Oration I Against the Arians 21–31

21. Come, then, let us look at the attributes of the Father, so that we may recognize whether the image is really his. The Father is eternal, immortal, powerful, light, king, almighty, God, Lord, creator, and maker. These must be in the image, so that truly “whoever has seen” the Son “may see the Father.” But if it is not so, but, as the Arians think, the Son is originated and not eternal, this is not a true image of the Father; unless, then, they put away all shame and say that his being called “image” is not a mark of a like substance, but is only his name. But that, again, you enemies of Christ, is not an image nor an exact imprint. For what resemblance is there between things from nothing and him who created the things that were not into being? Or how can what is not be like him who is, falling short of him in having once not been, and in being ranked with the things that came to be? For since the Arians want him to be such, they have devised arguments for themselves, saying: “If the Son is the Father's offspring and image, and is like the Father in all things, then just as he was begotten, the Son also ought by all means to beget and become himself father of a son; and in turn the one begotten from him ought also to beget, and so on to infinity; for this is what shows the begotten to be like the begetter.” Inventors of blasphemies indeed are these fighters against God! In order not to confess the Son as the Father's image, they think bodily and earthly things about the Father himself, charging him with cuttings, outflowings, and inflowings. If, then, God is like a man, let him also be a begetter as a man is, so that the Son may become father of another, and so on in succession from one another, so that, on their view, the succession may grow into a multitude of gods. But if “God is not like a man” (and he is not), we must not reckon the things of men in his case. For irrational animals and men, after a creative beginning, are begotten by succession from one another; and the one begotten, having been begotten from a father who was himself begotten, naturally becomes father of another in turn, having in himself from his father that by which he himself came to be. Therefore among such beings there is not properly “father” and properly “son,” nor do “father” and “son” remain fixed in them; for the same person is son of the one who begot him and father of the one begotten from him. But in the Godhead it is not so; for God is not like a man. For the Father is not from a father, so he does not beget one who will become a father; nor is the Son from an outflowing of the Father, nor has he been begotten from a Father who was begotten, so he has not been begotten in order to beget. Hence in the Godhead alone the “Father” is properly father, and the “Son” properly son; and in them, and in them alone, it holds fast that the Father is always Father and the Son always Son.

22. So whoever asks why the Son does not beget a son, let him ask why the Father did not have a father. But both are absurd and full of all impiety. For as the Father is always Father and could never become Son, so the Son is always Son and could never become Father. And in this he is shown the more to be the exact imprint and image of the Father, remaining what he is and not changing, but having his sameness from the Father. If, then, the Father changes, let the image change too; for so the image and radiance stands in relation to the one who begot it. But if the Father is unchangeable, and remains what he is, then necessarily the image too remains what it is and will not change. And the Son is from the Father; so he will not become anything other than what is proper to the Father's substance. So in vain have the senseless men devised this too, wishing to cut the image away from the Father, in order to make the Son equal to originated things. Ranking him among these, following the teaching of Eusebius, and thinking him to be such as the things that came to be through him are, Arius and his followers leapt away from the truth. Having collected for themselves crafty little phrases, they used to go about at the beginning, when they were fabricating this heresy, and even now some of them, meeting boys in the marketplace, question them, not from the divine Scriptures, but as if belching out “the overflow of their heart,” saying: “Did he who is make the one who was not from him who is, or the one who is? Did he then make him when he was, or when he was not?” And again: “Is the unbegotten one, or two?” And: “Is he free and does he not change by his own choice, being of a changeable nature? For he is not like a stone, remaining unmoved of himself.” Then, going in to silly women, they utter to them in turn effeminate little phrases: “Did you have a son before you gave birth? As you did not, so the Son of God too was not before he was begotten.” With such words these disgraceful men dance and play, and liken God to men; and while claiming to be Christians, “they change the glory of God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man.”

23. Such things, so senseless and foolish, ought to get no answer at all. But so that their heresy may not seem to have anything firm, it is fitting to refute them on these points too, even if in passing, especially because of the silly women who are easily deceived by them. When they say these things, they ought also to ask an architect, “Can you build without underlying material? As you cannot, so God too could not make the universe without underlying material.” They ought also to ask every human being, “Can you exist without a place? As you cannot, so God too is in a place,” so that in this way they may be put to shame even by those who hear them. Or why is it that when they hear that God has a Son, they look at themselves and deny him, but when they hear that he creates and makes, they no longer set human things against it? They ought to think in human terms about creating too, and to supply God with material, so as to deny that God is creator also, and so wallow at last with the Manichaeans. But if the thought of God goes beyond these things, and anyone, on merely hearing, believes and knows that he is, not as we are, but as God, and creates, not as men create, but as God, it is clear that he also begets, not as men beget, but as God. For God does not imitate man; rather it is men who, because God is properly and alone truly Father of his own Son, have themselves been named fathers of their own children. For from him “every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named.” And what they say, if it remains unexamined, makes them seem to have said something clever; but if anyone examines it with reason, they will be found to incur much laughter and mockery.

