle's testimony.