Literal Commentary on Genesis

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Chapter 1

1.1CSEL 28.1:3–5

Omnis diuina scriptura bipertita est secundum id, quod dominus significat dicens scribam eruditum in regno dei similem esse patri familias proferenti de thesauro suo noua et uetera, quae duo etiam testamenta dicuntur. in libris autem omnibus sanctis intueri oportet, quae ibi aeterna intimentur, quae facta narrentur, quae futura praenuntientur, quae agenda praecipiantur uel admoneantur. in narratione ergo rerum factarum quaeritur, utrum omnia secundum figurarum tantummodo intellectum accipiantur, an etiam secundum fidem rerum gestarum adserenda et defendenda sint. nam non esse accipienda figuraliter nullus christianus dicere audebit, adtendens apostolum dicentem: omnia autem haec in figura contingebant in illis, et illud, quod in Genesi scriptum est: et erunt duo in carne una, magnum sacramentum commendantem in Christo et in ecclesia. Si ergo utroque modo illa scriptura scrutanda est, quomodo dictum est praeter allegoricam significationem: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram? utrum in principio temporis, an quia primo omnium, an in principio, quod est uerbum dei unigenitus filius? et quomodo possit ostendi deum sine ulla sui commutatione operari mutabilia et temporalia? et quid significetur nomine caeli et terrae? utrum spiritalis corporalisque creatura caeli et terrae uocabulum acceperit, an tantummodo corporalis, ut in hoc libro de spiritali tacuisse intellegatur atque ita dixisse caelum et terram, ut omnem creaturam corpoream, superiorem atque inferiorem, significare uoluerit? an utriusque informis materia dicta est caelum et terra, spiritalis uidelicet uita, sicut esse potest in se, non conuersa ad creatorem — tali enim conuersione formatur atque perficitur; si autem non conuertatur, informis est — corporalis autem, si possit intellegi per priuationem omnis corporeae qualitatis, quae adparet in materia formata, cum iam sunt species corporum siue uisu siue alio quolibet sensu corporis perceptibiles?. An caelum intellegendum est creatura spiritalis ab exordio, quo facta est, perfecta illa et beata semper, terra uero corporalis materies adhuc inperfecta? quia terra, inquit, erat inuisibilis et inconposita, et tenebrae erant super abyssum: quibus uerbis uidetur informitatem significare substantiae corporalis. an utriusque informitas his etiam posterioribus uerbis significatur? corporalis quidem eo, quod dictum est: terra erat inuisibilis et inconposita, spiritalis autem eo, quod dictum est: et tenebrae erant super abyssum, ut translato uerbo tenebrosam abyssum intellegamus naturam uitae informem, nisi conuertatur ad creatorem: quo solo modo formari potest, ut non sit abyssus, et inluminari, ut non sit tenebrosa. et quomodo dictum est: tenebrae erant super abyssum? an quia non erat lux? quae si esset, utique superesset et tamquam superfunderet: quod tunc fit in creatura spiritali, cum conuertitur ad incommutabile atque incorporale lumen, quod deus est.

All divine Scripture is twofold, in keeping with what the Lord indicates when he says that a scribe instructed in the kingdom of God is like a householder who brings out of his treasure things new and old; these two are also called testaments. In all the holy books one must observe what eternal things are made known there, what deeds are narrated, what future things are foretold, and what things to be done are commanded or urged. So in the narration of things done, the question is whether everything is to be taken only in a figurative sense, or whether it is also to be asserted and defended as a faithful record of events. For no Christian will dare to say that these things are not to be taken figuratively, if he pays attention to the apostle when he says, “Now all these things happened to them in a figure,” and when he commends what is written in Genesis, “And the two shall be in one flesh,” as a great sacrament in Christ and in the church. If, then, that Scripture is to be examined in both ways, how, apart from its allegorical meaning, is it said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth”? Is it “in the beginning of time,” or “because first of all,” or “in the Beginning” who is the Word of God, the only-begotten Son? And how can it be shown that God works things changeable and temporal without any change in himself? And what is meant by the name “heaven and earth”? Did spiritual and bodily creation receive the name “heaven and earth,” or only bodily creation, so that in this book he is understood to have said nothing of the spiritual creation and to have said “heaven and earth” meaning to signify all bodily creation, higher and lower? Or is the formless matter of both called heaven and earth: spiritual life, namely, as it can exist in itself, not turned to the Creator (for it is formed and perfected by such a turning, and if it is not turned, it is formless), and bodily matter, if it can be understood by the removal of every bodily quality that appears in formed matter, when there are already forms of bodies perceptible by sight or by any other bodily sense? Or is “heaven” to be understood as spiritual creation, from the first moment in which it was made perfect and forever blessed, and “earth” as bodily matter still imperfect? For “the earth,” it says, “was invisible and unformed, and darkness was over the abyss”: by these words it seems to signify the formlessness of bodily substance. Or is the formlessness of both also signified by these later words? That of bodily substance by the words, “the earth was invisible and unformed,” and that of spiritual substance by the words, “and darkness was over the abyss,” so that by a figurative use of the word we understand the dark abyss as the nature of life that is formless unless it is turned to the Creator: only in this way can it be formed, so as not to be an abyss, and enlightened, so as not to be dark. And how was it said, “darkness was over the abyss”? Was it because there was no light? If there had been light, it would surely have been over it and, as it were, poured over it; and this happens in spiritual creation when it is turned to the unchangeable and incorporeal light, which is God.

1.2CSEL 28.1:5–7

Et quomodo dixit deus: fiat lux? utrum temporaliter, an in uerbi aeternitate? et si temporaliter, utique mutabiliter. quomodo ergo possit intellegi hoc dicere deus nisi per creaturam? ipse quippe est incommutabilis. et si per creaturam dixit deus: fiat lux, quomodo est prima creatura lux, si erat iam creatura, per quam deus diceret: fiat lux? an non est lux prima creatura, quia iam dictum erat: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram? et poterat per caelestem creaturam uox fieri temporaliter atque mutabiliter, qua diceretur: fiat lux? quod si ita est, corporalis lux facta est ista, quam corporeis oculis cernimus, dicente deo per creaturam spiritalem, quam deus iam fecerat, cum in principio fecit caelum et terram, fiat lux eo modo, quo per talis creaturae interiorem et occultum motum diuinitus dici potuit: fiat lux. An etiam corporaliter sonuit uox dicentis dei: fiat lux, sicut corporaliter sonuit uox dicentis dei: tu es filius meus dilectus? et hoc per creaturam corporalem, quam fecerat deus, cum in principio fecit caelum et terram, antequam fieret lux, quae in hac sonante uoce facta est? et si ita est. qua lingua sonuit ista uox dicente deo: fiat lux, quia nondum erat linguarum diuersitas, quae postea facta est in aedificatione turris post diluuium? quaenam lingua erat una et sola, qua deus locutus est: fiat lux? et quis erat, quem oportebat audire atque intellegere, ad quem uox huius modi proferretur? an haec absurda carnalisque cogitatio est atque suspicio? Quid ergo dicemus? an id, quod intellegitur in sono uocis, cum dicitur: fiat lux, non autem ipse corporeus sonus, hoc bene intellegitur esse uox dei? et utrum hoc ipsum ad naturam pertineat uerbi eius, de quo dicitur: in principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum? cum enim de illo dicitur: omnia per ipsum facta sunt, satis ostenditur et lux per ipsum facta, cum dixit deus: fiat lux. quod si ita est, aeternum est quod ait deus: fiat lux, quia uerbum dei, deus apud deum, filius unicus dei. patri coaeternus est, quamuis deo haec in aeterno uerbo dicente creatura temporalis facta sit. cum enim uerba sint temporis, cum dicimus "quando" et "aliquando". aeternum tamen est uerbo dei, quando fieri aliquid debeat, et tunc fit, quando fieri debuisse in illo uerbo est, in quo non est quando et aliquando, quoniam totum illud uerbum aeternum est.

And how did God say, “Let there be light”? In time, or in the eternity of the Word? And if in time, then surely with change. How then could God be understood to say this except through a creature? For he himself is unchangeable. And if God said “Let there be light” through a creature, how is light the first creature, if there was already a creature through which God might say, “Let there be light”? Or is light not the first creature, because it had already been said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” and a voice could have come about in time and with change through a heavenly creature, by which it was said, “Let there be light”? If so, the light that was made is this bodily light that we see with bodily eyes, God saying through the spiritual creation that he had already made when in the beginning he made heaven and earth, “Let there be light,” in the way in which “Let there be light” could be said by divine power through the inner and hidden movement of such a creature. Or did the voice of God saying “Let there be light” also sound bodily, as the voice of God sounded bodily saying, “You are my beloved Son”? And was this through a bodily creature that God had made when in the beginning he made heaven and earth, before the light was made that was made at the sound of this voice? And if so, in what language did this voice sound when God said, “Let there be light,” since there was not yet the diversity of languages that came about later at the building of the tower after the flood? What was that one and only language in which God spoke, “Let there be light”? And who was there who needed to hear and understand, to whom a voice of this kind would be uttered? Or is this an absurd and carnal thought and conjecture? What then shall we say? Is it what is understood in the sound of the voice when “Let there be light” is said, and not the bodily sound itself, that is rightly understood to be the voice of God? And does this itself belong to the nature of his Word, of whom it is said, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”? For when it is said of him, “All things were made through him,” it is shown clearly enough that light too was made through him when God said, “Let there be light.” If so, what God said, “Let there be light,” is eternal, because the Word of God, God with God, the only Son of God, is coeternal with the Father, although when God spoke these things in the eternal Word a temporal creature was made. For although “when” and “at some time” are words of time when we say them, yet in the Word of God it is eternal when something should be made; and it is made at the time when it is in that Word that it should have been made, in which there is no “when” or “at some time,” since that whole Word is eternal.

1.3CSEL 28.1:7

Et quid est lux ipsa, quae facta est? utrum spiritale quid an corporale? si enim spiritale, potest ipsa esse prima creatura iam hoc dicto perfecta, quae primo caelum appellata est, cum dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, ut, quod dixit deus: fiat lux. et facta est lux, eam reuocante ad se creatore conuersio eius facta atque inluminata intellegatur. Et cur ita dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, et non dictum est: in principio dixit deus: fiat caelum et terra. et facta sunt caelum et terra, sicut de luce narratur: dixit deus: fiat lux. et facta est lux? utrum prius uniuersaliter nomine caeli et terrae conprehendendum erat et commendandum, quod fecit deus, et deinde per partes exequendum, quomodo fecit, cum per singula dicitur: dixit deus, id est, quia per uerbum suum fecit, quidquid fecit?

And what is the light itself that was made? Something spiritual or something bodily? If it is spiritual, it may itself be the first creature, now made perfect by this saying, which was first called heaven when it was said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth”; so that when God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light, we would understand that its turning took place and it was enlightened as the Creator called it back to himself. And why was it said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” and not, “In the beginning God said, ‘Let there be heaven and earth,’ and heaven and earth were made,” as it is narrated of the light, “God said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light”? Was it that what God made had first to be comprehended and presented as a whole under the name of heaven and earth, and then how he made it had to be set out part by part, as it is said for each thing, “God said,” that is, because whatever he made, he made through his Word?

1.4CSEL 28.1:7–8

An cum primum fiebat informitas materiae siue spiritalis siue corporalis, non erat dicendum: dixit deus: fiat, quia formam uerbi semper patri cohaerentis, quo sempiterne dicit deus omnia, neque sono uocis neque cogitatione tempora sonorum uoluente, sed coaeterna sibi luce a se genitae sapientiae non imitatur inperfectio, cum dissimilis ab eo, quod summe ac primitus est, informitate quadam tendit ad nihilum, sed tunc imitatur uerbi formam semper atque incommutabiliter patri cohaerentem, cum et ipsa pro sui generis conuersione ad id, quod uere ac semper est, id est ad creatorem suae substantiae, formam capit et fit perfecta creatura? ut in eo, quod scriptura narrat: dixit deus: fiat, intellegamus dei dictum incorporeum in natura uerbi eius coaeterni, reuocantis ad se inperfectionem creaturae, ut non sit informis, sed formetur secundum singula, quae per ordinem exequitur. in qua conuersione et formatione quia pro suo modo imitatur deum uerbum, hoc est dei filium semper patri cohaerentem plena similitudine et essentia pari, qua ipse et pater unum sunt, non autem imitatur hanc uerbi formam, si auersa a creatore informis et inperfecta remaneat, propterea filii commemoratio non ita fit, quia uerbum, sed tantum, quia principium est, cum dicitur: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram; exordium quippe creaturae insinuatur adhuc in informitate inperfectionis. fit autem filii commemoratio, quod etiam uerbum est, in eo, quod scriptum est: dixit deus: fiat, ut per id, quod principium est, insinuet exordium creaturae existentis ab illo adhuc inperfectae, per id autem, quod uerbum est, insinuet perfectionem creaturae reuocatae ad eum, ut formaretur inhaerendo creatori et pro suo genere imitando formam sempiterne atque incommutabiliter inhaerentem patri, a quo statim hoc est, quod ille.

Or, when the formlessness of matter, whether spiritual or bodily, was first being made, was it not right to say, “God said, ‘Let there be,’” because imperfection does not imitate the form of the Word, who always cleaves to the Father, by whom God eternally says all things, neither by the sound of a voice nor by a thought that runs through the times of sounds, but by the light of the wisdom begotten from himself and coeternal with himself; imperfection does not imitate it when, unlike that which is supremely and originally, it tends by a kind of formlessness toward nothing; but it imitates the form of the Word, which always and unchangeably cleaves to the Father, when it too, by the turning proper to its kind toward that which truly and always is, that is, toward the Creator of its substance, takes on form and becomes a perfect creature? So that in what Scripture narrates, “God said, ‘Let there be,’” we may understand the incorporeal saying of God in the nature of his coeternal Word, calling back to himself the imperfection of the creature, so that it may not be formless but be formed according to each of the things that it sets out in order. In this turning and forming, it imitates in its own measure God the Word, that is, the Son of God who always cleaves to the Father in full likeness and equal essence, by which he and the Father are one; but it does not imitate this form of the Word if, turned away from the Creator, it remains formless and imperfect. That is why mention of the Son is made, not as the Word, but only as the Beginning, when it is said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth”; for the first beginning of creation, still in the formlessness of imperfection, is suggested there. But mention of the Son as also the Word is made in what is written, “God said, ‘Let there be’”: so that by his being the Beginning it suggests the first beginning of creation, existing from him while still imperfect, and by his being the Word it suggests the perfection of creation called back to him, so that it might be formed by cleaving to the Creator and by imitating, according to its kind, the form that cleaves eternally and unchangeably to the Father, from whom he immediately is what the Father is.

1.5CSEL 28.1:8–9

Non enim habet informem uitam uerbum filius, cui non solum hoc est esse quod uiuere, sed etiam hoc est ei uiuere, quod est sapienter ac beate uiuere. creatura uero quamquam spiritalis et intellectualis uel rationalis, quae uidetur esse illi uerbo propinquior, potest habere informem uitam, quia non, sicut hoc est ei esse quod uiuere, ita hoc uiuere quod sapienter ac beate uiuere. auersa enim a sapientia incommutabili stulte ac misere uiuit, quae informitas est. formatur autem conuersa ad incommutabile lumen sapientiae, uerbum dei; a quo enim extitit, ut sit utcumque ac uiuat, ad illum conuertitur, ut sapienter ac beate uiuat. principium quippe creaturae intellectualis est aeterna sapientia: quod principium manens in se incommutabiliter nullo modo cessaret occulta inspiratione uocationis loqui ei creaturae, cui principium est, ut conuerteretur ad id, ex quo esset, quod aliter formata ac perfecta esse non posset. ideoque interrogatus, quis esset, respondit: principium, quia et loquor uobis.

For the Word, the Son, does not have a formless life: for him, not only is to be the same as to live, but also to live is the same as to live wisely and blessedly. But creation, even spiritual and intellectual or rational creation, which seems to be nearer to that Word, can have a formless life, because, although for it to be is the same as to live, to live is not the same as to live wisely and blessedly. For when it is turned away from unchangeable Wisdom it lives foolishly and wretchedly, and this is formlessness. But it is formed when it is turned to the unchangeable light of Wisdom, the Word of God; for it turns to him by whom it came to be, so that it exists in some way and lives, in order to live wisely and blessedly. For the beginning of intellectual creation is eternal Wisdom; and this Beginning, remaining unchangeably in himself, would never cease to speak by the hidden inspiration of his call to the creature of which he is the beginning, so that it might turn to him from whom it came to be, because otherwise it could not be formed and perfected. And so, when he was asked who he was, he answered, “The Beginning, because I also speak to you.”

1.6CSEL 28.1:9–10

Quod autem filius loquitur, pater loquitur, quia patre loquente dicitur uerbum, quod filius est, aeterno more, si more dicendum est, loquente deo uerbum coaeternum. inest enim deo benignitas summa et sancta et iusta et quidam non ex indigentia, sed ex beneficientia ueniens amor in opera sua. propterea priusquam scriberetur: dixit deus: fiat lux, praecessit scriptura dicens: et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam, quia, siue aquae nomine appellare uoluit totam corporalem materiam, ut eo modo insinuaret, unde facta et formata sunt omnia, quae in suis generibus iam dinoscere possumus, appellans aquam, quia ex humida natura uidemus omnia in terra per species uarias formari atque concrescere, siue spiritalem uitam quandam ante formam conuersionis quasi fluitantem, superferebatur utique spiritus dei, quia subiacebat scilicet bonae uoluntati creatoris quidquid illud erat quod formandum perficiendumque inchoauerat, ut dicente deo in uerbo suo: fiat lux, in bona uoluntate, hoc est bono placito eius pro modo sui generis maneret, quod factum est. et ideo rectum est, quod placuerit deo, scriptura dicente: et facta est lux. et uidit deus lucem quia bona est, ut, quemadmodum in ipso exordio inchoatae creaturae, quae caeli et terrae nomine propter id, quod de illa perficiendum erat, commemorata est, trinitas insinuatur creatoris — nam dicente scriptura: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram intellegimus patrem in dei nomine et filium in principii nomine, qui non patri, sed per se ipsum creatae primitus ac potissimum spiritali creaturae et consequenter etiam uniuersae creaturae principium est. dicente autem scriptura: et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam, conpletam commemorationem trinitatis agnoscimus —, ita et in conuersione atque perfectione creaturae, ut rerum species digerantur, eadem trinitas insinuetur, uerbum dei scilicet et uerbi generator, cum dicitur: dixit deus, et sancta bonitas, in qua deo placet quidquid ei pro suae naturae modulo perfectum placet, cum dicitur: uidit deus quia bonum est.

And what the Son speaks, the Father speaks, because when the Father speaks, the Word who is the Son is spoken, in an eternal manner (if “manner” may be said), God speaking the coeternal Word. For there is in God a supreme goodness, holy and just, and a kind of love for his works that comes not from need but from beneficence. That is why, before it was written, “God said, ‘Let there be light,’” Scripture first said, “And the Spirit of God was borne over the water.” Whether by the name of water he meant to call all bodily matter, so as to suggest in this way that from which all the things were made and formed that we can now distinguish in their kinds (calling it water because we see all things on earth formed and growing together in various forms from a moist nature), or whether he meant a kind of spiritual life, as it were in flux before the form given by its turning, in either case the Spirit of God was borne over it, because whatever it was that he had begun, to be formed and perfected, was subject to the good will of the Creator. So when God said in his Word, “Let there be light,” what was made would remain, in the measure of its kind, in his good will, that is, in his good pleasure. And so it is right that it pleased God, as Scripture says, “And there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good.” Thus, just as at the very first beginning of creation, which was mentioned under the name of heaven and earth because of what was to be perfected from it, the Trinity of the Creator is suggested (for when Scripture says, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” we understand the Father in the name “God” and the Son in the name “Beginning,” who is the Beginning, not to the Father, but first and chiefly to the spiritual creation created through himself, and consequently to the whole of creation too; and when Scripture says, “And the Spirit of God was borne over the water,” we recognize the complete mention of the Trinity), so also in the turning and perfecting of creation, by which the forms of things are set in order, the same Trinity is suggested: the Word of God and the begetter of the Word, when it is said, “God said,” and the holy goodness in which whatever pleases God, perfected according to the small measure of its nature, pleases him, when it is said, “God saw that it was good.”

1.7CSEL 28.1:10–11

Sed cur commemorata prius quamuis inperfecta creatura postea commemoratur spiritus dei prius dicente scriptura: terra autem erat inuisibilis et inconposita, et tenebrae erant super abyssum, ac deinde inferente: et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam? an, quia egenus atque indigus amor ita diligit, ut rebus, quas diligit, subiciatur, propterea, cum commemoraretur spiritus dei, in quo sancta eius beniuolentia dilectioque intellegitur, superferri dictus est, ne facienda opera sua per indigentiae necessitatem potius quam per abundantiam beneficientiae deus amare putaretur? cuius rei memor apostolus dicturus de caritate supereminentem uiam demonstraturum se ait et alio loco, supereminentem, inquit, scientiae caritatem Christi. cum ergo sic oporteret insinuari spiritum dei, ut superferri diceretur, commodius factum est, ut prius insinuaretur aliquid inchoatum, cui superferri diceretur, non enim loco, sed omnia superante ac praecellente potentia.

But why is creation, though imperfect, mentioned first, and the Spirit of God afterward, Scripture first saying, “But the earth was invisible and unformed, and darkness was over the abyss,” and then adding, “and the Spirit of God was borne over the water”? Is it because a needy and wanting love loves in such a way that it is subject to the things it loves, and therefore, when the Spirit of God was mentioned, in whom his holy benevolence and love are understood, he was said to be borne over, so that God would not be thought to love the works he was to make out of the necessity of need rather than out of the abundance of beneficence? Mindful of this, the apostle, when about to speak of love, says that he will show a way that surpasses all, and in another place he speaks of “the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge.” Since, then, the Spirit of God had to be suggested in such a way that he was said to be borne over, it was more fitting that something begun should be suggested first, over which he could be said to be borne, not in place, but by a power that surpasses and excels all things.

1.8CSEL 28.1:11

Ita etiam rebus ex illa inchoatione perfectis atque formatis uidit deus, quia bonum est; placuit enim quod factum est in ea benignitate, qua placuit, ut fieret. duo quippe sunt, propter quae amat deus creaturam suam, ut sit et ut maneat. ut esset ergo, quod maneret, spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam; ut autem maneret, uidit deus, quia bonum est. et quod de luce dictum est, hoc de omnibus. manent enim quaedam supergressa omnem temporalem uolubilitatem in amplissima sanctitate sub deo, quaedam uero secundum sui temporis modos, dum per decessionem successionemque rerum saeculorum pulchritudo contexitur.

So also, when things had been perfected and formed out of that beginning, “God saw that it was good”; for what was made pleased him in that goodness by which it pleased him that it should be made. There are two reasons for which God loves his creation: that it may be, and that it may abide. So, that there might be something to abide, the Spirit of God was borne over the water; and that it might abide, God saw that it was good. And what was said of the light is said of all things. For some things abide, having passed beyond all temporal change, in the fullest holiness under God; and others abide according to the measures of their own time, while the beauty of the ages is woven together by the passing away and succession of things.

1.9CSEL 28.1:11–14

Quod ergo dixit deus: fiat lux. et facta est lux, in aliquo die dixit an ante omnem diem? si enim uerbo sibi coaeterno dixit, hoc utique intemporaliter dixit; si uero temporaliter dixit, non uerbo sibi coaeterno, sed per aliquam creaturam dixit temporalem. ac per hoc non erit prima creatura lux, quia iam erat, per quam temporaliter diceretur: fiat lux. atque illud ante omnem diem fecisse intellegitur, quod dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, ut caeli nomine intellegatur spiritalis iam facta et formata creatura, tamquam caelum caeli huius, quod in corporibus summum est. secundo enim die factum est firmamentum, quod rursus caelum appellauit. terrae autem nomine inuisibilis et inconpositae ac tenebrosa abysso inperfectio corporalis substantiae significata est, unde temporalia illa fierent, quorum prima esset lux. Quomodo autem per creaturam, quam fecit ante tempora, dici potuit temporaliter: fiat lux, inuenire difficile est. sono uocis enim non intellegimus dictum; nam quidquid est tale, corporeum est. an ex illa inperfectione substantiae corporalis fecit aliquam uocem corpoream, per quam sonaret: fiat lux? ergo aliquod uocale corpus ante lucem creatum atque formatum est. sed si ita est, iam erat tempus, per quod uox curreret sonorumque spatia sibi succedentium praeterirent. quodsi iam erat tempus, antequam fieret lux, in quo tempore uox fieret, qua sonaret "fiat lux", ad quem diem pertinebat illud tempus? unus enim dies idemque primus ille numerari incipit, quo facta est lux. an ad ipsum diem pertinet totum spatium temporis, et quo factum est uocale corpus, per quod sonaret "fiat lux", et quo facta est ipsa lux? sed omnis talis uox propter audientis corporalem sensum a loquente profertur; ita enim factus est, ut percusso aere sentiat. numquid itaque talem habebat auditum illud quidquid erat inuisibile et inconpositum, cui sic deus personaret ac diceret: fiat lux? abscedat itaque haec ab animo cogitantis absurditas. Utrum ergo spiritalis motus, sed tamen temporalis erat, quo dictum intellegimus "fiat lux," expressus ab aeterno deo per uerbum coaeternum in creatura spiritali, quam iam fecerat, cum dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, id est, in illo caelo caeli? an et ista locutio non tantum sine aliquo sono, sed etiam sine ullo temporali motu spiritalis creaturae in eius mente atque ratione fixa quodammodo modo a uerbo patri coaeterno et quodammodo inpressa intellegitur, secundum quam moueretur et ad speciem conuerteretur inferior illa tenebrosa inperfectio naturae corporeae et fieret lux? sed multum est ac difficillimum capere, quomodo dicatur deo non temporaliter iubente neque id temporaliter audiente creatura, quae contemplatione ueritatis omnia tempora excedit, sed intellectualiter sibimet inpressas ab incommutabili dei sapientia rationes, tamquam intellegibiles locutiones, in ea, quae infra sunt, transmittente fieri temporales motus in rebus temporalibus uel formandis uel administrandis. si autem lux, quae primum dicta est, ut fiat, et facta est, etiam primatum creaturae tenere intellegenda est, ipsa est intellectualis uita, quae nisi ad creatorem inluminanda conuerteretur, fluitaret informiter. cum conuersa autem et inluminata est, factum est, quod in uerbo dei dictum est: fiat lux.

So when God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light, did he say it on some day or before every day? For if he said it by the Word coeternal with himself, he certainly said it outside time; but if he said it in time, he said it not by the Word coeternal with himself but through some temporal creature. And in that case light will not be the first creature, because there was already one through which “Let there be light” might be said in time. And what was said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” is understood to have been made before every day, so that by the name of heaven is understood the spiritual creation already made and formed, as it were the heaven of this heaven, which is the highest among bodies. For on the second day the firmament was made, which again he called heaven. And by the name of earth, invisible and unformed, and by the dark abyss, the imperfection of bodily substance is signified, from which those temporal things were to be made, of which light would be the first. But how “Let there be light” could be said in time through a creature that he made before times is hard to discover. For we do not understand it to have been said by the sound of a voice; whatever is of that kind is bodily. Did he make from that imperfection of bodily substance some bodily voice through which “Let there be light” might sound? Then some vocal body was created and formed before light. But if so, there was already time, through which the voice might run and the spans of sounds following one another might pass. And if there was already time before light was made, in which the voice might come to be by which “Let there be light” sounded, to what day did that time belong? For one day, the same day as the first, begins to be counted from the moment light was made. Or does the whole span of time belong to that day, both that in which the vocal body was made through which “Let there be light” sounded and that in which light itself was made? But every such voice is uttered by a speaker for the bodily sense of a hearer, which is made to perceive when the air is struck. Did that invisible and unformed thing, whatever it was, have such hearing, so that God sounded to it and said, “Let there be light”? Let this absurdity depart, then, from the mind of one who thinks about it. Was it, then, a spiritual movement, yet a temporal one, by which we understand “Let there be light” to have been said, produced by the eternal God through the coeternal Word in the spiritual creation that he had already made when it was said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” that is, in that heaven of heaven? Or is this utterance understood to be not only without any sound, but also without any temporal movement of the spiritual creation, fixed in some manner in its mind and reason and in some manner imprinted by the Word coeternal with the Father, according to which that lower dark imperfection of bodily nature would be moved and turned to form, and light would come to be? But it is a great thing, and most difficult, to grasp how it may be said that, while God does not command in time and the creature does not hear in time (for by the contemplation of truth it goes beyond all times), but transmits to the things below it the reasons imprinted on it intellectually by the unchangeable Wisdom of God, as intelligible utterances, temporal movements come about in temporal things, whether they are being formed or governed. But if the light that was first told to come into being, and came into being, is also to be understood as holding the first place in creation, it is intellectual life itself, which would be in flux without form if it were not turned to the Creator to be enlightened. But when it was turned and enlightened, there came about what was said in the Word of God, “Let there be light.”

1.10CSEL 28.1:14–16

Uerum tamen quemadmodum sine tempore dictum est. quia in uerbum coaeternum patri non cadit tempus, utrum ita etiam sine tempore factum sit, quisquam forsitan quaerat. sed quomodo potest hoc intellegi, cum facta luce et diuisa a tenebris et inditis diei noctisque uocabulis dicat scriptura: et facta est uespera, et factum est mane dies unus? unde uidetur illud opus dei factum per spatium diei, quo peracto ad uesperam uentum est, quod est noctis initium. itemque peracto nocturno spatio conpletus est totus dies, ut mane fieret in alterum diem, in quo die deus aliud consequenter operaretur. Immo uero id ipsum permirabile est, cum deus nullo spatio syllabarum aeterna uerbi sui ratione dixerit: fiat lux, cur tanta mora facta sit lux, donec diei spatium praeteriret et uespera fieret. an forte cito quidem lux facta est, sed mora diurni temporis in eo consumi potuit, cum discerneretur a tenebris, atque utrumque discretum suis uocabulis signaretur?. mirum, si et hoc uel tanta mora fieri potuit a deo, quanta dicitur a nobis. discretio quippe lucis et tenebrarum in ipso utique opere, cum lux fieret, consecuta est; non enim lux esse potuit, nisi discerneretur a tenebris. Quod autem uocauit deus lucem diem et tenebras noctem, quanta mora fieri poterat, etiam si hoc syllabatim per sonum uocis egisset, nisi quanta et a nobis dicitur "lux uocetur dies et tenebrae uocentur nox?" nisi forte quis ita desipiat, ut, quia super omnia magnus est deus, putet ore dei prolatas quamuis paucissimas syllabas per totum diei spatium potuisse distendi. huc accedit, quia uerbo sibi coaeterno, id est incommutabilis sapientiae internis aeternisque rationibus, non corporali uocis sono uocauit deus lucem diem et tenebras noctem. rursum enim quaeritur, si uerbis, quibus utimur, uocauit, qua lingua uocauerit, et quid opus erat sonis transeuntibus, ubi cuiusquam non erat corporalis ullus auditus. et non inuenitur. An dicendum est, quod, cum cito peractum esset hoc opus dei. tamdiu stetit lux non succedente nocte, donec diurnum spatium perageretur, et tamdiu mansit nox luci succedens, donec spatium nocturni temporis praeteriret, et mane fieret diei sequentis uno primoque transacto? sed, si hoc dixero, uereor, ne deridear et ab his, qui certissime cognouerunt, et ab his, qui possunt facillime aduertere, quod eo tempore, quo nox apud nos est, eas partes mundi praesentia lucis inlustret, per quas sol ab occasu in ortum redit, ac per hoc omnibus uiginti quattuor horis non deesse per circuitum gyri totius alibi diem, alibi noctem. numquidnam ergo in parte aliqua posituri sumus deum, ubi ei uespera fieret, cum ab ea parte in aliam partem lux abscederet? nam et in libro, qui appellatur Ecclesiastes, ita scriptum est: et oritur sol, et occidit sol, et in locum suum ducit, hoc est, in eum locum, unde ortus est. sequitur enim et dicit: ipse oriens illuc uadit ad austrum et circuit ad aquilonem. australis ergo pars cum habet solem, nobis dies est, cum autem ad partem aquilonis circumiens peruenit, nobis nox est; non tamen in alia parte non est dies, ubi praesentia solis est: nisi forte poeticis figmentis cor inclinandum est, ut credamus solem mari se inmergere atque inde lotum ex alia parte mane surgere. quamquam, si ita esset, abyssus ipsa praesentia solis inlustraretur, atque ibi esset dies. posset enim et aquas inluminare, quando ab eis non posset extingui. sed hoc monstrosum est suspicari. quid? quod etiam sol nondum erat. Quapropter, si spiritalis lux primo die facta est, numquidnam occidit, ut ei succederet nox? si autem corporalis, quaenam illa lux est, quam post occasum solis uidere non possumus, quia nec luna erat adhuc nec aliquae stellae? aut si semper in ea parte caeli est, in qua sol, ut non sit solis lux, sed quasi comes eius eidem ita coniuncta, ut discerni dinoscique non possit, ad eandem reditur difficultatem soluendae huius quaestionis, quia et ista lux eodem modo quo sol tamquam comes eius ab occasu in ortum circumiens redit et est in alia parte mundi, quo tempore pars ista, in qua sumus. tenebrescit in noctem. ex quo cogit, quod absit, in una parte credere deum fuisse, quam partem lux ista desereret, ut posset ei uespera fieri. an forte in ea parte lucem ferat, in qua facturus erat hominem, et ideo, cum ab ipsa parte lux discessisset, uespera facta dicitur, etiam cum in alia parte lux illa esset, quae inde discesserat, mane exortura peracto circuitu?

Yet, just as it was said without time, because time does not touch the Word coeternal with the Father, someone might perhaps ask whether it was also made without time. But how can this be understood, when, after light was made and separated from the darkness and the names of day and night were given, Scripture says, “And evening came, and morning came, one day”? From this it seems that that work of God was done over the span of a day, at whose completion evening came, which is the beginning of night; and again, when the span of night was completed, the whole day was finished, so that morning came for the next day, on which God would go on to do another work. Indeed, this itself is most remarkable: when God said, “Let there be light,” by the eternal reason of his Word without any span of syllables, why did light take so long to be made, until the span of a day passed and evening came? Or perhaps light was made quickly, but the delay of daytime could be spent in its being separated from the darkness and in each being marked, once separated, with its own name? It would be strange if even this could take God as long as it takes us to say it. For the separation of light and darkness followed in the very act by which light was made; there could be no light unless it were separated from darkness. And as for God’s calling the light day and the darkness night, how long could that take, even if he had done it syllable by syllable with the sound of a voice, except as long as it takes us to say, “Let the light be called day and the darkness night”? Unless someone is so foolish as to think that, because God is great above all things, even very few syllables uttered by the mouth of God could have been stretched over the whole span of a day. Besides, God called the light day and the darkness night by the Word coeternal with himself, that is, by the inner and eternal reasons of unchangeable Wisdom, not by the bodily sound of a voice. For again it is asked, if he called them with words such as we use, in what language did he call them, and what need was there of passing sounds where there was no bodily hearing of anyone? And no answer is found. Or is it to be said that, when this work of God was quickly completed, the light remained, with no night following, until the span of a day was finished, and the night that followed the light remained until the span of night-time passed and the morning of the next day came, the one and first day having been completed? But if I say this, I fear I shall be laughed at both by those who know with full certainty, and by those who can very easily observe, that at the time when it is night with us the presence of light illuminates those parts of the world through which the sun returns from its setting to its rising, and that for this reason, throughout all twenty-four hours, as it goes round the whole circuit, there is always day in one place and night in another. Are we then going to place God in some region where evening would come for him, when the light departed from that region to another? For in the book called Ecclesiastes it is written thus: “And the sun rises, and the sun sets, and it leads to its place,” that is, to the place from which it rose. For it goes on to say, “Rising, it goes there to the south and circles round to the north.” So when the southern part has the sun, it is day for us; and when, circling round, it reaches the northern part, it is night for us. Yet it is not that there is no day in another part, where the sun is present: unless perhaps the heart is to be inclined to the fictions of poets, so that we believe the sun plunges into the sea and, washed there, rises in the morning on the other side. And yet, even if it were so, the abyss itself would be illuminated by the presence of the sun, and it would be day there; for the sun could light up the waters too, since it could not be extinguished by them. But it is monstrous to suspect this. And what of this, that the sun did not yet exist? Therefore, if it was a spiritual light that was made on the first day, did it set, so that night might follow it? And if it was bodily, what is that light which we cannot see after the sun has set, since there was not yet a moon or any stars? Or if it is always in the part of the sky where the sun is, so that it is not the light of the sun but, as it were, its companion, joined to it in such a way that it cannot be distinguished and told apart, we return to the same difficulty in solving this question: for this light too, like the sun as its companion, goes round and returns from setting to rising and is in the other part of the world at the time when this part, in which we are, grows dark into night. From this one is forced (God forbid) to believe that God was in one part of the world, which this light left, so that evening could come for him. Or perhaps he brought the light into the part in which he was going to make man, and so, when the light had departed from that part, evening is said to have come, even though that light which had departed from there was in another part, to rise again in the morning when its circuit was completed?

1.11CSEL 28.1:16–17

Ut quid ergo factus est sol in potestatem diei, qui luceret super terram, si lux illa diei faciendo suffecerat, quae dies etiam uocata erat? an illa prior regiones superiores a terra longinquas inlustrabat, ut sentiri non posset in terris, atque ita oportebat solem fieri, per quem dies inferioribus mundi partibus adpareret? potest et hoc dici auctum esse fulgorem diei sole addito, ut per illam lucem minus fulgens dies, quam nunc est, fuisse credatur. etiam hoc a quodam dictum scio primum naturam lucis inductam in opere creatoris, cum dictum est: fiat lux. et facta est lux, postea uero — quod de luminaribus dicitur — quid ex ipsa luce factum sit fuisse commemoratum ordine dierum, quo uisum est creatori cuncta esse facienda: quae natura lucis quo transierit facta uespera, ut uicissim nox perageretur, nec ille dixit nec facile inueniri posse arbitror. neque enim extinctam esse credendum est, ut nocturnae tenebrae succederent, et rursus accensam, ut mane fieret, antequam hoc solis officio gereretur, quod a quarto die coepisse fieri eadem scriptura testatur.

To what end, then, was the sun made to rule the day and to shine over the earth, if that light, which had even been called day, was enough to make the day? Did that earlier light illuminate the higher regions far from the earth, so that it could not be perceived on earth, and so the sun had to be made, through which day would appear to the lower parts of the world? This too can be said: that the brightness of day was increased by the addition of the sun, so that the day may be believed to have been less bright by that light than it is now. I know that someone has also said this: that the nature of light was first introduced in the work of the Creator when it was said, “Let there be light,” and there was light; but that afterward (in what is said of the lights in the sky) it was recorded what was made from that light, in the order of days in which it seemed good to the Creator that all things should be made. But where that nature of light went when evening came, so that night might pass in its turn, he did not say, nor do I think it can easily be found. For we must not believe that it was extinguished so that the darkness of night might follow, and kindled again so that morning might come, before this was done by the office of the sun, which the same Scripture testifies began on the fourth day.

1.12CSEL 28.1:17–19

Quod antequam fieret, quo circuitu sibi potuerint tres dies noctesque succedere lucis, quae primo facta est, permanente natura, si lux corporalis tunc facta intellegenda est, et inuenire et explicare difficile est. nisi forte molem terrenam et aquosam, antequam esset ab alterutro utrumque discretum, quod tertio die factum scribitur, tenebras deum appellasse quis dixerit propter crassiorem corpulentiam, quam lux penetrare non poterat, uel propter obscurissimam umbram tantae molis, quam necesse est, ut ex altera parte habeat corpus, ex alia parte lux fuerit. ad quem locum enim cuiuslibet corporis moles lucem peruenire non sinit, in eo loco umbra est, quoniam locus carens ea luce, qua inlustraretur, nisi inpediret corpus obpositum, hoc totum est, quod umbra dicitur. quae si pro mole corporis tam magna fuerit, ut occupet spatium terrae, quantum ex altera parte dies occupat, nox uocatur; neque enim omnes tenebrae nox. nam et in speluncis amplis, in quarum abdita lux inrumpere per obpositam molem non sinitur, sunt utique tenebrae, quia lux non est ibi, totumque illud spatium locus est carens luce; nec tamen tales tenebrae acceperunt uocabulum noctis, sed illae, quae in eam terrae partem succedunt, unde remouetur dies. sicut non omnis lux dies appellatur — nam et lunae lux est et siderum et lucernarum et coruscationum et quarumque rerum ita fulgentium - sed illa lux appellatur dies, cui nox praecedenti recedentique succedit. Sed si primaria lux illa undique terrae molem circumfusa contexerat, siue staret siue circumiret, non erat, ex qua parte admitteret noctem sibi succedere, quia nusquam ipsa discedebat, ut ei faceret locum. an ex una parte facta est, ut ipsa circumiens etiam noctem ex alia parte consequenter circumire permitteret? cum enim totam terram adhuc aqua tegeret, nihil inpediebat, ut aquosa et globosa moles ex una parte faceret diem lucis praesentia, ex alia noctem lucis absentia quae in eam partem succederet a tempore uespertino, ex qua lux in aliam declinaret. Quo ergo congregatae sunt aquae, si totam terram prius occupauerant? illae scilicet, quae detractae sunt, ut terra daretur, in quam partem congregatae sunt? si enim erat aliquid nudum terrae, quo congregarentur, iam adparebat arida nec totum abyssus occupabat; si autem totum texerant, quis erat locus, quo colligerentur, ut terrae ariditas adpareret? numquidnam in altum congregatae sunt, sicut fit, cum ad uentilandum in area messis trita subrigitur et congesta in aggerem nudat locum, quem diffusa contexerat? quis hoc dixerit, cum uideat usquequaque campos maris aequaliter fusos, quia etiam, cum aquae fluctuantis quidam uelut montes eriguntur, sedatis rursus tempestatibus conplanantur? et si qua litora nudantur latius, non potest dici nulla esse alia terrarum spatia, quo accedat id, quod aliunde decedit, unde in eum locum, ex quo recesserat, iterum accedat. cum autem tota omnino terra undosa natura cooperiretur, quo cederet, ut nudaret aliquas partes? an forte rarior aqua uelut nebula terras tegebat, quae congregatione spissata est, ut ex multis eas partibus, in quibus arida posset adparere, nudaret? quamquam et terra longe lateque subsidens potuit alias partes praebere concauas, quibus confluentes et conruentes aquae reciperentur, et adpareret arida ex his partibus, unde umor abscederet. Non est autem informis omni modo materies, ubi etiam nebulosa species adparuerit.

Before that was done, it is hard both to discover and to explain by what circuit three days and nights could have followed one another while the nature of the light that was made first remained, if it is a bodily light that is to be understood as made then. Unless perhaps someone were to say that God called the mass of earth and water darkness, before each was separated from the other (which is written to have been done on the third day), because of its denser bulk, which light could not penetrate, or because of the very dark shadow of so great a mass, which must exist on one side of it if light was on the other side. For in whatever place the mass of any body prevents the light from reaching, there is shadow; since a place lacking the light by which it would be illuminated if the body placed in the way did not hinder it, this is all that is called shadow. And if, because of the bulk of the body, this shadow is so great as to occupy as much space on the earth as the day occupies on the other side, it is called night. For not all darkness is night. In large caves, too, into whose recesses light is not allowed to break because of the mass in the way, there is certainly darkness, because there is no light there, and that whole space is a place lacking light; yet such darkness has not received the name of night, but only that which follows in that part of the earth from which the day is removed. So too not every light is called day, for there is the light of the moon and of the stars and of lamps and of lightning flashes and of all things that shine in that way; but that light is called day which night precedes and which, as it withdraws, night follows. But if that first light had surrounded the mass of the earth on every side and covered it, whether it stood still or went round, there was no side from which it would let night follow it, since it never departed anywhere to make room for night. Or was it made on one side, so that by going round it allowed night also to go round on the other side, following it? For since water still covered the whole earth, nothing prevented the watery and globe-shaped mass from making day on one side by the presence of light, and on the other night by the absence of light, night following, from evening on, into the part from which the light was moving away to another. Where, then, were the waters gathered, if they had previously occupied the whole earth? Those namely which were drawn off so that earth might be given, into what part were they gathered? For if there was some bare part of the earth into which they might be gathered, dry land was already visible and the abyss did not occupy everything; but if they had covered everything, what place was there into which they might be collected, so that the dryness of the earth might appear? Were they gathered upward, as happens when the threshed harvest is raised up on the threshing floor for winnowing and, heaped into a pile, lays bare the place that it covered when spread out? Who would say this, when he sees the plains of the sea spread out evenly everywhere, since even when certain mountains, as it were, of rolling water are raised up, they are levelled again when the storms are calmed? And if some shores are laid bare more widely, it cannot be said that there are no other stretches of land to which what withdraws from one place may come, so as to return from there again to the place from which it had withdrawn. But when the whole earth was entirely covered by watery nature, where could it withdraw so as to lay bare some parts? Or perhaps a thinner water like a mist covered the lands, which was thickened by being gathered, so as to lay bare the lands in many of those parts in which dry land could appear? And yet the earth too, sinking far and wide, could have offered other hollow parts, in which the waters flowing together and rushing down might be received, and dry land might appear in those parts from which the moisture withdrew. But matter is not formless in every way where even a misty form has appeared.

1.13CSEL 28.1:19–20

Et ideo quaeri adhuc potest, quando deus istas conspicuas aquarum terrarumque species qualitatesque creauerit; in nullo enim sex dierum hoc inuenitur. itaque si hoc ante omnem diem fecit, sicut ante istorum dierum primorum commemorationem scriptum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, ut in terrae uocabulo intellegamus iam formatam terrenam speciem superfusis aquis ista iam uisibili specie sui generis declaratis, ut in eo, quod sequitur scriptura dicens: terra autem erat inuisibilis et inconposita, et tenebrae erant super abyssum; et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam, nullam opinemur informitatem materiae, sed terram et aquam sine luce, quae nondum erat facta. suis iam notissimis qualitatibus conditas, ut ideo terra inuisibilis dicta intellegatur, quod aquis cooperta non posset uideri, etiamsi esset, qui posset uidere, ideo uero inconposita. quia nondum a mari distincta et cincta litoribus et suis fetibus animalibusque decorata: si ergo ita est, cur istae species. quae procul dubio corporales sunt, ante omnem diem factae sunt? cur non scriptum est: dixit deus: fiat terra. et facta est terra, item: dixit deus: fiat aqua. et facta est aqua. uel utrumque communiter, si una quasi lege loci infimi continentur. dixit deus: fiat terra. et sic est factum?

And so it can still be asked when God created these visible forms and qualities of waters and lands; for this is found on none of the six days. So if he did this before every day, as it is written before these first days are mentioned, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” so that by the word “earth” we understand the earthly form already shaped, with waters poured over it, these already declared in the visible form of their kind, then in what Scripture says next, “But the earth was invisible and unformed, and darkness was over the abyss, and the Spirit of God was borne over the water,” we would think of no formlessness of matter, but of earth and water without light (which had not yet been made), already established with their now well-known qualities. So the earth would be understood to be called invisible because, covered by the waters, it could not be seen, even if there were someone who could see; and unformed because it was not yet separated from the sea and bounded by shores and adorned with its offspring and animals. If, then, this is so, why were these forms, which are without doubt bodily, made before every day? Why is it not written, “God said, ‘Let there be earth,’ and earth was made,” and likewise, “God said, ‘Let there be water,’ and water was made”; or both together, if they are held under one law, as it were, of the lowest place, “God said, ‘Let there be earth,’ and so it was done”?

1.14CSEL 28.1:20–21

Cur non dictum est, cum hoc factum esset, "uidit deus, quia bonum est"? Haec enim consideratio suasit, quoniam manifestum est omne mutabile ex aliqua informitate formari simulque illud et catholica fides praescribit et certissima ratio docet nullarum naturarum materiam esse potuisse nisi ab omnium rerum non solum formatarum, sed etiam formabilium inchoatore deo atque creatore, de qua etiam dicit ei quaedam scriptura: qui fecisti mundum ex materia informi, hanc materiam illis uerbis, quibus pro spiritali prudentia tardioribus etiam lectoribus uel auditoribus congrueretur, fuisse commemoratam, quibus ante dierum enumerationem dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram et cetera, donec diceretur: et dixit deus, ut deinceps formatarum rerum ordo consequeretur.

Why was it not said, when this had been done, “God saw that it was good”? This consideration, then, has persuaded me. It is clear that everything changeable is formed from some formlessness; and at the same time the catholic faith prescribes and the most certain reason teaches that there could be no matter of any natures except from God, the originator and Creator not only of all things formed but also of all things that can be formed (of this matter a certain scripture also says to him, “You who made the world out of formless matter”). Hence this matter was mentioned in those words which, by spiritual prudence, would suit even slower readers or hearers, the words said before the counting of the days, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” and so on, until it was said, “And God said,” so that the order of formed things might then follow.

1.15CSEL 28.1:21–22

Non quia informis materia formatis rebus tempore prior est, cum sit utrumque simul concreatum, et unde factum est, et quod factum est — sicut enim uox materia uerborum est, uerba uero formatam uocem indicant, non autem qui loquitur prius emittit informem uocem, quam possit postea conligere atque in uerba formare: ita et deus creator non priore tempore fecit informem materiam et eam postea per ordinem - quarumque naturarum quasi secunda consideratione formauit; formatam quippe creauit materiam — sed quia illud, unde fit aliquid, etsi non tempore, tamen quadam origine prius est, quam illud, quod inde fit, potuit diuidere scriptura loquendi temporibus, quod deus faciendi temporibus non diuisit. si enim quaeratur, utrum uocem de uerbis an de uoce uerba faciamus, non facile quisquam ita tardo ingenio reperitur, qui non potius uerba fieri de uoce respondeat: ita quamuis utrumque simul qui loquitur faciat, quid unde faciat, naturali adtentioni satis adparet. quamobrem, cum simul utrumque deus fecerit, et materiam, quam formauit, et res, in quas eam formauit, et utrumque ab scriptura dici oportuerit, nec simul utrumque dici potuerit, prius illud, unde aliquid factum est, quam illud, quod inde factum est, dici debuisse quis dubitet? quia etiam cum dicimus materiam et formam, utrumque simul esse intellegimus nec utrumque simul possumus enuntiare. sicut autem in breuitate temporis contingit, cum duo ista uerba proferimus, ut alterum ante alterum proferamus, ita in prolixitate narrationis alterum prius quam alterum narrandum fuit, quamuis utrumque, ut dictum est, simul fecerit deus, ut, quod sola origine prius est in faciendo, etiam tempore prius sit in narrando, quia duae res, quarum etiam altera nullo modo prior est, nominari simul non possunt, quanto minus simul narrari! non itaque dubitandum est ita esse utcumque istam informem materiam prope nihil, ut non sit facta nisi a deo et rebus, quae de illa formatae sunt, simul concreata sit.

Not that formless matter is prior in time to formed things, since both were created together, that from which a thing was made and what was made. For just as the voice is the matter of words, and words signify formed voice, yet the speaker does not first emit a formless voice that he can afterward gather and form into words, so too God the Creator did not make formless matter at an earlier time and afterward form it in order, as by a second consideration, into the various natures; for he created matter already formed. But because that from which something is made, though not prior in time, is still prior in a kind of origin to that which is made from it, Scripture could divide in the times of speaking what God did not divide in the times of making. For if it is asked whether we make the voice from words or words from the voice, hardly anyone is found so slow-witted as not to answer that words are made from the voice. So, although the speaker makes both at once, what he makes from what is clear enough to natural attention. Therefore, since God made both at once, both the matter that he formed and the things into which he formed it, and Scripture had to speak of both but could not speak of both at once, who would doubt that it had to speak first of that from which something was made, and then of what was made from it? For even when we say “matter and form,” we understand both to exist at once, and yet we cannot utter both at once. And just as, in a short time, when we pronounce these two words, it happens that we pronounce one before the other, so in the length of a narrative one thing had to be narrated before the other, although God made both at once, as has been said; so that what is prior only in origin in the making is also prior in time in the narrating. For two things, of which one is in no way prior, cannot be named at once; how much less can they be narrated at once! So there is no doubt that this formless matter, however close to nothing, is such that it was made only by God and was created together with the things that were formed from it.

1.16CSEL 28.1:22–23

Sed si credibiliter dicitur eam significari illis uerbis: terra autem erat inuisibilis et inconposita, et tenebrae erant super abyssum; et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam, ut excepto, quod ibi positum est de spiritu dei, cetera rerum quidem uisibilium uocabula, sed ad illam informitatem, ut tardioribus poterat, insinuandam dicta intellegamus, quia duo haec elementa, id est terra et aqua, ad aliquid faciendum operantium manibus tractabiliora sunt ceteris, et ideo congruentius istis nominibus illa insinuabatur informitas: si ergo hoc probabiliter dicitur, non erat aliqua formata moles, quam lux ex una parte inlustrans ex altera faceret tenebras, unde nox posset die discedente succedere. Emissionem uero contractionemque lucis illius si uelimus diem noctemque intellegere, nec causam uidemus, cur ita fieret — non enim iam erant animalia, quibus haec uicissitudo salubriter exhiberetur et quibus postmodum exortis per circuitum solis cernimus exhiberi — nec ullum occurrit exemplum, quo istam emissionem contractionemque lucis, ut diei noctisque uicissitudines fierent, probare possimus. iactus enim radiorum ex oculis nostris cuiusdam quidem lucis est iactus et contrahi potest, cum aerem, qui est oculis nostris proximus, intuemur, et emitti, cum ad eandem rectitudinem quae sunt longe posita adtendimus. nec sane, cum contrahitur, omnino cernere, quae longe sunt, desinit, sed certe obscurius, quam cum in ea obtutus emittitur. sed tamen ea lux, quae in sensu uidentis est, tam exigua docetur, ut, nisi adiuuetur extraria luce, nihil uidere possimus; et quia discerni ab ea non potest, quo exemplo demonstrari possit emissio in diem et contractio lucis in noctem, sicut dixi, reperire difficile est.

But if it is said credibly that this matter is signified by the words, “But the earth was invisible and unformed, and darkness was over the abyss, and the Spirit of God was borne over the water” (so that, except for what is said there of the Spirit of God, we understand the rest as names indeed of visible things, but used to suggest that formlessness as it could be suggested to slower minds; because these two elements, earth and water, are more easily handled than the others by the hands of workers in making something, and so that formlessness was more fittingly suggested by these names); if, then, this is said with probability, there was no formed mass which the light, illuminating it on one side, might make dark on the other, so that night could follow when the day departed. And if we wish to understand day and night as the sending out and drawing in of that light, we neither see any cause why this should happen (for there were not yet living creatures for whom this alternation might be provided for their health, and for whom, after they came into being, we see it provided by the circuit of the sun), nor does any example occur to us by which we could prove such a sending out and drawing in of light to produce the alternations of day and night. The casting of rays from our eyes is indeed a casting of a certain light, and it can be drawn in when we look at the air nearest our eyes, and sent out when we attend to things far off in the same line. And certainly when it is drawn in it does not altogether cease to see what is far off, but sees it more dimly than when the gaze is sent out toward it. Yet the light that is in the sense of one who sees is shown to be so slight that unless it is helped by outside light we can see nothing; and because it cannot be told apart from that light, it is hard, as I said, to find an example by which the sending out of light for day and its drawing in for night could be demonstrated.

1.17CSEL 28.1:23–26

Si autem spiritalis lux facta est, cum dixit deus: fiat lux, non illa uera patri coaeterna intellegenda est, per quam facta sunt omnia, et quae inluminat omnem hominem, sed illa, de qua dici potuit: prior omnium creata est sapientia. cum enim aeterna illa et incommutabilis, quae non est facta, sed genita sapientia, in spiritales atque rationales creaturas sicut in animas sanctas se transfert, ut inluminatae lucere possint, fit in eis quaedam luculentae rationis adfectio, quae potest accipi facta lux, cum diceret deus: fiat lux, si iam erat creatura spiritalis, quae nomine caeli significata est in eo, quod scriptum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, non corporeum caelum, sed caelum incorporeum caeli corporei, hoc est super omne corpus non locorum gradibus, sed naturae sublimitate praepositum. quo autem modo simul fieri potuit, et quod inluminaretur et ipsa inluminatio, ac diuerso tempore narranda fuerit, paulo ante diximus, cum de materia tractaremus. Sed huic luci succedentem noctem, ut uespera fieret, quo pacto intellecturi sumus? a tenebris uero qualibus talis lux diuidi potuit dicente scriptura: et diuisit deus inter lucem et tenebras? numquid iam erant peccatores et stulti decidentes a lumine ueritatis, inter quos et in eadem luce permanentes diuideret deus, tamquam inter lucem et tenebras, et lucem uocans diem ac tenebras noctem ostenderet se non operatorem peccatorum, sed ordinatorem distributione meritorum? an hic dies totius temporis nomen est et omnia uolumina saeculorum hoc uocabulo includit ideoque non dictus est primus, sed unus dies? et facta est enim uespera, et factum est, inquit, mane dies unus, ut per hoc, quod facta est uespera, peccatum rationalis creaturae, quod autem factum est mane, renouatio eius significata uideatur. Sed haec allegoriae propheticae disputatio est, quam non isto sermone suscepimus. instituimus enim de scripturis nunc loqui secundum proprietatem rerum gestarum, non secundum aenigmata futurarum. ergo ad rationem factarum conditarumque naturarum quomodo inuenimus uesperam et mane in luce spiritali? an diuisio quidem lucis a tenebris distinctio est iam rei formatae ab informi, appellatio uero diei et noctis insinuatio distributionis est, qua significetur nihil deum inordinatum relinquere atque ipsam informitatem, per quam res de specie in speciem modo quodam transeundo mutantur, non esse indispositam neque defectus profectusque creaturae, quibus sibimet temporalia quaeque succedunt, sine subplemento esse decoris uniuersi? nox enim ordinatae sunt tenebrae. Propterea uero cum facta esset lux, dictum est: uidit deus lucem quia bona est, cum hoc posset post omnia eiusdem diei dicere, id est, ut, cum explicasset "dixit deus: fiat lux. et facta est lux. et diuisit deus inter lucem et tenebras et uocauit deus lucem diem et tenebras uocauit noctem", tunc diceret: et uidit deus, quia bonum est, et deinceps adnecteret: et facta est uespera, et factum est mane, sicut in aliis operibus facit, quibus uocabula inponit. hic ergo propterea non ita fecit, quoniam a formata re ad hoc distincta est illa informitas, ut non in ea finis esset, sed adhuc formanda restaret per creaturas ceteras iam corporales. itaque si, posteaquam distincta essent illa diuisione et uocabulis, tunc diceretur: uidit deus, quia bonum est, haec facta acciperemus significari, quibus iam in suo genere nihil esset addendum; quia uero lucem solam ita perfecerat, uidit deus, inquit, lucem quia bona est et diuisione ac nominibus discreuit a tenebris. neque tunc dixit: uidit deus, quia bonum est; ad hoc enim erat informitas illa discreta, ut adhuc inde alia formarentur. namque ista nox, quae nobis notissima est — facit enim eam super terras solis circuitus —, quando per luminarium distributionem a die diuiditur, post ipsam diuisionem diei et noctis dicitur: uidit deus, quia bonum est. non enim haec nox informis aliqua substantia erat, unde adhuc alia formarentur, sed spatium loci plenum aere, carens lumine diurno: cui utique nocti iam nihil addendum esset in genere suo, quo esset speciosior siue distinctior. uespera autem in toto illo triduo, antequam fierent luminaria, consummati operis terminus non absurde fortasse intellegitur; mane uero tamquam futurae operationis significatio.

But if it was a spiritual light that was made when God said, “Let there be light,” it is not to be understood as that true light, coeternal with the Father, through whom all things were made and who enlightens every man, but as that of which it could be said, “Wisdom was created before all things.” For when that eternal and unchangeable Wisdom, which was not made but begotten, passes into spiritual and rational creatures, as into holy souls, so that, enlightened, they can shine, there comes about in them a certain disposition of shining reason, which can be taken as the light made when God said, “Let there be light”; if there was already a spiritual creature signified by the name of heaven in what is written, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth”: not the bodily heaven, but the incorporeal heaven of the bodily heaven, that is, set above every body, not by degrees of place but by the loftiness of its nature. How both what was to be enlightened and the enlightening itself could be made at once, and yet had to be narrated at different times, we said a little earlier when we were treating of matter. But how are we to understand a night following this light, so that evening came? And from what kind of darkness could such a light be divided, when Scripture says, “And God divided between the light and the darkness”? Were there already sinners and fools falling away from the light of truth, between whom and those remaining in that light God divided, as between light and darkness, and by calling the light day and the darkness night showed that he is not the maker of sins but the one who orders them by the distribution of deserts? Or is this day the name of all time, which includes all the ages under this word, and is it therefore called not the first day but one day? For “evening came,” it says, “and morning came, one day,” so that by the coming of evening the sin of the rational creature seems to be signified, and by the coming of morning its renewal. But this is a discussion of prophetic allegory, which we have not undertaken in this work. For we have set out now to speak of the Scriptures according to the proper sense of things done, not according to the riddles of things to come. So, in terms of the natures made and established, how do we find evening and morning in a spiritual light? Is the dividing of the light from the darkness the distinction of a thing already formed from what is formless, while the naming of day and night suggests the ordering by which it is signified that God leaves nothing disordered; that formlessness itself, through which things change by passing in some way from form to form, is not unarranged; and that the failings and advances of creation, by which all temporal things succeed one another, are not without their contribution to the beauty of the universe? For night is ordered darkness. And the reason why it was said, as soon as light was made, “God saw the light, that it was good,” although he could have said this after everything of that same day (that is, when he had set out, “God said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light; and God divided between the light and the darkness, and God called the light day and the darkness he called night,” he could then have said, “And God saw that it was good,” and then added, “And evening came, and morning came,” as he does in the other works to which he gives names), the reason he did not do so here is that that formlessness was distinguished from the formed thing in such a way that it was not an end in itself but still remained to be formed through the other creatures, now bodily ones. So if, after they had been distinguished by that division and by names, it had then been said, “God saw that it was good,” we would take these to be signified as made things to which nothing more was to be added in their kind. But because he had perfected only the light in this way, “God saw,” it says, “the light, that it was good,” and he separated it from the darkness by division and names; and he did not then say, “God saw that it was good,” for that formlessness had been separated so that other things might still be formed from it. For this night that we know so well (the circuit of the sun over the lands makes it), when it is divided from the day by the arrangement of the lights, “God saw that it was good” is said after that division of day and night itself. For this night was not some formless substance from which other things would still be formed, but a space full of air lacking the light of day; and to this night certainly nothing more was to be added in its kind to make it more beautiful or more distinct. But evening, throughout those three days before the lights were made, may perhaps not unreasonably be understood as the end of a finished work, and morning as the signifying of a work to come.

1.18CSEL 28.1:26–27

Sed ante omnia meminerimus, unde iam multa diximus, non temporalibus quasi animi sui aut corporis motibus operari deum, sicut operatur homo uel angelus, sed aeternis atque incommutabilibus et stabilibus rationibus coaeterni sibi uerbi sui et quodam, ut ita dixerim, fotu pariter coaeterni sancti spiritus sui. nam et illud, quod per graecam et latinam linguam dictum est de spiritu dei, quod superferebatur super aquas, secundum syrae linguae intellectum, quae uicina est hebraeae — nam hoc a quodam docto christiano Syro fertur expositum — non superferebatur, sed fouebat potius intellegi perhibetur, nec sicut fouentur tumores aut uulnera in corpore aquis uel frigidis uel calore congruo temperatis, sed sicut oua fouentur ab alitibus, ubi calor ille materni corporis etiam formandis pullis quodammodo adminiculatur per quendam in suo genere dilectionis adfectum. non itaque per singulos dies istorum diuinorum operum tamquam temporales uoces dei carnaliter cogitemus. non enim ad hoc ipsa dei sapientia nostra infirmitate suscepta uenit ad conligendos sub alas suas filios Hierusalem quemadmodum gallina pullos suos, ut semper paruuli simus, sed ut malitia infantes mente esse pueri desinamus. Et in rebus obscuris atque a nostris oculis remotissimis, si qua inde scripta etiam diuina legerimus, quae possint salua fide, qua inbuimur, alias atque alias parere sententias, in nullam earum nos praecipiti adfirmatione ita proiciamus, ut, si forte diligentius discussa ueritas eam recte labefactauerit, corruamus, non pro sententia diuinarum scripturarum, sed pro nostra ita dimicantes, ut eam uelimus scripturarum esse, quae nostra est, cum potius eam, quae scripturarum est, nostram esse uelle debeamus.

But above all let us remember, as we have already said many times, that God does not work by temporal movements, as it were, of his mind or body, as a man or an angel works, but by the eternal, unchangeable and stable reasons of his Word, coeternal with himself, and by a kind of brooding, if I may put it so, of his Holy Spirit, equally coeternal. For what was said in the Greek and Latin languages of the Spirit of God, that he “was borne over the waters,” according to the sense of the Syriac language, which is close to Hebrew (this is reported to have been explained by a certain learned Syrian Christian), is said to be better understood not as “was borne over” but as “brooded over”; not as swellings or wounds in the body are treated with waters either cold or warmed to a suitable heat, but as eggs are brooded by birds, where the warmth of the mother’s body in some way also helps the chicks to be formed, through a kind of affection of love in its kind. So let us not think in a carnal way of temporal words of God on each of the days of these divine works. For the very Wisdom of God, having taken on our weakness, did not come to gather the children of Jerusalem under his wings, as a hen gathers her chicks, so that we might always be little ones, but so that, while being infants in malice, we might cease to be children in mind. And in obscure matters, very far removed from our eyes, if we read anything about them, even in the divine writings, that can give rise to different opinions without harm to the faith in which we are instructed, let us not throw ourselves into any one of them with headlong assertion, so that, if perhaps the truth, examined more carefully, rightly overturns it, we fall; fighting not for the meaning of the divine Scriptures but for our own, so that we would want our meaning to be that of the Scriptures, when we ought rather to want the meaning of the Scriptures to be ours.

1.19CSEL 28.1:27–29

Ponamus enim in eo, quod scriptum est: et dixit deus: fiat lux. et facta est lux, alium sensisse lucem corporalem factam et alium spiritalem. esse spiritalem lucem in creatura spiritali fides nostra non dubitat; esse autem lucem corporalem caelestem aut etiam super caelum uel ante caelum, cui succedere nox potuerit, tamdiu non est contra fidem, donec ueritate certissima refellatur. quod si factum fuerit. non hoc habebat scriptura diuina, sed hoc senserat humana ignorantia. si autem hoc uerum esse certa ratio demonstrauerit, adhuc incertum erit, utrum hoc in illis uerbis sanctorum librorum scriptor sentiri uoluerit, an aliud aliquid non minus uerum. quodsi cetera contextio sermonis non hoc eum uoluisse probauerit, non ideo falsum erit aliud, quod ipse intellegi uoluit, sed et uerum et quod utilius cognoscatur. si autem contextio scripturae hoc uoluisse intellegi scriptorem non repugnauerit, adhuc restabit quaerere, utrum et aliud non potuit. quodsi et aliud potuisse inuenerimus, incertum erit, quidnam eorum ille uoluerit; et utrumque sentiri uoluisse non inconuenienter creditur, si utrique sententiae cetera circumstantia subfragantur. Plerumque enim accidit, ut aliquid de terra, de caelo, de ceteris mundi huius elementis, de motu et conuersione uel etiam magnitudine et interuallis siderum, de certis defectibus solis ac lunae, de circuitibus annorum et temporum, de naturis animalium, fruticum, lapidum atque huiusmodi ceteris etiam non christianus ita nouerit, ut certissima ratione uel experientia teneat. turpe est autem nimis et perniciosum ac maxime cauendum, ut christianum de his rebus quasi secundum christianas litteras loquentem ita delirare audiat, ut, quemadmodum dicitur, toto caelo errare conspiciens risum tenere uix possit. et non tam molestum est, quod errans homo deridetur, sed quod auctores nostri ab eis, qui foris sunt, talia sensisse creduntur et cum magno eorum exitio, de quorum salute satagimus, tamquam indocti reprehenduntur atque respuuntur. cum enim quemquam de numero christianorum in ea re quam optime norunt errare conprehenderint et uanam sententiam suam de nostris libris adserere, quo pacto illis libris credituri sunt de resurrectione mortuorum et de spe uitae aeternae regnoque caelorum, quando de his rebus, quas iam experiri uel indubitatis numeris percipere potuerunt, fallaciter putauerint esse conscriptos? quid enim molestiae tristitiaeque ingerant prudentibus fratribus temerarii praesumtores, satis dici non potest, quod, si quando de praua et falsa opinatione sua reprehendi et conuinci coeperint ab eis, qui nostrorum librorum auctoritate non tenentur, ad defendendum id, quod leuissima temeritate et apertissima falsitate dixerunt, eosdem libros sanctos, unde id probent, proferre conantur uel etiam memoriter, quae ad testimonium ualere arbitrantur, multa inde pronuntiant uerba, non intellegentes neque quae loquuntur neque de quibus adfirmant.

For suppose that in what is written, “And God said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light,” one person thought it was bodily light that was made and another spiritual light. That there is spiritual light in spiritual creation our faith does not doubt; but that there is a bodily light, heavenly or even above the heaven or before the heaven, which night could follow, is not contrary to the faith so long as it is not refuted by most certain truth. And if that should happen, it was not what divine Scripture contained but what human ignorance had thought. But if certain reason demonstrates that this is true, it will still be uncertain whether the writer of the holy books meant this to be understood by those words, or something else no less true. And if the rest of the context of the passage proves that he did not mean this, the other thing that he did mean to be understood will not for that reason be false, but both true and more useful to know. But if the context of Scripture does not oppose the writer’s having meant this to be understood, it will still remain to ask whether he could not also have meant something else. And if we find that he could also have meant something else, it will be uncertain which of them he meant; and it is not unfitting to believe that he meant both to be understood, if the rest of the surrounding text supports both meanings. For it often happens that even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heaven, and the other elements of this world, about the motion and revolution or even the size and distances of the stars, about the definite eclipses of the sun and moon, about the cycles of years and seasons, about the natures of animals, shrubs, stones, and other such things, and holds it by most certain reason or experience. Now it is exceedingly disgraceful and harmful, and greatly to be avoided, that he should hear a Christian talking such nonsense about these things, as if according to the Christian writings, that, seeing him wrong by the whole sky, as the saying goes, he can scarcely keep from laughing. And the trouble is not so much that an erring man is laughed at, but that our authors are believed by those outside to have held such views, and, to the great ruin of those whose salvation we are concerned for, they are criticized and rejected as unlearned. For when they catch someone from the number of Christians in error on a subject they know very well, and hear him asserting his foolish opinion from our books, how are they going to believe those books on the resurrection of the dead and the hope of eternal life and the kingdom of heaven, when they think they were written falsely about things that they could already learn by experience or grasp by unquestionable calculation? What trouble and sorrow rash and presumptuous people bring on prudent brothers cannot be told enough: when they begin to be rebuked and refuted for their wrong and false opinion by those who are not bound by the authority of our books, then, to defend what they said with the lightest rashness and the plainest falsehood, they try to bring forward those same holy books to prove it, or even recite from memory many words from them that they think serve as evidence, “understanding neither what they say nor the things about which they make assertions.”

1.20CSEL 28.1:29–30

Ad hoc enim considerandum et obseruandum libri Geneseos multipliciter, quantum potui, enucleaui protulique sententias de uerbis ad exercitationem nostram obscure positis, non aliquid unum temere adfirmans cum praeiudicio alterius expositionis fortasse melioris, ut pro suo modulo eligat quisque quod capere possit: ubi autem intellegere non potest scripturam, deo det honorem, sibi timorem. sed cum tam multis exitibus uerba scripturae, quae tractauimus, exponantur, cohibeant se tandem, qui litteris inflati saecularibus haec ita posita, ut omnia pia corda nutriant, uelut inperitum atque inpolitum aliquid exagitant, sine pennis in terra reptantes et uolaturarum auium nidos inridentes. periculosius autem errant quidam infirmi fratres, qui cum istos inpios de caelestium corporum numeris uel de quibuslibet elementorum mundi huius quaestionibus subtiliter et copiose disserere audiunt, euanescunt et eos sibi cum suspirio praeponentes et magnos putantes saluberrimae pietatis libros cum fastidio repetunt et quos dulciter haurire deberent uix patienter adtingunt, a segetis asperitate abhorrentes et spinarum floribus inhiantes. non enim uacant uidere. quam suauis est dominus, nec in sabbato esuriunt; atque ideo pigri sunt potestate a domino accepta uellere spicas et tamdiu uersari manibus contritasque purgare, donec ad escam perueniant.

With this in view, to be considered and observed, I have explained the book of Genesis in many ways, as far as I could, and have put forward opinions on words placed obscurely for our exercise, not rashly affirming any one with prejudice to another explanation that is perhaps better, so that each may choose according to his small measure what he can grasp; and where he cannot understand Scripture, let him give God the honour and keep fear for himself. But since the words of Scripture that we have treated can be explained in so many ways, let those finally restrain themselves who, puffed up with worldly learning, attack as something unskilled and unpolished these words, which are set down so as to nourish all devout hearts; they crawl on the ground without wings and mock the nests of birds that are going to fly. But some weak brothers err more dangerously: when they hear these ungodly men discoursing subtly and at length on the numbers of the heavenly bodies or on any questions about the elements of this world, they lose heart, and with a sigh they put those men above themselves and think them great; they go back with distaste to the books of most wholesome piety and can scarcely bear to touch what they ought to drink in with delight, shrinking from the roughness of the crop and gaping at the flowers of thorns. For they have no leisure to see how sweet the Lord is, and they do not hunger on the sabbath; and so they are too lazy, with the authority received from the Lord, to pluck the ears and keep turning them in their hands and rub and clean them until they come to food.

1.21CSEL 28.1:30–32

Dicet aliquis: quid tu tanta tritura dissertationis huius, quid granorum exuisti? quid euentilasti? cur propemodum in quaestionibus adhuc latent omnia? adfirma aliquid eorum, quae multa posse intellegi disputasti. cui respondeo ad eum ipsum me suauiter cibum peruenisse, quod didici non haerere hominem in respondendo secundum fidem, quod respondendum est hominibus, qui calumniari libris nostrae salutis adfectant, ut, quidquid ipsi de natura rerum ueracibus documentis demonstrare potuerint, ostendamus nostris litteris non esse contrarium, quidquid autem de quibuslibet suis uoluminibus his nostris litteris, id est catholicae fidei contrarium protulerint, aut aliqua etiam facultate ostendamus aut nulla dubitatione credamus esse falsissimum, atque ita teneamus mediatorem nostrum, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae atque scientiae absconditi, ut neque falsae philosophiae loquacitate seducamur neque falsae religionis superstitione terreamur. et cum diuinos libros legimus in tanta multitudine uerorum intellectuum, qui de paucis uerbis eruuntur et sanitate catholicae fidei muniuntur, id potissimum deligamus, quod certum adparuerit eum sensisse, quem legimus; si autem hoc latet, id certe, quod circumstantia scripturae non inpedit et cum sana fide concordat; si autem et scripturae circumstantia pertractari ac discuti non potest, saltem id solum, quod fides sana praescribit. aliud est enim, quid potissimum scriptor senserit, non dinoscere, aliud autem a regula pietatis errare. si utrumque uitetur, perfecte se habet fructus legentis; si uero utrumque uitari non potest, etiam si uoluntas scriptoris incerta sit, sanae fidei congruam non inutile est eruisse sententiam.

Someone will say: “With all your threshing in this discussion, what grain have you husked? What have you winnowed? Why does almost everything still lie hidden in questions? Affirm one of the many things you have argued can be understood.” I answer him that I have come sweetly to this very food: I have learned that a man should not be at a loss in answering, according to the faith, what must be answered to people who try to slander the books of our salvation. Whatever they can demonstrate about the nature of things by true evidence, we should show is not contrary to our writings; but whatever they bring forward from any of their books that is contrary to these writings of ours, that is, to the catholic faith, we should either show by some means, or believe without any doubt, to be utterly false. And so let us hold fast to our Mediator, “in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” so that we are neither led astray by the talkativeness of false philosophy nor frightened by the superstition of false religion. And when we read the divine books, amid such a great number of true meanings drawn from a few words and safeguarded by the soundness of the catholic faith, let us choose above all the one that clearly appears to be what the author we are reading meant; but if this is hidden, then certainly one that the context of Scripture does not hinder and that agrees with sound faith; and if the context of Scripture too cannot be examined and discussed, then at least only what sound faith prescribes. For it is one thing not to discern what the writer chiefly meant, and another to stray from the rule of piety. If both are avoided, the reader’s fruit is complete; but if both cannot be avoided, even if the writer’s intention is uncertain, it is not without use to have drawn out a meaning that agrees with sound faith.

Chapter 2

2.1CSEL 28.1:32–35

Et dixit deus: fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum et sit diuidens inter aquam et aquam. et sic est factum. et fecit deus firmamentum et diuisit deus inter aquam, quae erat infra firmamentum, et inter aquam, quae erat super firmamentum. et uocauit deus firmamentum caelum. et uidit deus, quia bonum est. et facta est uespera, et factum est mane, dies secundus. de uerbo dei, quod dixit deus: fiat firmamentum et cetera et de placito eius, quo uidit, quia bonum est, et de uespera et de mane non opus est hic iterum similiterque disserere, atque ita deinceps, quotienscumque ista repetuntur, secundum superiorem inquisitionem interim consideranda esse admonemus. utrum autem nunc illud caelum fiat, quod excedit aeris omnia spatia eiusque omnem altitudinem, ubi etiam luminaria stellaeque constituuntur quarto die. an ipse aer uocetur firmamentum, merito quaeri potest. Multi enim asserunt istarum aquarum naturam super sidereum caelum esse non posse, quod sic habeant ordinatum pondus suum, ut uel super terras fluitent uel in aere terris proximo uaporaliter ferantur. neque quisquam istos debet ita refellere, ut dicat secundum omnipotentiam dei, cui cuncta possibilia sunt, oportere nos credere aquas etiam tam graues, quam nouimus atque sentimus, caelesti corpori, in quo sunt sidera, superfusas. nunc enim, quemadmodum deus instituerit naturas rerum, secundum scripturas eius nos conuenit quaerere, non, quid in eis uel ex eis ad miraculum potentiae suae uelit operari. neque enim, si uellet deus sub aqua oleum aliquando manere, non fieret; non ex eo tamen olei natura nobis esset incognita, quod ita facta sit, ut adpetendo suum locum, etiam si subterfusa fuerit, perrumpat aquas eisque se superpositam conlocet. nunc ergo quaerimus, utrum conditor rerum, qui omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuit, non unum locum proprium ponderi aquarum circa terram tribuerit, sed et super caelum, quod ultra limitem aeris circumfusum atque solidatum est. Quod qui negant esse credendum, de ponderibus elementorum argumentantur, negantes ullo modo ita desuper quasi quodam pauimento solidatum esse caelum, ut possit aquarum pondera sustinere, quod talis soliditas nisi terris esse non possit et, quidquid tale est, non caelum sed terra sit; non enim tantum locis, sed etiam qualitatibus elementa distingui, ut pro qualitatibus propriis etiam loca propria sortirentur. aqua scilicet super terram, quae etiam si sub terra stat aut labitur, sicut in antris cauernisque abditis, non tamen ea terrae parte, quam supra, sed ea, quam infra se habet, continetur. nam si ex parte superiore fuerit terrae pars ulla delapsa, non manet super aquam, sed ea perrupta demergitur et pergit ad terram: quo ueniens conquiescit tamquam in loco suo, ut supra sit aqua, subter autem terra. unde cognoscitur, quod etiam super aquas cum esset non ipsis aquis portabatur, sed conpage terrae tenebatur, sicut sese habent camerae speluncarum. Hic occurrit admonere cauendum errorem, quem in libro primo cauendum monui, ne forte, quia scriptum est in Psalmis: fundauit terram super aquam, arbitretur aliquis nostrum aduersus istos de ponderibus elementorum subtiliter disserentes isto testimonio scripturarum esse nitendum, quia illi non retenti auctoritate litterarum nostrarum et nescientes, quemadmodum dictum sit, libros sanctos facilius inridebunt quam illud repudiabunt, quod uel certis rationibus perceperunt uel experimentis manifestissimis probauerunt. illud namque in Psalmis aut figurate dictum recte accipi potest, ut, quoniam caeli et terrae nomine saepe in ecclesia spiritales carnalesque significantur, caelos ostenderit pertinere ad serenam intellegentiam ueritatis dicens: qui fecit caelos in intellegentia, terram uero ad fidem simplicem paruulorum non fabulosis opinionibus incertam atque fallacem, sed prophetica et euangelica praedicatione firmissimam, quae per baptismum solidatur, et ideo subiecerit dicens: fundauit terram super aquam; aut, si ad litteram cogit quisquam intellegi, non incongruenter uel sublimia terrarum, siue continentium siue insularum, accipiuntur, quae superiora sunt aquis, uel ipsa tegmina speluncarum, quae super aquas pendula soliditate firmata sunt. quocirca nec ad litteram quisquam potest sic intellegere, quod dictum est: fundauit terram super aquam, ut aquarum pondus terreno ponderi subportando naturali ordine quasi subiectum esse arbitretur.

“And God said, ‘Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide between water and water.’ And so it was done. And God made the firmament, and God divided between the water that was below the firmament and the water that was above the firmament. And God called the firmament heaven. And God saw that it was good. And evening came, and morning came, the second day.” About the word of God, in that God said, “Let there be a firmament,” and so on, and about his good pleasure, in that he saw that it was good, and about evening and morning, there is no need to discuss again here in the same way; and so from now on, whenever these things are repeated, we advise that they be considered meanwhile according to the earlier inquiry. But whether that heaven is now being made which goes beyond all the spaces of the air and all its height, where the lights and stars are also set on the fourth day, or whether the air itself is called the firmament, may rightly be asked. For many assert that the nature of these waters cannot be above the starry heaven, because they have their weight so ordered that they either flow over the earth or are carried as vapour in the air nearest the earth. And no one should refute these people by saying that, according to the omnipotence of God, to whom all things are possible, we must believe that waters even as heavy as those we know and perceive are spread over the heavenly body in which the stars are. For now it is fitting for us to inquire, according to his Scriptures, how God established the natures of things, not what he may wish to work in them or from them as a miracle of his power. For if God ever wished oil to remain under water, it would happen; yet the nature of oil would not on that account be unknown to us, namely that it is so made that, seeking its own place, even if it has been poured underneath, it breaks through the waters and sets itself on top of them. So now we are asking whether the Creator of things, who “arranged all things in measure and number and weight,” assigned to the weight of the waters not one proper place around the earth, but also one above the heaven, which is spread around and made solid beyond the boundary of the air. Those who deny that this is to be believed argue from the weights of the elements. They deny that the heaven is in any way made solid above like a kind of pavement, so that it could bear the weights of waters, because such solidity can belong only to earth, and whatever is such is not heaven but earth. For the elements, they say, are distinguished not only by places but also by qualities, so that according to their own qualities they are also allotted their own places: water, for instance, over earth; and even if it stands or glides under the earth, as in hidden grottoes and caves, it is held up not by the part of the earth that it has above it, but by the part that it has below it. For if any part of the earth slips down from the upper part, it does not remain on the water, but breaks through it, sinks, and makes its way to the earth; and when it comes there it rests as in its own place, so that the water is above and the earth beneath. From this it is known that, even when it was above the waters, it was not carried by the waters themselves but held by the structure of the earth, as the vaults of caves are. Here we must warn against an error that I warned against in the first book: that no one of us, because it is written in the Psalms, “He founded the earth upon the water,” should think that we must rely on this testimony of Scripture against those who discuss the weights of the elements with subtlety. For they, not held by the authority of our writings and not knowing in what sense it was said, will more readily laugh at the holy books than give up what they have grasped by certain reasoning or proved by the plainest experiments. For that verse in the Psalms can rightly be taken figuratively: since spiritual and carnal people are often signified in the church by the names of heaven and earth, it showed that the heavens belong to the serene understanding of truth, saying, “who made the heavens in understanding,” and the earth to the simple faith of little ones, not uncertain and deceptive with fabulous opinions, but most firm in the preaching of prophets and gospel, which is made solid through baptism; and so it added, “He founded the earth upon the water.” Or, if anyone insists that it be understood literally, it can quite fittingly be taken either of the high parts of the lands, whether continents or islands, which are higher than the waters, or of the very roofs of caves, which are held firm by a solidity hanging over the waters. Therefore no one can understand literally what was said, “He founded the earth upon the water,” in such a way as to think that the weight of the waters is by natural order placed beneath the weight of earth to support it.

2.2CSEL 28.1:35–36

Aerem uero aquis esse superiorem, quamuis propter ampliora sui spatia etiam aridam contegat, hinc intellegitur quod nullum uas ab ore inpressum repleri aquis potest: unde satis indicat aeris naturam locum petere superiorem. uidetur enim uas inane, sed aere plenum probatur, cum ore imo in aquam deprimitur; quia enim per superiorem partem non inuenit emicandi locum nec deorsum uersus inruptis aquis subter eas natura ire sinitur, plenitudine sua repellit eas et in uas non permittit intrare. cum autem uas ita conlocatur, ut os non habeat deorsum, sed in latus inclinatum, intrat aqua inferius exeunte aere superius. itemque si uasis erecti os pateat in caelum, cum infundis aquam, euadit aer sursum uersus ex aliis partibus, qua non infundis, et fit locus aquae deorsum uersus intrandi. quodsi ui maiore uas deprimitur, ut uel ex latere uel desuper aquae repente influant et undique os uasis obtegant, disrumpit eas aer sursum nitens, ut eis ad ima locum faciat; at ipsa disruptio singultus uasorum est, dum partibus fugit, quia totus tam cito non potest propter illius oris angustias. ita si aer super aquas ire cogitur, etiam confluentes eas dissicit, cum exilientes inpetu eius inpulsae ebulliunt et eum bullis crepantibus emittunt in sua properantem atque illis ad ima decidendi aditum dantem. si autem sub aquas ire cogatur ex uase, ut illo cedente uas ab ore in ima presso repleri uelis, facilius undis undique uersum cooperitur, quam per os eius ab inferiore parte intrandi gutta exigua reperit locum.

That air is higher than water, although because of its greater extent it also covers the dry land, is understood from this: no vessel pressed down mouth first can be filled with water. This shows clearly enough that the nature of air seeks a higher place. For a vessel seems empty, but it is proved to be full of air when it is pressed into water mouth downward; because the air finds no place to escape through the upper part, and its nature does not allow it to go downward and under the waters by breaking through them, it pushes them back by its fullness and does not let them enter the vessel. But when the vessel is placed so that its mouth is not downward but tilted to the side, the water enters below as the air goes out above. Likewise, if the mouth of an upright vessel is open to the sky, when you pour in water the air escapes upward from the other parts, where you are not pouring, and room is made for the water to enter downward. And if the vessel is pressed down with greater force, so that the waters suddenly flow in from the side or from above and cover the mouth of the vessel all round, the air, striving upward, breaks through them to make room for them below; and that very breaking through is the gurgling of vessels, while the air escapes in parts, since it cannot all go so quickly because of the narrowness of the mouth. So if air is forced to go above waters, it even scatters them as they flow together, when, driven by its force, they bubble up and leap out and release it with bursting bubbles as it hastens to its own place and gives them access to fall to the bottom. But if it is forced to go under the waters out of a vessel, as when you want a vessel pressed mouth downward to the bottom to be filled as the air gives way, the vessel is more easily covered by the waves on every side than a tiny drop finds room to enter through its mouth from below.

2.3CSEL 28.1:36

Iam uero ignem ad superna emicantem etiam ipsius naturam aeris uelle transcendere quis non sentiat? quandoquidem si ardentem faculam capite deorsum quisque teneat, nihilominus flammae crinis ad superiora contendit. sed quoniam circumfusi ac superfusi aeris praepollenti constipatione subinde ignis extinguitur et in eius qualitatem per abundantiam superatus subinde commutatur ac uertitur, ad uniuersam eius altitudinem transiliendam non potest perdurare. itaque super aerem purus ignis esse dicitur caelum, unde etiam sidera atque luminaria facta coniectant illius uidelicet igneae lucis in eas formas, quas in caelo cernimus, conglobata dispositaque natura; ac per hoc, sicut terrarum ponderibus et aer et aqua cedit, ut ad terram perueniant, sic aquarum ponderi et ipse aer cedit, ut uel ad terram uel ad aquam perueniat. unde intellegi uolunt hoc modo necesse fuisse, ut aer quoque, si quis eius particulam in spatiis illis sublimibus caeli posset dimittere, pondere suo caderet, donec ad aeria subter spatia perueniret. quapropter conligunt multo minus esse posse aquis supra illud igneum caelum aliquid loci, cum illic aer multo aquis leuior manere non possit.