24. First, their first question, of this kind, is foolish and unclear. For they do not indicate whom they are asking about, so that the one questioned might answer; they simply say, “He who is, the one who is not.” Who, then, is “he who is,” and what are the things that are not, you Arians? Or who is he who is, and who is “he who is not,” and what are said to be things that are, or things that are not? For “he who is” can make both things that are not and things that are and things that already existed. A carpenter, for example, a goldsmith, and a potter each work, according to his own craft, on material that exists and is there before them, making whatever vessels they wish; and the God of all himself took dust from the earth, which exists and had already come to be from him, and formed man; yet the earth itself, which did not exist before, he later made to be through his own Word. If, then, this is how they ask, it is clear that the creation was not before it came to be, while men work on material that exists; and their argument will prove incoherent, since things come to be both from what is and from what is not, as we have said. But if they are speaking about God and his Word, let them add what is missing to the question and ask thus: “Was God, who is, once without Word, and was he, being light, without brightness? Or was he always Father of the Word?” Or again thus: “Did the Father, who is, make the Word when he was not, or does he have with him always the Word, the proper offspring of his substance?” Then it will be known that they are meddling with and daring to be clever about God himself and the one who is from him. For who will put up with them when they say that God was once without Word? They have fallen again into the same thing as before, although they tried hard to avoid it and to hide it with their sophistries; but they have not been able. For no one would even want to hear them raise doubts that God was not always Father but became so later, so that they may imagine that his Word too once was not, since there are many proofs against them already stated, and since John says, “the Word was,” and Paul writes again, “who, being the radiance of his glory,” and, “who is God over all, blessed forever. Amen.”

25. It would have been better for them to keep quiet; but since they do not stop, one might dare in turn to put this counter-question to their shameless question. Perhaps, seeing themselves hemmed in by similar absurdities, they will withdraw from their fight against the truth. First, then, calling earnestly on God to be merciful, one might meet them thus: “Did God, who is, come to be when he was not? Or does he exist even before he came to be? Being, then, did he make himself? Or is he from nothing, and, being nothing before, did he suddenly appear?” Such a question is absurd; yes, absurd and full of blasphemy; but it is like theirs, for whichever answer they give is full of all impiety. And if it is blasphemous and more than impious to ask such things about God, it would be blasphemous to ask such things about his Word too. Nevertheless, to do away with their irrational and foolish question, one must answer thus: being, God is eternally. Since, then, the Father always is, his radiance too is eternally, which is his Word. And again, God, who is, has from himself the Word, who also is. Neither was the Word added later, when he was not before, nor was the Father ever without Word. For the daring attack on the Son carries the blasphemy up to the Father, as if he devised wisdom, Word, and Son for himself from outside. For whichever of these you name, it signifies the offspring from the Father, as has been said. So their question of this kind does not hold together, and naturally: for denying the Word, they have a question without reason as well. For if someone looking at the sun were to ask about its radiance, and say, “Did that which is make what is not, or did it make it when it was?” he would not be thought to reason soundly, but to be thunderstruck, because he imagines what comes from the light to be from outside and asks when and where and whether it was made. So also anyone who reasons and inquires thus about the Son and the Father would be much madder still, because he brings the Word from the Father in upon him from outside, and, talking of shadows, calls the natural offspring a work and says, “He was not before he was begotten.” Nevertheless, let them hear this answer to their question: the Father, who is, made the Son, who is. For “the Word became flesh”; and him, being Son of God, he made at the consummation of the ages Son of Man as well, unless they are going to say, with the Samosatene, that he did not even exist before he became man. This is enough from us in answer to their first question.

