Against Celsus 3.42

Celsus did not speak like a skilled dialectician, then, when he compared the human flesh of Jesus with gold, silver, and stone and said that it is more corruptible than they. For in strict reasoning, neither is an incorruptible thing more incorruptible than another incorruptible thing, nor a corruptible thing more corruptible than another corruptible thing. But even if it is more corruptible, we shall still say this in reply: if the matter that underlies all qualities can exchange its qualities, how is it not possible that the flesh of Jesus too, having exchanged its qualities, became such as it had to be to dwell in the ether and the places above it, no longer having the properties of fleshly weakness and those which Celsus called “more defiled”? Nor was he acting as a philosopher in this; for what is properly defiled is such because of vice, and the nature of a body is not defiled; for insofar as it is the nature of a body, it does not have vice, which is what generates defilement. Then, since he suspected our defense concerning the change of his body, he says: “But when he has laid these aside, then he will be a god? Why not rather Asclepius, Dionysus, and Heracles?” We shall say: What so great a thing did Asclepius or Dionysus or Heracles accomplish? And whom will they be able to show improved in character and made better by their words and life, so that they should become gods? For after reading the many stories about them, let us see whether they were pure of licentiousness, injustice, folly, or cowardice. And if nothing of the sort were found in them, Celsus's argument, which puts those just named on a level with Jesus, would be strong. But if it is clear that, even if some rather good things are reported of them, they are recorded to have done countless things contrary to right reason, how can you still reasonably say that they, rather than Jesus, became gods by laying aside the mortal body?