Now who does not perceive that fire, leaping upward, wants to pass beyond even the nature of air? For if anyone holds a burning torch head downward, the tresses of the flame nevertheless strive upward. But since fire is soon extinguished by the overpowering pressure of the air poured around and over it, and, overcome by its abundance, is soon changed and turned into its quality, it cannot last long enough to leap through its whole height. So it is said that pure fire above the air is the heaven, from which they conjecture that the stars and lights too were made, the nature of that fiery light being gathered into globes and arranged into the forms that we see in the heaven. And so, just as both air and water give way to the weights of earth so that it reaches the earth, so the air itself gives way to the weight of the waters so that they reach earth or water. From this they wish it to be understood that in the same way air too, if someone could release a particle of it in those lofty spaces of the heaven, would necessarily fall by its own weight until it reached the airy spaces beneath. Therefore they conclude that there can be much less room for waters above that fiery heaven, since air, which is much lighter than waters, cannot remain there.

2.4CSEL 28.1:36–38

Talibus eorum disputationibus cedens laudabiliter conatus est quidam demonstrare aquas super caelos, ut ex ipsis uisibilibus conspicuisque naturis adsereret scripturae fidem. et prius quidem, quod facillimum fuit, ostendit et hunc aerem caelum appellari non solum sermone communi, secundum quem dicimus serenum uel nubilum caelum, sed etiam nostrarum ipsarum consuetudine scripturarum, cum dicuntur uolatilia caeli, cum aues in hoc aere uolare manifestum sit; et dominus cum de nubibus loqueretur, faciem caeli, inquit, potestis probare. nubes autem etiam per proximum terris aerem conglobari saepe cernimus, cum per decliuia iugorum ita recumbunt, ut plerumque excedantur etiam cacuminibus montium. cum ergo probasset et hunc aerem caelum dici, nulla alia causa etiam firmamentum appellatum uoluit existimari, nisi quia interuallum eius diuidit inter quosdam uapores aquarum et istas aquas, quae corpulentius in terris fluitant. et nubes quippe, sicut experti sunt qui inter eas in montibus ambularunt, congregatione et conglobatione minutissimarum guttarum talem speciem reddunt: quae si spissantur amplius, ut coniungantur in unam grandem plures guttae minimae, non eam patitur aer apud se teneri. sed eius ponderi ad ima dat locum, et haec est pluuia. ergo ex aere, qui est inter uapores umidos, unde superius nubila conglobantur, et maria subterfusa, ostendere ille uoluit esse caelum inter aquam et aquam. hanc ergo diligentiam considerationemque laude dignissimam iudico. quod enim dixit. neque contra fidem est et in promtu posito documento credi potest. Quamquam possit uideri non inpedire propria pondera elementorum, quomodo etiam super illud sublime caelum possint esse aquae per illas minutias, per quas etiam super hoc spatium aeris esse potuerunt. qui quamuis grauior et inferior summo caelo subiaceat, procul dubio leuior est aquis, et tamen, ut super eum sint uapores illi, nullo pondere prohibentur. sic ergo et super illud caelum potest minutioribus guttis leuior halitus umoris extendi, qui pondere cadere non cogatur. ipsi quippe subtilissima ratione persuadent nullum esse quamlibet exiguum corpusculum, in quo diuisio finiatur. sed infinite omnia diuidi, quia omnis pars corporis corpus est, et omne corpus habeat necesse est dimidium quantitatis suae. ac per hoc si potest aqua, sicut uidemus, ad tantas guttarum minutias peruenire, ut super istum aerem uaporaliter feratur, qui natura leuior est aquis, cur non possit et super illud leuius caelum minutioribus guttis et leuioribus inmanere uaporibus?

Yielding to such arguments of theirs, a certain man made a praiseworthy attempt to demonstrate waters above the heavens, so as to support the trustworthiness of Scripture from visible and observable natures themselves. First, which was easiest, he showed that this air too is called heaven, not only in common speech, by which we say the sky is clear or cloudy, but also in the usage of our own Scriptures, when they speak of “the birds of heaven,” since it is obvious that birds fly in this air; and the Lord, speaking of clouds, said, “You can judge the face of the heaven.” And we often see clouds gathered even in the air nearest the earth, when they rest on the slopes of ridges in such a way that they are often topped even by the peaks of the mountains. So having proved that this air too is called heaven, he wished it to be thought that it was called the firmament for no other reason than that its interval divides between certain vapours of water and these waters that flow with greater bulk on the earth. For clouds too, as those have found who have walked among them in the mountains, take on such an appearance by the gathering and massing of very tiny drops; and if they are thickened further, so that many very small drops are joined into one large one, the air does not allow it to be held within it but gives way to its weight downward, and this is rain. So from the air that is between the moist vapours, from which clouds are gathered above, and the seas spread below, he wished to show that there is a heaven between water and water. I judge this diligence and consideration most worthy of praise. For what he said is not against the faith and can be believed on the basis of evidence ready to hand. And yet it might seem that the proper weights of the elements do not prevent waters from being even above that highest heaven, in those tiny particles in which they could also be above this space of air. For although the air is heavier than the highest heaven and lies lower beneath it, it is without doubt lighter than waters; and yet those vapours are not prevented by any weight from being above it. So too above that heaven a lighter exhalation of moisture in still tinier drops can be spread out, which would not be forced by weight to fall. For these same people persuade us by the subtlest reasoning that there is no particle of body, however small, in which division comes to an end, but all things are divided without limit, because every part of a body is a body, and every body must have half of its quantity. And therefore, if water can come, as we see, to such tiny drops that it is carried as vapour above this air, which is by nature lighter than waters, why can it not also remain above that lighter heaven in tinier drops and lighter vapours?

2.5CSEL 28.1:38–39

Quidam etiam nostri istos negantes propter pondera elementorum aquas esse posse super caelum sidereum de ipsorum siderum qualitatibus et meatibus conuincere moliuntur. idem namque adserunt stellam, quam Saturni appellant, esse frigidissimam eamque per annos triginta signiferum peragere circulum eo, quod superiore ac per hoc ampliore ambitu graditur. nam sol eundem circulum per annum conplet. et luna per mensem tanto, ut dicunt, breuius quanto inferius, ut spatio loci spatium temporis congruat. quaeritur itaque ab eis, unde illa stella sit frigida, quae tanto ardentior esse deberet, quanto sublimiore caelo rapitur. nam procul dubio cum rotunda moles circulari motu agitur, interiora eius tardius eunt, exteriora celerius, ut maiora spatia cum breuioribus ad eosdem gyros pariter occurrant, quae autem celerius utique feruentius. proinde memorata stella magis debuit calida esse quam frigida; quamuis enim suo motu, quoniam grande spatium est, triginta annis totum ambitum permeet, tamen caeli motu in contrarium rotata uelocius, quod cotidie necesse est patiatur — sic, ut dicunt. caeli singulae conuersiones dies singulos explicant —, calorem maiorem debuit caelo concitatiore concipere. nimirum ergo eam frigidam facit aquarum super caelum constitutarum illa uicinitas, quam nolunt credere, qui haec, quae breuiter dixi, de motu caeli et siderum disputant. his quidam nostri coniecturis agunt aduersus eos, qui nolunt aquas super caelum credere, et uolunt eam stellam esse frigidam, quae iuxta summum caelum circuit, ut ex hoc cogantur aquarum naturam iam non illic uaporali tenuitate, sed glaciali soliditate pendere. quoquo modo autem et qualeslibet aquae ibi sint, esse ibi eas minime dubitemus; maior est quippe scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas.

Some of our people also try to refute those who deny, because of the weights of the elements, that waters can be above the starry heaven, from the qualities and courses of the stars themselves. For these same people assert that the star they call Saturn’s is very cold, and that it takes thirty years to complete the circle of the zodiac because it moves in a higher and therefore wider orbit. For the sun completes the same circle in a year, and the moon in a month, so much more quickly, they say, as it is lower, so that the span of time matches the span of place. So they are asked why that star is cold, which ought to be the hotter the loftier the heaven by which it is carried. For without doubt, when a round mass is driven in circular motion, its inner parts go more slowly and its outer parts more quickly, so that the greater distances and the shorter come round together to the same turns; and what goes more quickly is surely hotter. Accordingly that star ought to be hot rather than cold. For although by its own motion, since the distance is great, it travels its whole orbit in thirty years, yet, whirled more swiftly in the opposite direction by the motion of the heaven, which it must undergo daily (since, as they say, each revolution of the heaven produces one day), it ought to have taken on greater heat from the heaven moving so swiftly. Surely, then, what makes it cold is the nearness of the waters set above the heaven, which those who argue as I have briefly described about the motion of the heaven and the stars refuse to believe. With these conjectures some of our people act against those who refuse to believe there are waters above the heaven, and they want the star that circles next to the highest heaven to be cold, so that the latter are forced to conclude that the nature of the waters is suspended there no longer in the thinness of vapour but in the solidity of ice. But however and of whatever kind the waters there may be, let us by no means doubt that they are there; for the authority of this Scripture is greater than all the capacity of human intelligence.

2.6CSEL 28.1:39–42

Sed animaduersum est a quibusdam, quod nec ego dissimulandum puto, non frustra, cum dixisset deus: fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum, et sit diuisio inter aquam et aquam, parum uisum esse subiungere: et sic est factum, nisi adderetur: et fecit deus firmamentum; et diuisit deus inter aquam, quae erat super firmamentum, et inter aquam, quae erat sub firmamento. quod quidem sic intellegunt, ut personam patris declaratam esse dicant in eo, quod scriptum est: et dixit deus: fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum, et sit diuisio inter aquam et aquam. et sic est factum, ac deinde, ut intellegatur filius fecisse, quod a patre dictum est, ut fieret, arbitrantur esse subnexum: et fecit deus firmamentum et diuisit deus et cetera. Sed cum antea legitur: et sic est factum, a quo intellegimus factum? si a filio, quid opus erat iam dicere: et fecit deus et quae sequuntur? si autem quod scriptum est: et sic est factum, a patre intellexerimus factum, non iam pater dicit et filius facit, et potest aliquid pater facere sine filio, ut deinde filius non hoc, sed aliud similiter faciat: quod est contra catholicam fidem. si autem illud, de quo dicitur: et sic est factum, hoc idem fit, cum itidem dicitur: et fecit deus, quid prohibet eundem intellegere facere quod dixit, qui dixit, ut fieret? an etiam excepto eo, quod scriptum est: et sic est factum, tantummodo in his uerbis, quibus dicitur: et dixit deus: fiat, et postea dicitur: et fecit deus, patris et filii personam uolunt intellegi? Sed quaeri adhuc potest, utrum quasi iussisse filio patrem debeamus accipere in eo, quod scriptum est: et dixit deus: fiat. sed cur non scriptura curauit ostendere personam etiam spiritus sancti? an ita trinitas intellegitur: et dixit deus: fiat. et fecit deus. et uidit deus, quia bonum est? sed non conuenit unitati trinitatis, ut filius quasi iussus fecisse intellegatur, spiritus autem sanctus nullo sibi iubente libere uidisse bonum esse, quod factum est. quibus enim uerbis iuberet filio pater, ut faceret, cum ipse sit principale uerbum patris, per quod facta sunt omnia? an eo ipso, quod scriptum est: fiat firmamentum, haec ipsa dictio uerbum est patris, unigenitus filius, in quo sunt omnia, quae creantur, etiam antequam creantur, et quidquid in illo est, uita est, quia quidquid per eum factum est, in ipso uita est, et uita utique creatrix. sub illo autem creatura? aliter ergo in illo sunt ea, quae per illum facta sunt, quia regit et continet ea: aliter autem in illo sunt ea, quae ipse est. ipse enim uita est, quae ita in illo est. ut ipse sit, quoniam ipse uita est lux hominum. quia ergo nihil creari posset siue ante tempora, quod quidem non est creatori coaeternum, siue ab exordio temporum siue in aliquo tempore, cuius creandi ratio, si tamen ratio recte dicitur, non in dei uerbo patri coaeterno coaeterna uita uiueret, propterea scriptura, priusquam insinuet unamquamque creaturam, ex ordine, quo conditam dicit, respicit ad dei uerbum, prius ponens: et dixit deus: fiat illud. non enim inuenit ullam causam rei creandae, quam in uerbo dei non inuenit creari debuisse. Non ergo deus totiens dixit: fiat illa uel illa creatura, quotiens in hoc libro repetitur: et dixit deus. unum quippe uerbum ille genuit, in quo dixit omnia, priusquam facta sunt singula; sed eloquium scripturae descendens ad paruulorum capacitatem dum insinuat singillatim genera creaturarum per singula respicit uniuscuiusque generis aeternam rationem in uerbo dei. nec illa repetita ille tamen repetit: et dixit deus. si enim uellet prius dicere: factum est firmamentum in medio aquarum, ut esset diuisio inter aquam et aquam, si quis ab eo quaereret, quomodo factum esset, recte responderet: dixit deus: fiat, id est, in uerbo dei aeterno erat, ut fieret. inde igitur incipit narrare unumquodque factum, quod etiam post facti narrationem quaerenti, quomodo factum sit, in reddenda ratione respondere deberet. Cum ergo audimus: et dixit deus: fiat. intellegimus, quod in uerbo dei erat, ut fieret. cum uero audimus: et sic est factum, intellegimus factam creaturam non excessisse praescriptos in uerbo dei terminos generis sui. cum uero audimus: et uidit deus, quia bonum est, intellegimus in benignitate spiritus eius non quasi cognitum, posteaquam factum est, placuisse, sed potius in ea bonitate placuisse, ut maneret factum, ubi placebat, ut fieret.

But some have observed, and I do not think it should be passed over, that it is not without purpose that, after God had said, “Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let there be a division between water and water,” it did not seem enough to add, “And so it was done,” unless there were also added, “And God made the firmament; and God divided between the water that was above the firmament and the water that was below the firmament.” They understand this to mean that the person of the Father is declared in what is written, “And God said, ‘Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let there be a division between water and water.’ And so it was done”; and then, so that the Son may be understood to have made what the Father said should be made, they think there was added, “And God made the firmament, and God divided,” and so on. But when we read before, “And so it was done,” by whom do we understand it to have been done? If by the Son, what need was there to say next, “And God made,” and what follows? But if we understand what is written, “And so it was done,” to have been done by the Father, then it is no longer the Father who speaks and the Son who makes, and the Father can make something without the Son, so that the Son then makes, not this, but something else in like manner; and this is against the catholic faith. But if that of which it is said, “And so it was done,” is the same thing that is done when it is said likewise, “And God made,” what prevents us from understanding that the same one who said it should be made makes what he said? Or, setting aside what is written, “And so it was done,” do they want the persons of the Father and the Son to be understood only in the words, “And God said, ‘Let there be,’” and afterward, “And God made”? But it can still be asked whether we should take it that the Father, as it were, commanded the Son in what is written, “And God said, ‘Let there be.’” But why did Scripture not take care to show the person of the Holy Spirit as well? Or is the Trinity understood thus: “And God said, ‘Let there be.’ And God made. And God saw that it was good”? But it does not suit the unity of the Trinity that the Son should be understood to have made as one commanded, while the Holy Spirit, with no one commanding him, freely saw that what was made was good. For with what words would the Father command the Son to make, since he himself is the original Word of the Father, through whom all things were made? Or is it that in the very fact that it is written, “Let there be a firmament,” this saying itself is the Word of the Father, the only-begotten Son, in whom are all things that are created, even before they are created; and whatever is in him is life, because whatever was made through him is life in him, and certainly creative life? But creation is under him. So the things made through him are in him in one way, because he rules and contains them; and in another way what he himself is is in him. For he himself is the life that is in him in such a way that it is he himself, since he himself is the life, the light of men. Because nothing could be created, whether before times (which is still not coeternal with the Creator), or from the beginning of times, or at any time, unless the reason for its creation (if “reason” is the right word) lived as coeternal life in the Word of God coeternal with the Father, Scripture, before it presents each creature in the order in which it says it was established, looks back to the Word of God, first putting, “And God said, ‘Let there be this.’” For it finds no cause for a thing to be created other than its finding in the Word of God that it should be created. So God did not say “Let there be this or that creature” as many times as “And God said” is repeated in this book. He begot one Word, in whom he said all things before each was made; but the language of Scripture, coming down to the capacity of little ones, while it presents the kinds of creatures one by one, looks back in each case to the eternal reason of each kind in the Word of God. And yet he does not repeat these things when he repeats, “And God said.” For if it had wished to say first, “A firmament was made in the midst of the waters, so that there might be a division between water and water,” and someone asked it how it was made, it would rightly answer, “God said, ‘Let there be,’” that is, it was in the eternal Word of God that it should be made. So it begins the narration of each thing made from what, even after narrating the thing made, it would have to answer in giving the reason to someone asking how it was made. So when we hear, “And God said, ‘Let there be,’” we understand that it was in the Word of God that it should be made. When we hear, “And so it was done,” we understand that the creature made did not go beyond the bounds of its kind prescribed in the Word of God. And when we hear, “And God saw that it was good,” we understand that in the kindness of his Spirit it pleased him, not as though known after it was made, but rather that it pleased him in that goodness, so that what was made might remain where it pleased him that it should be made.

2.7CSEL 28.1:42–43

Ac per hoc manet adhuc causa requirendi, cur, posteaquam dixit: et sic est factum, ubi perfectio iam operis indicatur, addidit: et fecit deus, cum eo ipso, quod ait: et dixit deus: fiat illud. et sic est factum, iam intellegatur id deum dixisse in uerbo suo, et factum esse per uerbum eius, atque ibi iam non solum patris, sed etiam filii possit adparere persona. nam si propter ostendendam filii personam repetitur ac dicitur: et fecit deus, numquid ergo non per filium congregauit aquam tertio die, ut adpareret arida, quia ibi non dicitur: et fecit deus congregari aquam, aut: congregauit deus aquam? sed tamen etiam ibi, posteaquam dixit: et factum est sic, tunc repetiuit dicens: et congregata est aqua, quae est sub caelo. numquid etiam lux non per filium facta est, ubi prorsus nullo modo repetiuit? potuit enim et illic ita dicere: et dixit deus: fiat lux. et sic est factum. et fecit deus lucem. et uidit quia bona est, aut certe, sicut in aquarum congregatione, ut non diceret: et fecit deus, sed tamen iterum repeteret: et dixit deus: fiat lux. et sic est factum. et facta est lux. et uidit deus lucem quia bona est. sed nullo modo repetens, posteaquam proposuit: et dixit deus: fiat lux, nihil aliud intulit nisi: et facta est lux, ac deinceps de placita luce et diuisa a tenebris et utroque appellato nominibus suis sine ulla repetitione narrauit.

And so there still remains a reason to ask why, after saying, “And so it was done,” where the completion of the work is already indicated, it added, “And God made,” since by the very words, “And God said, ‘Let there be this,’ and so it was done,” it is already understood that God said it in his Word and that it was done through his Word, and there the person not only of the Father but also of the Son can already appear. For if “And God made” is repeated and said in order to show the person of the Son, did he then not gather the water on the third day through the Son, so that dry land appeared, because there it is not said, “And God made the water be gathered,” or, “God gathered the water”? And yet there too, after saying, “And so it was done,” it then repeated, saying, “And the water that is under heaven was gathered.” Was light, too, not made through the Son, where there is no repetition at all? For there too it could have said, “And God said, ‘Let there be light.’ And so it was done. And God made the light. And he saw that it was good”; or at least, as in the gathering of the waters, not saying “And God made,” but still repeating, “And God said, ‘Let there be light.’ And so it was done. And light was made. And God saw the light, that it was good.” But with no repetition at all, after setting down, “And God said, ‘Let there be light,’” it added nothing but, “And there was light,” and then narrated without any repetition the light’s pleasing God, its division from the darkness, and the naming of each.

2.8CSEL 28.1:43–45

Quid sibi ergo uult in ceteris illa repetitio? an eo modo demonstratur primo die, quo lux facta est, conditionem spiritalis et intellectualis creaturae lucis appellatione intimari — in qua natura intelleguntur omnes sancti angeli atque uirtutes - et propterea non repetiuit factum, posteaquam dixit: facta est lux, quia non primo cognouit rationalis creatura conformationem suam ac deinde formata est, sed in ipsa sua conformatione cognouit, hoc est inlustratione ueritatis, ad quam conuersa formata est, cetera uero, quae infra sunt, ita creantur. ut prius fiant in cognitione rationalis creaturae ac deinde in genere suo? quapropter lucis conditio prius est in uerbo dei secundum rationem, qua condita est, hoc est in coaeterna patri sapientia, ac deinde in ipsa lucis conditione secundum naturam, quae condita est: illic non facta, sed genita, hic uero facta, quia ex informitate formata. et ideo dixit deus: fiat lux. et facta est lux, ut, quod ibi erat in uerbo, hic esset in opere. conditio uero caeli prius erat in uerbo dei secundum genitam sapientiam, deinde facta est in creatura spiritali, hoc est in cognitione angelorum secundum creatam in illis sapientiam; deinde quod caelum factum est, ut esset iam ipsa caeli creatura in genere proprio, sic et discretio uel species aquarum atque terrarum, sic naturae lignorum et herbarum, sic luminaria caeli, sic animantia orta ex aquis ac terra. Neque enim sicut pecora solo sensu corporis uident angeli haec sensibilia; sed si quo sensu tali utuntur, agnoscunt ea potius, quae melius nouerunt interius in ipso dei uerbo. a quo inluminantur, ut sapienter uiuant, cum sit in eis lux, quae primo facta est, si lucem spiritalem in illo die factam intellegimus. quemadmodum ergo ratio, qua creatura conditur, prior est in uerbo dei quam ipsa creatura, quae conditur, sic et eiusdem rationis cognitio prius fit in creatura intellectuali, quae peccato non tenebrata est, ac deinde ipsa conditio creaturae. neque enim sicut nos ad percipiendam sapientiam proficiebant angeli, ut inuisibilia dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicerent. qui ex quo creati sunt, ipsa uerbi aeternitate sancta et pia contemplatione perfruuntur atque inde ista respicientes secundum id, quod intus uident, uel recte facta adprobant uel peccata inprobant. Nec mirum est, quod sanctis angelis suis in prima lucis conditione formatis prius deus ostendebat, quod erat deinceps creaturus. neque enim intellectum dei nossent, nisi quantum ipse monstrasset. quis enim cognouit intellectum domini? aut quis consiliarius illi fuit? aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. ex ipso ergo discebant angeli, cum in eis fieret cognitio creaturae deinceps faciendae, ac deinde fieret in genere proprio. Quapropter iam luce facta, in qua intellegimus ab aeterna luce formatam rationalem creaturam, cum in ceteris creandis rebus audimus: et dixit deus: fiat, intellegamus ad aeternitatem uerbi dei recurrentem scripturae intentionem. cum uero audimus: et sic est factum, intellegamus in creatura intellectuali factam cognitionem rationis, quae in uerbo dei est, condendae creaturae, ut in ea natura prius quodam modo facta sit, quae anteriore quodam motu in ipso dei uerbo prior faciendam esse cognouit, ut postremo, cum audimus repeti et dici, quod fecit deus, iam intellegamus in suo genere fieri ipsam creaturam. porro cum audimus: et uidit deus, quia bonum est, intellegamus benignitati dei placuisse, quod factum est, ut pro modo sui generis maneret, quod placuit, ut fieret, cum spiritus dei superferebatur super aquam..

What, then, does that repetition mean in the other cases? Is it shown in this way that on the first day, when light was made, the establishing of the spiritual and intellectual creation is made known by the name of light (in this nature are understood all the holy angels and powers); and that therefore it did not repeat that it was made after saying, “There was light,” because the rational creature did not first know its formation and then become formed, but knew it in its very formation, that is, in the illumination by the truth to which it turned and was formed; while the other things below it are created in such a way that they come about first in the knowledge of the rational creature and then in their own kind? Therefore the establishing of light is first in the Word of God according to the reason by which it was established, that is, in the Wisdom coeternal with the Father, and then in the establishing of light itself according to the nature that was established: there not made but begotten, here made, because formed from formlessness. And so God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light, so that what was there in the Word might be here in the work. But the establishing of heaven was first in the Word of God according to the begotten Wisdom; then it was made in the spiritual creation, that is, in the knowledge of the angels according to the wisdom created in them; then heaven was made, so that the creature of heaven itself might exist in its own kind. So also the separation or form of waters and lands, so the natures of trees and plants, so the lights of heaven, so the living creatures arising from waters and earth. For angels do not see these sensible things with bodily sense alone, as cattle do; but if they use any such sense, they rather recognize things that they know better within, in the very Word of God, by whom they are enlightened so as to live wisely, since there is in them the light that was made first, if we understand that a spiritual light was made on that day. So just as the reason by which a creature is established is prior in the Word of God to the creature itself that is established, so too the knowledge of that same reason comes first in the intellectual creation that has not been darkened by sin, and then the establishing of the creature itself. For the angels did not advance toward grasping wisdom as we do, so as to behold the invisible things of God understood through the things that have been made. From the moment they were created they enjoy the very eternity of the Word in holy and devout contemplation, and, looking from there on these things according to what they see within, they either approve what is done rightly or disapprove sins. Nor is it surprising that God first showed his holy angels, formed in the first establishing of light, what he was going to create next. For they would not know the mind of God except so far as he himself showed it. “For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counsellor? Or who has first given to him, and it will be repaid him? For from him and through him and in him are all things.” So the angels learned from him, when there came about in them the knowledge of the creature to be made next, and then it came about in its own kind. Therefore, once light had been made, in which we understand the rational creation formed by the eternal light, when in the creation of the other things we hear, “And God said, ‘Let there be,’” let us understand that the intention of Scripture goes back to the eternity of the Word of God. And when we hear, “And so it was done,” let us understand that there came about in the intellectual creation the knowledge of the reason, which is in the Word of God, of the creature to be established, so that it was first made in some way in that nature which, by a kind of prior movement, first knew in the very Word of God that it was to be made; so that finally, when we hear it repeated and said that God made it, we understand that the creature itself now comes about in its own kind. Further, when we hear, “And God saw that it was good,” let us understand that what was made pleased the goodness of God, so that it might remain in the measure of its kind, as it pleased him that it should be made when the Spirit of God was borne over the water.

2.9CSEL 28.1:45–47

Quaeri etiam solet, quae forma et figura caeli esse credenda sit secundum scripturas nostras. multi enim multum disputant de his rebus, quas maiore prudentia nostri auctores omiserunt ad beatam uitam non profuturas discentibus et occupantes, quod peius est, multum pretiosa et rebus salubribus inpendenda temporum spatia. quid enim ad me pertinet, utrum caelum sicut sphaera undique concludat terram in media mundi mole libratam, an eam ex una parte desuper uelut discus operiat? sed quia de fide agitur scripturarum, propter illam causam, quam non semel commemoraui, ne quisquam eloquia diuina non intellegens, cum de his rebus tale aliquid uel inuenerit in libris nostris uel ex illis audierit, quod perceptis a se rationibus aduersari uideatur, nullo modo eis cetera utilia monentibus uel narrantibus uel praenuntiantibus credat, breuiter dicendum est de figura caeli hoc scisse auctores nostros, quod ueritas habet; sed spiritum dei, qui per eos loquebatur, noluisse ista docere homines nulli saluti profutura.. Sed, ait aliquis, quomodo non est contrarium his, qui figuram sphaerae caelo tribuunt, quod scriptum est in litteris nostris: qui extendit caelum sicut pellem? sit sane contrarium, si falsum est, quod illi dicunt; hoc enim uerum est, quod diuina dicit auctoritas, potius quam illud, quod humana infirmitas conicit. sed si forte illud talibus illi documentis probare potuerint, ut dubitari inde non debeat, demonstrandum est hoc, quod apud nos de pelle dictum est, ueris illis rationibus non esse contrarium; alioquin contrarium erit etiam ipsis in alio loco scripturis nostris, ubi caelum dicitur uelut camera esse suspensum. quid enim tam diuersum et sibimet aduersum quam plana pellis extensio et camerae curua conuexio? quodsi oportet, sicut oportet, haec duo sic intellegere, ut concordare utrumque nec sibimet repugnare inueniatur, ita oportet etiam utrumlibet horum illis non aduersari disputationibus, si eas forte ueras certa ratio declarauerit, quibus docetur caelum sphaerae figura undique esse conuexum, si tamen probatur. Et illa quidem apud nos camerae similitudo etiam secundum litteram accepta non inpedit eos qui sphaeram dicunt. bene quippe creditur secundum eam partem, quae super nos est, de caeli figura scriptura loqui uoluisse. si ergo sphaera non est, ex una parte camera est, ex qua parte caelum terram contegit; si autem sphaera est, undique camera est. sed illud, quod de pelle dictum est, magis urget, ne non sphaerae, quod humanum est forte commentum, sed ipsi nostrae camerae aduersum sit. quid autem hinc allegoriae senserim, Confessionum nostrarum liber tertius decimus habet. siue igitur ita, ut ibi posui, siue aliquo alio modo intellegendum sit caelum sicut pellis extentum, propter molestos et nimios exactores expositionis ad litteram hoc dico, quod, sicut arbitror, omnium sensibus patet. utrumque enim fortasse, id est et pellis et camera, figurate intellegi potest, utrumque autem ad litteram quomodo possit, uidendum est. si enim camera non solum curua, sed etiam plana recte dicitur, profecto et pellis non solum in planum, uerum etiam in rotundum sinum extenditur. nam et uter et uesica pellis est.

It is also often asked what form and shape of the heaven is to be believed according to our Scriptures. For many argue much about these matters, which our authors with greater prudence left out, since they would not help learners toward the blessed life and, what is worse, would take up much precious time that should be spent on things that lead to salvation. For what does it matter to me whether the heaven, like a sphere, encloses the earth on every side, balanced in the middle of the mass of the world, or covers it from above on one side like a disc? But since the trustworthiness of the Scriptures is at stake, for the reason I have mentioned more than once (that no one who does not understand the divine words, when he finds something of this kind about these matters in our books or hears it from them which seems to contradict the reasons he has grasped, should refuse to believe them in any way when they give other useful warnings or narratives or predictions), it must be said briefly that, concerning the shape of the heaven, our authors knew what the truth is; but the Spirit of God, who spoke through them, did not wish to teach men these things, which would profit no one for salvation. “But,” someone says, “how is what is written in our writings, ‘who stretches out the heaven like a skin,’ not contrary to those who give the heaven the shape of a sphere?” Let it be contrary, certainly, if what they say is false; for what divine authority says is true, rather than what human weakness conjectures. But if perhaps they can prove it by such evidence that it ought not to be doubted, it must be shown that what is said among us about the skin is not contrary to those true reasons; otherwise it will also be contrary to our Scriptures themselves in another place, where the heaven is said to be hung like a vault. For what is so different and so opposed to itself as the flat stretching of a skin and the curved convexity of a vault? But if we must (as we must) understand these two in such a way that both are found to agree and not to conflict with each other, so also we must understand either of them as not opposed to those arguments, if certain reason should show them to be true, by which it is taught that the heaven is convex on every side in the shape of a sphere, if indeed it is proved. And that likeness of a vault among us, even taken literally, does not hinder those who say it is a sphere. For it is well believed that Scripture wished to speak of the shape of the heaven according to the part that is above us. So if it is not a sphere, it is a vault on one side, the side on which the heaven covers the earth; but if it is a sphere, it is a vault on every side. But what is said of the skin presses harder, lest it be opposed, not to the sphere, which is perhaps a human invention, but to our own vault. What I have thought of its allegorical meaning is in the thirteenth book of my Confessions. So whether the heaven stretched out like a skin is to be understood as I set it out there or in some other way, I say this, because of tiresome and excessive demanders of a literal explanation, which I think is plain to everyone’s senses: perhaps both, that is, both skin and vault, can be understood figuratively; but how both can be understood literally must be seen. For if a vault is rightly said to be not only curved but also flat, then surely a skin too is stretched not only flat but also into a round hollow. For a wineskin and a bladder too are skin.

2.10CSEL 28.1:47–48

De motu etiam caeli nonnulli fratres quaestionem mouent, utrum stet anne moueatur. quia, si mouetur, inquiunt, quomodo firmamentum est? si autem stat, quomodo sidera, quae in illo fixa creduntur, ab oriente usque ad occidentem circumeunt septentrionibus breuiores gyros iuxta cardinem peragentibus, ut caelum, si est alius nobis occultus cardo ex alio uertice, sicut sphaera, si autem nullus alius cardo est, uelut discus rotari uideatur. quibus respondeo multum subtilibus et laboriosis rationibus ista perquiri, ut uere percipiatur, utrum ita an ita sit: quibus ineundis atque tractandis nec mihi iam tempus est nec illis esse debet. quos ad suam salutem et sanctae ecclesiae necessariam utilitatem cupimus informari. hoc sane nouerint nec nomen firmamenti cogere, ut stare caelum putemus — firmamentum enim non propter stationem, sed propter firmitatem aut propter intransgressibilem terminum superiorum et inferiorum aquarum uocatum intellegere licet — nec, si ueritas caelum stare persuaserit, inpediri nos circuitu siderum, ne hoc intellegere possimus. et ab ipsis quippe, qui haec curiosissime et otiosissime quaesiuerunt, inuentum est etiam caelo non moto, si sola sidera mouerentur, fieri potuisse omnia, quae in ipsis siderum conuersionibus animaduersa atque conprehensa sunt.

Some brothers also raise the question of the motion of the heaven, whether it stands still or moves. “Because,” they say, “if it moves, how is it a firmament? But if it stands still, how do the stars, which are believed to be fixed in it, go round from east to west, the northern stars making shorter circuits near the pole, so that the heaven seems to turn like a sphere, if there is another pole hidden from us at the other end, or like a disc, if there is no other pole?” I answer them that these things are investigated by very subtle and laborious reasonings, so as truly to grasp whether it is this way or that; and to undertake and treat these I no longer have time, nor should they, whom we desire to be instructed for their own salvation and for the necessary benefit of the holy church. Let them know this much: the name “firmament” does not compel us to think that the heaven stands still (one may understand it to be called firmament not because it stands still but because of its firmness, or because of the boundary between the upper and lower waters that cannot be crossed); nor, if the truth should persuade us that the heaven stands still, are we prevented by the circuit of the stars from being able to understand this. For it has been found even by those who have investigated these things most curiously and with most leisure that, even if the heaven did not move and only the stars moved, everything that has been observed and grasped in the very revolutions of the stars could have happened.

2.11CSEL 28.1:48–50

Et dixit deus: congregetur aqua, quae est sub caelo, in congregationem unam, et adpareat arida. et factum est sic. et congregata est aqua, quae est sub caelo, in congregationem suam, et adparuit arida. et uocauit deus aridam terram et congregationem aquae uocauit mare. et uidit deus, quia bonum est. iam de hoc opere dei propter alterius rei quaerendae necessitatem in primo nostro uolumine satis tractauimus. hic itaque breuiter admonemus, ut, quem forte non mouet, quando species aquarum terrarumque creata sit, quaerere, accipiat isto die non esse factum, nisi ut secernerentur haec duo elementa inferiora. quem uero mouet, cur in diebus facta sit lux et caelum, extra dies autem uel ante omnes dies aqua et terra, et cur ad dei uerbum facta sint illa dicente deo: fiat, haec autem deo quidem dicente discreta, non autem deo dicente facta inueniantur: habet, quod salua fide intellegat. scilicet id, quod dictum est ante dierum enumerationem: terra erat inuisibilis et inconposita, cum commendaret scriptura, cuiusmodi terram fecerat deus, quia praedixerat: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, nihil aliud his uerbis quam materiae corporalis informitatem insinuare uoluisse, eligens eam usitatius appellare quam obscurius, si tamen tardo intellectui non subrepat, ut, materiam et speciem quia uerbis scriptura separat, conetur haec duo etiam tempore separare, tamquam prius fuerit materia et ei temporis interuallo interposito postea sit addita species, cum deus haec simul creauerit materiamque formatam instituerit, cuius informitatem usitato, ut dixi, uocabulo uel terrae uel aquae scriptura praedixit. terra enim et aqua etiam suis qualitatibus id existentia quod uidemus tamen propter facilem corruptionem propinquiora sunt eidem informitati quam caelestia corpora. et quoniam per enumerationem dierum iam ex informi quaeque formata numerantur et ex ista corporali materia iam factum caelum narrauerat, cuius multum distat species a terrenis, iam, quod ex ea formandum in rerum infima parte restabat, noluit sub his uerbis in rerum creatarum ordinem inserere, ut diceretur: fiat, non acceptura ista residua informitate talem speciem, qualem acceperat caelum, sed iam inferiorem et infirmiorem atque informitati proximam, ut his potius uerbis, cum dicitur: congregentur aquae, et: adpareat arida, acceperint haec duo species proprias istas notissimas nobisque tractabiles, aqua mobilem, terra inmobilem: ideo de illa dictum est: congregetur, de hac: adpareat; aqua enim est labiliter fluxa, terra stabiliter fixa.

“And God said, ‘Let the water that is under heaven be gathered into one gathering, and let the dry land appear.’ And it was so done. And the water that is under heaven was gathered into its gathering, and the dry land appeared. And God called the dry land earth, and the gathering of the water he called sea. And God saw that it was good.” We have already discussed this work of God enough in our first book, because another question had to be investigated. So here we advise briefly: whoever is perhaps not moved to ask when the forms of waters and lands were created should accept that nothing was done on this day except that these two lower elements were separated. But whoever is moved to ask why light and heaven were made within the days, but water and earth outside the days or before all days, and why the former were made at the word of God, God saying, “Let there be,” whereas the latter are found to have been separated, indeed, at God’s saying, but not made at God’s saying, has something he may understand without harm to the faith. That is, what was said before the counting of the days, “The earth was invisible and unformed,” when Scripture was setting out what kind of earth God had made (for it had said before, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth”), meant by these words to suggest nothing other than the formlessness of bodily matter, choosing to name it in a more familiar rather than a more obscure way; provided it does not creep up on a slow understanding that, because Scripture separates matter and form in words, he should try to separate these two in time as well, as though matter existed first and form was added to it later after an interval of time had passed, whereas God created them together and established matter already formed, whose formlessness Scripture first mentioned, as I said, with the familiar word either of earth or of water. For earth and water, even though by their qualities they are what we see, are nevertheless, because they easily decay, nearer to that formlessness than the heavenly bodies. And since in the counting of the days each thing is numbered as already formed from the formless, and it had already narrated the heaven made from this bodily matter, whose form is far different from earthly things, it did not wish to insert what remained to be formed from it in the lowest part of things into the order of created things under the words “Let there be,” since this remaining formlessness was not to receive such a form as heaven had received, but one lower and weaker and nearest to formlessness; so that rather by these words, when it is said, “Let the waters be gathered,” and “Let the dry land appear,” these two received these proper forms, well known to us and easy to handle, water a mobile form, earth an immobile one. That is why it is said of the one, “Let it be gathered,” and of the other, “Let it appear”: for water flows and slips, earth is fixed and stable.

2.12CSEL 28.1:50–51

Et dixit deus: germinet terra herbam pabuli ferentem semen secundum genus et secundum similitudinem et lignum fructiferum faciens fructum, cuius semen eius in ipso in similitudinem suam super terram. et factum est sic. et eiecit terra herbam pabuli semen habentem secundum suum genus et secundum similitudinem et lignum fructiferum faciens fructum. cuius semen eius in ipso secundum genus super terram. et uidit deus, quia bonum est. et facta est uespera, et factum est mane dies tertius. hic moderamen ordinatoris aduertendum est, ut, quoniam distincta quaedam creatura est herbarum atque lignorum ab specie terrarum et aquarum, ut in elementis numerari non possint, seorsum de illis diceretur, ut exirent de terra, et seorsum illis redderentur illa solita, ut diceretur: et factum est sic, ac deinde repeteretur, quod factum est, seorsum quoque indicaretur deum uidisse, quia bonum est, tamen, quia fixa radicibus continuantur terris et conectuntur, ista quoque ad eundem diem pertinere uoluerit.

“And God said, ‘Let the earth bring forth the plant of pasture bearing seed according to its kind and according to its likeness, and the fruit-bearing tree making fruit, whose seed is in it according to its likeness, upon the earth.’ And it was so done. And the earth brought forth the plant of pasture having seed according to its kind and according to its likeness, and the fruit-bearing tree making fruit, whose seed is in it according to its kind, upon the earth. And God saw that it was good. And evening came, and morning came, the third day.” Here we should note the restraint of the one who arranges it. Since the creation of plants and trees is something distinct from the form of lands and waters, so that they cannot be counted among the elements, it is said of them separately that they should come out of the earth, and the usual formulas are given to them separately, so that it is said, “And it was so done,” and then what was done is repeated, and it is also indicated separately that God saw that it was good; yet, because they are joined and connected to the earth, fixed by their roots, he wished them also to belong to the same day.

2.13CSEL 28.1:51–53

Et dixit deus: fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli, sic ut luceant super terram in inchoationem diei et noctis et ut diuidant inter diem et noctem, et sint in signa et in tempora et in dies et in annos; et sint in splendorem in firmamento caeli, sic ut luceant super terram. et factum est sic. et fecit deus duo luminaria magna, luminare maius in inchoationem diei et luminare minus in inchoationem noctis, et stellas: et posuit ea deus in firmamento caeli. sic ut luceant super terram et ut sint in inchoationem diei et noctis et ut diuidant inter lucem et tenebras. et uidit deus, quia bonum est. et facta est uespera, et factum est mane dies quartus. in hoc quarto die quaerendum est, quid sibi uelit ista ordinatio, ut prius uel fierent uel secernerentur aqua et terra priusque terra germinaret, quam in caelo sidera fierent. neque enim possumus dicere electa esse quaeque meliora, quibus dierum series ita distingueretur, ut finis et medium maxime ornatius eminerent; septem quippe dierum medius quartus est. occurrit enim illud, quia septimo die non est facta ulla creatura. an forte lux primi diei magis respondet ad quietem septimi, ut eo modo concinentibus finibus iste rerum ordo texatur eminentibus de medio luminibus caeli? sed si primus dies septimo concinit, debet ergo et secundus sexto concinere. quid autem simile habet firmamentum caeli cum homine facto ad imaginem dei? an quia caelum totam superiorem mundi partem occupat, et homini in totam inferiorem potestas dominandi tributa est? sed quid agimus de pecoribus et bestiis, quas ipso die sexto in sua genera terra produxit? quae illis cum caelo potest esse conlatio? An potius, quoniam primo facta intellegitur lucis nomine spiritalis creaturae formatio, consequens erat, ut corporalis quoque creatura, id est mundus iste uisibilis fieret, qui factus est biduo propter duas partes suas maximas, quibus constat uniuersus, caelum scilicet et terram? secundum hanc rationis conlationem, qua et ipsa uniuersa creatura spiritalis et corporalis saepe caelum et terra nominatur, ita ut globus quoque iste turbulentioris aeris terrenae parti deputetur — exhalationibus quippe humidis corporascit — si quid uero tranquilli aeris est, ubi uentosi atque procellosi motus non possunt existere, ad caelestem partem pertineat, post hanc uniuersitatem molis corporeae fabricatam, quae uno loco tota est, quo conlocatus est mundus, consequens erat, ut inpleretur partibus intra uniuersum, quae de loco in locum congruis motibus agerentur. cuius generis herbae atque arbores non sunt. radicibus quippe istae fixae sunt terrae et, quamuis habeant motus incrementorum suorum, de locis tamen propriis non mouentur nisibus suis, sed, ubi fixa sunt. ibi aluntur et crescunt; propterea magis pertinent ad terram quam ad genera rerum, quae in aquis et terris mouentur. quia ergo uisibili mundo constituendo, hoc est caelo et terrae, duo sunt adtributi dies, restat, ut his mobilibus et uisibilibus partibus, quae creantur intra illum, tres dies reliqui deputentur; et quia, sicut caelum prius factum est, ita prius est ordinandum huiusmodi partibus suis, quarto die fiunt sidera, quibus super terram lucentibus habitatio quoque inlustretur inferior, ne habitatores eius in habitationem tenebrosam inducantur. et ideo, quia infirma corpora inferiorum habitatorum succedente motibus quiete reparantur, factum est, ut circumeunte sole diei noctisque uicissitudine propter uicissitudinem dormiendi et uigilandi potirentur, nox uero illa non indecora remaneret, sed lunae ac siderum luce et ipsos consolaretur homines, quibus plerumque operandi est nocturna etiam necessitas, et quibusdam animalibus, quae lucem solis ferre non possunt, ad sufficientiam temperaretur.

“And God said, ‘Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven, so as to shine upon the earth, for the beginning of day and of night, and to divide between day and night; and let them be for signs and for times and for days and for years; and let them be for brightness in the firmament of heaven, so as to shine upon the earth.’ And it was so done. And God made two great lights, the greater light for the beginning of day and the lesser light for the beginning of night, and the stars; and God set them in the firmament of heaven, so as to shine upon the earth, and to be for the beginning of day and of night, and to divide between light and darkness. And God saw that it was good. And evening came, and morning came, the fourth day.” On this fourth day we must ask what this order means: that water and earth were made or separated first, and the earth brought forth plants first, before the stars were made in the heaven. For we cannot say that the better things were chosen, by which the series of days would be so distinguished that the end and the middle would stand out with special ornament, since of seven days the fourth is the middle; for the objection arises that no creature was made on the seventh day. Or perhaps the light of the first day corresponds rather to the rest of the seventh, so that in this way this order of things is woven together with the ends in harmony and the lights of heaven standing out in the middle? But if the first day harmonizes with the seventh, then the second ought to harmonize with the sixth. But what likeness has the firmament of heaven to man made in the image of God? Is it because the heaven occupies the whole upper part of the world, and to man was given power to rule over the whole lower part? But what do we do with the cattle and beasts, which the earth brought forth according to their kinds on that same sixth day? What comparison can they have with heaven? Or rather, since what is understood to have been made first under the name of light is the formation of the spiritual creation, it followed that the bodily creation too should be made, that is, this visible world, which was made in two days because of its two greatest parts, of which the universe consists, namely heaven and earth? According to this reasoning (by which the whole of creation, spiritual and bodily, is also often named heaven and earth, so that this globe of more turbulent air is assigned to the earthly part, for it becomes bodily by moist exhalations, while whatever calm air there is, where windy and stormy movements cannot arise, belongs to the heavenly part), after this whole mass of bodily things had been built, which is entire in one place, where the world is set, it followed that it should be filled with parts within the universe that would be moved from place to place by fitting movements. Plants and trees are not of this kind. For they are fixed in the earth by their roots and, although they have the movements of their growth, they do not move from their own places by their own effort but are nourished and grow where they are fixed; therefore they belong more to the earth than to the kinds of things that move in waters and on earth. So since two days were assigned to establishing the visible world, that is, heaven and earth, it remains that the three remaining days be assigned to these mobile and visible parts that are created within it. And since, as heaven was made first, so it is first to be furnished with parts of this kind, the stars are made on the fourth day, so that by their shining upon the earth the lower dwelling too might be lit, and its inhabitants might not be led into a dark dwelling. And since the weak bodies of the lower inhabitants are restored by rest following their movements, it was arranged that, as the sun goes round, they should have the alternation of day and night for the alternation of sleeping and waking; yet the night should not remain without beauty, but by the light of the moon and stars should comfort both men, who often have to work at night too, and be tempered sufficiently for some animals that cannot bear the light of the sun.

2.14CSEL 28.1:53–56

Illud autem, quod dictum est: et sint in signa et in tempora et in dies et in annos, quis non uideat, quam obscure positum sit quarto die coepisse tempora, quasi superius triduum sine tempore praeterire potuerit? quis igitur animo penetrat. quomodo illi tres dies transierunt, antequam inciperent tempora, quae quarto die dicuntur incipere, uel utrum omnino transierint dies illi? an circa speciem factae rei dies appellatus sit et circa priuationem nox? ut nondum specie formata materia nox dicta sit, unde formanda erant cetera, sicut potest quamuis in rebus formatis intellegi tamen ex ipsa mutabilitate informitas materiae; non enim spatiis uel locorum quasi remotior uel temporum quasi anterior discerni potest. an potius in ipsa re facta atque formata eadem mutabilitas, hoc est deficiendi, ut ita dixerim, possibilitas, nox appellata sit, quia inest rebus factis, etiamsi non mutentur. posse mutari? uespera autem et mane non quasi per temporis praeteritionem et aduentum, sed per quendam terminum, quo intellegitur, quousque sit naturae proprie modus. unde sit naturae alterius consequenter exordium? an aliqua alia ratio sit horum uerborum diligentius uestiganda? Quis in tantum secretum facile inrumpat et quae signa dicat, cum dicit de sideribus: et sint in signa? neque enim illa dicit, quae obseruare uanitatis est, sed utique utilia et huius uitae usibus necessaria, quae uel nautae obseruant in gubernando uel omnes homines ad praeuidendas aeris qualitates per aestatem et hiemem et autumnalem uernalemque temperiem. et nimirum haec uocat tempora, quae per sidera fiunt, non spatia morarum, sed uicissitudines adfectionum caeli huius. nam si aliquis uel corporalis uel spiritalis motus conditionem istorum luminarium praecessit, ut aliquid a futura expectatione per praesens in praeteritum traiceret, sine tempore esse non potuit. et quis obtineat non fuisse nisi ab exordio siderum conditorum? sed certae horae et dies et anni, quos usitate nouimus, non fierent nisi motibus siderum. itaque si hoc modo intellegamus tempora, dies et annos, ut articulos quosdam, quos per horologia conputamus, uel in caelo notissimos, cum ab oriente usque in meridianam altitudinem sol insurgit atque inde rursus usque in occidentem uergit, ut possit deinceps aduerti uel lunam uel aliquod sidus ab oriente statim post occasum solis emergere, quod item cum ad meridianam caeli uenerit altitudinem, medium noctis indicet, tunc scilicet occasurum, cum sole redeunte fit mane; dies autem totos solis ab oriente usque ad occidentem circuitus; annos uero uel istos usitatos solis anfractus, non cum ad orientem, quod cotidie facit, sed cum ad eadem loca siderum redit - quod non facit nisi peractis trecentis sexaginta quinque diebus et sex horis, id est quadrante totius diei, quae pars quater ducta cogit interponi unum diem, quod Romani bissextum uocant, ut ad eundem circuitum redeatur, uel etiam maiores et occultiores annos; nam conpletis aliorum siderum spatiis maiores anni fieri dicuntur —: si ergo ita intellegamus tempora, dies, annos, nemo dubitat haec sideribus et luminaribus fieri. ita enim positum est, ut incertum sit, utrum ad omnia sidera pertineat, quod dictum est: sint in signa et in tempora et in dies et in annos. an signa et tempora ad cetera, dies uero et anni ad solem tantummodo.

And as for what was said, “And let them be for signs and for times and for days and for years,” who does not see how obscurely it is put that times began on the fourth day, as though the earlier three days could have passed without time? Who then penetrates with his mind how those three days passed before the times began which are said to begin on the fourth day, or whether those days passed at all? Or was “day” said with reference to the form of the thing made, and “night” with reference to its privation? So that matter not yet formed was called night, from which the rest was to be formed, just as, even in formed things, the formlessness of matter can be understood from their very changeability (for it cannot be distinguished either by spaces of place, as though more remote, or of time, as though earlier). Or rather, in the thing itself made and formed, was that same changeability, that is, the possibility, so to speak, of failing, called night, because it is present in made things even if they do not change: the capacity to change? And evening and morning, not as by the passing and coming of time, but by a kind of boundary, by which is understood how far the measure of a proper nature goes and where the beginning of another nature follows? Or is there some other meaning of these words to be traced more carefully? Who can easily break into so great a secret, and what signs does it mean when it says of the stars, “And let them be for signs”? For it does not mean those which it is vanity to observe, but certainly signs useful and necessary for the purposes of this life, which sailors observe in steering, or all men for foreseeing the qualities of the weather through summer and winter and the temperate seasons of autumn and spring. And no doubt it calls “times” those that come about through the stars, not spans of duration but alternations in the conditions of this sky. For if some movement, bodily or spiritual, preceded the establishing of these lights, such that it carried something from future expectation through the present into the past, it could not have been without time. And who could maintain that there was no time except from the beginning of the stars’ creation? But the definite hours and days and years that we commonly know would not come about except by the movements of the stars. So if we understand times, days and years in this way: as certain points that we calculate by clocks, or that are well known in the sky, when the sun rises from the east to its midday height and from there declines again to the west, so that one can then notice the moon or some star rising in the east immediately after sunset, which, when it in turn comes to the midday height of the sky, indicates the middle of the night, and will set at the time when the sun returns and it is morning; whole days as the circuits of the sun from east to east; and years either as these usual turnings of the sun, not when it returns to the east, as it does daily, but when it returns to the same positions among the stars (which it does only after three hundred and sixty-five days and six hours, that is, a quarter of a whole day, which part, taken four times, requires one day to be inserted, which the Romans call bissextus, so that it may return to the same circuit), or also greater and more hidden years (for greater years are said to come about when the courses of other stars are completed): if, then, we understand times, days and years in this way, no one doubts that these come about by the stars and lights. For it is so put that it is uncertain whether what was said, “Let them be for signs and for times and for days and for years,” applies to all the stars, or whether signs and times apply to the others and days and years only to the sun.

2.15CSEL 28.1:56–58

Qualis etiam luna facta sit, multi loquacissime inquirunt. atque utinam inquirentes loquantur ac non potius docere conantes! dicunt enim ideo plenam factam, quia non decebat, ut deus inperfectum aliquid illo die faceret in sideribus, quo scriptum est, quod facta sint sidera. qui autem resistunt, dicunt: ipsa ergo debuit prima luna dici, non quarta decima; quis enim incipit ita numerare? ego autem medius inter istos ita sum, ut neutrum adseram, sed plane dicam, siue primam siue plenam lunam deus fecerit, fecisse perfectam. ipsarum enim naturarum est deus auctor et conditor. omnis autem res quidquid progressu naturali per tempora congrua quodammodo prodit atque explicat etiam ante continebat occultum, si non specie uel mole corporis, ui tamen et ratione naturae. nisi forte arbor, quae per hiemem pomis uacua foliisque nudata est, tunc inperfecta dicenda est, aut uero in primordiis etiam suis, cum adhuc nullum fructum dedisset, inperfecta erat illa natura. quod non tantum de arbore, sed nec de ipso eius semine recte diceretur, ubi omnia, quae progressu temporis quodammodo procedunt, modis inuisibilibus latent. quamquam si aliquid deus inperfectum fecisse diceretur, quod deinde ipse perficeret, quid reprehensionis haberet ista sententia? iure autem displiceret, si id. quod ab illo inchoatum esset, ab alio perfectum esse diceretur. Qui ergo de terra non queruntur, quam fecit deus, cum in principio fecit caelum et terram, quia inuisibilis erat et inconposita et postea tertia die conspicua redditur atque conponitur, quid sibi de luna tenebras faciunt quaestionum? aut si, quod de terra dictum est, non temporis interuallo, cum simul deus materiam rebus concreauerit, sed narrationis distributione intellegunt dictum, cur in hoc, quod etiam oculis uideri potest, non intuentur integrum corpus habere lunam et tota sua rotunditate perfectum, etiam cum lumine corniculato siue incipiens ad terras lucere siue desinens fulget? si ergo lumen in ea crescit uel perficitur uel minuitur, non luminare ipsum, sed illud, quod accenditur, uariatur; si autem ex una sphaerulae suae parte semper lucet, sed, dum eam partem conuertit ad terram, donec totam conuertat, quod a prima usque ad quartam decimam fit, crescere uidetur, semper est plena, sed terrae habitatoribus non semper adparet. haec eadem ratio est, et si solis radiis inlustratur. non enim potest etiam sic, cum soli proxima est, nisi lucidis cornibus adparere, quia cetera pars, quae tota in orbem inlustratur, non est ad terras, ut uideri possit, nisi cum soli contraria est, ut totum terris adpareat, quod eius inluminat. Non desunt tamen, qui non eo se arbitrari dicunt lunam primitus a deo quartam decimam factam, quia plena facta credenda est, sed quia in scripturis dei uerba sic habent: lunam factam in inchoationem noctis; tunc autem noctis exordio uidetur, cum plena est, alias uero et per diem incipit uideri ante plenitudinem et in progressu noctis tanto ampliore quanto minuitur. sed qui per inchoationem noctis non intellegit nisi principatum — nam et graecum uerbum hoc magis indicat, cum dictum est: ap/rav, et in Psalmis apertius scriptum est: solem in potestatem diei, lunam et stellas in potestatem noctis — non cogitur a quarta decima numerare et credere lunam factam primo esse non primam.

Many also inquire very talkatively what the moon was like when it was made; and would that they spoke as inquirers and not rather as people trying to teach! For they say it was made full, because it was not fitting that God should make anything imperfect among the stars on the day on which it is written that the stars were made. But those who oppose them say, “Then it should have been called the first-day moon, not the fourteenth; for who begins counting in that way?” I stand between them, so as to assert neither, but I will say plainly that whether God made the moon new or full, he made it perfect. For God is the author and founder of natures themselves. And whatever any thing brings forth and unfolds by natural progress through fitting times, it contained hidden beforehand too, if not in form or bulk of body, yet in the power and reason of its nature. Unless perhaps a tree that is empty of fruit and stripped of leaves through the winter is then to be called imperfect, or that nature was imperfect in its first beginnings too, when it had not yet given any fruit. This could not rightly be said, not only of the tree, but not even of its seed, where all the things that come forth in some way with the progress of time lie hidden in invisible ways. And yet, if God were said to have made something imperfect which he himself then perfected, what would be blameworthy in that opinion? It would rightly displease if what had been begun by him were said to have been perfected by another. So those who do not complain about the earth, which God made when in the beginning he made heaven and earth, because it was invisible and unformed and afterward, on the third day, is made visible and formed, why do they make clouds of questions for themselves about the moon? Or if they understand what was said of the earth to have been said not by an interval of time, since God created matter together with things, but by the arrangement of the narrative, why do they not see in this matter, which can be seen even with the eyes, that the moon has a whole body and is perfect in its full roundness, even when it shines with a horned light, whether beginning to shine upon the earth or ceasing? So if the light in it grows, or is completed, or diminishes, it is not the light-bearer itself but what is lit in it that varies. And if it always shines on one side of its little sphere, but seems to grow while it turns that side toward the earth until it turns all of it (which happens from the first day to the fourteenth), it is always full, but does not always appear so to the inhabitants of the earth. The same reasoning holds if it is illuminated by the rays of the sun. For in that case too, when it is nearest the sun, it can appear only with bright horns, because the rest of it, which is wholly illuminated in a circle, is not turned toward the earth so as to be seen, except when it is opposite the sun, so that all of it that the sun lights appears to the earth. There are some, however, who say they think the moon was first made on the fourteenth day, not because it should be believed to have been made full, but because the words of God in the Scriptures say that the moon was made “for the beginning of night”; and it is seen at the beginning of night when it is full, whereas at other times it begins to be seen even during the day before it is full, and further on into the night the more it wanes. But one who understands by “beginning of night” nothing but rule (for the Greek word indicates this more when it is said, archas, and in the Psalms it is written more plainly, “the sun for the rule of the day, the moon and stars for the rule of the night”) is not forced to count from the fourteenth day and to believe that the moon was not first made at the first day of its cycle.

2.16CSEL 28.1:58–59

Quaeri etiam solet, utrum caeli luminaria ista conspicua. id est sol et luna et stellae, aequaliter fulgeant, sed, quod diuersis interuallis distent a terra, propterea diuersa claritate magis minusque nostris oculis adpareant. et de luna quidem qui haec dicunt, non dubitant eam minus lucere quam solem, a quo etiam perhibent inlustrari. multas autem stellas uel aequales soli uel etiam maiores audent dicere, sed longius positas paruas uideri. et nobis quidem potest fortasse sufficere. quoquo modo se ista res habeat, artifice deo condita sidera. quamquam teneamus auctoritate apostolica dictum: alia gloria solis et alia gloria lunae et alia gloria stellarum; stella enim ab stella differt in gloria. sed quia possunt adhuc dicere. etiamsi non resistant apostolo: differunt quidem in gloria. sed ad oculos terrenorum, aut, quia hoc propter resurgentium similitudinem dicebat apostolus, qui non utique ad oculos aliter erunt et in se aliter, differunt quidem et in se ipsis sidera in gloria, sed tamen nonnulla sunt etiam sole maiora, ipsi uiderint, quemadmodum soli tam magnum tribuant principatum. ut eum radiis suis quasdam stellas et eas quidem principales, quibus amplius subplicant isti quam ceteris, et tenere dicant et retro agere a cursu proprio. non enim fit uerisimile maiores aut etiam aequales uiolentia radiorum eius posse superari. aut si superiores signorum stellas uel septentrionum maiores esse adserunt, quae nihil tale a sole patiuntur, cur istas per signa circumeuntes amplius uenerantur? cur eas signorum dominas perhibent? etsi enim regradationes illas siderum, uel fortasse tarditates, non a sole fieri quisque contendat, sed aliis occultioribus causis, soli tamen istos in suis deliramentis, quibus uim fatorum a ueritate deuii suspicantur, praecipuam tribuere potestatem ex libris eorum certe manifestum est. Sed dicant quod uolunt de caelo alieni a patre, qui est in caelis; nobis autem de interuallis et magnitudine siderum subtilius aliquid quaerere talique inquisitioni rebus grauioribus et melioribus tempus necessarium inpendere non expedit nec congruit. et melius credimus esse ea ceteris maiora luminaria, quae sancta scriptura ita commendat: et fecit deus duo luminaria magna, quae tamen non sunt aequalia. nam consequenter dicit, cum ea ceteris praeposuerit, inter se ipsa litfen e. ait enim: luminare maius in inchoationem diei et luminare minus in inchoationem noctis. certe enim uel hoc concedent oculis nostris, ut ea manifestum sit amplius ceteris lucere super terram nec diem clarere nisi luce solis nec noctem tot stellis adparentibus ita lucere, si luna desit, quemadmodum praesentia illius inlustratur.

It is also often asked whether these visible lights of heaven, that is, the sun, moon and stars, shine equally, but appear to our eyes with different brightness, more or less, because they are at different distances from the earth. As for the moon, those who say this do not doubt that it shines less than the sun, by which they also maintain it is illuminated. But they dare to say that many stars are equal to the sun or even greater, but appear small because they are farther away. For us it may perhaps be enough that, however the matter stands, the stars were established by God as their maker. And yet we hold what was said by apostolic authority: “There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory.” But since they can still say, even without resisting the apostle, “They differ in glory, yes, but to the eyes of earthly beings”; or, since the apostle said this in comparison with those who rise again, who will certainly not be one thing to the eyes and another in themselves, “The stars do differ in glory in themselves too, but nevertheless some are even greater than the sun,” let them see how they can give the sun so great a primacy that they say it holds back certain stars with its rays and drives them back from their proper course, and these the principal stars at that, to which these people make supplication more than to the others. For it is not likely that greater or even equal stars could be overcome by the violence of its rays. Or if they assert that the higher stars of the zodiac signs or the northern stars are greater, which suffer nothing of this kind from the sun, why do they venerate more these that go round through the signs? Why do they declare them lords of the signs? For even if someone contends that those retrogradations of the stars, or perhaps slowings, come about not from the sun but from other more hidden causes, yet it is certainly clear from their books that in their ravings, by which, straying from the truth, they suppose a power of the fates, these people attribute special power to the sun. But let those who are strangers to the Father who is in heaven say what they like about the heaven; for us it is neither expedient nor fitting to inquire more subtly into the distances and size of the stars and to spend on such inquiry the time needed for weightier and better things. And we do better to believe that those lights are greater than the others which holy Scripture presents thus: “And God made two great lights,” which, however, are not equal. For, having set them above the others, it goes on to say that they differ from each other; for it says, “the greater light for the beginning of day and the lesser light for the beginning of night.” Certainly they will at least grant this to our eyes: that it is evident that these shine more than the others upon the earth, that the day is bright only by the light of the sun, and that the night, even with so many stars appearing, is not lit, if the moon is absent, as it is illuminated by its presence.

2.17CSEL 28.1:59–62

De fatis autem qualeslibet eorum argutias et quasi de mathesi documentorum experimenta, quae illi ἀποτελέσματα uocant, omnino a nostrae fidei sanitate respuamus; talibus enim disputationibus etiam orandi causas nobis auferre conantur et inpia peruersitate in malis factis, quae rectissime reprehenduntur, ingerunt accusandum potius deum auctorem siderum quam hominem scelerum. sed quod animae nostrae non sint natura corporibus ne quidem caelestibus subditae, audiant et philosophos suos; quia uero terrenis corporibus illa corpora superiora non ad ea, quae ipsi tractant, potentiora sunt, uel hinc aliquando cognoscant, quia, cum multa corpora diuersorum generum, uel animantium uel herbarum et arbustorum, uno simul puncto temporis seminentur unoque puncto temporis innumerabiliter multa nascantur, non tantum diuersis, sed etiam isdem terrarum locis tantae sunt uarietates in progressibus, in actibus et passionibus eorum, ut uere isti, sicut dicitur, perdant sidera, si ista considerent. Quid autem insulsius et hebetius quam, cum istis rebus conuincuntur, dicere ad solos homines sibi subiciendos fatalem stellarum pertinere rationem? in quibus tamen etiam ipsi de geminis conuincuntur, quorum diuerse uiuentium, diuerse felicium uel infelicium diuerseque morientium easdem plerumque constellationes accipiunt, quia, etsi interfuit aliquid, cum de utero funderentur, in nonnullis tamen tantum interest, quantum ab istis conprehendi conputatione non possit. manus sequentis Iacob, dum nascerentur, inuenta est pedem fratris praecedentis tenens; usque adeo sic nati sunt, quasi unus infans in duplum prolixior nasci uideretur. horum certe constellationes, quas appellant, nullo modo dispares esse potuerunt. quid ergo uanius, quam ut illas constellationes intuens mathematicus ad eundem horoscopum, ad eandem lunam diceret unum eorum a matre dilectum, alterum non dilectum? si enim aliud diceret, falsum profecto diceret; si autem hoc diceret, uerum quidem, sed non secundum suorum librorum ineptas cantiunculas diceret. quodsi huic historiae, quia de nostris profertur, nolunt credere, numquid et naturam rerum delere possunt? cum ergo se minime falli dicant, si horam conceptionis inuenerint, saltem sicut homines non dedignentur conceptum considerare geminorum. Ideoque fatendum est, quando ab istis uera dicuntur, instinctu quodam occultissimo dici, quem nescientes humanae mentes patiuntur. quod cum ad decipiendos homines fit, spirituum seductorum operatio est: quibus quaedam uera de temporalibus rebus nosse permittitur partim subtilioris sensus acumine, quia corporibus subtilioribus uigent, partim experientia callidiore propter tam magnam longitudinem uitae, partim sanctis angelis, quod ipsi ab omnipotente deo discunt, etiam iussu eius sibi reuelantibus, qui merita humana occultissimae iustitiae sinceritate distribuit. aliquando autem idem nefandi spiritus etiam quae ipsi facturi sunt uelut diuinando praedicunt. quapropter bono christiano siue mathematici siue quilibet inpie diuinantium, maxime dicentes uera, cauendi sunt, ne consortio daemoniorum animam deceptam pacto quodam societatis inretiant.

As for fate, let us utterly reject, from the soundness of our faith, all their subtleties of whatever kind and the so-called experimental proofs of their astrology, which they call apotelesmata. For by such arguments they try to take away from us even the reasons for praying, and with impious perversity, in evil deeds which are most rightly blamed, they urge that God, the author of the stars, is to be accused rather than man, the author of the crimes. But that our souls are not by nature subject to bodies, not even heavenly ones, let them hear even from their own philosophers. And that those higher bodies are not more powerful than earthly bodies with respect to the things these people deal with, let them learn at last from this: when many bodies of different kinds, whether of animals or of plants and shrubs, are sown at one and the same point of time, and innumerably many are born at one point of time, not only in different places on earth but also in the same places, there are such great differences in their development, actions and experiences that these people would truly, as the saying goes, lose their stars if they considered these things. And what is more foolish and dull than, when they are refuted by these facts, to say that the fateful reckoning of the stars applies only to human beings, as subject to them? Yet in human beings too they are refuted by twins, who live differently, are differently happy or unhappy, and die differently, though they mostly receive the same constellations; for even if there was some interval when they came out of the womb, in some cases the interval is so small that it cannot be grasped by their calculation. The hand of Jacob, who came second, was found, as they were being born, holding the foot of his brother who came first; they were born so closely together that it seemed like one infant twice as long being born. Certainly their “constellations,” as they call them, could in no way have been different. What then is emptier than that an astrologer, looking at those constellations, at the same horoscope and the same moon, should say that one of them was loved by his mother and the other not loved? For if he said otherwise, he would certainly say what is false; and if he said this, he would say what is true, but not according to the silly little songs of his books. And if they will not believe this history, because it is brought forward from our books, can they also abolish the nature of things? So since they say they are not deceived at all if they find the hour of conception, let them at least not disdain, as human beings, to consider the conception of twins. And so it must be admitted that, when true things are said by these people, they are said by a kind of very hidden prompting, which human minds undergo without knowing it. When this is done to deceive people, it is the work of seducing spirits, who are permitted to know some true things about temporal matters: partly by the keenness of a subtler sense, because they are strong in subtler bodies; partly by more cunning experience, because of such great length of life; and partly because the holy angels reveal to them, even by the command of God, what they themselves learn from almighty God, who distributes to human beings according to their deserts with the purity of a most hidden justice. Sometimes, too, these same wicked spirits foretell, as if by divination, what they themselves are going to do. Therefore a good Christian must beware of astrologers or any impious diviners, especially when they say true things, lest they ensnare the deceived soul in fellowship with demons by some pact of partnership.

2.18CSEL 28.1:62

Solet etiam quaeri, utrum caeli luminaria ista conspicua corpora sola sint an habeant rectores quosdam spiritus suos, et, si habent, utrum ab eis etiam uitaliter inspirentur, sicut animantur carnes per animas animalium, an sola sine ulla permixtione praesentia. quod licet non facile conprehendi possit, arbitror tamen in processu tractandarum scripturarum oportuniora loca posse occurrere, ubi nobis de hac re secundum sanctae auctoritatis regulas etsi non ostendere certum aliquid, tamen credere licebit. nunc autem seruata semper moderatione piae grauitatis nihil credere de re obscura temere debemus, ne forte, quod postea ueritas patefecerit, quamuis libris sanctis sine testamenti ueteris siue noui nullo modo esse possit aduersum, tamen propter amorem nostri erroris oderimus. nunc ad librum operis nostri iam tertium transeamus.

It is also often asked whether these visible lights of heaven are only bodies or whether they have certain spirits of their own as rulers, and, if they have, whether they are also given life by them, as flesh is animated by the souls of living creatures, or are only present to them without any mingling. Although this cannot easily be grasped, I think that, as we go on treating the Scriptures, more suitable places may occur where we may be allowed, according to the rules of holy authority, if not to show something certain about this matter, at least to believe it. But now, always keeping the moderation of devout seriousness, we ought to believe nothing rashly about an obscure matter, lest perhaps, out of love for our own error, we should hate what the truth later reveals, even though it can in no way be contrary to the holy books, whether of the Old Testament or the New. Now let us pass on to the third book of our work.

Chapter 3

3.1CSEL 28.1:62–63

Et dixit deus: educant aquae reptilia animarum uiuarum et uolatilia super terram secundum firmamentum caeli. et factum est sic. et fecit deus cetos magnos et omne animal reptilium, quae eduxerunt dum genus eorum. et omne uolatile pennatum secundum genus. et uidit deus, quia bona sunt. et benedixit ea deus dicens: crescite et multiplicamini et inplete aquas in mari, et uolatilia multiplicentur super terram. et facta est uespera, et factum est mane dies quintus. nunc in inferiore parte mundi ea, quae spiritu uitae mouentur, fiunt, et primum aquarum, quod aeris qualitati proximum elementum est, quia huic caelo, in quo sunt luminaria, ita uicinus est aer, ut et ipse caeli nomen acceperit; sed nescio, utrum etiam firmamentum possit uocari. dicuntur autem caeli pluraliter in una eademque re, quae dicitur unum caelum. nam cum in hoc libro singulari numero dicatur caelum, quod diuidit inter aquas; quae supra, et eas, quae infra sunt, in illo tamen psalmo, et aquae, inquit, quae super caelos sunt, laudent nomen domini. et caelos caelorum si bene intellegimus sidereos aeriorum, tamquam superiores inferiorum, et hos in eodem psalmo accipimus, ubi dictum est: laudate eum, caeli caelorum, satis adparet hunc aerem non solum caelum, sed etiam caelos dici, sicut dicuntur et terrae, nec aliud significatur quam illa quae singulariter terra dicitur, quando dicimus orbem terrarum et orbem terrae.

“And God said, ‘Let the waters bring forth creeping things of living souls, and flying things above the earth along the firmament of heaven.’ And it was so done. And God made great sea monsters and every creature of creeping things, which the waters brought forth according to their kind, and every winged flying thing according to its kind. And God saw that they were good. And God blessed them, saying, ‘Increase and multiply and fill the waters in the sea, and let the flying things multiply upon the earth.’ And evening came, and morning came, the fifth day.” Now, in the lower part of the world, the things that are moved by the spirit of life are made, and first those of the waters, which is the element nearest to the quality of air; because air is so near to this heaven in which the lights are that it too has received the name of heaven, though I do not know whether it can also be called firmament. And “heavens” are spoken of in the plural for one and the same thing that is called one heaven. For although in this book “heaven” is said in the singular for what divides between the waters that are above and those that are below, yet in that psalm it says, “And let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord.” And if we rightly understand the heavens of heavens to be the starry heavens above the airy ones, as higher above lower, and we take these also in the same psalm where it is said, “Praise him, heavens of heavens,” it is clear enough that this air is called not only heaven but also heavens; just as “lands” is said, and nothing else is meant than what is called in the singular “land,” when we say “the circle of the lands” and “the circle of the land.”

3.2CSEL 28.1:63–65

Hos etiam aerios caelos quondam perisse diluuio in quadam earum, quae canonicae appellantur, epistula legimus. neque enim umida illa natura, quae ita concreuerat, ut cubitis quindecim altissimorum montium transcenderet uertices, potuit ad sidera peruenire. sed quia huius aeris umidioris, in quo aues uolant, uel tota uel prope tota spatia conpleuerat, perisse, qui fuerant, caelos in illa epistula scribitur. quod nescio quemadmodum possit intellegi nisi in aquarum naturam pinguioris huius aeris qualitate conuersa; alioquin non perierunt tunc isti caeli, sed sublimius erecti sunt, cum locum eorum aqua occuparet. itaque facilius eos secundum illius epistulae auctoritatem perisse credimus et alios, sicut ibi scribitur, repositos extentis uidelicet exhalationibus, quam sic erectos, ut eis superioris caeli natura loco suo cederet. Oportebat itaque, ut in creandis habitatoribus inferioris huius mundi partis, quae saepe terrae nomine tota commemoratur, prius producerentur ex aquis animalia, postea uero de terra, quod ita sit aeri aqua similis, ut eius exhalationibus pinguescere probetur, ut et spiritum procellae faciat, id est uentum et nubila contrahat, et possit uolatus auium sustinere. quapropter etiamsi uerum dixit quidam saecularium poetarum: nubes excedit Olympus, et: pacem magna tenent, quia perhibetur in Olympi uertice aer esse tam tenuis, ut neque nebulis obumbretur nec turbetur uento nec sustentare alites possit nec ipsos, qui forte ascenderint homines, crassioris aurae spiritu alere, sicut in isto aere consuerunt, tamen et ipse aer est, unde aquis uicina qualitate diffunditur, et propterea ipse quoque in humidam naturam conuersus diluuii tempore creditur. neque enim arbitrandum est aliquid de spatiis siderei caeli usurpasse, cum omnes etiam altissimos montes aqua transcenderat.

We read in one of the letters called canonical that these airy heavens once perished in the flood. For that watery nature, which rose so high that it passed the tops of the highest mountains by fifteen cubits, could not reach the stars. But because it had filled all or nearly all the spaces of this moister air in which birds fly, that letter writes that the heavens that had been perished. I do not know how this can be understood except by the quality of this denser air being turned into the nature of waters; otherwise these heavens did not perish then, but were raised higher when water occupied their place. So we more easily believe, according to the authority of that letter, that they perished and that others, as is written there, were put in their place, namely by exhalations spread out, than that they were raised so that the nature of the higher heaven gave up its place to them. So it was fitting that, in creating the inhabitants of this lower part of the world, which is often mentioned as a whole by the name of earth, living creatures should be brought forth first from the waters and afterward from the earth, because water is so similar to air that air is proved to grow thick with its exhalations, so as to produce the spirit of storm, that is, wind, and to draw clouds together, and to be able to support the flight of birds. Therefore, even if one of the secular poets spoke truly, “Olympus rises above the clouds,” and “the heights hold peace,” because the air on the summit of Olympus is said to be so thin that it is neither overshadowed by clouds nor disturbed by wind, and cannot support birds or nourish with the breath of thicker air any men who may have climbed there, as they are used to being nourished in this air of ours, yet that too is air, from which it spreads down with a quality near to waters; and therefore it too is believed to have been turned into a moist nature at the time of the flood. For we must not think that the flood took over anything of the spaces of the starry heaven, though the water had passed even all the highest mountains.

3.3CSEL 28.1:65–66

Quamquam de conuersione elementorum etiam inter ipsos, qui haec otiosa cura subtilissime perscrutati sunt, non parua quaestio est. alii enim dicunt omnia in omnia posse mutari atque conuerti; alii uero esse aliquid omnino proprium singulis perhibent elementis, quod in alterius elementi qualitatem nullo modo uertatur. unde suo loco fortasse, si dominus uoluerit, diligentius disputabimus; nunc autem, quod ad praesentem sermonem adtinet, haec commemoranda existimaui, ut intellegamus seruatum esse ordinem rerum, quo prius oportuit aquarum animalia quam terrarum creata narrare. Et nullo modo arbitrandum est praetermissum esse in hac scriptura ullum mundi huius elementum, cum quattuor notissimis eum constare persuasum sit, quia uidetur hic caelum et aqua et terra commemorari, de aere autem taceri. consuetudo quippe nostrarum scripturarum est aut caeli et terrae nomine mundum appellare aut interdum addere et mare. aer itaque uel ad caelum pertinere intellegitur, si qua sunt in eius superioribus partibus tranquillissima et pacatissima spatia, uel ad terram propter hunc turbulentum et caliginosum locum, qui humida exhalatione pinguescit, quamuis et ipse saepius caeli nomine nuncupetur. ac per hoc non scriptum est: producant aquae reptilia animarum uiuarum, et producat aer uolatilia uolantia super terram, sed utrumque hoc animantium genus ex aquis productum esse narratur. quidquid ergo aquarum siue labiliter undosum et fluidum est siue uaporaliter tenuatum atque suspensum, ut illud reptilibus animarum uiuarum, hoc uolatilibus adpareat distributum, utrumque tamen humidae naturae deputetur.

And yet about the conversion of the elements there is no small question even among those who have investigated these things most subtly with idle care. For some say that all can be changed and turned into all; but others maintain that there is something entirely proper to each element that is in no way turned into the quality of another element. Perhaps, if the Lord wills, we shall discuss this more carefully in its place; but now, as far as the present discussion is concerned, I thought these things should be mentioned so that we may understand that the order of things was kept, by which it was right to narrate the creation of the creatures of the waters before those of the lands. And we must by no means think that any element of this world has been passed over in this Scripture, since it is commonly held that the world consists of four well-known elements, on the ground that here heaven and water and earth seem to be mentioned, but nothing is said of air. For it is the custom of our Scriptures to name the world either as heaven and earth or sometimes to add the sea as well. So air is understood to belong either to heaven, if there are any very calm and peaceful spaces in its upper parts, or to earth, because of this turbulent and murky region which grows thick with moist exhalation, although this too is quite often called by the name of heaven. And so it is not written, “Let the waters bring forth creeping things of living souls, and let the air bring forth flying things flying over the earth,” but both kinds of living creatures are narrated as brought forth from the waters. So whatever of the waters is either slipping, wavy and fluid, or made thin and suspended as vapour, the former appearing allotted to the creeping things of living souls and the latter to the flying things, both are nevertheless reckoned as moist nature.

3.4CSEL 28.1:66–67

Ideoque sunt etiam, qui subtilissima consideratione quinque istos manifestissimos corporis sensus secundum quattuor usitata elementa ita distinguant, ut oculos ad ignem. aures ad aerem dicant pertinere. olfaciendi autem gustandique sensum naturae humidae adtribuunt: et olfactum quidem istis exhalationibus humidis, quibus crassatur hoc spatium, in quo aues uolitant, gustatum uero istis fluxibilibus et corpulentis humoribus. nam quaecumque in ore sapiunt, ipsius oris humori commiscentur, ut sapiant, etiamsi arida cum acciperentur fuisse uideantur. ignis tamen omnia penetrat, ut motum in eis faciat. nam et humor priuatione caloris congelascit et, cum possint feruescere elementa cetera, ignis frigescere non potest; facilius quippe extinguitur, ut ignis non sit, quam frigidus manet aut fit alicuius frigidi contactu tepidior. tactus autem, qui est quintus in sensibus, terreno elemento magis congruit; proinde per totum corpus animantis, quod maxime ex terra est, quaeque tacta sentiuntur. dicunt etiam nec uideri sine igne posse aliquid nec tangi sine terra, ac per hoc elementa omnia in omnibus inesse, sed unumquodque eorum ex eo, quod amplius habet, accepisse uocabulum; ideo autem caloris priuatione, cum corpus nimie frigescit, obtundi sensum, quia motus pigrescit, qui ex calore inest corpori, dum ignis aerem et aer humida et humor terrena quaeque adficit, subtilioribus scilicet crassiora penetrantibus. Quanto autem quidque subtilius est in natura corporali, tanto est uicinius naturae spiritali quamuis longe distante genere, quandoquidem illud corpus est, illud non est.

And so there are also those who, by very subtle consideration, distinguish these five most obvious senses of the body according to the four common elements: they say the eyes belong to fire and the ears to air, and they assign the senses of smelling and tasting to moist nature; smell to those moist exhalations by which this space where the birds fly is thickened, and taste to those flowing and bodily liquids. For whatever has savour in the mouth is mixed with the moisture of the mouth itself in order to have savour, even if it seemed dry when it was taken in. But fire penetrates all things, to produce movement in them. For moisture freezes by the privation of heat, and while the other elements can grow hot, fire cannot grow cold; it is more easily extinguished, so that it is no longer fire, than it remains cold or becomes cooler by contact with something cold. And touch, which is the fifth among the senses, fits better with the earthy element; accordingly, things touched are felt through the whole body of a living creature, which is chiefly from earth. They also say that nothing can be seen without fire or touched without earth, and that therefore all the elements are present in all, but each has received its name from what it has more of; and that when the body grows very cold through the privation of heat, sense is dulled because the movement that is present in the body from heat becomes sluggish, as fire acts on air, air on moisture, and moisture on earthy things, the subtler penetrating the denser. And the subtler anything is in bodily nature, the nearer it is to spiritual nature, although very distant in kind, since the one is body and the other is not.

3.5CSEL 28.1:67–68

Ac per hoc, quoniam sentire non est corporis, sed animae per corpus, licet acute disseratur secundum diuersitatem corporeorum elementorum sensus esse corporis distributos, anima tamen, cui sentiendi uis inest, cum corporea non sit, per subtilius corpus agitat uigorem sentiendi. inchoat itaque motum in omnibus sensibus a subtilitate ignis, sed non in omnibus ad idem peruenit. in uisu enim peruenit represso calore usque ad eius lucem, in auditu usque ad liquidiorem aerem calore ignis penetrat; in olfactu autem transit aerem purum et peruenit ad humidam exhalationem: unde crassior haec aura subsistit. in gustatu et hanc transit et peruenit usque ad humorem corpulentiorem: quo etiam penetrato atque traiecto, cum ad terrenam grauitatem peruenit, tangendi ultimum sensum agit.

And so, since sensing belongs not to the body but to the soul through the body, although it is argued acutely that the body’s senses are distributed according to the diversity of the bodily elements, yet the soul, in which the power of sensing resides, since it is not bodily, exercises the vigour of sensing through the subtler body. So it begins the movement in all the senses from the subtlety of fire, but does not reach the same point in all. For in sight, with the heat held back, it reaches as far as its light; in hearing, it penetrates with the heat of fire as far as the clearer air; in smell, it passes through pure air and reaches the moist exhalation from which this thicker air is formed; in taste, it passes through this too and reaches the more bodily moisture; and when this too has been penetrated and passed through, when it reaches earthy heaviness, it exercises the last sense, touch.

3.6CSEL 28.1:68

Non igitur ignorabat naturas elementorum eorumque ordinem, qui cum uisibilium, quae intra mundum in elementis natura mouentur, conditionem introduceret prius caelestia luminaria, deinde aquarum animantia. terrarum autem postrema narrauit, non quod aerem praetermiserit, sed quod purissimi et quietissimi aeris, ubi uolare aues non posse dicuntur, si qua sunt spatia caelo superiori coniunguntur et caeli nuncupatione in scripturis ad superiorem mundi partem pertinere intelleguntur, ut terrae nomine uniuersaliter hoc totum significetur, ex quo incipit deorsum uersus: ignis, grando. nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis et omnes abyssi, donec perueniatur ad aridam, quae proprio nomine terra dicitur. aer itaque superior ille, siue quod ad caelestem mundi pertinet partem, siue quod nullum habet uisibilem habitatorem. de qualibus nunc sermo narrantis est, neque praetermissus est caelo nominato neque adnumeratus in creandis animalibus; iste uero inferior, qui excipit exhalationes humidas. maris ac terrae et ad sustinendas aues quodammodo crassatur, nonnisi ex aquis accipit animalia. quod enim eius humidum est, hoc portat alitum corpora, quae ita nituntur pennis uolantes, quemadmodum pisces quibusdam suis alis natantes.

So he was not ignorant of the natures of the elements and their order who, when introducing the establishing of the visible things that move by nature within the world in the elements, narrated first the heavenly lights, then the living creatures of the waters, and last those of the lands. It is not that he passed over air, but that the spaces of the purest and calmest air, where birds are said to be unable to fly, if there are any, are joined to the higher heaven and are understood in the Scriptures, under the name of heaven, to belong to the higher part of the world; so that by the name of earth is signified in general this whole region, from which there begins, going downward, “fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of storm,” and all the abysses, until one comes to the dry land, which is called earth by its proper name. So that higher air, whether because it belongs to the heavenly part of the world or because it has no visible inhabitant of the kind the narrator is now speaking of, is neither passed over, since heaven is named, nor counted among the living creatures to be created. But this lower air, which receives the moist exhalations of sea and land and is in a way thickened to support birds, receives living creatures only from the waters. For what is moist in it carries the bodies of birds, which in flying lean on their wings just as fish swim with certain wings of their own.