26. And you, Arians, remembering your own words, tell us: did he who is need one who was not for the making of all things, or did he need one who was? For you have said, “He fashioned the Son for himself as an instrument out of what was not, so that he might make all things through him.” Which, then, is better: what needs, or what fills the need? Or do both fill what the other lacks? For in saying such things you show rather the weakness of the one who fashioned him, if he alone was not strong enough to make all things but devised an instrument for himself from outside, like a carpenter or a shipwright who cannot work at anything without an axe and a saw. What could be more impious than this? But why dwell on these things at all as if they were formidable, when what has already been said is enough to show that what they say is mere fantasy? As for their other quite silly and foolish inquiry, which they put to the silly women, again no answer at all should have been needed about it either, except what we have said before, that the begetting from God must not be measured by human nature. Yet so that in this too they may condemn themselves, it is good to meet them again from their own premises, as follows. If they ask parents about a son at all, let them consider where the child that is begotten comes from. For even if the parent did not have a son before he begot him, yet, when he had him, he had him not from outside nor as something foreign, but from himself, proper to his substance, and an unvarying image, so that the one is seen in the other and the other contemplated in the one. If, then, they take the time of those who beget from human examples, why do they not from the same examples consider the naturalness and the propriety of children to their parents, but, like snakes, pick out of the earth only what serves their poison? When they ask parents and say, “Did you not have a son before you begot him?” they should have added and said, “And when you have a son, do you buy him from outside like a house or some other possession?” so that the parent might answer you: “Not from outside, but he is from me. For things from outside are possessions and pass from one owner to another; but my son is from me, proper to and like my substance, not having come to me from another, but begotten from me; therefore I am wholly in him, while remaining myself what I am.” For so it is: even if the parent differs in time, since as a man he too has come to be in time, yet he too would have had his child always coexisting with him, if nature had not hindered and prevented it from being possible. For Levi too “was still in the loins” of his great-grandfather before he himself was begotten and before his grandfather begot. When, then, a man comes to that age at which nature gives the ability, at once, with nature unhindered, he becomes father of the son from himself.

27. So if they asked parents about children, and learned that children by nature are not from outside but from their parents, let them confess about the Word of God too that he is wholly from the Father. And if they raise the question of time, let them say what hinders God. (For it is necessary to refute their impiety from the very things they asked in mockery.) Let them say, then, what hinders God from being always Father of the Son; for it is agreed that what is begotten is from the father. And so that they may condemn themselves for thinking any such thing about God at all, just as they asked women about times, so let them ask the sun about its radiance and the spring about what comes from it, so that they may learn that, although these are offspring, they exist always with those from which they come. And if such parents have both the “natural” and the “always” in relation to their children, why do they, suspecting God to be less than things originated, not bring out their impiety more openly? But if they do not dare to say this openly, and it is agreed that the Son is not from outside but is by nature an offspring from the Father, and nothing hinders God (for “God is not like a man,” but is more than the sun, or rather is the God of the sun), it is clear that the Word is both from him and always coexisting with the Father, the Word through whom the Father made all things that were not to be. That the Son is not “from nothing,” then, but is eternal and from the Father, the fact itself shows; and the heretics' question to parents refutes their malice. For they have learned what is natural, and they have been put to shame about times as well.

28. That one must not compare God's begetting with human nature, nor think that his Son is a “part” of God, nor that the begetting signifies any “passion” at all, we have said already above, and we say the same now: “God is not like a man.” For men beget with passion, having a fluid nature, and waiting for times because of the weakness of their own nature; but this cannot be said of God. For he is not composed of parts, but, being impassible and simple, he is Father of the Son impassibly and without division. And there is great evidence and proof of this again from the divine Scriptures. For the Word of God is his Son, and the Son is the Word and Wisdom of the Father; and Word and Wisdom is neither a creature nor a part of him whose Word it is, nor an offspring begotten with passion. Joining both, then, Scripture said “Son,” in order to proclaim the natural and true offspring of the substance; and so that no one might suppose the offspring to be human, again signifying his substance, it says that he is “Word,” “Wisdom,” and “radiance.” For from this we reckon that the begetting is impassible, eternal, and fitting for God. What passion, then, or what part of the Father is the Word, the Wisdom, the radiance? Even these senseless men can learn this. For as they asked women about a son, so let them ask men about their word, so that they may learn that the word they utter is neither a passion of theirs nor a part of their mind. And if the word of men, though men are passible and divisible, is like this, why do they reckon passions and parts in the case of the incorporeal and indivisible God, so that, pretending to be reverent about this, they may deny the true and natural begetting of the Son? That the offspring from God is not a passion has been sufficiently proved above; and it has now been shown in particular that the Word is not begotten by passion. Let them hear the same about Wisdom: “God is not like a man”; let them not imagine anything human about him in this either. For while men have become receptive of wisdom, God, participating in nothing, is himself Father of his own Wisdom, and those who participate in it are usually called wise. And Wisdom itself is not a passion or a part, but the proper offspring of the Father. For this reason he is always Father, and “Father” was not added to God later, lest he be thought changeable too. For if it is good that he is Father, but he was not always Father, then the good was not always in him.

