Against Celsus 5.45

But since Celsus thinks it makes no difference whether one calls the Most High Zeus, or Zen, or Adonai, or Sabaoth, or, as the Egyptians do, Amoun, or, as the Scythians do, Papaeus, come, let us discuss these matters briefly too, reminding the reader at the same time of what was said above on this problem, when Celsus's words called us to such matters. We say now too that the nature of names is not a matter of conventions made by those who assign them, as Aristotle thinks. For the languages among human beings do not have their origin from human beings, as is clear to those who can attend to the nature of incantations, which are appropriated, according to the different languages and the different sounds of the names, by the fathers of those languages. About these we spoke briefly above, saying that what naturally has power in a given language, when translated into another language, no longer accomplishes anything as it did in its own sounds. This is found even with human beings: for if someone has been called by a certain name from birth in the Greek language, we would not, by translating it into the language of the Egyptians or the Romans or any other people, make him suffer or do what he would suffer or do when called by the original form of his name. Nor, if we translated into Greek the name of someone called from the beginning in the Roman tongue, would we accomplish what the incantation promises to do while keeping the name first given him. If these things said about human names are true, what must we think about names that are for whatever reason referred to the divine? For something is translated into Greek, for example, from the name Abraham, and something is signified by the name Isaac, and something shown by the word Jacob. And if the one who invokes or adjures names "the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob," he may accomplish a certain thing, whether through the nature of these names or through their power, demons being overcome and made subject to the one who says them; but if he says "the God of the chosen father of the echo, and the God of laughter, and the God of the heel-grabber," what is named accomplishes nothing, like anything else without power. So too, if we translate the name Israel into Greek or another language, we will accomplish nothing; but if we keep it, attaching it to what those skilled in these things thought fit to combine it with, then something might happen, according to the promise of such invocations, from such a word. We will say the same about the word Sabaoth too, which is used in many incantations: if we translate the name as "Lord of the powers" or "Lord of hosts" or "Almighty" (for its interpreters have understood it differently), we will accomplish nothing; but if we keep it in its own sounds, we will accomplish something, as those skilled in these things say. We will say the same about Adonai too. If, then, neither Sabaoth nor Adonai, translated into what they seem to mean in the Greek tongue, accomplishes anything, how much less would it accomplish or have any power among those who think it makes no difference whether one calls the Most High Zeus, or Zen, or Adonai, or Sabaoth?