3.7CSEL 28.1:68–70

Proinde scienter tamquam spiritus dei, qui scribenti aderat, ex aquis dicit producta uolatilia. quarum natura bipertitum locum sortita est: inferiorem scilicet in unda labili, superiorem uero in aura flabili, illum deputatum natantibus, istum uolantibus. sicut huic elemento congruos duos etiam sensus animalibus datos uidemus: olfactum explorandis uaporibus, gustatum explorandis liquoribus. quod enim et tactu aquas uentosque sentimus, hoc est, quod terrae solidum omnibus admiscetur elementis; sed in his crassioribus sentitur amplius, ita ut etiam tangendo contrectari ualeant. ideoque et ista in duabus maximis mundi partibus generali terrae nomine conplectuntur, sicut ille psalmus ostendit, omnia superiora ab illo principio enumerans: laudate dominum de caelis. omniaque inferiora ab alio principio: laudate dominum de terra: ubi et spiritus tempestatis nominantur et omnes abyssi et ignis iste, qui urit tangentem, quia de terrenis et humidis motibus ita existit, ut subinde uertatur in aliud elementum. et quamuis naturae suae sursum nitendo indicet adpetitum, in caelestem tamen superiorem tranquillitatem non possit euadere, quia multo aere superatus et in eum conuersus extinguitur. ac per hoc in ista rerum parte corruptibiliore atque pigriore turbulentis motibus agitatur ad temperandum eius rigorem et ad usus terroresque mortalium. Quia ergo etiam tactu, qui ad terram proprie pertinet, sentiri possunt et fluctus undarum et flatus aurarum, propterea ipsa quoque aquatilium animalium corpora et terrenis uescuntur et, maxime aues, in terra etiam requiescunt fetusque propagant; pars enim humoris, quae uaporaliter exhalatur, etiam super terras extenditur. ideoque, cum dixisset scriptura: educant aquae reptilia animarum uiuarum et uolatilia, inquit, super terras, addidit sane dicens: secundum firmamentum caeli, in quo potest aliquanto manifestius adparere illud, quod ante uidebatur obscurum. non enim ait; in firmamento caeli, sicut de luminaribus, sed, uolatilia, inquit, super terras secundum firmamentum caeli. id est iuxta firmamentum caeli, quia uidelicet hoc caliginosum et humidum spatium, in quo aues uolant, illi spatio contiguum est ubi uolare non possunt, quod iam merito tranquillitatis et quietis pertinet ad firmamentum caeli. in caelo ergo uolant aues, sed in isto, quod ille psalmus etiam terrae nomine includit: propter quod caelum uocantur multis locis uolatilia caeli, non tamen in firmamento, sed secundum firmamentum.

So he speaks knowingly, as the Spirit of God who was present to the writer, when he says that the flying things were brought forth from the waters. Their nature has been allotted a twofold place: the lower in the slipping wave, the higher in the blowing air, the former assigned to swimmers, the latter to fliers. Just so we see that two senses suited to this element have been given to living creatures: smell for exploring vapours, taste for exploring liquids. For that we also perceive waters and winds by touch is because the solidity of earth is mixed into all the elements; but it is felt more in these denser ones, so that they can even be handled by touching. And so these too are included, of the two greatest parts of the world, under the general name of earth, as that psalm shows, which lists all the higher things from one beginning, “Praise the Lord from the heavens,” and all the lower things from another beginning, “Praise the Lord from the earth,” where the spirit of storm is named, and all the abysses, and this fire that burns whoever touches it, because it arises from earthy and moist movements in such a way that it is soon turned into another element. And although by striving upward it shows the desire of its nature, yet it cannot escape into the calm of the higher heaven, because, overcome by much air and turned into it, it is extinguished. And so in this more corruptible and sluggish part of things it is driven by turbulent movements, to temper its harshness and for the use and fear of mortals. Since, then, the waves of the waters and the blasts of the winds can be felt by touch too, which belongs properly to the earth, the bodies of aquatic creatures too feed on earthy things, and birds especially also rest on the earth and propagate their young; for the part of moisture that is exhaled as vapour is spread over the lands too. And so, when Scripture said, “Let the waters bring forth creeping things of living souls, and flying things,” it says, “above the earth,” it wisely added, “along the firmament of heaven,” in which what seemed obscure before can appear somewhat more clearly. For it does not say “in the firmament of heaven,” as of the lights, but “flying things,” it says, “above the earth along the firmament of heaven,” that is, next to the firmament of heaven; because this murky and moist space in which birds fly is adjacent to that space where they cannot fly, which by reason of its calm and quiet rightly belongs to the firmament of heaven. So birds fly in the heaven, but in that heaven which that psalm also includes under the name of earth; and for this reason they are called in many places “the birds of heaven,” yet not in the firmament but along the firmament.

3.8CSEL 28.1:70–71

Nonnulli putant propter sensus tarditatem non animam uiuam, sed reptilia animarum uiuarum appellata. sed si propterea sic appellarentur, daretur auibus nomen animae uiuae. cum uero et ipsa uolatilia dicta sunt. sicut illa reptilia, ut subaudiatur animarum uiuarum, fatendum est, ut arbitror. ita dictum, ac si diceretur: quae sunt in animabus uiuis reptilia uel uolatilia, sicut dici posset: ignobilia hominum, ut intellegeremus, quicumque sunt in hominibus ignobiles. quamquam enim sint et animalia terrestria, quae repunt super terram, tamen ex multo maiore numero pedibus mouentur, et tam pauca fortasse in terris repunt, quam pauca in aquis gradiuntur. Nonnulli autem putauerunt propterea non animam uiuam, sed reptilia animarum uiuarum pisces esse appellatos, quod eis memoria nulla sit nec aliqua uita uelut rationi uicinior; sed fallit eos experientia minor. nam quidam scripserunt, quae animaduertere potuerunt in uiuariis piscium, multa miranda. sed etiamsi forte falsa scripserunt, memoriam tamen pisces habere certissimum est. quod ipse sum expertus, et experiantur, qui possunt et uolunt. nam fons quidam magnus Bullensium regionum fere plenus est piscium. solent autem homines desuper intuentes eis aliquid iacere, quod sibi uel praeripiant confluentes uel inter se diripiant concertantes. quo pastu adsuefacti deambulantibus super oram fontis hominibus ipsi quoque cum eis gregatim natando eunt et redeunt, expectantes, unde aliquid iactent, quorum praesentiam sentiunt. non itaque frustra mihi uidetur aquarum animalia sic appellata reptilia, quemadmodum aues uolatilia; nam si uel nulla memoria uel sensus tardior animae uiuae nomen repulisset a piscibus, uolatilibus certe adhiberetur, quorum uita in oculis nostris est et memor et garrula et in nidis construendis educandisque fetibus sollertissima.

Some think that they are called, not “living soul,” but “creeping things of living souls,” because of the slowness of their senses. But if they were called so for that reason, the name “living soul” would be given to the birds. But since the flying things too are so named, like the creeping things, so that “of living souls” is understood, it must be admitted, I think, that it was said as if it were said, “those among living souls that are creeping or flying things,” just as one could say “the lowly of men,” so that we would understand “whoever among men are lowly.” For although there are also land animals that creep on the earth, yet by far the greater number move on feet, and perhaps as few creep on land as walk in the waters. And some have thought that fish are called, not “living soul,” but “creeping things of living souls,” because they have no memory nor any life nearer, as it were, to reason; but too little experience deceives them. For some have written many marvellous things they were able to observe in fishponds. But even if perhaps they wrote what is false, it is quite certain that fish have memory. I have experienced it myself, and let those who can and will experience it too. For a certain large spring in the district of Bulla is almost full of fish. People looking down from above are accustomed to throw them something, which they either snatch, crowding together, or tear from one another, competing. Accustomed to this feeding, when people walk along the edge of the spring, the fish too swim in shoals with them, going back and forth, waiting for those whose presence they perceive to throw them something. So it seems to me not without reason that the creatures of the waters are called creeping things, just as birds are called flying things; for if either the lack of memory or a slower sense had kept the name “living soul” away from fish, it would certainly have been applied to the flying things, whose life is before our eyes, mindful and chattering and most skilful in building nests and rearing their young.

3.9CSEL 28.1:71–72

Nec ignoro ita quosdam philosophos sua cuiusque elementi distribuisse animalia, ut terrena esse dicerent non tantum. quae in terra repunt atque gradiuntur, sed aues etiam, quod et ipsae in terra requiescant uolando fatigatae, aeria uero animalia daemones esse, caelestia deos: quorum quidem nos partim luminaria, partim angelos dicimus. idem tamen aquis pisces et sui generis beluas adtribuunt, ut nullum elementum suis animalibus uacet: quasi uero sub aquis terra non sit, aut probare possint pisces non in ea requiescere ac reparare natandi uires sicut uolandi aues, etsi forte rarius pisces id faciunt, quod ad gestanda corpora sit unda quam aura ualidior, ita ut terrena quoque animalia natantia ferat, siue usu docta, ut homines, siue natura, ut quadrupedia uel serpentes. aut si propterea non putant, quia non insunt piscibus pedes, [nec uituli Marini] nec phocae aquarum sunt nec colubri cocleaeque terrarum; nam et illae pedes habent et haec genera sine ullis pedibus, non dico, requiescunt in terra, sed ab ea uix aut numquam recedunt. dracones autem sine pedibus et in speluncis requiescere et in aerem sustolli perhibentur: qui quamquam non facile noti sint, litterae tamen non tantum nostrae, sed etiam gentilium nequaquam de istorum animantium genere tacuerunt.

Nor am I unaware that certain philosophers distributed living creatures to each element in such a way that they called earthly not only those that creep and walk on the earth but birds too, because they too rest on the earth when tired from flying; the creatures of the air, they said, are demons, and the heavenly ones gods, of which we call some lights and some angels. Yet the same people assign fish and sea beasts of their kind to the waters, so that no element is without its own living creatures: as if there were no earth under the waters, or as if they could prove that fish do not rest on it and restore their strength for swimming, as birds do for flying, even if perhaps fish do so more rarely, because water is stronger than air for carrying bodies, so that it even carries land animals that swim, whether taught by practice, like men, or by nature, like four-footed animals or serpents. Or if they do not think so because fish have no feet, then seals are not creatures of the waters, nor snakes and snails of the lands; for the former have feet, and these kinds, without any feet, not only rest on the earth but hardly ever, or never, leave it. And dragons without feet are said both to rest in caves and to be lifted into the air; and although they are not easily known, yet not only our writings but those of the gentiles too have by no means been silent about this kind of creature.

3.10CSEL 28.1:72–74

Quapropter, etsi daemones aeria sunt animalia, quoniam corporum aeriorum natura uigent, et propterea morte non dissoluuntur, quia praeualet in eis elementum, quod ad faciendum est quam ad patiendum aptius, duobus subterpositis. aqua scilicet et terra, uno autem superposito, id est igne sidereo — distribuuntur enim elementa ad patiendum duo: humor et humus, ad faciendum autem alia duo: aer et ignis —: si ergo haec ita sunt, non inpedit ista distinctio nostram scripturam, quae non ex aere, sed ex aquis producta indicat uolatilia, quia subtilioris quidem et in auras exhalati atque distenti, sed tamen humoris locus uolatilibus datus est. aer autem a confinio luminosi caeli usque ad aquarum fluuida et nuda terrarum peruenit. non tamen totum spatium eius exhalationes humidae infuscant, sed usque ad eum finem, unde incipit iam terra nominari secundum illum psalmum, ubi dicitur: laudate dominum de terra. superior uero pars aeris propter puram tranquillitatem caelo, cui conlimitatur, communi pace coniungitur et eius uocabulo connuncupatur. in qua fortassis parte si fuerunt ante transgressionem suam transgressores angeli cum principe suo, nunc diabolo, tunc archangelo — nam nonnulli nostri non eos putant caelestes uel supercaelestes angelos fuisse —, non mirum, si post peccatum in istam sunt detrusi caliginem, ubi tamen et aer sit et humore tenui contexatur, qui commotus uentos et uehementius concitatus etiam ignes ac tonitrua et contractus nubila et conspissatus pluuiam et congelantibus nubilis niuem et turbulentius congelantibus densioribus nubilis grandinem et distentus serenum facit occultis imperiis et opere dei a summis ad infima uniuersa, quae creauit, administrantis. unde in illo psalmo, cum commemorata essent: ignis, grando. nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis, ne talia sine diuina prouidentia fieri mouerique putarentur, continuo subiecit: quae faciunt uerbum eius. Si autem transgressores illi, antequam transgrederentur, caelestia corpora gerebant, neque hoc mirum est, si conuersa sunt ex poena in aeriam qualitatem, ut iam possint ab igne, id est ab elemento naturae superioris aliquid pati; nec aeris saltem spatia superiora atque puriora, sed ista caliginosa tenere permissa sunt, qui eis pro suo genere quidam quasi carcer est usque ad tempus iudicii. et si quid de his transgressoribus angelis diligentius requirendum est, alius erit adcommodatior scripturae locus. proinde nunc quod satis est: si haec spatia turbida et procellosa propter aeris naturam usque ad undas terrasque porrectam possunt aeria corpora sustinere, possunt et auium, quae productae sunt ex aquis, propter aquarum tenues halitus: qui scilicet eidem aeri iuxta undas et terras circumfuso atque ob hoc infimae et terrenae parti deputato uaporaliter inseruntur et auras intexunt, quae nocturnis rigoribus adgrauatae sereno etiam rore destillant, si autem uehementius frigus est, etiam gelu candidius inalbescunt.

Therefore, even if demons are creatures of the air, because they are strong in the nature of airy bodies, and are not dissolved by death for this reason, because there prevails in them an element that is more fit for acting than for being acted on, with two placed beneath it, water and earth, and one above it, the starry fire (for the elements are divided into two for being acted on, moisture and earth, and two others for acting, air and fire); if, then, these things are so, this distinction does not hinder our Scripture, which indicates that the flying things were brought forth not from the air but from the waters, because the place given to the flying things is that of moisture, subtler indeed and exhaled and spread into the air, but still moisture. Now air reaches from the boundary of the luminous heaven to the flowing waters and the bare lands. Yet moist exhalations do not darken all its space, but only as far as that limit from which it begins to be called earth, according to that psalm where it is said, “Praise the Lord from the earth.” But the upper part of the air, because of its pure calm, is joined in a common peace to the heaven with which it borders and is called by its name along with it. If perhaps the transgressing angels were in that part before their transgression, with their prince, now the devil, then an archangel (for some of our writers do not think they were heavenly or super-heavenly angels), it is not surprising if after their sin they were thrust down into this murk, where nevertheless there is air, and it is woven with thin moisture; which, when stirred, makes winds; when stirred more violently, also fire and thunder; when drawn together, clouds; when thickened, rain; when the clouds freeze, snow; when the denser clouds freeze more turbulently, hail; and when spread out, clear weather, by the hidden commands and the work of God, who governs all that he created, from the highest to the lowest. That is why in that psalm, when “fire, hail, snow, ice, the spirit of storm” had been mentioned, so that such things might not be thought to come about and be moved without divine providence, it immediately added, “which do his word.” But if those transgressors, before they transgressed, had heavenly bodies, neither is it surprising if these were changed as a punishment into the quality of air, so that they can now suffer something from fire, that is, from an element of a higher nature; and they have been permitted to occupy not even the higher and purer spaces of the air, but this murky region, which is for them, according to their kind, a kind of prison until the time of judgment. And if anything about these transgressing angels needs to be investigated more carefully, there will be a more suitable place in Scripture. So for now this is enough: if these turbid and stormy spaces, because of the nature of air extending as far as the waves and the lands, can support airy bodies, they can also support the bodies of birds, which were brought forth from the waters, because of the thin exhalations of the waters, which are mixed as vapour into that same air spread around next to the waves and lands, and for that reason assigned to the lowest and earthly part, and are woven into the breezes, which, weighed down by the chill of night, drip even in clear weather as dew, and, if the cold is sharper, turn whiter still as frost.

3.11CSEL 28.1:74–76

Et dixit deus: educat terra animam uiuam secundum genus: quadrupedia et reptilia et bestias terrae secundum genus et pecora secundum genus. et factum est sic. et fecit deus bestias terrae secundum genus et pecora secundum genus et omnia reptilia terrae secundum genus. et uidit deus, quia bona sunt. iam nunc consequens erat, ut alteram partem, quae proprie terra dicitur, infimi huius loci. quem totum cum omnibus abyssis et nebuloso aere uniuersaliter uocabulo terrae alibi scriptura conplectitur, ornaret animalibus suis. et manifesta quidem sunt animalium genera, quae in uerbo dei terra produxit. sed quia saepe nomine pecorum uel nomine bestiarum animalia omnia rationis expertia solent intellegi, merito quaeritur, quas nunc proprie bestias et quae pecora dicat. et repentia quidem siue reptilia terrena non est dubitandum quod omnes serpentes intellegi uoluit, quamquam et bestiae dici possint; pecorum autem nomen non usitate serpentibus conuenit. rursum leonibus et pardis et tigridibus et lupis et uulpibus, canibus etiam et simiis atque id genus ceteris usitate conuenit uocabulum bestiarum. pecorum autem nomen his animalibus adcommodatius aptari solet, quae sunt in usu hominum, siue adiuuandis laboribus, ut boues et equi et si qua talia, siue ad lanicium uel ad uescendum, ut oues et sues. Quid ergo sunt quadrupedia? quamquam enim haec omnia praeter quaedam serpentia quattuor pedibus gradiantur, nisi tamen hoc nomine proprie quaedam uellet intellegi, non utique hic etiam quadrupedia nominaret, quamuis de his in repetitione tacuerit. an cerui et damae et onagri et apri — quia neque illis bestiis, ubi leones sunt, coniungi possunt; similes enim sunt illis pecoribus neque tamen sub cura humana sunt — proprie quadrupedia nuncupata sunt, quasi reliqua essent haec animalia, quibus ista appellatio generalis quidem cum multis propter numerum pedum, sed tamen speciali significatione tribueretur? an, quia ter dixit: secundum genus, tria quaedam genera nos inuitat adtendere? primo secundum genus quadrupedia et reptilia: ubi arbitror significatum, quae quadrupedia dixerit, scilicet quae in genere sunt reptilium, sicut sunt lacerti, steliones et si quid huiusmodi est. ideoque in repetitione quadrupedum nomen non iterauit, quia reptilium uocabulo fortasse conplexus est: unde ibi non simpliciter ait: reptilia, sed addidit: omnia reptilia terrae; ideo terrae, quia sunt et aquarum, et ideo omnia, ut illic intellegantur, quae quattuor etiam pedibus nituntur, quae superius quadrupedum nomine significata proprie sunt. bestias autem, de quibus item ait: secundum genus, quidquid ore aut etiam unguibus saeuit exceptis serpentibus. pecora uero, de quibus tertio ait: secundum genus, quae neutra ui lacerant, sed aut de cornibus aut ne hoc quidem. praedixi enim et quadrupedum nomen quam late pateat ipso pedum numero facile agnosci et nomine pecorum uel bestiarum omne inrationale animal aliquando conprehendi. sed etiam ferarum uocabulum solet in latina lingua tantumdem ualere; non ideo tamen neglegenda fuit consideratio, quomodo possint haec nomina, quae non frustra in hoc scripturarum loco posita sunt, etiam speciali distinctione discerni, quod in usu loquendi cotidiano facile animaduerti potest.

“And God said, ‘Let the earth bring forth the living soul according to its kind: four-footed animals and creeping things and beasts of the earth according to their kind, and cattle according to their kind.’ And it was so done. And God made the beasts of the earth according to their kind and the cattle according to their kind and all the creeping things of the earth according to their kind. And God saw that they were good.” Now it followed that he should adorn with its living creatures the other part of this lowest region, which is properly called earth; the whole region, with all the abysses and the cloudy air, Scripture elsewhere includes under the general name of earth. The kinds of living creatures that the earth brought forth at the word of God are clear. But since all the animals without reason are often understood by the name of cattle or by the name of beasts, it is rightly asked which he now calls beasts in the proper sense and which cattle. As for creeping or crawling things of the earth, there is no doubt that he meant all serpents to be understood, although they could also be called beasts; but the name of cattle does not usually fit serpents. Again, the word “beasts” usually fits lions and leopards and tigers and wolves and foxes, dogs too and apes and others of that kind. But the name of cattle is usually applied more fittingly to those animals that are in human use, either to help with labour, like oxen and horses and the like, or for wool or for food, like sheep and pigs. What, then, are “four-footed animals”? For although all these, except certain serpents, walk on four feet, yet unless he had wished certain animals to be understood by this name in the proper sense, he would surely not have named four-footed animals here too, although he was silent about them in the repetition. Or are deer and fallow deer and wild asses and boars (because they cannot be joined to those beasts among which are lions, for they are like those cattle, yet they are not under human care) called four-footed animals in the proper sense, as though these were the remaining animals, to which this name, general indeed and shared with many because of the number of feet, was given nevertheless with a special meaning? Or, because he said “according to its kind” three times, does he invite us to attend to three kinds? First, “according to their kind, four-footed animals and creeping things”: where I think it is indicated which four-footed animals he meant, namely those that are in the kind of creeping things, such as lizards, geckos and anything of that sort. And so in the repetition he did not repeat the name of four-footed animals, because perhaps he included them under the word “creeping things”: that is why there he does not say simply “creeping things” but adds “all the creeping things of the earth”: “of the earth,” because there are also creeping things of the waters; and “all,” so that those are understood there which also rest on four feet, which were properly signified above by the name of four-footed animals. And the beasts, of which he likewise says “according to their kind,” are whatever is savage with mouth or claws, except serpents. And the cattle, of which he says “according to their kind” the third time, are those that tear with neither, but either with horns or not even with them. For I said before both that the wide extent of the name “four-footed animals” is easily recognized from the number of feet itself, and that by the name of cattle or beasts every irrational animal is sometimes included. And the word ferae (“wild animals”) usually has just as wide a meaning in the Latin language. Yet that was no reason to neglect the question how these names, which are not set in this place of Scripture without purpose, can also be distinguished by a special distinction, which can easily be noticed in the usage of everyday speech.

3.12CSEL 28.1:76–78

Non frustra etiam lectorem mouet, utrumne passim et quasi fortuito an aliqua ratione dicatur: secundum genus, tamquam fuerint et antea, cum primo creata narrentur. an genus eorum in superioribus rationibus intellegendum est, utique spiritalibus, secundum quas creantur inferius? sed si ita esset, hoc de luce, hoc de caelo, hoc de aquis et terris, hoc de caeli luminaribus diceretur. quid enim eorum est, cuius non aeterna et incommutabilis ratio in ipsa dei sapientia uigeat, quae adtingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauiter? incipit autem hoc dici de herbis et lignis usque ad haec terrena animantia. nam et in eis, quae ex aquis creata sunt, quamuis in prima commemoratione dictum non sit, in illa tamen iteratione dictum est: et fecit deus cetos magnos et omnem animam animalium reptilium, quae eduxerunt aquae secundum genus eorum, et omne uolatile pennatum secundum genus. An quia haec ita exorta sunt, ut ex eis alia nascerentur et originis formam successione seruarent, ideo dicuntur secundum genus propter propagationem prolis, qua permansura creabantur? sed cur de lignis et herbis non solum dicitur: secundum genus, uerum etiam secundum similitudinem, cum et animalia siue aquarum siue terrarum secundum similitudinem suam generent? an, quia genus sequitur similitudo, noluit eam ubique repetere? nam et semen non ubique repetiuit, cum tam herbis et lignis insit quam animalibus etsi non omnibus. obseruatum est enim quaedam ita nasci ex aquis uel terra, ut sexus eis nullus sit, et ideo semen eorum non sit in eis, sed in elementis, ex quibus oriuntur. hoc est ergo secundum genus, ubi et seminum uis et similitudo intellegitur succedentium decedentibus, quia nihil eorum ita creatum est, ut semel existeret, uel permansurum uel nullo succedente decessurum. Cur ergo et de homine non ita dictum est: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram secundum genus, cum et hominis propago manifesta sit? an quia non ita deus fecerat hominem, ut moreretur, si praeceptum seruare uoluisset, et ideo non erat necessarius decessori successor? sed post peccatum conparatus est pecoribus insensatis et similis factus est eis, ut iam filii saeculi huius generent et generentur, quo possit mortalium genus seruata successione subsistere. quid sibi ergo uult post hominem factum illa benedictio: crescite et multiplicamini et inplete terram, quod utique generando fieri posset? an nihil hinc temere dicendum, donec ad eum scripturae locum perueniamus, ubi diligentius ista requirenda atque tractanda sunt? potest enim nunc fortasse sufficere propterea de homine non dictum esse: secundum genus, quia unus fiebat, de quo etiam femina facta est. non enim multa genera hominum, sicut herbarum, lignorum, piscium, uolatilium, serpentium, pecorum, bestiarum, ut sic dictum accipiamus: secundum genus, ac si diceretur generatim, ut inter se similia atque ad unam originem seminis pertinentia distinguerentur a ceteris.

It also moves the reader, not without reason, whether “according to its kind” is said at random and as if by chance, or for some reason, as though they had existed before, though they are narrated as being created for the first time. Or is their kind to be understood in the higher reasons, spiritual ones surely, according to which they are created below? But if that were so, it would be said of the light, of the heaven, of the waters and lands, of the lights of heaven. For which of them is there whose eternal and unchangeable reason is not alive in the very Wisdom of God, which “reaches mightily from end to end and orders all things sweetly”? But it begins to be said with the plants and trees and continues up to these land animals. For in those created from the waters too, although it is not said in the first mention, it is said in the repetition: “And God made great sea monsters and every soul of creeping creatures, which the waters brought forth according to their kind, and every winged flying thing according to its kind.” Or, because these came into being in such a way that others would be born from them and preserve the form of their origin by succession, are they said to be “according to their kind” because of the propagation of offspring by which they were created to endure? But why is it said of trees and plants not only “according to its kind” but also “according to its likeness,” since living creatures too, of the waters or of the lands, beget according to their likeness? Or, because likeness follows kind, did he not wish to repeat it everywhere? For he did not repeat “seed” everywhere either, although it is present in animals as well as in plants and trees, though not in all. For it has been observed that some are born from waters or earth in such a way that they have no sex, and so their seed is not in them but in the elements from which they arise. So this is “according to its kind”: where both the power of seeds and the likeness of those succeeding to those passing away is understood, because none of them was created to exist once, either to remain forever or to pass away with no one succeeding. Why, then, was it not said of man too, “Let us make man in our image and likeness according to his kind,” since the propagation of man is also obvious? Is it because God had not made man so that he would die, if he had been willing to keep the commandment, and so a successor was not needed for one passing away? But after sin he was compared to senseless cattle and became like them, so that now the children of this age beget and are begotten, in order that the mortal race may endure by keeping up succession. What then does that blessing mean after man was made, “Increase and multiply and fill the earth,” which certainly could be done by begetting? Or should nothing be said rashly about this until we come to that place of Scripture where these things must be investigated and treated more carefully? For it may perhaps be enough for now that it was not said of man “according to his kind” because one was being made, from whom the woman too was made. For there are not many kinds of men, as there are of plants, trees, fish, birds, serpents, cattle and beasts, so that we should take “according to its kind” to be said as if it meant “kind by kind,” so that those that are similar among themselves and belong to one origin of seed might be distinguished from the others.

3.13CSEL 28.1:78–79

Item quaeritur, quid tantum aquarum animalia de creatore meruerint, ut sola benedicerentur sicut homines. nam et ipsa benedixit deus dicens: crescite et multiplicamini et inplete aquas maris, et uolatilia multiplicentur super terram. an in uno genere creaturae dicendum fuit, ut in ceteris consequenter intellegeretur, quae generationibus crescunt? prius ergo diceretur in eo, quod primum tale creatum est, in herba scilicet atque ligno. an forte quae nullum haberent propagandae prolis adfectum ac sine ullo sensu generarent indigna iudicauit illis benedictionis uerbis: crescite et multiplicamini, ubi autem talis inesset adfectus, ibi primum hoc dixit, ut in terrenis animalibus etiam non dictum intellegeretur? necessarium autem fuit hoc in homine repetere, ne quisquam diceret in officio gignendi filios ullum esse peccatum, sicut est in libidine siue fornicandi siue ipso coniugio inmoderatius abutendi.

It is also asked what the creatures of the waters deserved so much of the Creator that they alone were blessed, as human beings were. For God blessed them too, saying, “Increase and multiply and fill the waters of the sea, and let the flying things multiply upon the earth.” Was it that it had to be said in one kind of creature, so that it would be understood as a consequence in the others that increase by generation? Then it would have been said first in the first thing of that kind to be created, namely the plant and the tree. Or perhaps he judged those that would have no affection for propagating offspring and would generate without any sense unworthy of those words of blessing, “Increase and multiply,” and where such affection was present, there he said it first, so that it would be understood in the land animals too, even though it was not said? But it was necessary to repeat it in the case of man, so that no one would say that there is any sin in the duty of begetting children, as there is in lust, whether in sexual immorality or in using marriage itself without moderation.

3.14CSEL 28.1:79–80

Nonnulla etiam de quibusdam minutissimis animalibus quaestio est, utrum in primis rerum conditionibus creata sint, an ex consequentibus rerum mortalium corruptionibus. nam pleraque eorum aut de uiuorum corporum uitiis, uel purgamentis uel exhalationibus aut cadauerum tabe gignuntur, quaedam etiam de corruptione lignorum et herbarum, quaedam de corruptionibus fructuum: quorum omnium non possumus recte dicere deum non esse creatorem. inest enim omnibus quoddam naturae sui generis decus, ita ut in his maior sit admiratio bene considerantis et laus uberior omnipotentis artificis, qui omnia in sapientia fecit, quae a fine usque ad finem pertendens et suauiter cuncta disponens nec ea ipsa rerum nouissima, quae pro sui generis ordine dissoluuntur, et quarum dissolutionem ex poena nostrae mortalitatis horremus, relinquit informia, sed creat minima corpore, acuta sensu animantia, ut maiore adtentione stupeamus agilitatem muscae uolantis quam magnitudinem iumenti gradientis ampliusque miremur opera formicularum quam onera camelorum. Sed utrum, ut dixi, in primis rerum conditionibus, quae isto sex dierum ordine creata narrantur, haec quoque minima instituta credamus, an postea consequentibus corruptibilium corporum solutionibus, hoc quaeritur. et potest quidem dici ea minutissima, quae ex aquis uel terris oriuntur, tunc creata: in quibus etiam illa non absurde intelleguntur, quae nascuntur ex his, quae terra germinante orta sunt, et quia praecesserant conditionem non solum animalium, sed etiam luminarium, et quia terrae continuantur per radicum conexionem, unde illo die, quo adparuit arida, exorta sunt, ut potius ad subplementum habitationis quam ad numerum habitatorum pertinere intellegerentur. cetera uero, quae de animalium gignuntur corporibus, et maxime mortuorum, absurdissimum est dicere tunc creata, cum animalia ipsa creata sunt: nisi quia inerat iam omnibus animatis corporibus uis quaedam naturalis et quasi praeseminata et quodammodo liciata primordia futurorum animalium, quae de corruptionibus talium corporum pro suo quaeque genere ac differentiis erant exortura per administrationem ineffabilem omnia mouente incommutabiliter creatore.

There is also some question about certain very tiny animals, whether they were created in the first establishing of things or from the later decay of mortal things. For most of them are born either from the diseases, the waste, or the exhalations of living bodies, or from the rotting of corpses; some also from the decay of wood and plants, and some from the decay of fruits. Of all of these we cannot rightly say that God is not the creator. For in all of them there is a certain beauty of nature proper to their kind, so that in them the wonder of one who considers them well is greater, and the praise of the almighty Craftsman richer, who “made all things in wisdom.” This Wisdom, “reaching from end to end and ordering all things sweetly,” does not leave without form even those last of things which are dissolved according to the order of their kind, and whose dissolution we dread because of the punishment of our mortality; but it creates living creatures tiny in body and keen in sense, so that we are amazed with greater attention at the nimbleness of a flying fly than at the size of a walking beast of burden, and admire the works of little ants more than the loads of camels. But whether, as I said, we are to believe that these smallest creatures too were established in the first establishing of things, which is narrated as created in this order of six days, or afterward from the later dissolution of corruptible bodies, this is the question. It can indeed be said that the tiniest creatures that arise from waters or lands were created then. Among these may reasonably be understood also those that are born from the things that arose when the earth brought forth plants, both because these had preceded the establishing not only of the animals but also of the lights, and because they are joined to the earth by the connection of their roots, from which they arose on the day when the dry land appeared, so that they would be understood to belong to the furnishing of the dwelling rather than to the number of the inhabitants. But as for the others, which are born from the bodies of animals, and especially of dead ones, it is most absurd to say that they were created then, when the animals themselves were created; unless it be that there was already present in all animate bodies a certain natural power and, as it were, the pre-sown and in some way interwoven first beginnings of future animals, which were to arise from the decay of such bodies, each according to its kind and differences, by the ineffable governance of the Creator, who moves all things while remaining unchangeable.

3.15CSEL 28.1:80–81

De generibus quoque animalium uenenosis et perniciosis quaeri solet, utrum post peccatum hominis ad uindictam creata sint, an potius, ut iam creata essent innoxia, nonnisi postea peccatoribus nocere coeperunt. neque hoc mirum est, quandoquidem etiam temporibus huius uitae laboriosae atque aerumnosae, cum sit nemo ita iustus, ut perfectum se audeat dicere fideliter adtestante apostolo et dicente: non quia iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim, cumque adhuc exercendae atque in infirmitate perficiendae uirtuti necessariae sint temtationes et molestiae corporales eodem rursus apostolo manifestante, qui ait, in magnitudine reuelationum ne extolleretur, datum sibi esse stimulum carnis, angelum satanae, ut eum colaphizaret, rogatumque a se dominum tertio, ut discederet ab eo, respondisse sibi: sufficit tibi gratia mea; nam uirtus in infirmitate perficitur, tamen et sanctus Danihel inter leones saluus atque intrepidus uixit, qui non utique deo mentiens in oratione non tantum peccata populi sui, sed etiam sua fatetur, et in ipsius apostoli manu mortifera uipera inhaesit nec laesit. potuerunt ergo ista etiam creata nihil nocere, si causa non extitisset uel terrendorum puniendorumque uitiorum uel probandae perficiendaeque uirtutis, quia et exempla sunt demonstranda patientiae ad profectum ceterorum, et ipse sibi homo in temtationibus certius innotescit, et iuste salus illa perpetua, quae turpiter amissa est per uoluntatem, fortiter recipitur per dolorem.

It is also often asked about the poisonous and harmful kinds of animals, whether they were created after man’s sin for punishment, or rather were created harmless and only afterward began to harm sinners. Nor is this surprising, since even in the times of this toilsome and wretched life (when no one is so righteous that he dares to call himself perfect, as the apostle faithfully testifies when he says, “Not that I have already received or am already perfect”; and when temptations and bodily troubles are still necessary for exercising virtue and perfecting it in weakness, as the same apostle again makes clear when he says that, lest he be exalted by the greatness of the revelations, a thorn in the flesh was given him, an angel of Satan to buffet him, and that when he asked the Lord three times that it might depart from him, the Lord answered him, “My grace is sufficient for you, for virtue is made perfect in weakness”), holy Daniel nevertheless lived safe and unafraid among lions, though he certainly did not lie to God when in his prayer he confessed not only the sins of his people but also his own; and a deadly viper fastened on the hand of the apostle himself and did not harm him. So these creatures too, though created, could have done no harm, if there had not arisen the cause either of frightening and punishing vices or of testing and perfecting virtue; because examples of patience must be shown for the progress of others, and man comes to know himself more surely in temptations, and that everlasting salvation which was shamefully lost by the will is justly recovered bravely through pain.

3.16CSEL 28.1:81–82

Dicet aliquis: cur ergo inuicem bestiae nocent, quibus nec peccata ulla sunt, ut uindicta ista dicatur, nec ullam recipiunt tali exercitatione uirtutem? ideo nimirum, quia scilicet aliae cibi sunt aliarum. nec recte possumus dicere: non essent aliae, quibus aliae uescerentur. habent enim omnia, quamdiu sunt, mensuras, numeros, ordines suos: quae cuncta merito considerata laudantur nec sine occulta pro suo genere moderatione pulchritudinis temporalis etiam ex alio in aliud transeundo mutantur. quod si stultos latet, sublucet proficientibus clarumque perfectis est. et certe omnibus talibus inferioris creaturae motibus praebentur homini salubres admonitiones, ut uideat, quantum sibi satagendum sit pro salute spiritali et sempiterna, qua omnibus inrationalibus animantibus antecellit, cum illa uideat a maximis elephantis usque ad minimos uermiculos pro salute corporali et temporali. quam pro sui generis inferiore ordinatione sortita sunt, siue resistendo siue cauendo agere quidquid ualent: quod non adparet, nisi cum quaedam refectionem corporis sui ex aliorum corporibus quaerunt, alia se uel repugnandi uiribus uel fugae praesidio uel latebrarum munimine tuentur. nam et ipse corporis dolor in quolibet animante magna et mirabilis animae uis est, quae illam conpagem ineffabili permixtione uitaliter continet et in quandam sui moduli redigit unitatem, cum eam non indifferenter, sed, ut ita dicam, indignanter patitur corrumpi atque dissolui.

Someone will say: “Why then do beasts harm one another, when they have no sins, so that this could be called punishment, and they gain no virtue by such exercise?” Clearly because some are food for others. And we cannot rightly say, “There should not be some on which others feed.” For all things, as long as they exist, have their measures, numbers and orders; all of these, rightly considered, are praised, and even when they change, passing from one into another, it is not without a hidden governance of temporal beauty proper to their kind. If this is hidden from fools, it glimmers for those who are making progress and is clear to the perfect. And certainly in all such movements of lower creation wholesome warnings are offered to man, that he may see how much he must strive for his spiritual and everlasting salvation, by which he surpasses all irrational living creatures, when he sees them, from the largest elephants to the smallest worms, doing whatever they can, whether by resisting or by taking care, for the bodily and temporal safety allotted to them in the lower ordering of their kind. This appears only when some seek to restore their own bodies from the bodies of others, while others protect themselves by the strength to fight back, or by the help of flight, or by the protection of hiding places. For even bodily pain in any living creature is a great and wonderful power of the soul, which holds that structure together in life by an ineffable mingling and brings it into a kind of unity according to its measure, since it suffers it to be corrupted and dissolved, not with indifference, but, so to speak, with indignation.

3.17CSEL 28.1:82–83

Illud etiam fortasse aliquem moueat, si animalia noxia uiuos homines aut poenaliter laedunt aut salubriter exercent aut utiliter probant aut ignoranter docent, cur in escas suas dilacerant etiam corpora hominum mortuorum. quasi uero quidquam intersit ad nostram utilitatem, ista caro iam exanimis in naturae profunda secreta per quos transitus eat, unde mirabili omnipotentia creatoris reformanda rursus eruatur. quamquam et hinc fiat quaedam prudentibus admonitio, ut se ita commendent fideli creatori omnia, maxima et minima, occulto nutu administranti, cui nostri etiam capilli numerati sunt, ne propter inanes curas exanimatorum corporum suorum ulla genera mortium perhorrescant, sed piae fortitudinis neruos ad omnia praeparare non dubitent.

This too may perhaps move someone: if harmful animals either injure living human beings as punishment, or exercise them for their good, or test them usefully, or teach them without knowing it, why do they also tear apart the bodies of dead human beings for their food? As if it made any difference to our advantage through what passages this flesh, now lifeless, goes into the deep secret places of nature, from which it will be brought out again to be re-formed by the wonderful omnipotence of the Creator. And yet from this too there comes a warning to the prudent, that they should so entrust themselves to the faithful Creator, who governs all things, the greatest and the least, by his hidden will, and by whom even our hairs are numbered, that they should not dread any kind of death because of empty cares for their lifeless bodies, but should not hesitate to prepare the sinews of devout courage for anything.

3.18CSEL 28.1:83–84

Talis etiam quaestio de spinis et tribulis solet oboriri et de quibusdam lignis infructuosis, uel cur uel quando creata sint, cum deus dixerit: producat terra herbam pabuli seminantem semen et lignum fructiferum faciens fructum. sed qui ita mouentur, non intellegunt saltem de usitatis formulis humani iuris, quemadmodum appelletur ususfructus. utilitas enim quaedam fruentium in fructus nomine consideratur. quantae autem sint utilitates, siue manifestae siue occultae, omnium, quae terra gignens radicitus alit, et ipsi quaedam intueantur et ab expertis cetera inquirant. Et de spinis quidem ac tribulis absolutior potest esse responsio, quia post peccatum dictum est homini de terra: spinas et tribulos pariet tibi. nec tamen facile dicendum est tunc coepisse ista oriri ex terra. fortassis enim quoniam in ipsis quoque generibus seminum multae reperiuntur utilitates, poterant habere locum suum sine ulla poena hominis. sed ut in agris, in quibus iam poenaliter laborabat, etiam ista nascerentur, hoc ad cumulum poenae ualere credi potest, cum possent alibi nasci uel ad auium pecorumque pastus uel ad ipsorum hominum aliquos usus. quamquam et ille sensus non abhorret ab his uerbis, quo ita intellegitur dictum: spinas et tribulos pariet tibi, ut haec etiam antea terra pariens non tamen homini pareret ad laborem, sed cuiusque modi animalibus conuenientem cibum — sunt enim, quae his generibus, et mollioribus et aridioribus, commode suauiterque uescantur — tunc autem coeperit ista homini parere ad aerumnosum negotium, cum post peccatum coepit in terra laborare, non quod aliis locis haec antea nascerentur et postea in agris, quos homo ad capiendas fruges coleret, sed et prius et postea in isdem locis, prius tamen non homini, post autem homini, ut hoc significetur, quod additum est: tibi, quia non est dictum: spinas et tribulos pariet, sed: pariet tibi, id est, ut tibi iam ista nasci incipiant ad laborem, quae ad pastum tantummodo aliis animalibus antea nascebantur.

A similar question often arises about thorns and thistles and certain fruitless trees, why or when they were created, since God said, “Let the earth bring forth the plant of pasture sowing seed, and the fruit-bearing tree making fruit.” But those who are moved in this way do not understand, at least from the usual formulas of human law, what is called usufruct; for a certain benefit to those who enjoy it is considered under the name of fruit. And how great the benefits, whether evident or hidden, of all that the earth brings forth and nourishes by roots, let them both observe some for themselves and inquire about the rest from those who have experience. And about thorns and thistles a more complete answer can be given, because after sin it was said to man about the earth, “It will bring forth thorns and thistles for you.” Yet it is not to be said lightly that these began to grow from the earth only then. For perhaps, since many benefits are found in these kinds of seeds too, they could have had their place without any punishment of man. But that they should grow also in the fields in which he was now labouring as a punishment may be believed to serve to heap up the punishment, since they could grow elsewhere, either as pasture for birds and cattle or for some uses of men themselves. And yet that other sense too is not out of keeping with these words, by which “It will bring forth thorns and thistles for you” is understood to mean that the earth brought these forth before too, yet not for man to labour over, but as suitable food for animals of every kind (for there are animals that feed conveniently and pleasantly on these kinds, both the softer and the drier); but that it began to bring them forth for man as a wretched business when after sin he began to labour on the earth. Not that these grew in other places before and afterward in the fields that man cultivated to gain crops, but both before and after in the same places, yet before not for man, and afterward for man; so that this is signified by the added “for you,” because it is not said, “It will bring forth thorns and thistles,” but, “It will bring them forth for you,” that is, so that these things now begin to grow for you, for labour, which previously grew only as food for other animals.

3.19CSEL 28.1:84–86

Et dixit deus: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et dominetur piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium pecorum et omnis terrae et omnium reptilium repentium super terram. et fecit deus hominem, ad imaginem dei fecit eum: masculum et feminam fecit eos. et benedixit eos deus dicens: crescite et multiplicamini et inplete terram et dominamini eius et principamini piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium pecorum et omnis terrae et omnium reptilium repentium super terram. et dixit deus: ecce dedi uobis omne pabulum seminale seminans semen, quod est super omnem terram, et omne lignum, quod habet in se fructum seminis seminalis — uobis erit ad escam et omnibus bestiis terrae et omnibus uolatilibus caeli et omni reptili repenti super terram, quod habet in se spiritum uitae - et omne pabulum uiride in escam. et factum est sic. et uidit deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona ualde. et facta est uespera, et factum est mane dies sextus. etiam atque etiam de natura hominis post erit uberior considerandi et diligentius disserendi locus. nunc tamen, ut opera sex dierum nostra inquisitio pertractatioque concludat, hoc primum breuiter dicimus non indifferenter accipiendum, quod in aliis operibus dicitur: dixit deus: fiat, hic autem: dixit deus: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, ad insinuandam scilicet, ut ita dicam, pluralitatem personarum propter patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum. quam tamen deitatis unitatem intellegendam statim admonet dicens: et fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, non quasi pater ad imaginem filii aut filius ad imaginem patris — alioquin non uere dictum est: ad imaginem nostram, si ad patris solius aut ad filii solius imaginem factus est homo — sed ita dictum: fecit deus ad imaginem dei, tamquam diceretur: fecit deus ad imaginem suam. cum autem nunc dicitur: ad imaginem dei, cum superius dictum sit: ad imaginem nostram, significatur, quod non id agat illa pluralitas personarum, ut plures deos uel dicamus uel credamus uel intellegamus, sed patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum — propter quam trinitatem dictum est: ad imaginem nostram — unum deum accipiamus, propter quod dictum est: ad imaginem dei.

“And God said, ‘Let us make man in our image and likeness; and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and all cattle and all the earth and all creeping things that creep upon the earth.’ And God made man; in the image of God he made him; male and female he made them. And God blessed them, saying, ‘Increase and multiply and fill the earth and have dominion over it, and rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and all cattle and all the earth and all creeping things that creep upon the earth.’ And God said, ‘Behold, I have given you all seed-bearing pasture sowing seed, which is upon all the earth, and every tree that has in it the fruit of seed-bearing seed; it will be food for you and for all the beasts of the earth and all the birds of heaven and every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth, which has in it the spirit of life; and all green pasture for food.’ And it was so done. And God saw all the things that he had made, and behold, they were very good. And evening came, and morning came, the sixth day.” There will be a fuller place later for considering again and again the nature of man and discussing it more carefully. Now, however, so that our inquiry and treatment may conclude the works of the six days, we say this first briefly: it is not to be taken as indifferent that in the other works it is said, “God said, ‘Let there be,’” but here, “God said, ‘Let us make man in our image and likeness’”: namely, to suggest, if I may put it so, a plurality of persons, because of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Yet immediately it warns that the unity of the Godhead is to be understood, saying, “And God made man in the image of God”; not as though the Father made him in the image of the Son, or the Son in the image of the Father (otherwise “in our image” would not be truly said, if man was made in the image of the Father alone or of the Son alone); but it is said, “God made him in the image of God,” as if it were said, “God made him in his own image.” And when it now says, “in the image of God,” after it said above, “in our image,” it is signified that that plurality of persons does not lead us to say or believe or understand many gods, but that we should take the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit (because of which Trinity it is said, “in our image”) as one God, because of which it is said, “in the image of God.”

3.20CSEL 28.1:86–88

Hic etiam illud non est praetereundum, quia, cum dixisset: ad imaginem nostram, statim subiunxit: et habeat potestatem piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et ceterorum animalium rationis expertium, ut uidelicet intellegamus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem dei, in quo inrationalibus animantibus antecellit. id autem est ipsa ratio uel mens uel intellegentia uel si quo alio uocabulo commodius appellatur. unde et apostolus dicit: renouamini in spiritu mentis uestrae et induite nouum hominem, qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creauit eum, satis ostendens, ubi sit homo creatus ad imaginem dei, quia non corporis liniamentis, sed forma quadam intellegibili mentis inluminatae. Ac per hoc, sicut in illa prima luce, si eo nomine recte intellegitur facta lux intellectualis particeps aeternae atque incommutabilis sapientiae dei, non dictum est: et sic est factum, ut deinde repeteretur: et fecit deus, quia, sicut iam, quantum potuimus, disseruimus, non fiebat cognitio aliqua uerbi dei in prima creatura, ut post eam cognitionem inferius crearetur, quod in eo uerbo creabatur, sed ipsa primo creabatur lux, in qua fieret cognitio uerbi dei, per quod creabatur, atque ipsa cognitio illi esset ab informitate sua conuerti ad formantem deum et creari atque formari, postea uero in ceteris creaturis dicitur: et sic est factum, ubi significatur in illa luce, hoc est in intellectuali creatura, prius facta uerbi cognitio, ac deinde, cum dicitur: et fecit deus, ipsius creaturae genus fieri demonstratur, quod in uerbo dei dictum erat, ut fieret: hoc et in hominis conditione seruatur; dixit enim deus: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram et cetera. ac deinde non dicitur: et sic est factum, sed iam subinfertur: et fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, quia et ipsa natura scilicet intellectualis est sicut illa lux, et propterea hoc est ei fieri, quod est agnoscere uerbum dei, per quod fit. Nam si diceretur: et sic est factum, et postea subinferretur: et fecit deus, quasi primo factum intellegeretur in cognitione rationalis creaturae ac deinde in aliqua creatura, quae rationalis non esset; quia uero et ista rationalis creatura est, et ipsa eadem agnitione perfecta est. sicut enim post lapsum peccati homo in agnitione dei renouatur secundum imaginem eius, qui creauit eum, ita in ipsa agnitione creatus est, antequam delicto ueterasceret, unde rursus in eadem agnitione renouaretur. quae autem non in ea cognitione creata sunt, quia siue corpora siue inrationales animae creabantur, primo facta est in creatura intellectuali cognitio eorum a uerbo, quo dictum est, ut fierent, propter quam cognitionem primo dicebatur: et sic est factum, ut ostenderetur facta ipsa cognitio in ea natura, quae hoc in uerbo dei ante cognoscere poterat; ac deinde fiebant ipsae corporales et inrationales creaturae, propter quod deinceps addebatur: et fecit deus.

Here too this must not be passed over: that after saying, “in our image,” he immediately added, “and let him have power over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven” and the other animals without reason, so that we may understand that man was made in the image of God in that by which he surpasses the irrational living creatures. And this is reason itself, or mind, or understanding, or whatever other word it may more fittingly be called by. That is why the apostle too says, “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who is being renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him,” showing clearly enough where man was created in the image of God: not in the lineaments of the body, but in a certain intelligible form of the enlightened mind. And so, just as in that first light (if by that name is rightly understood the making of an intellectual light sharing in the eternal and unchangeable Wisdom of God) it was not said, “And so it was done,” so that it might then be repeated, “And God made,” because, as we have already discussed as far as we could, there was not first some knowledge of the Word of God in the first creature, so that after that knowledge there might be created below what was being created in that Word; but the light itself was first created, in which the knowledge of the Word of God, through whom it was being created, might come about, and that knowledge itself was for it to be turned from its formlessness to God who forms it, and to be created and formed; whereas afterward, in the other creatures, it is said, “And so it was done,” where it is signified that the knowledge of the Word came about first in that light, that is, in the intellectual creation, and then, when it is said, “And God made,” it is shown that the kind of creature itself comes into being which had been spoken in the Word of God that it should be made: this is kept in the establishing of man too. For God said, “Let us make man in our image and likeness,” and so on. And then it is not said, “And so it was done,” but next is added, “And God made man in the image of God,” because this nature too is intellectual, like that light, and therefore for it to be made is the same as to know the Word of God through whom it is made. For if it were said, “And so it was done,” and afterward it were added, “And God made,” it would be understood as though it were made first in the knowledge of the rational creature and then in some creature that was not rational; but because this too is a rational creature, it too was perfected by that same knowledge. For just as after the fall into sin man is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him, so he was created in that very knowledge before he grew old in sin, from which he might be renewed again in the same knowledge. But the things that were not created in that knowledge, because they were created either as bodies or as irrational souls, their knowledge came about first in the intellectual creation from the Word by whom it was said that they should be made; and because of this knowledge it was first said, “And so it was done,” to show that the knowledge itself came about in that nature which could know this beforehand in the Word of God; and then the bodily and irrational creatures themselves came into being, because of which there was added next, “And God made.”

3.21CSEL 28.1:88

Quomodo autem inmortalis factus sit homo et acceperit ad escam cum aliis animalibus herbam pabuli ferentem semen et lignum fructiferum et herbam uiridem, difficile est dicere. si enim peccato mortalis effectus est, utique ante peccatum non indigebat talibus cibis. neque enim posset corpus illud fame corrumpi. nam illud, quod dictum est: crescite et multiplicamini et inplete terram, quamquam nisi per concubitum maris et feminae fieri non posse uideatur — unde hinc quoque mortalium corporum existit indicium — potest tamen dici alium modum esse potuisse in corporibus inmortalibus, ut solo pietatis adfectu nulla corruptionis concupiscentia filii nascerentur, nec mortuis parentibus successuri nec ipsi morituri, donec terra inmortalibus hominibus inpleretur, ac sic instituto iusto et sancto populo, qualem post resurrectionem futurum credimus, nascendi etiam modus fieret: potest quidem dici et, quomodo dicatur, alia consideratio est; sed non etiam hoc quisquam dicere audebit ciborum indigentiam, quibus reficiantur, nisi mortalibus corporibus esse posse.

But how man was made immortal and yet received for food, with the other animals, the plant of pasture bearing seed and the fruit-bearing tree and the green plant, is hard to say. For if he was made mortal by sin, then before sin he certainly did not need such food; for that body could not be corrupted by hunger. As for what was said, “Increase and multiply and fill the earth,” although it seems that this could not be done except through the union of male and female (from which there also arises an indication of mortal bodies), it can nevertheless be said that there could have been another way in immortal bodies, so that children would be born by the affection of devotion alone, with no lust belonging to corruption; they would neither succeed parents who had died nor die themselves, until the earth was filled with immortal human beings; and so, when a just and holy people had been established, such as we believe there will be after the resurrection, there would also be an end to being born. This can indeed be said, and how it could be said is another consideration; but no one will dare to say this too: that a need for food by which to be restored could exist except in mortal bodies.

3.22CSEL 28.1:88–90

Nonnulli autem etiam hoc suspicati sunt tunc interiorem hominem factum, corpus autem hominis postea, cum ait scriptura: et finxit deus hominem de limo terrae, ut, quod dictum est: fecit, ad spiritum pertineat, quod autem: finxit, ad corpus, nec adtenderunt masculum et feminam nonnisi secundum corpus fieri potuisse. licet enim subtilissime disseratur ipsam mentem hominis, in qua factus est ad imaginem dei, quandam scilicet rationalem uitam, distribui in aeternae contemplationis ueritatem et in rerum temporalium administrationem, atque ita fieri quasi masculum et feminam illa parte consulente, hac obtemperante: in hac tamen distributione non recte dicitur imago dei, nisi illud, quod inhaeret contemplandae incommutabili ueritati. in cuius rei figura Paulus apostolus uirum tantum dicit imaginem et gloriam dei; mulier autem, inquit, gloria uiri est itaque quamuis hoc in duobus hominibus diuersi sexus exterius secundum corpus figuratum sit, quod etiam in una hominis interius mente intellegitur, tamen et femina, quia corpore femina est, renouatur etiam ipsa in spiritu mentis suae in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creauit, ubi non est masculus et femina. sicut enim ab hac gratia renouationis et reformatione imaginis dei non separantur feminae, quamuis in sexu, corporis earum aliud figuratum sit, secundum quod uir solus dicitur esse imago et gloria dei, sic et in ipsa prima conditione hominis secundum id, quod et femina homo erat, habebat utique mentem suam eandemque rationalem, secundum quam ipsa quoque facta est ad imaginem dei. sed propter unitatem coniunctionis, fecit deus, inquit, hominem ad imaginem dei. ac ne quisquam putaret solum spiritum hominis factum, quamuis secundum solum spiritum fieret ad imaginem dei, fecit illum, inquit, masculum et feminam fecit illos, ut iam etiam corpus factum intellegatur. rursus ne quisquam arbitraretur ita factum, ut in homine singulari uterque sexus exprimeretur, sicut interdum nascuntur, quos androgynos uocant, ostendit se singularem numerum propter coniunctionis unitatem posuisse et quod de uiro mulier facta est, sicut postea manifestabitur, cum id, quod hic breuiter dictum est, diligentius coeperit explicari; et ideo pluralem numerum continuo subiecit dicens: fecit eos et benedixit eos. sed, ut iam dixi, diligentius in consequenti scriptura de hominis creatione requiremus.

Some have also supposed that the inner man was made then, but the body of man afterward, when Scripture says, “And God formed man from the slime of the earth,” so that “made” refers to the spirit and “formed” to the body; and they did not notice that male and female could have been made only according to the body. For although it may be argued very subtly that the very mind of man, in which he was made in the image of God, a kind of rational life, is divided into the truth of eternal contemplation and the administration of temporal things, and thus becomes as it were male and female, one part counselling and the other obeying, yet in this division it is not rightly called the image of God except for that which cleaves to the contemplation of the unchangeable truth. In figure of this, the apostle Paul says that only the man is the image and glory of God; “but the woman,” he says, “is the glory of the man.” So although what is understood inwardly in the one mind of a human being is figured outwardly in two human beings of different sex according to the body, yet the woman too, who is a woman in body, is herself also renewed in the spirit of her mind in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created, where there is no male and female. For just as women are not separated from this grace of renewal and re-forming of the image of God, although in the sex of their body something else is figured, according to which the man alone is said to be the image and glory of God, so also in the first establishing of man, in that the woman too was a human being, she certainly had her mind, and the same rational mind, according to which she too was made in the image of God. But because of the unity of the union, “God made,” it says, “man in the image of God.” And so that no one would think that only the spirit of man was made, although he was made in the image of God according to the spirit alone, it says, “He made him male and female; he made them,” so that the body too is now understood to have been made. Again, so that no one would think that he was made in such a way that both sexes were expressed in a single human being, as sometimes those are born whom they call androgynes, it shows that it used the singular number because of the unity of the union, and because the woman was made from the man, as will be made clear later when what is said briefly here begins to be explained more carefully; and so it immediately added the plural number, saying, “He made them, and he blessed them.” But, as I have already said, we shall inquire more carefully into the creation of man in the Scripture that follows.

3.23CSEL 28.1:90–91

Nunc aduertendum est, quod, posteaquam dixit: et sic est factum, statim subiecit: et uidit deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona ualde, ubi intellegitur potestas et facultas ipsa data naturae humanae sumendi ad escam pabulum agri et fructus ligni. ad hoc enim intulit: et sic est factum, quod ab illo loco inchoauerat, ubi ait: et dixit deus: ecce dedi uobis pabulum seminale et cetera. nam si ad omnia, quae supra dicta sunt, rettulerimus, quod ait: et sic est factum, consequens erit, ut fateamur etiam creuisse illos iam et multiplicatos inpleuisse terram in eodem sexto die, quod eadem scriptura testante post multos annos factum inuenimus. quapropter, cum data esset facultas haec edendi, et hoc deo dicente homo cognouisset, dicitur: et sic est factum, in hoc utique, quod deo dicente homo cognouit. nam si id etiam tunc egisset, id est in escam illa, quae data sunt, etiam uescendo adsumsisset, seruaretur illa consuetudo scripturae, ut, posteaquam dictum est: et sic est factum, quod ad exprimendam praecedentem cognitionem pertinet, deinde inferretur etiam ipsa operatio ac diceretur: et acceperunt et ederunt. poterat enim ita dici, etiamsi non rursus nominaretur deus, sicut illo loco, posteaquam dictum est: congregetur aqua, quae est sub caelo, in congregationem unam, et adpareat arida, subinfertur: et sic est factum, ac deinde non dicitur: et fecit deus, sed tamen ita repetitur: et congregata est aqua in congregationem suam et cetera.

Now we must notice that after saying, “And so it was done,” he immediately added, “And God saw all the things that he had made, and behold, they were very good.” Here is understood the power and ability itself given to human nature to take for food the pasture of the field and the fruit of the tree. For he brought in “And so it was done” with reference to what he had begun from the place where he said, “And God said, ‘Behold, I have given you seed-bearing pasture,’” and so on. For if we refer “And so it was done” to everything said above, it will follow that we must admit that they had already increased and multiplied and filled the earth on the same sixth day, which, by the testimony of the same Scripture, we find happened after many years. So since this ability to eat had been given, and man had come to know it as God spoke, it is said, “And so it was done,” certainly in that man came to know it as God spoke. For if he had also done it then, that is, had also taken by eating the things that were given for food, the custom of Scripture would be kept, so that after it was said, “And so it was done,” which serves to express the preceding knowledge, the act itself would then be brought in, and it would be said, “And they took and ate.” For it could have been said so even if God were not named again, as in that place where, after it was said, “Let the water that is under heaven be gathered into one gathering, and let the dry land appear,” there is added, “And so it was done,” and then it is not said, “And God made,” but it is nevertheless repeated thus, “And the water was gathered into its gathering,” and so on.

3.24CSEL 28.1:91–93

Quod autem non singillatim ut in ceteris etiam de humana creatura dixit: et uidit deus, quia bonum est, sed post hominem factum datamque illi potestatem uel dominandi uel edendi subintulit de omnibus: et uidit deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona ualde, merito quaeri potest. potuit enim primo reddi homini singillatim, quod singillatim ceteris, quae antea facta sunt, redditum est, tum demum de omnibus dici, quae fecit deus, ecce bona ualde. an forte, quia sexto die perficiuntur omnia, propterea de omnibus dicendum fuit: uidit deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona ualde, non singillatim de his, quae ipso die facta sunt? cur ergo de pecoribus et bestiis et reptilibus terrae dictum est, quae ad eundem diem sextum pertinent? nisi forte illa et singillatim in suo genere et cum ceteris uniuersaliter dici bona meruerunt, et homo factus ad imaginem dei nonnisi cum ceteris hoc dici meruit. an quia perfectus nondum erat, quia nondum erat in paradiso constitutus? quasi uero, posteaquam ibi constitutus est, dictum sit, quod hic praetermissum est. Quid ergo dicemus? an, quia praesciebat deus hominem peccaturum nec in suae imaginis perfectione mansurum, non singillatim, sed cum ceteris eum dicere uoluit bonum, uelut intimans, quid esset futurum? quia, cum ea, quae facta sunt, in eo, quod facta sunt, quantum acceperunt, manent, sicut uel illa, quae non peccauerunt, uel illa, quae peccare non possunt, et singula bona et in uniuerso omnia ualde bona sunt. non enim frustra est additum: ualde, quia et corporis membra, si etiam singula pulchra sunt, multo sunt tamen in uniuersi corporis conpage omnia pulchriora; quia oculum, uerbi gratia, placitum atque laudatum, tamen, si separatum a corpore uideremus, non diceremus tam pulchrum quam in illa conexione membrorum, cum loco suo positus in uniuerso corpore cerneretur. ea uero, quae peccando amittunt decus proprium, nullo modo tamen efficiunt, ut non etiam ipsa recte ordinata cum toto atque uniuerso bona sint. homo igitur ante peccatum et in suo genere utique bonus erat; sed scriptura praetermisit hoc dicere, ut illud potius diceret, quod futurum aliquid praenuntiaret. non enim falsum de illo dictum est. qui enim singillatim bonus est, magis utique cum omnibus bonus est. non autem, quando cum omnibus bonus est, sequitur, ut etiam singillatim bonus sit. moderatum est itaque, ut id diceretur, quod et in praesenti uerum esset et praescientiam significaret futuri. deus enim naturarum optimus conditor, peccantium uero iustissimus ordinator est, ut etiam, si qua singillatim fiunt delinquendo deformia, semper tamen cum eis uniuersitas pulchra sit. sed iam ea, quae sequuntur, in sequenti uolumine pertractemus.

But it may rightly be asked why he did not say of the human creature individually, as in the other cases, “And God saw that it was good,” but after man was made and given power both to rule and to eat, he added of all things, “And God saw all the things that he had made, and behold, they were very good.” For it could first have been rendered to man individually, as it had been rendered individually to the other things made before, and then finally said of all the things God made, “Behold, they were very good.” Or perhaps, because all things are completed on the sixth day, it had to be said of all things, “God saw all the things that he had made, and behold, they were very good,” and not individually of the things made on that day? Why then was it said of the cattle and beasts and creeping things of the earth, which belong to the same sixth day? Unless perhaps they deserved to be called good both individually in their kind and generally with the others, while man, made in the image of God, deserved to be called so only with the others. Or was it because he was not yet perfect, because he had not yet been placed in paradise? As if, after he was placed there, what was omitted here were said! What then shall we say? Was it that, because God foreknew that man would sin and would not remain in the perfection of his image, he wished to call him good, not individually but with the others, as if hinting at what was to come? For when the things that have been made remain in what they were made, so far as they have received it, like those that have not sinned or those that cannot sin, they are both good individually and all very good in the whole. For “very” is not added without purpose: because the members of the body too, even if each is beautiful, are nevertheless all much more beautiful in the structure of the whole body. An eye, for instance, is pleasing and praised; yet if we saw it separated from the body we would not call it as beautiful as in that connection of the members, when it is seen set in its place in the whole body. But the things that lose their proper beauty by sinning in no way bring it about that they too, rightly ordered with the whole and the universe, are not good. So man before sin was certainly good in his own kind too; but Scripture left out saying this, so that it might rather say what would foretell something to come. For what was said of him is not false. For whoever is good individually is all the more good with all; but when he is good with all, it does not follow that he is also good individually. So it was measured to say what was both true in the present and signified foreknowledge of the future. For God is the best founder of natures and the most just orderer of sinners, so that even if some things become deformed individually by doing wrong, the universe with them is always beautiful. But let us now treat what follows in the next book.

Chapter 4

4.1CSEL 28.1:93–94

Et consummata sunt caelum et terra et omnis ornatus eorum. et consummauit deus in die sexto opera sua, quae fecit; et requieuit deus die septimo ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit. et benedixit deus diem septimum et sanctificauit eum, quia in ipso requieuit ab omnibus operibus suis, quae inchoauit deus facere. arduum quidem atque difficillimum est uiribus intentionis nostrae uoluntatem scriptoris in istis sex diebus mentis uiuacitate penetrare. utrum praeterierint dies illi et addito septimo nunc per uolumina temporum non re, sed nomine repetantur. in toto enim tempore multi dies ueniunt praeteritis similes, nullus autem idem redit. utrum ergo praeterierint dies illi, an istis, qui eorum uocabulis et numero censentur, in temporum ordine cotidie transcurrentibus illi in ipsis rerum conditionibus maneant, ut non solum in illis tribus, antequam fierent luminaria, sed etiam in reliquis item tribus diei nomen intellegamus in specie rei, quae creata est, noctemque eius in priuatione uel defectu uel si quo alio nomine melius significatur, cum amittitur species aliqua mutatione a forma ad informitatem declinante atque uergente — quae mutatio in omni creatura siue possibilitate inest, etiamsi desit effectu, sicut in caelestibus superioribus, siue ad inplendam in infimis rebus pulchritudinem temporalem per ordinatas uices quorumque mutabilium cessionibus successionibusque peragitur, sicut manifestum est in rebus terrenis atque mortalibus - uespera uero in omnibus perfectae conditionis quasi terminus quidam sit. mane autem incipientis exordium — omnis enim creata natura certis suis initiis et finibus continetur —: indagare difficile est. sed siue hoc siue illud siue aliquid etiam tertium probabilius, quod dicatur, possit inueniri, quod in progressu disputationis forsitan adparebit, quemadmodum in illis diebus et nox et uespera et mane intellegatur, non est tamen ab re, ut consideremus senarii numeri perfectionem in ipsa interiore natura numerorum: quam mente intuentes ea, quae sensibus etiam corporis adiacent, numeramus numeroseque disponimus.

“And heaven and earth were finished, and all their adornment. And on the sixth day God finished his works which he had made; and on the seventh day God rested from all his works which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because on it he rested from all his works which God began to make.” It is indeed arduous and most difficult for the powers of our attention to penetrate with keenness of mind the intention of the writer in these six days. Did those days pass away, so that, with a seventh added, they are now repeated through the cycles of time not in reality but in name? For in the whole of time many days come that are like past ones, but none returns as the same. Did those days, then, pass away, or, while these days that are reckoned by their names and number run by daily in the order of time, do those days remain in the very establishing of things? In that case we would understand the name “day,” not only in those three days before the lights were made but also in the remaining three, as the form of the thing that was created, and its “night” as the privation or failing of it, or whatever better name signifies the loss of some form through a change that declines and tends from form toward formlessness. Such change is present in every creature, either as a possibility even if it is not actually realized, as in the higher heavenly things, or it is carried out through ordered alternations, by the yielding and succession of changeable things, to complete a temporal beauty in the lowest things, as is plain in earthly and mortal things. “Evening,” then, would be in all things as it were the limit of the completed establishing, and “morning” the starting point of one beginning; for every created nature is bounded by its own fixed beginnings and ends. This is difficult to search out. But whether this or that, or some third thing more probable, can be found to say about how night, evening, and morning are to be understood in those days (which will perhaps appear as the discussion proceeds), it is not beside the point that we should consider the perfection of the number six in the inner nature of numbers itself. Contemplating it with the mind, we count, and arrange in number, even the things that lie open to the senses of the body.

4.2CSEL 28.1:94–98

Inuenimus ergo senarium numerum primum esse perfectum ea ratione, quod suis partibus conpleatur; sunt enim et alii numeri aliis causis rationibusque perfecti. proinde istum senarium ea ratione perfectum diximus, quod suis partibus conpleatur, talibus dumtaxat partibus, quae multiplicatae possint consummare numerum, cuius partes sunt; talis enim pars numeri dici potest quota sit. nam ternarius numerus potest dici pars non tantum senarii, cuius dimidia est, sed omnium ampliorum, quam est ipse ternarius. nam et quaternarii et quinarii pars maior ternarius est; potest enim diuidi et quaternarius in tria et unum et quinarius in tria et duo. et septenarii et octonarii et nouenarii et quidquid ultra est numerorum pars est ternarius non maior uel dimidia, sed minor. nam septenarius quoque diuidi potest in tria et quattuor et octonarius in tria et quinque et nouenarius in tria et sex; sed nullius horum potest dici ternarius quota sit pars nisi tantum nouenarii, cuius pars tertia est sicut senarii dimidia. itaque horum omnium, quos commemoraui, nullus consummatur ex aliquot ternariis nisi senarius et nouenarius. nam ille constat ex duobus ternariis, iste autem ex tribus. Senarius ergo numerus, ut dicere coeperam, partibus suis connumeratis et in summam ductis ipse conpletur. alii namque sunt numeri, quorum partes simul ductae minorem summam faciunt, alii uero ampliorem; certis autem interuallorum rationibus pauciores inueniuntur, qui suis partibus conpleantur, quarum summa nec citra insistat nec ultra excrescat, sed ad tantum occurrat, quantus est ipse numerus, cuius partes sunt. horum primus senarius est. nam unius in numeris nullae partes sunt. sic enim dicitur et unum in numeris, quibus numeramus, ut non habeat dimidium uel aliquam partem, sed uere ac pure et simpliciter unum sit. duorum autem pars unum est et ea dimidia nec ulla altera. ternarius uero duas habet, unam, quae dici possit quota sit — quod est unum; nam tertia eius est - et aliam maiorem, quae non possit dici quota sit, id est duo; nec huius ergo conputari possunt partes illae. de quibus agimus, id est quae dici possunt quotae sint. porro quaternarius duas habet tales: nam unum quarta eius est, duo dimidia; sed ambae in summam ductae, id est unum et duo simul, ternarium faciunt. non quaternarium. non ergo eum conplent partes suae, quia in summa minore consistunt. quinarius non habet talem nisi unam, id est ipsum unum, quae quinta pars eius est; nam et duo quamuis pars eius minor sit et tria maior, neutra tamen earum dici potest quota pars eius sit. senarius uero tres partes tales habet: sextam, tertiam, dimidiam. sexta eius unum est, tertia duo, dimidia tria. haec autem partes in summam ductae, id est unum et duo et tria, simul eundem consummant perficiuntque senarium. Iam septenarius non habet talem partem nisi septimam,. quod est unum, octonarius tres: octauam, quartam, dimidiam, id est: unum, duo et quattuor. sed haec similiter ductae septenarium faciunt infra insistentem, non ergo inplent eundem octonarium. nouenarius duas habet: nonam, quod est unum, et tertiam, quod est tria. haec autem simul quaternarium faciunt longe nouenario minorem. denarius tres habet partes tales: unum decimam, duo quintam, quinque dimidiam: qui numeri simul ducti ad octonarium perueniunt, non ad denarium. undenarius non habet nisi solam undecimam, sicut septenarius solam septimam et quinarius solam quintam et ternarius solam tertiam et binarius solam dimidiam, quod in omnibus unum est. duodenarius uero partibus suis talibus simul ductis non ipse consummatur, sed exceditur; ampliorem quippe duodenario numerum faciunt: nam usque ad sedecim perueniunt. habet enim eas quinque: duodecimam, sextam. quartam, tertiam, dimidiam. nam duodecima eius unum est, sexta duo, quarta tria, tertia quattuor, dimidia sex: unum autem et duo et tria et quattuor et sex in summam ducta sedecim faciunt. Et ne multis morer, in infinita serie numerorum plures numeri reperiuntur, qui tales partes aut non habent nisi singulas, sicut ternarius et quinarius et ceteri eiusmodi, aut ita plures habent tales partes, ut in unum ductae atque in summam redactae uel citra insistant, sicut est octonarius et nouenarius et alii plurimi, uel ultra excedant, sicut duodecimus et duodeuicesimus et multi tales. plures ergo reperiuntur quilibet horum quam illi, qui perfecti uocantur, eo, quod suis simul ductis talibus partibus conpleantur. nam post senarium duodetricesimus inuenitur, qui similiter suis partibus talibus constat; habet enim eas quinque: uicesimam et octauam, quartam decimam, septimam, quartam, dimidiam; id est: unum et duo et quattuor et septem et quattuordecim. quae simul ductae eundem duodetricesimum conplent; fiunt enim uiginti octo. et quanto magis numerorum ordo procedit, tanto productioribus pro rata portione interuallis reperiuntur hi numeri, qui suis talibus partibus in summam redactis ad se ipsos occurrunt, dicunturque perfecti. quorum enim numerorum tales partes simul ductae non inplent eosdem numeros, quorum partes sunt, inperfecti nominantur; quorum autem etiam excedunt, plus quam perfecti appellantur. Perfecto ergo numero dierum, hoc est senario, perfecit deus opera sua, quae fecit. ita enim scriptum est: et consummauit deus in die sexto opera sua, quae fecit. magis autem in istum numerum intentus fio, cum considero etiam ordinem operum ipsorum. sicut enim idem numerus gradatim partibus suis in trigonum surgit — nam ita sequuntur unum, duo, tria, ut nullus alius interponi possit, quae singulae senarii partes sunt quibus constat: unum sexta, duo tertia, tria dimidia — ita uno die facta est lux, duobus autem sequentibus fabrica mundi huius: uno superior pars, id est firmamentum, altero inferior, id est mare et terra. sed partem superiorem nullis alimentorum corporalium generibus inpleuit, quia non ibi erat positurus corpora tali refectione indigentia. at inferiorem, quam sibi congruentibus animalibus ornaturus erat, necessariis eorum indigentiae cibis ante ditauit. reliquis ergo tribus diebus ea creata sunt, quae intra mundum, id est intra istam uniuersitatem uisibilem ex elementis omnibus factam, uisibilia suis et congruis motibus agerentur. primo in firmamento luminaria, quia prius erat factum firmamentum, deinde in inferiore animantia, sicut ordo ipse poscebat, uno die aquarum. alio terrarum. nec quisquam ita demens est, ut audeat dicere non potuisse deum facere uno die cuncta, si uellet, aut, si uellet, biduo: uno die spiritalem creaturam et alio die corporalem, siue uno die caelum cum omnibus pertinentibus et alio terram cum omnibus. quae in ea sunt. et omnino quando uellet et quamdiu uellet et quomodo uellet. quis est, qui dicat uoluntati eius aliquid potuisse resistere?

We find, then, that six is the first perfect number, for the reason that it is completed by its parts; for other numbers too are perfect for other causes and reasons. So we have said that this number six is perfect for the reason that it is completed by its parts, but only by such parts as, when multiplied, can make up the number whose parts they are; for such a part of a number can be said to be a definite fraction of it. Three can be called a part not only of six, of which it is the half, but of all numbers greater than three. For three is the larger part of four and of five; for four can be divided into three and one, and five into three and two. And of seven, eight, nine, and whatever numbers lie beyond, three is a part, not a larger part or a half, but a smaller one. For seven too can be divided into three and four, eight into three and five, and nine into three and six; but of none of these can three be said to be a definite fraction except of nine, of which it is a third, as it is a half of six. So of all these numbers I have mentioned, none is made up of a certain number of threes except six and nine; the first consists of two threes, the second of three.

The number six, then, as I had begun to say, is itself completed when its parts are counted together and added into a sum. For there are other numbers whose parts taken together make a smaller sum, and others whose parts make a larger one; but at fixed ratios of interval fewer numbers are found that are completed by their parts, whose sum neither stops short nor overgrows, but comes exactly to the size of the number whose parts they are. Of these the first is six. For one has no parts among numbers. One among the numbers with which we count is so called because it has no half or any part, but is truly, purely, and simply one. Of two, one is a part, and that the half, and there is no other. Three has two parts: one that can be said to be a definite fraction, namely one, for it is its third; and another, larger, that cannot be called a definite fraction, namely two. So these parts of three cannot be counted among those we are dealing with, that is, those that can be called definite fractions. Four has two such parts: one is its fourth, two its half; but both added together, that is, one and two, make three, not four. So its parts do not complete it, because they stop at a smaller sum. Five has only one such part, namely one itself, which is its fifth; for although two is a smaller part of it and three a larger, neither can be called a definite fraction of it. But six has three such parts: a sixth, a third, and a half. Its sixth is one, its third two, its half three. And these parts added together, that is, one and two and three, together make up and complete the same six.

Next, seven has no such part except its seventh, which is one; eight has three: an eighth, a fourth, a half, that is, one, two, and four. But these, added in the same way, make seven, which stops short, so they do not fill out eight. Nine has two: its ninth, which is one, and its third, which is three; and these together make four, far less than nine. Ten has three such parts: one, its tenth; two, its fifth; five, its half; and these numbers added together come to eight, not to ten. Eleven has only its eleventh, as seven has only its seventh, five only its fifth, three only its third, and two only its half, which in all of them is one. Twelve, however, is not completed by such parts added together but exceeded; for they make a number greater than twelve, reaching sixteen. For it has five of them: its twelfth, sixth, fourth, third, and half. Its twelfth is one, its sixth two, its fourth three, its third four, its half six; and one, two, three, four, and six added into a sum make sixteen.

Not to dwell on it longer: in the infinite series of numbers more numbers are found that either have only one such part, like three and five and others of that kind, or have several such parts so that, when added together and brought to a sum, they either stop short, like eight and nine and very many others, or exceed, like twelve and eighteen and many such. More numbers of either of these kinds are found, then, than of those that are called perfect because they are completed by such parts added together. For after six comes twenty-eight, which likewise consists of such parts; for it has five of them: its twenty-eighth, fourteenth, seventh, fourth, and half, that is, one, two, four, seven, and fourteen, which added together complete the same twenty-eight; for they make twenty-eight. And the further the order of numbers proceeds, the longer, in proportion, are the intervals at which these numbers are found which, when such parts are brought to a sum, come back to themselves and are called perfect. For numbers whose such parts taken together do not fill out the numbers whose parts they are are called imperfect; those whose parts even exceed them are called more than perfect.

So it was in a perfect number of days, that is, six, that God perfected his works which he made. For thus it is written: “And on the sixth day God finished his works which he had made.” And I become more intent on this number when I consider also the order of the works themselves. For as this same number rises step by step through its parts into a triangle (for one, two, three follow one another so that no other can be inserted, and these are each parts of six of which it consists: one the sixth, two the third, three the half), so in one day light was made, and in the two following days the structure of this world: in one the upper part, that is, the firmament, in the other the lower part, that is, sea and land. But he did not fill the upper part with any kinds of bodily food, because he was not going to place there bodies that need such nourishment. The lower part, however, which he was going to adorn with animals suited to it, he first enriched with the food necessary for their need. So in the remaining three days were created those visible things within the world, that is, within this visible universe made of all the elements, which would be moved by their own appropriate motions: first the lights in the firmament, because the firmament had been made first; then living creatures in the lower part, as the order itself required, on one day those of the waters, on another those of the land. Nor is anyone so mad as to dare to say that God could not have made everything in one day if he had wished, or, if he had wished, in two: spiritual creation on one day and bodily creation on another, or heaven with all that belongs to it on one day and earth with all that is in it on another; and altogether when he wished, for as long as he wished, and in whatever way he wished. Who is there who would say that anything could have resisted his will?

4.3CSEL 28.1:98–100

Quapropter, cum eum legimus sex diebus omnia perfecisse et senarium numerum considerantes inuenimus esse perfectum, atque ita creaturarum ordinem currere, ut etiam ipsarum partium, quibus iste numerus perficitur, adpareat quasi gradata distinctio, ueniat etiam illud in mentem, quod alio loco scripturarum ei dicitur: omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti, atque ita cogitet anima, quae potest. inuocato in auxilium deo et inpertiente atque. inspirante uires, utrum haec tria, mensura, numerus, pondus, in quibus deum disposuisse omnia scriptum est, erant alicubi, antequam crearetur uniuersa natura, an etiam ipsa creata sunt. et, si erant antea, ubi erant. neque enim ante creaturam erat aliquid nisi creator. in ipso ergo erant. sed quomodo? nam et ista. quae creata sunt, in ipso esse legimus. an illa sicut ipse, ista uero sicut in illo, a quo reguntur et gubernantur? et quomodo illa ipse? neque enim deus mensura est aut numerus aut pondus aut ista omnia. an secundum id, quod nouimus mensuram in his, quae metimur, et numerum in his, quae numeramus, et pondus in his, quae adpendimus, non est deus ista? secundum id uero, quod mensura omni rei modum praefigit et numerus omni rei speciem praebet et pondus omnem rem ad quietem ac stabilitatem trahit, ille primitus et ueraciter et singulariter ista est, qui terminat omnia et format omnia et ordinat omnia, nihilque aliud dictum intellegitur, quomodo per cor et linguam humanam potuit: omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti, nisi: omnia in te disposuisti? Magnum est paucisque concessum excedere omnia, quae metiri possunt, ut uideatur mensura sine mensura, excedere omnia, quae numerari possunt, ut uideatur numerus sine numero, excedere omnia, quae pendi possunt, ut uideatur pondus sine pondere.

Therefore, when we read that he perfected all things in six days, and, considering the number six, find that it is perfect, and that the order of creatures runs in such a way that a graded distinction appears even among the parts by which this number is perfected, let there also come to mind what is said to him in another place of the Scriptures: “You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight.” And let the soul that is able, calling God to its aid, with him granting and breathing in strength, consider whether these three, measure, number, and weight, in which it is written that God arranged all things, existed somewhere before the whole of nature was created, or were themselves also created; and, if they existed before, where they were. For before creation there was nothing except the Creator. So they were in him. But how? For we read that the things that were created are also in him. Were the former in him as being himself, and the latter as being in him by whom they are ruled and governed? And how were the former himself? For God is not measure, or number, or weight, or all of these. Is it that, in the sense in which we know measure in the things we measure, number in the things we count, and weight in the things we weigh, God is not these; but in the sense in which measure fixes a limit for every thing, number supplies every thing with its form, and weight draws every thing to rest and stability, he is these, primarily, truly, and uniquely, he who bounds all things, forms all things, and orders all things? And is nothing else meant, so far as it could be said by a human heart and tongue, by “You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight,” than “You have arranged all things in yourself”? It is a great thing, granted to few, to go beyond all things that can be measured, so as to see measure without measure; to go beyond all things that can be counted, so as to see number without number; to go beyond all things that can be weighed, so as to see weight without weight.

4.4CSEL 28.1:100–101

Neque enim mensura et numerus et pondus in lapidibus tantummodo et lignis atque eiusmodi molibus et quantiscumque corporalibus uel terrestribus uel caelestibus animaduerti et cogitari potest. est autem mensura aliquid agendi, ne sit inreuocabilis et inmoderata progressio; et est numerus et adfectionum animi et uirtutum, quo ab stultitiae deformitate ad sapientiae formam decusque conligitur; et est pondus uoluntatis et amoris, ubi adparet, quanti quidque in adpetendo, fugiendo, praeponendo postponendoque pendatur. at haec animorum atque mentium et mensura alia mensura cohibetur, et numerus alio numero formatur, et pondus alio pondere rapitur. mensura autem sine mensura est, cui aequatur quod de illa est, nec alicunde ipsa est; numerus sine numero est, quo formantur omnia, nec formatur ipse; pondus sine pondere est, quo referuntur, ut quiescant, quorum quies purum gaudium est, nec illud iam refertur ad aliud. Sed nomina mensurae et numeri et ponderis quisquis nonnisi uisibiliter nouit, seruiliter nouit. transcendat itaque omne, quod ita nouit, aut si nondum potest, nec ipsis nominibus haereat, de quibus cogitare nisi sordide non potest. tanto enim magis cuique ista in superioribus cara sunt, quanto ipse minus est in inferioribus caro. quodsi non uult aliquis ea uocabula, quae in rebus infirmis et abiectissimis didicit, transferre ad illa sublimia, quibus intuendis mentem serenare conatur, non est urgendus, ut faciat. dum enim hoc intellegatur, quod intellegendum est, non magnopere curandum est. quid uocetur. scire oportet tamen, cuiusmodi similitudo est inferiorum ad superiora. non enim aliter recte hinc illuc ratio tendit et nititur. Jam uero si quisquam dicit creatam esse mensuram et numerum et pondus, in quibus deum omnia disposuisse scriptura testatur, si in illis omnia disposuit, eadem ipsa ubi disposuit? si in aliis, quomodo ergo in ipsis omnia, quando ipsa in aliis? non itaque dubitandum est illa esse extra ea, quae disposita sunt, in quibus omnia disposita sunt

For measure, number, and weight can be noticed and thought of not only in stones and wood and masses of that kind, and in bodies of any size, earthly or heavenly. There is also a measure in acting, so that it may not be an unchecked and immoderate advance; there is a number both of the affections of the mind and of the virtues, by which the mind is gathered from the deformity of folly to the form and beauty of wisdom; and there is a weight of the will and of love, in which it appears how much each thing is weighed in desiring, fleeing, preferring, and putting after. But this measure of souls and minds is restrained by another measure, this number is formed by another number, and this weight is carried along by another weight. But there is a measure without measure, to which what comes from it is made equal, and which is not itself from anywhere; there is a number without number, by which all things are formed, and which is not itself formed; there is a weight without weight, to which those things are brought back to rest whose rest is pure joy, and which is no longer itself brought back to anything else.

But whoever knows the names of measure, number, and weight only in a visible way knows them in a servile way. Let him therefore go beyond everything he knows in that way; or, if he cannot yet, let him not cling to the names themselves, of which he cannot think except in a base way. For the more these things are dear to each person in higher things, the less he himself is flesh in lower things. But if someone does not wish to transfer the words he learned in weak and most lowly things to those sublime things, in contemplating which he tries to make his mind serene, he is not to be pressed to do it. For so long as what is to be understood is understood, there need be no great concern about what it is called. Yet one ought to know what kind of likeness the lower things bear to the higher; for in no other way does reason rightly reach and strive from here to there.

Now if anyone says that the measure, number, and weight in which Scripture testifies that God arranged all things were created: if he arranged all things in them, where did he arrange these themselves? If in others, how then did he arrange all things in these, when these were in others? So there is no doubt that those things in which all things were arranged are outside the things that were arranged.

4.5CSEL 28.1:101–102

An forte putabimus ita dictum esse: omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti, ac si diceretur: omnia sic disposuisti, ut haberent mensuram et numerum et pondus? quia et, si diceretur: omnia corpora in coloribus disposuisti, non hinc esset consequens, ut ipsa dei sapientia, per quam facta sunt omnia, colores in se prius habuisse intellegeretur, in quibus faceret corpora, sed ita acciperetur: omnia corpora in coloribus disposuisti, ac si diceretur: omnia corpora sic disposuisti, ut haberent colores. quasi uero a creatore deo disposita in coloribus corpora, id est ita disposita, ut colorata essent, possit aliter intellegi, nisi aliqua ratio colorum singulis corporum generibus distribuendorum in ipsa disponentis sapientia non defuisse intellegatur, etsi color ibi non appellatur. hoc est enim, quod dixi, dum res conceditur, non esse de uocabulis laborandum. Faciamus ergo ita dictum esse: omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti, tamquam dictum esset ita disposita, ut haberent proprias mensuras suas et proprios numeros et proprium pondus, quae in eis pro sui cuiusque generis mutabilitate mutarentur, augmentis et diminutionibus, multitudine et paucitate, leuitate et grauitate secundum dispositionem dei: numquid, sicut ista mutantur, ita ipsum dei consilium, in quo ea disposuit, mutabile dicimus? auerterit ipse tantam dementiam!

Or shall we perhaps think that “You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight” was said as if it said, “You arranged all things so that they had measure and number and weight”? For if it were said, “You arranged all bodies in colors,” it would not follow that the Wisdom of God itself, through which all things were made, should be understood to have had colors in itself first, in which it might make bodies; rather it would be taken thus: “You arranged all bodies in colors,” as if it said, “You arranged all bodies so that they had colors.” As though bodies arranged in colors by God the Creator, that is, arranged so that they were colored, could be understood in any other way than that some reason of the colors to be distributed to each kind of body was not lacking in the very Wisdom of the one who arranged them, even if it is not called color there. This is what I said: when the thing is granted, there is no need to labor over words.