29. “But look,” they say, “God is also always a maker, and the power to create was not added to him later. Since he is creator, then, are his works eternal too, and is it not right to say of them either, ‘They were not before they came to be’?” Senseless Arians! What likeness is there between a son and a work, that they should say of creators what applies to a father? And how, when so great a difference between offspring and work has been shown above, do they persist in their ignorance? The same must be said again, then: the work is outside its maker, as has been said, but the son is the proper offspring of the substance. So the work need not always exist, for the craftsman works when he wishes; but the offspring is not subject to will, but is a property of the substance. And one could be and be called a maker even if the works do not yet exist; but one could not be called a father, nor be one, if no son exists. And if they meddle with the question why God, who is always able to make, does not always make, this daring too belongs to madmen. For “who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counsellor?” Or how will “the thing formed say” to the potter, “Why have you made me thus?” But so that we may not keep silent, even if we find only a faint argument, let them hear that, although God is always able to make, yet originated things could not be eternal; for they are from nothing, and were not before they came to be. And how could things that were not before they came to be coexist with God, who always is? Therefore God, looking to what was profitable for them, made all things when he saw that, once they had come to be, they could endure. And just as, although he was able from the beginning, in the time of Adam or Noah or Moses, to send his own Word, he did not send him until “the consummation of the ages” (for he saw that this was profitable for all creation), so too he made originated things when he wished and when it was profitable for them. But the Son, not being a work but proper to the Father's substance, always is. For since the Father always is, what is proper to his substance, which is his Word and Wisdom, must always be too. And the creatures, even if they do not yet exist, do not lessen the maker, for he has the ability to create when he wishes; but the offspring, if it is not always with the Father, is a lessening of the completeness of his substance. Hence the works were created through his Word when he wished; but the Son is always the proper offspring of the Father's substance.

30. These things gladden the faithful, but grieve the heretics, who see their heresy destroyed. And that further question of theirs, when they say, “Is the unoriginate one, or two?” shows their thinking to be not upright but suspect and full of guile. For they do not ask this for the honor of the Father, but for the dishonor of the Word. So if anyone, not knowing their craftiness, answers, “The unoriginate is one,” they at once vomit out their poison, saying, “Then the Son is one of the things originated, and we were right to say, ‘He was not before he came to be.’” For they mix up and stir up everything, only so that they may separate the Word from the Father and count the creator of all things among his works. First, then, they deserve condemnation on this score: while blaming the bishops who met at Nicaea for using words not found in Scripture (words that were not blasphemous, but were set down to destroy their impiety), they themselves have deserted to the same charge by uttering words not found in Scripture and devising insults against the Lord, “understanding neither what they say nor the things about which they make confident assertions.” Let them ask the Greeks, from whom they heard it (for it is not an invention of the Scriptures but of theirs), so that, hearing how many meanings the word has, they may learn that they do not even know how to ask properly about the things they speak of. For because of them I too have inquired, and learned that “unoriginate” is said of what “has not yet come to be but can come to be,” as wood that has not yet become a boat but can become one. And again “unoriginate” is said of what “neither has come to be nor can ever come to be,” as a triangle that is square, or an even number that is odd; for a triangle has never become square, nor could it ever, and an even number has never become odd, nor could it ever. And again “unoriginate” is said of what “exists, but has not come to be from anyone, nor has any father at all.” And the crafty sophist Asterius, the advocate of the heresy, added in his own little treatise that “unoriginate” is what is “not made, but always is.” So they ought to have added in what sense they understand “unoriginate” when they ask, so that the one questioned might answer correctly.

31. But if they think they are asking properly when they say, “Is the unoriginate one, or two?” they will hear first, as ignorant men, that there are both many and none: very many that “can come to be,” and none that “cannot,” as has been said. And if they ask in the sense Asterius favored, that what is not a work but always is, is unoriginate, let them hear not once but many times that the Son too could in this sense be called unoriginate. For he is neither one of the things originated nor a work, but exists eternally with the Father, as has already been shown, even if they change their ground many times only to say against the Lord, “He is from nothing,” and “He was not before he was begotten.” So, failing at every point, if they finally choose to ask in the sense of “what exists, but has neither been begotten from anyone nor has a father of its own,” they will hear from us too that in this sense the unoriginate is one and only, the Father; but they will gain nothing more by hearing it. For God's being called unoriginate in this sense does not show that the Son is originated, since it is clear from the proofs already given that the Word is such as the one who begot him. So if God is unoriginate, his image, which is his Word and Wisdom, is not originated but an offspring. For what resemblance does the originated have to the unoriginate? (One must not shrink from saying the same things again.) For if they want the originated to be like the unoriginate, so that whoever sees the one sees the other, they are not far from saying that the unoriginate is the image of creatures too; and then everything is confused by them: things originated made equal to the unoriginate, and the unoriginate brought down by being measured against the works, only so that they may bring the Son down among the works.