Against Celsus 4.3

Having said that we say he has come down and the Jews that he will come down as judge, he thinks he can at once accuse the statement as most shameful and not needing a long refutation, and he says: “What is the purpose of such a descent for God?” He does not see that in our view the purpose of the descent is, first, to turn back what the Gospel calls “the lost sheep of the house of Israel,” and second, because of their disobedience, to take from them what is called the kingdom of God and give it “to other tenants” besides the Jews of old, the Christians, who “will render the fruits” of God's kingdom to God “in their seasons,” each action being a fruit of the kingdom. We, then, have said a little out of much in answer to Celsus's question, “For what is the purpose of such a descent for God?” But Celsus supplies himself with things that would be said neither by Jews nor by us, saying: “Or is it to learn what goes on among men?” For none of us says that Christ comes into life in order to learn what goes on among men. Then, as if some would say, “To learn what goes on among men,” he raises the objection to himself: “For does he not know all things?” Then, as if we would answer that he does know, he raises a further difficulty, saying: “Does he know, then, but not correct them, and is he unable to correct them by divine power?” All this too is said foolishly. For God always, by his own Word, who from generation to generation passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God and prophets, corrects those who hear what is said; and in the coming of Christ he corrects by the Christian teaching, not those unwilling, but those who have chosen the better life that pleases God. And I do not know what kind of correction Celsus wanted to happen when he raised the difficulty, “Is he not able to correct them by divine power, unless he sends someone specially endowed by nature for this?” Did he want correction to come to men by God's putting images into their minds, taking away wickedness all at once and implanting virtue? Another may inquire whether such a thing is consistent or possible by nature; but we would say: Suppose it is possible. Where then is what is in our power, and where is praiseworthy assent to the truth, or acceptable rejection of falsehood? And even if it were granted once that this is possible and fittingly done, why should one not rather ask about the beginning, saying something analogous to Celsus, “Was God not able by divine power to make men not needing correction at all, but good and perfect from the start, with wickedness never having come into existence?” These things can carry away ordinary and unintelligent people, but not one who looks into the nature of things: that if you take away the voluntary character of virtue, you take away its very being. A whole treatise is needed on these matters; and the Greeks too have said not a little about them in their works on providence, who would not have said what Celsus set out: “He knows, but he does not correct, nor is he able to correct by divine power.” We too have spoken about these things in many places as far as we could, and the divine words have made them plain to those able to hear them.