Let us suppose, then, that “You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight” was said as if it said that they were arranged so as to have their own proper measures and proper numbers and proper weight, which change in them according to the changeableness of each one's kind, by increase and diminution, by multitude and fewness, by lightness and heaviness, according to God's arrangement. Do we then say that, as these things change, so the very counsel of God in which he arranged them is changeable? May he himself avert such madness!

4.6CSEL 28.1:102

Cum ergo haec ita disponerentur, ut haberent mensuras et numeros et pondera sua, ubi ea cernebat ipse disponens? neque enim extra se ipsum, sicut cernimus oculis corpora, quae utique nondum erant, cum disponerentur, ut fierent. nec ita intra se ipsum ista cernebat, sicut cernimus animo phantasias corporum, quae non praesto sunt oculis, sed ea, quae uidimus, uel ex eis, quae uidimus, imaginando cogitamus. quo ergo modo ista cernebat, ut ita disponeret? quo, nisi eo, quo solus potest? Uerum tamen nos mortales et peccatores, quorum animas adgrauant corpora corruptibilia et quorum sensum multa cogitantem terrena deprimit habitatio — quamquam, et si corda mundissima et mentes simplicissimas gereremus sanctisque angelis iam essemus aequales, non utique nobis ita nota esset diuina substantia sicut ipsa sibi —

When, then, these things were being arranged so as to have their measures, numbers, and weights, where did he who arranged them see them? Not outside himself, as we see bodies with our eyes, for they did not yet exist when they were being arranged so as to come into being. Nor did he see them within himself in the way we see with the mind the images of bodies that are not present to our eyes, when we think by imagination of the things we have seen or of things drawn from what we have seen. In what way, then, did he see them so as to arrange them? In what way except that in which he alone can?

Yet we, mortals and sinners, whose souls are weighed down by corruptible bodies and whose sense, which thinks many things, is pressed down by its earthly dwelling (although, even if we bore the purest hearts and the simplest minds and were already equal to the holy angels, the divine substance would certainly not be known to us as it is known to itself),

4.7CSEL 28.1:102–103

tamen istam senarii numeri perfectionem nec extra nos ipsos cernimus, sicut oculis corpora, nec ita intra nosmet ipsos, quemadmodum corporum phantasias et uisibilium imagines rerum, sed alio quodam longe differenti modo. quamuis enim se obiectent mentis aspectui quasi corpusculorum quaedam simulacra, cum senarii numeri conpositio uel ordo uel partitio cogitatur, tamen ualidior et praepotentior desuper ratio non eis adnuit interiusque uim numeri contuetur: per quem contuitum fidenter dicit id, quod dicitur unum in numeris, in nullas partes diuidi posse, nulla autem corpora nisi in partes innumerabiles diuidi, et facilius caelum et terram transire, quae secundum senarium numerum fabricata sunt, quam effici posse, ut senarius numerus non suis partibus conpleatur. gratias itaque creatori semper agat animus humanus, a quo ita creatus est, ut hoc possit uidere, quod auium nulla, nulla bestiarum, quae tamen nobiscum uident et caelum et terram et luminaria et mare et aridam et omnia, quae in eis sunt. Quamobrem non possumus dicere propterea senarium numerum esse perfectum, quia sex diebus perfecit deus omnia opera sua, sed propterea deum sex diebus perfecisse opera sua, quia senarius numerus perfectus est. itaque, etiamsi ista non essent, perfectus ille esset; nisi autem ille perfectus esset, ista secundum eum perfecta non fierent.

nevertheless do not see this perfection of the number six outside ourselves, as we see bodies with our eyes, nor within ourselves in the way we see the images of bodies and the likenesses of visible things, but in another, far different way. For although certain likenesses, as it were, of little bodies present themselves to the mind's gaze when the composition, order, or division of the number six is thought of, yet a stronger and more powerful reason from above does not assent to them, and contemplates the power of number more inwardly. Through this contemplation it says confidently that what is called one among numbers cannot be divided into any parts, while no body can be divided except into innumerable parts; and that heaven and earth, which were built according to the number six, would pass away more easily than it could be brought about that six is not completed by its parts. So let the human mind always give thanks to the Creator, by whom it was so created that it can see this, which none of the birds and none of the beasts can see, though they see with us the heaven and the earth and the lights and the sea and the dry land and all that is in them.

Therefore we cannot say that the number six is perfect because God perfected all his works in six days, but that God perfected his works in six days because the number six is perfect. So even if these works did not exist, that number would be perfect; but unless it were perfect, these works would not have been made perfect according to it.

4.8CSEL 28.1:103–105

Iam uero, quod scriptum est requieuisse deum in die septimo ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, et ideo eundem diem benedixisse et sanctificasse, quia in ipso requieuit ab omnibus operibus suis, ut, quomodo possumus, quantum ab ipso adiuti fuerimus, intellectu conemur adtingere, prius de hoc carnales hominum suspiciones a nostris mentibus abigamus. numquid enim dici uel credi fas est deum laborasse in operando, cum ea, quae supra scripta sunt, condidit, quando dicebat, et fiebant? ita quippe nec homo laborat, si aliquid faciendum, mox ut dixerit, fiat. quamuis enim humana uerba sonis adminiculata ita proferantur, ut sermo diuturnus fatiget, tamen, cum tam pauca sunt, quam pauca legimus in eo, quod scriptum est, cum deus dixit: fiat lux, fiat firmamentum et cetera usque in finem operum, quae sexto die consummauit, nimis absurdi deliramenti est istum uel hominis, nedum dei, laborem putare. An forte quis dixerit dicendo quidem, ut fierent, quae continuo facta sunt, deum non laborasse, sed forte cogitando, quid fieri debuisset, qua cura uelut liberatus rerum perfectione requieuerit et eo merito diem, quo primum factus est, ab hac animi intentione securus benedicere et sanctificare uoluerit? quodsi haec sapere multum desipere est — rerum enim condendarum tam facultas quam facilitas inconparabilis et ineffabilis est apud deum — quid restat, ut intellegamus, nisi forte creaturae rationali, in qua et hominem creauit, in se ipso requiem praebuisse post eius perfectionem per donum spiritus sancti, per quem diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, ut illuc feramur adpetitu desiderii, quo cum uenerimus requiescamus, id est nihil amplius requiramus? sicut enim recte dicitur deus facere, quidquid ipso in nobis operante fecerimus, ita recte dicitur deus requiescere, cum eius munere requiescimus. Hoc quidem recte intellegimus, quia et uerum est et non magnae intentionis indiget, ut uideamus ita dici requiescere deum, cum requiescere nos facit, sicut dicitur cognoscere, cum efficit, ut cognoscamus. neque enim deus temporaliter cognoscit, quod ante non nouerat, et tamen dicit Abrahae: nunc cognoui, quoniam times deum: ubi quid aliud accipimus, nisi: nunc feci, ut cognosceres? his locutionum modis. cum ea, quae non accidunt deo, tamquam illi accidant loquimur, eum facere agnoscimus, ut nobis accidant, ea dumtaxat, quae laudabilia sunt, et haec quantum scripturarum usus admittit. neque enim temere nos aliquid de deo tale dicere debemus, quod in scriptura eius non legimus.

Now as for what is written, that God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he made, and therefore blessed and sanctified that day, because on it he rested from all his works: in order that we may try to reach it with our understanding, as far as we can and as far as we are helped by him, let us first drive the carnal suspicions of men about it from our minds. Is it right to say or believe that God labored in working when he established the things written above, since he spoke and they came to be? Not even a man labors if something that is to be done comes to be as soon as he has spoken. For although human words, carried by sounds, are uttered in such a way that long speech tires, yet when they are as few as the few we read in what is written when God said, “Let there be light,” “Let there be a firmament,” and so on to the end of the works which he finished on the sixth day, it is the raving of utter absurdity to think this a labor even for a man, much less for God. Or will someone perhaps say that God did not labor in saying that the things should come to be which at once were made, but perhaps in thinking what ought to be made; and that, freed as it were from this care by the completion of things, he rested, and for that reason wished to bless and sanctify the day on which he was first free of this effort of mind? But if to think such things is to be very foolish (for with God both the power and the ease of establishing things are incomparable and ineffable), what remains for us to understand, except perhaps that he granted to the rational creature, in which he also created man, rest in himself after its perfection, through the gift of the Holy Spirit, through whom love is poured out in our hearts, so that we may be borne there by the appetite of desire, and when we arrive there we may rest, that is, seek nothing further? For as God is rightly said to do whatever we do with him working in us, so God is rightly said to rest when by his gift we rest.

This indeed we understand rightly, since it is true and needs no great effort of attention for us to see that God is said to rest when he makes us rest, as he is said to know when he brings it about that we know. For God does not know in time what he did not know before, and yet he says to Abraham, “Now I know that you fear God”; where what else do we take it to mean than “Now I have made you know”? By these modes of speech, when we speak of things that do not happen to God as if they happened to him, we recognize that he makes them happen to us, but only things that are praiseworthy, and these only so far as the usage of the Scriptures permits. For we ought not rashly to say anything of God of this kind that we do not read in his Scripture.

4.9CSEL 28.1:105–106

Ex hoc locutionis modo arbitror dictum illud ab apostolo: nolite contristare spiritum sanctum dei, in quo signati estis in die redemtionis. neque enim ipsa spiritus sancti, qua est quidquid ipse est, substantia contristari potest, cum habeat aeternam atque incommutabilem beatitudinem magisque sit ipsa aeterna incommutabilis beatitudo. sed quia ita in sanctis habitat, ut eos inpleat caritate, qua necesse est, ut homines ex tempore gaudeant prouectu fidelium et bonis operibus, et ideo necesse est etiam contristentur lapsu uel peccatis eorum, de quorum fide ac pietate gaudebant — quae tristitia laudabilis est, quia uenit ex dilectione, quam spiritus sanctus infundit - propterea ipse spiritus dicitur contristari ab eis, qui sic agunt, ut eorum factis contristentur sancti, non ob aliud, nisi quia spiritum sanctum habent: quo dono tam boni sunt, ut eos mali maestificent, hi maxime, quos bonos fuisse siue nouerunt siue crediderunt. quae profecto tristitia non solum non culpanda, uerum etiam praecipue laudanda ac praedicanda est. Hoc genere locutionis rursum idem apostolus mirabiliter usus est, ubi ait: nunc autem cognoscentes deum, immo cogniti a deo. neque enim tunc eos cognouerat deus, praecognitos uidelicet ante constitutionem mundi; sed quia tunc eum ipsi illius munere. non suo merito uel facultate cognouerant, maluit tropice loqui, ut tunc ab illo cognitos diceret, cum eis cognoscendum se praestitit, et uerbum corrigere, quasi hoc minus recte dixerit, quod proprie dixerat, quam sinere, ut hoc sibi adrogarent se potuisse, quod eis posse ille donauerat.

From this mode of speaking, I think, the apostle said, “Do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, in whom you were sealed for the day of redemption.” For the very substance of the Holy Spirit, by which he is whatever he is, cannot be grieved, since it has eternal and unchangeable blessedness, or rather is itself eternal, unchangeable blessedness. But because he so dwells in the saints that he fills them with love, by which men necessarily rejoice in time at the progress and good works of the faithful, and therefore necessarily also grieve at the fall or sins of those in whose faith and piety they used to rejoice (and this grief is praiseworthy, since it comes from the love that the Holy Spirit pours in), the Spirit himself is said to be grieved by those who act in such a way that the saints are grieved at their deeds, for no other reason than that they have the Holy Spirit. By this gift they are so good that the wicked sadden them, above all those whom they knew or believed to have been good. This grief is certainly not only not to be blamed but especially to be praised and proclaimed.

The same apostle again used this kind of speech admirably when he says, “But now that you know God, or rather are known by God.” For God did not know them only then, since they were foreknown before the foundation of the world; but because they had then come to know him by his gift, not by their own merit or ability, he preferred to speak figuratively, saying that they were then known by him when he granted himself to be known by them, and to correct his word as though he had said less rightly what he had said properly, rather than allow them to claim for themselves that they had been able to do what he had given them the ability to do.

4.10CSEL 28.1:106–107

Hic ergo intellectus in eo, quod positum est requieuisse deum ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit bona ualde, quia ipse nos facit requiescere, cum bona opera fecerimus, quibusdam forte suffecerit; sed nos huius sententiae scripturarum consideratione suscepta urguemur quaerere, quonam modo et ipse requiescere potuerit, quamuis requie sua nobis insinuata sperare admonuerit in se requiem nostram futuram. sicut. enim ipse fecit caelum et terram et ea, quae in eis sunt, et omnia sexto die consummauit, nec in eis aliquid dici potest nos creasse illo donante, ut crearemus, et ideo dictum esse: consummauit deus in die sexto opera sua, quae fecit. quia, ut a nobis consummarentur, ipse praestitit: ita et quod dictum est: requieuit deus in die septimo ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, non utique nostram requiem. quam concedente ipso adepturi sumus, sed ipsius primitus intellegere debemus, qua in septimo die requieuit consummatis operibus, ut prius omnia, quae scripta sunt, facta monstrentur et deinde, si opus est, etiam aliquid significasse doceantur. recte quippe dicitur, sicut deus post opera sua bona requieuit, ita et nos post opera nostra bona requieturos: sed ob hoc etiam recte flagitatur. ut, quemadmodum disputatum est de operibus dei, quae ipsius esse satis adparet, ita de requie dei satis disseratur, quae proprie ipsius demonstratur.

This understanding, then, of the statement that God rested from all his works which he made very good, namely that he makes us rest when we have done good works, may perhaps satisfy some. But we, having undertaken the study of this statement of the Scriptures, are pressed to ask in what way he himself could rest, even though by making his rest known to us he has prompted us to hope that our rest will be in him. For he himself made heaven and earth and the things that are in them, and finished all things on the sixth day, and it cannot be said that we created anything among them by his gift enabling us to create, so that it was said, “God finished on the sixth day his works which he made,” because he granted that they should be finished by us. In the same way, in what is said, “God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he made,” we ought to understand first not our rest, which by his granting we shall attain, but his own, by which he rested on the seventh day when his works were finished. Thus it is first shown that all that is written was done, and then, if need be, it is taught that it also signified something. It is indeed rightly said that, as God rested after his good works, so we shall rest after our good works; but for that very reason it is also rightly required that, as the works of God, which plainly appear to be his, have been discussed, so his rest, which is shown to be properly his own, be adequately discussed.

4.11CSEL 28.1:107–108

Quapropter iustissima ratione conpellimur indagare, si ualeamus, atque eloqui, quomodo utrumque sit uerum, et quod hic scriptum est in septimo die requieuisse deum ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, et quod in euangelio dicit ipse. per quem facta sunt omnia. pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. eis enim hoc respondit, qui propter requiem dei scripturae huius auctoritate antiquitus commendatam sabbatum ab eo non obseruari querebantur. et dici quidem probabiliter potest obseruandum sabbatum Iudaeis fuisse praeceptum in umbra futuri, quae spiritalem requiem figuraret, quam deus exemplo huius quietis suae fidelibus bona opera facientibus arcana significatione pollicebatur. cuius quietis et dominus Iesus Christus, qui nonnisi quando uoluit passus est, etiam sepultura sua mysterium confirmauit. ipso quippe die sabbati requieuit in sepulcro eumque totum diem habuit sanctae cuiusdam uacationis, posteaquam sexto die, id est parasceue, quam dicunt sextam sabbati, consummauit omnia opera sua, cum de illo quae scripta sunt in ipso crucis patibulo conplerentur. nam et hoc uerbo usus est quando ait: consummatum est; et inclinato capite tradidit spiritum. quid ergo mirum, si deus istum diem, quo erat Christus in sepultura quieturus, uolens etiam hoc modo praenuntiare ab operibus suis in uno die requieuit, deinceps operaturus ordinem saeculorum, ut et illud uerum diceretur: pater meus usque nunc operatur?

For this reason we are compelled by the most just reasoning to search out, if we can, and to state how both are true: what is written here, that on the seventh day God rested from all his works which he made, and what he himself, through whom all things were made, says in the Gospel: “My Father is working until now, and I am working.” He gave this answer to those who complained that he did not keep the Sabbath, which had been commended of old by the authority of this Scripture because of God's rest. And it can indeed plausibly be said that the keeping of the Sabbath was commanded to the Jews as a shadow of what was to come, which would figure the spiritual rest that God, by the example of this rest of his, promised by a hidden signification to the faithful who do good works. The Lord Jesus Christ, who suffered only when he willed, confirmed the mystery of this rest even by his burial. For on the very day of the Sabbath he rested in the tomb and had that whole day as a kind of holy leisure, after he had finished all his works on the sixth day, that is, the day of preparation, which they call the sixth day of the week, when the things written of him were fulfilled on the very gibbet of the cross. For he used this very word when he said, “It is finished,” and, bowing his head, he gave up his spirit. What wonder, then, if God, wishing in this way also to foretell this day on which Christ was to rest in the tomb, rested from his works on one day, being thereafter to work out the order of the ages, so that this too might be called true: “My Father is working until now”?

4.12CSEL 28.1:108–110

Potest etiam intellegi deum requieuisse a condendis generibus creaturae, quia ultra iam non condidit aliqua genera noua, deinceps autem usque nunc et ultra operari eorundem generum administrationem, quae tunc instituta sunt, non ut ipso saltem die septimo potentia eius a caeli et terrae omniumque rerum quas condiderat gubernatione cessaret, alioquin continuo dilaberentur. creatoris namque potentia et omnipotentis atque omnitenentis uirtus causa subsistendi est omni creaturae: quae uirtus ab eis, quae creata sunt, regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species omnisque natura concideret. neque enim, sicut structor aedium, cum fabricauerit, abscedit, atque illo cessante atque abscedente stat opus eius, ita mundus uel ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei deus regimen sui subtraxerit. Proinde et quod dominus ait: pater meus usque modo operatur, continuationem quandam operis eius, qua uniuersam creaturam continet atque administrat, ostendit. aliter enim posset intellegi, si diceret: et nunc operatur, ubi non esset necesse, ut operis continuationem acciperemus, aliter autem cogit intellegi, cum ait: usque nunc, ex illo scilicet, quo cuncta cum conderet operatus est. et quod scriptum est de sapientia eius: pertingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauiter, de qua item scriptum est, quod motus eius agilior celeriorque sit omnibus motibus: satis adparet recte intuentibus hunc ipsum inconparabilem et ineffabilem, et si possit intellegi, stabilem motum suum rebus eam praebere suauiter disponendis, quo utique subtracto, si ab hac operatione cessauerit, eas continuo perituras. et illud, quod ait apostolus, cum deum Atheniensibus praedicaret: in illo uiuimus et mouemur et sumus, liquide cogitatum, quantum humana mens ualet, adiuuat hanc sententiam, qua credimus et dicimus deum in his, quae creauit, indesinenter operari. neque enim tamquam substantia eius sic in illo sumus, quemadmodum dictum est, quod habeat uitam in semet ipso, sed utique, cum aliud sumus quam ipse, non ob aliud in illo sumus, nisi quia id operatur, et hoc est opus eius, quo continet omnia et quo eius sapientia pertendit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauiter, per quam dispositionem in illo uiuimus et mouemur et sumus. unde conligitur, quod, si hoc opus suum rebus subtraxerit, nec uiuemus nec mouebimur nec erimus. claret igitur ne uno quidem die cessasse deum ab opere regendi, quae creauit, ne motus suos naturales, quibus aguntur atque uegetantur, ut omnino naturae sint et in eo, quod sunt, pro suo quaeque genere maneant, ilico amitterent et esse aliquid omnino desinerent, si eis subtraheretur motus ille sapientiae dei, quo disponit omnia suauiter. quapropter sic accipimus deum requieuisse ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, ut iam nouam naturam ulterius nullam conderet, non ut ea, quae condiderat, continere et gubernare cessaret. unde et illud uerum est, quod septimo die requieuit deus, et illud, quod usque nunc operatur.

It can also be understood that God rested from establishing kinds of creature, because he no longer established any new kinds, but thereafter, until now and beyond, works the governing of those same kinds which were then set up; not that his power ceased, even on that seventh day, from governing heaven and earth and all the things he had established, otherwise they would at once have fallen apart. For the power of the Creator, and the might of the Almighty who holds all things together, is the cause of every creature's subsisting. If this might ever ceased from ruling the things that were created, their form too would at the same time cease, and all nature would collapse. For it is not as with a builder of houses, who, when he has built, goes away, and though he stops and goes away his work stands; the world could not stand even for the twinkling of an eye if God withdrew his rule from it.

Accordingly, what the Lord says, “My Father is working until now,” shows a certain continuation of his work, by which he holds together and governs the whole creation. It could be understood otherwise if he said, “And he is working now,” where we would not have to take it as a continuation of work; but it compels another understanding when he says “until now,” that is, from the time when he worked in establishing all things. And from what is written of his Wisdom, “She reaches mightily from end to end and arranges all things sweetly,” of which it is also written that her movement is more agile and swifter than all movements, it is clear enough to those who look rightly that she supplies this incomparable and ineffable movement of hers, and, if it can be understood, a stable movement, to the things that are sweetly arranged; and that if it were withdrawn, if she ceased from this working, they would at once perish. And what the apostle says when he preached God to the Athenians, “In him we live and move and are,” if it is thought through clearly, as far as the human mind can, supports this view by which we believe and say that God works unceasingly in the things he has created. For we are not in him as his substance, in the way it is said that he “has life in himself”; but since we are something other than he, we are in him for no other reason than that he works this, and this is his work by which he holds all things together and by which his Wisdom reaches mightily from end to end and arranges all things sweetly; and through this arrangement “in him we live and move and are.” From this it is gathered that if he withdraws this work of his from things, we shall neither live nor move nor be. It is clear, then, that God has not ceased for even one day from the work of ruling what he created, lest they immediately lose their natural motions, by which they are moved and quickened so that they are natures at all and remain, each according to its kind, in what they are, and lest they cease altogether to be anything, if that movement of the Wisdom of God by which she arranges all things sweetly were withdrawn from them. Therefore we take it that God rested from all his works which he made in such a way that he no longer established any new nature, not that he ceased to hold together and govern what he had established. Hence both are true: that on the seventh day God rested, and that he is working until now.

4.13CSEL 28.1:110–111

Et opera quidem eius bona uidemus, quietem uero eius post bona opera nostra uidebimus. ob quam significandam mandauit Hebraeo populo unum diem obseruandum: quod tam carnaliter agebant, ut eo die dominum saluatorem nostrum uidentes operari criminarentur, ac sic eis de opere patris rectissime responderet, cum quo et ipse operabatur aequaliter non solum creaturae uniuersae administrationem, sed etiam ipsam nostram salutem. iam uero tempore gratiae reuelatae obseruatio illa sabbati, quae unius diei uacatione figurabatur, ablata est ab obseruatione fidelium. in ea quippe iam gratia perpetuum sabbatum obseruat, qui spe futurae quietis operatur quidquid boni operatur nec in ipsis bonis operibus suis quasi habens bonum, quod non acceperit, gloriatur; ita enim tamquam diem sabbati, hoc est dominicae cessationis in sepultura suscipiens atque intellegens baptismi sacramentum quiescit a pristinis operibus suis, ut iam in nouitate uitae ambulans deum in se operari cognoscat, qui simul et operatur et quiescit et creaturae praebens congruam gubernationem et apud se habens aeternam tranquillitatem.

His works, indeed, we see to be good; his rest we shall see after our good works. To signify it, he commanded the Hebrew people to keep one day; and they kept it so carnally that, seeing our Lord and Savior working on that day, they accused him, and so he answered them most rightly concerning the work of the Father, with whom he himself worked equally, not only in governing the whole creation but also in our very salvation. Now, in the time of grace revealed, that keeping of the Sabbath, which was figured by the leisure of one day, has been removed from the observance of the faithful. For in this grace he keeps a perpetual Sabbath who, in the hope of future rest, works whatever good he works, and does not boast in his good works as though he had a good that he had not received. For thus, receiving and understanding the sacrament of baptism as a kind of Sabbath day, that is, of the Lord's resting in the tomb, he rests from his former works, so that, walking now in newness of life, he recognizes that God works in him, God who at once works and rests, both providing fitting government to creation and having eternal tranquillity in himself.

4.14CSEL 28.1:111–112

Denique ipse nec, cum creauit, defessus nec, cum cessauit, refectus est, sed nos uoluit per scripturam suam ad quietis exhortari desiderium intimando nobis eam diem se sanctificasse, in quo quieuit ab omnibus operibus suis. nam nusquam omnium sex dierum, quibus creata sunt omnia, legitur aliquid sanctificasse. nec ante ipsos sex dies, ubi scriptum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, additum est: et sanctificauit, sed diem istum, in quo requieuit ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, uoluit sanctificare, tamquam et apud ipsum, qui nihil in opere suo laborat, plus quies quam operatio ualeat. hoc quidem in hominibus euangelium nobis intimat, ubi saluator noster meliorem partem dicit Mariae, quod sedens ad pedes eius requiescebat in uerbo eius, quam Marthae quamuis propter obsequium, quo ei ministrabat, circa multa occupatae et licet bonum opus operantis. uerum hoc in deo quomodo sit uel intellegatur, difficile dictu est, etiamsi cogitatu aliquantulum adtingi potest, cur deus sanctificauerit diem quietis suae, qui nullum sanctificauerit operis sui, nec ipsum sextum, quo et hominem fecit et cuncta perfecit. ac primum ipsum requiescere dei quale sit, cuius humanae mentis acies adsequi potest? quod tamen nisi esset, hoc omnino ista scriptura non poneret. dicam sane, quod sentio, haec duo indubitata praeloquens nec deum uelut post laborem desideratumue negotii sui finem temporali quadam requie delectatum nec has litteras auctoritate tanta merito praeminentes frustra falsoque dixisse, quod deus ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, in septimo die requieuerit eaque causa eundem diem sanctificauerit.

Finally, he was neither wearied when he created nor refreshed when he ceased, but he wished, through his Scripture, to stir us to the desire of rest by making known to us that he sanctified that day on which he rested from all his works. For nowhere in all the six days in which all things were created do we read that he sanctified anything. Nor before those six days, where it is written, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” is “and he sanctified” added; but he willed to sanctify this day on which he rested from all his works which he made, as if even with him, who labors not at all in his work, rest counted for more than working. Among men the Gospel makes this known to us, where our Savior says that Mary had the better part, because, sitting at his feet, she rested in his word, than Martha, though she was busy about many things in the service with which she ministered to him and was doing a good work. But how this is in God, or how it is to be understood, is hard to say, even if one can reach some little way by thought toward why God sanctified the day of his rest, when he sanctified no day of his work, not even the sixth, on which he made man and perfected all things. And first, what is God's resting itself? Whose human mind's gaze can attain it? Yet if it were not so, this Scripture would not state it at all. I will say what I think, stating first these two indubitable points: that God did not delight in some temporal rest as if after labor or after a desired end of his task; and that these writings, rightly preeminent with such great authority, did not say vainly or falsely that God rested on the seventh day from all his works which he made and for that reason sanctified that day.

4.15CSEL 28.1:112

Nimirum ergo, quia uitium est et infirmitas animae ita suis operibus delectari, ut potius in eis quam in se requiescat ab eis, cum procul dubio melius aliquid in illa sit, quo ea facta sunt, quam ipsa, quae facta sunt, insinuatur nobis deus per hanc scripturam, qua dicitur requieuisse ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, nullo opere suo sic delectatus, quasi faciendi eius eguerit, uel minor futurus, nisi fecisset, uel beatior, cum fecisset. quia enim ex illo ita est quidquid ex illo est, ut ei debeat, quod est, ipse autem nulli. quod ex ipso est, debeat, quod beatus est, se rebus, quas fecit, diligendo praeposuit, non sanctificans diem, quo ea facienda inchoauit, nec illum, quo ea perfecit, ne illis uel faciendis uel factis auctum eius gaudium uideretur, sed eum, quo ab ipsis in se ipso requieuit. et ipse quidem numquam ista requie caruit, sed nobis eam per diem septimum ostendit. hinc etiam significans non percipi requiem suam nisi a perfectis, cum ad eam intimandam non deputauit diem, nisi qui perfectionem rerum omnium sequebatur. nam qui semper est quietus, tunc nobis requieuit, cum se requieuisse monstrauit.

Surely, then, since it is a fault and weakness of the soul to delight in its works in such a way that it rests in them rather than resting from them in itself (for without doubt there is something better in it, by which they were made, than the things that were made), God is made known to us through this Scripture, which says that he rested from all his works which he made, as not having delighted in any work of his as though he needed to make it, or as though he would be less had he not made it, or more blessed once he had made it. For whatever is from him is from him in such a way that it owes him what it is; but he owes to nothing that is from him his being blessed. So he set himself above the things he made, in loving, sanctifying not the day on which he began to make them, nor that on which he perfected them, lest his joy seem to have been increased by their being made or by their having been made, but that on which he rested from them in himself. He himself, indeed, was never without this rest, but he showed it to us through the seventh day. By this he also signified that his rest is attained only by the perfect, since to make it known he assigned no day except the one that followed the perfection of all things. For he who is always at rest rested for us then, when he showed that he had rested.

4.16CSEL 28.1:112–113

Illud quoque adtendendum est, quod dei requiem, qua de se ipso beatus est, nobis insinuari oportebat, ut intellegamus, quomodo dicatur etiam requiescere in nobis: quod non dicitur, nisi cum in se requiem praestat et nobis. requies igitur dei recte intellegentibus ea est, qua nullius indiget bono; et ideo certa et nobis in illo est, quia et nos beatificamur bono, quod ipse est, non ipse bono, quod nos sumus. nam et nos aliquod bonum ab illo sumus, qui fecit omnia bona ualde, in quibus fecit et nos. porro alia res bona praeter ipsum nulla est, quam ipse non fecit; ac per hoc nullo praeter se alio bono indiget, qui bono, quod fecit, non eget. haec est eius requies ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit. quibus autem bonis laudabiliter non egeret, si nulla fecisset? nam etiam sic dici posset nullis egens bonis, non a factis in se ipso requiescendo, uerum omnino nulla faciendo. sed bona facere si non posset, nulla esset potentia; si autem posset nec faceret, magna esset inuidentia. quia ergo est omnipotens et bonus, omnia ualde bona fecit; quia uero se ipso bono perfecte beatus est, ab omnibus, quae fecit, in se ipso requieuit, ea scilicet requie, a qua numquam recessit. sed si diceretur requieuisse a faciendis. nihil aliud quam non fecisse intellegeretur: nisi autem diceretur requieuisse a factis, non eis egere, quae fecit, minus commendaretur. Quo itaque die hoc commendari oportuisse nisi septimo? intellegit quisquis senarii numeri perfectionem, de qua supra locuti sumus. perfectioni creaturae congruenter adhibitam recolit. si enim senario numero perficienda fuerat creatura, sicuti perfecta est, eaque requies dei nobis erat commendanda, qua demonstraretur nec perfectis beatificari creaturis, procul dubio dies erat in hac commendatione sanctificandus, qui sequitur sextum, quo erigeremur ad hanc requiem concupiscendam, ut et nos in illo requiescamus.

This also is to be noted: that God's rest, by which he is blessed in himself, had to be made known to us so that we might understand how he is said also to rest in us; which is said only when he grants rest in himself to us too. God's rest, then, for those who understand rightly, is that by which he needs no one's good; and so it is sure for us also in him, because we too are made blessed by the good which he is, not he by the good which we are. For we too are some good from him who made all things very good, among which he made us also. Moreover, there is no other good thing besides himself that he did not make; and therefore he needs no good other than himself, since he does not need the good he made. This is his rest from all his works which he made. But in what praiseworthy sense would he not need goods if he had made none? For even so he could be said to need no goods, not by resting in himself from things made, but by making nothing at all. But if he could not make good things, there would be no power; and if he could and did not, there would be great envy. Since, then, he is almighty and good, he made all things very good; and since he is perfectly blessed in himself as the good, he rested in himself from all the things he made, that is, with the rest from which he never departed. But if it were said that he rested from things to be made, it would be understood only that he had not made them; and unless it were said that he rested from things made, it would be less clearly set forth that he does not need the things he made.

On what day, then, ought this to have been set forth if not on the seventh? Anyone understands this who recalls the perfection of the number six, of which we spoke above, fittingly applied to the perfection of creation. For if creation was to be perfected in the number six, as it was perfected, and God's rest was to be set forth to us, by which it would be shown that he is not made blessed even by creatures that are perfect, then without doubt the day to be sanctified in this setting forth was the one that follows the sixth, so that we might be raised to long for this rest, that we too may rest in him.

4.17CSEL 28.1:113–114

Neque enim similitudo pia est, si uelimus similes ita esse deo, ut et nos ab operibus nostris requiescamus in nobis, sicut ipse requieuit in se ab operibus suis. in quodam quippe incommutabili bono requiescere debemus, quod ille nobis est, qui nos fecit. haec erit igitur summa minimeque superba et uere pia requies nostra, ut, sicut ipse requieuit ab omnibus operibus suis, quia non ei opera sua, sed ipse sibi bonum est, quo beatus est, ita et nos ab omnibus operibus non tantum nostris, uerum etiam ipsius nonnisi in illo requieturos nos esse speremus idque desideremus post bona opera nostra, quae in nobis agnoscimus illius potius esse quam nostra, ut etiam sic post bona opera sua ipse requiescat, cum post bona opera, quae ab illo iustificati fecerimus, in se nobis requiem praestat. magnum est enim nobis ab illo extitisse, sed maius erit in illo quieuisse, sicut ipse non ideo beatus est, quia haec fecit, sed quia etiam factis non egens in se potius quam in ipsis requieuit. unde non operis, sed quietis diem sanctificauit, quia non haec faciendo, sed eis, quae fecit, non egendo se beatum intimauit. Quid ergo tam humile ac facile adfatu et quid tam sublime atque arduum cogitatu quam deus requiescens ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit? et ubi requiescens nisi in se ipso, quia beatus nonnisi se ipso? quando, nisi semper? in diebus autem, quibus rerum, quas condidit, consummatio narratur et ab eis quietis dei ordo distinguitur, quando, nisi in septimo die, qui earum sequitur perfectionem? a perfectis enim requiescit, qui nec perfectis eget, quo beatior esse possit.

For it is not a godly likeness if we wish to be like God in such a way that we too rest from our works in ourselves, as he rested in himself from his works. We ought to rest in some unchangeable good, which for us is he who made us. This, then, will be our highest rest, not at all proud and truly godly: that, as he rested from all his works, because not his works but he himself is to himself the good by which he is blessed, so we too may hope to rest from all works, not only ours but even his, in none but him; and that we may desire this after our good works, which we recognize in us to be his rather than ours; so that thus too he rests after his good works, when, after the good works which we have done having been justified by him, he grants us rest in himself. For it is a great thing for us to have come into being from him, but it will be greater to have rested in him; just as he is blessed not because he made these things, but because, not needing even the things made, he rested in himself rather than in them. Hence he sanctified the day not of work but of rest, because he made known that he is blessed not by making these things but by not needing the things he made.

What, then, is so lowly and easy to say, and what so sublime and difficult to think, as God resting from all his works which he made? And resting where, if not in himself, since he is blessed only in himself? When, if not always? But in the days in which the completion of the things he established is narrated, and the order of God's rest is distinguished from them, when, if not on the seventh day, which follows their perfection? For he rests from things made perfect who does not need even things made perfect in order to be more blessed.

4.18CSEL 28.1:114–118

Et quod apud illum quidem quieti eius nec mane nec uespera est, quia nec aperitur initio nec clauditur fine, perfectis autem operibus eius mane habet et uesperam non habet, perfecta quippe creatura habet quoddam initium suae conuersionis ad quietem creatoris sui, sed illa non habet finem quasi terminum perfectionis suae, sicut ea, quae facta sunt. ac per hoc requies dei non ipsi deo, sed rerum ab eo conditarum perfectioni inchoatur, ut in illo incipiat requiescere, quod ab illo perficitur, et in eo habere mane — in suo enim genere tamquam uespera terminatum est — sed in deo uesperam habere iam non potest, quia non erit aliquid illa perfectione perfectius. In illis enim diebus, quibus omnia creabantur, uesperam terminum conditae creaturae, mane autem initium condendae alterius accipiebamus. ac per hoc quinti diei uespera terminus est conditae quinto die creaturae, mane autem, quod post ipsam uesperam factum est, initium est condendae sexto die creaturae, qua condita tamquam eius terminus facta est uespera. et quia nihil aliud condendum restiterat, ita post illam uesperam mane factum est, ut non esset initium condendae alterius creaturae, sed initium quietis uniuersae creaturae in requie creatoris. neque enim caelum et terra et omnia, quae in eis sunt, uniuersa scilicet spiritalis corporalisque creatura in se ipsa manet, sed utique in illo, de quo dictum est: in illo enim uiuimus et mouemur et sumus, quia, etsi unaquaeque pars potest esse in toto, cuius pars est, ipsum tamen totum non est nisi in illo, a quo conditum est. et ideo non absurde intellegitur sexto die conpleto post eius uesperam factum mane, non quo significaretur initium condendae alterius creaturae, sicut in ceteris, sed quo significaretur initium manendi et quiescendi totius, quod conditum est, in illius quiete, qui condidit. quae quies deo nec initium habet nec terminum; creaturae autem habet initium, sed non habet terminum. et ideo septimus dies eidem creaturae coepit a mane, sed nullo uespere terminatur. Nam si in ceteris diebus uespera et mane talium temporum uices significant, qualia nunc per haec cotidiana spatia peraguntur, non uideo, quid prohibuerit et septimum diem uespera noctemque eiusdem mane concludere, ut similiter diceretur: et facta est uespera, et factum est mane dies septimus. quandoquidem et ipse unus est dierum, qui omnes septem sunt, quorum repetitione menses et anni et saecula peraguntur, ut mane, quod poneretur post uesperam septimi, hoc esset initium octaui diei, de quo iam deinceps silendum fuit, quia idem primus est, ad quem reditur, a quo rursus hebdomadis series ordiatur. unde probabilius est istos quidem septem dies illorum nominibus et numero alios atque alios sibimet succedentes currendo temporalia peragere spatia, illos autem primos sex dies inexperta nobis atque inusitata specie in ipsis rerum conditionibus explicatos, in quibus et uespera et mane sicut ipsa lux et tenebrae, id est dies et nox, non eam uicissitudinem praebuerunt, quam praebent isti per solis circuitus: quod certe de illis tribus fateri cogimur, qui ante condita luminaria commemorati atque numerati sunt. Ac per hoc qualiscumque in eis uespera et mane fuerit, nullo modo tamen opinandum est eo mane, quod post sexti diei uesperam factum est, initium accepisse requiem dei ne temporale aliquod bonum illi aeternitati et incommutabilitati accidisse uanitate temeraria suspicemur — sed illam quidem requiem dei, qua in se ipso requiescit eoque bono beatus est quod ipse sibi est, nec initium eidem ipsi habere nec terminum, consummatae autem creaturae habere initium eandem requiem dei, quoniam rei cuiusque perfectio non tam in uniuerso, cuius pars est, quam in eo, a quo est, in quo et ipsum uniuersum est. pro sui generis modulo stabilitur, ut quiescat, id est, ut sui momenti ordinem teneat. ac per hoc ipsa uniuersitas creaturae, quae sex diebus consummata est, aliud habet in sua natura, aliud in ordine, quo in deo est, non sicut deus, sed tamen ita, ut ei quies propriae stabilitatis non sit, nisi in illius quiete, qui nihil praeter se adpetit, quo adepto requiescat. et ideo, dum ipse manet in se, quidquid ex illo est retorquet ad se, ut omnis creatura in se habeat naturae suae terminum, quo non sit, quod ipse est, in illo autem quietis locum, quo seruet, quod ipsa est. scio, quod non proprie dixerim locum; nam proprie dicitur in spatiis, quae corporibus occupantur. sed quia et ipsa corpora non manent in loco, nisi quo sui ponderis tamquam adpetitu perueniunt, ut eo conperto requiescant, ideo non incongruenter a corporalibus ad spiritalia uerbum transfertur, ut dicatur - locus, cum res ipsa plurimum distet. Initium ergo creaturae in quiete creatoris illo mane significatum arbitror, quod factum est post uesperam sexti diei; non enim posset in eo nisi perfecta requiescere. proinde sexto die consummatis omnibus factaque uespera factum est et mane, quo inciperet consummata creatura in illo, a quo facta est requiescere. quo initio eum in se ipso requiescentem ubi et ipsa requiescere posset inuenit, tanto stabilius atque firmius, quanto ipsa illius, non ille huius eguit ad quietem suam. sed quoniam quidquid erit uniuersa creatura quibuslibet mutationibus suis non utique nihil erit, ideo creatura uniuersa in creatore suo semper manebit; ac per hoc post illud mane nulla deinde uespera fuit. Hoc diximus, cur septimus dies, in quo requieuit deus ab omnibus operibus suis, mane habuerit post uesperam sexti, uesperam uero non habuerit.

And with him, indeed, his rest has neither morning nor evening, because it neither opens with a beginning nor closes with an end; but for his perfected works it has a morning and has no evening. For perfected creation has a certain beginning of its turning toward the rest of its Creator, but that rest has no end, as a limit of its perfection, as the things that were made have. And so God's rest begins not for God himself but for the perfection of the things established by him, so that what is perfected by him begins to rest in him and has a morning in this (for in its own kind it is bounded as by an evening); but in God it can no longer have an evening, because there will be nothing more perfect than that perfection.

In those days in which all things were being created we took evening as the limit of the creature established, and morning as the beginning of another to be established. And so the evening of the fifth day is the limit of the creature established on the fifth day, and the morning which came after that evening is the beginning of the creature to be established on the sixth day; and when it was established, an evening came as its limit. And because nothing else remained to be established, after that evening morning came in such a way that it was not the beginning of another creature to be established but the beginning of the rest of the whole creation in the rest of the Creator. For heaven and earth and all that is in them, that is, the whole of spiritual and bodily creation, do not abide in themselves but in him of whom it is said, “For in him we live and move and are”; because, although each part can be in the whole of which it is a part, the whole itself is only in him by whom it was established. And so it is not absurd to understand that, when the sixth day was completed, morning came after its evening, not to signify the beginning of another creature to be established, as in the other days, but to signify the beginning of the abiding and resting of the whole that was established in the rest of him who established it. This rest has for God neither beginning nor end, but for creation it has a beginning but no end. And so the seventh day began for that creation with a morning but is ended by no evening.

For if in the other days evening and morning signify alternations of times such as now pass through these daily spans, I do not see what would have prevented the seventh day too from being closed by an evening, and its night by a morning, so that it would likewise be said, “And there was evening, and there was morning, the seventh day,” since it too is one of the days, all seven, by whose repetition months and years and ages are completed; so that the morning placed after the evening of the seventh would be the beginning of the eighth day, of which nothing further needed to be said, because it is the same as the first, to which there is a return, from which the series of the week begins again. Hence it is more probable that these seven days, with the names and number of those days, succeeding one another in turn, run through temporal spans, but that those first six days unfolded in a form unknown and unfamiliar to us in the very establishing of things, in which evening and morning, like light and darkness themselves, that is, day and night, did not provide the alternation that these days provide through the circuit of the sun. This we are certainly compelled to admit of those three days which were mentioned and numbered before the lights were established.

And so, whatever evening and morning were in them, we must by no means suppose that God's rest took its beginning from that morning which came after the evening of the sixth day, lest with rash vanity we suspect that some temporal good befell that eternity and unchangeableness. Rather, that rest of God, by which he rests in himself and is blessed in the good which he is to himself, has neither beginning nor end for him; but for completed creation that same rest of God has a beginning. For the perfection of each thing is established, according to the measure of its kind, not so much in the universe of which it is a part as in him from whom it is and in whom the universe itself is, so that it may rest, that is, keep the order of its own weight. And so the whole of creation, which was completed in six days, has one thing in its own nature and another in the order by which it is in God, not as God is, yet in such a way that it has no rest of its own stability except in the rest of him who desires nothing besides himself, on attaining which he might rest. And so, while he remains in himself, he turns back to himself whatever is from him, so that every creature has in itself the limit of its nature, by which it is not what he is, but in him the place of rest, by which it keeps what it is. I know that I have not said “place” properly; for it is properly said of spaces occupied by bodies. But since bodies themselves do not remain in a place except the one they reach as by the desire of their weight, so that, having found it, they rest, the word is not unfittingly transferred from bodily to spiritual things, so that one says “place,” though the thing itself is very different.

I think, then, that the beginning of creation in the rest of the Creator is signified by that morning which came after the evening of the sixth day; for it could not rest in him unless it were perfect. Accordingly, when all things were completed on the sixth day and evening came, there came also a morning, in which completed creation would begin to rest in him by whom it was made. In that beginning it found him resting in himself, where it too could rest, the more stably and firmly as it needed him, not he it, for its rest. But since whatever the whole creation will be through any of its changes, it will certainly not be nothing, the whole creation will always remain in its Creator; and therefore after that morning there was no evening. We have said this about why the seventh day, on which God rested from all his works, had a morning after the evening of the sixth, but had no evening.

4.19CSEL 28.1:118

Est aliud, quod de hac re magis proprie meliusque possit, quantum existimo, intellegi, sed aliquanto difficilius explicari, ut non creaturae, sed etiam sibi requies dei septimo die mane habuerit sine uespera, id est initium sine termino. si enim ita diceretur: requieuit deus in die septimo, nec adderetur: ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, frustra huius quietis initium quaereremus. non enim incipit deus requiescere, cuius requies sine initio, sine termino sempiterna est. sed quoniam ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, eis non egendo requieuit, intellegitur requies quidem dei nec coepta nec terminata; requies autem eius ab omnibus operibus suis. quae fecit, ex eo coepta est, ex quo illa perfecit. neque enim operibus suis non egendo requieuisset, priusquam essent, quibus nec perfectis eguisset; et quia eis omnino numquam. eguit nec ista beatitudo, qua non eis eget, tamquam proficiendo perficietur, ideo septimo diei nulla uespera accessit.

There is another way in which this matter can, I think, be understood more properly and better, though it is somewhat more difficult to explain: that God's rest on the seventh day had a morning without an evening, that is, a beginning without an end, not only for creation but also for himself. For if it were said only, “God rested on the seventh day,” and “from all his works which he made” were not added, we would seek the beginning of this rest in vain. For God does not begin to rest, whose rest is everlasting, without beginning and without end. But since he rested from all his works which he made by not needing them, it is understood that God's rest indeed neither began nor ended, but his rest from all his works which he made began from the time when he perfected them. For he could not have rested by not needing his works before there existed the works which he would not have needed even when they were perfected. And since he never needed them at all, and this blessedness by which he does not need them will not be perfected as if by making progress, no evening was added to the seventh day.

4.20CSEL 28.1:118–120

Sed plane quaeri potest dignaque consideratione mouet, quomodo intellegatur in se ipso deus requieuisse ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, cum scriptum sit: et requieuit deus in die septimo. non enim dictum est: in se ipso. sed: in die septimo. quid est ergo dies septimus? utrum creatura est aliqua, an temporis tantummodo spatium? sed etiam temporis spatium creaturae temporali concreatum est. ac per hoc et ipsum sine dubio creatura est. neque enim ulla tempora uel sunt uel esse potuerunt uel poterunt, quorum deus non sit creator. ac per hoc et istum septimum diem, si tempus est, quis creauit, nisi omnium temporum creator? sed illi sex dies cum quibus uel in quibus creaturis creati sint, superior scripturae sanctae sermo indicat. quocirca in his diebus septem, quorum species nota nobis est, qui re quidem ipsa praetereunt, sed aliis succedentibus nomina sua quodammodo tradunt, ut illi sex dies nominentur, nouimus eorum primi quando creati sint; septimum autem diem, qui nomine sabbati nuncupatur, quando deus creauerit, non uidemus. in ipso quippe die non fecit aliquid, immo ab eis, quae sex diebus fecerat. in eodem septimo requieuit. quomodo ergo requieuit in die, quem non creauit? aut quomodo eum post sex dies continuo creauit, cum sexto die consummauerit omnia, quae creauit, nec aliquid septimo die creauerit, sed in eo potius ab omnibus, quae creauerat, requieuerit? an unum tantummodo diem creauit deus, ut eius repetitione multi, qui dicuntur dies, praeterirent atque transcurrerent, nec opus erat, ut septimum diem crearet, quia illius, quem creauerat, septima repetitio hunc utique faciebat? lucem quippe, de qua scriptum est: et dixit deus: fiat lux. et facta est lux, discreuit a tenebris eamque uocauit diem et tenebras uocauit noctem. tunc itaque deus diem fecit, cuius repetitionem scriptura appellat secundum diem, deinde tertium et usque ad sextum. quo consummauit deus opera sua: atque inde illius diei primitus creati septima repetitio septimi diei nomen accepit, in quo requieuit deus. ac per hoc nulla creatura est septimus dies, nisi eadem ipsa septies rediens, quae condita est, quando uocauit deus lucem diem et tenebras noctem.

But it can plainly be asked, and it prompts a question worth considering, how God is to be understood to have rested in himself from all his works which he made, when it is written, “And God rested on the seventh day.” For it is not said “in himself” but “on the seventh day.” What, then, is the seventh day? Is it some creature, or only a span of time? But even a span of time was created together with temporal creation, and so it too is without doubt a creature. For there are not, nor could there have been, nor will there be, any times of which God is not the Creator. And so, if this seventh day is time, who created it, if not the Creator of all times? But with what creatures, or in what creatures, those six days were created, the preceding words of Holy Scripture indicate. Therefore, among these seven days whose form is known to us, which indeed pass away in reality but in some way hand on their names to the others that follow, so that they are named after those six days, we know when the first of those days were created; but when God created the seventh day, which is called by the name of Sabbath, we do not see. For on that day he made nothing; rather, on that same seventh day he rested from the things he had made in six days. How, then, did he rest on a day which he did not create? Or how did he create it immediately after the six days, when he finished all that he created on the sixth day and created nothing on the seventh day, but rather rested on it from all that he had created? Or did God create only one day, so that by its repetition the many that are called days would pass and run by, and there was no need for him to create a seventh day, since the seventh repetition of the day he had created made it? For the light, of which it is written, “And God said, Let there be light, and there was light,” he separated from the darkness, and called it day, and called the darkness night. Then, therefore, God made the day, whose repetition Scripture calls the second day, then the third, and so on to the sixth, on which God finished his works; and from then on the seventh repetition of that day first created received the name of the seventh day, on which God rested. And so the seventh day is no creature except that same one returning seven times, which was established when God called the light day and the darkness night.

4.21CSEL 28.1:120–121

Rursus ergo ad eam quaestionem relabimur, de qua in primo libro exisse uidebamur, ut item quaeramus, quomodo circuire potuerit lux ad exhibendam diurnam nocturnamque uicissitudinem, non solum antequam caeli luminaria, sed antequam ipsum caelum, quod firmamentum appellatum est, factum esset, antequam denique ulla species terrae uel maris, quae circuitum lucis admitteret sequente nocte, unde illa transisset. cuius quaestionis difficultate conpulsi ausi sumus disceptationem nostram quasi ad hanc terminare sententiam, ut diceremus illam lucem, quae primitus facta est, conformationem esse creaturae spiritalis, noctem uero adhuc formandam in reliquis operibus rerum materiem, quae fuerat instituta, cum in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, antequam uerbo faceret diem. sed nunc diei septimi consideratione commoniti facilius est, ut nos ignorare fateamur, quod remotum est a sensibus nostris, quonam modo lux illa, quae dies appellata est, uel circuitu suo uel contractione et emissione, si corporalis est, uices diurnas nocturnasque peregerit uel, si spiritalis est, condendis creaturis omnibus praesentata sit suaque ipsa praesentia diem, noctem uero absentia, uesperam initio absentiae, mane initio praesentiae fecerit, quam ut in re aperta contra diuinae scripturae uerba conemur dicendo aliud esse diem septimum quam illius diei, quem fecit deus, septimam repetitionem. alioquin aut non creauit deus diem septimum aut aliquid creauit post illos sex dies, id et ipsum diem septimum; falsumque erit, quod scriptum est, in sexto die consummasse omnia opera sua et in septimo requieuisse ab omnibus operibus suis. quod utique quoniam falsum esse non potest, restat, ut praesentia lucis illius, quem diem deus fecit, per omnia eius opera repetita sit, quotiens dies nominatus est, et in ipso septimo, in quo requieuit ab operibus suis.

So we slip back again into the question from which we seemed to have come out in the first book, and ask again how light could circle round to produce the alternation of day and night, not only before the lights of heaven were made, but before heaven itself, which was called the firmament, was made, and finally before there was any form of earth or sea that would allow a circuit of light, with night following where it had passed. Compelled by the difficulty of this question, we ventured to bring our discussion to something like this conclusion: that the light which was first made is the forming of spiritual creation, and the night the matter, still to be formed in the remaining works of things, which had been set up when in the beginning God made heaven and earth, before he made day by his word. But now, prompted by the consideration of the seventh day, it is easier for us to admit that we do not know what is remote from our senses, namely how that light which was called day carried out the alternations of day and night, whether by its circuit or by contraction and emission, if it is bodily; or, if it is spiritual, how it was present to all the creatures to be established and made day by its presence, night by its absence, evening by the beginning of its absence, morning by the beginning of its presence; than for us to try, in a plain matter, against the words of divine Scripture, by saying that the seventh day is something other than the seventh repetition of that day which God made. Otherwise either God did not create the seventh day, or he created something after those six days, namely the seventh day itself; and what is written will be false, that on the sixth day he finished all his works and on the seventh rested from all his works. Since this certainly cannot be false, it remains that the presence of that light which God made day was repeated through all his works, as often as “day” is named, and on the seventh day itself, on which he rested from his works.

4.22CSEL 28.1:121–122

Sed quoniam lux corporalis, antequam fieret caelum, quod firmamentum uocatur, in quo etiam luminaria facta sunt. quo circuitu uel quo processu et recessu uices diei et noctis exhibere potuerit, non inuenimus, istam quaestionem relinquere non debemus sine aliqua nostrae prolatione sententiae, ut, si lux illa, quae primitus creata est non corporalis sed spiritalis est, sicut post tenebras facta est, ubi intellegitur a sua quadam informitate ad creatorem conuersa atque formata, ita et post uesperam fiat mane, cum post cognitionem suae propriae naturae, qua non est quod deus, refert se ad laudandam lucem, quod ipse deus est, cuius contemplatione formatur. et quia ceterae creaturae, quae infra ipsam fiunt, sine cognitione eius non fiunt, propterea nimirum idem dies ubique repetitur, ut eius repetitione fiant tot dies, quotiens distinguntur rerum genera creatarum, perfectione senarii numeri terminanda: ut uespera primi diei sit etiam sui cognitio non se esse, quod deus est, mane autem post hanc uesperam, quo concluditur dies unus et inchoatur secundus, conuersio sit eius, qua id, quod creata est, ad laudem referat creatoris et percipiat de uerbo dei cognitionem creaturae, quae post ipsam fit, hoc est firmamenti: quod in eius cognitione fit prius, cum dicitur: et sic est factum, deinde in natura ipsius firmamenti, quod conditur. cum additur etiam postea iam dicto "et sic est factum": et fecit deus firmamentum. deinde fit uespera illius lucis, cum ipsum firmamentum non in uerbo dei sicut ante, sed in ipsa eius natura cognoscit: quae cognitio quoniam minor est, recte nomine uesperae significatur. postquam fit mane, quo concluditur secundus dies et incipit tertius: in quo mane itidem conuersio est lucis huius. id est diei huius ad laudandum deum, quod operatus sit firmamentum, et percipiendam de uerbo eius cognitionem creaturae, quae condenda est post firmamentum. ac per hoc, cum dicit deus: congregetur aqua, quae est sub caelo, in collectionem unam et adpareat arida, cognoscit hoc illa lux in uerbo dei, quo id dicitur, et ideo sequitur: et sic est factum, hoc est in eius cognitione ex uerbo dei; deinde cum additur: et congregata est aqua et cetera, cum iam dictum esset: et sic est factum. ipsa creatura in suo genere fit: quae item, cum in suo genere facta cognoscitur ab ea luce, quae iam in uerbo dei faciendam cognouerat, fit tertio uespera, et inde hoc modo cetera usque ad mane post uesperam sexti diei.

But since we do not find by what circuit, or by what advance and retreat, bodily light could have produced the alternations of day and night before heaven was made, which is called the firmament, in which the lights were also made, we must not leave this question without putting forward some view of ours. It is this: if that light which was first created is not bodily but spiritual, then, just as it was made after darkness, where it is understood to have been turned from a certain formlessness of its own toward the Creator and formed, so too morning comes after evening, when, after knowing its own nature, by which it is not what God is, it turns back to praise the light which God himself is, by contemplation of whom it is formed. And since the other creatures that are made below it are not made without its knowledge, the same day is surely repeated everywhere, so that by its repetition there are as many days as there are distinct kinds of created things, to be bounded by the perfection of the number six. Thus the evening of the first day would be also its knowledge of itself, that it is not what God is; and the morning after this evening, by which one day is concluded and the second begun, would be its turning by which it refers what it was created to be to the praise of the Creator, and receives from the Word of God the knowledge of the creature that is made after it, that is, the firmament. This is made first in its knowledge, when it is said, “And so it was done,” then in the nature of the firmament itself, which is established when, after “and so it was done” has been said, there is added, “And God made the firmament.” Then comes the evening of that light, when it knows the firmament itself, not in the Word of God as before, but in its own nature; and since this knowledge is lesser, it is rightly signified by the name of evening. After this comes the morning by which the second day is concluded and the third begins. In this morning there is likewise the turning of this light, that is, of this day, to praise God for having worked the firmament, and to receive from his Word the knowledge of the creature to be established after the firmament. And so, when God says, “Let the water that is under heaven be gathered into one gathering, and let the dry land appear,” that light knows it in the Word of God by which it is said; and so there follows, “And so it was done,” that is, in its knowledge from the Word of God. Then, when “and the water was gathered” and so on is added, after “and so it was done” had already been said, the creature itself is made in its own kind; and when, having been made in its own kind, it is known by that light which had already known in the Word of God that it was to be made, evening comes for the third time; and thence in this way the rest follow, up to the morning after the evening of the sixth day.

4.23CSEL 28.1:122–123

Multum quippe interest inter cognitionem rei cuiusque in uerbo dei et cognitionem eius in natura eius, ut illud merito ad diem pertineat, hoc ad uesperam. in conparatione enim lucis illius, quae in uerbo dei conspicitur, omnis cognitio, qua creaturam quamlibet in se ipsa nouimus, non inmerito nox dici potest: quae rursum tantum differt ab errore uel ignorantia eorum, qui nec ipsam creaturam sciunt, ut in eius conparatione non incongrue dicatur dies. sicut ipsa uita fidelium, quae in hac carne atque in hoc saeculo ducitur, in conparatione uitae infidelis atque inpiae non inrationabiliter lux et dies appellatur dicente apostolo: fuistis enim aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino, et illud: abiciamus ergo opera tenebrarum et induamur arma lucis, sic ut in die honeste ambulemus: qui tamen dies nisi rursus in conparatione illius diei, quo aequales angelis facti uidebimus deum, sicuti est, ipse quoque nox esset, non hic prophetiae lucerna indigeremus. unde apostolus Petrus dicit: habemus certiorem propheticum sermonem, cui bene facitis intendentes sicut lucernae lucenti in obscuro loco, donec dies lucescat, et lucifer oriatur in cordibus uestris.

For there is a great difference between the knowledge of each thing in the Word of God and the knowledge of it in its own nature, so that the former rightly belongs to day, the latter to evening. For in comparison with that light which is seen in the Word of God, all knowledge by which we know any creature in itself may not unjustly be called night; and this in turn differs so much from the error or ignorance of those who do not know even the creature itself that in comparison with it it may not unfittingly be called day. In the same way the very life of the faithful, which is led in this flesh and in this world, is not unreasonably called light and day in comparison with an unbelieving and ungodly life, as the apostle says, “For you were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord,” and, “Let us therefore cast off the works of darkness and put on the armor of light, so that we may walk honorably as in the day.” Yet unless this day were in turn itself night in comparison with that day on which, made equal to the angels, we shall see God as he is, we would not need here the lamp of prophecy. Hence the apostle Peter says, “We have the more sure prophetic word, to which you do well to attend as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in your hearts.”

4.24CSEL 28.1:123–124

Quapropter, cum sancti angeli, quibus post resurrectionem coaequabimur, si uiam — quod nobis Christus factus est usque in finem tenuerimus, semper uideant faciem dei uerboque eius unigenito filio, sicut patri aequalis est, perfruantur, in quibus prima omnium creata est sapientia. procul dubio uniuersam creaturam, in qua ipsi sunt principaliter conditi, in ipso uerbo dei prius nouerunt, in quo sunt omnium, etiam quae temporaliter facta sunt, aeternae rationes, tamquam in eo, per quod facta sunt omnia, ac deinde in ipsa creatura, quam sic nouerunt, tamquam infra despicientes eamque referentes ad illius laudem, in cuius incommutabili ueritate rationes, secundum quas facta est, principaliter uident. ibi ergo tamquam per diem, unde et concordissima unitas eorum eiusdem ueritatis participatione dies est primitus creatus, hic autem tamquam per uesperam; sed continuo fit mane — quod in omnibus sex diebus animaduerti potest — quia non remanet angelica scientia in eo, quod creatum est, quin hoc continuo referat ad eius laudem atque caritatem, in quo id non factum esse, sed faciendum fuisse cognoscitur: in qua ueritate stando dies est. nam si uel ad se ipsam natura angelica conuerteretur seque amplius delectaretur quam illo, cuius participatione beata est, intumescens superbia caderet, sicut diabolus: de quo suo loco loquendum est, cum de serpente hominis seductore sermo debitus flagitabitur.

Therefore, since the holy angels, to whom we shall be made equal after the resurrection if we hold to the end to the way which Christ became for us, always see the face of God and enjoy his Word, the only-begotten Son, as he is equal to the Father, and since wisdom was created first of all in them, they without doubt knew the whole creation, in which they themselves were established first, first in the very Word of God, in whom are the eternal reasons of all things, even of those made in time, as in him through whom all things were made; and then in the creature itself, which they thus knew, as if looking down below and referring it to the praise of him in whose unchangeable truth they see first the reasons according to which it was made. There, then, it is as by day; hence their most harmonious unity, by sharing in the same truth, is the day that was first created. Here, however, it is as by evening. But at once morning comes (which can be observed in all six days), because angelic knowledge does not remain in what has been created without at once referring it to the praise and love of him in whom it is known, not as made but as to be made; and by standing in this truth it is day. For if the angelic nature turned even toward itself and delighted in itself more than in him by sharing in whom it is blessed, it would swell with pride and fall, like the devil. Of him we must speak in his place, when the discussion owed to the serpent, the seducer of man, will require it.

4.25CSEL 28.1:124–125

Quia ergo angeli creaturam in ea ipsa creatura sic sciunt, ut ei scientiae electione ac dilectione praeponant, quod eam sciunt in ueritate, per quam facta sunt omnia, participes eius effecti, ideo per omnes sex dies non nominatur nox, sed post uesperam et mane dies unus, item post uesperam et mane dies secundus, deinde post uesperam et mane dies tertius ac sic usque in mane sexti diei, unde incipit septimus quietis dei, quamuis cum suis noctibus dies tamen non noctes narrantur. tunc enim nox ad diem pertinet, non dies ad noctem, cum sublimes et sancti angeli id, quod creaturam in ipsa creatura nouerunt, referunt ad illius honorem et amorem, in quo aeternas rationes, quibus creata est, contemplantur eaque concordissima contemplatione sunt unus dies, quem fecit dominus, cui coniungetur et ecclesia ex hac peregrinatione liberata, ut et nos exultemus et iucundemur in ea.

Since, then, the angels know the creature in the creature itself in such a way that, by choice and love, they prefer to that knowledge the fact that they know it in the Truth through which all things were made, having been made sharers in it, for that reason through all six days night is not named; but after evening and morning, one day; again after evening and morning, the second day; then after evening and morning, the third day; and so on to the morning of the sixth day, from which begins the seventh, of God's rest. Though they have their nights, it is days, not nights, that are recounted. For night then belongs to day, not day to night, when the lofty and holy angels refer what they know of the creature in the creature itself to the honor and love of him in whom they contemplate the eternal reasons by which it was created; and by that most harmonious contemplation they are the one day which the Lord has made, to which the church too will be joined when freed from this pilgrimage, so that we also may rejoice and be glad in it.

4.26CSEL 28.1:125–126

Huius ergo diei, cuius et uespera et mane secundum supra dictam rationem accipi potest, sexta repetitione consummata est uniuersa creatura factumque est mane, quo finiretur sextus dies, et unde inciperet septimus uesperam non habiturus, quia dei requies non est creatura: quae. cum per dies ceteros conderetur. aliter in se ipsa facta cognoscebatur, quam in illo, in cuius ueritate facienda uidebatur, cuius cognitionis quasi decolor species uesperam faciebat. non itaque iam forma ipsius operis dies et terminus uespera et alterius operis initium mane in hac rerum conditarum narratione debet intellegi, ne cogamur contra scripturam dicere praeter sex dies conditam diei septimi creaturam, aut ipsum diem septimum nullam esse creaturam; sed dies ille, quem fecit deus, per opera eius ipse repetitur non circuitu corporali, sed cognitione spiritali. cum illa beata societas angelorum et primitus contemplatur in uerbo dei, quo dicit deus: fiat, atque ideo prius in eius cognitione fit, cum dicitur: et sic est factum, et postea rem ipsam factam in ea ipsa cognoscit — quod significatur facta uespera — et eam deinde cognitionem rei factae ad illius ueritatis laudem refert, ubi rationem uiderat faciendae, quod significatur facto mane. ac sic per omnes illos dies unus est dies non istorum dierum consuetudine intellegendus, quos uidemus solis circuitu determinari atque numerari; sed alio quodam modo, a quo et illi tres dies, qui ante conditionem istorum luminarium commemorati sunt, alieni esse non possunt. is enim modus non usque ad diem quartum, ut inde iam istos usitatos cogitaremus, sed usque ad sextum septimumque perductus est, ut longe aliter accipiendus sit dies et nox, inter quae duo diuisit deus, et aliter iste dies et nox, inter quae dixit, ut diuidant luminaria, quae creauit, cum ait: et diuidant inter diem et noctem. tunc enim diem hunc condidit, cum condidit solem, cuius praesentia eundem exhibet diem; ille autem dies primitus conditus iam triduum peregerat, cum haec luminaria illius diei quarta repetitione creata sunt.

By the sixth repetition of this day, then, whose evening and morning can be taken according to the account given above, the whole creation was completed, and the morning came by which the sixth day was ended and from which the seventh began, which was to have no evening, because God's rest is not a creature. Creation, when it was being established through the other days, was known as made in itself otherwise than in him in whose Truth it was seen as to be made, and the somewhat faded appearance of this knowledge made the evening. So in this narrative of the establishing of things we must no longer understand “day” as the form of the work itself, “evening” as its limit, and “morning” as the beginning of another work, lest we be forced, against Scripture, to say that the creature of the seventh day was established beyond the six days, or that the seventh day itself is no creature. Rather, that day which God made is itself repeated through his works, not by a bodily circuit but by spiritual knowledge, when that blessed society of angels first contemplates in the Word of God that by which God says, “Let it be,” and so it is first made in their knowledge, when it is said, “And so it was done”; and afterward knows the thing itself as made in itself, which is signified by “evening came”; and then refers that knowledge of the thing made to the praise of that Truth where it had seen the reason of the thing to be made, which is signified by “morning came.” And so through all those days there is one day, not to be understood after the manner of these days which we see marked out and counted by the circuit of the sun, but in some other way, from which those three days too, which are mentioned before the establishing of these lights, cannot be excluded. For that manner was carried on not just to the fourth day, so that from then on we might think of these ordinary days, but to the sixth and seventh; so that the day and night between which God divided are to be taken in a far different sense from this day and night between which he said that the lights he created should divide, when he said, “And let them divide between day and night.” For he established this day when he established the sun, whose presence produces it; but that day first established had already gone through three days when these lights were created at the fourth repetition of that day.

4.27CSEL 28.1:126

Quapropter, quoniam illum diem uel illos dies, qui eius repetitione numerati sunt, in hac nostra mortalitate terrena experiri ac sentire non possumus et, si quid ad eos intellegendos conari possumus, non debemus temerariam praecipitare sententiam, tamquam de his aliud sentiri congruentius probabiliusque non possit, istos septem dies, qui pro illis agunt hebdomada, cuius cursu et recursu tempora rapiuntur, in qua dies unus est a solis ortu usque in ortum circuitus, sic illorum uicem quandam exhibere credamus, ut non eos illis similes, sed multum inpares minime dubitemus.

Therefore, since we cannot experience or perceive that day, or those days numbered by its repetition, in this earthly mortality of ours, and since, if we can make some attempt to understand them, we ought not to rush into a rash judgment, as if nothing more fitting and more probable could be thought about them, let us believe that these seven days, which in place of those make up the week, by whose course and return the times are swept along, and in which one day is the circuit of the sun from rising to rising, present a kind of counterpart to those days, in such a way that we do not doubt at all that they are not like them but very unequal to them.

4.28CSEL 28.1:126–127

Nec quisquam arbitretur illud, quod dixi de luce spiritali et condito die in spiritali et angelica creatura et de contemplatione, quam habet in uerbo dei, et de cognitione, qua in se ipsa creatura cognoscitur, eiusque relatione ad laudem incommutabilis ueritatis, ubi prius ratio uidebatur rei faciendae, quae cognita est facta, non iam proprie, sed quasi figurate atque allegorice conuenire ad intellegendum diem et uesperam et mane, sed aliter quidem, quam in hac consuetudine cotidianae lucis huius et corporalis, non tamen tamquam hic proprie, ibi figurate; ubi enim melior et certior lux, ibi uerior etiam dies. cur ergo non et uerior uespera et uerius mane? nam si in istis diebus habet quandam declinationem suam lux in occasum, quam uesperae nomine nuncupamus, et ad ortum iterum reditum, quod mane dicimus, cur et illic uesperam non dicamus, cum a contemplatione creatoris creatura despicitur, et mane, cum a cognitione creaturae in laudem creatoris adsurgitur? neque enim et Christus sic dicitur lux, quomodo dicitur lapis, sed illud proprie, hoc utique figurate. quisquis ergo non eam, quam pro nostro modulo uel indagare uel putare potuimus, sed aliam requirit in illorum dierum enumeratione sententiam, quae non in prophetia figurate, sed in hac creaturarum conditione proprie meliusque possit intellegi, quaerat et diuinitus adiutus inueniat. fieri enim potest, ut etiam ego aliam his diuinae scripturae uerbis congruentiorem fortassis inueniam. neque enim hanc ita confirmo, ut aliam, quae praeponenda sit, inueniri non posse contendam, sicut confirmo requiem dei scripturam sanctam non quasi post lassitudinem uel curae molestiam nobis insinuare uoluisse.

Nor let anyone think that what I said about spiritual light, about the day established in spiritual and angelic creation, about the contemplation it has in the Word of God and the knowledge by which creation is known in itself, and about its referring to the praise of unchangeable Truth, where the reason of the thing to be made, which was then known as made, was first seen, fits our understanding of day, evening, and morning not properly but only figuratively and allegorically. It fits otherwise, indeed, than in our familiar experience of this daily, bodily light; yet not as if here properly and there figuratively. For where the light is better and more certain, there the day too is truer. Why, then, not also a truer evening and a truer morning? For if in these days light has a certain declining toward its setting, which we call by the name of evening, and a return again toward its rising, which we call morning, why should we not speak there too of evening, when creation is looked down upon from the contemplation of the Creator, and of morning, when one rises from the knowledge of creation to the praise of the Creator? For Christ too is not called light in the same way as he is called a stone; the former is said properly, the latter certainly figuratively. Whoever, then, seeks not the view that we have been able to search out or suppose according to our small measure, but another in the enumeration of those days, which could be understood not figuratively in prophecy but properly and better in this establishing of creatures, let him seek, and with God's help find it. For it may be that I too shall perhaps find another more fitting to these words of divine Scripture. For I do not affirm this one in such a way as to maintain that no other can be found that should be preferred; as I do affirm that Holy Scripture did not wish to suggest to us God's rest as if after weariness or the trouble of care.

4.29CSEL 28.1:127–128

Quamobrem potest aliquis fortasse mecum disputando certare, ut dicat sublimium caelorum angelos non alternatim contueri primo rationes creaturarum incommutabiliter in uerbi dei incommutabili ueritate ac deinde ipsas creaturas et tertio earum etiam in se ipsis cognitionem ad laudem referre creatoris, sed eorum mentem mirabili facilitate haec omnia simul posse. numquid tamen dicet aut, si quisquam dixerit, audiendus est illam caelestem in angelorum milibus ciuitatem aut non contemplari creatoris aeternitatem aut mutabilitatem ignorare creaturae aut ex eius quoque inferiore quadam cognitione non laudare creatorem? simul hoc totum possint, simul hoc totum faciant; possunt tamen et faciunt. simul ergo habent et diem et uesperam et mane.

Someone may perhaps argue with me, saying that the angels of the highest heavens do not, in alternation, contemplate first the reasons of creatures, unchangeably, in the unchangeable Truth of the Word of God, then the creatures themselves, and thirdly refer to the praise of the Creator their knowledge of them in themselves, but that their mind can do all these at once with wonderful ease. Yet will he say, or if anyone says it, should he be heeded, that that heavenly city among the thousands of angels either does not contemplate the eternity of the Creator, or is ignorant of the changeableness of creation, or does not praise the Creator even from some lower knowledge of it? Let them be able to do all this at once, let them do all this at once; still they can and they do. So they have day and evening and morning at once.

4.30CSEL 28.1:128–129

Neque enim uerendum est. ne forte qui est idoneus iam illa sentire ideo non putet hoc ibi posse fieri, quia in his diebus, qui solis huius circuitu peraguntur, fieri non potest. et hoc quidem non potest eisdem partibus terrae; uniuersum autem mundum quis non uideat, si adtendere uelit, et diem, ubi sol est, et noctem, ubi non est, et uesperam, unde discedit, et mane, quo accedit, simul habere? sed nos plane in terris haec omnia simul habere non possumus; nec ideo tamen istam terrenam conditionem lucisque corporeae temporalem localemque circuitum illi patriae spiritali coaequare debemus, ubi semper est dies in contemplatione incommutabilis ueritatis, semper uespera in cognitione in se ipsa creaturae, semper mane etiam ex hac cognitione in laudem creatoris, quia non ibi abscessu lucis superioris, sed inferioris cognitionis distinctione fit uespera, nec mane tamquam nocti ignorantiae scientia matutina succedat, sed quod uespertinam etiam cognitionem in gloriam conditoris adtollat. denique et ille nocte non nominata, uespere, inquit, et mane et meridie enarrabo, adnuntiabo; et exaudies uocem meam, hic fortasse per temporum uices, sed tamen, quantum puto, significans, quid sine temporum uicibus ageretur in patria, cuius peregrinatio suspirabat.

Nor need we fear that one who is already fit to perceive those things will therefore think this cannot happen there, because it cannot happen in these days that are completed by the circuit of this sun. And this indeed cannot happen in the same parts of the earth; but who does not see, if he will pay attention, that the whole world has at once day where the sun is, night where it is not, evening where it is leaving, and morning where it is approaching? But we plainly cannot have all these at once on earth; nor should we for that reason make this earthly condition, and the temporal and spatial circuit of bodily light, equal to that spiritual homeland where there is always day in the contemplation of unchangeable Truth, always evening in the knowledge of creation in itself, always morning also from this knowledge in the praise of the Creator. For there evening comes not by the departure of the higher light but by the distinction of a lower knowledge; nor does morning come as if morning knowledge succeeded a night of ignorance, but because it lifts even the evening knowledge to the glory of the Founder. Finally, that man too, without naming night, says, “Evening and morning and noon I will tell, I will proclaim, and you will hear my voice”; here perhaps through alternations of time, yet, as I think, signifying what is done without alternations of time in the homeland for which his pilgrimage sighed.

4.31CSEL 28.1:129

Sed numquid, si iam nunc simul ista omnia gerit atque habet angelica illa societas et unitas diei, quem primitus condidit deus, tunc etiam cum haec conderentur simul haec habuit? nonne per omnes sex dies, cum ea, quae per singulos deo condere placuit, conderentur, primo haec accipiebat in uerbo dei, ut in eius notitia primitus fierent. cum dicebatur: et sic est factum, deinde, cum facta essent in sua propria natura, qua sunt, deoque placuissent, quia bona sunt, tunc ea itidem cognoscebat alia quadam inferiore cognitione, quae nomine uesperae significata est ac deinde facta uespera fiebat mane, cum de suo opere deus laudaretur et alterius creaturae, quae deinceps facienda erat, ex dei uerbo notitia, priusquam fieret, acciperetur? non ergo tunc simul omnia, et dies et uespera et mane, sed singillatim per ordinem, quem scriptura commemorat.

But if that angelic society and unity of the day which God first established now does and has all these things at once, did it also have them at once then, when these things were being established? Through all six days, when the things that it pleased God to establish on each day were being established, did it not first receive them in the Word of God, so that they were first made in its knowledge, when it was said, “And so it was done”; then, when they had been made in their own proper nature, in which they exist, and had pleased God because they are good, did it not then likewise know them by another, lower knowledge, signified by the name of evening; and then, after evening came, did not morning come, when God was praised for his work, and knowledge of the next creature to be made was received from the Word of God before it was made? Then, therefore, not all at once, day and evening and morning, but one by one in the order that Scripture records.

4.32CSEL 28.1:129–131

An etiam tunc simul omnia, quoniam non secundum temporum moras, sicut fiunt dies isti, cum oritur et occidit sol et in locum suum redit, ut rursus oriatur, sed secundum potentiam spiritalem mentis angelicae cuncta quae uoluerit simul notitia facillima conprehendente? nec ideo tamen sine ordine, quo adparet conexio praecedentium sequentiumque causarum. neque enim cognitio fieri potest, nisi cognoscenda praecedant: quae item priora sunt in uerbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, quam in his, quae facta sunt, omnibus. mens itaque humana prius haec, quae facta sunt, per sensus corporis experitur eorumque notitiam pro infirmitatis humanae modulo capit et deinde quaerit eorum causas, si quo modo possit ad eas peruenire, principaliter atque incommutabiliter manentes in uerbo dei, ac sic inuisibilia eius per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicere. quod quanta tarditate ac difficultate agat et quanta temporis mora propter corpus corruptibile, quod adgrauat animam, etiam quae feruentissimo studio rapitur, ut instanter ac perseueranter haec agat. quis ignorat? mens uero angelica pura caritate inhaerens uerbo dei, posteaquam illo ordine creata est, ut praecederet cetera, prius ea uidit in uerbo dei facienda, quam facta sunt; ac sic prius in eius fiebant cognitione cum deus dicebat, ut fierent, quam in sua propria natura: quae itidem facta in eis ipsis etiam cognouit minore utique notitia, quae uespera dicta est. quam notitiam sane praecedebant quae fiebant, quia praecedit cognitionem quidquid cognosci potest; nisi enim prius sit, quod cognoscatur, cognosci non potest. post hoc si eo modo sibi placeret, ut amplius se ipsa quam creatore suo delectaretur, non fieret mane, id est non de sua cognitione in laudem creatoris adsurgeret. cum uero factum est, faciendum erat aliud et cognoscendum deo dicente: fiat, ut prius itidem fieret in cognitione mentis angelicae et posset rursus dici: et sic est factum, ac deinde in natura propria, ubi sequente uespera nosceretur. Ac per hoc etiamsi nulla hic morarum temporalium sint interualla, praecessit tamen ratio condendae creaturae in uerbo dei, cum dixit: fiat lux, et secuta est ipsa lux, qua angelica mens formata est atque in sua natura facta est, non autem alibi sequebatur, ut fieret. et ideo non prius dictum est: et sic est factum, et postea dictum est: et fecit deus lucem, sed continuo post uerbum dei facta est lux adhaesitque creanti luci lux creata, uidens illam et se in illa, id est rationem, qua facta est. uidit etiam se in se, id est distante, quod factum est, ab eo, qui fecit. et ideo cum placuisset deo factum uidenti, quia bonum est, et diuisa esset lux a tenebris et uocata lux dies et tenebrae nox, facta est et uespera, quia necessaria erat et ista cognitio, qua distingueretur a creatore creatura aliter in se ipsa cognita quam in illo; atque inde mane et aliud praenoscendum, quod fuerat uerbo dei faciendum, prius in cognitione mentis angelicae, deinde in natura ipsius firmamenti. et ideo dixit deus: fiat firmamentum. et sic est factum, in cognitione spiritalis creaturae hoc priusquam in eo ipso fieret praenoscentis. deinde fecit deus firmamentum, iam utique ipsam firmamenti naturam, cuius minor esset tamquam uespertina cognitio: ac sic usque ad omnium operum finem et usque ad requiem dei, quae non habet uesperam, quia non est facta sicut creatura, ut posset etiam ipsius geminari cognitio, tamquam prior et maior in uerbo dei sicut in die et posterior ac minor in se ipsa sicut in uespera.

Or was it all at once even then, since it was not according to the delays of time, as these days come about when the sun rises and sets and returns to its place to rise again, but according to the spiritual power of the angelic mind, which grasps whatever it wishes all at once with the easiest knowledge? Yet not, for that reason, without order, in which the connection of preceding and following causes appears. For knowledge cannot come about unless the things to be known come first; and these again are prior in the Word, through whom all things were made, to what they are in all the things that were made. So the human mind first experiences through the senses of the body these things that have been made, and takes knowledge of them according to the small measure of human weakness, and then seeks their causes, if in some way it can reach them, abiding primarily and unchangeably in the Word of God, and so behold his invisible things, understood through the things that were made. With what slowness and difficulty it does this, and with what delay of time, because of the corruptible body that weighs down the soul, even a soul carried away by the most fervent zeal to do this urgently and perseveringly, who does not know?

But the angelic mind, clinging with pure love to the Word of God, after it was created in that order so as to precede the rest, first saw in the Word of God the things to be made before they were made; and so they were made first in its knowledge, when God was saying that they should be made, before they were made in their own proper nature. And when they had been made it also knew them in themselves, with a lesser knowledge certainly, which was called evening. The things that were being made did indeed precede that knowledge, since whatever can be known precedes the knowing of it; for unless what is to be known first exists, it cannot be known. After this, if it had pleased itself in such a way as to delight more in itself than in its Creator, morning would not have come, that is, it would not have risen from its knowledge to the praise of the Creator. But when morning came, another thing was to be made and known, as God said, “Let it be,” so that it might likewise be made first in the knowledge of the angelic mind, and it could again be said, “And so it was done,” and then in its own nature, where, with the following evening, it would be known.

And so, even if there are no intervals of temporal delay here, yet the reason of the creature to be established preceded in the Word of God, when he said, “Let there be light,” and that light followed by which the angelic mind was formed and made in its own nature; but it did not follow elsewhere, so as to come to be. And so it was not first said, “And so it was done,” and afterward, “And God made light,” but immediately after the word of God light was made, and the created light clung to the creating Light, seeing it and itself in it, that is, the reason by which it was made. It saw itself also in itself, that is, what was made as distinct from him who made it. And so, when it had pleased God, seeing what was made, because it is good, and the light had been divided from the darkness and the light called day and the darkness night, evening also came, because this knowledge too was necessary, by which the creature, known otherwise in itself than in him, would be distinguished from the Creator. And then came morning, and another thing to be foreknown, which was to be made by the Word of God, first in the knowledge of the angelic mind, then in the nature of the firmament itself. And so God said, “Let there be a firmament,” and so it was done, in the knowledge of the spiritual creature, which foreknew it before it was made in itself. Then God made the firmament, now indeed the very nature of the firmament, whose knowledge would be lesser, as of evening. And so on to the end of all the works and up to the rest of God, which has no evening, because it was not made as a creature, so that its knowledge too could be doubled, as prior and greater in the Word of God, as by day, and later and lesser in itself, as by evening.

4.33CSEL 28.1:131–133

Sed si omnia simul mens angelica potest, quae singillatim per ordinem conexarum causarum sermo distinguit, numquid etiam quae fiebant, uelut ipsum firmamentum, uelut aquarum congregatio speciesque nudata terrarum. uelut fruticum et arborum germinatio, luminarium et siderum conformatio, aquatilia terrestriaque animantia, simul omnia facta sunt, ac non potius per interualla temporum secundum praefinitos dies? an forte non, sicut ea secundum motus eorum naturales nunc experimur, ita etiam cum primitus instituta sunt cogitare debemus, sed secundum mirabilem atque ineffabilem uirtutem sapientiae dei, quae adtingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauiter? neque enim et ipsa gradibus adtingit aut tamquam gressibus peruenit. quapropter quam facilis ei efficacissimus motus est, tam facile deus condidit omnia, quoniam per illam sunt condita, ut hoc, quod nunc uidemus temporalibus interuallis ea moueri ad peragenda, quae suo cuique generi conpetunt, ex illis rationibus insitis ueniat, quas tamquam seminaliter sparsit deus in ictu condendi. cum dixit, et facta sunt; mandauit, et creata sunt. Non itaque tarde institutum est, ut essent tarda, quae tarda sunt, nec ea mora sunt condita saecula, qua transcurrunt. hos enim numeros tempora peragunt, quos cum crearentur non temporaliter acceperunt. alioquin si rerum naturales motiones dierumque istorum, quos nouimus, usitata spatia, cum haec primitus uerbo dei facta sunt, cogitemus, non uno die opus erat, sed pluribus, ut ea, quae radicibus pullulant terramque uestiunt, subter primitus germinarent, deinde certo numero dierum pro suo quaeque genere in auras erumperent, etiam si hoc usque fieret, quod de creata natura eorum die uno, id est tertio factum scriptura narrauit. deinde quot diebus opus erat, ut aues uolarent, si a suis primordiis existentes ad plumas et pennas per naturae suae numeros peruenerunt? an forte oua tantum creata erant, cum quinto die dictum est, quod eiecerint aquae omne uolatile pennatum secundum suum genus? aut si propterea recte hoc dici potuit, quia in illo humore ouorum iam erant omnia, quae per numeros certos dierum coalescunt et explicantur quodammodo, quia inerant iam ipsae numerosae rationes incorporaliter corporeis rebus intextae, cur non et ante oua id ipsum recte dici potuerit, cum iam eaedem rationes in elemento humido fierent, quibus alites per temporales sui cuiusque generis moras oriri et perfici possent? de quo enim creatore scriptura ista narrauit. quod sex diebus consummauerit opera sua, de illo alibi non utique dissonanter scriptum est, quod creauerit omnia simul. ac per hoc et istos dies sex uel septem. uel potius unum sexies septiesue repetitum, simul fecit, qui fecit omnia simul. quid ergo opus erat sex dies tam distincte dispositeque narrari? quia scilicet hi, qui non possunt uidere, quod dictum est: creauit omnia simul, nisi cum eis sermo tardius incedat, ad id, quo eos ducit, peruenire non possunt.

But if the angelic mind can grasp all at once the things that the narrative distinguishes one by one in the order of connected causes, were the things that were being made, such as the firmament itself, the gathering of the waters and the laying bare of the face of the land, the sprouting of shrubs and trees, the forming of the lights and stars, the creatures of the water and the land, also all made at once, and not rather at intervals of time according to the appointed days? Or perhaps we ought not to think of them, when they were first set up, as we now experience them according to their natural motions, but according to the wonderful and ineffable power of the Wisdom of God, which “reaches mightily from end to end and arranges all things sweetly”? For she does not reach by stages or arrive as if by steps. Therefore, as easy as her most effective movement is to her, so easily did God establish all things, since they were established through her; so that what we now see, that they are moved over intervals of time to accomplish what befits each kind, comes from those implanted reasons which God scattered as seeds, so to speak, in the instant of establishing, when “he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created.”

