Miscellanies 6.18.162
Summary: The knower gives his time to the most important things and takes Greek philosophy like dessert in his leisure; those lost in sophistry miss what matters; true knowledge grasps causes, and even to reject philosophy one must first philosophize.
Greek text · Stählin 2:515–516
Ὁ γνωστικὸς δʼ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις ἀεί ποτε διατρίβει· εἰ δέ που σχολὴ καὶ ἀνέσεως καιρὸς ἀπὸ τῶν προηγουμένων, ἀντὶ τῆς ἄλλης ῥᾳθυμίας καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐφάπτεται φιλοσοφίας, οἷον τρωγάλιόν τι ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ παροψώμενος, οὐ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀμελήσας, προσλαβὼν δέ, ἐφʼ ὅσον πρέπει, καὶ ταῦτα διʼ ἃς προεῖπον αἰτίας. οἱ δὲ τῶν οὐκ ἀναγκαίων καὶ περιττῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὀρεχθέντες καὶ μόνοις τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς προσανέχοντες σοφίσμασι τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ κυριωτάτων ἀπελείφθησαν, οἱ τὰς σκιὰς ἀτεχνῶς τῶν λόγων διώκοντες. καλὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ πάντα ἐπίστασθαι· ὅτῳ δὲ ἀσθενεῖ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὴν πολυμαθῆ ἐμπειρίαν, τὰ προηγούμενα καὶ βελτίω αἱρήσεται μόνα. ἡ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι ἐπιστήμη, ἥν φαμεν μόνον ἔχειν τὸν γνωστικόν, κατάληψίς ἐστι βεβαία διὰ λόγων ἀληθῶν καὶ βεβαίων ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας γνῶσιν ἀνάγουσα, ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων τοῦ ἀληθοῦς περὶ ὁδηποτοῦν αὐτίκα καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμων ὑπάρχει. καὶ γὰρ οὖν εὖ πως ἔχειν μοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνος· εἰ φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον· αὐτὸ γάρ τι αὑτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ· ἀλλʼ εἰ καὶ μὴ φιλοσοφητέον· οὐ γάρ τις καταγνῴη ἄν τινος μὴ τοῦτο πρότερον ἐγνωκώς. φιλοσοφητέον ἄρα.
English · Claude translation
The one who knows among us always spends his time on the most important things; but if there is ever leisure and a time of rest from the principal things, instead of other idleness he also takes up Greek philosophy, eating it like a dessert after dinner, not neglecting the better things, but taking these too, as far as is fitting, for the reasons I stated before. But those who have hankered after the unnecessary and superfluous parts of philosophy and devoted themselves only to eristic sophisms have been left behind in the necessary and most important things, simply chasing the shadows of words. It is good, then, to know everything; but a person whose soul is too weak to stretch itself to wide learning will choose only the principal and better things. For true scientific knowledge, which we say only the one who knows has, is a firm grasp through true and firm reasons, leading up to the knowledge of the cause; and the one who knows the truth scientifically about anything whatever at once knows scientifically the falsehood about the same thing. And indeed that argument seems to me to be sound: “If one must philosophize, one must philosophize; for it follows from itself. And if one must not philosophize, one must still philosophize; for no one could condemn a thing without first coming to know it. Therefore one must philosophize.”
About this passage
Notes
Translation notes
- The closing argument is traditionally ascribed to Aristotle's lost Protrepticus. In the second conditional, “one must still philosophize” is supplied from the sense of the elliptical Greek.
Cite this passage
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.18.162 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/6/18/162/).
Plain text
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.18.162 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/6/18/162/).
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