So it was not slowly set up that slow things should be slow, nor were the ages established with the delay with which they run by. For the times carry out those numbers which things received, not in time, when they were created. Otherwise, if we think of the natural motions of things and the familiar spans of these days we know, when these things were first made by the Word of God, there would have been need not of one day but of several, so that the things that spring from roots and clothe the earth should first germinate underground, and then, in a fixed number of days according to each one's kind, break out into the air, even if this were all done that Scripture narrates was done on the one day, the third, concerning the creation of their nature. Then, how many days would have been needed for birds to fly, if, arising from their first beginnings, they reached feathers and wings through the numbers of their nature? Or were only eggs created, when it was said on the fifth day that the waters brought forth every winged flying thing according to its kind? Or if this could rightly be said because in that fluid of the eggs there already were all the things that grow together and unfold in a certain number of days, since the numerical reasons themselves were already present, woven incorporeally into bodily things, why could the same not rightly have been said even before the eggs, when those same reasons were already coming to be in the watery element, by which birds could arise and be perfected through the temporal delays proper to each kind? For of the same Creator of whom this Scripture has narrated that he finished his works in six days, it is written elsewhere, certainly without contradiction, that he created all things at once. And so he who made all things at once also made at once these six or seven days, or rather the one day repeated six or seven times. What need was there, then, for six days to be narrated so distinctly and in order? Plainly because those who cannot see what is said, “He created all things at once,” cannot reach the point to which the narrative leads them unless it proceeds more slowly with them.

4.34CSEL 28.1:133–136

Quomodo ergo dicimus septies repetitam lucis illius praesentiam per angelicam cognitionem a uespere ad mane, cum ipsa tria simul, id est et diem et uesperam et mane semel ei habere suffecerit, cum simul uniuersam creaturam, sicut simul facta est, et in primis atque incommutabilibus rationibus, per quas condita est, contemplaretur propter diem et in eius ipsius natura cognosceret propter uesperam et creatorem ex ipsa etiam inferiore cognitione propter mane laudaret? aut quomodo praecedebat mane, ut in uerbo cognosceret, quid esset deo postea faciendum, id ipsum etiam consequenter uespere cognitura, si prius et posterius nihil factum est, quia omnia simul facta sunt? immo uero et prius atque posterius per sex dies quae commemorata sunt facta sunt, et simul omnia facta sunt, quia et haec scriptura, quae per memoratos dies narrat opera dei, et illa, quae simul eum dicit fecisse omnia, uerax est; et utraque una est, quia uno spiritu ueritatis inspirante conscripta est. Sed in his rebus, in quibus quid prius sit uel posterius, interualla temporum non demonstrant, quamuis utrumque dici possit, id est et simul et prius atque posterius, facilius tamen intellegitur quod dicitur simul quam quod prius atque posterius: uelut cum solem intuemur orientem, certe manifestum est, quod ad eum acies nostra peruenire non posset, nisi transiret totum aeris caelique spatium, quod inter nos et ipsum est. hoc autem cuius longinquitatis sit, quis aestimare sufficiat? nec utique perueniret eadem acies uel radius oculorum nostrorum ad transeundum aerem, qui est super mare, nisi prius transisset eum, qui est super terram, in qualibet mediterranea regione simus, ab eo loco, ubi sumus, usque ad litus maris. deinde, si ad eandem lineam contuitus nostri adhuc post mare terrae adiacent, eum quoque aerem, qui super illas transmarinas terras est, transire acies nostra non potest, nisi prius peracto spatio aeris illius, qui super mare, quod primum occurrit, extenditur. faciamus iam post illas transmarinas terras nonnisi oceanum remanere. numquid et aerem, qui super oceanum diffunditur, potest transire acies nostra, nisi prius transierit quidquid aeris citra oceanum supra terram est? oceani autem magnitudo inconparabilis perhibetur; sed quantacumque sit, prius oportet aerem, qui supra est, transeant radii nostrorum oculorum et postea quidquid ultra est tum demum ad solem perueniant, quem uidemus. num igitur quia totiens hic diximus "prius" et "postea", ideo non simul omnia uno ictu transit noster obtutus? si enim clausis oculis faciem contra uisuri solem ponamus, nonne mox, ut eos aperuerimus, ibi potius aciem nostram nos inuenisse, quam illuc eam perduxisse putabimus, ita ut nec ipsi oculi prius aperti fuisse uideantur quam illa quo intenderat peruenisse? et certe iste corporeae lucis est radius, emicans ex oculis nostris et tam longe posita tanta celeritate contingens, ut aestimari conpararique non possit. nempe hic et illa omnia tam ampla inmensaque spatia simul uno ictu transiri manifestum est et quid prius posteriusque transeatur, nihilo minus certum est. Merito resurrectionis nostrae celeritatem cum exprimere uellet apostolus, in ictu oculi dixit fieri. neque enim aliquid in rerum corporearum motibus uel ictibus potest celerius inueniri. quodsi oculorum carnalium acies celeritate potest tantum, quid mentis acies uel humanae? quanto magis angelicae? quid iam de ipsius summae dei sapientiae celeritate dicatur, quae adtingit ubique propter suam munditiam, et nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit? in his ergo, quae simul facta sunt, nemo uidet, quid prius posteriusue fieri debuerit, nisi in illa sapientia, per quam facta sunt omnia per ordinem simul.

How, then, do we say that the presence of that light was repeated seven times through angelic knowledge, from evening to morning, when it was enough for it to have those three, day and evening and morning, at once and once for all? For it contemplated the whole creation at once, as it was made at once, both in the first and unchangeable reasons through which it was established, which makes the day, and knew it in its own nature, which makes the evening, and praised the Creator even from this lower knowledge, which makes the morning. Or how did morning precede, so that it might know in the Word what God was to make afterward, and then know the same thing in the evening, if nothing was made earlier and later, since all things were made at once? Rather, the things recorded through six days were made both earlier and later, and all were made at once; because both this Scripture, which narrates the works of God through the days mentioned, and that one, which says he made all things at once, are truthful. And both are one, because they were written by the inspiration of the one Spirit of truth.

But in things in which intervals of time do not show what is earlier or later, although both can be said, that is, both “at once” and “earlier and later,” yet what is said “at once” is understood more easily than what is said “earlier and later.” For example, when we look at the rising sun, it is certainly plain that our gaze could not reach it unless it passed through the whole space of air and sky that lies between us and it; and who could estimate how great that distance is? And that gaze, or ray of our eyes, would certainly not come to pass through the air that is over the sea unless it had first passed through the air that is over the land, from the place where we are to the shore of the sea, in whatever inland region we may be. Then, if beyond the sea there still lie lands on the same line of our sight, our gaze cannot pass through the air over those lands across the sea either unless it has first traversed the space of the air that stretches over the sea it meets first. Let us now suppose that beyond those lands across the sea only the Ocean remains. Can our gaze pass through the air that spreads over the Ocean unless it has first passed through all the air on this side of the Ocean, above the land? The size of the Ocean is said to be beyond comparison; but however great it is, the rays of our eyes must first pass through the air that is above it, and afterward whatever lies beyond, and only then reach the sun that we see. Does our gaze, then, not pass through all of it at once in one instant, just because we have said “first” and “afterward” so many times here? For if, with our eyes closed, we set our face toward the sun in order to see it, shall we not think, as soon as we open them, that we have found our gaze there rather than brought it there, so that our eyes do not even seem to have been opened before it reached where it was directed? And certainly this is a ray of bodily light, flashing from our eyes and touching things placed so far away with such speed that it cannot be estimated or compared. Clearly, all those vast and immense spaces are passed through at once in one instant, and it is nonetheless certain what is passed through earlier and what later.

Rightly, when the apostle wished to express the speed of our resurrection, he said that it happens “in the twinkling of an eye.” For nothing swifter can be found in the motions or strokes of bodily things. But if the gaze of fleshly eyes can do so much by its speed, what can the gaze of the mind, even human? How much more that of the angelic mind? What, then, is to be said of the speed of the supreme Wisdom of God itself, which “reaches everywhere because of its purity, and nothing defiled enters into it”? In these things, then, which were made at once, no one sees what had to be made earlier or later except in that Wisdom through which all things were made in order and at once.

4.35CSEL 28.1:136

Dies ergo ille, quem deus primitus fecit. si spiritalis rationalisque creatura est, id est angelorum supercaelestium atque uirtutum, praesentatus est omnibus operibus dei hoc ordine praesentiae. quo ordine scientiae, qua et in uerbo dei facienda praenosceret et in creatura facta cognosceret non per interuallorum temporalium moras, sed prius et posterius habens in conexione creaturarum, in efficacia uero creatoris omnia simul. sic enim fecit, quae futura essent, ut non temporaliter faceret temporalia, sed ab eo facta currerent tempora. ac per hoc isti dies septem, quos lux corporis caelestis circumeundo explicat atque replicat, secundum quandam umbram significationis admonent nos quaerere illos dies, in quibus lux creata spiritalis omnibus operibus dei per senariam numeri perfectionem praesentari potuerit, atque inde in septimam requiem dei mane habere, uesperam non habere, ut non hoc sit deo requieuisse in die septimo, tamquam ipso die septimo eguerit ad requiem suam, sed quod in conspectu angelorum suorum requieuerit ab omnibus operibus suis, quae fecit, non utique nisi in se ipso, qui factus non est; id est, ut creatura eius angelica, quae cognoscendis omnibus operibus eius in ipso et in illis tamquam dies cum uespera praesentata est, nihil post omnia ualde bona opera eius melius cognosceret quam illum ab omnibus in se ipso requiescere nullo eorum egente, quo sit beatior.

That day, then, which God first made, if it is the spiritual and rational creation, that is, of the supercelestial angels and powers, was present to all the works of God in this order of presence, which is the order of knowledge, by which it both foreknew in the Word of God the things to be made and knew them made in creation, not through delays of temporal intervals, but having earlier and later in the connection of creatures, and all at once in the efficacy of the Creator. For he made the things that were to be in such a way that he did not make temporal things in time, but the times, made by him, ran their course. And so these seven days, which the light of the heavenly body unfolds and folds up again in its circuit, by a kind of shadow of signification prompt us to seek those days in which the created spiritual light could be present to all the works of God through the perfection of the number six, and thence have a morning in the seventh, the rest of God, and no evening. Thus God's resting on the seventh day does not mean that he needed that seventh day for his rest, but that in the sight of his angels he rested from all his works which he made, certainly in none but himself, who was not made; that is, that his angelic creation, which was present to know all his works in him and in themselves, as day with evening, should know nothing better, after all his very good works, than that he rests from them all in himself, needing none of them to be more blessed.

Chapter 5

5.1CSEL 28.1:137–139

Hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri, antequam exortum est. non enim pluerat deus super terram et homo non erat, qui operaretur terram. fons autem ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae. nunc certe firmior fit illa sententia, qua intellegitur unum diem fecisse deum, unde iam illi sex uel septem dies unius huius repetitione numerari potuerint, quandoquidem apertius sancta scriptura iam dicit, concludens quodammodo cuncta, quae ab initio usque ad hunc locum dixerat, atque infert: hic est liber creaturae uel facturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies. neque enim quisque dicturus est caelum et terram hic ita commemorata, sicut dictum erat, antequam conditus insinuaretur dies, in principio fecit deus caelum et terram. illud enim si eo modo intellegitur, ut aliquid deus fecerit sine die, priusquam faceret diem, qua ratione id possit accipi suo loco dixi, quod dicendum putaui, nulli intercludens melius intellegendi licentiam. nunc autem, hic est, inquit, liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, satis, ut opinor, ostendens non hic se ita commemorasse caelum et terram, sicut in principio, antequam fieret dies, cum tenebrae essent super abyssum, sed quomodo factum est caelum et terra, cum factus est dies, id est iam formatis atque distinctis partibus et generibus rerum, quibus uniuersa creatura disposita atque conposita reddit hanc speciem, quae mundus uocatur. Illud hic ergo caelum commemoratum est, quod cum creasset deus firmamentum uocauit, cum omnibus, quae in illo sunt, et ea terra, quae cum abysso imum obtinebat locum, cum omnibus, quae in ea sunt. sequitur enim et adiungit: fecit deus caelum et terram, ut caeli et terrae nomine et praemisso, antequam factum diem commemoraret, et repetito, cum commemorasset, non sinat suspicari ita se nunc caelum et terram nominasse, sicut in principio, antequam esset creatus dies. sic enim uerba contexuit: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram, ut, si quisquam uelit sic intellegere, quod superius positum est: liber creaturae caeli et terrae, quemadmodum dictum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram, priusquam conderet diem, quia prius et hic commemorata sunt caelum et terra et postea factus est dies, corrigatur consequentibus uerbis, quia et post commemoratum factum diem rursus caeli et terrae nomen adiunctum est. Quamquam et hoc, quod positum est "cum" et sic adiunctum, factus est dies, cuiuis contentioso extorqueat alium intellectum esse non posse. si enim ita esset interpositum, ut diceretur: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae. factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram, quisquam forte arbitraretur librum creaturae caeli et terrae sic appellatum, quomodo appellatum est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram ante conditum diem, ac deinde subiunctum: factus est dies, sicut ibi postea narratum est, quod deus fecerit diem: inde continuo rursum dictum: fecit deus caelum et terram, tamquam sic iam, quemadmodum haec facta sunt post conditum diem. sed quia ita interpositum est, ut diceretur: cum factus est dies. siue hoc superioribus uerbis conectas, ut sit una sententia: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, siue inferioribus, ut item hoc modo sit plena sententia: cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram, procul dubio cogit eo modo se intellegi caelum et terram commemorasse, quomodo facta sunt, cum factus est dies. deinde cum dictum esset: fecit deus caelum et terram, additum est: et omne uiride agri, quae certe manifestum est tertio die facta. unde liquidius adparet eundem illum esse unum diem, quem fecit deus, quo repetito factus est et secundus et tertius et ceteri usque ad septimum diem.

“This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth: when the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang up. For God had not rained upon the earth, and there was no man to work the earth. But a spring went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the earth.” Now indeed that view becomes firmer by which it is understood that God made one day, from which those six or seven days could be numbered by the repetition of this one; since Holy Scripture now says it more openly, in a way summing up all that it had said from the beginning to this place, and adds, “This is the book of the creation (or of the making) of heaven and earth, when the day was made.” For no one will say that heaven and earth are mentioned here in the same way as was said, before the establishing of day was made known, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth.” For if that is understood to mean that God made something without day, before he made day, I said in its place what I thought should be said about how it can be taken, closing to no one the freedom of understanding it better. But now it says, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when the day was made,” showing clearly enough, I think, that it has not mentioned heaven and earth here in the way it did “in the beginning,” before day was made, when darkness was upon the abyss, but in the way heaven and earth were made when day was made, that is, when the parts and kinds of things had already been formed and distinguished, by which the whole creation, arranged and composed, presents this appearance that is called the world.

So the heaven mentioned here is the one which God, when he had created it, called the firmament, with all that is in it, and the earth is the one which, with the abyss, held the lowest place, with all that is in it. For it continues and adds, “God made heaven and earth,” so that, by setting the name of heaven and earth both before mentioning that day was made and again after mentioning it, it does not allow us to suspect that it now named heaven and earth as it did “in the beginning,” before day was created. For it joined the words thus: “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when the day was made, God made heaven and earth.” So if anyone wishes to understand what is put first, “the book of the creation of heaven and earth,” in the sense in which it was said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” before he established day, on the ground that here too heaven and earth are mentioned first and afterward day is made, let him be corrected by the following words, since after the mention of the making of day the name of heaven and earth is again added.

And even the fact that “when” is put in and joined thus, “when the day was made,” would wrest from any quarrelsome person the admission that no other understanding is possible. For if it had been inserted so as to say, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth. The day was made. God made heaven and earth,” someone might perhaps think that “the book of the creation of heaven and earth” was so called in the sense in which it was said, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” before day was established, and that “the day was made” was then added, as it was narrated there afterward that God made the day; and that then it was said again at once, “God made heaven and earth,” as if now in the way these were made after day was established. But since it was inserted so as to say “when the day was made,” whether you connect this with the preceding words, so that the sentence is, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when the day was made,” or with the following words, so that the sentence is complete in this way, “When the day was made, God made heaven and earth,” it without doubt compels us to understand that it mentioned heaven and earth as they were made when day was made. Then, after it was said, “God made heaven and earth,” there is added, “and every green thing of the field,” which certainly were made on the third day. Hence it appears more clearly that it is that same one day which God made, by whose repetition the second and the third and the others up to the seventh day were made.

5.2CSEL 28.1:139–140

Cum autem nomine caeli et terrae usitato more scripturarum nunc uniuersam creaturam uoluerit accipi, quaeri potest cur addiderit: et omne uiride agri. quod mihi uidetur ideo posuisse, ut significantius intimaret, quem diem commendauerit, quod ait: cum factus est dies. cito enim quisquam putaret hunc diem lucis corporeae commendatum, quo circumeunte nobis uicissitudo diurni nocturnique temporis exhibetur. sed cum creaturarum conditarum ordinem recolimus et inuenimus omne uiride agri tertio die creatum, antequam sol fieret. qui quarto die factus est, cuius praesentia dies iste cotidianus usitatusque peragitur, quando audimus: cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, admonemur de ipso die cogitare, quem siue corporalem in nescio qua luce nobis incognita siue spiritalem in societate unitatis angelicae non tamen talem, qualem hic nouimus, intellectu uestigare conemur.

But since he wished the whole creation to be understood now by the name of heaven and earth, in the usual manner of the Scriptures, one may ask why he added, “and every green thing of the field.” It seems to me that he put it in order to make known more significantly which day he meant when he said, “when the day was made.” For someone might quickly think that the day meant was the day of bodily light, by whose circuit the alternation of daytime and nighttime is presented to us. But when we recall the order of the creatures established and find that every green thing of the field was created on the third day, before the sun was made, which was made on the fourth day and by whose presence this daily, familiar day is carried out, then when we hear, “When the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field,” we are prompted to think of that day which we try to trace by understanding, whether as bodily, in some light unknown to us, or as spiritual, in the society of angelic unity, but in any case not such as the day we know here.

5.3CSEL 28.1:140–142

Illud etiam non ab re fuerit intueri, quod, cum posset dicere: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum fecit deus caelum et terram, ut in caelo et terra intellegeremus quidquid in eis est, sicut loqui diuina scriptura consueuit, ut nomine caeli et terrae saepissime, interdum addito et maris, uniuersam insinuet creaturam, aliquando adiungens et dicens: et quae sunt in eis, ut, quidquid horum diceret, ibi intellegeremus et diem, siue quem primitus condidit, siue istum, quem praesentia solis facit: non ita dixit, sed interposuit diem dicens: cum factus est dies. nec ita locutus est, ut diceret: hic est liber creaturae diei et caeli et terrae, tamquam hoc ordine, quo facta narrantur, nec ita: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies et caelum et terra, cum fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, nec ita: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum fecit deus diem et caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, nec ita: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae. fecit deus diem et caelum et terram et omne uiride agri — hos enim magis locutionis modos loquendi consuetudo poscebat -: sed ait: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, tamquam illud insinuans, cum factus est dies, tunc fecisse deum caelum et terram et omne uiride agri. Porro autem superior narratio factum diem primitus indicat eumque unum diem deputat; post quem secundum adnumerat, quo factum est firmamentum, et tertium, quo species terrae marisque digestae sunt et lignum atque herbam terra produxit. an forte hoc illud est, quod in libro superiore moliebamur ostendere deum simul fecisse omnia, quandoquidem narrationis illa contextio, cum sex dierum ordine creata cuncta et consummata memorasset, nunc ad unum diem omnia rediguntur nomine caeli et terrae adiuncto etiam fruticum genere? nimirum propter quod supra dixi, ut si fortassis ex hac nostra consuetudine intellegeretur dies, corrigeretur lector, cum recoleret uiride agri ante istum solarem diem deum dixisse, ut terra produceret. ita iam non ex alio sanctae scripturae libro profertur testimonium, quod omnia simul deus creauerit, sed uicina testificatio paginae consequentis ex hac re nos admonet dicens: cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, ut istum diem et septies intellegas repetitum, ut fierent septem dies et, cum audis tunc facta omnia, cum factus est dies, illam senariam uel septenariam repetitionem sine interuallis morarum spatiorumque temporalium factam, si possis, adprehendas, si autem nondum possis, haec relinquas conspicienda ualentibus, tu autem cum scriptura non deserente infirmitatem tuam et materno incessu tecum tardius ambulante proficias, quae sic loquitur, ut altitudine superbos inrideat, profunditate adtentos terreat, ueritate magnos pascat, affabilitate paruulos nutriat.

It will also not be beside the point to observe that he could have said, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when God made heaven and earth,” so that we might understand by heaven and earth whatever is in them, as divine Scripture is accustomed to speak, very often making known the whole creation by the name of heaven and earth, sometimes with “and the sea” added, sometimes adding and saying “and all that is in them,” so that, whichever of these it said, we would understand there also the day, whether the one he first established or this one which the presence of the sun makes. But he did not speak thus; he inserted the day, saying, “when the day was made.” Nor did he speak so as to say, “This is the book of the creation of day and heaven and earth,” as in the order in which they are narrated as made; nor thus, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when the day was made and heaven and earth, when God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field”; nor thus, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when God made day and heaven and earth and every green thing of the field”; nor thus, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth. God made day and heaven and earth and every green thing of the field” (for ordinary usage would rather have called for these ways of speaking). But he says, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth, when the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field,” as if making known that when the day was made, then God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field.

Moreover, the earlier narrative indicates that day was made first and counts it as one day; after which it numbers a second, on which the firmament was made, and a third, on which the forms of land and sea were set apart and the earth brought forth tree and grass. Is this perhaps what we were trying to show in the previous book, that God made all things at once, since that sequence of narration, after recording that all things were created and finished in the order of six days, now brings all things back to one day under the name of heaven and earth, with the kind of shrubs also added? Surely for the reason I gave above: so that, if the day were perhaps understood after our familiar usage, the reader would be corrected when he recalled that God said that the earth should bring forth the green thing of the field before this solar day. So testimony that God created all things at once is no longer brought from another book of Holy Scripture; the near testimony of the following page reminds us of it, saying, “When the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field.” Thus you may understand this day as repeated seven times, so that there were seven days; and, when you hear that all things were made then, when the day was made, you may grasp, if you can, that the sixfold or sevenfold repetition was made without intervals of delay and spans of time. But if you cannot yet, leave these things to be contemplated by those who are able, and make progress yourself with Scripture, which does not desert your weakness but walks more slowly with you at a mother's pace; for it speaks in such a way that by its height it mocks the proud, by its depth it awes the attentive, by its truth it feeds the great, by its kindness it nourishes the little ones.

5.4CSEL 28.1:142–145

Quid sibi ergo uult etiam quod sequitur? nam ita sermo contexitur: cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri, antequam exortum est. quid est hoc? nonne quaerendum est, ubi ea fecerit, antequam essent super terram et antequam exorta sunt? quis enim non procliuius crederet tunc ea deum fecisse, cum exorta sunt, non antequam exorta sunt, nisi admoneretur hoc diuino eloquio ista deum ante fecisse, quam exorerentur, ut, si ubi facta sint inuenire non possit, credat tamen ante facta quam exorta quisquis huic scripturae pie credit; inpie quippe non credit. Quid ergo dicemus? an, quod nonnulli putauerunt, in ipso uerbo dei facta omnia. antequam exorerentur in terra? sed, si hoc modo facta sunt, non cum factus est dies, sed antequam fieret dies, facta sunt; aperte autem scriptura dicit: cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum, antequam exoreretur. si ergo cum factus est dies, non utique antequam fieret dies, ac per hoc non in uerbo, quod patri coaeternum est, antequam dies, antequam omnino aliquid fieret, sed cum factus est dies. nam illa, quae in uerbo dei ante omnem creaturam sunt, non utique facta sunt; haec autem facta sunt, cum factus est dies, sicut scripturae uerba declarant, sed tamen antequam essent super terram et antequam exorerentur: quod de uiridibus et feno agri dictum est. Ubi ergo? an in ipsa terra causaliter et rationabiliter, sicut in seminibus iam sunt omnia, antequam euoluant quodammodo atque explicent incrementa et species suas per numeros temporum? sed ista semina, quae uidemus, iam super terram sunt, iam exorta sunt. an non erant super terram, sed infra terram, et ideo, antequam exorta sunt, facta sunt, quia tunc exorta sunt, cum semina germinarunt et accessu incrementorum in auras eruperunt, quod per moras temporum nunc fieri uidemus suo cuique generi distributas? num ergo semina tunc facta sunt, cum factus est dies, et in ipsis erat omne uiride agri et omne fenum nondum ea specie, qua sunt super terram iam exorta, sed ea ui, qua sunt in rationibus seminum? semina ergo primum terra produxit? sed non ita scriptura loquebatur, cum diceret: et produxit terra herbam pabuli, uel herbam feni, seminans semen secundum genus et secundum similitudinem, et lignum fructuosum faciens fructum, cuius semen suum in se secundum genus super terram. his enim uerbis magis adparet semina esse orta ex herbis et lignis, non autem illa ex seminibus, sed ex terra, praesertim quia et ipsa uerba dei sic se habent. non enim ait: germinent semina in terra herbam feni et lignum fructuosum, sed ait: germinet terra herbam feni seminans semen, ut semen ex herba, non herbam insinuaret ex semine. et sic est factum. et produxit terra, id est: prius sic est factum in cognitione illius diei, et produxit terra. iam, ut hoc fieret etiam in ipsa creatura, quae condita est. Quomodo ergo, antequam essent super terram et antequam exorerentur? quasi eis aliud fuerit fieri cum caelo et terra, quando factus est dies ille inusitatus atque incognitus nobis, quem primum deus fecit, aliud autem exoriri iam super terram, quod non fit nisi per hos dies, quos circuitus solis facit per temporum moras suo cuique generi adcommodatas? quod si ita est diesque ille societas atque unitas supercaelestium angelorum atque uirtutum est, procul dubio longe aliter nota est angelis creatura dei, aliter nobis; excepto, quod eam in uerbo dei nouerunt, per quod facta sunt omnia, etiam in se ipsa dico longe aliter eis notam esse quam nobis: illis enim primordialiter, ut ita dicam. uel originaliter, sicut eam deus primitus condidit et post eam conditionem a suis operibus requieuit non condendo aliquid amplius, nobis autem secundum rerum antea conditarum administrationem iam per ordines temporum, secundum quam deus iam illis rebus senaria perfectione consummatis usque modo operatur. Causaliter ergo tunc dictum est produxisse terram herbam et lignum, id est producendi accepisse uirtutem. in ea quippe iam tamquam in radicibus, ut ita dixerim, temporum facta erant, quae per tempora futura erant; nam utique postea plantauit deus paradisum iuxta orientem et eiecit ibi de terra omne lignum speciosum ad aspectum et bonum ad escam. nec tamen dicendum est eum tunc aliquid addidisse creaturae, quod ante non fecerat, quod uelut illi perfectioni, qua omnia bona ualde sexto die consummauit post esset addendum; sed quia iam omnes naturae fructicum atque lignorum in prima conditione factae fuerant, a qua conditione deus requieuit, mouens deinde administransque per temporales cursus illa ipsa, quae condidit et a quibus conditis requieuit, non solum tunc plantauit paradisum, sed etiam nunc omnia, quae nascuntur. quis enim alius etiam nunc ista creat, nisi qui usque nunc operatur? sed creat haec modo ex his, quae iam sunt; tunc autem ab illo, cum omnino nulla essent, creata sunt, cum factus est dies ille, qui etiam ipse omnino non erat, spiritalis uidelicet atque intellectualis creatura.

What, then, does what follows mean? For the passage runs thus: “When the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang up.” What is this? Must we not ask where he made them before they were upon the earth and before they sprang up? For who would not more readily believe that God made them when they sprang up, not before they sprang up, unless he were told by this divine utterance that God made them before they sprang up? So, even if he cannot find where they were made, whoever believes this Scripture piously still believes that they were made before they sprang up; for it is impious not to believe it.

What, then, shall we say? That, as some have thought, all things were made in the Word of God himself before they sprang up on the earth? But if they were made in this way, they were made not when the day was made but before the day was made; and Scripture plainly says, “When the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and all the grass before it sprang up.” If, then, it was when the day was made, certainly not before the day was made, and therefore not in the Word, who is coeternal with the Father, before the day, before anything at all was made, but when the day was made. For the things that are in the Word of God before all creation were certainly not made; but these were made when the day was made, as the words of Scripture declare, yet before they were upon the earth and before they sprang up, as is said of the green things and the grass of the field.

Where, then? In the earth itself, causally and in their reasons, as all things already are in seeds before they unfold, so to speak, and display their growth and forms through the numbers of time? But these seeds that we see are already upon the earth, have already sprung up. Or were they not upon the earth but beneath it, and were they therefore made before they sprang up, because they sprang up when the seeds germinated and by the addition of growth broke out into the air, as we now see happening over the delays of time apportioned to each kind? Were seeds, then, made when the day was made, and was every green thing of the field and all the grass in them, not yet in the form in which they are when they have already sprung up upon the earth, but in that power by which they are in the reasons of seeds? Did the earth, then, first bring forth seeds? But Scripture did not speak so when it said, “And the earth brought forth the herb of pasture, or the herb of grass, seeding seed according to its kind and according to its likeness, and the fruitful tree bearing fruit, whose seed is in it according to its kind upon the earth.” For by these words it appears rather that seeds arose from the herbs and trees, and that these came not from seeds but from the earth; especially since the very words of God are so. For he does not say, “Let the seeds in the earth sprout the herb of grass and the fruitful tree,” but he says, “Let the earth sprout the herb of grass seeding seed,” to make known that the seed comes from the herb, not the herb from the seed. “And so it was done. And the earth brought forth”: that is, first it was so done in the knowledge of that day, and then the earth brought forth, so that this might be done also in the very creature that was established.

How, then, “before they were upon the earth and before they sprang up”? As if it were one thing for them to be made with heaven and earth, when that day was made, unusual and unknown to us, which God made first; and another to spring up upon the earth, which happens only through these days which the circuit of the sun makes, through delays of time suited to each kind? If this is so, and that day is the society and unity of the supercelestial angels and powers, then without doubt God's creation is known in a far different way to the angels than to us. Apart from the fact that they know it in the Word of God, through whom all things were made, I say that even in itself it is known to them far differently than to us: to them primordially, so to speak, or originally, as God first established it and after that establishing rested from his works, establishing nothing more; to us, however, according to the governing of things previously established, now through the orders of time, by which God, those things having already been finished in the perfection of six, is working until now.

So it was then said causally that the earth brought forth herb and tree, that is, that it received the power of bringing them forth. For in it, as in the roots of time, so to speak, the things that were to be through time had already been made. For certainly afterward God planted paradise toward the east, and brought forth there from the earth every tree beautiful to the sight and good for food. Yet it must not be said that he then added to creation something he had not made before, which had to be added afterward, as it were, to that perfection by which he finished all things very good on the sixth day. Rather, since all the natures of shrubs and trees had already been made in the first establishing, from which establishing God rested, moving and governing thereafter through temporal courses those very things which he established and from which, once established, he rested, he not only planted paradise then but also plants now all things that are born. For who else creates these things even now except he who is working until now? But he creates these now from things that already exist; then, however, they were created by him when nothing at all existed, when that day too was made, which itself did not exist at all, namely the spiritual and intellectual creation.

5.5CSEL 28.1:145–147

Factae itaque creaturae motibus coeperunt currere tempora: unde ante creaturam frustra tempora requiruntur, quasi possint inueniri ante tempora tempora. motus enim si nullus esset uel spiritalis uel corporalis creaturae, quo per praesens praeteritis futura succederent, nullum esset tempus omnino. moueri autem creatura non utique posset, si non esset. potius ergo tempus a creatura quam creatura coepit a tempore, utrumque autem ex deo; ex ipso enim et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. nec sic accipiatur quod dictum est: tempus a creatura coepit, quasi tempus creatura non sit, cum sit creaturae motus ex alio in aliud consequentibus rebus secundum ordinationem administrantis dei cuncta quae creauit. quapropter cum primam conditionem creaturarum cogitamus, a quibus operibus suis deus in die septimo requieuit, nec illos dies sicut istos solares nec ipsam operationem ita cogitare debemus, quemadmodum nunc aliquid deus operatur in tempore, sed quemadmodum operatus est, unde inciperent tempora, quemadmodum operatus est omnia simul, praestans eis etiam ordinem non interuallis temporum, sed conexione causarum, ut ea, quae simul facta sunt, senario quoque illius diei numero praesentato perficerentur. Non itaque temporali, sed causali ordine prius facta est informis formabilisque materies, et spiritalis et corporalis, de qua fieret, quod faciendum esset, cum et ipsa, priusquam instituta est, non fuisset; nec instituta est nisi ab illo utique summo deo et uero, ex quo sunt omnia. quae siue caeli et terrae nomine significata sit, quae in principio fecit deus ante unum illum diem, quem condidit, propterea iam sic appellata, quia inde facta sunt caelum et terra, siue nomine terrae inuisibilis et inconpositae atque abyssi tenebrosae, iam in primo libro tractatum est. In his uero, quae iam ex informitate formata sunt euidentiusque appellantur creata uel facta uel condita, primum factus est dies; oportebat enim, ut primatum creaturae obtineret illa natura, quae creaturam per creatorem, non creatorem per creaturam posset agnoscere. secundo firmamentum, unde corporeus incipit mundus. tertio species maris et terrae, atque in terra potentialiter, ut ita dicam, natura herbarum atque lignorum. sic enim terra ad dei uerbum ea produxit, antequam exorta essent, accipiens omnes numeros eorum, quos per tempora exereret secundum suum genus. deinde, posteaquam haec uelut habitatio rerum condita est, quarto die luminaria et sidera creata sunt, ut prius pars mundi superior rebus, quae intra mundum mouentur, uisibilibus ordinaretur. quinto aquarum natura, quia caelo aerique coniungitur, produxit ad dei uerbum indigenas suos, omnia scilicet natatilia et uolatilia; et haec potentialiter in numeris, qui per congruos temporum motus exererentur. sexto terrestria similiter animalia, tamquam ex ultimo elemento mundi ultima, nihilominus potentialiter, quorum numeros tempus postea uisibiliter explicaret. Hunc omnem ordinem creaturae ordinatae dies ille cognouit; et per hanc cognitionem sexies quodammodo praesentatus tamquam sex dies exhibuit, cum sit unus dies ea, quae facta sunt, in creatore primitus et in ipsis consequenter agnoscens nec in ipsis remanens, sed eorum etiam posteriorem cognitionem ad dei referens dilectionem, uesperam et mane et meridiem in omnibus praebuit, non per moras temporum, sed propter ordinem conditorum. postremo quietis sui creatoris, quia in se requiescit ab omnibus operibus suis. notitiam repraesentans, in qua non habet uesperam, benedici et sanctificari ob hoc meruit. unde ipsum septenarium numerum sancto spiritui quodammodo dedicatum commendat scriptura et nouit ecclesia. Hic est ergo liber creaturae caeli et terrae, quia in principio fecit deus caelum et terram secundum materiae quandam, ut ita dicam, formabilitatem, quae consequenter uerbo eius formanda fuerat, praecedens formationem suam non tempore, sed origine. nam utique cum formaretur, primum factus est dies; cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri, antequam exoreretur, sicut tractauimus uel si quid liquidius et congruentius uideri et dici potuit aut potuerit.

Times, then, began to run with the motions of creatures once they were made; hence it is vain to seek times before creation, as if times could be found before times. For if there were no motion of spiritual or bodily creation, by which future things succeed past ones through the present, there would be no time at all. But creation could certainly not be moved if it did not exist. So time began from creation rather than creation from time, but both are from God; “for from him and through him and in him are all things.” Nor let the statement that time began from creation be taken as if time were not a creature, since it is the motion of creation from one thing to another as things follow one another according to the ordering of God, who governs all that he created. Therefore, when we think of the first establishing of creatures, from which works God rested on the seventh day, we ought not to think of those days as of these solar days, nor of that working as God now works something in time, but as he worked so that times might begin from it, as he worked all things at once, giving them an order, not by intervals of time but by the connection of causes, so that the things made at once were also perfected by the sixfold presentation of that day.

So it was not in temporal but in causal order that formless and formable matter, both spiritual and bodily, was made first, from which what was to be made would be made, since it too did not exist before it was set up; nor was it set up except by that supreme and true God from whom are all things. Whether it is signified by the name of heaven and earth, which God made in the beginning before that one day which he established, called so already because heaven and earth were made from it, or by the name of the invisible and unformed earth and the dark abyss, has already been treated in the first book.

Among the things that were now formed from formlessness and are more evidently called created, made, or established, day was made first. For it was fitting that the first place in creation should be held by that nature which could know the creature through the Creator, not the Creator through the creature. Second, the firmament, where the bodily world begins. Third, the forms of sea and land, and in the land, potentially, so to speak, the nature of herbs and trees. For thus the earth at God's word brought them forth before they had sprung up, receiving all their numbers, which it would put forth through times according to their kind. Then, after this dwelling place of things, as it were, was established, on the fourth day the lights and stars were created, so that the upper part of the world might first be furnished with visible things that move within the world. On the fifth, the nature of the waters, because it is joined to heaven and air, brought forth at God's word its native creatures, namely all that swim and fly; and these too potentially, in numbers that would be put forth through the fitting motions of time. On the sixth, likewise the land animals, as the last things from the last element of the world, again potentially, whose numbers time would afterward unfold visibly.

That day knew this whole order of ordered creation; and, being presented six times, as it were, through this knowledge, it displayed as it were six days. Though it is one day, knowing the things that were made first in the Creator and then in themselves, and not remaining in them but referring even its later knowledge of them to the love of God, it presented evening, morning, and midday in all of them, not through delays of time but because of the order of the things established. Finally, presenting the knowledge of the rest of its Creator, because he rests in himself from all his works, in which it has no evening, it was found worthy for this reason to be blessed and sanctified. Hence Scripture commends, and the church knows, the number seven itself as in some way dedicated to the Holy Spirit.

This, then, is the book of the creation of heaven and earth: because in the beginning God made heaven and earth according to a certain formability, so to speak, of matter, which was then to be formed by his Word, preceding its own formation not in time but in origin. For certainly, when it was being formed, day was made first; when the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang up, as we have discussed, or as anything clearer and more fitting could or can be seen and said.

5.6CSEL 28.1:147–150

Quod autem sequitur: non enim pluerat deus super terram, et homo non erat. qui operaretur terram, quo pertineat et quid nobis insinuet, indagare difficile est. tamquam ideo, antequam exortum est, fecit deus fenum agri, quia nondum pluerat super terram; si enim post pluuiam fenum fecisset, pluuia magis exortum quam factum ab eo uideretur. quid enim? quod post pluuiam exoritur, ab alio fit nisi ab eodem deo? cur autem non erat homo, qui operaretur terram? nonne iam sexto die fecerat hominem et septimo requieuerat ab omnibus operibus suis? an hoc recapitulando commemorat, quoniam, quando fecit deus omne uiride agri et omne fenum, nondum pluerat super terram, et nondum erat homo? tertio quippe die fecit ista, hominem autem sexto. sed cum fecit deus omne uiride atque omne fenum agri, antequam exortum est super terram, non solum homo non erat. qui operaretur terram, sed nec ipsum fenum erat super terram, quod utique ante dicit factum quam exortum. an ideo die tertio deus fecit ista, quia nondum erat homo, qui operando terram faceret ea? quasi uero tam multa ligna et tam multa genera herbarum non sine ulla opera hominum nascuntur ex terra. An ob hoc utrumque positum est, et quia nondum pluerat super terram et quia nondum erat homo, qui operaretur terram? ubi enim opera humana non est, per pluuiam ista nascuntur. sunt autem quaedam, quae etiam per pluuiam non nascuntur, nisi opera humana accedat. ideo nunc utrumque adiutorium necessarium est, ut cuncta nascantur; tunc autem utrumque defuit. ideo fecit haec deus potentia uerbi sui sine pluuia et sine opere humano. nam etiam nunc ipse facit, sed iam per pluuiam et per hominum manus, quamuis neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, deus. Quid est ergo, quod adiungit: fons autem ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae? ille quippe fons tanta largitate manans sicut Nilus Aegypto posset uniuersae terrae esse pro pluuia. quid itaque pro magno conmendatum est, antequam plueret, fecisse deum illa gignentia, cum tantum posset adiuuare pluuia, quantum fons inrigans terram? uerum et si aliquid minus, minora illa fortasse, non tamen nulla nascerentur. an hinc etiam more suo scriptura tamquam infirmis infirmiter loquitur et tamen innuit aliquid, quod intellegat qui ualuerit? nimirum enim sicut isto die paulo superius commemorato significauit unum diem factum a deo et tunc deum fecisse caelum et terram, cum factus est dies, ut, quomodo possemus, cogitaremus simul omnia deum fecisse, quamuis superior sex dierum enumeratio uelut temporum interualla ostendisse uideretur, ita, cum dixisset cum caelo et terra deum fecisse omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri, antequam exortum est, addidit: nondum enim pluerat deus super terram, nec erat homo, qui operaretur terram, tamquam diceret: non ea sic fecit deus, quemadmodum facit nunc talia, cum pluit et cum operantur homines. haec enim iam per moras temporum fiunt, quae tunc non erant, cum fecit omnia simul, unde etiam tempora inciperent.

What follows, however, “For God had not rained upon the earth, and there was no man to work the earth,” is difficult to search out: what it refers to and what it makes known to us. It is as if God made the grass of the field before it sprang up because it had not yet rained upon the earth; for if he had made the grass after rain, it would seem to have sprung up through the rain rather than to have been made by him. But what? Is what springs up after rain made by anyone other than the same God? And why was there no man to work the earth? Had he not already made man on the sixth day, and rested on the seventh from all his works? Or does he mention this by way of recapitulation, since, when God made every green thing of the field and all the grass, it had not yet rained upon the earth and there was not yet a man? For he made these on the third day, but man on the sixth. But when God made every green thing and all the grass of the field before it sprang up upon the earth, not only was there no man to work the earth, but not even the grass itself was upon the earth, which it says was made before it sprang up. Or did God make these on the third day because there was not yet a man to make them by working the earth? As though so many trees and so many kinds of herbs were not born from the earth without any work of men!

Or were both put down, that it had not yet rained upon the earth and that there was not yet a man to work the earth, for this reason: where there is no human work, these things are born through rain; but there are some that are not born even through rain unless human work is added? So now both helps are necessary for all things to be born; but then both were lacking. So God made these by the power of his word without rain and without human work. For even now he himself makes them, but now through rain and through men's hands; although “neither he who plants is anything nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase.”

What, then, is meant by what he adds: “But a spring went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the earth”? Such a spring, flowing with as much abundance as the Nile does for Egypt, could serve the whole earth in place of rain. Why then is it made much of that God made those growing things before it rained, when a spring watering the earth could help as much as rain? Or even if it helped somewhat less, those things would perhaps be born smaller, but not not at all. Or does Scripture here too, in its manner, speak weakly as to the weak, and yet hint at something for one who is able to understand? Surely, just as by that day mentioned a little earlier it signified that one day was made by God and that God made heaven and earth when the day was made, so that, as far as we could, we should think that God made all things at once, even though the preceding enumeration of six days seemed to show intervals of time; so, having said that with heaven and earth God made every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth and all the grass of the field before it sprang up, it added, “For God had not yet rained upon the earth, nor was there a man to work the earth,” as if to say: God did not make them in the way he now makes such things, when it rains and when men work. For these things now come about through delays of time, which did not exist then, when he made all things at once, from which times too would begin.

5.7CSEL 28.1:150–152

Quod ergo sequitur: fons autem ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae, hinc iam, quantum arbitror, intimatur, quae fiant secundum interualla temporum ex illa prima conditione creaturarum, ubi facta sunt omnia simul. et recte ab eo coepit elemento, ex quo cuncta genera nascuntur uel animalium uel herbarum atque lignorum, ut agant temporales numeros suos naturis propriis distributos. omnia quippe primordia seminum, siue unde omnis caro siue unde omnia frutecta gignuntur, umida sunt et ex umore concrescunt. insunt autem illis efficacissimi numeri trahentes secum sequaces potentias ex illis perfectis operibus dei, a quibus in die septimo requieuit. Uerum tamen quis iste sit fons ad inrigandam faciem terrae omnis idoneus, merito quaeritur. si enim fuit et obstrusus est uel siccatus, causa quaerenda est. nunc enim uidemus nullum esse fontem, quo inrigetur omnis facies terrae. fortassis ergo peccatum hominum hanc etiam poenam conmeruit, ut tanta illius fontis repressa largitas facillimam terris auferret fecunditatem, ut incolentium augeretur labor. posset hoc, quamuis nulla id scriptura narrauerit, adfirmare humana suspicio, nisi illud occurreret, quod peccatum hominum, cui poena laboris inposita est, post paradisi delicias extitit; paradisus autem habebat praegrandem fontem suum, de quo post diligentius suo loco loquendum est, ex cuius uno capite quattuor magna flumina et nota gentibus manare narrantur. ubi ergo erat iste fons aut ista flumina, quando ille unus maximus ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae? certe enim tunc non Geon, qui dicitur Nilus, unus ex illis quattuor, rigabat Aegyptum, quando fons ascendebat de terra et non Aegyptum tantum, sed omnem faciem terrae satiabat. An primo deum uoluisse credendum est uno fonte maximo inrigare omnem terram, ut ea, quae in illa principaliter condiderat. accepto humoris adiutorio iam etiam per temporalia spatia gignerentur pro suorum generum diuersitate etiam diuersis numeris dierum, et postea plantato paradiso repressisse illum fontem multisque fontibus, sicut eam nunc uidemus, inpleuisse terram, de paradisi autem uno fonte quattuor ingentia flumina diuisisse, ut et terra cetera creaturarum suarum plena generibus congruos numeros suorum temporum agentibus fontes etiam suos haberet ac fluuios et paradisus loco electiore plantatus quattuor illa flumina ex capite sui fontis emitteret? aut ex ipso uno fonte paradisi multo largius exundante prius totam rigasse terram atque ad parienda per temporum numeros genera, quae in ea sine interuallis temporum creauerat, fecundasse ac postea repressisse in eo loco aquarum eruptionem uastissimam, ut de diuersis per omnem terram capitibus fluminum ac fontium iam manarent, ac deinde in regione illius fontis non iam uniuersam terram rigantis, sed memorabiles quattuor solos illos fluuios emittentis plantasse paradisum, ubi hominem, quem fecerat, conlocaret?

As for what follows, then, “But a spring went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the earth,” from here on, I think, we are told of the things that come about over intervals of time from that first establishing of creatures, in which all things were made at once. And it rightly began with that element from which all kinds of animals, herbs, and trees are born, so that they carry out their temporal numbers apportioned to their own natures. For all the first beginnings of seeds, whether those from which all flesh or those from which all plants are produced, are moist and grow from moisture. And there are in them most effective numbers, drawing with them powers that follow from those perfected works of God from which he rested on the seventh day.

But it is rightly asked what this spring was, sufficient to water the face of the whole earth. For if it existed and was blocked or dried up, the cause must be sought. For now we see that there is no spring by which the whole face of the earth is watered. Perhaps, then, the sin of men also earned this penalty, that the great abundance of that spring was held back and took away from the lands their easy fruitfulness, so that the labor of their inhabitants might be increased. Human conjecture might affirm this, though no Scripture has narrated it, were it not for the objection that the sin of men, on which the penalty of labor was imposed, arose after the delights of paradise; and paradise had its own very great spring, of which we must speak more carefully later in its place, from whose single source four great rivers known to the nations are said to flow. Where, then, was that spring, or those rivers, when that one very great spring went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the earth? For certainly Geon, which is called the Nile, one of those four, was not then watering Egypt, when a spring went up from the earth and saturated not Egypt only but the whole face of the earth.

Or must we believe that God first willed to water the whole earth with one very great spring, so that the things he had established in it in their first causes, receiving the help of moisture, might be produced also through spans of time, according to the diversity of their kinds, even in different numbers of days; and that afterward, when paradise was planted, he held back that spring and filled the earth with many springs, as we see it now, but divided four great rivers from the one spring of paradise, so that the rest of the earth, full of the kinds of its creatures carrying out the fitting numbers of their times, might also have its springs and rivers, and paradise, planted in a choicer place, might send out those four rivers from the source of its spring? Or that from that one spring of paradise, overflowing much more abundantly, he first watered the whole earth and made it fruitful to bring forth, through the numbers of time, the kinds which he had created in it without intervals of time; and afterward held back in that place the vast eruption of waters, so that they now flowed from various sources of rivers and springs throughout the earth; and then, in the region of that spring, which no longer watered the whole earth but sent out only those four memorable rivers, planted paradise, where he would place the man he had made?

5.8CSEL 28.1:152

Quia enim non omnia scripta sunt, quemadmodum post illam primam rerum conditionem tempora cucurrerint seque secutae sint administrationes creaturarum, quae primitus factae sextoque die illo consummatae sunt, sed quantum satis iudicauit spiritus, qui inerat scribenti ea, quae non solum ad factarum rerum notitiam, sed etiam ad futurarum praefigurationem ualerent, nescientes coniectamus. quid fieri potuerit, quod ille non nesciens praetermisit, tantum id conantes pro modulo nostro, quantum adiuuamur, efficere, ne aliqua absurditas uel repugnantia putetur esse in scripturis sanctis, quae opinionem lectoris offendat et, dum existimat fieri non potuisse, quae facta esse scriptura conmemorat, uel resiliat a fide uel non accedat ad fidem.

For since not everything has been written down about how, after that first establishing of things, the times ran their course and the governing of the creatures that were first made and finished on that sixth day followed, but only as much as the Spirit who was in the writer judged sufficient, things that would serve not only for knowledge of what was done but also for prefiguring what was to come, we, not knowing, conjecture what could have happened that he, not in ignorance, passed over. We attempt only this, according to our small measure and as far as we are helped: that no absurdity or contradiction be thought to exist in the holy Scriptures that would offend the reader's opinion, so that, thinking that the things Scripture records as done could not have been done, he would either recoil from the faith or not come to the faith.

5.9CSEL 28.1:152–153

Proinde cum de isto fonte quaerimus, quomodo id, quod dictum est: ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae, non inpossibile uideatur, si ea, quae diximus, inpossibilia cuiquam uidentur, quaerat ipse aliud, quo tamen uerax ista scriptura monstretur, quae procul dubio uerax est, etiamsi non monstretur. nam si argumentari uoluerit, quo eam falsam esse conuincat, aut ipse nulla uera de creaturarum conditione atque administratione dicturus est aut, si uera dixerit, istam non intellegendo falsam putabit; uelut si contendat ideo non potuisse uno quantolibet fonte omnem terrae faciem rigari, quia, si montes non rigabat, non omnem terrae faciem rigabat; si autem etiam montes rigabat, non erat iam inpertitio saginae, sed diluuii inundatio: quod si terra tunc sic erat, totum mare erat, et nondum discreta erat arida.

Accordingly, when we ask about this spring, how what is said, “It went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the earth,” may not seem impossible: if what we have said seems impossible to anyone, let him seek something else by which this Scripture may be shown to be truthful, which without doubt is truthful even if it is not shown to be. For if he wishes to argue so as to prove it false, either he will say nothing true about the establishing and governing of creatures, or, if he says true things, he will think this Scripture false by not understanding it. For example, he might contend that the whole face of the earth could not be watered by one spring, however great, because if it did not water the mountains it did not water the whole face of the earth; but if it watered the mountains too, it was no longer a sharing out of nourishment but the inundation of a flood; and if the earth was like that then, it was all sea, and the dry land had not yet been separated.

5.10CSEL 28.1:153–154

Cui respondetur, quia hoc uicibus temporum posset, sicut certo tempore per plana Aegypti Nilus restagnat et alio tempore ad ripas suas redit. aut si iste nescio cuius ignotae ac longinquae partis mundi aquis et pruinis hiemalibus anniuersaria creditur incrementa conligere, quid de oceani alternis aestibus, quid de quibusdam litoribus, quae late nudantur fluctibus uicissimque operiuntur, dici potest? ut omittam, quod de quorundam fontium mira uicissitudine perhibetur, certo annorum interuallo sic eos inundare, ut totam illam regionem rigent, cui alio tempore ex altis puteis ad potandum sufficientem praebent aquam. cur sit ergo incredibile, si ex uno abyssi capite alterna inundatione fluente atque refluente tunc uniuersa terra rigata est? quodsi ipsius abyssi magnitudinem ea parte excepta, quod mare dicitur et euidenti amplitudine atque amaris fluctibus terras ambit, in ea sola parte, quam reconditis sinibus terra continet, unde se omnes fontes amnesque diuersis tractibus uenisque distribuunt et suis quique locis erumpunt, fontem uoluit scriptura appellare, non fontes, propter naturae unitatem eumque per innumerabiles uias antrorum atque rimarum ascendentem de terra et ubique dispertitis quasi crinibus inrigantem omnem faciem terrae non continua specie tamquam maris aut stagni, sed sicut uidemus ire aquas per alueos fluminum flexusque riuorum et eorum excessu uicina perfundere, quis non accipiat, nisi qui contentioso spiritu laborat? potest quippe etiam ita dicta intellegi omnis terrae facies inrigata, quemadmodum dicitur omnis uestis facies colorata. etiamsi non continuatim, sed maculatim fiat, praesertim quia tunc in nouitate terrarum etsi non omnia. plura tamen plana fuisse credibile est, qua latius possent erumpentia fluenta dispergi atque distendi. Quapropter de istius fontis magnitudine uel multitudine, qui siue unam habuit alicunde eruptionem siue propter aliquam in terrae occultis sinibus unitatem, unde omnes aquae super terram scatent omnium fontium magnorum atque paruorum. unus fons dictus est, per omnes dispertitiones suas ascendens de terra et inrigans omnem faciem terrae, siue etiam, quod est credibilius, quia non ait: unus fons ascendebat de terra. sed ait: fons autem. ascendebat de terra, pro numero plurali posuit singularem, ut sic intellegamus fontes multos per uniuersam terram loca uel regiones proprias inrigantes, sicut dicitur miles et multi intelleguntur, sicut dicta est lucusta et rana in plagis, quibus Aegyptii percussi sunt, cum esset innumerabilis lucustarum numerus et ranarum: iam non diutius laboremus.

The answer to him is that this could happen by alternations of time, as at a certain season the Nile floods the plains of Egypt and at another returns to its banks. Or if the Nile is believed to gather its yearly increase from the waters and winter frosts of some unknown and distant part of the world, what can be said of the alternating tides of the Ocean, and of certain shores that are laid bare far and wide by the waves and covered again in turn? To say nothing of what is reported of the wonderful alternation of certain springs, that at a fixed interval of years they overflow so as to water that whole region, to which at other times they supply enough water for drinking only from deep wells. Why, then, should it be incredible if the whole earth was then watered from one source of the abyss, flowing and ebbing in alternating flood? But suppose that, leaving aside that part of the abyss itself which is called the sea, which surrounds the lands with its evident breadth and bitter waves, Scripture wished to call the part that the earth holds in its hidden recesses, from which all springs and rivers distribute themselves through various tracts and veins and break out each in its own place, a “spring,” not “springs,” because of the unity of its nature; and that it went up from the earth through countless paths of caves and fissures, and, divided everywhere like hair, watered the whole face of the earth, not in a continuous form like that of a sea or a pool, but as we see waters go through the beds of rivers and the windings of streams and by their overflow soak the neighboring land. Who would not accept this, except one who labors with a contentious spirit? For the whole face of the earth can be understood to have been watered in the way the whole face of a garment is said to be colored even if it is done not continuously but in spots; especially since then, in the newness of the lands, it is credible that, if not all, yet most of them were plains, over which the streams that broke out could be spread and extended more widely.

Therefore, concerning the size or the number of this spring, whether it had one outflow from somewhere, or was called one spring because of some unity in the hidden recesses of the earth from which all the waters of all springs, great and small, gush out upon the earth, going up from the earth through all its divisions and watering the whole face of the earth; or else, which is more credible, since it does not say “one spring went up from the earth” but “a spring went up from the earth,” it put the singular for the plural, so that we may understand many springs throughout the whole earth watering their own places or regions, as one says “the soldier” and many are understood, and as “the locust” and “the frog” were said in the plagues with which the Egyptians were struck, when the number of locusts and frogs was countless: let us labor no longer.

5.11CSEL 28.1:154–155

Sed illud etiam atque etiam consideremus, utrum possit nobis per omnia constare sententia, qua dicebamus aliter operatum deum omnes creaturas prima conditione, a quibus operibus in die septimo requieuit, aliter ista eorum administratione, qua usque nunc operatur: id est, tunc omnia simul sine ullis temporalium morarum interuallis, nunc autem per temporum moras. quibus uidemus sidera moueri ab ortu ad occasum, caelum mutari ab aestate ad hiemem, germina certis dierum momentis pullulare, grandescere, uirescere, arescere, animalia quoque statutis temporum metis et cursibus et concipi et perfici et nasci et per aetates usque in senium mortemque decurrere et cetera huiusmodi temporalia. quis enim operatur ista nisi deus etiam sine ullo tali suo motu? non enim et ipsi accidit tempus. inter illa ergo opera dei, a quibus requieuit in die septimo, et ista, quae usque nunc operatur, quendam scriptura interponens suae narrationis articulum commendauit se illa explicasse et coepit iam ista contexere. illorum explicatorum commendatio sic facta est: hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri, antequam exoreretur. non enim pluerat deus super terram et homo non erat, qui operaretur terram. istorum autem contextio sic coepit: fons autem ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae. ab hac commemoratione fontis huius et deinceps ea, quae narrantur, per moras temporum facta sunt, non omnia simul.

But let us consider again and again whether the view we were stating can hold good for us in every respect: that God worked all creatures in one way in the first establishing, from which works he rested on the seventh day, and in another way in this governing of them, by which he is working until now; that is, then all at once, without any intervals of temporal delay, but now through the delays of time, by which we see the stars move from rising to setting, the sky change from summer to winter, plants at fixed moments of days sprout, grow, turn green, and wither, and animals too, at appointed bounds and courses of time, be conceived, completed, and born, and run through the ages of life to old age and death, and other temporal things of this kind. For who works these things except God, even without any such motion of his own? For time does not befall him either. Between those works of God, then, from which he rested on the seventh day, and these which he is working until now, Scripture, inserting a kind of joint in its narrative, has made known that it has finished setting forth the former and has now begun to set out the latter. The notice that the former were finished was given thus: “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth: when the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang up. For God had not rained upon the earth, and there was no man to work the earth.” The account of the latter began thus: “But a spring went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the earth.” From this mention of this spring onward, the things narrated were done through the delays of time, not all at once.

5.12CSEL 28.1:155–156

Cum ergo aliter se habeant omnium creaturarum rationes incommutabiles in uerbo dei. aliter eius illa opera, a quibus in die septimo requieuit, aliter ista, quae ex illis usque nunc operatur, horum trium hoc, quod extremum posui. nobis utcumque notum est per corporis sensus et huius consuetudinem uitae. duo uero illa remota a sensibus nostris et ab usu cogitationis humanae prius ex diuina auctoritate credenda sunt, deinde per haec, quae nota sunt. utcumque noscenda, quanto quisque magis minusue potuerit pro suae capacitatis modo diuinitus adiutus, ut possit.

Since, then, the unchangeable reasons of all creatures in the Word of God are one thing, those works of his from which he rested on the seventh day another, and these which he is working from them until now another, of these three the last I mentioned is known to us in some fashion through the senses of the body and the familiar experience of this life. The other two, remote from our senses and from the habits of human thought, must first be believed on divine authority, and then come to be known in some fashion through the things that are known, each one more or less as he can, according to the measure of his capacity, helped by God that he may be able.

5.13CSEL 28.1:156–157

De primis ergo illis diuinis incommutabilibus aeternisque rationibus, quoniam ipsa dei sapientia, per quam facta sunt omnia, priusquam fierent, ea nouerat, sicut scriptura testatur: in principio erat uerbum et uerbum erat apud deum et deus erat uerbum. hoc erat in principio apud deum. omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, quis ergo tam sit demens, ut dicat non ea deum fecisse, quae nouerat? porro si nouerat. ubi nisi apud se ipsum, apud quem uerbum erat, per quod facta sunt omnia? nam si extra se ipsum ea nouerat, quis eum docuerat? quis enim cognouit sensum domini? aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Quamquam et ea, quae sequuntur in euangelio, satis adserant istam sententiam; adiungit enim euangelista et dicit: quod factum est, in illo uita est, et uita erat lux hominum, quia scilicet rationales mentes, in quo genere homo factus est ad imaginem dei, non habent ueram lucem suam nisi ipsum uerbum dei. per quod facta sunt omnia, cuius participes esse poterunt ab omni iniquitate et errore mundatae.

Concerning, then, those first divine, unchangeable, and eternal reasons: since the very Wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, knew them before they were made, as Scripture testifies, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made”: who, then, would be so mad as to say that God did not make the things he knew? Moreover, if he knew them, where, except with himself, with whom was the Word through whom all things were made? For if he knew them outside himself, who had taught him? “For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor? Or who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid him? For from him and through him and in him are all things.” And what follows in the Gospel also asserts this view sufficiently; for the evangelist adds and says, “What was made, in him is life, and the life was the light of men”; since, namely, rational minds, in which kind man was made to the image of God, have no true light of their own except the Word of God himself, through whom all things were made, in whom they will be able to share when cleansed from all iniquity and error.

5.14CSEL 28.1:157–158

Non ergo ita pronuntiari oportet: quod factum est in illo, uita est, ut subdistinguamus: quod factum est in illo, et deinde inferamus: uita est. quid enim non in illo factum est, cum commemoratis multis etiam terrenis creaturis dicatur in psalmo: omnia in sapientia fecisti, dicat et apostolus: quoniam in ipso condita sunt omnia in caelo et in terra. uisibilia et inuisibilia. consequens ergo erit, si ita distinxerimus, ut et ipsa terra et quaecumque in ea sunt uita sint. quae cum absurde dicantur omnia uiuere, quanto absurdius, ut etiam uita sint? praesertim quia distinguit, de quali uita loquatur, cum addit: et uita erat lux hominum. sic ergo distinguendum est, ut, cum dixerimus: quod factum est, deinde inferamus: in illo uita est, non in se scilicet, hoc est in sua natura, qua factum est, ut conditio creaturaque sit, sed in illo uita est, quia omnia, quae per ipsum facta sunt, nouerat, antequam fierent, ac per hoc in illo erant non sicut creatura, quam fecit, sed sicut uita et lux hominum. quod est ipsa sapientia et ipsum uerbum unigenitus filius dei. eo modo ergo in illo uita est, quod factum est, quomodo dictum est: sicut habet pater uitam in semet ipso, sic dedit filio habere uitam in semet ipso. Nec praetermittendum est, quod emendatiores codices habent: quod factum est, in illo uita erat, ut sic intellegatur: uita erat, quomodo in principio erat uerbum, et uerbum erat apud deum, et deus erat uerbum. quod ergo factum est, iam uita erat in illo, et uita non qualiscumque — nam et pecora dicuntur uiuere, quae frui non possunt participatione sapientiae — sed uita erat lux hominum. mentes quippe rationales purgatae gratia eius possunt peruenire ad eiusmodi uisionem, qua nec superius quicquam sit nec beatius.

So it should not be read, “What was made in him is life,” with a pause after “What was made in him,” and then adding “is life.” For what was not made in him, when, after many earthly creatures have been mentioned, it is said in the psalm, “You have made all things in wisdom,” and the apostle says, “For in him all things were established in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible”? It would follow, then, if we punctuated it that way, that the earth itself and whatever is in it would be life. And since it is absurd to say that all things live, how much more absurd to say that they are even life? Especially since he specifies what sort of life he is speaking of when he adds, “and the life was the light of men.” So it should be punctuated thus: when we have said “What was made,” we then add “in him is life”; not in itself, that is, in its own nature, by which it was made so as to be a thing established and a creature, but in him it is life, because he knew all things that were made through him before they were made, and therefore they were in him not as the creature that he made but as life and the light of men, which is Wisdom itself and the Word himself, the only-begotten Son of God. What was made, then, is life in him in the way in which it is said, “As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself.”

Nor should we pass over the fact that more correct manuscripts have “What was made, in him was life,” so that it is understood thus: “was life,” as “in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” What was made, then, was already life in him; and not life of any kind (for even cattle are said to live, which cannot enjoy a share in wisdom), but the life was the light of men. For rational minds, cleansed by his grace, can come to that kind of vision than which nothing is higher or more blessed.

5.15CSEL 28.1:158–159

Sed etiam si hoc legamus et intellegamus: quod factum est, in illo uita est, manet ista sententia, ut id, quod per ipsum factum est, uita esse in illo intellegatur, in qua uita uidit omnia, quando fecit et, sicut uidit, ita fecit, non praeter se ipsum uidens, sed in se ipso ita enumerauit omnia, quae fecit. nec alia uisio ipsius et patris, sed una, sicut una substantia. nam et in libro Iob ita ipsa sapientia, per quam facta sunt omnia, praedicatur: sapientia uero, inquit, unde inuenta est? uel quis sit locus scientiae? ignorat mortalis uiam eius nec inuenietur in hominibus. et paulo post: audiuimus, inquit, eius gloriam. dominus commendauit uiam eius et ipse nouit locum eius. ipse enim omne, quod est sub caelo, perspicit et nouit quae sunt in terra omnia quae fecit: uentorum libramenta aquae mensuras quando fecit, sicut uidit, enumerauit. his atque huiusmodi testimoniis probatur, quod haec omnia, priusquam fierent, erant in notitia facientis, et utique ibi meliora, ubi ueriora, ubi aeterna et incommutabilia. quamquam sufficere debeat, ut quisque nouerit, uel inconcusse credat, quod deus haec omnia fecerit, non opinor eum esse tam excordem, ut deum quae non nouerat fecisse arbitretur. porro, si nouerat ea, priusquam faceret ea, profecto, priusquam fierent, apud illum erant eo modo nota, quo sempiterne atque incommutabiliter uiuunt et uita sunt, facta autem eo modo, quo unaquaeque creatura in genere suo est.

But even if we read and understand “What was made, in him is life,” this view stands: that what was made through him is understood to be life in him, in which life he saw all things when he made them, and as he saw, so he made; not seeing outside himself, but in himself he numbered all the things he made. Nor is his vision one and the Father's another, but one, as the substance is one. For in the book of Job too that Wisdom through which all things were made is proclaimed thus: “But Wisdom,” it says, “where is it found? Or what is the place of knowledge? A mortal does not know its way, nor will it be found among men.” And a little later: “We have heard,” it says, “of its glory. The Lord has commended its way, and he knows its place. For he looks upon everything that is under heaven and knows all things that are on the earth which he made: the weights of the winds, the measures of the water; when he made them, as he saw, he numbered them.” By these and similar testimonies it is proved that all these things, before they were made, were in the knowledge of their Maker, and certainly better there, where they were truer, where they were eternal and unchangeable. Although it should be enough for anyone to know, or firmly to believe, that God made all these things, I do not think anyone is so senseless as to suppose that God made things he did not know. Moreover, if he knew them before he made them, then surely before they were made they were known with him in the way in which they live everlastingly and unchangeably and are life, but made in the way in which each creature is in its own kind.

5.16CSEL 28.1:159–160

Quamuis ergo illa aeterna incommutabilisque natura, quod deus est, habens in se, ut sit, sicut Moysi dictum est: ego sum qui sum, longe scilicet aliter, quam sunt ista, quae facta sunt, quoniam illud uere ac primitus est, quod eodem modo semper est nec solum non commutatur, sed commutari omnino non potest, nihil horum, quae fecit, existens et omnia primitus habens, sicut ipse est — neque enim ea faceret, nisi ea nosset, antequam faceret, nec nosset, nisi uideret, nec uideret, nisi haberet, nec haberet ea, quae nondum facta erant, nisi quemadmodum est ipse non factus —: quamuis, inquam, illa substantia ineffabilis sit nec dici utcumque homini per hominem possit nisi usurpatis quibusdam locorum ac temporum uerbis, cum sit ante omnia tempora et ante omnes locos, tamen propinquior nobis est. qui fecit, quam multa, quae facta sunt. in illo enim uiuimus et mouemur et sumus; istorum autem pleraque remota sunt a mente nostra propter dissimilitudinem sui generis, quoniam corporalia sunt, nec idonea est ipsa mens nostra, in ipsis rationibus, quibus facta sunt, ea uidere apud deum, ut per hoc sciamus, quot et quanta qualiaque sint, etiamsi non ea uideamus per corporis sensus. remota quippe sunt a sensibus corporis nostri, quoniam longe sunt uel interpositis aut obpositis aliis a nostro contuitu actuque separantur. ex quo fit, ut maior ad illa inuenienda sit labor quam ad illum, a quo facta sunt, cum sit inconparabili felicitate praestantius illum ex quantulacumque particula pia mente sentire quam illa uniuersa conprehendere. unde recte culpantur in libro sapientiae inquisitores huius saeculi: si enim tantum, inquit, potuerunt ualere, ut possent aestimare saeculum, quomodo eius dominum non facilius inuenerunt? ignota enim sunt fundamenta terrae oculis nostris, et qui fundauit terram, propinquat mentibus nostris.

Although, then, that eternal and unchangeable nature which is God has in itself its being, as was said to Moses, “I am who am,” in a way far different, certainly, from the being of the things that were made (for that truly and primarily is which always is in the same way, and not only is not changed but cannot be changed at all), being none of the things he made and having all of them primarily, as he himself is (for he would not make them unless he knew them before he made them, nor know them unless he saw them, nor see them unless he had them, nor have the things not yet made except in the way in which he himself is not made); although, I say, that substance is ineffable and cannot be spoken of in any fashion to a man by a man except by using certain words of place and time, since it is before all times and before all places, yet he who made us is nearer to us than many things that were made. For “in him we live and move and are”; whereas most of these things are remote from our mind because of the unlikeness of their kind, since they are bodily; nor is our mind itself fit to see them with God in the very reasons by which they were made, so as to know thereby how many, how great, and of what kind they are, even if we do not see them through the senses of the body. For they are remote from the senses of our body, since they are far away, or are separated from our sight and action by other things placed between or in front. Hence there is greater labor in finding them than in finding him by whom they were made; though it is better, with incomparable happiness, to perceive him with a devout mind in however small a portion than to comprehend them all. Hence the inquirers of this world are rightly blamed in the book of Wisdom: “For if they were able to know so much,” it says, “that they could estimate the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord?” For the foundations of the earth are unknown to our eyes, and he who founded the earth draws near to our minds.

5.17CSEL 28.1:160–161

Iam nunc consideremus ea, quae fecit deus omnia simul, a quibus in sexto die consummatis requieuit in septimo, postea consideraturi opera eius, in quibus usque nunc operatur. ipse enim ante saecula; a saeculo autem ea dicimus, ex quo coepit saeculum, sicut ipsum mundum, in saeculo autem, sicut ea, quae nascuntur in mundo. cum ergo scriptura dixisset: omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, paulo post ait: in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est. de hoc opere dei alio loco scriptum est: qui fecisti mundum de materia informi. hic mundus plerumque caeli et terrae nomine nuncupatur, sicut iam commemorauimus, quem scriptura dicit deum fecisse, cum factus est dies. de quibus uerbis iam, quantum uisum est, disputauimus, quemadmodum congruat conditioni mundi huius, et quod sex diebus consummatus est cum omnibus, quae in eo sunt, et quod tunc factus est, cum factus est dies, ut et illud congruat, quod creauit omnia simul

Now let us consider the things that God made all at once, from which, when they were finished on the sixth day, he rested on the seventh, intending afterward to consider his works in which he is working until now. For he himself is before the ages; but we say that those things are from the age which began with the age, such as the world itself, and those things are in the age which are born in the world. So when Scripture had said, “All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made,” a little later it says, “He was in this world, and the world was made through him.” Of this work of God it is written in another place, “You who made the world from formless matter.” This world is usually called by the name of heaven and earth, as we have already mentioned, which Scripture says God made when the day was made. About these words we have already discussed, as far as seemed good, how it fits the establishing of this world both that it was finished in six days with all that is in it and that it was made then, when the day was made, so that this too fits: that he created all things at once.

5.18CSEL 28.1:161

Huius uniuersae dei creaturae multa non nouimus, siue quae in caelis sunt altius, quam ut noster sensus ea possit adtingere, siue quae in regionibus terrarum fortassis inhabitabilibus siue quae deorsum latent uel in profundo abyssi uel in occultis sinibus terrae. haec igitur antequam fierent, utique non erant. quomodo ergo deo nota erant, quae non erant? et rursus quomodo ea faceret, quae sibi nota non erant? non enim quidquam fecit ignorans. nota ergo fecit, non facta cognouit. proinde, antequam fierent, et erant et non erant: erant in dei scientia, non erant in sua natura. ac per hoc factus est dies ille, cui utroque modo innotescerent, et in deo et in se ipsis, illa uelut matutina siue diurna cognitione, hac uero uelut uespertina. ipsi autem deo non audeo dicere alio modo innotuisse, cum ea fecisset, quam illo. quo ea nouerat ut faceret, apud quem non est commutatio nec momenti obumbratio.

Of this whole creation of God there are many things we do not know, whether things in the heavens higher than our senses can reach, or things in regions of the earth that are perhaps uninhabitable, or things hidden below, in the depth of the abyss or in the hidden recesses of the earth. These things, then, before they were made, certainly did not exist. How, then, were things that did not exist known to God? And again, how would he make things that were not known to him? For he made nothing in ignorance. So he made things known, he did not come to know things made. Accordingly, before they were made, they both were and were not: they were in God's knowledge; they were not in their own nature. And so that day was made to which they became known in both ways, both in God and in themselves, in the former as by morning or daytime knowledge, in the latter as by evening knowledge. But I do not dare to say that they became known to God himself, when he had made them, in any other way than that in which he knew them in order to make them, “with whom there is no change nor shadow of turning.”

5.19CSEL 28.1:161–163

Non sane propter inferiorum scientiam nuntiis indiget, quasi per eos fiat scientior; sed illo simplici ac mirabili modo nouit omnia stabiliter atque incommutabiliter. habet autem nuntios propter nos et propter ipsos, quia illo modo deo parere et adsistere. ut eum de inferioribus consulant eiusque supernis praeceptis et iussis obtemperent, bonum est eis in ordine propriae naturae atque substantiae. nuntii autem graece. angeli dicuntur: quo nomine generali uniuersa illa superna ciuitas nuncupatur, quem primum diem conditum existimamus. Nam nec illud eos latuit mysterium regni caelorum. quod oportuno tempore reuelatum est pro salute nostra, quo ex hac peregrinatione liberati eorum coetui coniungamur. neque enim hoc ignorarent, quandoquidem ipsum semen, quod oportuno tempore aduenit, per ipsos dispositum est in manu mediatoris, id est in eius potestate, qui dominus eorum est, et in forma dei et in forma serui. dicit item apostolus: mihi minimo omnium sanctorum data est gratia haec in gentibus adnuntiare inuestigabiles diuitias Christi et inluminare, quae sit dispositio sacramenti. quod fuit absconditum a saeculis in deo, qui uniuersa creauit. ut innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus per ecclesiam multiformis sapientia dei secundum propositum saeculorum quam fecit in Christo Iesu domino nostro. sic ergo fuit hoc absconditum a saeculis in deo, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus per ecclesiam multiformis sapientia dei, quia ibi primitus ecclesia, quo post resurrectionem et ista ecclesia congreganda est, ut simus aequales angelis dei. illis ergo a saeculis innotuit, quia omnis creatura non ante saecula, sed a saeculis. ab ipsa enim exorta sunt saecula et ipsa a saeculis, quoniam initium eius initium saeculorum est; unigenitus autem ante saecula, per quem facta sunt saecula. ideoque ex persona sapientiae, ante saecula, inquit. fundauit me, ut in ea faceret omnia, cui dictum est: omnia in sapientia fecisti. Quod non autem in deo tantum innotescit angelis. quod absconditum est, uerum etiam hic eis adparet, cum efficitur atque propalatur, idem apostolus ita testis est: et sine dubio, inquit, magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, iustificatum est in spiritu, adparuit angelis, praedicatum est in gentibus. creditum est in mundo, adsumtum est in gloria. et, nisi fallor, mirum est, si non omnia, quae dicitur deus tamquam ad praesens tempus cognoscere, ideo dicitur, quia cognosci facit, siue ab angelis siue ab hominibus. modus quippe iste locutionis, cum per efficientem id quod efficitur significatur. creber est in scripturis sanctis, maxime cum de deo aliquid dicitur, quod ei ad proprietatem locutionis non conuenire praesidens mentibus nostris ipsa ueritas clamat.

Certainly he does not need messengers for knowledge of lower things, as if he became more knowing through them; but in that simple and wonderful way he knows all things stably and unchangeably. He has messengers, however, for our sake and for theirs, because to obey and attend upon God in that way, so as to consult him about lower things and comply with his heavenly precepts and commands, is good for them in the order of their own nature and substance. Messengers in Greek are called angels; by this general name that whole heavenly city is called, which we think was established as the first day.

For not even that mystery of the kingdom of heaven was hidden from them which was revealed at the fitting time for our salvation, by which, freed from this pilgrimage, we are joined to their company. For they could not be ignorant of it, since the very seed which came at the fitting time was ordained through them in the hand of the mediator, that is, in the power of him who is their Lord, both in the form of God and in the form of a servant. The apostle likewise says, “To me, the least of all the saints, this grace was given, to proclaim among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all as to what is the dispensation of the mystery hidden from the ages in God, who created all things, so that the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the church, according to the purpose of the ages which he made in Christ Jesus our Lord.” So this was hidden from the ages in God in such a way that the manifold wisdom of God was nevertheless made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the church; because there is the church first, where after the resurrection this church too is to be gathered, so that we may be equal to the angels of God. It was made known to them, then, from the ages, because the whole creation is not before the ages but from the ages. For the ages arose from it and it is from the ages, since its beginning is the beginning of the ages; but the Only-begotten is before the ages, through whom the ages were made. And so, in the person of Wisdom, it says, “Before the ages he founded me,” that in her he might make all things, to whom it is said, “You have made all things in wisdom.”

That what is hidden is made known to the angels not only in God, but also appears to them here when it is accomplished and brought to light, the same apostle testifies thus: “And without doubt,” he says, “great is the mystery of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, appeared to angels, was preached among the Gentiles, believed in the world, taken up in glory.” And, unless I am mistaken, it would be strange if all the things that God is said to know as if at a present time were not said for the reason that he causes them to be known, whether by angels or by men. For this mode of speaking, when what is effected is signified through what effects it, is frequent in the holy Scriptures, especially when something is said of God which Truth itself, presiding over our minds, cries out does not befit him in the proper sense of the words.

5.20CSEL 28.1:163–165

Iam nunc ergo discernamus opera dei. quae usque nunc operatur, ab illis operibus, a quibus in die septimo requieuit. sunt enim, qui arbitrentur tantummodo mundum ipsum factum a deo, cetera iam fieri ab ipso mundo, sicut ille ordinauit et iussit, deum autem ipsum nihil operari. contra quos profertur illa sententia domini: pater meus usque modo operatur. et ne quisquam putaret apud se illum aliquid operari, non in hoc mundo, pater in me manens, inquit, facit opera sua; et sicut pater suscitat mortuos et uiuificat, sic et filius quos uult uiuificat. deinde quia non solum magna atque praecipua, uerum etiam ista terrena et extrema ipse operatur, ita dicit apostolus: stulte, tu quod seminas non uiuificatur, nisi moriatur; et quod seminas, non corpus quod futurum est seminas, sed nudum granum fere tritici aut alicuius ceterorum; deus autem illi dat corpus quomodo uoluerit et unicuique seminum proprium corpus. sic ergo credamus uel, si possumus, etiam intellegamus usque nunc operari deum, ut, si conditis ab eo rebus operatio eius subtrahatur, intercidant. Sed plane, si aliquam creaturam sic eum nunc instituere putauerimus, ut genus eius primae illi suae conditioni non inseruerit, aperte contradicimus dicenti scripturae, quod consummauerit omnia opera sua in die sexto. secundum illa enim genera rerum, quae primo condidit, noua eum multa facere, quae tunc non fecit, manifestum est. nouum autem genus instituere credi recte non potest, quoniam tunc omnia consummauit. mouet itaque occulta potentia uniuersam creaturam suam eoque motu illa uersata, dum angeli iussa perficiunt, dum circumeunt sidera, dum alternant uenti, dum abyssus aquarum lapsibus et diuersis etiam per aerem conglobationibus agitatur, dum uireta pullulant suaque semina euoluunt, dum animalia gignuntur uarioque adpetitu proprias uitas agunt, dum iniqui iustos exercere permittuntur, explicat saecula, quae illi, cum primum condita est. tamquam plicita indiderat: quae tamen in suos cursus non explicarentur, si ea ille, qui condidit, prouido motu administrare cessaret.

Now, then, let us distinguish the works of God which he is working until now from those works from which he rested on the seventh day. For there are some who think that only the world itself was made by God, and that the other things are now made by the world itself, as he ordained and commanded, while God himself works nothing. Against them is brought that saying of the Lord: “My Father is working until now.” And lest anyone think that he works something in his own presence and not in this world, he says, “The Father abiding in me does his works”; and, “As the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom he will.” Then, because he works not only great and chief things but also these earthly and lowest ones, the apostle says thus: “Fool, what you sow is not made alive unless it dies; and what you sow, you do not sow the body that is to be, but a bare grain, perhaps of wheat or of some other kind; but God gives it a body as he wills, and to each of the seeds its own body.” So let us believe, or if we can, also understand, that God is working until now in such a way that, if his working were withdrawn from the things established by him, they would perish.

But plainly, if we should think that he now sets up some creature in such a way that he did not insert its kind in that first establishing of his, we openly contradict Scripture, which says that he finished all his works on the sixth day. For it is plain that, according to those kinds of things which he first established, he makes many new things which he did not make then. But he cannot rightly be believed to set up a new kind, since he then finished all things. So by a hidden power he moves his whole creation; and, turned by that motion, while angels carry out commands, while the stars go round, while the winds alternate, while the abyss of waters is stirred by falls and by various gatherings even through the air, while green things sprout and unfold their seeds, while animals are born and lead their own lives with various appetites, while the wicked are permitted to exercise the just, creation unfolds the ages which he had placed in it, folded up as it were, when it was first established. Yet they would not be unfolded into their courses if he who established them ceased to govern them by his provident motion.

5.21CSEL 28.1:165–166

Admoneri autem nos oportet his, quae in tempore formantur atque nascuntur, quomodo ista considerare debeamus. non enim frustra scriptum est de sapientia, quod amatoribus suis ostendit se in uiis hilariter et in omni prouidentia occurrit illis. nec omnino audiendi sunt, qui putauerunt sublimes quidem mundi partes, id est a confinio corpulentioris aeris huius et supra, diuina prouidentia gubernari, hanc autem imam partem terrenam et humidam aerisque huius uicinioris, qui terrarum et aquarum exhalationibus humescit, in quo uenti nubesque consurgunt. casibus potius et fortuitis motibus agitari. contra hos enim loquitur psalmus, qui cum explicasset laudem caelestium se etiam ad ista inferiora conuertit dicens: laudate dominum de terra, dracones et omnes abyssi: ignis, grando, nix. glacies. spiritus tempestatis, quae faciunt uerbum eius. nihil enim tam uidetur casibus uolui quam omnes istae procellosae ac turbulentae qualitates, quibus caeli huius inferioris, quod non inmerito etiam terrae nomine deputatum est, facies uariatur et uertitur. sed cum addidit: quae faciunt uerbum eius, satis ostendit earum quoque rerum ordinem diuino subditum imperio latere nos potius quam uniuersitatis deesse naturae. quid autem? ore suo saluator, cum dicit unum passerem non cadere in terram sine dei uoluntate, et quod fenum agri post paululum mittendum in clibanum ipse tamen uestiat. nonne confirmat non solum totam istam mundi partem rebus mortalibus et corruptibilibus deputatam, uerum etiam uilissimas eius abiectissimasque particulas diuina prouidentia regi?

We ought to be instructed by the things that are formed and born in time how we should consider them. For it is not written in vain of Wisdom that she shows herself joyfully to her lovers in the ways and meets them in all providence. And those are not to be heeded at all who have thought that the higher parts of the world, that is, from the boundary of this denser air upward, are governed by divine providence, but that this lowest part, earthly and moist, and of this nearer air, which is made moist by the exhalations of land and water, and in which winds and clouds rise, is driven rather by chance and random motions. Against them the psalm speaks, which, having set out the praise of heavenly things, turns also to these lower things, saying, “Praise the Lord from the earth, you dragons and all depths; fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy wind, which do his word.” For nothing seems so much tossed about by chance as all these stormy and turbulent conditions by which the face of this lower sky, which not without reason is also counted under the name of earth, is varied and changed. But when it added, “which do his word,” it showed clearly enough that the order of these things too, subject to divine command, is hidden from us rather than lacking to the nature of the universe. What, then? When the Savior says with his own mouth that not one sparrow falls to the ground without the will of God, and that he himself clothes the grass of the field which shortly is to be thrown into the oven, does he not confirm that not only this whole part of the world assigned to mortal and corruptible things, but even its most worthless and lowly particles, are ruled by divine providence?

5.22CSEL 28.1:166–167

Et certe isti, qui hoc negant nec sanctis eloquiis tantae auctoritatis adquiescunt, si in hac mundi parte, quam putant fortuitis motibus perturbari potius quam sapientia diuinae summitatis regi et, ut hoc quasi probent, gemino abutuntur argumento, uel quod supra commemoraui de inconstantia tempestatum uel de felicitatibus atque infelicitatibus hominum, quod non pro uitae meritis accidunt, uiderent tantum ordinem, quantus in membris carnis cuiuslibet animantis adparet, non dico medicis, qui haec propter artis suae necessitatem diligenter patefacta et dinumerata rimati sunt, sed cuiuis mediocris cordis et considerationis homini, nonne clamarent ne puncto quidem temporis deum, a quo est omnis mensurarum modus, omnis parilitas numerorum, omnis ordo ponderum, ab eius gubernatione cessare? quid ergo absurdius, quid insulsius sentiri potest quam eam totam esse uacuam nutu et regimine prouidentiae, cuius extrema et exigua uideas tanta dispositione formari, ut aliquanto adtentius cogitata ineffabilem incutiant admirationis horrorem? et cum animae natura naturae corporis antecellat, quid est dementius quam putare nullum esse diuinae prouidentiae iudicium de moribus hominum, cum in eorum carne tanta eius sollertiae clareant et demonstrentur indicia? sed quia haec minima in promtu sunt sensibus nostris et ea facile uestigamus, elucet in eis ordo rerum; at illa, quorum ordinem uidere non possumus, inordinata arbitrantur. qui esse non putant. nisi quod uidere possunt, aut, si putant, tale aliquid putant, quale uidere consueuerunt.

And certainly those who deny this and do not acquiesce in the holy utterances of such great authority, in this part of the world which they think is disturbed by random motions rather than ruled by the Wisdom of the divine height (and to prove this, as it were, they misuse a twofold argument: either what I mentioned above about the inconstancy of the weather, or the good and bad fortunes of men, which do not befall them according to the merits of their lives): if they saw the great order that appears in the members of the flesh of any living creature, not, I say, to physicians, who for the needs of their art have examined these things carefully, laid open and enumerated, but to any man of ordinary mind and reflection, would they not cry out that God, from whom is every limit of measures, every equality of numbers, every order of weights, does not cease from governing it even for a moment of time? What, then, can be thought more absurd, more foolish, than that the whole of that part is empty of the nod and rule of providence, when you see its last and smallest things formed with such arrangement that, considered somewhat more attentively, they strike one with an ineffable awe of wonder? And since the nature of the soul surpasses the nature of the body, what is madder than to think that there is no judgment of divine providence about the conduct of men, when such signs of its skill shine out and are shown in their flesh? But because these smallest things lie ready to our senses and we easily trace them, the order of things shines out in them; while those things whose order we cannot see are thought disordered by those who think nothing exists except what they can see, or, if they think so, think it something like what they are accustomed to see.

5.23CSEL 28.1:167–170

Nos autem, quorum gressus, ne in illam peruersitatem incidamus, eadem diuina prouidentia per sanctam scripturam regit, ex ipsis quoque operibus dei eodem adiuuante indagare conemur, ubi haec simul creauerit, cum a consummatis suis operibus requieuit, quorum species per ordinem temporum usque nunc operatur. consideremus ergo cuiuslibet arboris pulchritudinem in robore, ramis. frondibus, pomis: haec species non utique repente tanta ac talis exorta est. sed quo etiam ordine nouimus. surrexit enim a radice. quam terrae primum germen infixit, atque inde omnia illa formata et distincta creuerunt. porro illud germen ex semine: in semine ergo illa omnia primitus fuerunt non mole corporeae magnitudinis, sed ui potentiaque causali. nam illa magnitudo copia terrae humorisque congesta est. sed illa in exiguo grano mirabilior praestantiorque uis est, qua ualuit adiacens humor conmixtus terrae tamquam materies uerti in ligni illius qualitatem, in ramorum diffusionem, in foliorum uiriditatem ac figuram; in fructuum formas et opulentiam omniumque ordinatissimam distinctionem. quid enim ex arbore illa surgit aut pendet. quod non ex quodam occulto thesauro seminis illius extractum atque depromtum est? at illud semen ex arbore licet non illa sed altera, atque illa rursus ex altero semine; aliquando autem et arbor ex arbore, cum surculus demitur atque plantatur. ergo et semen ex arbore et arbor ex semine et arbor ex arbore. semen autem ex semine nullo modo, nisi arbor interueniat prius; arbor uero ex arbore, etiamsi semen non interueniat. alternis igitur successionibus alterum ex altero, sed utrumque ex terra nec ex ipsis terra; prior igitur eorum parens terra. sic et animalia: potest incertum esse utrum ex ipsis semina, an ipsa ex seminibus; quodlibet tamen horum prius, ex terra certissimum est. Sicut autem in ipso grano inuisibiliter erant omnia simul, quae per tempora in arborem surgerent, ita ipse mundus cogitandus est, cum deus simul omnia creauit, habuisse simul omnia, quae in illo cum illo facta sunt, quando factus est dies, non solum caelum cum sole et luna et sideribus, quorum species manet motu rotabili, et terram et abyssos, quae uelut inconstantes motus patiuntur atque inferius adiuncta partem alteram mundo conferunt, sed etiam illa, quae aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exorerentur, quomodo nobis iam nota sunt in eis operibus, quae deus usque nunc operatur. Quae cum ita sint, hic est liber creaturae caeli et terrae, cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri. antequam exortum est. non sic, quomodo facit opere, quo nunc usque operatur per pluuiam et hominum agriculturam — ad hoc enim adiunctum est: non enim pluerat deus super terram nec erat homo qui operaretur terram — sed illo modo, quo creauit omnia simul senarioque dierum numero consummauit. cum diem, quem fecit, eis, quae fecit, sexies praesentauit non alternante spatio temporaliter, sed ordinata cognitione causaliter. a quibus operibus in die septimo requieuit. etiam suam requiem eiusdem diei notitiae gaudioque praebere dignatus. et ideo non eum in quolibet opere suo, sed in sua requie benedixit et sanctificauit. unde nullam ulterius creaturam instituens, sed ea. quae omnia simul fecit, administratorio actu gubernans et regens sine cessatione operatur, simul et requiescens et operans, sicut iam ista tractata sunt. quorum operum eius, quae nunc usque operatur, per uolumina temporum explicandorum uelut exordium narrandi sumens ait scriptura: fons autem ascendebat de terra et inrigabat omnem faciem terrae. de quo fonte quia diximus, quod dicendum putauimus, ea quae sequuntur ab alio consideremus exordio.

But let us, whose steps the same divine providence guides through Holy Scripture so that we do not fall into that perversity, try, with the same help, to trace from the very works of God where he created at once these things whose forms he is working until now through the order of times, when he rested from his finished works. Let us consider, then, the beauty of any tree in its trunk, branches, leaves, and fruit. This form certainly did not spring up suddenly in such size and quality, but in the order that we know. For it rose from a root, which the sprout first fixed in the earth, and from there all those parts grew, formed and distinct. Moreover, that sprout came from a seed; so in the seed all those things were at first, not in the bulk of bodily size but in causal force and power. For that size was built up by an abundance of earth and moisture. But that force in the tiny grain is more wonderful and excellent, by which the neighboring moisture, mixed with earth as matter, could be turned into the quality of that wood, the spreading of branches, the greenness and shape of the leaves, the forms and richness of the fruit, and the most orderly distinction of them all. For what rises or hangs from that tree that has not been drawn out and brought forth from a kind of hidden treasure of that seed? But that seed comes from a tree, though not that one but another, and that tree again from another seed; and sometimes a tree comes from a tree, when a cutting is taken and planted. So seed comes from tree, and tree from seed, and tree from tree; but seed from seed in no way unless a tree comes in between first; whereas tree comes from tree even if no seed comes in between. So by alternating successions one comes from the other, but both from the earth, and not the earth from them; so their first parent is the earth. So too with animals: it may be uncertain whether seeds come from them or they from seeds; but whichever of these is first, it is most certain that it is from the earth.

And as in the grain itself there were invisibly at once all the things that would rise through time into a tree, so the world itself must be thought to have had at once, when God created all things at once, all the things that were made in it and with it when the day was made: not only heaven with the sun and moon and stars, whose form remains with rotating motion, and the earth and the depths, which undergo as it were inconstant motions and, joined below, contribute the other part to the world, but also those things which water and earth produced potentially and causally, before they arose through the delays of time in the way they are now known to us in the works which God is working until now.

This being so, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth: when the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang up”: not in the way he makes them by the work by which he is working until now, through rain and the farming of men (for this is why it was added, “For God had not rained upon the earth, nor was there a man to work the earth”), but in the way in which he created all things at once and finished them in the number of six days, when he presented the day that he made six times to the things that he made, not by an alternating span in time, but causally by an ordered knowledge. From these works he rested on the seventh day, deigning to give even his rest to the knowledge and joy of that same day. And so he blessed and sanctified it not in any work of his but in his rest. Hence, setting up no further creature, but governing and ruling by his administering action the things which he made all at once, he works without ceasing, at once resting and working, as has already been discussed. Taking, as it were, the beginning of the narration of these works of his which he is working until now, to be unfolded through the cycles of time, Scripture says, “But a spring went up from the earth and watered the whole face of the earth.” Since we have said about this spring what we thought should be said, let us consider what follows from another beginning.

Chapter 6

6.1CSEL 28.1:170–171

Et finxit deus hominem puluerem de terra et insufflauit in faciem eius flatum uitae. et factus est homo in animam uiuentem. hic primo uidendum est. utrum ista recapitulatio sit, ut nunc dicatur, quomodo factus sit homo, quem sexto illo die factum legimus. an uero tunc quidem, cum fecit omnia simul, in his etiam hominem latenter fecit, sicut fenum terrae antequam esset exortum, ut eo modo et ipse, cum iam esset in secreto quodam naturae aliter factus, sicut illa, quae simul creauit, cum factus esset dies, accessu temporis etiam isto modo fieret, quo in hac perspicua forma uitam gerit, uel male uel bene, sicut fenum, quod factum est, antequam exoreretur super terram, accedente iam tempore et fontis illius inrigatione exortum est. ut esset super terram. Prius ergo secundum recapitulationem id conemur accipere. fortassis quippe ita homo factus sit in die sexto, sicut dies ipse primitus factus est, sicut firmamentum. sicut terra et mare. neque enim haec dicenda sunt ante in quibusdam primordiis iam facta latuisse ac deinde in hanc faciem, qua mundus exstructus est. accessu temporis tamquam exorta claruisse, sed ab exordio saeculi, cum factus est dies, conditum mundum, in cuius elementis simul sunt condita, quae post accessu temporis orerentur. uel frutecta uel animalia quaeque secundum suum genus. nam nec ipsa sidera credendum est in elementis mundi primitus facta atque recondita accessu postea temporis extitisse atque in has enituisse formas, quae caelitus fulgent, sed illo senario perfectionis numero creata simul omnia, cum factus est dies. utrum ergo sic et homo ista iam specie, qua in sua natura uiuit et agit siue bonum siue malum? an et ipse in occulto sicut fenum agri, antequam exortum est. ut hoc ei post esset accessu temporis exoriri, quod de puluere factus est?

“And God formed man, dust from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” Here we must first see whether this is a recapitulation, so that it is now said how man was made whom we read was made on that sixth day; or whether, when he made all things at once, he made man too among them in a hidden way, like the grass of the earth before it had sprung up, so that he too, having already been made in another way in a certain secret of nature, like the things he created at once when the day was made, should with the passing of time be made also in this way, in which he lives his life in this visible form, whether badly or well; as the grass, which was made before it sprang up upon the earth, sprang up with the passing of time and the watering of that spring, so as to be upon the earth.

Let us first try, then, to take it as a recapitulation. For perhaps man was made on the sixth day in the same way as the day itself was first made, as the firmament, as the land and the sea. For it must not be said that these were first made and lay hidden in certain first beginnings and then, with the passing of time, sprang up, as it were, and became manifest in this appearance in which the world has been built; rather, the world was established from the beginning of the age, when the day was made, and in its elements were established at once the things that would arise afterward with the passing of time, whether plants or animals, each according to its kind. For neither must we believe that the stars themselves were first made and stored away in the elements of the world, and afterward, with the passing of time, came forth and shone in these forms which gleam from heaven; but all things were created at once in that number of perfection, six, when the day was made. Was man, then, also made thus, already in this appearance in which he lives in his own nature and does good or evil? Or was he too made in a hidden way, like the grass of the field before it sprang up, so that his being made from dust was to come forth afterward with the passing of time?

6.2CSEL 28.1:171–172

Accipiamus ergo eum sexto ipso die in hac perspicua uisibilique forma de limo fictum, sed tunc non commemoratum, quod nunc recapitulando insinuatur, et uideamus, utrum nobiscum ipsa scriptura concordet. sic certe scriptum est, cum adhuc diei sexti opera narrarentur: et dixit deus: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et habeat potestatem piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium pecorum et omnis terrae et omnium repentium, quae repunt super terram. et fecit deus hominem, ad imaginem dei fecit eum: masculum et feminam fecit eos. et benedixit eos deus dicens: crescite et multiplicamini et inplete terram et dominamini eius et habete potestatem piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium pecorum et omnis terrae et omnium reptilium repentium super terram. iam ergo de limo formatus erat et illi iam soporato mulier ex latere facta erat. sed hoc commemoratum non erat, quod nunc recapitulando commemoratum est. neque enim sexto die factus est masculus et accessu temporis postea facta femina; sed fecit eum, inquit; masculum et feminam fecit eos et benedixit eos. quomodo ergo iam homine in paradiso constituto mulier ei facta est? an et hoc praetermissum scriptura recoluit? nam sexto illo die etiam paradisus plantatus. est et ibi homo conlocatus et soporatus est, ut Eua formaretur; et ea formata euigilauit eique nomen inposuit. sed haec nisi per temporales moras fieri non possent. non itaque ita facta sunt, sicut creata sunt omnia simul.

Let us take it, then, that he was formed from clay on the sixth day itself in this manifest and visible form, but that what is now made known by recapitulation was not mentioned then, and let us see whether Scripture itself agrees with us. It is certainly written thus, while the works of the sixth day were still being narrated: “And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness; and let him have power over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and all cattle and all the earth and all creeping things that creep upon the earth. And God made man; to the image of God he made him; male and female he made them. And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply and fill the earth and have dominion over it, and have power over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and all cattle and all the earth and all creeping things that creep upon the earth.” So he had then already been formed from clay, and the woman had already been made from his side while he slept; but this had not been mentioned, and is now mentioned by recapitulation. For the male was not made on the sixth day and the female made afterward with the passing of time; but it says, “he made him; male and female he made them, and blessed them.” How, then, was the woman made for him when the man had already been placed in paradise? Or did Scripture go back to this too, having passed it over? For on that sixth day paradise too was planted, and the man was placed there, and was put to sleep so that Eve might be formed; and when she was formed he awoke and gave her a name. But these things could not happen except through delays of time. So they were not made in the way in which all things were created at once.

6.3CSEL 28.1:172–173

Quantamlibet enim homo cogitet facilitatem, qua deus etiam haec simul cum ceteris fecit, uerba certe hominis nouimus nisi per temporales morulas emitti uoce non posse. cum ergo uerba hominis audimus, uel cum animantibus uel cum mulieri nomen inposuit uel cum secutus etiam dixit: propter hoc relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et coniungetur uxori suae; et erunt duo in carne una. quibuslibet syllabis ista sonuerint, nec duae quaecumque in his uerbis syllabae simul sonare potuerunt, quanto minus haec omnia cum his, quae simul creata sunt, simul fieri! ac per hoc aut et illa omnia non simul ab ipso summo exordio saeculorum, sed per moras atque interualla temporum facta sunt diesque ille non spiritali sed corporali substantia primum conditus uel circuitu lucis nescio quomodo uel emissione et contractione mane ac uesperam faciebat; aut. si consideratis omnibus, quae superioribus sermonibus pertractata sunt, probabilis ratio persuasit illum diem spiritalem sublimiter ac primitus conditum lucem quandam sapientem uocatum esse diem, cuius praesentia per ordinatam cognitionem conditioni rerum in numero senario praeberetur, atque huic sententiae scripturae uerba congruere, quod ait postea: cum factus dies est, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum agri, antequam exoreretur, adtestari etiam, quod alibi scriptum est: qui uiuit in aeternum, creauit omnia simul: non est dubium hoc, quod homo de limo terrae fictus est eique formata uxor ex latere. iam non ad conditionem, qua simul omnia facta sint, pertinere, quibus perfectis requieuit deus, sed ad eam operationem, quae fit iam per uolumina saeculorum, qua usque nunc operatur. Huc accedit, quod ipsa etiam uerba, quibus narratur, quomodo deus paradisum plantauerit in eoque hominem, quem fecerat, conlocarit ad eumque adduxerit animalia, quibus nomina inponeret, in quibus cum adiutorium simile illi non fuisset inuentum. tunc ei mulierem costa eius detracta formauerit, satis nos admonent haec non ad illam operationem dei pertinere, unde requieuit in die septimo, sed ad istam potius, qua per temporum cursus usque nunc operatur. cum enim paradisus plantaretur, ita narrat: et plantauit deus paradisum in Eden ad orientem et posuit ibi hominem, quem finxerat. et eiecit deus adhuc de terra omne lignum pulchrum ad aspectum et bonum ad escam.

However great the ease one imagines with which God made these things too at once with the rest, we certainly know that a man's words cannot be uttered by the voice except through little delays of time. When, then, we hear the words of the man, whether when he gave names to the animals or to the woman, or when he went on to say, “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two will be in one flesh,” whatever syllables these sounded in, not even any two syllables in these words could sound at once; how much less could all these things be done at once with the things that were created at once! And therefore either all those things too were made not at once from the very beginning of the ages but through delays and intervals of time, and that day, first established not of spiritual but of bodily substance, made morning and evening in some way, by a circuit of light or by emission and contraction; or, if, all that was discussed in the previous books having been considered, a probable reason has persuaded us that that day, established sublimely and first as spiritual, a certain wise light, was called day, whose presence was provided through ordered knowledge to the establishing of things in the number six; and if the words of Scripture agree with this view when it says afterward, “When the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and all the grass of the field before it sprang up,” and if what is written elsewhere also testifies, “He who lives forever created all things at once”: then there is no doubt that man's being formed from the clay of the earth and his wife's being formed from his side no longer belong to the establishing in which all things were made at once, which having been perfected God rested, but to that working which now takes place through the cycles of the ages, by which he is working until now.

To this is added that the very words by which it is narrated how God planted paradise and placed in it the man he had made, and brought to him the animals for him to give them names, and, when no help like him was found among them, then formed the woman for him by taking out his rib, sufficiently remind us that these things belong not to that working of God from which he rested on the seventh day but rather to this, by which he is working until now through the courses of time. For when paradise was planted, it narrates thus: “And God planted paradise in Eden toward the east and placed there the man whom he had formed. And God brought forth further from the earth every tree beautiful to the sight and good for food.”

6.4CSEL 28.1:173–174

Cum ergo dicit: eiecit adhuc de terra omne lignum pulchrum ad aspectum, manifestat utique, quod aliter nunc eiecerit de terra lignum, aliter tunc, cum tertio die produxit terra herbam pabuli seminantem semen secundum suum genus et lignum fructuosum secundum suum genus. hoc est enim: eiecit adhuc, super illud scilicet. quod iam eiecerat: tunc utique potentialiter et causaliter in opere pertinente ad creanda omnia simul, a quibus consummatis in die septimo requieuit, nunc autem uisibiliter in opere pertinente ad temporum cursum, sicut usque nunc operatur. Nisi forte quis dicat non omne ligni genus tertio die creatum. sed dilatum aliquid, quod sexto crearetur, cum homo factus est atque in paradiso constitutus. sed quae die sexto creata sint, apertissime scriptura declarat, anima. uiua scilicet secundum unumquodque genus quadrupedum et repentium et bestiarum et ipse homo ad imaginem dei masculus et femina. proinde potuit praetermittere, quomodo sit homo factus, quem tamen ipso die factum esse narrauit, ut recapitulando postea, quemadmodum etiam factus fuerit, intimaret, hoc est de terrae puluere, et mulier illi de latere, non tamen aliquod creaturae genus praetermittere, uel in eo, quod dixit deus: fiat, siue: faciamus, uel in eo, quod dicitur: sic est factum, siue: fecit deus. alioquin frustra per singulos dies tam diligenter distincta sunt omnia, si permixtionis dierum potest ulla suspicio residere, ut, cum herba et lignum diei tertio sit adtributum, aliqua ligna etiam sexto die creata esse credamus, quae ipso sexto die scriptura tacuerit.

When, then, it says, “He brought forth further from the earth every tree beautiful to the sight,” it certainly makes plain that he brought forth trees from the earth in one way now and in another way then, when on the third day the earth brought forth the herb of pasture seeding seed according to its kind and the fruitful tree according to its kind. For this is what “he brought forth further” means, namely beyond what he had already brought forth: then, certainly, potentially and causally, in the work belonging to the creating of all things at once, from which, when finished, he rested on the seventh day; but now visibly, in the work belonging to the course of time, as he is working until now.

Unless perhaps someone says that not every kind of tree was created on the third day, but something was put off to be created on the sixth, when man was made and placed in paradise. But Scripture declares most plainly what was created on the sixth day: the living soul, namely, according to each kind of four-footed animals and creeping things and beasts, and man himself, to the image of God, male and female. Accordingly, it could pass over how man was made, whom it nevertheless narrated was made on that day, so as to make known afterward by recapitulation how he was made, that is, from the dust of the earth, and the woman for him from his side; but it could not pass over any kind of creature, either in what God said, “Let it be,” or “Let us make,” or in what is said, “So it was done,” or “God made.” Otherwise all things were distinguished so carefully day by day in vain, if any suspicion could remain of a mixing of the days, so that, though herb and tree were assigned to the third day, we should believe that some trees were also created on the sixth day, about which Scripture was silent on that sixth day.

6.5CSEL 28.1:174–176

Postremo, quid respondebimus de bestiis agri et uolatilibus caeli. quae adduxit deus ad Adam, ut uideret, quid ea uocaret? quod ita scriptum est: et dixit dominus deus: non bonum est esse hominem solum; faciamus illi adiutorium secundum ipsum. et finxit deus adhuc de terra omnes bestias agri et omnia uolatilia caeli et adduxit illa ad Adam, ut uideret, quid uocabit illa: et omne quodcumque illud uocauit Adam animam uiuam, hoc nomen illius. et uocauit Adam nomina omnibus pecoribus et omnibus uolatilibus caeli et omnibus bestiis agri. Adae autem non est inuentus adiutor similis ipsi. et iniecit deus mentis alienationem super Adam, et obdormiuit: et sumsit unam de costis eius et adinpleuit carnem in locum eius. et aedificauit dominus deus costam, quam sumsit de Adam, in mulierem. si ergo consequenter, cum in pecoribus et bestiis agri et uolatilibus caeli non esset inuentum adiutorium simile homini, fecit ei deus adiutorium simile de costa lateris eius, hoc autem factum est, cum easdem bestias agri et uolatilia caeli adhuc de terra finxisset et ad illum adduxisset: quomodo sexto die factum hoc potest intellegi, quandoquidem illo die produxit terra animam uiuam secundum uerbum dei, uolatilia uero quinto die produxerunt aquae similiter secundum uerbum dei? non itaque hic diceretur: et finxit deus adhuc de terra omnes bestias agri et omnia uolatilia caeli, nisi quia iam terra produxerat omnes bestias agri sexto die et aqua omnia uolatilia caeli quinto die. aliter ergo tunc, id est potentialiter atque causaliter, sicut illi operi conpetebat, quo creauit omnia simul, a quibus in die septimo requieuit, aliter autem nunc, sicut ea uidemus, quae per temporalia spatia creat, sicut usque nunc operatur. ac per hoc iam per istos notissimos lucis corporalis dies, qui circuitu solis fiunt. Eua facta est de latere uiri sui. tunc enim deus adhuc finxit de terra bestias et uolatilia, in quibus cum adiutorium simile ipsi Adam non esset inuentum, illa formata est. in talibus ergo diebus etiam ipsum de limo finxit deus. Neque enim dicendum est masculum quidem sexto die factum, feminam uero posterioribus diebus, cum ipso sexto die apertissime dictum sit: masculum et feminam fecit eos et benedixit eos et cetera, quae de ambobus et ad ambos dicuntur. aliter ergo tunc ambo et nunc aliter ambo: tunc scilicet secundum potentiam per uerbum dei tamquam seminaliter mundo inditam, cum creauit omnia simul, a quibus in die septimo requieuit, ex quibus omnia suis quaeque temporibus iam per saeculorum ordinem fierent, nunc autem secundum operationem praebendam temporibus, qua usque nunc operatur, et oportebat iam suo tempore fieri Adam de limo terrae eiusque mulierem ex uiri latere.

Finally, what shall we answer about the beasts of the field and the birds of the sky, which God brought to Adam to see what he would call them? For it is written thus: “And the Lord God said: It is not good for the man to be alone; let us make for him a help according to himself. And God formed further from the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them; and whatever Adam called each living soul, that is its name. And Adam called names for all cattle and all the birds of the sky and all the beasts of the field. But for Adam there was not found a helper like himself. And God cast an ecstasy upon Adam, and he slept; and he took one of his ribs and filled up flesh in its place. And the Lord God built the rib which he took from Adam into a woman.” If, then, consequently, when no help like the man was found among the cattle and the beasts of the field and the birds of the sky, God made a help like him from the rib of his side, and this happened when he had further formed those same beasts of the field and birds of the sky from the earth and brought them to him: how can this be understood to have happened on the sixth day, since on that day the earth brought forth the living soul at the word of God, while the waters brought forth the birds on the fifth day, likewise at the word of God? So it would not be said here, “And God formed further from the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky,” unless the earth had already brought forth all the beasts of the field on the sixth day and the water all the birds of the sky on the fifth day. So it was in one way then, that is, potentially and causally, as befitted that work by which he created all things at once, from which he rested on the seventh day; but in another way now, as we see the things which he creates through spans of time, as he is working until now. And so Eve was made from the side of her husband already in these well-known days of bodily light, which come about by the circuit of the sun. For then God further formed from the earth the beasts and birds, among which, when no help like Adam was found, she was formed. In such days, then, God formed him too from the clay.

For it must not be said that the male was made on the sixth day and the female on later days, since on that sixth day itself it is said most plainly, “Male and female he made them, and blessed them,” and the other things that are said of both and to both. So both were made in one way then and both in another way now: then, namely, according to the power placed in the world by the Word of God, as it were seminally, when he created all things at once, from which he rested on the seventh day, from which all things would come to be, each in its own time, through the order of the ages; but now according to the working that is to be supplied to times, by which he is working until now; and it was fitting that Adam should now be made in his own time from the clay of the earth and his wife from the man's side.

6.6CSEL 28.1:176–178

In qua distributione operum dei partim ad illos dies inuisibiles pertinentium, in quibus creauit omnia simul, partim ad istos, in quibus operatur cotidie quidquid ex illis tamquam inuolucris primordialibus in tempore euoluitur. si non inportune neque absurde scripturae uerba secuti sumus, quae nos ad haec distinguenda duxerunt, cauendum est, ne propter ipsarum rerum aliquanto difficilem perceptionem, quam tardiores adsequi non sufficiunt, putemur aliquid sentire ac dicere, quod scimus nos nec sentire nec dicere. quamquam enim praecedentibus sermonibus. quantum potuerim, lectorem praestruxerim, plures tamen arbitror caligare in his locis et putare ita fuisse prius hominem in illo dei opere quo simul omnia creata sunt, ut aliquam uitam duceret, ut dei locutionem ad se directam, cum dixit deus: ecce dedi uobis omne pabulum seminale, discerneret, crederet, intellegeret. nouerit ergo, qui hoc putat, non hoc me sensisse neque dixisse. Sed rursus, si dixero non ita fuisse hominem in illa prima rerum conditione, qua creauit deus omnia simul, sicuti est non tantum perfectae aetatis homo, sed ne infans quidem, nec tantum infans, sed ne puerperium quidem in utero matris, nec tantum hoc, sed ne semen quidem uisibile hominis, putabit omnino non fuisse. redeat ergo ad scripturam, inueniet sexto die hominem factum ad imaginem dei, factos autem masculum et feminam. item quaerat, quando facta sit femina, inueniet extra illos sex dies; tunc enim facta est, quando deus de terra finxit adhuc bestias agri et uolatilia caeli, non quando uolatilia produxerunt aquae et animam uiuam, in qua et bestiae sunt, produxit terra. tunc autem factus est homo et masculus et femina: ergo et tunc et postea. neque enim tunc et non postea aut uero postea et non tunc; nec alii postea, sed idem ipsi aliter tunc, aliter postea. quaeret ex me: quomodo postea? respondebo: uisibiliter, sicut species humanae constitutionis nota nobis est, non tamen parentibus generantibus, sed ille de limo, illa de costa eius. quaeret: tunc quomodo? respondebo: inuisibiliter, potentialiter, causaliter, quomodo fiunt futura non facta. Hic forte non intelleget. subtrahuntur enim ei cuncta, quae nouit, usque ad ipsam seminum corpulentiam. neque enim uel tale aliquid homo iam erat. cum in prima illa sex dierum conditione factus erat. datur quidem de seminibus ad hanc rem nonnulla similitudo propter illa, quae in eis futura conserta sunt; uerum tamen ante omnia uisibilia semina sunt illae causae. sed non intellegit. quid ergo faciam, nisi, quantum possum, salubriter moneam, ut scripturae dei credat et tunc factum hominem, quando deus, cum factus est dies, fecit caelum et terram, de quo alibi scriptura dicit: qui uiuit in aeternum, creauit omnia simul, et tunc, quando iam non simul sed suis quaeque temporibus creans finxit eum de limo terrae et ex eius osse mulierem? nam nec isto modo eos illo sexto die factos nec tamen eos illo sexto die non factos intellegere scriptura permittit.

In this distribution of the works of God, partly belonging to those invisible days in which he created all things at once, partly to these days in which he works daily whatever unfolds in time from those things, as from primordial wrappings, if we have not followed the words of Scripture, which led us to make these distinctions, inappropriately or absurdly, we must take care lest, because of the somewhat difficult perception of the things themselves, which slower minds are not able to attain, we be thought to hold and say something which we know we neither hold nor say. For although in the preceding books I have prepared the reader as much as I could, I think many are still in the dark in these places, and suppose that man was first in that work of God in which all things were created at once in such a way that he led some kind of life, so that he could discern, believe, and understand the speech of God directed to him when God said, “Behold, I have given you every seed-bearing food.” Let him who thinks this know, then, that I have neither held nor said it.

But again, if I say that man was not in that first establishing of things, in which God created all things at once, in the way that a man of full age is, nor even an infant, and not only not an infant but not even an embryo in the mother's womb, and not only that but not even the visible seed of a man, he will think that he did not exist at all. Let him return, then, to Scripture: he will find that man was made on the sixth day to the image of God, and made male and female. Let him likewise ask when the woman was made: he will find it outside those six days; for she was made then, when God further formed from the earth the beasts of the field and the birds of the sky, not when the waters brought forth the birds and the earth brought forth the living soul, among which are also the beasts. But man, both male and female, was made then: so both then and afterward. For it is not then and not afterward, or afterward and not then; nor were others made afterward, but the very same ones in one way then and in another way afterward. He will ask me: How afterward? I will answer: visibly, in the form of the human constitution known to us, yet not by parents begetting, but he from the clay, she from his rib. He will ask: How then? I will answer: invisibly, potentially, causally, as things to come are made, not yet made.

Here perhaps he will not understand. For everything he knows is taken away from him, even down to the bodily substance of seeds. For man was not even anything like that when he had been made in that first establishing of the six days. Some likeness to this matter is indeed given from seeds, because of the future things bound up in them; but those causes are prior to all visible seeds. But he does not understand. What, then, shall I do, except, as far as I can, warn him for his good to believe the Scripture of God: that man was made both then, when God, when the day was made, made heaven and earth (of which Scripture says elsewhere, “He who lives forever created all things at once”), and then, when, no longer creating at once but each thing in its own time, he formed him from the clay of the earth and the woman from his bone? For Scripture does not allow us to understand either that they were made in this way on that sixth day, or yet that they were not made on that sixth day.

6.7CSEL 28.1:178–179

Forte ergo animae eorum sexto illo die factae erant, ubi et ipsa imago dei recte intellegitur in spiritu mentis eorum, ut postea corpora formarentur? sed neque hoc credere scriptura eadem permittit. primo propter illam operum consummationem - quae non uideo quomodo possit intellegi, si defuit aliquid tunc non causaliter conditum, quod postea uisibiliter conderetur — deinde quia sexus ipse masculi et feminae nisi in corporibus esse non potest. quod si quisquam secundum intellectum et actionem tamquam utrumque sexum in una anima accipiendum putauerit. quid faciet de his, quae ad escam deus ipso die dedit de lignorum fructibus, quae nisi homini habenti corpus non utique congrua est? nam si et hanc escam figurate quisquam accipere uoluerit. recedet a proprietate rerum gestarum. quae primitus in huiusmodi narrationibus omni obseruatione fundanda est.

Were their souls, then, perhaps made on that sixth day, in which the image of God itself is rightly understood to be in the spirit of their mind, so that their bodies were formed afterward? But the same Scripture does not allow us to believe this either. First, because of that completion of the works (and I do not see how it can be understood if something was then lacking that was not established causally, to be established afterward visibly); second, because the sex itself of male and female cannot exist except in bodies. And if anyone thinks that both sexes, as it were, are to be understood in one soul, according to understanding and action, what will he do with the food that God gave on that same day from the fruits of the trees, which is certainly fitting only for a man who has a body? For if anyone wishes to take this food too figuratively, he will depart from the proper sense of the events, which in narratives of this kind must first of all be established with all care.

6.8CSEL 28.1:179–180

Quomodo, inquit. ergo loquebatur eis. qui nondum audiebant nec intellegebant, quia nec erant, qui uerba perciperent? possem respondere sic eos adlocutum deum, quemadmodum Christus nos nondum natos et tam longe post futuros, nec tantum nos, sed etiam eos omnes, qui futuri sunt post nos. omnibus enim dicebat, quos suos futuros uidebat: ecce ego uobiscum sum usque in consummationem saeculi; sicut deo notus erat propheta, cui dixit: priusquam te formarem in utero, noui te, sicut decimatus est Leui, cum esset in lumbis Abraham. cur enim non ita et ipse Abraham in Adam et ipse Adam in primis operibus mundi, quae deus creauit omnia simul? sed uerba domini per os carnis eius et uerba dei per ora prophetarum temporali corporis uoce proferuntur et omnibus syllabis suis congruas temporum moras sumunt atque consumunt; cum uero deus dicebat: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et habeat potestatem piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium pecorum et omnis terrae et omnium repentium, quae repunt super terram, et: crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et dominamini eius et habete potestatem piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium pecorum et omnis terrae et omnium repentium, quae repunt super terram, et: ecce dedi uobis omne pabulum seminale seminans semen, quod est super omnem terram, et omne lignum fructiferum, quod habet in se fructum seminis seminalis, quod erit, uobis ad escam, ipse sermo eius ante omnem aeris sonum, ante omnem carnis et nubis uocem in illa eius summa sapientia, per quam facta sunt omnia, non quasi humanis auribus instrepebat, sed rebus factis rerum faciendarum causas inserebat et omnipotenti potentia futura faciebat hominemque suo tempore formandum in temporum tamquam semine uel tamquam radice condebat. quando condebat, unde inciperent saecula ab illo condita, qui est ante saecula. creaturae quippe aliae creaturas alias quaedam tempore, quaedam causis praecedunt; ille autem omnia, quae fecit, non solum excellentia, qua etiam causarum effector est, uerum etiam aeternitate praecedit. sed de hoc oportunioribus deinde scripturarum locis fortassis plenius disserendum est.

“How, then,” he says, “did he speak to those who did not yet hear or understand, since there was no one yet to receive the words?” I could answer that God addressed them in the way Christ addressed us, not yet born and to come so long afterward, and not only us but also all those who will come after us. For he said to all whom he saw would be his, “Behold, I am with you to the end of the age”; as the prophet was known to God, to whom he said, “Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you”; as Levi paid tithes when he was in the loins of Abraham. Why, then, not Abraham himself likewise in Adam, and Adam himself in the first works of the world, which God created all at once? But the words of the Lord through the mouth of his flesh, and the words of God through the mouths of the prophets, are uttered by the temporal voice of a body and take up and use up delays of time fitting to all their syllables. But when God said, “Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him have power over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and all cattle and all the earth and all creeping things that creep upon the earth,” and, “Increase and multiply and fill the earth and have dominion over it, and have power over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and all cattle and all the earth and all creeping things that creep upon the earth,” and, “Behold, I have given you every seed-bearing food seeding seed which is upon all the earth, and every fruit-bearing tree which has in itself the fruit of seed that will be, for food for you”: his speech itself, before any sound of air, before any voice of flesh or cloud, in that supreme Wisdom of his through which all things were made, did not resound as if to human ears; rather, it inserted in things made the causes of things to be made, and by almighty power made future things, and established man, to be formed in his own time, as in the seed or the root of times, when he established that from which the ages would begin, established by him who is before the ages. For some creatures precede others, some in time, some in causes; but he precedes all that he made not only by excellence, by which he is also the maker of causes, but also by eternity. But perhaps this should be discussed more fully later at more suitable places in the Scriptures.

6.9CSEL 28.1:180–182

Nunc de homine quod coeptum est terminetur ea moderatione seruata, ut in profundo scripturae sensu magis praestemus diligentiam requirendi quam adfirmandi temeritatem. quia enim nouerat Hieremiam deus, priusquam eum formaret in utero, dubitare fas non est; apertissime quippe dicit: priusquam te formarem in utero, noui te. ubi autem illum nosset, antequam ita formasset, etsi nostrae infirmitati adsequi uel difficile uel inpossibile est - utrum in aliquibus propinquioribus causis, sicut Leui in lumbis Abrahae decimatus est, an in ipso Adam, in quo genus humanum tamquam radicaliter institutum est; et in eo ipso utrum iam cum de limo formatus esset, an causaliter in his operibus factus, quae creauit omnia simul; an uero ante omnem potius creaturam, sicut elegit et praedestinauit sanctos suos ante mundi constitutionem; an potius in omnibus praecedentibus causis, siue quas commemoraui siue quas non commemoraui, priusquam in utero formaretur —: non arbitror scrupulosius quaeri oportere, dummodo Hieremiam constet ex quo est in hac luce a parentibus editus ex illo egisse uitam propriam, qua grandescens aetatis accessu posset uiuere seu male seu bene, antea uero nullo modo, non solum priusquam in utero formaretur, sed nec iam ibi formatus, antequam natus. neque enim habet ullam cunctationem apostolica illa sententia de geminis in utero Rebeccae nondum agentibus aliquid boni aut mali. Nec tamen frustra scriptum est nec infantem mundum esse a peccato, cuius est unius diei uita super terram, et illud in psalmo: ego in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in peccatis mater mea me in utero aluit, et quod in Adam omnes moriuntur, in quo omnes peccauerunt. nunc autem liquido teneamus, quaelibet parentum merita traiciantur in prolem, quaecumque gratia dei, antequam nascatur, quemque sanctificet, nec iniquitatem esse apud deum nec boni maliue agere quemquam, quod ad propriam personam pertineat, antequam natus est, illamque sententiam, qua nonnulli putant alibi peccasse magis minusque animas et pro diuersorum meritis peccatorum in diuersa corpora esse detrusas, apostolicae non conuenire sententiae, cum apertissime dictum sit nihil egisse nondum natos siue boni siue mali. Ac per hoc alia quaestio est suo loco retractanda, quid de peccato primorum parentum, qui duo soli fuerunt, generis humani contraxerit uniuersa consparsio; nihil tamen talium meritorum habere potuisse hominem, antequam de terrae puluere fictus esset, antequam suo tempore uiueret, nulla quaestio est. sicut enim Esau et Iacob, quos nondum natos dixit apostolus nihil egisse boni uel mali, non possemus dicere traxisse aliquid meriti de parentibus, si nec ipsi parentes egissent aliquid boni aut mali, nec genus humanum peccasse in Adam, si ipse non peccasset Adam — non autem peccasset Adam, nisi iam suo tempore uiueret, quo posset uiuere siue bene siue male —: ita frustra peccatum eius seu recte factum requiritur, cum adhuc in rebus simul creatis causaliter. conditus nec uita propria iam uiuebat nec in parentibus erat sic uiuentibus. in illa enim prima conditione mundi, cum deus creauit omnia simul, homo factus est, qui esset futurus — ratio creandi hominis, non actio creati.

Now let us finish what we began about man, keeping this moderation: that in the deep sense of Scripture we show the diligence of inquiring rather than the rashness of affirming. That God knew Jeremiah before he formed him in the womb, it is not right to doubt; for he says most plainly, “Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you.” But where he knew him before he formed him thus, even if it is difficult or impossible for our weakness to attain (whether in some nearer causes, as Levi paid tithes in the loins of Abraham; or in Adam himself, in whom the human race was established as at its root; and in Adam himself, whether when he had already been formed from clay, or when he was made causally in those works which God created all at once; or rather before all creation, as he chose and predestined his saints before the foundation of the world; or rather in all the preceding causes, whether those I have mentioned or those I have not, before he was formed in the womb): I do not think we need inquire more scrupulously, provided it is established that Jeremiah, from the time he was brought forth by his parents into this light, led his own life, by which, growing with the increase of age, he could live either badly or well; but before that in no way, not only before he was formed in the womb, but not even when already formed there, before he was born. For that apostolic statement about the twins in Rebecca's womb, not yet doing anything good or evil, admits no hesitation.

Yet it is not written in vain that not even an infant whose life on earth is of one day is clean from sin, and that in the psalm, “I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother nourished me in the womb,” and that in Adam all die, in whom all sinned. But now let us hold clearly that, whatever merits of parents are passed on to offspring, whatever grace of God sanctifies anyone before he is born, there is no iniquity with God, and no one does good or evil, as regards his own person, before he is born; and that the view by which some think that souls sinned more or less elsewhere and were thrust into different bodies according to the merits of their different sins does not agree with the apostle's statement, since it is said most plainly that those not yet born had done nothing, either good or evil.

And therefore it is another question, to be treated again in its place, what the whole lump of the human race contracted from the sin of the first parents, who were only two; but there is no question that man could have had no merits of this kind before he was formed from the dust of the earth, before he lived in his own time. For just as we could not say that Esau and Jacob, whom the apostle said had done nothing good or evil before they were born, contracted any merit from their parents if the parents themselves had done nothing good or evil, nor that the human race sinned in Adam if Adam himself had not sinned (and Adam would not have sinned unless he were already living in his own time, in which he could live either well or badly): so it is vain to look for his sin or his right action when, still established causally among the things created at once, he was neither yet living a life of his own nor was in parents so living. For in that first establishing of the world, when God created all things at once, man was made who was to be: the reason for creating man, not the action of a man created.

6.10CSEL 28.1:182–183

Sed haec aliter in uerbo dei, ubi ista non facta, sed aeterna sunt, aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta futura sunt, aliter in rebus, quae secundum causas simul creatas non iam simul, sed suo quaeque tempore creantur: in quibus Adam iam formatus ex limo et dei flatu animatus, sicut fenum exortum, aliter in seminibus, in quibus rursus quasi primordiales causae repetuntur de rebus ductae, quae secundum causas, quas primum condidit, extiterunt, uelut herba ex terra, semen ex herba. in quibus omnibus ea iam facta modos et actus sui temporis acceperunt, quae ex occultis atque inuisibilibus rationibus, quae in creatura causaliter latent, in manifestas formas naturasque prodierunt, sicut herba exorta super terram et homo factus in animam uiuam et cetera huius modi, siue frutecta siue animantia ad illam operationem dei pertinentia, qua usque nunc operatur. sed etiam ista secum gerunt tamquam iterum se ipsa inuisibiliter in occulta quadam ui generandi, quam extraxerunt de illis primordiis causarum suarum, in quibus creato mundo, cum factus est dies, antequam in manifestam speciem sui generis exorerentur, inserta sunt.

But these things are in one way in the Word of God, where they are not made but eternal; in another way in the elements of the world, where all things that are to be were made at once; in another way in the things which, according to the causes created at once, are created no longer at once but each in its own time, among which is Adam, already formed from clay and animated by the breath of God, like the grass that has sprung up; and in another way in seeds, in which there are again, as it were, primordial causes, drawn from the things that came into being according to the causes which he first established, as the herb from the earth, the seed from the herb. In all these, things already made have received the modes and actions of their own time, which have come forth into manifest forms and natures from the hidden and invisible reasons that lie causally in creation, like the herb that has sprung up upon the earth and man made into a living soul, and other things of this kind, whether plants or animals, belonging to that working of God by which he is working until now. But these too carry with them, as it were, themselves again, invisibly, in a certain hidden power of generating, which they drew from those primordial beginnings of their causes, in which they were inserted into the created world, when the day was made, before they arose into the manifest form of their kind.

6.11CSEL 28.1:183–185

Si enim prima illa opera dei, cum simul omnia creauit, in suo modo perfecta non essent, ea procul dubio post adderentur, quae illis perficiendis defuissent, ut quaedam uniuersitatis perfectio ex utriusque constaret singulis quasi semis, uelut alicuius totius partes essent, quarum coniunctione ipsum totum, cuius partes fuerant, conpleretur. rursus, si ita essent illa perfecta, sicut perficiuntur, cum suis quaeque temporibus in manifestas formas actusque procreantur, profecto aut nihil ex eis post ea tempora fieret aut hoc fieret, quod ex istis, quae suo quaeque iam tempore oriuntur, deus non cessat operari. nunc autem, quia et consummata quodam modo et quodam modo inchoata sunt ea ipsa, quae consequentibus euoluenda temporibus primitus deus simul omnia creauit, cum faceret mundum — consummata quidem, quia nihil habent illa in naturis propriis, quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt, quod non in istis causaliter factum sit, inchoata uero, quoniam quaedam erant quasi semina futurorum per saeculi tractum ex occulto in manifestum locis congruis exerenda — ipsius etiam scripturae uerba satis ad hoc admonendum insigniter uigent, si quis in eis euigilet. nam et consummata ea dicit et inchoata; nisi enim consummata essent, non scriptum esset: et consummata sunt caelum et terra et omnis conpositio eorum. et consummauit deus in die sexto opera sua, quae fecit. et benedixit deus diem septimum et sanctificauit eum; rursusque, nisi inchoata essent. non ita sequeretur, quia in illa die requieuit ab omnibus operibus suis, quae inchoauit deus facere. Hic igitur si quis inquirat, quomodo consummauit et quomodo inchoauit — neque enim alia consummauit, alia inchoauit, sed eadem ipsa utique, a quibus in die septimo requieuit — ex his. quae supra diximus, clarum est. consummasse quippe ista intellegimus deum. cum creauit omnia simul ita perfecte, ut nihil ei adhuc in ordine temporum creandum esset, quod non hic ab eo iam in ordine causarum creatum esset, inchoasse autem, ut, quod hic praefixerat causis, post inpleret effectis. proinde formauit deus hominem puluerem terrae, uel limum terrae — hoc est de puluere uel limo terrae — et inspirauit siue sufflauit in eius faciem spiritum uitae, et factus est homo in animam uiuam, non tunc praedestinatus — hoc enim ante saeculum in praescientia creatoris — neque tunc causaliter uel consummate inchoatus uel inchoate consummatus — hoc enim a saeculo in rationibus primordialibus, cum simul omnia crearentur — sed creatus in tempore suo uisibiliter in corpore, inuisibiliter in anima, constans ex anima et corpore.

For if those first works of God, when he created all things at once, were not perfect in their own way, then without doubt whatever was lacking for their perfection would have been added afterward, so that a certain perfection of the universe would consist of the two, each as it were a half, as if they were parts of some whole, by whose joining the whole of which they were parts would be completed. Again, if they had been perfect in the way things are perfected when each is brought forth in its own time into manifest forms and actions, then surely either nothing would be made from them after those times, or only what God does not cease to work from these things that now arise, each in its own time. But as it is, the very things which God first created all at once, when he made the world, to be unfolded in following times, are in one way completed and in one way begun: completed, because they have nothing in their own natures, by which they run the courses of their times, that was not made causally in those first works; begun, because they were as it were seeds of future things, to be brought forth through the course of the age from hidden to manifest in fitting places. And the words of Scripture itself are strikingly forceful in reminding us of this, if anyone will wake up to them. For it says both that they were completed and that they were begun. For if they had not been completed, it would not have been written, “And heaven and earth were completed, and all their arrangement. And on the sixth day God completed his works which he made. And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it”; and again, if they had not been begun, there would not follow, “because on that day he rested from all his works which God began to make.”

If anyone asks here how he completed and how he began (for he did not complete some things and begin others, but certainly the same things from which he rested on the seventh day), it is clear from what we said above. For we understand that God completed these things when he created all things at once so perfectly that there was nothing further for him to create in the order of times that had not already been created by him here in the order of causes; and that he began them, so that what he had here fixed beforehand in causes he would afterward fulfill in effects. Accordingly, God formed man, dust of the earth, or clay of the earth (that is, from the dust or clay of the earth), and breathed or blew into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul: not then predestined (for this was before the age, in the foreknowledge of the Creator), nor then begun causally, either completely begun or incompletely completed (for this was from the age, in the primordial reasons, when all things were created at once), but created in his own time, visibly in the body, invisibly in the soul, consisting of soul and body.

6.12CSEL 28.1:185–187

Iam ergo uideamus, quomodo eum fecerit deus, primum de terra corpus eius, post etiam de anima uidebimus, si quid ualebimus. quod enim manibus corporalibus deus de limo finxerit hominem, nimium puerilis cogitatio est, ita ut, si hoc scriptura dixisset, magis eum, qui scripsit, translato uerbo usum credere deberemus, quam deum talibus membrorum liniamentis determinatum. qualia uidemus in corporibus nostris. dictum est enim: manus tua gentes disperdidit, et: eduxisti populum tuum in manu forti et brachio excelso. sed pro potestate et uirtute dei positum huius membri nomen quis usque adeo desipit, ut non intellegat? Nec illud audiendum est, quod nonnulli putant, ideo praecipuum dei opus esse hominem, quia cetera dixit, et facta sunt. hunc autem ipse fecit, sed ideo potius, quia hunc ad imaginem suam fecit. nam illa, quae dixit et facta sunt, ideo sic scriptum est, quia per uerbum eius facta sunt, sicut per hominem hominibus dici potuit uerbis, quae temporaliter cogitantur et uoce proferuntur. non sic autem loquitur deus, nisi cum per creaturam corporalem loquitur. sicut Abrahae, sicut Moysi, sicut per nubem de filio suo. ante omnem uero creaturam, ut esset ipsa creatura, eo uerbo dictum est, quod in principio erat deus apud deum; et quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil, utique et homo per ipsum factus est. certe enim caelum uerbo fecit, quia dixit et factum est; scriptum est tamen: et opera manuum tuarum sunt caeli. et de hoc imo quasi fundo mundi scriptum est: quoniam ipsius est mare, et ipse fecit illud, et aridam terram manus eius finxerunt. non igitur hoc in honorem hominis deputetur, uelut cetera deus dixerit, et facta sint, hunc autem ipse fecerit, aut uerbo cetera, hunc autem manibus fecerit. sed hoc excellit in homine, quia deus hominem ad imaginem suam fecit propter hoc, quod ei dedit mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus: unde iam superiore loco disseruimus. in quo honore positus, si non intellexerit, ut bene agat, eisdem ipsis pecoribus, quibus praelatus est, conparabitur. sic enim et scriptum est: homo in honore positus non intellexit; conparatus est pecoribus insensatis et similis factus est eis. nam et pecora deus fecit, sed non ad imaginem suam. Nec dicendum est: "hominem ipse fecit, pecora uero iussit, et facta sunt"; et hunc enim et illa per uerbum suum fecit, per quod facta sunt omnia. sed quia idem uerbum et sapientia et uirtus eius est, dicitur et manus eius non uisibile membrum, sed efficiendi potentia. nam haec eadem scriptura, quae dicit, quod deus hominem de limo terrae finxerit. dicit etiam, quod et bestias agri de terra finxerit. quando eas cum uolatilibus caeli adduxit ad Adam, ut uideret, quid ea uocaret. sic enim scriptum est: et finxit deus adhuc de terra omnes bestias. si ergo et hominem de terra et bestias de terra ipse formauit, quid habet homo excellentius in hac re, nisi quod ipse ad imaginem dei creatus est? nec tamen hoc secundum corpus, sed secundum intellectum mentis, de quo post loquemur. quamquam et in ipso corpore habeat quandam proprietatem, quae hoc indicet, quod erecta statura factus est, ut hoc ipso admoneretur non sibi terrena esse sectanda, uelut pecora, quorum uoluptas omnis ex terra est: unde in aluum cuncta prona atque prostrata sunt. congruit ergo et corpus eius animae rationali non secundum liniamenta figurasque membrorum, sed potius secundum id, quod in caelum erectum est ad intuenda, quae in corpore ipsius mundi superna sunt; sicut anima rationalis in ea debet erigi, quae in spiritalibus natura maxime excellunt, ut quae sursum sunt sapiat, non quae sunt super terram.

Now, then, let us see how God made him: first his body from the earth; afterward we shall see about the soul too, if we are able. For to think that God formed man from clay with bodily hands is an excessively childish thought; so much so that, if Scripture had said this, we ought rather to believe that the writer used a figurative word than that God is bounded by such outlines of limbs as we see in our bodies. For it is said, “Your hand destroyed the nations,” and, “You led out your people with a strong hand and an uplifted arm.” But who is so foolish as not to understand that the name of this member is put for the power and might of God?

Nor should we heed what some think, that man is God's chief work because he spoke the other things and they were made, but made this one himself; rather it is because he made him to his own image. For of the things he spoke and they were made, it is written thus because they were made through his Word, as it could be said by a man to men in words that are thought in time and uttered by the voice. But God does not speak thus except when he speaks through a bodily creature, as to Abraham, as to Moses, as through the cloud about his Son. Before all creation, however, so that creation itself might exist, it was spoken by that Word who in the beginning was God with God; and since all things were made through him and without him nothing was made, certainly man too was made through him. Certainly he made heaven by the Word, since he spoke and it was made; yet it is written, “And the heavens are the works of your hands.” And of this lowest part, the floor as it were, of the world it is written, “For the sea is his, and he made it, and his hands formed the dry land.” So let it not be counted to man's honor as if God spoke the other things and they were made but made this one himself, or made the others by word but this one by hands. Rather, man excels in this, that God made man to his own image, because he gave him an intellectual mind, by which he surpasses the cattle, as we have already discussed in an earlier place. Placed in this honor, if he does not understand so as to act well, he will be compared to those very cattle over which he was set. For so it is written: “Man, placed in honor, did not understand; he was compared to senseless cattle and became like them.” For God made the cattle too, but not to his own image.

Nor should it be said, “He made man himself, but commanded the cattle, and they were made”; for he made both this one and those through his Word, through whom all things were made. But since that same Word is also his Wisdom and Power, it is also called his hand, not a visible member but the power of effecting. For this same Scripture, which says that God formed man from the clay of the earth, says also that he formed the beasts of the field from the earth, when he brought them with the birds of the sky to Adam to see what he would call them. For it is written thus: “And God formed further from the earth all the beasts.” If, then, he formed both man from the earth and the beasts from the earth, what does man have more excellent in this matter except that he was created to the image of God? Yet this is not according to the body but according to the understanding of the mind, of which we shall speak later. Although even in the body itself he has a certain property that indicates this, in that he was made with upright stature, so that by this very fact he might be reminded not to pursue earthly things like the cattle, whose whole pleasure is from the earth, which is why they are all bent and prone toward the belly. His body too, then, befits a rational soul, not according to the outlines and shapes of its limbs but rather in that it is raised toward heaven to look upon the things that are on high in the body of the world itself; just as the rational soul ought to be raised toward the things that most excel in nature among spiritual things, so as to set its mind on the things above, not on the things on earth.

6.13CSEL 28.1:187–189

Sed quomodo eum fecit deus de limo terrae? utrum repente in aetate perfecta, hoc est uirili atque iuuenali, an sicut nunc usque format in uteris matrum? neque enim alius haec fecit quam ille, qui dixit: priusquam te formarem in utero, noui te, ut illud tantum proprium habuerit Adam, quod non ex parentibus natus est, sed factus ex terra, eo tamen modo, ut in hoc perficiendo et per aetates augendo hi temporum numeri complerentur, quos naturae humani generis adtributos uidemus. an potius hoc non est requirendum? utrumlibet enim fecerit, hoc fecit, quod deum et omnipotentem et sapientem posse ac facere congruebat. ita enim certas temporum leges generibus qualitatibusque rerum in manifestum ex abdito producendis adtribuit, ut eius uoluntas sit super omnia. potentia quippe sua numeros creaturae dedit, non ipsam potentiam eisdem numeris adligauit. nam spiritus eius ita faciendo mundo superferebatur, ut et facto superferatur, non corporalibus locis, sed excellentia potestatis. Quis enim nescit aquam concretam terrae, cum ad radices uitis uenerit, duci in saginam ligni illius atque in eo sumere qualitatem, qua in uuam procedat paulatim erumpentem atque. in ea grandescente uinum fiat maturumque dulcescat, quod adhuc feruescat expressum et quadam uetustate firmatum ad usum bibendi utilius iucundiusque perueniat? num ideo dominus lignum quaesiuit aut terram aut has temporum moras, cum aquam miro conpendio conuertit in uinum, et tale uinum, quod etiam ebrius conuiua laudaret? numquid adiutorio temporis eguit conditor temporis? nonne certis dierum numeris suo cuique generi adcommodatis omnis natura serpentum coalescit, formatur, nascitur, roboratur? num expectati sunt hi dies, ut in draconem uirga conuerteretur de manu Moysi et Aaron? nec ista cum fiunt, contra naturam fiunt, nisi nobis, quibus aliter naturae cursus innotuit, non autem deo, cui hoc est natura, quod fecerit.

But how did God make him from the clay of the earth? Suddenly, at full age, that is, as a grown young man, or as he now forms men in their mothers' wombs? For no other made these than he who said, “Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you”; so that Adam's only peculiarity would be that he was not born of parents but made from the earth, yet in such a way that, in perfecting him and increasing him through the ages of life, those numbers of times were fulfilled which we see assigned to the nature of the human race. Or rather, should this not be asked? For whichever he did, he did what it befitted God, both almighty and wise, to be able to do and to do. For he assigned fixed laws of time to the kinds and qualities of things to be brought forth from hiding into the open in such a way that his will is above all. By his power he gave numbers to creation; he did not bind his power itself to those numbers. For his Spirit was borne above the world in making it in such a way that he is also borne above it when made, not in bodily places but by the excellence of his power.

For who does not know that water mixed with earth, when it comes to the roots of a vine, is drawn into the nourishment of that wood and takes on in it the quality by which it goes into the grape that gradually bursts forth, and, as the grape grows, becomes wine and grows sweet as it ripens; which, when pressed, still ferments, and, made firm by some aging, comes to be more useful and pleasant for drinking? Did the Lord, then, look for wood or earth or these delays of time when by a wonderful shortcut he turned water into wine, and such wine that even a drunken guest would praise it? Did the Founder of time need the help of time? Does not every kind of serpent grow together, take form, be born, and gain strength in fixed numbers of days suited to its kind? Were these days waited for, so that the rod from the hand of Moses and Aaron might be turned into a serpent? Nor, when these things happen, do they happen against nature, except for us, to whom the course of nature has become known otherwise, but not for God, for whom nature is what he has made.

6.14CSEL 28.1:189

Quaeri autem merito potest, causales illae rationes, quas mundo indidit, cum primum simul omnia creauit. quomodo sint institutae: utrum ut, quemadmodum uidemus cuncta nascentia uel fruticum uel animalium, in suis conformationibus atque incrementis sua pro diuersitate generum diuersa spatia peragerent temporum, an ut, quemadmodum creditur factus Adam. sine ullo progressu incrementorum uirili aetate continuo formarentur. sed cur non utrumque illas credimus habuisse, ut hoc ex eis futurum esset, quod facturo placuisset? si enim illo modo dixerimus, incipit contra ipsas factum uideri non solum etiam illud de aqua uinum, sed et omnia miracula, quae contra naturae usitatum cursum fiunt; si autem isto modo, multo erit absurdius istas ipsas cotidianas naturae formas et species contra illas primarias omnium nascentium causales rationes suorum temporum peragere spatia. restat ergo, ut ad utrumque modum habiles creatae sint, siue ad istum, quo usitatissime temporalia transcurrunt, siue ad illum, quo rara et mirabilia fiunt, sicut deo facere placuerit, quod tempori congruat.

But it may rightly be asked how those causal reasons which he placed in the world when he first created all things at once were set up: whether so that, as we see all things that are born, whether plants or animals, they would pass through different spans of time in their forming and growth according to the diversity of their kinds; or so that, as Adam is believed to have been made, they would be formed at once at full age without any progress of growth. But why do we not believe that they had both, so that from them would come whatever pleased him who was to make it? For if we say it was the former way, not only that wine from water but all the miracles that happen against the usual course of nature begin to seem to have been done against them; but if the latter way, it will be much more absurd that these daily forms and kinds of nature pass through the spans of their times against those primary causal reasons of all things that are born. It remains, then, that they were created fit for both ways, whether for this one, by which temporal things most usually run their course, or for that one, by which rare and wonderful things happen, as it pleases God to do what befits the time.

6.15CSEL 28.1:189–190

Uerum tamen sic factus est homo, quemadmodum illae primae causae habebant, ut fieret primus homo, quem non ex parentibus nasci, qui nulli praecesserant, sed de limo formari oportebat secundum causalem rationem, in qua primitus factus erat. nam si aliter factus est, non eum deus in illorum sex dierum operibus fecerat. in quibus cum dicitur factus, ipsam causam utique fecerat deus, qua erat suo tempore homo futurus et secundum quam fuerat ab illo faciendus, qui simul et consummauerat inchoata propter perfectionem causalium rationum et inchoauerat consummanda propter ordinem temporum. si ergo in illis primis rerum causis, quas mundo primitus creator inseruit, non tantum posuit, quod de limo formaturus erat hominem, sed etiam quemadmodum formaturus. utrum sicut in matris utero, an in forma iuuenali, procul dubio sic fecit, ut illic praefixerat; neque enim contra dispositionem suam faceret. si autem uim tantum ibi posuit possibilitatis, ut homo fieret, quoquo modo fieret, ut et sic et sic posset, id est, ut id quoque ibi esset. quia et sic et sic posset, unum autem ipsum modum, quo erat facturus, in sua uoluntate seruauit, non mundi constitutioni contexuit, manifestum est etiam sic non factum esse hominem contra quam erat in illa prima conditione causarum, quia ibi erat etiam sic fieri posse, quamuis non ibi erat ita fieri necesse esse. hoc enim non erat in conditione creaturae, sed in placito creatoris, cuius uoluntas rerum est necessitas.

Nevertheless, man was made in the way those first causes held, so that the first man would be made, who had to be formed not by being born of parents, since none had preceded, but from clay, according to the causal reason in which he had first been made. For if he was made otherwise, God had not made him in the works of those six days. When he is said to have been made in them, God certainly made the very cause by which man was to be in his own time and according to which he was to be made by him who at once both completed things begun, because of the perfection of the causal reasons, and began things to be completed, because of the order of times. If, then, in those first causes of things which the Creator first inserted in the world, he placed not only that he would form man from clay but also how he would form him, whether as in a mother's womb or in youthful form, without doubt he made him as he had fixed beforehand there; for he would not act against his own arrangement. But if he placed there only the power of possibility, that man should be made, in whatever way he should be made, so that he could be made either way, that is, so that this too was there, that he could be made either way, while he kept the one way in which he would make him in his own will and did not weave it into the constitution of the world, it is plain that even so man was not made contrary to what was in that first establishing of causes, since it was there that he could also be made thus, although it was not there that he must necessarily be made thus. For this was not in the establishing of creation but in the good pleasure of the Creator, whose will is the necessity of things.

6.16CSEL 28.1:190–191

Nam et nos pro captu infirmitatis humanae iam in ipsis rebus tempore exortis possumus nosse, quid in cuiusque natura sit, quod experimento perceperimus; sed utrum etiam futurum sit ignoramus. est quippe in natura huius, uerbi gratia, iuuenis, ut senescat; sed utrum etiam hoc sit in dei uoluntate, nescimus. sed nec in natura esset, nisi in dei uoluntate prius fuisset, qui condidit omnia. et utique occulta ratio est senectutis in corpore iuuenali uel iuuentutis in corpore puerili; neque enim oculis cernitur, sicut ipsa in puero pueritia, sicut iuuentus in iuuene, sed alia quadam notitia conligitur inesse in natura quiddam latens, quo educantur in promtu numeri occulti uel iuuentutis a pueritia uel senectutis a iuuentute. occulta est ergo ista ratio, qua fit, ut hoc esse possit, sed oculis; menti autem non est occulta. utrum autem hoc etiam necesse sit, omni modo nescimus. et illam quidem, qua fit. ut esse possit, esse in natura ipsius corporis nouimus; illam uero, qua fit, ut necesse sit, manifestum est illic non esse.

For we too, according to the capacity of human weakness, can know, in things that have already arisen in time, what is in the nature of each, which we have perceived by experience; but whether it will also come about, we do not know. For it is in the nature of this young man, for example, that he will grow old; but whether this is also in God's will, we do not know. But it would not be in his nature either unless it had first been in the will of God, who established all things. And certainly there is a hidden reason of old age in a youthful body, or of youth in a boy's body; for it is not seen with the eyes, as boyhood itself is in a boy and youth in a young man, but by some other knowledge it is gathered that there is something latent in nature by which the hidden numbers, of youth from boyhood or of old age from youth, are brought out into the open. This reason, then, by which it comes about that this can be, is hidden, but from the eyes; it is not hidden from the mind. But whether this is also necessary, we do not know at all. And the reason by which it comes about that it can be, we know to be in the nature of the body itself; but the reason by which it comes about that it must be is plainly not there.

6.17CSEL 28.1:191–192

Sed fortassis in mundo est, ut necesse sit; istum hominem senescere; si autem nec in mundo est, in deo est. hoc enim necessario futurum est, quod ille uult, et ea uere futura sunt. quae ille praesciuit; nam multa secundum inferiores causas futura sunt. sed si ita sunt et in praescientia dei, uere futura sunt; si autem ibi aliter sunt, ita potius futura sunt, sicut ibi sunt, ubi qui praescit falli non potest. nam futura dicitur senectus in iuuene, sed tamen futura non est, si ante moriturus est. hoc autem ita erit, sicut se habent aliae causae siue mundo contextae siue in dei praescientia reseruatae; nam secundum quasdam causas futurorum moriturus erat Ezechias, cui deus addidit quindecim annos ad uitam, id utique faciens, quod ante constitutionem mundi se facturum esse praesciebat et in sua uoluntate seruabat. non ergo id fecit, quod futurum non erat; hoc enim magis erat futurum, quod se facturum esse praesciebat. nec tamen illi anni additi recte dicerentur, nisi ad aliquid adderentur, quod se aliter in aliis causis habuerat. secundum aliquas igitur causas inferiores iam uitam finierat; secundum illas autem, quae sunt in uoluntate et praescientia dei, qui ex aeternitate nouerat, quid illo tempore facturus erat — et hoc uere futurum erat — tunc erat finiturus uitam, quando finiuit uitam, quia, etsi oranti concessum est, etiam sic eum oraturum ut tali orationi concedi oporteret ille utique praesciebat, cuius praescientia falli non poterat. et ideo quod praesciebat necessario futurum erat.

But perhaps it is in the world that this man must necessarily grow old; and if it is not in the world, it is in God. For what he wills will necessarily come about, and those things will truly come about which he foreknew; for many things are to come according to lower causes. But if they are so in God's foreknowledge too, they will truly come about; if they are otherwise there, they will rather come about as they are there, where he who foreknows cannot be deceived. For old age is said to be in the future for a young man, yet it is not in the future if he is going to die first. And this will be as the other causes stand, whether woven into the world or reserved in God's foreknowledge. For according to certain causes of future things Hezekiah was going to die, to whom God added fifteen years of life, doing what he foreknew before the foundation of the world that he would do and kept in his will. So he did not do what was not going to be; rather, what he foreknew he would do was what was going to be. Yet those years would not rightly be called added unless they were added to something that had stood otherwise in other causes. According to certain lower causes, then, he had already ended his life; but according to those causes which are in the will and foreknowledge of God, who knew from eternity what he would do at that time (and this was truly what was going to be), he was to end his life when he did end it. For although it was granted to him when he prayed, he whose foreknowledge could not be deceived certainly foreknew that he would pray in such a way that such a prayer ought to be granted. And so what he foreknew was necessarily going to be.

6.18CSEL 28.1:192

Quapropter. si omnium futurorum causae mundo sunt insitae, cum ille factus est dies, quando deus creauit omnia simul. non aliter Adam factus est, cum de limo formatus est, sicut est credibilius iam perfectae uirilitatis, quam erat in illis causis, ubi deus hominem in sex dierum operibus fecit. ibi enim erat non solum, ut ita fieri posset, uerum etiam ut ita eum fieri necesse esset. tam enim non facit deus contra causam, quam sine dubio uolens praestituit, quam contra uoluntatem suam non facit. si autem non omnes causas in creatura primitus condita praefixit, sed aliquas in sua uoluntate seruauit, non sunt quidem illae, quas in sua uoluntate seruauit, ex istarum quas creauit necessitate pendentes: non tamen possunt esse contrariae, quas in sua uoluntate seruauit, illis, quas sua uoluntate constituit, quia dei uoluntas non potest sibi esse contraria. istas ergo sic condidit, ut ex illis esse illud, cuius causae sunt, possit, sed non necesse sit; illas autem sic abscondit, ut ex eis esse necesse sit hoc, quod ex istis fecit, ut esse possit.

Therefore, if the causes of all future things were implanted in the world when that day was made, when God created all things at once, Adam was made, when he was formed from clay, most probably already of full manhood, in no other way than he was in those causes where God made man in the works of the six days. For there it was not only that he could be made thus, but also that he must necessarily be made thus. For God no more acts against the cause which he without doubt willingly fixed beforehand than he acts against his own will. But if he did not fix all causes beforehand in creation as first established, but kept some in his own will, those which he kept in his will do not indeed depend on the necessity of those which he created; yet those which he kept in his will cannot be contrary to those which he established by his will, because God's will cannot be contrary to itself. So he established these in such a way that from them the thing of which they are the causes can come to be, but need not; while he hid those in such a way that from them must come to be what he made possible from these.

6.19CSEL 28.1:192–194

Solet item quaeri, utrum animale corpus prius homini formatum sit e limo, quale nunc habemus, an spiritale, quale resurgentes habebimus. quamquam enim hoc in illud mutabitur — seminatur enim corpus animale, resurgit corpus spiritale — tamen quid prius homini factum sit, ideo disceptatur, quia, si animale factum est, non hoc recipiemus, quod in illo perdidimus, sed tanto melius quanto spiritale animali praeponendum est, quando erimus aequales angelis dei. sed angeli possunt aliis et iustitia praeponi; numquid et domino? de quo tamen dictum est: minorasti eum paulo minus ab angelis. unde. nisi propter carnis infirmitatem, quam sumsit ex uirgine formam serui accipiens, in qua moriens a seruitute nos redimeret? sed quid hinc diutius disseramus? non enim obscura est apostoli sententia de hac re. qui cum uoluisset adhibere testimonium, quo probaret esse corpus animale, non tam de suo uel de cuiusquam hominis corpore, quod in praesenti uidebatur, quam de hoc ipso scripturae huius loco recoluit et adhibuit dicens: si est corpus animale, est et spiritale. sic et scriptum est: factus est primus homo Adam in animam uiuentem. nouissimus Adam in spiritum uiuificantem. sed non primum quod spiritale est, sed quod animale, postea spiritale. primus homo de terra terrenus; secundus homo de caelo caelestis. qualis terrenus, tales et terreni; et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes. et quomodo induimus imaginem terreni, induamus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est. quid dici potest ad hoc? imaginem ergo caelestis hominis nunc ex fide portamus habituri in resurrectione, quod credimus; imaginem autem terreni hominis ab ipso exordio humanae generationis induimus.

It is likewise often asked whether the body first formed for man from clay was an animal body, such as we have now, or a spiritual one, such as we shall have when we rise. For although the one will be changed into the other (“it is sown an animal body, it rises a spiritual body”), it is disputed what was made first for man, because, if an animal body was made, we shall not receive back what we lost in him, but something as much better as the spiritual is to be preferred to the animal, when we shall be equal to the angels of God. But angels can be surpassed by others even in righteousness; can they by the Lord too? Yet of him it is said, “You made him a little less than the angels.” Why, unless because of the weakness of flesh which he took from the virgin, receiving the form of a servant, in which by dying he might redeem us from servitude? But why discuss this at length? For the apostle's view on this matter is not obscure. Wishing to bring a testimony to prove that there is an animal body, he recalled and cited not so much his own body or that of any man, which was visible at present, as this very place of this Scripture, saying: “If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual one. Thus it is also written: The first man Adam became a living soul, the last Adam a life-giving spirit. But not first what is spiritual, but what is animal, afterward the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly. As was the earthly, so are the earthly; and as is the heavenly, so are the heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of him who is from heaven.” What can be said to this? We now bear the image of the heavenly man by faith, to have in the resurrection what we believe; but the image of the earthly man we have borne from the very beginning of human generation.

6.20CSEL 28.1:194

Hic occurrit alia quaestio, quomodo renouemur, si non ad hoc per Christum reuocamur, quod in Adam prius eramus. quamquam enim multa non in pristinum, sed in melius renouentur, ab inferiore tamen statu, quam quo erant antea, renouantur. unde. ergo ille filius mortuus erat et reuixit, perierat et inuentus est, unde illi profertur stola prima, si non inmortalitatem recipit, quam perdidit Adam? quomodo autem perdidit inmortalitatem, si corpus habuit animale? neque enim animale corpus, sed spiritale erit, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit inmortalitatem. nonnulli his angustiis coartati, ut et illa constet sententia, qua exemplum de animali corpore hinc datum est, ut diceretur: factus est primus homo Adam in animam uiuentem, [nouissimus Adam in spiritum uiuificantem], et ista renouatio receptioque inmortalitatis non absurde dicatur in pristinum futura, in illud scilicet, quod Adam perdidit, putauerunt prius quidem hominem fuisse corporis animalis, sed, dum in paradiso constitutus est, eum fuisse mutatum, sicut nos quoque resurrectione mutabimur. hoc quidem liber Geneseos non commemorat; sed ut possint utraque testimonia scripturarum inter se consentire, siue illud, quod de animali corpore dictum est, siue illa, quae de renouatione nostra plurima in sanctis litteris reperiuntur, hoc tamquam necessario consequi crediderunt.

Here another question arises: how are we renewed, if we are not called back through Christ to what we were before in Adam? For although many things are renewed not to their former state but to a better one, yet they are renewed from a state lower than that in which they were before. Why, then, was that son dead and came to life again, was lost and is found; why is the first robe brought out for him, if he does not receive back the immortality which Adam lost? But how did Adam lose immortality if he had an animal body? For it will be not an animal but a spiritual body when this corruptible has put on incorruption and this mortal has put on immortality. Some, pressed by these difficulties, so that both the statement holds in which an example of the animal body is given from this place, where it is said, “The first man Adam became a living soul,” and this renewal and recovery of immortality may not absurdly be said to be a return to the former state, namely to what Adam lost, have thought that man was indeed at first of an animal body, but that when he was placed in paradise he was changed, as we too shall be changed in the resurrection. The book of Genesis does not mention this; but so that both testimonies of the Scriptures might agree with each other, both what is said about the animal body and the very many things found in the holy writings about our renewal, they believed this followed as if necessarily.

6.21CSEL 28.1:194–195

Sed si ita est, frustra conamur paradisum et illas arbores earumque fructus praeter figuratam significationem prius accipere ad rerum gestarum proprietatem. quis enim credat iam illius modi cibos ex arborum pomis inmortalibus et spiritalibus corporibus necessarios esse potuisse? uerum tamen, si aliud non potest inueniri, melius eligimus paradisum spiritaliter intellegere quam uel putare non renouari hominem, cum totiens hoc scriptura commemoret, uel eum existimare recipere, quod non ostenditur amisisse. huc accedit, quod et ipsa mors hominis, quam eum peccato commeruisse multa diuina testimonia conloquuntur, indicat eum sine morte futurum fuisse, nisi peccasset. quomodo ergo sine morte mortalis? aut quomodo non mortalis, si corpus animale?

But if this is so, we try in vain to take paradise and those trees and their fruits first in the proper sense of events, apart from figurative signification. For who would believe that foods of that kind from the fruit of trees could have been necessary for immortal and spiritual bodies? Yet, if nothing else can be found, we would rather choose to understand paradise spiritually than either to think that man is not renewed, when Scripture mentions this so often, or to suppose that he receives back what he is not shown to have lost. Add to this that man's death itself, which many divine testimonies say he earned by sin, indicates that he would have been without death had he not sinned. How, then, was he mortal without death? Or how was he not mortal if he had an animal body?

6.22CSEL 28.1:195–196

Unde quidam non eum mortem corporis peccato meruisse arbitrantur, sed mortem animae, quam fecit iniquitas. nam credunt eum propter corpus animale exiturum fuisse de hoc corpore ad requiem scilicet, quam nunc habent sancti, qui iam dormierunt, et in fine saeculi eadem membra inmortaliter recepturum, ut uidelicet mors corporis non de peccato accidisse uideatur, sed naturaliter, ut animalium ceterorum. uerum his rursus apostolus occurrit et dicit: corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem uita est propter iustitiam. si autem spiritus eius, qui suscitauit Christum a mortuis, habitat in uobis, qui suscitauit Christum a mortuis uiuificabit et mortalia corpora uestra per inhabitantem spiritum eius in uobis. ac per hoc mors etiam corporis de peccato est. si ergo non peccasset Adam, nec corpore moreretur ideoque inmortale haberet et corpus. quomodo ergo inmortale, si animale?

Hence some think that he earned by sin not the death of the body but the death of the soul, which iniquity caused. For they believe that because of his animal body he would have departed from this body to rest, namely the rest which the saints who have already fallen asleep now have, and at the end of the age would have received the same members back immortally; so that the death of the body would seem to have befallen not from sin but naturally, as with the other animals. But the apostle meets them in turn and says, “The body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him who raised Christ from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit dwelling in you.” And therefore the death of the body too is from sin. If, then, Adam had not sinned, he would not have died in body, and therefore he would have had an immortal body too. How, then, immortal, if animal?

6.23CSEL 28.1:196

Sed rursus non uident, qui eius corpus in paradiso mutatum putant, ut ex animali fieret spiritale, nihil inpedire. si non peccasset, ut post paradisi uitam, quam iuste oboedienterque uixisset, acciperet eandem corporis mutationem in uitam aeternam, ubi iam cibis corporalibus non egeret. quid ergo necesse est propter hoc iam cogi figurate, non proprie paradisum intellegere, quia non posset mori corpus nisi peccato? uerum est quidem, quod non moreretur etiam corpore, nisi peccasset; aperte quippe dicit apostolus: corpus mortuum est propter peccatum: animale tamen posset esse ante peccatum et post uitam iustitiae, cum deus uellet, fieri spiritale.

But again, those who think his body was changed in paradise, so as to become spiritual from animal, do not see that nothing prevented him, had he not sinned, from receiving after the life of paradise, which he would have lived righteously and obediently, the same change of the body into eternal life, where he would no longer need bodily food. Why, then, must we be forced for this reason to understand paradise figuratively, not properly, because the body could not die except through sin? It is true indeed that he would not have died even in body had he not sinned; for the apostle says plainly, “The body is dead because of sin.” Yet it could be animal before sin and, after a life of righteousness, when God willed, become spiritual.

6.24CSEL 28.1:196–197

Quomodo ergo, inquiunt, renouari dicimur, si non hoc recipimus, quod perdidit primus homo, in quo omnes moriuntur? hoc plane recipimus secundum quendam modum et non hoc recipimus secundum quendam modum. non itaque inmortalitatem spiritalis corporis recipimus, quam nondum habuit homo, sed recipimus iustitiam, ex qua per peccatum lapsus est homo. renouabimur ergo a uetustate peccati non in pristinum corpus animale, in quo fuit Adam, sed in melius. id est in corpus spiritale, cum efficiemur aequales angelis dei, apti caelesti habitationi, ubi esca, quae corrumpitur, non egebimus. renouabimur ergo spiritu mentis nostrae secundum imaginem eius, qui creauit nos, quam peccando Adam perdidit. renouabimur autem etiam carne, cum hoc corruptibile induet incorruptionem, ut sit spiritale corpus, in quod nondum mutatus, sed mutandus erat Adam, nisi mortem etiam corporis animalis peccando meruisset. Denique non ait apostolus: corpus quidem mortale propter peccatum, sed: corpus mortuum propter peccatum.

“How, then,” they say, “are we said to be renewed, if we do not receive back what the first man lost, in whom all die?” Plainly we receive it back in one way, and do not receive it back in another. We do not receive back the immortality of a spiritual body, which man did not yet have; but we receive back the righteousness from which man fell through sin. We shall be renewed, then, from the oldness of sin, not into the former animal body in which Adam was, but into something better, that is, into a spiritual body, when we are made equal to the angels of God, fit for the heavenly dwelling, where we shall not need food that perishes. We shall be renewed, then, in the spirit of our mind according to the image of him who created us, which Adam lost by sinning. And we shall be renewed also in the flesh, when this corruptible puts on incorruption, so that it may be a spiritual body, into which Adam had not yet been changed but was to be changed, had he not earned by sinning the death even of the animal body. Finally, the apostle does not say, “The body indeed is mortal because of sin,” but, “The body is dead because of sin.”

6.25CSEL 28.1:197

Illud quippe ante peccatum et mortale secundum aliam et inmortale secundum aliam causam dici poterat; id est mortale, quia poterat mori, inmortale, quia poterat non mori. aliud est enim non posse mori, sicut quasdam naturas inmortales creauit deus; aliud est autem posse non mori, secundum quem modum primus homo creatus est inmortalis, quod ei praestabatur de ligno uitae, non de constitutione naturae: a quo ligno separatus est, cum peccasset, ut posset mori, qui nisi peccasset posset non mori. mortalis ergo erat conditione corporis animalis, inmortalis autem beneficio conditoris. si enim corpus animale, utique mortale, quia et mori poterat, quamuis et inmortale ideo, quia et non mori poterat. neque enim inmortale, quod mori omnino non possit. erit nisi spiritale, quod nobis futurum in resurrectione promittitur. ac per hoc illud animale et ob hoc mortale, quod propter iustitiam spiritale fieret, et ob hoc omni modo inmortale factum est propter peccatum non mortale, quod et antea erat, sed mortuum, quod posset non fieri, si homo non peccasset.

For before sin that body could be called both mortal for one reason and immortal for another; that is, mortal because it could die, immortal because it could not die. For it is one thing not to be able to die, as God created certain natures immortal; it is another to be able not to die, in which way the first man was created immortal. This was granted him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of his nature; and he was separated from that tree when he sinned, so that he who, had he not sinned, could not die, could die. He was mortal, then, by the condition of an animal body, but immortal by the gift of the Founder. For if the body was animal, it was certainly mortal, because it could die, though also immortal because it could not die. For there will be no body immortal in such a way that it cannot die at all except the spiritual one, which is promised to us in the resurrection. And therefore that animal and therefore mortal body, which through righteousness would have become spiritual and therefore immortal in every way, was made through sin not mortal, which it was before, but dead, which it need not have become had man not sinned.

6.26CSEL 28.1:197–198

Quomodo enim corpus nostrum dicit apostolus mortuum, cum adhuc de uiuentibus loqueretur, nisi quia iam ipsa condicio moriendi ex peccato parentum haesit in prole? animale est enim et hoc corpus, sicut et primi hominis fuit; sed hoc iam in ipso animalis genere multo est deterius; habet enim necessitatem moriendi, quod illud non habuit. quamuis enim restabat adhuc, ut inmutaretur et spiritale factum plenam inmortalitatem perciperet, ubi cibo corruptibili non egeret, tamen, si iuste uiueret homo, in spiritalem habitudinem corpus eius mutaretur, non iret in mortem. in nobis autem etiam iuste uiuentibus corpus moriturum est. propter quam necessitatem ex illius primi hominis peccato uenientem non mortale, sed mortuum corpus nostrum dixit apostolus, quia omnes in Adam morimur. item dicit: sicut est ueritas in Iesu deponere uos secundum priorem conuersationem ueterem hominem, eum, qui corrumpitur secundum concupiscentias deceptionis, hoc est, factus Adam per peccatum. uide ergo, quid sequatur. renouamini autem spiritu mentis uestrae et induite nouum hominem, eum, qui secundum deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate ueritatis. ecce, quod perdidit Adam per peccatum!

For how does the apostle call our body dead, when he was speaking of the living, unless because the very condition of dying, from the sin of the parents, has clung to the offspring? For this body too is animal, as the first man's was; but this one, within the very kind of animal body, is much worse; for it has the necessity of dying, which that one did not have. For although it still remained for that body to be changed and, made spiritual, to receive full immortality, where it would not need corruptible food, yet if man lived righteously his body would be changed into a spiritual condition, it would not go into death. But in us, even when we live righteously, the body is going to die. Because of this necessity coming from that first man's sin, the apostle called our body not mortal but dead, because we all die in Adam. He likewise says, “As the truth is in Jesus, put off, according to your former way of life, the old man, who is corrupted according to the lusts of deceit,” that is, what Adam became through sin. See, then, what follows: “But be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who was created according to God in righteousness and holiness of truth.” See what Adam lost through sin!

6.27CSEL 28.1:198–199

In hoc ergo renouamur secundum id, quod amisit Adam, id est secundum spiritum mentis nostrae; secundum autem corpus, quod seminatur animale et surget spiritale, in melius renouabimur, quod nondum fuit Adam. Dicit item apostolus: expoliantes uos ueterem hominem cum actibus eius induite nouum, qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creauit eum. hanc imaginem in spiritu mentis inpressam perdidit Adam per peccatum, quam recipimus per gratiam iustitiae, non spiritale atque inmortale corpus, in quo ille nondum fuit, et in quo erunt omnes sancti resurgentes a mortuis; hoc enim praemium est illius meriti, quod amisit. proinde illa stola prima aut ipsa iustitia est, unde lapsus est, aut, si indumentum corporalis inmortalitatis significat, etiam hanc ille sic amisit, cum propter peccatum ad eam peruenire non potuit. dicitur enim et amisisse uxorem et amisisse honorem, qui speratum non acceperit illo, a quo sperabat, offenso.

In this, then, we are renewed according to what Adam lost, that is, according to the spirit of our mind; but according to the body, which is sown animal and will rise spiritual, we shall be renewed into something better, which Adam not yet was. The apostle likewise says, “Stripping off the old man with his deeds, put on the new, who is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him.” This image, impressed in the spirit of the mind, Adam lost through sin, and we receive it back through the grace of righteousness; not the spiritual and immortal body, in which he not yet was, and in which all the saints will be when they rise from the dead; for this is the reward of that merit which he lost. Accordingly, that first robe is either righteousness itself, from which he fell, or, if it signifies the garment of bodily immortality, he lost this too in this sense, that because of sin he could not attain it. For a man is said to have lost a wife or to have lost an honor who did not receive what he hoped for because he offended the one from whom he hoped for it.

6.28CSEL 28.1:199–200

Secundum hanc ergo sententiam corpus animale habuit Adam non tantum ante paradisum, sed iam in paradiso constitutus, quamuis in interiore homine fuerit spiritalis secundum imaginem eius, qui creauit eum: quod amisit peccando meruitque etiam corporis mortem, qui non peccando mereretur et in corpus spiritale commutationem. nam si et interius animaliter uixit, non possumus dici ad hoc ipsius renouari. quibus enim dicitur: renouamini spiritu mentis uestrae, hoc eis dicitur, ut spiritales fiant: quod si ille nec in ipsa mente fuit, quomodo nos renouamur ad id, quod homo numquam fuit? apostoli autem et omnes iusti animale utique corpus adhuc habebant, sed tamen spiritaliter interius uiuebant, renouati scilicet in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius. qui creauit eos; non ideo tamen iam peccare non poterant, si consentirent iniquitati. nam et spiritales posse cadere in temtatione peccati ostendit apostolus, ubi ait: fratres, et si praeoccupatus fuerit homo in aliquo delicto, uos, qui spiritales estis, instruite huiusmodi in spiritu lenitatis, intendens te ipsum, ne et tu temteris. hoc dixit ne cuiquam inpossibile uideatur, quod peccauit Adam, si spiritalis erat mente, quamuis animalis esset corpore. quae cum ita sint, nihil tamen adhuc praepropere confirmamus, sed expectamus potius, utrum etiam cetera scriptura hunc intellectum non inpediat.

According to this view, then, Adam had an animal body not only before paradise but also when placed in paradise, although in the inner man he was spiritual according to the image of him who created him. This he lost by sinning, and earned also the death of the body, he who by not sinning would have earned the change into a spiritual body as well. For if he lived in an animal way inwardly too, we cannot be said to be renewed to what he was. For to those to whom it is said, “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind,” it is said so that they may become spiritual; and if he was not so even in his mind, how are we renewed to what man never was? The apostles and all the righteous certainly still had an animal body, yet they lived spiritually within, renewed, that is, in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created them; but they were not therefore no longer able to sin, if they consented to iniquity. For the apostle shows that even spiritual men can fall in the temptation of sin, when he says, “Brothers, even if a man is overtaken in some fault, you who are spiritual instruct such a one in a spirit of gentleness, looking to yourself, lest you too be tempted.” This is said so that it may not seem impossible to anyone that Adam sinned if he was spiritual in mind though animal in body. This being so, we still affirm nothing prematurely, but wait rather to see whether the rest of Scripture also does not hinder this understanding.

6.29CSEL 28.1:200

Sequitur enim quaestio de anima ualde difficilis, in qua multi laborauerunt nobisque, ubi laboremus, reliquerunt. siue enim quia non omnium omnia legere potui, qui de hac re secundum scripturarum nostrarum ueritatem ad aliquid liquidum minimeque dubium peruenire potuerunt, siue quia tanta quaestio est, ut etiam qui eam ueraciter soluunt non facile intellegantur a talibus, qualis ipse sum, fateor neminem mihi adhuc persuasisse, quod sic habeam de anima, ut nihil amplius quaerendum putem. utrum autem nunc certum aliquid inuenturus sim et definiturus, ignoro. quod autem potuero, si conatum meum dominus adiuuerit, sequenti uolumine explicare curabo.

There follows a very difficult question about the soul, on which many have labored and left us something to labor on. Whether because I have not been able to read everything by all those who, on this matter, have been able to reach something clear and not at all doubtful in accordance with the truth of our Scriptures, or because the question is so great that even those who truly solve it are not easily understood by such as I am, I confess that no one has yet persuaded me so that I hold a view about the soul such that I think nothing more needs to be sought. Whether I shall now find and define anything certain, I do not know. But what I can, if the Lord helps my effort, I shall take care to set out in the following book.

Chapter 7

7.1CSEL 28.1:200–201

Et finxit deus hominem puluerem de terra et flauit in faciem eius flatum uitae, et factus est homo in animam uiuentem. haec uerba scripturae nobis et in principio superioris libri consideranda proposueramus et de ipso homine facto maximeque de eius corpore, quantum satis duximus, quod secundum scripturas uisum est, disseruimus. sed quia de anima humana non parua quaestio est, ad hunc eam librum differendam putauimus nescientes, quantum nos dominus adiuturus esset recte loqui cupidos, illud tamen scientes, nisi, quantum ipse adiuuaret, recte nos non esse locuturos. recte autem est ueraciter atque congruenter nihil audacter refellendo, nihil temere adfirmando, dum adhuc dubium est, uerum falsumne sit, siue fidei siue scientiae christianae, quod autem doceri potest, uel rerum ratione apertissima uel scripturarum auctoritate certissima sine cunctatione adserendo. Ac primum illud uideamus, quod scriptum est: flauit uel sufflauit in faciem eius flatum uitae. nonnulli enim codices habent: spirauit uel inspirauit in faciem eius. sed cum graeci habeant svstpoairjasv, non dubitatur flauit uel sufflauit esse dicendum. quaerebamus autem in superiore sermone de manibus dei, cum homo de limo formatus cogitaretur; quid ergo nunc dicendum est in eo quod scriptum est: sufflauit deus, nisi quia sicut non manibus corporis finxit, ita nec faucibus labiisue sufflauit? Uerum tamen hoc uerbo scriptura in quaestione difficillima plurimum nos, quantum opinor, adiuuit.

“And God formed man as dust from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” We had set these words of Scripture before us for consideration at the beginning of the previous book too, and we discussed the making of man himself, and above all his body, as far as we thought sufficient, according to what seemed right in the light of the Scriptures. But because the question of the human soul is no small one, we thought it should be put off to this book, not knowing how far the Lord would help us, who desire to speak rightly, yet knowing this: that unless he helped us, we would not speak rightly. To speak rightly is to speak truthfully and fittingly: refuting nothing boldly and affirming nothing rashly while it is still doubtful whether a thing is true or false, whether for Christian faith or for Christian knowledge, but asserting without hesitation what can be taught either by the plainest reasoning about things or by the surest authority of the Scriptures. And first let us look at what is written: “He blew” or “he breathed upon his face the breath of life.” For some manuscripts have “he breathed” or “he breathed into his face.” But since the Greek manuscripts have ἐνεφύσησεν, there is no doubt that “he blew” or “he breathed upon” is the right rendering. Now in the previous discussion we were asking about the hands of God when man was thought of as formed from mud. What, then, is to be said now about what is written, “God breathed upon,” except that, just as he did not form him with bodily hands, so he did not breathe with throat or lips? And yet with this word, I think, Scripture has helped us very much in a most difficult question.

7.2CSEL 28.1:201–202

Nam cum quidam ex hoc uerbo crediderint aliquid esse animam de ipsa substantia dei, id est eiusdem naturae, cuius ille est, hoc ideo putantes, quia cum homo sufflat, aliquid de se ipso eicit in flatu, hinc potius admonendi sumus hanc. inimicam fidei catholicae reprobare sententiam. nos enim credimus dei naturam atque substantiam, quae in trinitate creditur a multis, intellegitur a paucis, omnino esse incommutabilem. porro autem animae naturam uel in deterius uel in melius commutari posse quis ambigit? ac per hoc sacrilega opinio est eam et deum credere unius esse substantiae. quid enim hoc modo aliud quam et ille commutabilis creditur? credendum itaque est et intellegendum neque ullo modo dubitandum, quod recta fides habet, animam sic esse a deo tamquam rem, quam fecerit, non tamquam naturae, cuius ipse est, siue genuerit siue quoquo modo protulerit.

For since some have believed, on the basis of this word, that the soul is something of the very substance of God, that is, of the same nature as he is, thinking so because when a man breathes out he puts forth something of himself in the breath, we ought rather to be warned by this to reject this opinion, which is hostile to the catholic faith. For we believe that the nature and substance of God, which is believed in the Trinity by many and understood by few, is altogether unchangeable. But who doubts that the nature of the soul can be changed either for the worse or for the better? And therefore it is a sacrilegious opinion to believe that it and God are of one substance. For what else is this but to believe that he too is changeable? So it is to be believed and understood, and in no way doubted, as the right faith holds, that the soul is from God as a thing which he made, not as of the nature which he himself is, whether by begetting it or by putting it forth in any way whatever.

7.3CSEL 28.1:202–203

Et quomodo, inquiunt, scriptum est: sufflauit in faciem eius, et factus est homo in animam uiuam, si non anima dei pars est uel dei omnino substantia? immo uero ex hoc uerbo satis adparet ita non esse. cum enim homo sufflat, anima utique ipsa subiacentem sibi naturam corporis mouet et de illa, non de se ipsa flatum facit; nisi forte isti tam tardi sunt, ut nesciant isto reciproco halitu, quem de hoc aere circumfuso ducimus et reddimus, fieri etiam flatum, cum uoluntate sufflamus. quodsi etiam non ex hoc, qui forinsecus adiacet, accepto et reddito, sed ex ipsius nostri corporis natura, qua constat, sufflando aliquid eiceremus, non eadem natura est corporis et animae: quod et ipsi utique consentiunt. quapropter etiam sic aliud est animae substantia, qua corpus regit et mouet, aliud flatus, quem regendo et mouendo facit de corpore sibi subdito, non de se ipsa, cui corpus est subditum. cum itaque longe quidem inconparabili modo sed tamen anima. regat subditum corpus et deus subditam creaturam, cur non potius intellegatur de subiecta sibi creatura fecisse deus animam in eo, quod sufflasse dictus est, quandoquidem ipsa anima, quamuis corpori suo non ita dominetur ut deus uniuersitati, quam condidit, tamen eius motu, non de sua substantia flatum facit? Possemus quidem dicere nec ipsum dei flatum esse animam hominis, sed deum sufflando fecisse animam in homine; sed ne putentur meliora quae fecit uerbo quam quod fecit flatu, quia et in nobis melius est uerbum quam flatus, nihil est interim secundum supra dictam rationem, cur animam ipsam flatum dei dicere dubitemus, dum intellegatur non esse dei natura atque substantia, sed hoc ipsum esse sufflare, quod est flatum facere, quod autem flatum facere, hoc animam facere. cui sententiae congruit quod per Esaiam dicit deus: spiritus enim a me procedet, et flatum omnem ego feci; nam non quemlibet flatum corporeum eum dicere sequentia docent. cum enim dixisset: omnem flatum ego feci, et, propter peccatum, inquit, pusillum quid contristaui eum et percussi eum. quid ergo dicit flatum nisi animam, quae propter peccatum percussa et contristata est? quid igitur est: omnem flatum ego feci, nisi: omnem animam ego feci?

“And how,” they say, “is it written, ‘He breathed upon his face, and man became a living soul,’ if the soul is not a part of God or wholly God's substance?” On the contrary, from this very word it is clear enough that it is not so. For when a man breathes out, the soul itself moves the nature of the body that lies under it and makes the breath from that, not from itself; unless perhaps these people are so slow that they do not know that, by this alternating breath which we draw in and give back from the surrounding air, breath is also produced when we breathe out at will. And even if we were to put out something by breathing, not from this air that lies around us outside, taken in and given back, but from the nature of which our body itself consists, the nature of the body and of the soul is not the same: and this they themselves certainly agree. So even thus the substance of the soul, by which it rules and moves the body, is one thing, and the breath, which by ruling and moving it makes from the body subject to it, not from itself, to which the body is subject, is another. Since, then, the soul rules the body subject to it, and God the creation subject to him, in a far incomparable way but still alike, why not rather understand that God made the soul from the creation subject to him, in that he is said to have breathed, since the soul itself, though it does not rule its body as God rules the universe he founded, still makes breath by moving the body, not from its own substance? We could indeed say that the breath of God is not itself the soul of man, but that God by breathing made the soul in man; but lest the things he made by a word be thought better than what he made by breath, because in us too a word is better than breath, there is for the present no reason, according to the reasoning given above, why we should hesitate to call the soul itself the breath of God, provided it is understood not to be God's nature and substance, but that to breathe is the same as to make breath, and to make breath is to make a soul. With this view agrees what God says through Isaiah: “For a spirit shall go forth from me, and every breath I have made.” For what follows shows that he does not mean just any bodily breath. For when he had said, “every breath I have made,” he says, “because of sin I grieved him a little and struck him.” What then does he call breath but the soul, which was struck and grieved because of sin? What then is “every breath I have made” but “every soul I have made”?

7.4CSEL 28.1:203–204

Si ergo deum diceremus tamquam corporei mundi huius animam, cui mundus ipse esset tamquam corpus unius animantis, recte non eum diceremus sufflando fecisse animam hominis, nisi corpoream de isto aere subiacente sibi ex corpore suo, non tamen quod dedisset sufflando de se ipso dedisse putare deberemus, sed ita de sibi subiecto aere corporis sui, sicut anima de huiusmodi re similiter adiacente, hoc est de corpore, non de se ipsa flatum facit. nunc uero quia non tantummodo mundi corpus deo esse subditum dicimus, sed illum esse supra omnem creaturam siue corporalem siue spiritalem, nec de se ipso nec de corporeis elementis credendus est animam fecisse sufflando.

If, then, we called God, as it were, the soul of this bodily world, so that the world itself was to him like the body of one living being, we would rightly say that he made the soul of man by breathing only as something bodily, from this air lying under him, out of his body; yet we ought not to think that what he gave by breathing he gave from himself, but from the air of his body subject to him, just as the soul makes breath from a thing similarly lying near it, that is, from the body, not from itself. But as it is, since we say not only that the body of the world is subject to God but that he is above every creature, whether bodily or spiritual, he is not to be believed to have made the soul by breathing either from himself or from the bodily elements.

7.5CSEL 28.1:204–205

Utrum autem ex eo, quod omnino non erat, id est ex nihilo, an ex aliqua re, quae iam ab illo facta spiritaliter. erat, sed anima nondum erat, merito quaeri potest. si enim deum adhuc aliquid ex nihilo creare non credimus, posteaquam creauit omnia simul, et ob hoc a consummatis omnibus operibus requieuisse credimus, quae inchoauit facere, ut, quidquid deinde faceret, ex his faceret, non uideo, quemadmodum intellegamus adhuc eum ex nihilo animas facere. an dicendum est eum in illis quidem operibus primorum sex dierum fecisse diem illum occultum ac, si hoc potius credi oportet, spiritalem atque intellectualem naturam, scilicet unitatis angelicae, et mundum, id est caelum et terram, atque in illis iam extantibus naturis rationes creasse futurarum aliarum naturarum, non ipsas naturas? alioquin si iam ibi creatae essent, sicut erant futurae, non adhuc essent futurae. quod si ita est, nondum erat in conditis rebus animae humanae ulla natura et tunc esse coepit, cum eam deus sufflando fecit atque indidit homini. Sed non ideo quaestio sublata est, qua quaeritur adhuc, utrum eam naturam, quae anima dicitur et antea non erat ex nihilo creauerit, tamquam ipse flatus eius non ex aliqua substantia subiacente factus sit, sicut de flatu dicebamus, quem facit anima ex corpore suo, sed omnino ex nihilo tunc factus sit flatus, cum deus flare uoluit, idemque hominis anima factus sit: an uero iam erat aliquid spiritale, quamuis hoc, quidquid erat, nondum animae natura erat, atque ex hoc factus sit flatus dei, quae natura esset animae, sicut nec corporis humani natura iam erat, antequam deus eam de limo terrae uel puluere formauisset. non enim caro humana erat puluis aut limus, sed tamen aliquid erat, unde illa fieret, quae nondum erat.

But whether he made it from what did not exist at all, that is, from nothing, or from some thing that had already been made by him spiritually, though the soul did not yet exist, may rightly be asked. For if we do not believe that God still creates anything from nothing after he created all things together, and believe for that reason that he rested from all the works he had begun to make, once they were completed, so that whatever he made afterwards he made from these, I do not see how we are to understand that he still makes souls from nothing. Or are we to say that in those works of the first six days he made that hidden day, or, if this is rather to be believed, the spiritual and intellectual nature, namely of the angelic unity, and the world, that is, heaven and earth, and that in those natures which already existed he created the reasons of other natures to come, not the natures themselves? Otherwise, if they had already been created there as they were going to be, they would not still be going to be. If this is so, there was not yet any nature of the human soul in the things founded, and it began to exist when God made it by breathing and put it into man. But the question is not thereby removed; for it is still asked whether he created that nature which is called the soul, and which did not exist before, from nothing, as though his breath itself was not made from any underlying substance (as we said of the breath which the soul makes from its body), but the breath was made wholly from nothing when God willed to breathe, and the same became the soul of man; or whether there was already something spiritual, although this, whatever it was, was not yet the nature of a soul, and from it the breath of God was made which was to be the nature of the soul, just as the nature of the human body did not yet exist before God formed it from the mud or dust of the earth. For human flesh was not dust or mud, yet there was something from which it might be made, though it did not yet exist.

7.6CSEL 28.1:205–206

Num ergo credibile est in primis illis sex dierum operibus deum condidisse non solum futuri corporis humani causalem rationem uerum etiam materiem, de qua fieret, id est terram, de cuius limo uel puluere fingeretur, animae autem solam ibi condidisse rationem, secundum quam fieret. non etiam quandam pro suo genere materiam, de qua fieret? si enim quiddam incommatabile esset anima, nullo modo eius quasi materiem quaerere deberemus; nunc autem mutabilitas eius satis indicat eam interim uitiis atque fallaciis deformem reddi, formari autem uirtutibus ueritatisque doctrina, sed in sua iam natura, qua est anima, sicut etiam caro in sua natura, qua iam caro est, et salute decoratur et morbis uulneribusque foedatur. sed sicut haec excepto, quod iam caro est,-in qua natura uel proficit, ut pulchra, uel deficit, ut deformis sit, habuit etiam materiem, id est terram, de qua fieret, ut omnino caro esset: sic fortasse potuit et anima, antequam ea ipsa natura fieret, -quae anima dicitur, cuius uel pulchritudo uirtus uel deformitas uitium est, habere aliquam materiem pro suo genere spiritalem, quae nondum esset anima, sicut terra, de qua caro facta est, iam erat aliquid, quamuis non erat caro. Sed enim terra inplebat mundi infimam partem, antequam de illa corpus hominis fieret, conferens uniuerso totum suum, ut, etiamsi nulla ex ea caro fieret animantis cuiusquam. specie tamen sua mundi fabricam molemque conpleret, secundum quam dicitur mundus caelum et terra.

Is it credible, then, that in those first works of the six days God founded not only the causal reason of the human body to come but also the material from which it would be made, that is, the earth, from whose mud or dust it would be formed, but for the soul founded there only the reason according to which it would be made, and not also some material of its own kind from which it would be made? For if the soul were something unchangeable, we ought in no way to look for its material, so to speak; but as it is, its changeableness shows clearly enough that it is at times made ugly by vices and errors and formed by virtues and the teaching of truth, but in its own nature, by which it already is a soul; just as the flesh too, in its own nature, by which it is already flesh, is both adorned by health and disfigured by diseases and wounds. But just as the flesh, apart from the fact that it is already flesh, a nature in which it either advances so as to be beautiful or declines so as to be ugly, also had material, that is, earth, from which it was made so as to be flesh at all: so perhaps the soul too, before it was made that very nature which is called the soul, whose beauty is virtue and whose ugliness is vice, could have had some material of its own kind, spiritual, which was not yet a soul, just as the earth from which flesh was made was already something, though it was not flesh. But the earth filled the lowest part of the world before the body of man was made from it, contributing its whole being to the universe, so that, even if no flesh of any living thing were made from it, it would still by its form complete the structure and mass of the world, according to which the world is called heaven and earth.

7.7CSEL 28.1:206–207

At uero illa spiritalis materies, si fuit ulla, unde anima fieret, uel si est ulla, unde animae fiunt, quid ipsa est? quod nomen, quam speciem, quem usum in rebus conditis tenet? uiuit, an non? si uiuit, quid agit? quid confert uniuersitatis effectibus? beatamne uitam gerit, an miseram, an neutram? uiuificat aliquid? an ab hoc etiam opere uacat et in quodam secreto uniuersitatis otiosa requiescit sine uigili sensu motuque uitali? si enim nulla prorsus adhuc uita erat, quomodo esset uitae futurae quaedam incorporea nec uiua materies? aut falsum est aut nimis latet. si autem iam uiuebat nec beate nec misere, quomodo rationalis erat? quodsi tunc rationalis facta est, cum ex illa materie natura humanae animae facta est, inrationalis ergo uita materies erat animae rationalis, id est humanae? quid ergo inter illam pecorisque distabat? an rationalis erat iam possibilitate, nondum facultate? si enim uidemus infantilem animam, iam utique hominis animam, nondum coepisse uti ratione et tamen eam rationalem iam dicimus, cur non credatur sic in illa materie, de qua facta est, quietum fuisse motum etiam sentiendi, sicut in ista infantili, quae iam certe anima est hominis, quietus est adhuc motus ratiocinandi?

But that spiritual material, if there was any, from which the soul was made, or if there is any from which souls are made, what is it? What name, what form, what function does it hold among things founded? Does it live or not? If it lives, what does it do? What does it contribute to the workings of the universe? Does it lead a happy life, or a wretched one, or neither? Does it give life to anything? Or is it idle even from this work, and does it rest unoccupied in some recess of the universe, without wakeful sensation and living motion? For if there was as yet no life at all, how could there be a bodiless and lifeless material of life to come? Either it is false or it is very hidden. But if it already lived, neither happily nor wretchedly, how was it rational? And if it became rational when the nature of the human soul was made from that material, then was irrational life the material of the rational, that is, the human, soul? What then would distinguish it from that of a beast? Or was it already rational in possibility but not yet in capacity? For if we see that an infant's soul, which is certainly already the soul of a man, has not yet begun to use reason, and yet we already call it rational, why not believe that in that material from which it was made even the motion of sensation was at rest, just as in this infant's soul, which is certainly already the soul of a man, the motion of reasoning is still at rest?

7.8CSEL 28.1:207

Nam si iam beata erat uita, de qua facta est hominis anima, deterius ergo facta est, et ideo non iam illa materies huius, sed illius ista defluxio est. nam materies aliqua cum formatur, praesertim a deo, in melius sine dubitatione formatur. sed etiam si cuiusquam in aliqua beatitudine factae a deo uitae defluxio anima humana posset intellegi, nec sic credenda erat esse coepisse in aliquo actu meritorum suorum, nisi ex quo propriam coepit agere uitam, dum anima facta est animans carnem et eius sensibus uelut nuntiis utens atque in se ipsa se uiuere sentiens sua uoluntate, intellectu, memoria. si enim est aliquid, unde istam defluxionem formatae carni deus inspiraret, tamquam sufflando animam faciens, idemque beatum est, nullo modo mouetur aut mutatur aut amittit aliquid, cum hoc ab eo defluit, unde anima fit. non est enim corpus, ut tamquam exhalando minuatur.

For if the life from which the soul of man was made was already happy, then it was made worse, and so that life is not the material of this soul, but this soul is an outflowing of that life. For when any material is formed, especially by God, it is without doubt formed for the better. But even if the human soul could be understood as an outflowing of some life made by God in some happiness, not even so should it be believed to have begun to exist in any activity of its own merits except from the time it began to lead its own life, when it was made a soul animating flesh and using its senses as messengers, and perceiving itself living in itself by its will, understanding, and memory. For if there is something from which God breathed this outflowing into the formed flesh, as if making a soul by breathing, and that something is happy, it is in no way moved or changed or loses anything when this flows out of it from which the soul is made. For it is not a body, so as to be diminished as though by exhaling.

7.9CSEL 28.1:207–208

Si autem anima inrationalis materies est quodammodo, de qua fit anima rationalis, id est humana, rursus quaeritur, etiam ipsa inrationalis unde fiat, quia et ipsam non facit nisi creator omnium naturarum. an illa de materie corporali? cur non ergo et ista? nisi forte quod uelut gradatim fieri conceditur conpendio posse deum facere quisquam negabit. proinde quaelibet adhibeatur interpositio, si corpus est materies animae inrationalis et anima inrationalis est materies animae rationalis, procul dubio corpus est materies animae rationalis. quod neminem umquam scio ausum esse sentire, nisi qui et ipsam animam nonnisi in genere alicuius corporis ponit. Deinde cauendum est, ne quaedam translatio animae fieri a pecore in hominem posse credatur — quod ueritati fideique catholicae omnino contrarium est — si concesserimus inrationalem animam ueluti materiem subiacere, unde rationalis anima fiat. sic enim fiet, ut, si haec in melius commutata erit hominis, illa quoque in deterius commutata sit pecoris. de quo ludibrio quorundam philosophorum etiam eorum posteri erubuerunt nec eos hoc sensisse, sed non recte intellectos esse dixerunt. et credo ita esse. uelut si quisquam etiam de scripturis nostris hoc sentiat, ubi dictum est: homo in honore positus non intellexit; conparatus est pecoribus in sensatis et similis factus est eis, aut ubi item legitur: ne tradideris bestiis animam confitentem tibi. neque enim non omnes haeretici scripturas catholicas legunt nec ob aliud sunt haeretici, nisi quod eas non bene intellegentes suas -falsas opiniones contra earum ueritatem peruicaciter adserunt. sed quoquo modo se habeat uel non habeat opinio philosophorum de reuolutionibus animarum, catholicae tamen fidei non conuenit credere animas pecorum in homines aut hominum in pecora transmigrare.

But if an irrational soul is in some way the material from which the rational, that is, the human, soul is made, it is asked again from what the irrational soul itself is made, since it too is made only by the creator of all natures. Is it from bodily material? Why not this one too, then? Unless perhaps someone will deny that God can do by a short way what is granted can be done by stages, as it were. So whatever intermediate step is introduced, if body is the material of the irrational soul and the irrational soul is the material of the rational soul, without doubt body is the material of the rational soul. I know of no one who has ever dared to think this, except one who places the soul itself only in the class of some kind of body. Next we must beware lest it be believed that some passing of the soul from beast into man can take place, which is wholly contrary to truth and to the catholic faith, if we grant that an irrational soul underlies as material from which a rational soul is made. For it will follow that, if this soul is changed for the better and becomes a man's, that other is changed for the worse and becomes a beast's. Even the successors of certain philosophers were ashamed of this absurdity of theirs, and said that they had not held it but had not been rightly understood. And I believe it is so. It is as if someone were to take this view even from our Scriptures, where it is said, “Man, being placed in honor, did not understand; he was compared to senseless beasts and became like them,” or again where it is read, “Do not hand over to beasts the soul that confesses to you.” For not all heretics fail to read the catholic Scriptures, and they are heretics for no other reason than that, not understanding them well, they stubbornly assert their false opinions against their truth. But however the opinion of the philosophers about the cycles of souls stands or does not stand, it does not agree with the catholic faith to believe that the souls of beasts pass into men or those of men into beasts.

7.10CSEL 28.1:208–210

Fieri sane homines uitae genere pecoribus similes et ipsae res humanae clamant et scriptura testatur. unde est illud, quod commemoraui: homo in honore positus non intellexit; conparatus est iumentis insensatis et similis factus est eis, sed in hac uita utique, non post mortem. proinde uel talibus bestiis nolebat in potestatem dari animam suam, qui dicebat: ne tradideris bestiis animam confitentem tibi — quales cauendos significat dominus, ubi dicit eos indutos uestitu ouium, intus autem esse lupos rapaces — uel ipsi diabolo et angelis eius; nam et ille dictus est et leo et draco. Quid enim adferunt argumenti philosophi, qui putant hominum animas in pecora uel pecorum in homines post mortem posse transferri? hoc certe, quod morum similitudo ad id trahat, uelut auaros in formicas, rapaces in miluos, saeuos ac superbos in leones, sectatores inmundae uoluptatis in sues et si qua similia. haec quippe adserunt nec adtendunt per hanc rationem nullo modo fieri posse, ut pecoris anima post mortem in hominem transferatur. nullo modo enim porcus similior erit homini quam porco; et cum mansuescunt leones, canibus uel etiam ouibus fiunt similiores quam hominibus. cum igitur a pecorum moribus pecora non recedunt et quae aliquantulum ceteris dissimilia fiunt, similiora sunt tamen suo generi quam humano longeque plus ab hominibus quam a pecoribus differunt, numquam erunt hominum animae istae, si ea, quae similiora sunt, trahunt. si autem hoc argumentum falsum est, quomodo erit uera illa opinio, quandoquidem nihil aliud adferunt, quo etiamsi non uera, saltem uerisimilis habeatur? unde procliuius et ipse crediderim, quod etiam eorum posteri sectatores, illos homines, qui haec primitus in suis libris posuerunt, in hac uita potius intellegi uoluisse quadam peruersitate morum ac turpitudine homines pecorum similes fieri ac sic quodam modo in pecora commutari, ut hoc dedecore obiecto eos a cupiditatum prauitate reuocarent.

That men become like beasts by their way of life, human affairs themselves proclaim and Scripture bears witness. Hence the verse I mentioned: “Man, being placed in honor, did not understand; he was compared to senseless cattle and became like them”: but in this life, certainly, not after death. So he who said, “Do not hand over to beasts the soul that confesses to you,” did not wish his soul to be given into the power either of such beasts, the kind the Lord means we should beware of when he says that they are clothed in sheep's clothing but inwardly are ravening wolves, or of the devil himself and his angels; for he too is called both lion and dragon. For what argument do the philosophers bring who think that the souls of men can be transferred after death into beasts, or those of beasts into men? This, certainly: that likeness of character draws them to it, the greedy into ants, the rapacious into kites, the cruel and proud into lions, the followers of unclean pleasure into swine, and the like. This is what they assert, and they do not notice that by this reasoning it can in no way happen that the soul of a beast is transferred into a man after death. For a pig will in no way be more like a man than like a pig; and when lions are tamed, they become more like dogs or even sheep than men. Since, then, beasts do not depart from the character of beasts, and those that become a little unlike the rest are still more like their own kind than the human, and differ far more from men than from beasts, these souls will never be the souls of men, if it is likeness that draws them. But if this argument is false, how will that opinion be true, since they bring nothing else by which it might be held, if not true, at least probable? So I myself would more readily believe, as even their later followers did, that those men who first put these things in their books wished it to be understood that in this life men become like beasts by a certain perversity and foulness of character, and so in a way are changed into beasts, so that by setting this disgrace before them they might call them back from depraved desires.

7.11CSEL 28.1:210–211

Nam illa, quae feruntur accidisse, ut quidam quasi recordarentur in quorum animalium corporibus fuerint aut falsa narrantur aut ludificationibus daemonum hoc in eorum animis factum est. si enim contingit in somnis, ut fallaci memoria quasi recordetur se homo fuisse, quod non fuit, aut egisse, quod non egit, quid mirum, si quodam dei iusto occultoque iudicio sinuntur daemones in cordibus etiam uigilantium tale aliquid posse? Manichaei autem, qui se christianos uel putant uel putari uolunt, in hac opinione translationis uel reuolutionis animarum eo sunt illis gentium philosophis uel si qui alii uani homines hoc putant deteriores et detestabiliores, quod illi animae naturam a dei natura discernunt, isti autem, cum aliud nihil dicant esse animam quam ipsam dei substantiam atque id omnino, quod deus est, non trepidant eam tam turpiter commutabilem dicere, ut nullum sit herbae seu uermiculi genus, ubi eam non esse conmixtam uel quo reuolui non posse mirabili opinentur insania. qui tamen si remotis ab animo suo rerum obscurissimarum quaestionibus, quas carnali corde uersantes necesse est ut in opiniones falsas, noxias monstrosasque labantur et prouoluantur, unum illud firmissime teneant, quod omni animae rationali sine ullius disputationis ambagibus naturaliter et ueraciter insitum est, esse omnino incommutabilem et incorruptibilem deum, tota eorum milleformis fabula repente dilabitur, quam in suis uanis ac sacrilegis mentibus nonnisi de dei turpissima mutabilitate pinxerunt. Non est igitur materies animae humanae nec anima inrationalis.

As for the stories told of things that happened, that some people seemed to remember in the bodies of which animals they had been, either they are false or this was produced in their minds by the deceptions of demons. For if it happens in sleep that a man, by a false memory, seems to remember that he was what he was not, or did what he did not do, what wonder if, by some just and hidden judgment of God, demons are allowed to be able to do something of the kind even in the hearts of those who are awake? The Manichees, however, who either think themselves Christians or wish to be thought so, are in this opinion of the transfer or cycle of souls worse and more detestable than those pagan philosophers, or any other vain men who think so, in that those philosophers distinguish the nature of the soul from the nature of God, whereas these, though they say that the soul is nothing other than the very substance of God and wholly what God is, do not shrink from calling it so shamefully changeable that, in their amazing madness, they think there is no kind of plant or little worm with which it is not mixed or into which it cannot be turned. Yet if they put out of their minds questions about the most obscure things, which, turned over by a carnal heart, must slip and tumble into false, harmful, and monstrous opinions, and held most firmly this one thing, which is naturally and truly implanted in every rational soul without the windings of any argument, that God is wholly unchangeable and incorruptible, their whole thousand-shaped fable would collapse at once, which in their vain and sacrilegious minds they have painted only out of a most shameful changeableness of God. Therefore the material of the human soul is not an irrational soul either.

7.12CSEL 28.1:211–212

Quid ergo est, unde anima flatu dei facta est? an corpus aliquod erat terrenum quidem et humidum? nullo modo; hinc enim potius caro facta est. nam quid aliud est limus quam terra humida? nec humore solo anima facta credenda est quasi caro de terra, anima de aqua. nimis enim absurdum est inde factam putare animam hominis, unde facta est caro piscis et uolucris. Ergo fortassis ex aere? huic enim elemento etiam flatus conpetit; sed noster, non dei. unde supra diximus hoc potuisse congruenter putari, si animam mundi tamquam unius maximi animantis deum crederemus, ut ita eam flauerit de aere corporis sui. sicut flat nostra de sui. cum uero deum esse constet supra omne mundi corpus et supra omnem spiritum, quem creauit, inconparabili omnino distantia, quomodo id recte dici potest? an forte quanto magis deus uniuersae creaturae suae praesens est omnipotentia singulari, tanto magis potuit ex aere flatum facere, quae anima hominis esset? sed cum anima non sit corporea. quidquid autem ex mundi corporeis elementis fit, corporeum sit necesse est inque mundi elementis etiam aer iste numeretur, nec si de puri illius caelestisque ignis elemento facta anima diceretur, credi oporteret. omne quippe corpus in omne corpus posse mutari non defuerunt qui adsererent; corpus autem aliquod, siue terrenum siue caeleste, conuerti in animam fierique naturam incorpoream nec quemquam sensisse scio nec fides habet.

What, then, is it from which the soul was made by the breath of God? Was it some body, earthy and moist? By no means; for from this rather the flesh was made. For what else is mud but moist earth? Nor is the soul to be believed made from moisture alone, as though the flesh were made from earth and the soul from water. For it is too absurd to think that the soul of man was made from that from which the flesh of fish and bird was made. Perhaps, then, from air? For breath belongs to this element; but ours, not God's. So we said above that this could fittingly be thought if we believed God to be the soul of the world as of one very great living being, so that he breathed it from the air of his body, as our soul breathes from that of its own. But since it is certain that God is above the whole body of the world and above every spirit he created, at an altogether incomparable distance, how can this rightly be said? Or perhaps, the more God is present to his whole creation by his unique omnipotence, the more he could make from air a breath that would be the soul of man? But since the soul is not bodily, and whatever is made from the bodily elements of the world must be bodily, and this air too is counted among the elements of the world, it ought not to be believed even if the soul were said to be made from the element of that pure and heavenly fire. For there have been some who asserted that every body can be changed into every body; but that any body, whether earthly or heavenly, is turned into a soul and becomes a bodiless nature, I know of no one who has held, nor does the faith hold it.

7.13CSEL 28.1:212

Deinde — si non est contemnendum, quod medici non tantum dicunt, uerum etiam probare se adfirmant — quamuis omnis caro terrenam soliditatem in promtu gerat, habet tamen in se et aeris aliquid, quod et pulmonibus continetur et a corde per uenas, quas arterias uocant, diffunditur; et ignis non solum feruidam qualitatem, cuius sedes in iecore est, uerum etiam luculentam, quam uelut eliquari ac subuolare ostendunt in excelsum cerebri locum, tamquam in caelum corporis nostri. unde et radii emicant oculorum et de cuius medio uelut centro quodam non solum ad oculos, sed etiam ad sensus ceteros tenues fistulae deducuntur, ad aures uidelicet, ad nares, ad palatum, propter audiendum, olfaciendum atque gustandum; ipsumque tangendi sensum, qui per totum corpus est, ab eodem cerebro dirigi per medullam ceruicis et eam, quae continetur ossibus, quibus dorsi spina conseritur, ut inde se tenuissimi quidam riuuli, qui tangendi sensum faciunt, per cuncta membra diffundant.

Next, if what physicians not only say but claim to prove is not to be despised: although all flesh plainly bears an earthy solidity, it also has in it something of air, which is held in the lungs and spread from the heart through the veins they call arteries; and of fire, not only the hot quality, whose seat is in the liver, but also the bright quality, which they show to be refined and to rise up to the high region of the brain, as into the heaven of our body. From there the rays of the eyes flash out, and from its middle, as from a kind of center, fine tubes lead not only to the eyes but to the other senses also, namely to the ears, the nostrils, and the palate, for hearing, smelling, and tasting; and the sense of touch itself, which is throughout the whole body, is directed from the same brain through the marrow of the neck and the marrow enclosed in the bones of which the spine of the back is composed, so that from there certain very fine little streams, which produce the sense of touch, spread through all the limbs.

7.14CSEL 28.1:212–213

Cum igitur his quasi nuntiis accipiat anima quidquid eam corporalium non latet, ipsa uero usque adeo aliud quiddam sit, ut, cum uult intellegere uel diuina uel deum uel omnino etiam se ipsam suasque considerare uirtutes, ut aliquid ueri certique conprehendat, ab hac ipsorum quoque oculorum luce se auertat eamque ad hoc negotium non tantum nullo adiumento, uerum etiam nonnullo inpedimento esse sentiens se in obtutum mentis adtollat: quomodo ex eo genere aliquid est, cum eiusdem generis summum non sit nisi lumen, quod ex oculis emicat, quo illa non adiuuatur nisi ad corporeas formas coloresque sentiendos habetque ipsa innumerabilia longe dissimilia cuncto generi corporum, quae nonnisi intellectu atque ratione conspiciat, quo nullus carnis sensus aspirat?

Since, then, the soul receives through these messengers, as it were, whatever of bodily things is not hidden from it, while it itself is something so different that, when it wishes to understand either divine things or God or even itself altogether and to consider its own powers, so as to grasp something true and certain, it turns away even from this light of the eyes and, perceiving that for this task it is not only no help but even something of a hindrance, raises itself to the gaze of the mind: how is it something of that kind, when the highest of that kind is nothing but the light that flashes from the eyes, by which the soul is not helped except to perceive bodily forms and colors, while the soul itself holds countless things far unlike the whole class of bodies, which it sees only by understanding and reason, to which no sense of the flesh aspires?

7.15CSEL 28.1:213

Quapropter non est quidem humanae animae natura nec de terra nec de aqua nec de aere nec de igne quolibet; sed tamen crassioris corporis sui materiam, hoc est humidam quandam terram, quae in carnis uersa est qualitatem, per subtiliorem naturam corporis administrat, id est per lucem et aerem. nullus enim sine his duobus uel sensus in corpore est uel ab anima spontaneus corporis motus. sicut autem prius esse debet nosse quam facere, ita sentire prius est quam mouere. anima ergo quoniam res est incorporea corpus, quod incorporeo uicinum est, sicuti est ignis uel potius lux et aer, primitus agit et per haec cetera quae crassiora sunt corporis, sicuti humor et terra — unde carnis corpulentia solidatur — quae magis sunt ad patiendum subdita quam praedita ad faciendum.

Therefore the nature of the human soul is not from earth, nor water, nor air, nor any kind of fire; yet it governs the material of its grosser body, that is, a certain moist earth turned into the quality of flesh, through the finer nature of body, that is, through light and air. For without these two there is neither any sensation in the body nor any spontaneous movement of the body by the soul. And just as knowing must come before doing, so sensing comes before moving. The soul, then, since it is a bodiless thing, acts first on the body that is close to the bodiless, such as fire, or rather light, and air, and through these on the other, grosser parts of the body, such as moisture and earth (from which the bulk of the flesh is made solid), which are more subject to being acted upon than endowed for acting.

7.16CSEL 28.1:213–214

Non mihi ergo uidetur dictum: factus est homo in animam uiuam, nisi quia sentire coepit in corpore: quod est animatae uiuentisque carnis certissimum indicium. nam mouentur et arbusta non tantum ui extrinsecus inpellente, uelut cum uentis agitantur, sed illo motu, quo intrinsecus agitur quidquid ad incrementum speciemque arboris pertinet, quo ducitur sucus in radicem uertiturque in ea, quibus constat herbae natura uel ligni; nihil enim horum sine interno motu. sed iste motus non est spontaneus, qualis ille, qui sensui copulatur ad corporis administrationem, sicut in omni animalium genere, quam uocat scriptura animam uiuam. nam et nobis nisi inesset etiam ille motus, nec crescerent nostra corpora nec ungues capillosque producerent. sed si hoc solum esset in nobis sine sensu motuque illo spontaneo, non diceretur homo factus in animam uiuam.

So it does not seem to me that “man became a living soul” was said for any reason except that he began to have sensation in the body, which is the surest sign of animated and living flesh. For trees too are moved, not only by a force pushing from outside, as when they are shaken by the winds, but by the motion by which everything belonging to the growth and form of a tree is worked from within, by which sap is drawn into the root and turned into the things of which the nature of plant or wood consists; for none of these happens without inner motion. But this motion is not spontaneous, like the motion joined to sensation for governing the body, as in every kind of animal, which Scripture calls a living soul. For if that other motion were not also in us, our bodies would not grow, nor put forth nails and hair. But if this alone were in us, without sensation and that spontaneous motion, it would not be said that man became a living soul.

7.17CSEL 28.1:214–215

Proinde, quoniam pars cerebri anterior, unde sensus omnes distribuuntur, ad frontem conlocata est atque in facie sunt ipsa uelut organa sentiendi — excepto tangendi sensu, qui per totum corpus diffunditur; qui tamen etiam ipse ab eadem anteriore parte cerebri ostenditur habere uiam suam, quae retrorsus per uerticem atque ceruicem ad medullam spinae, de qua loquebamur paulo ante, deducitur, unde habet utique sensum in tangendo et facies, sicut totum corpus, exceptis sensibus uidendi, audiendi, olfaciendi, gustandi, qui in sola facie praelocati sunt — ideo scriptum arbitror, quod in faciem deus sufflauerit homini flatum uitae, cum factus est in animam uiuam. anterior quippe pars posteriori merito praeponitur, quia et ista ducit, illa sequitur et ab ista sensus, ab illa motus est, sicut consilium praecedit actionem.

Accordingly, since the front part of the brain, from which all the senses are distributed, is placed toward the forehead, and the organs of sensation themselves are, as it were, in the face (except the sense of touch, which is spread through the whole body; yet even this is shown to have its path from the same front part of the brain, a path which leads backward through the crown and the neck to the marrow of the spine, of which we spoke a little before, so that the face too has the sense of touch, like the whole body, besides the senses of sight, hearing, smell, and taste, which are placed in the face alone): for this reason, I think, it is written that God breathed the breath of life into man's face when he became a living soul. For the front part is rightly put before the back, because the one leads and the other follows, and from the one comes sensation, from the other movement, just as deliberation goes before action.

7.18CSEL 28.1:215

Et quoniam corporalis motus, qui sensum sequitur, sine interuallis temporum nullus est, agere autem interualla temporum spontaneo motu nisi per adiutorium memoriae non ualemus, ideo tres tamquam uentriculi cerebri demonstrantur: unus anterior ad faciem, a quo sensus omnis; alter posterior ad ceruicem, a quo motus omnis; tertius inter utrumque, in quo memoriam uigere demonstrant, ne, cum sensum sequitur motus, non conectat homo quod faciendum est, si fuerit quod fecit oblitus. haec illi certis indiciis probata esse dicunt, quando et ipsae partes aliquo adfectae morbo uel uitio, cum defecissent officia uel sentiendi uel mouendi membra uel motus corporis reminiscendi, satis quid ualerent singulae declararunt eisque adhibita curatio cui rei reparandae profecerit exploratum est. sed anima in istis tamquam in organis agit, nihil horum est ipsa; sed uiuificat et regit omnia et per haec corpori consulit et huic uitae, in qua factus est homo in animam uiuam.

And since no bodily movement that follows sensation takes place without intervals of time, and we cannot manage intervals of time by spontaneous movement except with the help of memory, three ventricles, as it were, of the brain are pointed out: one in front, toward the face, from which all sensation comes; another behind, toward the neck, from which all movement comes; and a third between the two, in which they show that memory is active, so that, when movement follows sensation, a man may not fail to connect what is to be done through having forgotten what he has done. They say these things are proved by sure signs, since when these parts themselves have been affected by some disease or defect, and the functions of sensing, or of moving the limbs, or of remembering bodily movement have failed, it has become clear enough what each of them does, and when treatment was applied it was found which function it served to restore. But the soul acts in these as in organs; it is none of them itself; but it gives life to and rules them all, and through them provides for the body and for this life in which man became a living soul.

7.19CSEL 28.1:215–216

Unde ergo sit ipsa, id est de qua uelut materie deus hunc flatum fecerit, quae anima dicitur, dum quaeritur, nihil corporeum debet occurrere. sicut enim deus omnem creaturam, sic anima omnem corpoream creaturam naturae dignitate praecellit. per lucem tamen et aerem, quae in ipso quoque mundo praecellentia sunt corpora magisque habent faciendi praestantiam quam patiendi corpulentiam, sicut humor et terra, tamquam per ea quae spiritui similiora sunt corpus administrat. nuntiat enim aliquid lux corporea; cui autem nuntiat, non hoc est, quod illa; et haec est anima, cui nuntiat, non illa, quae nuntiat. et cum adflictiones corporis moleste sentit, actionem suam, qua illi regendo adest, turbato eius temperamento inpediri offenditur, et haec offensio dolor uocatur. et aer, qui neruis infusus est, paret uoluntati, ut membra moueat, non autem ipse uoluntas est. et illa pars media motum membrorum nuntiat, ut memoria teneatur, non ipsa memoria est. denique, dum haec eius tamquam ministeria uitio quolibet seu perturbatione omni modo deficiunt desistentibus nuntiis sentiendi et ministris mouendi, tamquam non habens cur adsit abscedit. si autem non ita deficiunt, ut in morte adsolet, turbatur eius intentio, tamquam conantis redintegrare labentia nec ualentis. et in quibus rebus turbatur, inde cognoscitur quae pars ministeriorum in causa sit, ut, si potuerit, medicina succurrat.

So when it is asked where the soul itself comes from, that is, from what material, as it were, God made this breath which is called the soul, nothing bodily ought to come to mind. For just as God surpasses every creature, so the soul surpasses every bodily creature in the dignity of its nature. Yet it governs the body through light and air, which in the world too are the superior bodies and have more of the excellence of acting than of the bulk of being acted upon, as moisture and earth have; it governs it, as it were, through the things more like spirit. For bodily light reports something; but that to which it reports is not what it is; and the soul is that to which it reports, not the light that reports. And when the soul feels the afflictions of the body with distress, it is offended that its action, by which it is present to the body to rule it, is hindered when the body's balance is disturbed, and this offense is called pain. And the air poured into the nerves obeys the will, to move the limbs, but is not itself the will. And that middle part reports the movement of the limbs so that it may be held in memory; it is not itself memory. Finally, when these, its servants as it were, fail completely through some defect or disturbance, the messengers of sensation and the servants of movement ceasing, the soul departs, as having no reason to be present. But if they do not fail in the way that usually happens in death, the soul's attention is disturbed, as of one trying to restore what is slipping and unable to do so. And from the things in which it is disturbed one learns which part of its servants is the cause, so that, if possible, medicine may help.

7.20CSEL 28.1:216–217

Namque aliud esse ipsam, aliud haec eius corporalia ministeria, uel uasa uel organa uel si quid aptius dici possunt, hinc euidenter elucet, quod plerumque se uehementi cogitationis intentione auertit ab omnibus, ut prae oculis patentibus recteque ualentibus multa posita nesciat et, si maior intentio est, dum ambulabat, repente subsistat, auertens utique imperandi nutum a ministerio motionis, qua pedes agebantur; si autem non tanta est cogitationis intentio, ut figat ambulantem loco, sed tamen tanta est, ut partem illam cerebri mediam nuntiantem corporis motus non uacet aduertere, obliuiscitur aliquando et unde ueniat et quo eat, et transit inprudens uillam, quo tendebat, natura sui corporis sana, sed sua in aliud auocata. quapropter istas corporei caeli corporeas quasdam particulas, id est lucis et aeris, quae primae excipiunt nutus animae uiuificantis, eo quod incorporeae naturae propinquiores sunt quam humor et terra, ut ad earum proximum ministerium tota moles administretur, utrum deus de hoc circumfuso et superfuso caelo corpori uiuentis miscuerit aut adiunxerit, an et ipsas de limo sicut carnem fecerit, non est ad rem pertinens quaestio. omne quippe corpus in omne corpus mutari posse credibile est; quodlibet autem corpus mutari posse in animam credere absurdum est.

For that the soul itself is one thing, and these bodily servants of it, or vessels, or organs, or whatever they may more aptly be called, another, is evidently clear from this: that often, by an intense effort of thought, it turns itself away from everything, so that it does not know many things set before eyes that are open and perfectly healthy; and if the effort is greater, it suddenly stops while walking, turning away its signal of command from the service of motion by which the feet were moved. But if the effort of thought is not so great as to fix the walker to the spot, but is still so great that the soul is not free to attend to that middle part of the brain which reports the movements of the body, it sometimes forgets both where it is coming from and where it is going, and unawares passes the farm it was heading for, the nature of its body being sound, but its own nature called away to something else. Therefore, as to these bodily particles of the bodily heaven, that is, of light and air, which first receive the signals of the life-giving soul, because they are nearer to the bodiless nature than moisture and earth, so that the whole mass is governed through their immediate service: whether God mixed them into or joined them to the body of the living being from this heaven poured around and above us, or made them too from the mud, like the flesh, is a question not to the point. For it is credible that every body can be changed into every body; but to believe that any body can be changed into a soul is absurd.

7.21CSEL 28.1:217–219

Quamobrem nec illud audiendum est, quod quidam putauerunt, quintum quoddam esse corpus unde sint animae, quod nec terra nec aqua sit nec aer nec ignis, siue iste turbulentior atque terrenus, siue ille caelestis purus et lucidus, sed nescio quid aliud, quod careat usitato nomine, sed tamen corpus sit. si enim qui hoc sentiunt hoc dicunt corpus, quod et nos, id est naturam quamlibet longitudine, latitudine, altitudine spatium loci occupantem, neque hoc est anima neque inde facta credenda est. quidquid enim tale est, ut multa non dicam, in quacumque sui parte lineis diuidi uel circumscribi potest: quod anima si pateretur, nullo modo nosse posset tales lineas, quae per longum secari non queunt, quales in corpore non posse inueniri nihilominus nouit. Nec ipsa sibi aliquid tale occurrit, cum se nescire non possit, etiam quando, se ut cognoscat, inquirit. cum enim se quaerit, nouit, quod se quaerat; quod nosse non posset, si se non nosset. neque enim aliunde se quaerit quam a se ipsa. cum ergo quaerentem se nouit, se utique nouit et omne, quod nouit, tota nouit. cum itaque se quaerentem nouit, tota se nouit, ergo et totam se nouit; neque enim aliquid aliud, sed se ipsam tota nouit. quid ergo adhuc se quaerit, si quaerentem se nouit? neque enim si nesciret se, posset quaerentem se scire se; sed hoc in praesenti; quod autem de se quaerit, quid antea fuerit uel quid futura sit quaerit. desinat ergo nunc interim suspicari se esse corpus, quia, si aliquid tale esset, talem se nosset, quae magis se nouit quam caelum et terram, quae per sui corporis oculos nouit. Omitto dicere, quia illud eius, quod etiam pecora habere intelleguntur uel caeli uolatilia, cum habitacula sua seu nidos repetunt, quo capiuntur imagines omnium rerum corporalium, nullo modo cuiquam corpori simile est; et utique hoc potius corpori esse simile deberet, ubi corporearum rerum similitudines continentur. at si hoc corpus non est, quia certum est eas similitudines corporum illic non solum memoriter detineri, uerum etiam innumerabiles pro arbitrio figurari, quanto minus alia qualibet ui sua corpori esse anima similis potest! Si autem corpus esse dicunt alia qualibet notione omne quod est, id est omnem naturam atque substantiam, non quidem admittenda est ista locutio, ne non inueniamus, quomodo loquentes ea, quae corpora non sunt, a corporibus distinguamus; non tamen nimis est de nomine laborandum. nam et nos dicimus, quidquid anima est, non esse horum quattuor notissimorum elementorum, quae manifesta sunt corpora, sed neque hoc esse, quod deus est. quid sit autem, non dicitur melius quam anima uel spiritus uitae. ideo enim additur" uitae", quia et iste aer plerumque dicitur spiritus. quamquam et animam eundem aerem appellauerunt, ut iam non possit inueniri nomen, quo proprie distinguatur ista natura, quae nec corpus nec deus est nec uita sine sensu, qualis potest credi in arboribus, nec uita sine rationali mente, qualis est in pecoribus, sed uita nunc minor quam angelorum, et futura, quod angelorum, si ex praecepto sui creatoris hic uixerit. Unde sit autem, id est de qua uelut materie facta sit uel de qua perfecta beataque natura defluxerit uel utrum omnino ex nihilo facta sit, etiamsi dubitatur et quaeritur, illud tamen minime dubitandum est et, si aliquid antea fuit, a deo factum esse, quod fuit, et eam nunc a deo factam, ut anima uiua sit; aut enim nihil fuit aut hoc, quod est, non fuit. sed illam partem, qua quaerebamus quasi eius materiem unde facta sit, iam satis tractauimus.

For this reason we must not listen either to what some have thought, that there is a certain fifth body from which souls come, which is neither earth nor water nor air nor fire (whether this more turbulent, earthly fire or that pure and bright heavenly one), but something else, lacking a customary name, yet still a body. For if those who think so mean by body what we mean, that is, any nature that occupies a space in place by length, breadth, and height, the soul is neither this nor is it to be believed made from it. For whatever is of that kind, not to say more, can be divided or bounded by lines in any part of it: and if the soul were subject to this, it could in no way know lines of the kind that cannot be cut lengthwise, which it nevertheless knows cannot be found in a body. Nor does the soul meet anything of this kind in itself, since it cannot fail to know itself, even when it inquires so as to know itself. For when it seeks itself, it knows that it is seeking itself; which it could not know if it did not know itself. For it seeks itself from nowhere else than from itself. Since, then, it knows itself seeking, it certainly knows itself, and whatever it knows, it knows as a whole. So when it knows itself seeking, it knows itself as a whole, and therefore it knows the whole of itself; for it knows nothing else but itself, as a whole. Why then does it still seek itself, if it knows itself seeking? For if it did not know itself, it could not know that it is seeking itself; but this is in the present; what it seeks about itself is what it was before or what it will be. Let it stop, then, for the present, suspecting that it is a body, because if it were something of that kind, it would know itself as such, since it knows itself better than it knows heaven and earth, which it knows through the eyes of its body. I pass over saying that that power of the soul which even beasts and the birds of the sky are understood to have when they return to their lairs or nests, in which the images of all bodily things are grasped, is in no way like any body; and surely that power ought rather to be like a body in which the likenesses of bodily things are contained. But if this is not a body, since it is certain that these likenesses of bodies are not only held there in memory but countless ones are also formed at will, how much less can the soul be like a body in any other power of its own! But if they call everything that is, that is, every nature and substance, a body in some other sense, this way of speaking is indeed not to be admitted, lest we find no way of speaking by which to distinguish the things that are not bodies from bodies; yet we need not labor too much over a name. For we too say that whatever the soul is, it is not of these four best known elements, which are plainly bodies, but neither is it what God is. But what it is, is not better said than “soul” or “spirit of life.” “Of life” is added because this air too is often called spirit. Although they have also called this same air soul, so that a name can no longer be found by which this nature can be properly distinguished, which is neither body nor God, nor life without sensation, such as can be believed to be in trees, nor life without a rational mind, such as is in beasts, but a life now lower than that of the angels, and one that will be what the angels are, if it lives here according to its creator's command. But where it comes from, that is, from what material, as it were, it was made, or from what perfect and happy nature it flowed out, or whether it was made wholly from nothing: even though this is doubted and inquired into, this at least is in no way to be doubted, that, if something existed before, what existed was made by God, and that the soul has now been made by God so as to be a living soul; for either nothing existed, or what exists now did not exist. But the part in which we were inquiring into its material, so to speak, from which it was made, we have now treated enough.

7.22CSEL 28.1:219–221

Nunc, si omnino non fuit, quaerendum est, quomodo possit intellegi, quod causalis eius ratio fuisse dicebatur in primis sex dierum operibus dei, quando fecit deus hominem ad imaginem suam, quod nisi secundum animam non recte intellegitur. uerendum est autem, ne, cum dicimus non ipsas tunc naturas atque substantias, quae futurae fuerant, deum creauisse, dum crearet omnia simul, sed earum futurarum causales quasdam rationes, putemur inania quaedam dicere. quae sunt enim istae causales rationes, secundum quas posset iam dici deus fecisse hominem ad imaginem suam, cuius corpus nondum de limo finxerat, cui nondum animam flando fecerat? et corporis quidem humani etiamsi fuit aliqua occulta ratio, qua futurum erat, ut formaretur, erat et materies, de qua formaretur, id est terra, in qua uideri potest illa ratio uelut in semine latuisse; animae autem faciendae, id est flatum faciendi, qui esset anima hominis, quae ibi ratio causalis primitus condita est, cum diceret deus: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram — quod nisi secundum animam recte intellegi non potest —, si nulla erat natura, ubi conderetur? Si enim haec ratio in deo erat, non in creatura, nondum ergo erat condita. quomodo ergo dictum est: fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei? si autem iam in creatura erat, hoc est in his, quae simul omnia creauerat deus, in qua creatura erat? utrum spiritali, an corporali? si spiritali, agebatne aliquid in corporibus mundi, seu caelestibus seu terrestribus? et in ea erat hoc uacans antequam homo in sua natura propria conderetur, sicut. in ipso homine iam propriam ducente uitam latenter otioseque inest ratio generandi, quae non operatur nisi per concubitum atque conceptum. an et illa creatura spiritalis, in qua latenter erat haec ratio, nihil agebat sui operis? et ut quid creata erat? an ut contineret rationem futurae animae humanae uel futurarum animarum, tamquam in se ipsis esse non possent, sed in aliqua creatura uita propria iam uiuente, sicut generandi ratio non potest esse nisi in aliquibus iam existentibus perfectisque naturis? parens ergo animae instituta est aliqua creatura spiritalis, in qua sit ratio futurae animae, quae non inde existat, nisi cum eam deus homini inspirandam facit. neque enim et ex homine fetum uel seminis uel ipsius iam prolis creat et format nisi deus per sapientiam adtingentem ubique propter suam munditiam, ita ut nihil inquinatum in eam incurrat, dum pertendit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauiter. sed nescio, quemadmodum possit intellegi ad hoc tantum creatam nescio quam creaturam spiritalem, quae in dei conditionibus per illos sex dies factis non commemoraretur, cum deus hominem sexto die fecisse dictus est, quem nondum in propria natura fecerat, sed adhuc ratione causali in illa creatura, quae commemorata non est. magis enim debuit ipsa commemorari, quae sic consummata erat, ut non adhuc esset secundum suae praecedentem rationem facienda.

Now, if the soul did not exist at all, we must ask how we can understand the statement that its causal reason existed in the first works of the six days of God, when God made man to his image, which is not rightly understood except of the soul. We must beware, though, lest, when we say that God did not then create the very natures and substances that were to be, when he created all things together, but certain causal reasons of those that were to be, we be thought to be saying something empty. For what are these causal reasons according to which God could already be said to have made man to his image, when he had not yet formed his body from the mud nor made his soul by breathing? And of the human body, even if there was some hidden reason by which it was to be formed, there was also the material from which it would be formed, that is, earth, in which that reason can be seen to have lain hidden as in a seed; but what causal reason for making the soul, that is, for making the breath that would be man's soul, was first founded there when God said, “Let us make man to our image and likeness” (which cannot rightly be understood except of the soul), if there was no nature in which it might be founded? For if this reason was in God, not in a creature, then it had not yet been founded. How then was it said, “God made man to the image of God”? But if it was already in a creature, that is, in the things God had created all together, in what creature was it? Spiritual or bodily? If spiritual, did that creature do anything in the bodies of the world, whether heavenly or earthly? And was this reason lying idle in it before man was founded in his own proper nature, just as in man himself, once he leads his own life, the reason of begetting lies hidden and idle and does not work except through intercourse and conception? Or did that spiritual creature, in which this reason lay hidden, do no work of its own? And for what purpose had it been created? Was it to contain the reason of the human soul to come, or of the souls to come, as though these could not exist in themselves, but only in some creature already living its own life, just as the reason of begetting cannot exist except in natures already existing and complete? Then some spiritual creature was set up as the parent of the soul, in which the reason of the soul to come would be, a soul which does not come into being from it except when God makes it to be breathed into man. For even from man God alone creates and forms the offspring, whether as seed or as the child itself, through Wisdom, which reaches everywhere because of its purity, so that nothing defiled falls into it, while it reaches mightily from end to end and orders all things sweetly. But I do not know how it can be understood that some spiritual creature was created only for this purpose, a creature which would not be mentioned among the works of God made in those six days, when God is said to have made man on the sixth day, whom he had not yet made in his own nature, but still only by a causal reason in that creature which is not mentioned. For that creature ought rather to have been mentioned, which had been so completed that it was not still to be made according to a reason going before it.

7.23CSEL 28.1:221–222

An forte in illius diei natura, quem primitus condidit, si spiritus intellectualis dies ille recte accipitur, hanc faciendae animae causalem rationem deus inseruit, cum sexto die fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, causam scilicet rationemque praefigens, secundum quam eum post illos septem dies faceret, ut uidelicet corporis eius causalem rationem in natura terrae, animae autem in natura illius diei creasse credatur? sed quid aliud dicitur, cum hoc dicitur, nisi angelicum spiritum quasi parentem esse animae humanae, si sic in illo inest animae humanae creandae praecondita ratio, sicut in homine futurae prolis suae, ut corporum quidem humanorum parentes homines sint, animarum autem angeli, creator uero et corporum et animarum deus, sed corporum ex hominibus, animarum ex angelis, aut prioris corporis ex terra et prioris animae ex angelica natura, ubi rationes eorum causales praefixerat, quando primitus fecit hominem in his. quae simul omnia creauit, deinceps uero iam homines ex hominibus, corpus ex corpore, animam ex anima! durum est hoc angeli aut angelorum filiam dicere esse animam, sed multo durius caeli corporei; quanto magis ergo maris et terrae! multo minus igitur in aliqua corporali creatura causalis animae ratio praecondita est, cum faceret deus hominem ad imaginem suam, antequam eum suo tempore de limo formatum flatu animaret. si absurde creditur animam causaliter in natura angelica condidisse.

Or perhaps, in the nature of that day which he founded first, if that day is rightly taken as intellectual spirit, God placed this causal reason for making the soul when on the sixth day he made man to his image, fixing beforehand, that is, the cause and reason according to which he would make him after those seven days, so that he may be believed to have created the causal reason of man's body in the nature of the earth, and that of his soul in the nature of that day? But what else is said, when this is said, than that the angelic spirit is a kind of parent of the human soul, if the reason for creating the human soul is founded beforehand in it in the way that the reason of his future offspring is in a man, so that men are the parents of human bodies and angels the parents of souls, while God is the creator of both bodies and souls, but of bodies from men and of souls from angels; or of the first body from earth and of the first soul from the angelic nature, where he had fixed their causal reasons beforehand when he first made man among the things he created all together, but thereafter men from men, body from body, soul from soul! It is hard to say that the soul is the daughter of an angel or of angels, but much harder to say it is the daughter of the bodily heaven; how much more, then, of sea and earth! Much less, therefore, was the causal reason of the soul founded beforehand in any bodily creature when God made man to his image, before in its own time he animated him, formed from the mud, by his breath, if it is absurd to believe that he founded the soul causally in the angelic nature.

7.24CSEL 28.1:222–223

Illud ergo uideamus, utrum forsitan uerum esse possit, quod certe humanae opinioni tolerabilius mihi uidetur, deum in illis primis operibus, quae simul omnia creauit, animam etiam humanam creasse, quam suo tempore membris ex limo formati corporis inspiraret: cuius corporis in illis simul conditis rebus rationem creasse causaliter, secundum quam fieret, cum faciendum esset, corpus humanum. nam neque illud, quod dictum est" ad imaginem suam", nisi in anima neque illud, quod dictum est "masculum et feminam", nisi in corpore recte intellegimus. credatur ergo, si nulla scripturarum auctoritas seu ueritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi, anima uero iam ipsa crearetur, sicut primitus conditus est dies, et creata lateret in operibus dei, donec eam suo tempore sufflando, hoc est inspirando, formato ex limo corpori insereret.

Let us see, then, whether this may perhaps be true, which certainly seems to me more acceptable to human opinion: that God, in those first works which he created all together, created the human soul too, which in its own time he would breathe into the limbs of the body formed from mud, while of that body he created, among the things founded together, the reason causally, according to which the human body would be made when it was to be made. For we rightly understand “to his image” only of the soul, and “male and female” only of the body. Let it be believed, then, if no authority of the Scriptures or reasoning of truth contradicts it, that man was made on the sixth day in such a way that the causal reason of the human body was created in the elements of the world, but the soul itself was created, just as the day was first founded, and, once created, lay hidden in the works of God until in its own time he put it, by breathing, that is, by breathing into, into the body formed from mud.

7.25CSEL 28.1:223–224

Sed hic rursus non spernenda oritur quaestio. si enim iam facta erat anima et latebat, ubi ei posset esse melius quam ibi? quid ergo fuit causae, ut anima innocenter uiuens insereretur uitae huius carnis, in qua peccando ipsum, qui eam creauit, offenderet, unde eam merito sequeretur laboris aerumna damnationisque cruciatus? an illud dicendum est, quod ad corpus administrandum uoluntate propria fuerit inclinata, in qua uita corporis, quoniam et iuste et inique uiui potest, quod eligeret hoc haberet, uel praemium de iustitia uel de iniquitate subplicium, ut nec illi apostolicae sententiae sit contrarium, qua dicit nondum natos nihil egisse boni seu mali? illa quippe inclinatio uoluntatis ad corpus nondum est actio uel iustitiae uel iniquitatis, de qua ratio reddenda est in iudicio dei recepturo unoquoque secundum ea, quae per corpus gessit, siue bonum siue malum. cur ergo non iam et illud credatur, quod dei nutu ad corpus uenerit, ubi, si uellet secundum eius praeceptum agere, mercedem acciperet uitae aeternae atque angelorum societatis; si autem contemneret, poenas iustissimas lueret siue laboris diuturni siue ignis aeterni? an, quia hoc ipsum, deo uolenti obtemperasse, iam utique actio bona est, et erit contrarium nondum natos nihil egisse uel boni uel mali?

But here again a question arises which is not to be despised. For if the soul had already been made and lay hidden, where could it be better off than there? What reason was there, then, for the soul, living innocently, to be put into the life of this flesh, in which by sinning it would offend him who created it, so that the hardship of toil and the torment of condemnation would rightly follow it? Or must it be said that it was inclined by its own will to govern a body, so that in this life of the body, since one can live in it both justly and unjustly, it would have what it chose, either a reward for justice or a punishment for injustice, so that this would not be contrary to the apostle's statement that those not yet born had done nothing good or evil? For that inclination of the will toward the body is not yet an act either of justice or of injustice, for which account is to be given at the judgment of God, when each will receive according to what he did through the body, whether good or evil. Why, then, should we not believe this too, that it came to the body at God's bidding, where, if it chose to act according to his command, it would receive the reward of eternal life and the company of the angels, but if it despised it, it would pay the most just penalties, either of long toil or of eternal fire? Or, because this very thing, having obeyed God when he willed it, is certainly already a good act, will it be contrary to the statement that those not yet born had done nothing either good or evil?

7.26CSEL 28.1:224

Quae si ita sunt, fatebimur etiam non in eo rerum genere animam primitus creatam, ut esset praescia futuri operis sui uel iusti uel iniqui. nimis quippe incredibile est eam potuisse propria uoluntate inclinari ad corporis uitam, si se ita in quibusdam peccaturam esse praesciret, ut iuste subplicio perpetuo puniretur. iuste sane creator laudatur in omnibus, qui fecit omnia bona ualde. neque enim ex his tantum laudandus est, quibus praescientiam dedit, cum recte laudetur etiam, quia pecora creauit, quibus est natura humana praestantior etiam in ipsis peccantibus. natura quippe hominis ex deo est, non iniquitas, qua se ipse inuoluit male utendo libero arbitrio: quod tamen si non haberet, in natura rerum minus excelleret. cogitandus est quippe homo iuste uiuens etiam non praescius futurorum et ibi uidendum est, excellentia uoluntatis bonae quam non inpediatur ad recte uiuendum et deo placendum, quod ignarus futuri uiuit ex fide. huiusmodi ergo creaturam quisquis esse nollet in rebus, contradicit dei bonitati; quisquis autem poenas eam non uult luere pro peccatis, inimicus est aequitati.

If this is so, we shall also admit that the soul was not first created in such a class of things as to foreknow its future work, whether just or unjust. For it is quite incredible that it could have been inclined by its own will to the life of the body if it foreknew that it would sin in certain things in such a way as to be justly punished with everlasting punishment. The Creator is rightly praised in all things, who made all things very good. For he is not to be praised only for those to which he gave foreknowledge, since he is rightly praised also because he created beasts, to which human nature is superior even in those who sin. For the nature of man is from God, not the injustice in which he has entangled himself by misusing free choice; yet if he did not have free choice, he would be less excellent in the nature of things. For we must think of a man living justly even without foreknowledge of the future, and there we must see how little the excellence of a good will is hindered from living rightly and pleasing God by the fact that, not knowing the future, it lives by faith. Whoever, then, would not want such a creature to exist among things contradicts the goodness of God; and whoever does not want it to pay penalties for its sins is an enemy of justice.

7.27CSEL 28.1:224–225

Sed si ad hoc fit anima, ut mittatur in corpus, quaeri potest, utrum, si noluerit, conpellatur. sed melius creditur hoc naturaliter uelle, id est in ea natura creari, ut uelit, sicut naturale nobis est uelle uiuere; male autem uiuere iam non est naturae, sed peruersae uoluntatis, quam iuste poena consequitur. Frustra ergo iam quaeritur, ei qua ueluti materie facta sit anima, si recte intellegi potest in primis illis operibus facta, cum factus est dies; sicut enim illa, quae non erant, facta sunt, sic et haec inter illa. quodsi et materies aliqua formabilis fuit, et corporalis et spiritalis — non tamen et ipsa instituta nisi a deo, ex quo sunt omnia — quae quidem formationem suam non tempore, sed origine praecederet, sicut uox cantum, quid nisi de materia spiritali facta anima congruentius creditur?

But if the soul is made in order to be sent into a body, it may be asked whether it is compelled if it does not wish it. But it is better believed that it wills this naturally, that is, that it is created in such a nature as to will it, just as it is natural for us to will to live; but to live badly is no longer a matter of nature but of a perverse will, which punishment justly follows. It is useless, then, to ask any longer from what material, as it were, the soul was made, if it can rightly be understood to have been made in those first works, when the day was made; for just as those things which did not exist were made, so was this among them. But if there was also some formable material, both bodily and spiritual (yet not itself set up except by God, from whom are all things), which preceded its own forming not in time but in origin, as sound precedes song, what is more fittingly believed than that the soul was made from spiritual material?

7.28CSEL 28.1:225–229

Si autem aliquis non uult eam existimare factam, nisi cum formato corpori est inspirata, uideat, quid respondeat, cum quaeritur, unde facta sit. aut enim ex nihilo dicturus est deum aliquid fecisse uel facere post illam consummationem operum suorum et debet intueri, quomodo explicet sexto die factum hominem ad imaginem dei — quod nisi secundum animam recte intellegi non posset —, id est in qua natura causalis ratio facta fuerit eius rei, quae nondum fuit, aut non de nihilo, sed de aliquo iam existente factam dicet animam et laborabit inquirendo, quaenam illa natura sit, utrum corporalis an spiritalis, secundum eas quaestiones, quas superius uersauimus, manente illa quoque molestia, ut adhuc quaeratur, in qua substantia creaturarum in sex diebus primitus conditarum causalem illam rationem fecerit animae, quam nondum uel de nihilo uel de aliquo fecerat. Quam si eo modo deuitare uoluerit, ut dicat sexto die etiam de limo factum esse hominem, sed hoc recapitulando postea commemoratum, uideat de muliere quid dicat, quia, masculum et feminam, dixit, fecit eos et benedixit eos. quodsi et ipsam eo die factam esse de uiri osse responderit, adtendat, quomodo adserat sexto die facta uolatilia, quae adducta sunt ad Adam, cum scriptura omne genus uolatilium quinto die creatum ex aquis insinuet, item sexto die ligna etiam quae in paradiso plantata sunt, cum eadem scriptura hoc creaturae genus tertio diei tribuerit. ipsa etiam uerba consideret, quid sit: eiecit adhuc de terra omne lignum pulchrum ad aspectum et bonum ad escam, tamquam illa, quae tertio die terra eiecerat, non erant pulchra ad aspectum et bona ad escam, cum in his essent operibus, quae fecit deus omnia bona ualde; quid sit etiam: finxit deus adhuc de terra omnes bestias agri et omnia uolatilia caeli; tamquam illa non fuerint omnia, quae primo producta erant, uel potius nulla ante producta erant. neque enim dictum est: et finxit deus adhuc de terra ceteras bestias agri et cetera uolatilia caeli, quasi quae minus uel terra sexto die uel aqua quinto die produxerit, sed omnes bestias, inquit, et omnia uolatilia. necnon et illud cogitet, quemadmodum deus et sex diebus fecerit omnia: primo ipsum diem, secundo firmamentum, tertio speciem maris et terrae atque ex terra herbam et ligna, quarto luminaria et sidera, quinto aquarum animalia, sexto terrae, et postea dicatur: cum factus est dies, fecit deus caelum et terram et omne uiride agri, quandoquidem, cum factus est dies, non fecit nisi ipsum diem; quomodo etiam omne uiride agri fecerit, antequam esset super terram, et omne fenum, antequam exoreretur; tunc enim factum, cum exortum est, non, antequam exoreretur, quis non diceret, nisi scripturae uerba reuocarent? meminerit etiam scriptum esse: qui uiuit in aeternum, creauit omnia simul, et uideat, quemadmodum simul creata dici possint, quorum creatio spatiis temporalibus distat, non horarum tantum, sed etiam dierum. curet quoque ostendere, quomodo utrumque sit uerum, quod contrarium uideri potest, et deum in die septimo ab omnibus operibus suis requieuisse, quod Geneseos liber dicit, et usque nunc eum operari, quod dominus dicit. respiciat etiam quae dicta sunt consummata, quomodo eadem dicta sint inchoata. His enim omnibus diuinae scripturae testimoniis, quam esse ueracem nemo dubitat nisi infidelis aut inpius, ad illam sententiam ducti sumus, ut diceremus deum ab exordio saeculi primum simul omnia creauisse, quaedam conditis iam ipsis naturis, quaedam praeconditis causis; sicut non solum praesentia, uerum etiam futura fecit omnipotens et ab eis factis requieuit, ut eorum deinceps administratione atque regimine crearet etiam ordines temporum et temporalium, quia et consummauerat ea propter omnium generum terminationem et inchoauerat propter saeculorum propagationem, ut propter consummata requiesceret, propter inchoata usque nunc operaretur. sed si possunt haec melius intellegi, non solum non resisto, uerum etiam faueo. Nunc tamen de anima, quam deus inspirauit homini sufflando in eius faciem, nihil confirmo, nisi quia ex deo sic est, ut non sit substantia dei et sit incorporea. id est non sit corpus, sed spiritus, non de substantia dei genitus nec de substantia dei procedens, sed factus a deo, nec ita factus, ut in eius naturam natura ulla corporis uel inrationalis animae uerteretur, ac per hoc de nihilo; et quod sit inmortalis secundum quendam uitae modum, quem nullo modo potest amittere; secundum quandam uero mutabilitatem, qua potest uel deterior uel melior fieri, non inmerito etiam mortalis possit intellegi, quoniam ueram inmortalitatem solus ille habet, de quo proprie dictum est: qui solus habet inmortalitatem. cetera, quae in hoc libro locutus sum disceptando, ad hoc ualeant legenti, ut aut nouerit, quemadmodum sine adfirmandi temeritate quaerenda sint, quae non aperte scriptura loquitur, aut, si ei quaerendi modus iste non placet, quemadmodum ipse quaesiuerit sciam, ut, si me potest docere, non abnuam, si autem non potest, a quo ambo discamus mecum requirat.

But if anyone does not want to think that the soul was made except when it was breathed into the formed body, let him see what he will answer when asked from what it was made. For either he will say that God made or makes something from nothing after that completion of his works, and he must consider how he will explain that man was made on the sixth day to the image of God (which cannot rightly be understood except of the soul), that is, in what nature the causal reason was made of a thing that did not yet exist; or he will say that the soul was made not from nothing but from something already existing, and he will labor in inquiring what that nature is, whether bodily or spiritual, according to the questions we turned over above, while that difficulty also remains, that it is still asked in which substance of the creatures first founded in the six days God made that causal reason of the soul, which he had not yet made either from nothing or from something. And if he wishes to avoid this by saying that man was also made from the mud on the sixth day, but that this was mentioned afterwards by way of recapitulation, let him see what he will say about the woman, because it says, “Male and female he made them, and he blessed them.” And if he answers that she too was made on that day from the man's bone, let him consider how he will assert that the birds that were brought to Adam were made on the sixth day, when Scripture indicates that every kind of bird was created from the waters on the fifth day; and likewise that the trees which were planted in paradise were made on the sixth day, when the same Scripture assigned this kind of creature to the third day. Let him also consider the words themselves, what is meant by “He made to spring up besides from the earth every tree beautiful to look at and good for food,” as though those which the earth had brought forth on the third day were not beautiful to look at and good for food, when they were among the works all of which God made very good; and what is meant by “God formed besides from the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky,” as though those first produced were not all, or rather none had been produced before. For it does not say, “And God formed besides from the earth the rest of the beasts of the field and the rest of the birds of the sky,” as if supplying those which the earth on the sixth day or the water on the fifth day had produced less, but “all the beasts,” it says, “and all the birds.” Let him also think how God both made all things in six days (first the day itself, on the second the firmament, on the third the form of sea and land and from the land plants and trees, on the fourth the lights and stars, on the fifth the creatures of the waters, on the sixth those of the land) and it is afterwards said, “When the day was made, God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field,” since, when the day was made, he made nothing but the day itself; how, too, he made every green thing of the field before it was upon the earth, and every plant before it sprang up; for who would not say it was made when it sprang up, not before it sprang up, unless the words of Scripture called him back? Let him remember too that it is written, “He who lives for ever created all things together,” and see how things can be said to have been created together whose creation is separated by intervals of time, not only of hours but of days. Let him take care also to show how both are true, though they may seem contrary: that God rested on the seventh day from all his works, as the book of Genesis says, and that he is working until now, as the Lord says. Let him consider too how the things said to have been completed are said also to have been begun. For by all these testimonies of divine Scripture, which no one doubts to be truthful except an unbeliever or an ungodly man, we were led to the view that we said God from the beginning of the age first created all things together, some with their natures already founded, some with their causes founded beforehand; just as the Almighty made not only present things but also future ones, and rested from making them, so that afterwards, by governing and ruling them, he might also create the orders of times and of temporal things; for he had both completed them, because of the boundaries of all kinds, and begun them, because of the unfolding of the ages, so that because of the completed things he rested, and because of the begun things he is working until now. But if these things can be better understood, I not only do not resist but welcome it. For now, however, about the soul which God breathed into man by breathing into his face, I affirm nothing except that it is from God in such a way that it is not the substance of God, and that it is bodiless, that is, not a body but a spirit; not begotten from the substance of God nor proceeding from the substance of God, but made by God; and not made in such a way that any nature of body or of irrational soul was turned into its nature, and therefore made from nothing; and that it is immortal according to a certain mode of life which it can in no way lose; but according to a certain changeableness, by which it can become worse or better, it may not unfittingly be understood to be also mortal, since true immortality belongs only to him of whom it is properly said, “who alone has immortality.” The other things I have said in this book by way of discussion should serve the reader for this: either to know how the things which Scripture does not say openly are to be inquired into without rashness in affirming, or, if this way of inquiring does not please him, to let me know how he himself has inquired, so that, if he can teach me, I may not refuse; but if he cannot, let him seek with me the one from whom we may both learn.

Chapter 8

8.1CSEL 28.1:229–232

Et plantauit deus paradisum in Eden ad orientem et posuit ibi hominem quem finxit. non ignoro de paradiso multos multa dixisse; tres tamen de hac re quasi generales sunt sententiae. una eorum, qui tantummodo corporaliter paradisum intellegi uolunt, alia eorum, qui spiritaliter tantum, tertia eorum, qui utroque modo paradisum accipiunt, alias corporaliter, alias autem spiritaliter. breuiter ergo ut dicam, tertiam mihi fateor placere sententiam. secundum hanc suscepi nunc loqui de paradiso, quod dominus donare dignabitur, ut homo factus e limo — quod utique corpus humanum est — in paradiso corporali conlocatus intellegatur, ut, quemadmodum ipse Adam, etsi aliquid aliud significat secundum id, quod eum formam futuri esse dixit apostolus, homo tamen in natura propria expressus accipitur, qui uixit certo numero annorum et propagata numerosa prole mortuus est, sicut moriuntur et ceteri homines, etsi non sicut ceteri ex parentibus natus, sed sicut primitus oportebat ex terra factus est, ita et paradisus, in quo eum conlocauit deus, nihil aliud quam locus quidam intellegatur terrae scilicet, ubi habitaret homo terrenus. Narratio quippe in his libris non genere locutionis figuratarum rerum est sicut in Cantico canticorum, sed omnino gestarum est sicut in Regnorum libris et huiuscemodi ceteris. sed quia illic ea dicuntur, quae uitae humanae usus notissimus habet, non difficile, immo promtissime primitus accipiuntur ad litteram, ut deinde ex illis quid etiam futurorum res ipsae gestae significauerint exculpatur; hic autem, quia ea dicuntur, quae usitatum naturae cursum intuentibus non occurrant, nolunt ea quidam proprie, sed figurate dicta intellegi atque ex illo loco uolunt incipere historiam, id est rerum proprie gestarum narrationem, ex quo dimissi de paradiso Adam et Eua conuenerunt atque genuerunt. quasi uero usitatum nobis sit, uel quod tot annos uixerunt uel quod Enoch translatus est uel quod et grandaeua et sterilis peperit et cetera eiusmodi. Sed alia est, inquiunt, narratio factorum mirabilium, alia institutarum creaturarum; illic enim ea ipsa insolita ostendunt alios esse tamquam naturales modos rerum, alios miraculorum — quae magnalia nominantur — hic autem ipsa insinuatur institutio naturarum. quibus respondetur: sed ideo insolita et ipsa, quia prima. nam quid tam sine exemplo et sine pari facto in rerum mundanarum constitutione quam mundus? num ideo credendum non est deum fecisse mundum, quia iam non facit mundos, aut non fecisse solem, quia iam non facit soles? et hoc quidem non de paradiso, sed de ipso homine permotis debuit responderi; nunc uero, cum ipsum sic credant a deo factum, sicut alius nullus factus est, cur paradisum nolunt ita factum credere, quemadmodum nunc uident siluas fieri? Ad eos quippe loquor, qui auctoritatem harum litterarum sequuntur; eorum enim quidam non proprie, sed figurate paradisum intellegi uolunt. nam qui omnino aduersantur his litteris, alias cum eis atque aliter egimus, quamquam et haec in hoc ipso opere nostro, quantum ualemus, ita defendamus ad litteram, ut, qui non rationabiliter moti propter animum peruicacem uel hebetem credere ista detrectant, nullam tamen inueniant rationem, unde falsa esse conuincant. uerum isti nostri, qui fidem habent his diuinis libris et nolunt paradisum ad proprietatem litterae intellegi, locum scilicet amoenissimum, fructuosis nemoribus opacatum eundemque magnum et magno fonte fecundum, cum uideant nulla humana opera tot ac tanta uirecta siluescere occulto opere dei, miror, quemadmodum credant ipsum hominem ita factum, quemadmodum numquam uiderunt. aut si et ipse figurate intellegendus est, quis genuit Cain et Abel et Seth? an et ipsi figurate tantum fuerunt, non etiam homines ex hominibus nati? de proximo ergo adtendant istam praesumtionem quo tendat et conentur nobiscum cuncta primitus, quae gesta narrantur, in expressionem proprietatis accipere. quis enim eis postea non faueat intellegentibus, quid ista etiam figurata significatione commoneant, siue ipsarum spiritalium naturarum uel adfectionum siue rerum etiam futurarum? sane si nullo modo possent salua fide ueritatis ea, quae corporaliter hic nominata sunt, etiam corporaliter accipi, quid aliud remaneret, nisi ut ea potius figurate dicta intellegeremus, quam scripturam sanctam inpie culparemus? porro autem, si non solum non inpediunt, uerum etiam solidius adserunt diuini eloquii narrationem haec etiam corporaliter intellecta, nemo erit, ut opinor, tam infideliter pertinax, qui cum ea secundum regulam fidei exposita proprie uiderit malit in pristina remanere sententia, si forte illi uisa fuerant, nonnisi figurate posse accipi.

“And God planted paradise in Eden toward the east, and placed there the man whom he had formed.” I am not unaware that many people have said many things about paradise; yet there are, so to speak, three general views on the matter. One is of those who want paradise to be understood only bodily; another of those who want it understood only spiritually; the third of those who take paradise in both ways, sometimes bodily and sometimes spiritually. To put it briefly, then, I confess that the third view pleases me. According to it I have undertaken now to speak about paradise, as the Lord will deign to grant, so that the man made from mud (which is certainly a human body) may be understood as placed in a bodily paradise. Just as Adam himself, even if he signifies something else, according to the apostle's saying that he was a type of the one to come, is still taken as a man expressed in his own nature, who lived a certain number of years and, having produced numerous offspring, died, just as other men die, even if he was not born from parents like the rest but was made from the earth, as had to be at the first; so too paradise, in which God placed him, is to be understood as nothing other than a certain place, namely of the earth, where an earthly man might live. For the narrative in these books is not in the kind of speech used for figurative things, as in the Song of Songs, but is wholly of things done, as in the books of Kingdoms and others of that kind. But because in those books things are said which the most familiar experience of human life contains, they are taken first, not with difficulty but very readily, in the literal sense, so that afterwards one may draw out from them what the very events also signified of things to come; here, however, because things are said which do not occur to those who look at the usual course of nature, some do not want them understood as said properly but figuratively, and they want the history, that is, the narrative of things properly done, to begin from the point where Adam and Eve, sent out of paradise, came together and had children. As though it were usual for us that they lived so many years, or that Enoch was taken away, or that a woman both very old and barren gave birth, and the like. “But,” they say, “a narrative of wonderful deeds is one thing, a narrative of the founding of creatures another; for there the very unusualness of the events shows that there are some modes of things that are natural, so to speak, and others that are miracles (which are called mighty works), whereas here the founding of natures itself is being presented.” To them the answer is: but these too are unusual because they are the first. For what is so without example and without equal in the establishment of worldly things as the world? Is it therefore not to be believed that God made the world, because he no longer makes worlds, or that he made the sun, because he no longer makes suns? And this answer should indeed have been given to those disturbed not about paradise but about man himself; but as it is, since they believe that man was made by God in a way that no one else was made, why are they unwilling to believe that paradise was made in the way they now see woods come to be? I am speaking, of course, to those who follow the authority of these writings; for some of them want paradise understood not properly but figuratively. With those who are wholly opposed to these writings we have dealt elsewhere and in another way, although in this very work too we defend these things in the literal sense as far as we can, so that those who refuse to believe them, moved not by reason but by a stubborn or dull mind, may still find no reason by which to prove them false. But as for these people of ours, who have faith in these divine books and do not want paradise understood according to the proper sense of the letter, namely as a most pleasant place, shaded by fruitful groves, and also large and made fertile by a great spring, though they see so many and such great green places grow into woods with no human work, by the hidden work of God: I wonder how they believe that man himself was made in a way they have never seen. Or if he too is to be understood figuratively, who begot Cain and Abel and Seth? Or were they too only figurative, and not also men born of men? Let them consider, then, from close at hand where this presumption leads, and let them try with us to take all the things that are narrated as done first as the expression of their proper sense. For who would not afterwards support them when they understand what these things also suggest by figurative meaning, whether about spiritual natures or affections themselves, or about things to come? Certainly, if the things which are named here bodily could in no way be taken bodily without harm to the faith of truth, what would remain but to understand them as said figuratively, rather than ungodly to find fault with holy Scripture? But if, understood bodily, these things not only do not hinder but even more firmly support the narrative of the divine word, there will be no one, I think, so unbelievingly stubborn that, when he sees them expounded in their proper sense according to the rule of faith, he would prefer to remain in his former opinion, if perhaps it had seemed to him that they could only be taken figuratively.

8.2CSEL 28.1:232–233

Nam et ego contra Manichaeos, qui has litteras ueteris testamenti non aliter quam oportet accipiendo errant, sed omnino non accipiendo et detestando blasphemant, duos conscripsi libros recenti tempore conuersionis meae, cito uolens eorum uel confutare deliramenta uel erigere intentionem ad quaerendam in litteris, quas oderunt, christianam et euangelicam fidem. et quia non mihi tunc occurrebant omnia quemadmodum proprie possent accipi magisque non posse uidebantur aut uix posse atque difficile, ne retardarer, quid figurate significarent, ea quae ad litteram inuenire non potui, quanta ualui breuitate ac perspicuitate explicaui, ne uel multa lectione uel disputationis obscuritate deterriti in manus ea sumere non curarent. memor tamen quid maxime uoluerim nec potuerim, ut non figurate sed proprie primitus cuncta intellegerentur, nec omnino desperans etiam sic posse intellegi id ipsum in prima parte secundi libri ita posui. sane, inquam, quisquis uoluerit omnia, quae dicta sunt, secundum litteram accipere, id est non aliter intellegere, quam littera sonat, et potest euitare blasphemias et omnia congruentia fidei catholicae praedicare, non solum ei non est inuidendum, sed praecipuus multumque laudabilis intellector habendus est. si autem nullus exitus datur, ut pie et digne deo quae scripta sunt intellegantur, nisi figurate atque in aenigmatis proposita ista credamus habentes auctoritatem apostolicam, a quibus tam multa de libris ueteris testamenti soluuntur aenigmata, modum, quem intendimus, teneamus adiuuante illo, qui nos petere, quaerere et pulsare adhortatur, ut omnes istas figuras rerum secundum catholicam fidem, siue quae ad historiam siue quae ad prophetiam pertinent, explicemus non praeiudicantes meliori diligentiorique tractatui siue per nos siue per alios, quibus dominus reuelare dignatur. haec tunc dixi. nunc autem quia uoluit dominus, ut ea diligentius intuens atque considerans non frustra, quantum opinor, extimarem etiam per me posse secundum propriam, non secundum allegoricam locutionem haec scripta esse monstrari, sicut ea, quae superius uoluimus ostendere, sic etiam quae sequuntur de paradiso perscrutemur.

For I too, against the Manichees, who err not by taking these writings of the Old Testament otherwise than they should, but blaspheme by not accepting them at all and detesting them, wrote two books soon after my conversion, wishing quickly either to refute their ravings or to direct their attention to seeking the Christian and gospel faith in the writings which they hate. And because at that time it did not occur to me how all things could be taken in their proper sense, and it seemed rather that they could not, or could only barely and with difficulty, I explained, so as not to be held up, what the things which I could not find in the literal sense signified figuratively, as briefly and clearly as I could, so that they might not be deterred by much reading or by obscure argument from taking them in hand. Yet, remembering what I chiefly wanted and could not achieve, that all things should be understood first not figuratively but properly, and not wholly despairing that they could be understood so, I put it this way in the first part of the second book: “Certainly,” I said, “whoever wishes to take all that has been said according to the letter, that is, to understand it no otherwise than the letter sounds, and can avoid blasphemies and declare everything in agreement with the catholic faith, should not only not be begrudged, but should be held an outstanding and highly praiseworthy interpreter. But if no way out is given for understanding what is written in a manner pious and worthy of God except by believing these things to be set forth figuratively and in riddles, having the authority of the apostles, by whom so many riddles of the books of the Old Testament are solved, let us keep to the method we intend, with the help of him who urges us to ask, seek, and knock, so as to explain all these figures of things according to the catholic faith, whether they belong to history or to prophecy, without prejudice to a better and more careful treatment, either by us or by others to whom the Lord deigns to reveal it.” That is what I said then. But now, since the Lord has willed that, looking at and considering these things more carefully, I should think, not in vain I believe, that I too could show that these things were written according to their proper and not according to an allegorical manner of speech, let us examine what follows about paradise in the same way as we wished to show the earlier things.

8.3CSEL 28.1:233–235

Plantauit ergo deus paradisum in deliciis — hoc est enim in Eden — ad orientem et posuit ibi hominem, quem finxerat. sic enim scriptum est, quia sic factum est. deinde recapitulat, ut hoc ipsum, quod breuiter posuit, ostendat quemadmodum factum sit, hoc est quemadmodum paradisum deus plantauerit et illic hominem, quem finxerat, constituerit. sic enim sequitur: et eiecit adhuc deus de terra omne lignum pulchrum ad aspectum et bonum ad escam. non dixit: et eiecit deus de terra aliud lignum uel ceterum lignum, sed: eiecit, inquit, adhuc de terra omne lignum pulchrum ad aspectum et bonum ad escam. iam ergo tunc produxerat terra omne lignum et pulchrum ad aspectum et bonum ad escam, hoc est tertio die; nam sexto die dixerat: ecce dedi uobis omne pabulum seminale seminans semen, quod est super omnem terram, et omne lignum fructiferum, quod habet in se fructum seminis seminalis, quod erit uobis ad escam. num ergo aliud eis tunc dedit, aliud nunc dare uoluit? non opinor. sed cum ex his generibus sint ista ligna instituta in paradiso, quae iam terra tertio die produxerat, adhuc ea produxit in tempore suo, quia tunc scilicet, quod scriptum est ea produxisse terram, causaliter factum erat in terra; hoc est, quia tunc ea producendi uirtutem latenter acceperat, qua uirtute fit, ut etiam nunc talia terra progignat in manifesto atque in tempore suo. Uerba ergo dei sexto die dicentis: ecce dedi uobis omne pabulum seminale seminans semen, quod est super omnem terram et cetera non sonabili uel temporali uoce prolata uerba sunt, sed sicut in uerbo eius est creandi potentia; dici autem hominibus, quid sine temporalibus sonis deus dixerit, nonnisi per temporales sonos potuit. futurum enim erat, ut homo iam de limo formatus et flatu eius animatus et quidquid ex illo humani generis extitisset uteretur eis ad escam, quae super terram exortura erant ex illa uirtute generandi, quam terra iam acceperat. cuius futuri causales rationes in creatura condens, tamquam iam extitisset, loquebatur interna atque intima ueritate, quam nec oculus uidit nec auris audiuit, sed spiritus eius scribenti utique reuelauit.

So “God planted paradise in delights” (for this is what Eden means) “toward the east, and placed there the man whom he had formed.” It is written so because it was done so. Then he recapitulates, so as to show how this very thing which he set down briefly was done, that is, how God planted paradise and established there the man whom he had formed. For it goes on: “And God made to spring up besides from the earth every tree beautiful to look at and good for food.” He did not say, “And God made to spring up from the earth another tree” or “the rest of the trees,” but “he made to spring up besides from the earth,” it says, “every tree beautiful to look at and good for food.” So the earth had already then brought forth every tree both beautiful to look at and good for food, that is, on the third day; for on the sixth day he had said, “Behold, I have given you every seed-bearing plant yielding seed, which is upon all the earth, and every fruit-bearing tree that has in it the fruit of seed-bearing seed, which shall be food for you.” Did he then give them one thing, and wish to give another now? I think not. But since these trees set up in paradise were of the kinds which the earth had already brought forth on the third day, the earth brought them forth besides in their own time, because then, of course, what is written, that the earth brought them forth, was done causally in the earth; that is, because then it had received in hidden form the power of bringing them forth, by which power it comes about that even now the earth produces such things openly and in their own time. So the words of God saying on the sixth day, “Behold, I have given you every seed-bearing plant yielding seed, which is upon all the earth,” and the rest, are not words uttered by a sounding or temporal voice, but are as the power of creating is in his Word; but what God said without temporal sounds could be told to men only through temporal sounds. For it was to come about that man, once formed from mud and animated by his breath, and whatever of the human race came from him, would use for food the things that were to spring up on the earth from that power of generating which the earth had already received. Founding the causal reasons of this future in creation, he spoke as though it already existed, by an inner and inmost truth, which eye has not seen nor ear heard, but which his Spirit certainly revealed to the writer.

8.4CSEL 28.1:235–237

Illud plane, quod sequitur: et lignum uitae in medio paradiso et lignum scientiae dinoscendi bonum et malum, diligentius considerandum est, ne cogat in allegoriam, ut non ista ligna fuerint, sed aliud aliquid nomine ligni significent. dictum est enim de sapientia: lignum uitae est omnibus amplectentibus eam. uerum tamen cum sit Hierusalem aeterna in caelis, etiam in terra ciuitas, qua illa significaretur, condita est; et Sarra et Agar quamuis duo testamenta significarent, erant tamen etiam quaedam mulieres duae; et cum Christus per ligni passionem fluento spiritali nos inriget, erat tamen et petra, quae aquam sitienti populo ligno percussa manauit, de qua diceretur: petra autem erat Christus. aliud quam erant illa omnia significauerunt, sed tamen etiam ipsa corporaliter fuerunt. et quando a narrante commemorata sunt, non erat illa figurata locutio, sed earum expressa narratio, quarum erat figurata praecessio. erat ergo et lignum uitae quemadmodum petra Christus, nec sine mysteriis rerum spiritalium corporaliter praesentatis uoluit hominem deus in paradiso uiuere. erat ergo ei in lignis ceteris alimentum, in illo autem sacramentum, quid significans nisi sapientiam, de qua sic dictum est: lignum uitae est amplectentibus eam, quemadmodum de Christo diceretur: petra manans est sitientibus eum? recte quippe appellatur quod ad eum significandum praecessit. ipse est ouis, quae immolatur in pascha; tamen et illud non tantum dicendo figurabatur, sed etiam faciendo. neque enim ouis illa non erat ouis; plane ouis erat et occidebatur et manducabatur. et tamen eo uero facto aliud etiam quiddam figurabatur, non sicut ille uitulus saginatus, qui minore filio reuertente in epulas caesus est. ibi quippe ipsa narratio figurarum est, non rerum figurata significatione gestarum. non enim hoc euangelista, sed ipse dominus narrauit: euangelista uero dominum hoc narrasse narrauit. proinde ergo quod narrauit euangelista etiam factum est, dominum scilicet talia locutum fuisse; ipsius autem domini narratio parabola fuit, de qua numquam exigitur, ut etiam ad litteram facta monstrentur, quae sermone proferuntur. Christus est et lapis unctus a Iacob et lapis reprobatus ab aedificantibus, qui factus est in caput anguli; sed illud etiam in rebus gestis factum est, hoc autem tantum in figuris praedictum. illud quippe scripsit narrator rerum praeteritarum, hoc praenuntiator tantummodo futurarum.

But what follows, “and the tree of life in the middle of paradise, and the tree of the knowledge of discerning good and evil,” must be considered more carefully, lest it force us into allegory, so that these were not trees but signify something else under the name of tree. For it is said of Wisdom, “She is a tree of life to all who embrace her.” But although there is an eternal Jerusalem in the heavens, a city by which it might be signified was also founded on earth; and although Sarah and Hagar signified the two covenants, they were nevertheless also two real women; and although Christ waters us with a spiritual stream through the suffering on the wood, there was nevertheless also the rock which, struck with wood, poured out water for the thirsty people, of which it could be said, “And the rock was Christ.” All those things signified something other than what they were, but they also existed bodily themselves. And when they were mentioned by the narrator, that was not figurative speech, but the express narrative of things which were a figurative foreshadowing. So there was also a tree of life, as the rock was Christ; and God did not wish man to live in paradise without the mysteries of spiritual things presented bodily. So in the other trees he had nourishment, but in that one a sacrament; signifying what but Wisdom, of whom it was said, “She is a tree of life to those who embrace her,” just as it might be said of Christ, “He is a flowing rock to those who thirst for him”? For what went before to signify him is rightly called by his name. He is the lamb that is sacrificed at the Passover; yet that was prefigured not only by saying but also by doing. For that lamb was certainly a lamb; it was plainly a lamb and was killed and eaten. And yet by that real deed something else was also prefigured; not like that fatted calf which was killed for the feast when the younger son returned. For there the narrative itself is of figures, not of things done with a figurative meaning. For it was not the evangelist but the Lord himself who narrated this; the evangelist narrated that the Lord narrated it. So what the evangelist narrated also happened, namely that the Lord said such things; but the Lord's own narrative was a parable, of which it is never required that the things told in words be shown to have happened literally. Christ is both the stone anointed by Jacob and the stone rejected by the builders which has become the head of the corner; but the first also happened in actual events, while the second was only foretold in figures. For the first was written by a narrator of past events, the second by one who only foretold future ones.

8.5CSEL 28.1:237–239

Sic et sapientia, idem ipse Christus, lignum uitae est in paradiso spiritali, quo misit de cruce latronem; creatum est autem quod eam significaret, lignum uitae etiam in paradiso corporali, quia hoc illa scriptura dixit, quae res suis temporibus gestas narrans et hominem corporaliter factum et in corpore uiuentem ibi constitutum esse narrauit. aut si quisquam putat animas, cum corpore excesserint, locis corporaliter uisibilibus contineri, cum sint sine corpore, adserat sententiam suam; non deerunt, qui sic faueant, ut illum etiam diuitem sitientem in loco utique corporali fuisse contendant ipsamque animam omnino esse corpoream propter arentem linguam et stillam aquae de Lazari digito concupitam pronuntiare non dubitent, cum quibus ego de tam magna quaestione nulla temeritate confligo. melius est enim dubitare de occultis quam litigare de incertis. illum quippe diuitem in ardore poenarum et illum pauperem in refrigerio gaudiorum intellegendos esse non dubito. sed quomodo intellegenda sit illa flamma inferni, ille sinus Abrahae, illa lingua diuitis, ille digitus pauperis, illa sitis tormenti, illa stilla refrigerii, uix fortasse a mansuete quaerentibus, a contentiose autem certantibus numquam inuenitur. cito sane respondendum est, ne nos profunda ista quaestio et multi sermonis indigens tardet. si corporalibus locis animae continentur, etiam exutae corporibus, potuit ille latro in eum introduci paradisum, ubi fuerat corpus primi hominis, ut aptiore scripturarum loco, si ulla necessitas flagitauerit, etiam de hac re quid uel quaeramus uel arbitremur utcumque promamus. Nunc uero. quod sapientia non sit corpus et ideo nec lignum, nec dubito nec dubitari a quoquam puto; potuisse autem per lignum, id est per corpoream creaturam tamquam sacramento quodam significari sapientiam in paradiso corporali ille credendum non existimat, qui uel tam multa in scripturis rerum spiritalium corporalia sacramenta non uidet uel hominem primum cum eiusmodi aliquo sacramento uiuere non debuisse contendit, cum apostolus dicat etiam hoc, quod de muliere dixit, quam constat ei factam esse de latere, propterea relinquet homo patrem et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae; et erunt duo in carne una, sacramentum hoc magnum esse in Christo et in ecclesia. mirum est autem et uix ferendum, quemadmodum uelint homines paradisum figurate dictum et nolint etiam figurate factum. quodsi concedunt sicut de Agar et Sarra, sicut de Ismahel et Isaac haec quoque et facta et tamen etiam figurata, cur non admittant etiam lignum uitae et uere aliquod lignum fuisse et tamen sapientiam figurasse non uideo. Illud quoque addo quamquam corporalem cibum, talem tamen illam arborem praestitisse, quo corpus hominis sanitate stabili firmaretur, non sicut ex alio cibo, sed nonnulla inspiratione salubritatis occulta. profecto enim licet usitatus panis aliquid tamen amplius habuit, cuius una collyride hominem deus ab indigentia famis dierum quadraginta spatio uindicauit. an forte credere dubitabimus per alicuius arboris cibum cuiusdam altioris significationis gratia homini deum praestitisse, ne corpus eius uel infirmitate uel aetate in deterius mutaretur aut in occasum etiam laberetur, qui ipsi cibo humano praestitit tam mirabilem statum, ut in fictilibus uasculis farina et oleum deficientes reficeret nec deficeret? iam hic de genere contentiosorum quisquam existat et dicat deum in terris nostris miracula talia facere debuisse, in paradiso autem non debuisse: quasi uero non uel de puluere hominem uel de latere uiri mulierem maius ibi miraculum fecit, quam quod hic mortuos suscitauit.-

So too Wisdom, who is Christ himself, is the tree of life in the spiritual paradise, into which he sent the thief from the cross; but there was also created, to signify her, a tree of life in the bodily paradise, because that Scripture said so which, narrating things done in their own times, narrated both that man was made bodily and that, living in the body, he was established there. Or if anyone thinks that souls, when they have left the body, are held in bodily visible places, though they are without a body, let him maintain his view; there will be no lack of people to support it, so that they contend that even that rich man who thirsted was in a bodily place, and do not hesitate to declare that the soul itself is wholly bodily because of the parched tongue and the drop of water desired from Lazarus's finger; with them I do not rashly do battle about so great a question. For it is better to doubt about hidden things than to quarrel about uncertain ones. I do not doubt that that rich man is to be understood as in the burning of punishment, and that poor man in the refreshment of joys. But how that flame of hell is to be understood, that bosom of Abraham, that tongue of the rich man, that finger of the poor man, that thirst of torment, that drop of refreshment, is perhaps hardly found by those who seek gently, and never by those who fight contentiously. I must answer briefly, lest this deep question, which needs much discussion, hold us up. If souls are held in bodily places, even when stripped of their bodies, that thief could have been brought into the paradise where the body of the first man had been; so that in a more suitable place in the Scriptures, if any need demands it, we may set out in some fashion what we either ask or think on this matter too. But for now, that Wisdom is not a body and therefore not a tree, I do not doubt, nor do I think anyone doubts; but that Wisdom could have been signified in the bodily paradise through a tree, that is, through a bodily creature, as by a kind of sacrament, he alone thinks unbelievable who either does not see so many bodily sacraments of spiritual things in the Scriptures, or contends that the first man ought not to have lived with any sacrament of that kind, although the apostle says that even this, which was said about the woman who was certainly made for him from his side, “Therefore a man will leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife, and the two will be in one flesh,” is a great sacrament in Christ and in the church. But it is strange and hardly bearable how people want paradise to have been spoken of figuratively but do not want it to have been made figuratively too. And if they grant that, as with Hagar and Sarah, as with Ishmael and Isaac, these things too were both done and also figurative, I do not see why they do not admit that the tree of life too was truly a tree and yet prefigured Wisdom. I add this too: that although that tree gave bodily food, it was such as to strengthen the body of man in lasting health, not as from other food, but by some hidden inbreathing of wholeness. For certainly the ordinary bread had something more about it, by one cake of which God protected a man from the want of hunger for forty days. Or shall we hesitate to believe that through the food of some tree, for the sake of some higher signification, God granted to man that his body should not be changed for the worse by weakness or age, or even slip into death, when he gave to human food itself so wonderful a state that, in clay jars, flour and oil, as they ran out, were restored and did not run out? Now let someone of the contentious kind arise and say that God ought to have done such miracles in our lands, but not in paradise: as if he did not do a greater miracle there in making man from dust or woman from the man's side than when here he raised the dead.

8.6CSEL 28.1:239–240

Sequitur, ut uideamus de ligno scientiae dinoscendi bonum et malum. prorsus et hoc lignum erat uisibile et corporale sicut arbores ceterae. quod ergo lignum esset, non est dubitandum; sed cur hoc nomen acceperit, requirendum. mihi autem etiam atque etiam consideranti dici non potest quantum placeat illa sententia non fuisse illam arborem cibo noxiam — neque enim qui fecerat omnia bona ualde in paradiso institueret aliquid mali - sed malum fuisse homini transgressionem praecepti. oportebat autem, ut homo sub domino deo positus alicunde prohiberetur, ut ei promerendi dominum suum uirtus esset ipsa oboedientia, quam possum uerissime dicere solam esse uirtutem omni creaturae rationali agenti sub dei potestate, primumque esse et maximum uitium tumoris ad ruinam sua potestate uelle uti, cuius uitii nomen est inoboedientia. non esset ergo, unde se homo dominum habere cogitaret atque sentiret, nisi ei aliquid iuberetur. arbor itaque illa non erat mala, sed appellata est scientiae dinoscendi bonum et malum, quia, si post prohibitionem ex illa homo ederet, in illa erat praecepti futura transgressio, in qua homo per experimentum poenae disceret, quid interesset inter oboedientiae bonum et inoboedientiae malum. proinde et hoc non in figura dictum, sed uere quoddam lignum accipiendum est, cui non de fructu uel pomo quod indidem nasceretur, sed ex ipsa re nomen inpositum est, quae illo contra uetitum tacto fuerat secutura.

Next we are to look at the tree of the knowledge of discerning good and evil. This tree too was certainly visible and bodily like the other trees. That it was a tree, then, is not to be doubted; but why it received this name must be asked. Now when I consider it again and again, I cannot say how much I am pleased by the view that that tree was not harmful as food (for he who had made all things very good would not have set up anything evil in paradise), but that the evil for man was the transgression of the command. For it was fitting that man, placed under the Lord God, should be forbidden something, so that obedience itself should be his virtue for deserving well of his Lord; obedience, I can say most truly, is the only virtue of every rational creature acting under God's power, and the first and greatest vice of swelling pride, leading to ruin, is to want to use one's own power; and the name of this vice is disobedience. So there would be nothing by which man might think and feel that he had a Lord unless something were commanded him. That tree, then, was not evil, but it was called the tree of the knowledge of discerning good and evil because, if man ate from it after the prohibition, the future transgression of the command would be in it, in which man would learn by experience of punishment what difference there is between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. So this too is not said figuratively, but is to be taken as truly a tree, to which the name was given not from the fruit or apple that would grow on it, but from the very thing that was to follow when it was touched against the prohibition.

8.7CSEL 28.1:240–242

Flumen autem exiit de Eden, quod inrigabat paradisum, et inde diuisum est in quattuor partes. ex his uni nomen est Phison, hoc est quod circuit totam terram Euilat, ubi est aurum; aurum autem terrae illius bonum et ibi est carbunculus et lapis prasinus. et nomen flumini secundo Geon, hoc est quod circuit totam terram Aethiopiam. flumen autem tertium Tigris, hoc est quod fluit contra Assyrios. flumen autem quartum Euphrates. de his fluminibus quid amplius satagam confirmare, quod uera sint flumina nec figurate dicta, quae non sint, quasi tantummodo aliquid nomina ipsa significent, cum et regionibus, per quas fluunt, notissima sint et omnibus fere gentibus diffamata? quin immo ex his, quoniam constat ea prorsus esse — nam duobus eorum nomina uetustas mutauit, sicut Tiberis dicitur fluuius, qui prius Albula uocabatur; Geon quippe ipse est, qui nunc dicitur Nilus; Phison autem ille dicebatur, quem nunc Gangen appellant; duo uero cetera, Tigris et Euphrates, antiqua etiam nomina tenuerunt — nos admoneri oportet cetera quoque primitus ad proprietatem litterae accipere, non in eis figuratam locutionem putare, sed res ipsas, quae ita narrantur, et esse et aliquid etiam figurare, non quia non posset parabola locutionis adsumere aliquid de re, quam non proprie quoque esse constaret. sicut de illo dominus loquitur, qui descendebat ab Hierusalem in Hiericho et incidit in latrones. quis non sentiat et plane uideat esse parabolam locutionemque illam totam esse figuratam? uerum duae ciuitates, quae ibi nominatae sunt, hodieque in locis propriis demonstrantur. sed hoc modo acciperemus et quattuor haec flumina, si cetera, quae de paradiso narrantur, non proprie sed figurate accipere ulla necessitas cogeret; at nunc, cum primitus proprie res ipsas intellegere ratio nulla prohibeat, cur non potius auctoritatem scripturae simpliciter sequimur in narratione rerum gestarum res uere gestas prius intellegentes, tum demum quidquid aliud significant perscrutantes? An eo mouebimur, quod de his fluminibus dicitur aliorum esse fontes notos, aliorum autem prorsus incognitos et ideo non posse accipi ad litteram, quod ex uno paradisi flumine diuiduntur? cum potius credendum sit, quoniam locus ipse paradisi a cognitione hominum est remotissimus, inde quattuor aquarum partes diuidi, sicut fidelissima scriptura testatur, sed ea flumina, quorum fontes noti esse dicuntur, alicubi isse sub terras et post tractus prolixarum regionum locis aliis erupisse, ubi tamquam in suis fontibus nota esse perhibentur. nam hoc solere nonnullas aquas facere quis ignorat? sed ibi hoc scitur,. ubi non diu sub terris currunt. exibat ergo flumen de Eden, id est de loco deliciarum, et inrigabat paradisum, id est ligna omnia pulchra atque fructuosa, quae omnem terram regionis illius opacabant.

“And a river went out from Eden which watered paradise, and from there it divided into four parts. The name of one of them is Phison: it is the one that goes around the whole land of Evilat, where there is gold; and the gold of that land is good, and there is the carbuncle and the green stone. And the name of the second river is Geon: it is the one that goes around the whole land of Ethiopia. And the third river is the Tigris: it is the one that flows over against the Assyrians. And the fourth river is the Euphrates.” Why should I take further pains to confirm about these rivers that they are real rivers and not spoken of figuratively, as if they did not exist and only their names signified something, when they are very well known in the regions through which they flow and spread abroad among almost all nations? Rather, since it is certain that they altogether exist (for antiquity has changed the names of two of them, as the river now called Tiber was formerly called Albula; for Geon is the one now called the Nile, and the one now called the Ganges was called Phison; but the other two, Tigris and Euphrates, have kept their ancient names), we ought to be reminded by them to take the other things too first in the proper sense of the letter, not to think there is figurative speech in them, but that the very things narrated so both exist and also prefigure something; not because a parable in speech could not take something from a thing which was certainly not also real in the proper sense, as when the Lord speaks of the man who was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among robbers. Who does not perceive and plainly see that it is a parable and that the whole of that speech is figurative? Yet the two cities named there are shown in their own places even today. But we would take these four rivers too in that way if any necessity compelled us to take the other things narrated about paradise not properly but figuratively; but as it is, since no reason forbids us first to understand the things themselves properly, why do we not rather follow simply the authority of Scripture in the narrative of things done, understanding first that they were really done, and only then examining whatever else they signify? Or shall we be disturbed by the fact that the sources of some of these rivers are said to be known and those of others wholly unknown, and that therefore it cannot be taken literally that they are divided from one river of paradise? But rather it is to be believed that, since the place of paradise itself is very far removed from human knowledge, four branches of water are divided from there, as most faithful Scripture testifies, but that those rivers whose sources are said to be known went somewhere under the earth and, after passing through long tracts of country, broke out in other places, where they are said to be known as if at their sources. For who does not know that some waters are accustomed to do this? But it is known there, where they do not run long under the earth. So a river went out from Eden, that is, from the place of delights, and watered paradise, that is, all the beautiful and fruitful trees which shaded the whole land of that region.

8.8CSEL 28.1:242–243

Et sumsit dominus deus hominem, quem fecit, et posuit eum in paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret. et praecepit dominus deus Adae dicens: ab omni ligno quod est in paradiso escae edes; de ligno autem cognoscendi bonum et malum non manducabitis de illo. qua die autem ederitis ab eo, morte moriemini. cum superius breuiter dixerit deum plantasse paradisum et constituisse ibi hominem, quem finxerat, recapitulauit, ut narraret, quomodo sit paradisus constitutus. nunc ergo et illud recapitulando commemorauit, quomodo ibi deus posuerit hominem, quem fecit. uideamus itaque, quid sit, quod dictum est: ut operaretur et custodiret. quid operaretur uel quid custodiret? numquid forte agriculturam dominus uoluit operari primum hominem? an non est credibile, quod eum ante peccatum damnauerit ad laborem? ita sane arbitraremur, nisi uideremus cum tanta uoluptate animi agricolari quosdam, ut eis magna poena sit inde in aliud auocari. quidquid ergo deliciarum habet agricultura, tunc utique longe amplius erat, quando nihil accidebat aduersi uel terrae uel caelo. non enim erat laboris adflictio, sed exhilaratio uoluntatis, cum ea, quae deus creauerat, humani operis adiutorio laetius feraciusque prouenirent: unde creator ipse uberius laudaretur, qui animae in corpore animali constitutae rationem dedisset operandi ac facultatem, quantum animo uolenti satis esset, non quantum inuitum indigentia corporis cogeret. Quod enim maius mirabiliusque spectaculum est aut ubi magis cum rerum natura humana ratio quodammodo loqui potest, quam cum positis seminibus, plantatis surculis, translatis arbusculis, insitis malleolis tamquam interrogatur quaeque uis radicis et germinis quid possit quidue non possit, unde possit, unde non possit, quid in ea ualeat numerorum inuisibilis interiorque potentia, quid extrinsecus adhibita diligentia, inque ipsa consideratione perspicere, quia neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, deus, quia et illud operis, quod accedit extrinsecus, per illum accedit, quem nihilominus creauit et quem regit atque ordinat inuisibiliter deus?

“And the Lord God took the man whom he had made and placed him in paradise to work and to keep. And the Lord God commanded Adam, saying: From every tree that is in paradise you shall eat for food; but of the tree of knowing good and evil you shall not eat of it. On the day you eat of it, you shall die by death.” Having said briefly above that God planted paradise and established there the man whom he had formed, he recapitulated so as to narrate how paradise was established. Now, then, he has also mentioned by recapitulation how God placed there the man whom he had made. Let us see, then, what is meant by “to work and to keep.” What was he to work, or what to keep? Did the Lord perhaps want the first man to work at farming? Or is it not credible that he condemned him to toil before sin? So indeed we would think, unless we saw some people farm with such delight of mind that it is a great punishment for them to be called away from it to something else. Whatever delights farming has, then, there were surely far more then, when nothing adverse happened either to land or sky. For there was not the affliction of toil but the gladness of will, when the things God had created came forth more joyfully and abundantly with the help of human work; so that the Creator himself would be praised more richly, who had given to a soul established in an animal body the reason and the ability to work, as much as was enough for a willing mind, not as much as bodily need would force upon an unwilling one. For what greater and more wonderful spectacle is there, or where can human reason in a way talk more with the nature of things, than when, with seeds sown, cuttings planted, saplings transplanted, and slips grafted, the power of each root and bud is questioned, so to speak, as to what it can and cannot do, why it can and why it cannot, what the invisible inner power of numbers can do in it, what the care applied from outside; and in this very consideration to see that neither he who plants is anything nor he who waters, but God who gives the growth, since even the work which comes from outside comes through one whom God has nevertheless created and whom he invisibly rules and orders?

8.9CSEL 28.1:243–245

Hinc iam in ipsum mundum uelut in quandam magnam arborem rerum oculus cogitationis adtollitur atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio prouidentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim uoluntaria. et naturalis quidem per occultam dei administrationem, qua etiam lignis et herbis dat incrementum, uoluntaria uero per angelorum opera et hominum; secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferiusque terrestria, luminaria sideraque fulgere, diei noctisque uices agitari, aquis terram fundatam interlui atque circumlui, aerem altius superfundi, arbusta et animalia concipi et nasci, crescere. senescere, occidere et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturalique motu geritur; in hac autem altera signa dari, doceri et disci. agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri et quaeque alia siue in superna societate aguntur siue in hac terrena atque mortali, ita ut bonis consulatur et per nescientes malos; inque ipso homine eandem geminam prouidentiae uigere potentiam: primo erga corpus naturalem, scilicet eo motu, quo fit, quo crescit, quo senescit: uoluntariam uero, quo illa ad uictum, tegumentum curationemque consulitur. similiter erga animam naturaliter agitur, ut uiuat, ut sentiat, uoluntarie uero, ut discat, ut consentiat.. Sicut autem in arbore id agit agricultura forinsecus, ut illud proficiat, quod geritur intrinsecus, sic in homine secundum corpus ei, quod intrinsecus agit natura, seruit extrinsecus medicina, itemque secundum animam, ut natura beatificetur intrinsecus, doctrina ministratur extrinsecus. quod autem ad arborem colendi neglegentia, hoc ad corpus medendi incuria, hoc ad animam discendi segnitia: et quod ad arborem humor inutilis, hoc ad corpus uictus exitiabilis, hoc ad animam persuasio iniquitatis. deus itaque super omnia, qui condidit omnia et regit omnia, omnes naturas bonus creat, omnes uoluntates iustus ordinat. quid ergo abhorret a uero, si credamus hominem ita in paradiso constitutum, ut operaretur agriculturam non labore seruili, sed honesta animi uoluptate? quid enim hoc opere innocentius uacantibus et quid plenius magna consideratione prudentibus?

From here the eye of thought is raised to the world itself, as to a great tree of things, and in it too a twofold working of providence is found, partly natural, partly voluntary: natural, through God's hidden governance, by which he gives growth even to trees and plants; voluntary, through the works of angels and of men. According to the first, the heavenly things are ordered above and the earthly below, the lights and stars shine, the alternation of day and night goes on, the earth founded on the waters is flowed through and around by them, the air is poured out higher above, trees and animals are conceived and born, grow, grow old, and die, and whatever else is done in things by an inner and natural motion. In the second, signs are given, things are taught and learned, fields are tilled, societies are governed, arts are practised, and whatever else is done either in the society above or in this earthly and mortal one, so that the good are provided for even through the wicked who do not know it. And in man himself the same twofold power of providence is active: toward the body, first, the natural power, namely by the motion by which it comes into being, grows, and grows old; and the voluntary, by which it is provided with food, clothing, and care. Similarly, toward the soul it acts naturally, so that it lives and senses, and voluntarily, so that it learns and consents. And just as in a tree farming does from outside what helps that which is done from within to advance, so in man, as to the body, medicine serves from outside what nature does within; and likewise as to the soul, teaching is supplied from outside so that nature may be made happy within. What neglect of cultivation is to the tree, neglect of healing is to the body, and laziness in learning to the soul; and what useless moisture is to the tree, deadly food is to the body, and persuasion to wickedness to the soul. God therefore, above all things, who founded all things and rules all things, creates all natures as good and orders all wills as just. What, then, is far from the truth if we believe that man was so placed in paradise as to work at farming, not with servile toil but with honorable pleasure of mind? For what is more innocent than this work for those at leisure, and what fuller of great reflection for the wise?

8.10CSEL 28.1:245–248

Ut custodiret autem quid? an ipsum paradisum? contra quos? nullus certe uicinus metuebatur inuasor, nullus limitis perturbator, nullus fur, nullus adgressor. quomodo ergo intellecturi sumus corporalem paradisum potuisse ab homine corporaliter custodiri? sed neque scriptura dixit: ut operaretur et custodiret paradisum, dixit autem: ut operaretur et custodiret. quamquam si de graeco diligentius ad uerbum exprimatur, ita scriptum est: et accepit dominus deus hominem, quem fecit, et posuit eum in paradiso operari eum et custodire. sed utrum ipsum hominem posuit operari — hoc enim sensit, qui interpretatus est: ut operaretur — an eundem paradisum operari, id est ut homo paradisum operaretur, ambigue sonat et uidetur magis exigere locutio, ut non dicatur: operaretur paradisum, sed in paradiso. Uerum tamen, ne forte sic dictum sit: ut operaretur paradisum, sicut superius dictum est: nec erat homo, qui operaretur terram — eadem quippe locutio est: operari terram, quae: operari paradisum — ambiguam sententiam ad utrumque tractemus. si enim non est necesse, ut accipiamus "paradisum custodire", sed "in paradiso", quid ergo in paradiso custodire? nam quid operari in paradiso, iam, ut uisum est, disseruimus. an ut quod operaretur in terra per agriculturam, in se ipso custodiret per disciplinam, id est ut, sicut ei ager obtemperaret colenti se, ita et ipse praecipienti domino suo, ut sumto praecepto oboedientiae fructum, non spinas inoboedientiae redderet? denique, quoniam similitudinem a se culti paradisi in se ipso custodire subditus noluit, similem sibi agrum damnatus accepit. spinas, inquit, et tribulos pariet tibi. Quodsi et illud intellegamus, ut paradisum operaretur et paradisum custodiret, operari quidem paradisum posset, sicut supra diximus, per agriculturam, custodire autem non aduersus inprobos aut inimicos, qui nulli erant, sed fortassis aduersus bestias. quomodo istuc? aut quare? numquid enim bestiae iam in hominem saeuiebant, quod nisi peccato non fieret? ipse quippe bestiis omnibus ad se adductis, sicut post commemoratur, nomina inposuit, ipse etiam sexta die lege uerbi dei cum omnibus communes cibos accepit. aut si erat iam, quod timeretur in bestiis, quonam pacto posset unus homo illum munire paradisum? neque enim exiguus locus erat, quem tantus fons inrigabat. custodire quippe ille deberet, si posset paradisum tali et tanta maceria communire, ut eo serpens non posset intrare; sed mirum, si, priusquam communiret, omnes serpentes inde posset excludere. Proinde intellectum ante oculos cur praetermittimus? positus est quippe homo in paradiso, ut operaretur eundem paradisum, sicut supra disputatum est, per agriculturam non laboriosam, sed deliciosam et mentem prudentis magna atque utilia commonentem, custodiret autem eundem paradisum ipsi sibi, ne aliquid admitteret, quare inde mereretur expelli. denique accepit et praeceptum, ut sit per quod sibi custodiat paradisum, id est quo conseruato non inde proiciatur. recte enim quisque dicitur non custodisse rem suam, qui sic egit, ut amitteret eam, etiamsi alteri salua sit, qui eam uel inuenit uel accipere meruit. Est alius in his uerbis sensus, quem puto non inmerito praeponendum, ut ipsum hominem operaretur deus et custodiret. sicut enim operatur homo terram, non ut eam faciat esse terram, sed ut cultam atque fructuosam, sic deus hominem multo magis, quem ipse creauit, ut homo sit, eum ipse operatur, ut iustus sit, si homo ab illo per superbiam non abscedat; hoc est enim apostatare a deo, quod initium superbiae scriptura dicit. initium, inquit, superbiae hominis apostatare a deo. quia ergo deus est incommutabile bonum, homo autem et secundum animam et secundum corpus mutabilis res est, nisi ad incommutabile bonum, quod deus est, conuersus substiterit, formari, ut iustus beatusque sit, non potest. ac per hoc deus idem, qui creat hominem, ut homo sit, ipse operatur hominem atque custodit, ut etiam bonus beatusque sit. quapropter qua locutione dicitur homo operari terram, quae iam terra erat, ut ornata atque fecunda sit, ea locutione dicitur deus operari hominem, qui iam homo erat, ut pius sapiensque sit, eumque custodire, quod homo sua potestate in se quam illius supra se delectatus dominationemque eius contemnens tutus esse non possit.

But “to keep” what? Paradise itself? Against whom? Certainly no neighboring invader was feared, no disturber of boundaries, no thief, no attacker. How, then, are we to understand that a bodily paradise could be kept bodily by man? But Scripture did not say “to work and to keep paradise”; it said “to work and to keep.” Although, if it is rendered word for word more carefully from the Greek, it is written thus: “And the Lord God took the man whom he made and placed him in paradise to work it and to keep it.” But whether he placed the man himself to work (for so the one who translated “to work” understood it) or to work paradise, that is, so that man would work paradise, sounds ambiguous, and the expression seems rather to require that it be said not “to work paradise” but “in paradise.” Yet in case it was said “to work paradise” in the same way as it was said above, “and there was no man to work the earth” (for “to work the earth” is the same expression as “to work paradise”), let us treat the ambiguous sentence in both ways. For if we need not take it as “to keep paradise” but as “in paradise,” what then was he to keep in paradise? For what he was to work in paradise we have already discussed, as it seemed right. Was it that what he worked in the earth by farming he should keep in himself by discipline, that is, that as the field obeyed him when he tilled it, so he too should obey his Lord when he commanded, so that, having received the command, he would yield the fruit of obedience and not the thorns of disobedience? In the end, since he would not, as a subject, keep in himself the likeness of the paradise he tilled, he received, when condemned, a field like himself: “It shall bring forth thorns and thistles for you,” it says. But if we understand it as working paradise and keeping paradise, he could work paradise, as we said above, by farming, but keep it not against wicked men or enemies, of whom there were none, but perhaps against beasts. How so? Or why? For were beasts already raging against man, which would not happen except through sin? For he himself gave names to all the beasts when they were brought to him, as is mentioned afterwards; and on the sixth day, by the law of God's word, he received food in common with all of them. Or if there was already something to be feared in beasts, how could one man fortify that paradise? For it was no small place that so great a spring watered. He ought to have kept it, if he could fortify paradise with a wall of such a kind and size that the serpent could not get in; but it would be strange if, before fortifying it, he could shut out all serpents from it. Why then do we pass over the meaning before our eyes? Man was placed in paradise to work that paradise, as was argued above, by farming that was not toilsome but delightful and that suggested great and useful things to the mind of the wise, and to keep that paradise for himself, so as not to commit anything for which he would deserve to be expelled from it. In short, he also received a command, so that there would be something by which to keep paradise for himself, that is, by observing which he would not be thrown out of it. For anyone is rightly said not to have kept his property who acted in such a way as to lose it, even if it is safe for someone else who either found it or deserved to receive it. There is another sense in these words which I think may rightly be preferred: that God was to work man himself and to keep him. For just as man works the earth, not to make it be earth but to make it tilled and fruitful, so, much more, God works man, whom he himself created so that he is man, so that he may be just, if man does not depart from him through pride; for this is to apostatize from God, which Scripture calls the beginning of pride. “The beginning of man's pride,” it says, “is to apostatize from God.” Since, then, God is the unchangeable good, while man, both in soul and in body, is a changeable thing, he cannot be formed so as to be just and happy unless he remains turned toward the unchangeable good, which is God. And therefore the same God who creates man so that he is man himself works man and keeps him so that he may also be good and happy. Therefore, in the way of speaking in which man is said to work the earth, which was already earth, so that it may be adorned and fruitful, God is said to work man, who was already man, so that he may be godly and wise, and to keep him, because man, delighting in his own power over himself rather than in God's over him, and despising his dominion, cannot be safe.

8.11CSEL 28.1:248–249

Proinde nullo modo uacare arbitror, sed nos aliquid et magnum aliquid admonere, quod ab ipso diuini libri huius exordio, ex quo ita coeptus est: in principio fecit deus caelum et terram usque ad hunc locum, nusquam positum est "dominus deus", sed tantum modo "deus". nunc uero. ubi ad id uentum est, ut hominem in paradiso constitueret eumque per praeceptum operaretur et custodiret, ita scriptura locuta est: et sumsit dominus deus hominem, quem fecit, et posuit eum in paradiso operari eum et custodire: non quod supra dictarum creaturarum dominus non esset deus; sed, quia hoc nec propter angelos nec propter alia, quae creata sunt, sed propter hominem scribebatur, ad eum admonendum, quantum ei expediat habere dominum deum, hoc est sub eius dominatione oboedienter uiuere quam licentiose abuti propria potestate, nusquam hoc prius ponere uoluit, nisi ubi peruentum est ad eum in paradiso conlocandum, operandum et custodiendum: ut non diceret sicut et cetera omnia superius: et sumsit deus hominem, quem fecit, sed diceret: et sumsit dominus deus hominem, quem fecit, et posuit eum in paradiso operari eum, ut iustus esset, et custodire, ut tutus esset, ipsa utique dominatione sua, quae non est illi, sed nobis utilis. ille quippe nostra seruitute non indiget, nos uero dominatione illius indigemus, ut operetur et custodiat nos. et ideo uerus solus est dominus. quia non illi ad suam, sed ad nostram utilitatem salutemque seruimus; nam si nobis indigeret, eo ipso non uerus dominus esset, cum per nos eius adiuuaretur necessitas, sub qua et ipse seruiret. merito ille in psalmo, dixi, inquit, domino: deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. nec ita sentiendum est, quod diximus, nos illi ad utilitatem nostram salutemque seruire, tamquam aliud aliquid ab illo expectemus quam eum ipsum, qui summa utilitas et salus nostra est; sic enim eum gratis secundum illam uocem diligimus: mihi autem adhaerere deo bonum est.

So I think it is in no way idle, but reminds us of something, and something great, that from the very beginning of this divine book, which begins thus, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” up to this place, “Lord God” is nowhere set down, but only “God.” But now, when it came to God's establishing man in paradise and working and keeping him through a command, Scripture spoke thus: “And the Lord God took the man whom he had made and placed him in paradise to work him and to keep him.” Not that God was not Lord of the creatures mentioned above; but because this was written not for the sake of the angels or of the other things that were created, but for the sake of man, to remind him how much it profits him to have God as Lord, that is, to live obediently under his dominion rather than licentiously to abuse his own power, Scripture chose not to set this down anywhere earlier than where it came to his being placed in paradise, worked, and kept: so that it would not say, as of all the other things above, “And God took the man whom he had made,” but would say, “And the Lord God took the man whom he had made and placed him in paradise to work him,” so that he might be just, “and to keep him,” so that he might be safe; by his very dominion, that is, which is useful not to him but to us. For he does not need our service, but we need his dominion, so that he may work and keep us. And therefore he alone is truly Lord, because we serve him not for his benefit but for our benefit and salvation; for if he needed us, by that very fact he would not be truly Lord, since his need would be helped through us, a need under which he too would be a servant. Rightly does the one in the psalm say, “I said to the Lord, You are my God, because you have no need of my goods.” Nor is what we said, that we serve him for our benefit and salvation, to be taken as though we expected anything from him other than himself, who is our highest benefit and salvation; for so we love him freely, according to that saying, “But for me to cleave to God is good.”

8.12CSEL 28.1:249–251

Neque enim tale aliquid est homo, ut factus deserente eo, qui fecit, possit aliquid agere bene tamquam ex se ipso: sed tota eius actio bona est ad eum conuerti, a quo factus est, et ab eo iustus, pius, sapiens beatusque semper fieri, non fieri et recedere, sicut a corporis medico sanari et abire, quia medicus corporis operarius fuit extrinsecus seruiens naturae intrinsecus operanti sub deo, qui operatur omnem salutem gemino illo opere prouidentiae, de quo supra locuti sumus. non ergo ita se debet homo ad deum conuertere, ut, cum ab eo factus fuerit iustus, abscedat, sed ita, ut ab illo semper fiat. eo quippe ipso, cum ab illo non discedit, eius sibi praesentia iustificatur et inluminatur et beatificatur operante et custodiente deo, dum oboedienti subiectoque dominatur. Neque enim, ut dicebamus, sicut operatur homo terram. ut culta atque fecunda sit, qui, cum fuerit operatus abscedit, relinquens eam uel aratam uel satam uel rigatam uel si quid aliud, manente opere, quod factum est, cum operator abscesserit, ita deus operatur hominem iustum, id est iustificando eum, ut, si abscesserit, maneat in abscedente quod fecit: sed potius, sicut aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit, quia, si factus esset, non autem fieret, etiam absente lumine lucidus maneret, sic homo deo sibi praesente inluminatur, absente autem continuo tenebratur, a quo non locorum interuallis, sed uoluntatis auersione disceditur. Ille itaque operetur hominem bonum atque custodiat, qui incommutabiliter bonus est. semper ab illo fieri semperque perfici debemus inhaerentes ei et in ea conuersione, quae ad illum est, permanentes, de quo dicitur: mihi autem adhaerere deo bonum est, et cui dicitur: fortitudinem meam ad te custodiam. ipsius enim sumus figmentum creati, non tantum ad hoc, ut homines simus, sed ad hoc etiam, ut boni simus. nam et apostolus cum fidelibus ab inpietate conuersis gratiam, qua salui facti sumus, commendaret, gratia enim, inquit, salui facti estis per fidem; et hoc non ex uobis, sed dei donum est, non ex operibus, ne forte quis extollatur. ipsius enim sumus figmentum creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis, quae praeparauit deus, ut in illis ambulemus. et alibi cum dixisset: cum timore et tremore uestram ipsorum salutem operamini, ne sibi putarent tribuendum, tamquam ipsi se facerent iustos et bonos, continuo subiecit: deus enim est, qui operatur in uobis. sumsit ergo dominus deus hominem, quem fecit, et posuit eum in paradiso operari eum, hoc est "operari in eo" et "custodire eum."

For man is not such a thing that, once made, he can do anything well as if from himself when he who made him abandons him; but his whole good action is to turn to him by whom he was made, and to be made always just, godly, wise, and happy by him, not to be made so and then depart, as one is healed by a physician of the body and goes away; for the physician of the body was a worker serving from outside the nature that works from within under God, who works all health by that twofold work of providence of which we spoke above. So man ought not to turn to God in such a way that, when he has been made just by him, he goes away, but in such a way that he is always being made so by him. For by this very fact, that he does not depart from him, he is justified, enlightened, and made happy by his presence, while God works and keeps him as he rules over him obedient and subject. For, as we were saying, it is not as when man works the earth so that it may be tilled and fruitful: when he has worked it he goes away, leaving it ploughed or sown or watered or whatever else, the work that was done remaining when the worker has gone away. God does not work man just in that way, that is, by justifying him, so that if he goes away what he did remains in the one he leaves; but rather, just as the air, when light is present, has not been made bright but is being made bright (for if it had been made bright and were not being made so, it would remain bright even when the light was absent), so man is enlightened when God is present to him, but when God is absent he is at once darkened, God from whom one departs not by distances of place but by turning away of the will. Let him, then, work man good and keep him, who is unchangeably good. We ought always to be made by him and always perfected, cleaving to him and remaining in that turning which is toward him, of whom it is said, “But for me to cleave to God is good,” and to whom it is said, “I will keep my strength toward you.” For we are his handiwork, created not only to be men but also to be good. For the apostle too, when he was commending to the faithful who had turned from ungodliness the grace by which we have been saved, says, “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not from yourselves, but it is the gift of God; not from works, lest anyone be lifted up. For we are his handiwork, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared that we should walk in them.” And elsewhere, when he had said, “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling,” lest they think it should be credited to themselves, as though they made themselves just and good, he at once added, “For it is God who works in you.” So “the Lord God took the man whom he had made and placed him in paradise to work him,” that is, “to work in him,” “and to keep him.”

8.13CSEL 28.1:251–252

Et praecepit dominus deus Adae dicens: ab omni ligno, quod est in paradiso, edes ad escam: de ligno autem cognoscendi bonum et malum non manducabitis de illo. qua die autem ederitis ab eo, morte moriemini. si aliquid mali esset lignum illud, unde prohibuit hominem deus, eius ipsius mali natura uenenatus uideretur ad mortem. quia uero ligna omnia in paradiso bona plantauerat, qui fecit omnia bona ualde, nec ulla ibi natura mali erat, quia nusquam est mali ulla natura — quod diligentius, si dominus uoluerit, disseremus, cum de illo serpente dicere coeperimus —, ab eo ligno, quod malum non erat, prohibitus est, ut ipsa per se praecepti conseruatio bonum illi esset et transgressio malum. Nec potuit melius et diligentius demonstrari, quantum malum sit sola inoboedientia, cum ideo reus iniquitatis factus est homo, quia eam rem tetigit contra prohibitionem, quam si non prohibitus tetigisset, non utique peccasset. nam qui dicit uerbi gratia: noli tangere hanc herbam — si forte uenenosa est mortemque praenuntiat, si tetigerit — sequetur quidem mors contemtorem praecepti; sed etiam, si nemo prohibuisset atque ille tetigisset, nihilominus utique moreretur. illa quippe res congrua saluti uitaeque eius non esset, siue inde uetaretur siue non uetaretur. item cum quisque prohibet eam rem tangi, quae non quidem tangenti, sed illi, qui prohibuit, obesset, uelut si quisquam in alienam pecuniam misisset manum prohibitus ab eo, cuius erat illa pecunia, ideo esset prohibito peccatum, quia prohibenti poterat esse damnosum. cum uero illud tangitur, quod nec tangenti obesset, si non prohiberetur, nec cuiquam alteri, quandolibet tangeretur, quare prohibitum est, nisi ut ipsius per se bonum oboedientiae et ipsius per se malum inoboedientiae monstraretur? Denique a peccante nihil aliud adpetitum est nisi non esse sub dominatione dei, quando illud admissum est, in quo, ne admitteretur, sola deberet iussio dominantis adtendi. quae si sola adtenderetur, quid aliud quam dei uoluntas adtenderetur? quid aliud quam dei uoluntas amaretur? quid aliud quam dei uoluntas humanae uoluntati praeponeretur? dominus quidem cur iusserit, uiderit; faciendum est a seruiente quod iussit et tunc forte. uidendum est a promerente, cur iusserit. sed tamen, ut causam iussionis huius non diutius requiramus, si haec ipsa magna est utilitas homini, quod deo seruit, iubendo deus utile facit quidquid iubere uoluerit, de quo metuendum non est, ne iubere quod inutile est possit.

“And the Lord God commanded Adam, saying: From every tree that is in paradise you shall eat for food; but of the tree of knowing good and evil you shall not eat of it. On the day you eat of it, you shall die by death.” If that tree from which God forbade man had been something evil, he would seem to have been poisoned unto death by the nature of that evil itself. But since he who made all things very good had planted all the trees in paradise good, and there was no nature of evil there, because there is no nature of evil anywhere (which we will discuss more carefully, if the Lord wills, when we begin to speak about that serpent), he was forbidden that tree, which was not evil, so that keeping the command would itself be good for him and transgressing it evil. Nor could it have been shown better or more carefully how great an evil disobedience alone is, since man became guilty of wickedness because he touched against the prohibition a thing which, if he had touched it without being forbidden, he would certainly not have sinned. For if someone says, for example, “Do not touch this plant,” if perhaps it is poisonous and threatens death if he touches it, death will indeed follow for the one who despises the command; but even if no one had forbidden it and he had touched it, he would die just the same. For that thing would not be suited to his health and life, whether he was forbidden it or not. Likewise, when someone forbids a thing to be touched which would harm not the one touching it but the one who forbade it, as if someone put his hand on another's money when forbidden by the owner of the money, it would be a sin for the one forbidden because it could be harmful to the one forbidding. But when a thing is touched which would neither harm the one touching it if it were not forbidden, nor anyone else whenever it was touched, why was it forbidden, except to show the good of obedience in itself and the evil of disobedience in itself? In short, the sinner sought nothing else than not to be under God's dominion, when he committed that in which, to keep from committing it, he ought to have paid attention to the command of his Lord alone. And if that alone had been attended to, what else would have been attended to than the will of God? What else would have been loved than the will of God? What else would have been put before the human will than the will of God? Why the Lord commanded it is his concern; what he commanded is to be done by the servant, and then perhaps the one who deserves it may see why he commanded it. But, so as not to seek longer for the reason of this command: if this very thing is a great benefit to man, that he serves God, then by commanding God makes beneficial whatever he wills to command, and there is no fear that he could command what is not beneficial.

8.14CSEL 28.1:252–254

Nec fieri potest, ut uoluntas propria non grandi ruinae pondere super hominem cadat, si eam uoluntati superioris extollendo praeponat. hoc expertus est homo contemnens praeceptum dei et hoc experimento didicit, quid interesset inter bonum et malum, bonum scilicet oboedientiae. malum autem inoboedientiae, id est superbiae et contumaciae, peruersae imitationis dei et noxiae libertatis. hoc autem in quo ligno accidere potuit, ex ipsa re, ut iam supra dictum est, nomen accepit. malum enim nisi experimento non sentiremus, quia nullum esset, si non fecissemus. neque enim ulla natura malum est, sed amissio boni hoc nomen accepit. bonum quippe incommutabile deus est; homo autem, quantum ad eius naturam, in qua eum deus condidit, pertinet, bonum est quidem, sed non incommutabile ut deus. mutabile autem bonum, quod est post incommutabile bonum, melius bonum fit, cum bono incommutabili adhaeserit amando atque seruiendo rationali et propria uoluntate. ideo quippe et haec magni boni natura est, quia et hoc accepit, ut possit summi boni adhaerere naturae. quod si noluerit, bono se priuat, et hoc ei malum est, unde per iustitiam dei etiam cruciatus consequitur. quid enim tam iniquum, quam ut bene sit desertori boni? neque ullo modo fieri potest, ut ita sit. sed aliquando amissi superioris boni non sentitur malum. cum habetur quod amatum est inferius bonum. sed diuina iustitia est, ut qui uoluntate amisit, quod amare debuit, amittat cum dolore, quod amauit, dum naturarum creator ubique laudetur. adhuc enim est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum; nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullus boni amissi dolor esset in poena. Cui autem sine mali experimento placet bonum, id est ut, antequam boni amissionem sentiat, eligat tenere, ne amittat, supra omnes homines praedicandus est. sed hoc nisi cuiusdam singularis laudis esset, non illi puero tribueretur, qui ex genere Israhel factus Emmanuhel nobiscum deus reconciliauit nos deo, hominum et dei homo mediator, uerbum apud deum, caro apud nos, uerbum caro inter deum et nos. de illo quippe propheta dicit: priusquam sciat puer bonum aut malum, contemnet malitiam, ut eligat bonum. quomodo quod nescit aut contemnit aut eligit, nisi quia haec duo sciuntur aliter per prudentiam boni, aliter per experientiam mali? per prudentiam boni malum scitur, etsi non sentitur; tenetur enim bonum, ne amissio eius sentiatur malum. item per experientiam mali scitur bonum, quoniam quid amiserit sentit, cui de bono amisso male fuerit. priusquam sciret ergo puer per experientiam aut bonum, quo careret, aut malum, quod boni amissione sentiret, contemsit malum, ut eligeret bonum, id est noluit amittere quod habebat, ne sentiret amittendo quod amittere non debebat. singulare exemplum oboedientiae! quippe qui non uenit facere uoluntatem suam, sed uoluntatem eius, a quo missus est, non sicut ille, qui elegit facere uoluntatem suam, non eius, a quo factus est. merito sicut per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi, quia, sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes uiuificabuntur.

Nor can it be that one's own will does not fall upon a man with the weight of a great ruin if he proudly puts it before the will of one higher. This man experienced when he despised the command of God, and by this experience he learned what difference there is between good and evil, namely the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, that is, of pride and defiance, of perverse imitation of God and harmful freedom. And the tree in which this could happen took its name from the thing itself, as was said above. For we would not perceive evil except by experience, because there would be none if we had not done it. For no nature is evil, but the loss of good has received this name. For the unchangeable good is God; man, as far as concerns the nature in which God founded him, is indeed good, but not unchangeable like God. And a changeable good, which comes after the unchangeable good, becomes a better good when it cleaves to the unchangeable good by loving and serving it with a rational and its own will. For this too is why this is the nature of a great good: because it has received this too, that it can cleave to the nature of the highest good. But if it will not, it deprives itself of good, and this is evil for it, from which, by the justice of God, torment also follows. For what is so unjust as that it should go well with a deserter of the good? Nor can it in any way be so. But sometimes the evil of having lost the higher good is not felt, when the lower good that was loved is possessed. But it is divine justice that he who by his will lost what he ought to have loved should lose with pain what he loved, while the Creator of natures is praised everywhere. For it is still a good that grieves at the good that has been lost; for unless some good had remained in the nature, there would be no grief for lost good in the punishment. But he who is pleased by the good without experience of evil, that is, who, before he feels the loss of good, chooses to hold it so as not to lose it, is to be praised above all men. But if this were not a matter of singular praise, it would not be attributed to that child who, made of the race of Israel, Emmanuel, God with us, reconciled us to God, the mediator of God and men, a man, the Word with God, flesh with us, the Word made flesh between God and us. For of him the prophet says, “Before the child knows good or evil, he will despise wickedness, to choose the good.” How does he either despise or choose what he does not know, except that these two are known in one way by the wisdom of good and in another by the experience of evil? By the wisdom of good, evil is known even if it is not felt; for the good is held so that its loss may not be felt as evil. Likewise, by the experience of evil the good is known, since he who has fared ill from losing the good feels what he has lost. So before the child knew by experience either the good he would lack or the evil he would feel through losing the good, he despised the evil so as to choose the good, that is, he did not want to lose what he had, lest by losing it he feel what he ought not to lose. A singular example of obedience! For he came not to do his own will but the will of him by whom he was sent; not like that man who chose to do his own will, not that of him by whom he was made. Rightly, just as through one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so through one man's obedience many will be made righteous; because, as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive.

8.15CSEL 28.1:254–255

Frustra autem nonnulli acute obtunsi sunt, cum requirunt, quomodo potuerit appellari lignum dinoscentiae boni et mali, antequam in eo transgressus esset homo praeceptum atque ipsa experientia dinosceret, quid interesset inter bonum, quod amisit, et malum, quod admisit. lignum enim tale nomen accepit, ut eo secundum prohibitionem non tacto caueretur, quod eo contra prohibitionem tacto sentiretur. neque enim quia inde contra praeceptum manducauerunt, ideo factum est illud lignum dinoscentiae boni et mali, sed utique, etiam si oboedientes essent et nihil inde contra praeceptum usurpassent, id recte uocaretur, quod ibi eis accideret, si usurpassent. quemadmodum si uocaretur arbor saturitatis, quod inde possent homines saturari, numquid, si nemo accessisset, ideo nomen illud esset incongruum? quandoquidem cum accederent et saturarentur, tunc probarent, quam hoc recte arbor illa uocaretur.

Some people, though sharp, have been dulled in vain when they ask how it could be called the tree of discerning good and evil before man had transgressed the command in it and discerned by experience itself what difference there was between the good he lost and the evil he committed. For the tree received such a name so that, by not touching it in keeping with the prohibition, man would beware of what would be felt if it were touched against the prohibition. For it was not because they ate from it against the command that that tree became the tree of discerning good and evil; but surely, even if they had been obedient and had taken nothing from it against the command, it would rightly be called by what would happen to them there if they had taken from it. Just as, if it were called the tree of fullness because men could be filled from it, would that name be unfitting if no one had come to it? For when they came and were filled, they would then prove how rightly that tree was so called.

8.16CSEL 28.1:255–257

Et quomodo, inquiunt, intellegeret homo, quod ei dicebatur lignum dinoscentiae boni et mali, quando ipsum malum quid esset omnino nesciebat? hoc qui sapiunt parum adtendunt, quemadmodum a contrariis notis sic pleraque intellegantur ignota, ut etiam uerba rerum, quae non sunt, cum in loquendo interponuntur, nullus caliget auditor. hoc enim quod omnino non est nihil uocatur; et has duas syllabas nemo non intellegit, qui latine audit et loquitur. unde, nisi cum sensus intuetur id, quod est, et eius priuatione quid etiam non sit agnoscit? sic et inane cum dicitur, intuendo corporis plenitudinem priuatione eius tamquam contraria quid dicatur inane intellegimus. sicut audiendi sensu non solum de uocibus. uerum etiam de silentio iudicamus, sic ex uita, quae inerat homini, posset eius cauere contrarium, id est uitae priuationem, quae mors uocatur. et ipsam causam, qua perderet quod amabat, id est quodlibet factum suum, quo fieret, ut amitteret uitam, quibuslibet syllabis appellaretur — quemadmodum latine cum dicitur peccatum uel malum — tamquam signum eius intellegeret, quod mente discerneret. nos enim quomodo intellegimus, cum dicitur resurrectio, quam numquam experti sumus? nonne quia sentimus, quid sit uiuere, et eius rei priuationem uocamus mortem, unde reditum ad id, quod sentimus, resurrectionem appellamus? et si quo alio nomine in quacumque lingua id ipsum appellatur, menti utique signum insinuatur in uoce loquentium, quo sonante agnoscat quod etiam sine signo cogitaret. mirum est enim, quemadmodum rerum, quas habet, amissionem etiam inexpertam natura deuitet. quis enim pecora docuit deuitationem mortis nisi sensus uitae? quis paruulum puerum adhaerescere baiulo suo, si eum fuerit ex alto iacere minatus? quod ex quodam tempore incipit, sed tamen antequam aliquid eius modi expertus sit. Sic ergo illis primis hominibus iam uita erat dulcis, quam profecto amittere deuitabant, idque ipsum quibuscumque modis uel sonis significantem deum intellegere poterant. nec aliter eis posset persuaderi peccatum, nisi prius persuaderetur eos ex illo facto non esse morituros, id est illud, quod habebant et se habere gaudebant, non amissuros: unde suo loco loquendum est. aduertant itaque, si quos mouet, quomodo potuerint intellegere inexperta nominantem uel minantem deum, et uideant nos omnium inexpertorum nomina nonnisi ex contrariis. quae iam nouimus, si priuationum sunt, aut ex similibus, si specierum sunt, sine ullo aestu dubitationis agnoscere. nisi forte aliquem mouet, quemadmodum loqui potuerint uel loquentem intellegere, qui non didicerant uel crescendo inter loquentes uel aliquo magisterio; quasi magnum fuerit deo loqui eos docere, quos ita fecerat, ut hoc possent etiam ab hominibus discere, si essent a quibus.

“And how,” they say, “would man understand what he was told, the tree of discerning good and evil, when he did not know at all what evil itself was?” Those who think this pay too little attention to how most unknown things are understood from known opposites, so that even when words for things that do not exist are put into speech, no hearer is in the dark. For what does not exist at all is called “nothing”; and everyone who hears and speaks Latin understands these two syllables. How, unless the mind looks at what is and, by its absence, recognizes also what is not? So too when “empty” is said, by looking at the fullness of a body we understand, by its absence as by its opposite, what is meant by empty. Just as with the sense of hearing we judge not only of sounds but also of silence, so from the life that was in man he could beware of its opposite, that is, the absence of life, which is called death. And the very cause by which he would lose what he loved, that is, any act of his by which it would come about that he lost life, by whatever syllables it was named (as when in Latin it is called “sin” or “evil”), he would understand as a sign of what he distinguished in his mind. For how do we understand when resurrection is spoken of, which we have never experienced? Is it not because we feel what it is to live, and call the absence of this death, and call the return from it to what we feel resurrection? And if the same thing is called by any other name in any language, a sign is certainly conveyed to the mind in the speaker's voice, at whose sound it recognizes what it would think even without a sign. For it is wonderful how nature avoids the loss of the things it has, even without experience of it. For who taught beasts to avoid death but the sense of life? Who taught a little child to cling to the one carrying him if he threatens to throw him from a height? This begins at a certain age, but still before he has experienced anything of the kind. So for those first human beings life was already sweet, and they certainly avoided losing it, and they could understand God when he signified this by whatever means or sounds. Nor could sin have been urged on them except by first persuading them that they would not die from that deed, that is, that they would not lose what they had and rejoiced to have: of which we must speak in its place. So let those who are disturbed about how they could understand God naming or threatening things they had not experienced take note, and see that we recognize the names of all things we have not experienced, without any turmoil of doubt, only from their opposites, which we already know, if they are absences, or from similar things, if they are kinds. Unless perhaps someone is disturbed about how they could speak or understand one speaking when they had not learned either by growing up among speakers or by any teaching; as though it were a great thing for God to teach to speak those whom he had made such that they could learn it even from men, if there had been any to learn from.

8.17CSEL 28.1:257

Merito sane quaeritur, utrum hoc praeceptum uiro tantum dederit deus an etiam feminae. sed nondum narratum est, quemadmodum facta est femina. an forte iam erat facta, sed hoc quemadmodum gestum sit quod prius erat gestum postea recapitulando narratum est? uerba enim scripturae sic se habent: et praecepit dominus deus Adae dicens; non dixit "praecepit eis". deinde sequitur: ab omni ligno quod est in paradiso escae edes; non dixit "edetis". deinde adiungit: de ligno autem cognoscendi bonum et malum non manducabitis de illo. iam hic tamquam ad ambos pluraliter loquitur et pluraliter praeceptum terminat dicens: qua die autem ederitis ab eo, morte moriemini. an sciens, quod ei facturus erat mulierem, ita praecepit ordinatissime, ut per uirum praeceptum domini ad feminam perueniret? quam disciplinam in ecclesia seruat apostolus dicens: si quid autem discere uolunt, domi uiros suos interrogent.

It is rightly asked whether God gave this command to the man only or also to the woman. But it has not yet been narrated how the woman was made. Or perhaps she had already been made, but how what had been done earlier was done is narrated afterwards by recapitulation? For the words of Scripture are these: “And the Lord God commanded Adam, saying”; it did not say “commanded them.” Then follows: “From every tree that is in paradise you shall eat for food”; it did not say “you (plural) shall eat.” Then it adds: “but of the tree of knowing good and evil you shall not eat of it.” Here now it speaks in the plural as to both, and ends the command in the plural, saying: “On the day you eat of it, you shall die by death.” Or, knowing that he was going to make the woman for him, did he command in this most orderly way, so that the Lord's command would reach the woman through the man? This discipline the apostle keeps in the church, saying, “If they want to learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home.”

8.18CSEL 28.1:257–258

Item quaeri potest, quomodo nunc deus locutus sit ad hominem, quem fecit, iam certe sensu ac mente praeditum, ut audire et intellegere loquentem ualeret. neque enim aliter praeceptum posset accipere, quo transgressor eius esset, nisi hoc acceptum intellegeret. quomodo ergo illi locutus est deus? utrum intus in mente secundum intellectum, id est ut sapienter intellegeret uoluntatem ac praeceptum dei sine ullis corporalibus sonis uel corporalium similitudinibus rerum? sed non sic existimo primo homini locutum deum. talia quippe scriptura narrat, ut potius credamus sic esse deum locutum homini in paradiso, sicut etiam postea locutus est patribus, sicut Abrahae, sicut Moysi, id est in aliqua specie corporali. hinc est enim, quod audierunt eius uocem perambulantis in paradiso ad uesperam et absconderunt se.

Again it may be asked how God now spoke to the man whom he had made, now certainly endowed with sense and mind, so that he could hear and understand one speaking. For he could not otherwise receive a command, so as to be a transgressor of it, unless he understood it when received. How then did God speak to him? Inwardly in the mind, by understanding, that is, so that he would wisely understand God's will and command without any bodily sounds or likenesses of bodily things? But I do not think God spoke so to the first man. For Scripture narrates such things that we should rather believe God spoke to man in paradise as he also spoke later to the fathers, as to Abraham, as to Moses, that is, in some bodily form. Hence it is that they heard his voice as he walked in paradise toward evening, and hid themselves.

8.19CSEL 28.1:258

Locus itaque magnus neque praetereundus proponitur, ut intueamur, quantum possumus, quantum ipse adiuuare et donare dignatur, opus diuinae prouidentiae bipertitum, quod superius, cum de agricultura loqueremur, transitoria quadam occasione perstrinximus, ut inde iam inciperet legentis animus hoc adsuescere contueri, quod adiuuat plurimum, ne quid indignum de ipsa dei substantia sentiamus. dicimus itaque summum ipsum, uerum, unum ac solum deum, patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, id est deum uerbumque eius et utriusque spiritum, trinitatem ipsam neque confusam neque separatam, deum, qui solus habet inmortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem, quem nemo hominum uidit nec uidere potest, nec locorum uel finito uel infinito spatio contineri nec temporum uel finito uel infinito uolumine uariari. neque enim est in eius substantia, qua deus est, quod breuius sit in parte quam in toto, sicut necesse est esse quae in locis sunt, aut fuit in eius substantia, quod iam non est, uel erit, quod nondum est, sicut in naturis, quae possunt temporis mutabilitatem pati.

A great subject, then, not to be passed over, is set before us: that we should consider, as far as we can and as far as he deigns to help and grant, the twofold work of divine providence, which we touched on above in passing when we were speaking of farming, so that the reader's mind might begin from there to grow used to contemplating this, which helps very much to keep us from thinking anything unworthy of the very substance of God. We say, then, that the supreme, true, one and only God, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, that is, God and his Word and the Spirit of both, the Trinity itself, neither confused nor separated, God, who alone has immortality and dwells in light unapproachable, whom no man has seen or can see, is neither contained in a space of places, whether finite or infinite, nor varied by a course of times, whether finite or infinite. For there is nothing in his substance, by which he is God, that is less in the part than in the whole, as must be the case with things that are in places; nor was there anything in his substance that no longer is, or will there be anything that is not yet, as in natures that can undergo the changeableness of time.

8.20CSEL 28.1:258–259

Hic ergo incommutabili aeternitate uiuens creauit omnia simul, ex quibus currerent tempora et inplerentur loca temporalibusque et localibus rerum motibus saecula uoluerentur. in quibus rebus quaedam spiritalia, quaedam corporalia condidit, formans materiam, quam nec alius nec ullus, sed omnino ipse informem ac formabilem instituit, ut formationem suam non tempore, sed origine praeueniret. spiritalem autem creaturam corporali praeposuit, quod spiritalis tantummodo per tempora mutari posset, corporalis autem per tempora et locos. exempli enim gratia per tempus mouetur animus uel reminiscendo, quod oblitus erat, uel discendo, quod nesciebat, uel uolendo, quod nolebat; per locos autem corpus uel a terra in caelum uel a caelo in terram uel ab oriente ad occidentem uel si quo alio simili modo. omne autem, quod mouetur per locum, non potest nisi et per tempus simul moueri; at non omne, quod mouetur per tempus, necesse est etiam per locum moueri. sicut ergo substantiam, quae mouetur per tempus et locum, praecedit substantia, quae tantum per tempus, ita ipsam praecedit illa, quae nec per locum nec per tempus. ac per hoc, sicut per tempus et locum mouet corpus ipse tantum per tempus motus conditus spiritus, ita per tempus mouet conditum spiritum ipse nec per tempus nec per locum motus conditor spiritus. sed spiritus creatus mouet se ipsum per tempus et per tempus ac locum corpus; spiritus autem creator mouet se ipsum sine tempore ac loco, mouet conditum spiritum per tempus sine loco, mouet corpus per tempus et locum.

He, then, living in unchangeable eternity, created all things together, from which times would run and places be filled and ages roll on by the temporal and local movements of things. Among these things he founded some spiritual and some bodily, forming the material which no other, nor anyone, but he himself altogether set up unformed and formable, so that it would precede its forming not in time but in origin. And he put the spiritual creation above the bodily, because the spiritual can be changed only through times, the bodily through times and places. For example, the mind is moved through time by remembering what it had forgotten, or learning what it did not know, or willing what it did not will; but the body is moved through places, from earth to heaven, or from heaven to earth, or from east to west, or in any other similar way. Now everything that is moved through place cannot but be moved through time as well; but not everything that is moved through time must also be moved through place. So, just as the substance that is moved through time only precedes the substance that is moved through time and place, so that substance which is moved neither through place nor through time precedes it. And therefore, just as the created spirit, itself moved only through time, moves the body through time and place, so the creating Spirit, moved neither through time nor through place, moves the created spirit through time. The created spirit moves itself through time and moves the body through time and place; but the creating Spirit moves itself without time and place, moves the created spirit through time without place, and moves the body through time and place.

8.21CSEL 28.1:259–261

Quocirca quisquis intellegere conatur, quemadmodum aeternus, uere aeternus et uere inmortalis atque incommutabilis deus, ipse nec per locum nec per tempus motus, moueat temporaliter et localiter creaturam suam, non eum puto posse adsequi, nisi prius intellexerit, quemadmodum anima, hoc est spiritus creatus non per locum, sed tantum per tempus motus, moueat corpus per tempus et locum. si enim quod in se ipso agitur capere nondum potest, quanto minus illud, quod supra est! Adfecta quippe anima carnalium sensuum consuetudine etiam se ipsam cum corpore per locum moueri putat, dum id per locum mouet. quae si posset diligenter inspicere tamquam cardines membrorum corporis sui quemadmodum articulatim dispositi sint, a quibus initia motionum nitantur, inueniet ea, quae per spatia locorum mouentur, nisi ab eis, quae loco fixa sunt, non moueri. non enim mouetur solus digitus, nisi manus fixa sit, a cuius articulo, uelut inmoto cardine, moueatur. sic tota palma ab articulo cubiti, sic cubitus ab articulo humeri, humerus ab scapula cum mouetur stantibus utique cardinibus, quibus motio nitatur, it per loci spatium, quod mouetur; sic plantae in talo est articulus, quo stante moueatur; sic cruris in genu et totius pedis in coxa. et nullus membri motus omnino est, quem uoluntas mouet, nisi ab aliquo articuli cardine, quem nutus eiusdem uoluntatis primitus figit, ut ab eo, quod loci spatio non mouetur, agi ualeat, quod mouetur. denique nec in ambulando pes leuatur, nisi alius fixus totum corpus ferat, donec ille, qui motus est, a loco, unde fertur, ad locum, quo fertur, inmoto articulo sui cardinis innitatur. Porro, si in corpore nullum membrum per locum uoluntas mouet nisi ab eo membri articulo, quem non mouet, cum et illa pars corporis, quae mouetur, et illa, qua fixa fit, ut moueatur, corporeas habeant quantitates suas, quibus occupent spatia locorum suorum, quanto magis ipse animae nutus, cui membra deseruiunt, ut quod placuerit figatur, unde id, quod mouendum est, innitatur, cum anima non sit natura corporea nec locali spatio corpus inpleat, sicut aqua utrem siue spongiam, sed miris modis ipso incorporeo nutu commixta sit uiuificando corpori, quo et inperat corpori quadam intentione, non mole: quanto magis, inquam, nutus ipse uoluntatis eius non per locum mouetur, ut corpus per locum moueat, quando totum per partes mouet nec aliquas loco mouet nisi per illas, quas loco non mouet!

Therefore whoever tries to understand how the eternal God, truly eternal and truly immortal and unchangeable, himself moved neither through place nor through time, moves his creation in time and place, cannot, I think, attain it unless he first understands how the soul, that is, a created spirit moved not through place but only through time, moves the body through time and place. For if it cannot yet grasp what goes on in itself, how much less what is above it! For the soul, affected by the habit of the fleshly senses, thinks that it too is moved through place with the body, while it moves the body through place. But if it could carefully inspect, as it were, the hinges of the limbs of its body, how they are arranged joint by joint, and from which the beginnings of movements take their support, it would find that the things moved through spaces of place are not moved except from those which are fixed in place. For a finger alone is not moved unless the hand is fixed, from whose joint, as from an unmoved hinge, it is moved. So the whole hand is moved from the joint of the elbow, so the forearm from the joint of the shoulder, and the upper arm from the shoulder blade: when it is moved, the hinges on which the movement relies standing still, what is moved goes through a space of place. So the foot has its joint in the ankle, by whose standing still it is moved; so the leg has its joint in the knee, and the whole leg in the hip. And there is no movement at all of a limb which the will moves, except from some hinge of a joint which the signal of the same will first fixes, so that what is moved can be moved from what is not moved in space of place. Finally, in walking too a foot is not raised unless the other, fixed, bears the whole body, until the one that was moved, carried from the place where it is to the place where it is going, rests on the unmoved joint of its hinge. Further, if in the body the will moves no limb through place except from the joint of the limb which it does not move, although both the part of the body that is moved and the part fixed so that it may be moved have their bodily quantities by which they occupy the spaces of their places, how much more is the very signal of the soul, which the limbs serve so that what it pleases is fixed and what is to be moved relies on it (since the soul is not a bodily nature, nor does it fill the body by local space, as water fills a skin or a sponge, but is mingled in wonderful ways with the body by giving it life, by that very bodiless signal by which it also commands the body by a kind of intention, not by bulk): how much more, I say, is the very signal of its will not moved through place in order to move the body through place, since it moves the whole by parts, and moves no parts in place except through those which it does not move in place!

8.22CSEL 28.1:261–262

Quod si intellegere difficile est, utrumque credatur, et quod creatura spiritalis non per locum mota moueat corpus per locum et quod deus non per tempus motus moueat creaturam spiritalem per tempus. quodsi de anima quisque non uult hoc credere - quod quidem sine dubio non solum crederet, uerum etiam intellegeret, si eam posset, sicuti est, incorpoream cogitare. cui enim non facile occurrat, quod per locum non moueatur, quae per loci spatia non distenditur? quidquid autem per loci spatia distenditur corpus est; ac per hoc consequens est, ut anima per locum moueri non putetur, si corpus non esse credatur — sed, ut dicere coeperam, si de anima hoc quisque non uult credere, non nimis urguendus est; substantiam uero dei nisi credat nec per tempus nec per locum moueri, nondum perfecte incommutabilem credit.

But if this is hard to understand, let both be believed: that the spiritual creation, not moved through place, moves the body through place, and that God, not moved through time, moves the spiritual creation through time. But if anyone does not want to believe this of the soul (which he would doubtless not only believe but also understand, if he could think of it as bodiless, as it is; for to whom would it not readily occur that what is not extended through spaces of place is not moved through place? Whatever is extended through spaces of place is a body; and therefore it follows that the soul is not to be thought to be moved through place, if it is believed not to be a body): but, as I had begun to say, if anyone does not want to believe this of the soul, he need not be pressed too hard; but unless he believes that the substance of God is moved neither through time nor through place, he does not yet believe it to be perfectly unchangeable.

8.23CSEL 28.1:262–263

Uerum quia omnino incommutabilis est illa natura trinitatis et ob hoc ita aeterna, ut ei aliquid coaeternum esse non possit, ipsa apud se ipsam et in se ipsa sine ullo tempore ac loco, mouet tamen per tempus et locum sibi subditam creaturam, naturas creans bonitate, uoluntates ordinans potestate, ut in naturis nulla sit, quae non ab illo sit, in uoluntatibus autem nulla bona sit, cui non prosit, nulla mala sit, qua bene uti non possit. sed quia non omnibus naturis dedit uoluntatis arbitrium, illae autem, quibus dedit, potentiores ac superiores sunt, illae naturae, quae non habent uoluntatem, subditae sint necesse est illis, quae habent, et hoc ordinatione creatoris, qui numquam ita punit uoluntatem malam, ut naturae perimat dignitatem. cum igitur omne corpus et omnis anima inrationalis non habeat uoluntatis arbitrium, subdita ista sunt eis naturis, quae praeditae sunt arbitrio uoluntatis, nec omnibus omnia, sed sicut distribuit iustitia creatoris. ergo dei prouidentia regens atque administrans uniuersam creaturam, et naturas et uoluntates, naturas, ut sint, uoluntates autem, ut nec infructuosae bonae nec inpunitae malae sint, subdit primitus omnia sibi, deinde creaturam corporalem creaturae spiritali, inrationalem rationali, terrestrem caelesti, femineam masculinae, minus ualentem ualentiori, indigentiorem copiosiori, in uoluntatibus autem bonas sibi, ceteras uero ipsis seruientibus sibi, ut hoc patiatur uoluntas mala, quod ex iussu dei fecerit bona, siue per se ipsam siue per malam, in rebus dumtaxat, quae naturaliter sunt etiam malis uoluntatibus subditae, id est in corporibus. nam in se ipsis malae uoluntates habent interiorem poenam suam eandem ipsam iniquitatem suam.

But because that nature of the Trinity is altogether unchangeable, and therefore so eternal that nothing can be coeternal with it, itself with itself and in itself without any time or place, it nevertheless moves through time and place the creation subject to it, creating natures by its goodness and ordering wills by its power, so that among natures there is none that is not from him, and among wills none good that he does not help, none evil that he cannot use well. But because he did not give choice of will to all natures, and those to which he gave it are more powerful and higher, the natures which do not have will must be subject to those which have it, and this by the ordering of the Creator, who never punishes an evil will in such a way as to destroy the dignity of its nature. Since, then, every body and every irrational soul lacks choice of will, these are subject to the natures endowed with choice of will; not all to all, but as the justice of the Creator distributes. So the providence of God, ruling and governing the whole creation, both natures and wills (natures so that they exist, wills so that the good are not fruitless nor the evil unpunished), first subjects all things to himself, then the bodily creation to the spiritual, the irrational to the rational, the earthly to the heavenly, the female to the male, the less strong to the stronger, the needier to the richer; and among wills, the good to himself, and the rest to those who serve him, so that the evil will suffers what the good will has done at God's command, whether by itself or through an evil will, in those things at least which are by nature subject even to evil wills, that is, in bodies. For in themselves evil wills have their inner punishment, which is their very wickedness itself.

8.24CSEL 28.1:263

Ac per hoc sublimibus angelis deo subdite fruentibus et deo beate seruientibus subdita est omnis natura corporea, omnis inrationalis uita, omnis uoluntas uel infirma uel praua, ut hoc de subditis uel cum subditis agant, quod naturae ordo poscit in omnibus iubente illo, cui subiecta sunt omnia. proinde illi in illo ueritatem incommutabilem uident et secundum eam suas dirigunt uoluntates. fiunt ergo illi participes aeternitatis, ueritatis,. uoluntatis eius semper sine tempore et loco; mouentur autem eius imperio etiam temporaliter illo non temporaliter moto, nec ita, ut ab eius contemplatione resiliant aut defluant, sed simul et illum sine loco ac tempore contemplantur et eius in inferioribus iussa perficiunt, mouentes se per tempus, corpus autem per tempus et locum, quantum eorum congruit actioni. et ideo deus bipertito prouidentiae suae opere praeest uniuersae creaturae suae, naturis, ut fiant, uoluntatibus autem, ut sine suo iussu uel permissu nihil faciant.

And therefore to the exalted angels, who enjoy God in subjection and serve God in happiness, is subject every bodily nature, every irrational life, every will either weak or depraved, so that they do with or concerning their subjects what the order of nature requires in all things, at the command of him to whom all things are subject. So they see in him the unchangeable truth and direct their wills according to it. They become, then, partakers of his eternity, truth, and will, always, without time and place; but by his command they are moved also in time, he not being moved in time; and not so as to spring back or flow away from contemplating him, but they both contemplate him without place and time and carry out his commands among lower things, moving themselves through time and bodies through time and place, as far as befits their action. And therefore God presides over his whole creation by the twofold work of his providence: over natures, so that they come to be; over wills, so that they do nothing without his command or permission.

8.25CSEL 28.1:263–265

Natura igitur uniuersitatis corporalis non adiuuatur extrinsecus corporaliter. neque enim est extra eam ullum corpus; alioquin non est uniuersitas. intrinsecus autem adiuuatur incorporaliter deo id agente, ut omnino natura sit, quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. partes uero eiusdem uniuersitatis et intrinsecus incorporaliter adiuuantur, uel potius fiunt, ut naturae sint, et extrinsecus corporaliter, quo se melius habeant, sicut alimentis, agricultura, medicina et quaecumque etiam ad ornatum fiunt, ut non solum saluae ac fecundiores, uerum etiam decentiores sint. Spiritalis autem creata natura si perfecta atque beata est, sicut angelorum sanctorum, quantum adtinet ad se ipsam, quo sit sapiensque sit, nonnisi intrinsecus incorporaliter adiuuatur. intus ei quippe loquitur deus miro et ineffabili modo neque per scripturam corporalibus instrumentis adfixam neque per uoces corporalibus auribus insonantes neque per corporum similitudines, quales in spiritu imaginaliter fiunt, sicut in somnis uel in aliquo excessu spiritus — quod graece dicitur Ixa-caoic et nos eo uerbo iam utimur pro latino - quia et hoc genus uisionum, quamuis interius fiat quam sunt ea, quae animo per sensus corporis nuntiantur, tamen, quia simile est eis, ita ut, cum fit, discerni ab eis aut omnino non possit aut certe uix et rarissime possit, et quia exterius est quam illud, quod in ipsa incommutabili ueritate mens rationalis et intellectualis intuetur eaque luce de his omnibus iudicat, inter illa, quae extrinsecus fiunt, arbitror esse deputandum. creatura ergo spiritalis et intellectualis perfecta et beata, qualis angelorum est, sicut dixi, quantum adtinet ad se ipsam, quo sit sapiensque ac beata sit, nonnisi intrinsecus adiuuatur aeternitate, ueritate, caritate creatoris; extrinsecus uero si adiuuari dicenda est, eo fortasse solo adiuuatur, quod inuicem uident et de sua societate gaudent in deo et quod perspectis etiam eis ipsis omnibus creaturis undique gratias agit laudatque creatorem. quod autem adtinet ad creaturae angelicae actionem, per quam uniuersarum rerum generibus maximeque humano prouidentia dei prospicitur, ipsa extrinsecus adiuuat et per illa uisa, quae similia sunt corporalibus, et per ipsa corpora. quae angelicae subiacent potestati.

The nature of the bodily universe, then, is not helped bodily from outside. For there is no body outside it; otherwise it is not the universe. But it is helped from within in a bodiless way, God bringing it about that it is a nature at all, since from him and through him and in him are all things. But the parts of that universe are both helped from within in a bodiless way, or rather made, so that they are natures, and helped from outside bodily, so that they may be in better condition, as by food, farming, medicine, and whatever is done also for adornment, so that they may be not only sound and more fruitful but also more beautiful. But created spiritual nature, if it is perfect and happy, like that of the holy angels, is helped, as far as concerns itself, so that it exists and is wise, only from within in a bodiless way. For God speaks to it inwardly in a wonderful and ineffable manner, not through writing fixed on bodily materials, nor through voices sounding in bodily ears, nor through likenesses of bodies such as are formed in the spirit in images, as in dreams or in some going out of the spirit (which in Greek is called ecstasis, and we now use that word for the Latin). For this kind of vision too, although it takes place more inwardly than the things reported to the mind through the bodily senses, is nevertheless, because it is like them, so that when it happens it either cannot be distinguished from them at all or certainly only with difficulty and very rarely, and because it is more outward than what the rational and intellectual mind beholds in the unchangeable truth itself and by whose light it judges all these things, to be counted, I think, among the things which happen from outside. So the perfect and happy spiritual and intellectual creation, such as the angels' is, as I said, is helped, as far as concerns itself, so that it exists and is wise and happy, only from within, by the eternity, truth, and love of the Creator; and if it is to be said to be helped from outside, it is perhaps helped only by this, that they see one another and rejoice in their fellowship in God, and that, beholding all creatures, themselves included, it gives thanks on every side and praises the Creator. But as for the action of the angelic creation, by which God's providence watches over the kinds of all things and above all the human kind, it helps from outside both through those visions which are like bodily things and through bodies themselves, which are subject to angelic power.

8.26CSEL 28.1:265

Quae cum ita sint, cum deus omnipotens et omnitenens, incommutabili aeternitate, ueritate, uoluntate semper idem, non per tempus nec per locum motus mouet per tempus creaturam spiritalem, mouet etiam per tempus et locum creaturam corporalem, ut eo motu naturas, quas intrinsecus substituit, etiam extrinsecus administret et per uoluntates sibi subditas, quas per tempus et per corpora sibi atque illis uoluntatibus subdita, quae per tempus et locum mouet, eo tempore ac loco, cuius ratio in ipso deo uita est sine tempore ac loco: cum ergo tale aliquid deus agit, non debemus opinari eius substantiam, qua deus est, temporibus locisque mutabilem aut per tempora et loca mobilem, sed in opere diuinae prouidentiae ista cognoscere non in illo opere, quo naturas creat, sed in illo, quo intrinsecus creatas etiam extrinsecus administrat, cum sit ipse nullo locorum uel interuallo uel spatio incommutabili excellentique potentia et interior omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omni re, quia ipse est super omnia. item nullo temporum uel interuallo uel spatio incommutabili aeternitate et antiquior est omnibus, quia ipse est ante omnia, et nouior omnibus, quia idem ipse post omnia.

Since this is so, since God almighty and all-holding, always the same in unchangeable eternity, truth, and will, not moved through time or through place, moves the spiritual creation through time and moves also the bodily creation through time and place, so that by that movement he governs also from outside the natures which he established from within, both through wills subject to him, which he moves through time, and through bodies subject to him and to those wills, which he moves through time and place, at that time and place whose reason is life in God himself without time and place: when, then, God does something of this kind, we ought not to suppose that his substance, by which he is God, is changeable in times and places or movable through times and places, but to recognize these things in the work of divine providence; not in that work by which he creates natures, but in that by which he governs from outside also the natures created from within; since he himself, by no interval or space of places, by his unchangeable and surpassing power, is both more inward than every thing, because in him are all things, and more outward than every thing, because he himself is above all things. Likewise, by no interval or space of times, by his unchangeable eternity, he is both older than all things, because he is before all things, and newer than all things, because the same he is after all things.

8.27CSEL 28.1:265–267

Quapropter, cum audimus dicentem scripturam: et praecepit dominus deus Adae dicens: ab omni ligno, quod est in paradiso, escae edes; de ligno autem cognoscendi bonum et malum non manducabitis de illo. qua die autem ederitis ab eo, morte moriemini, si modum quaerimus, quomodo ista locutus sit deus, modus quidem ipse a nobis proprie conprehendi non potest. certissime tamen tenere debemus deum aut per suam substantiam loqui aut per sibi subditam creaturam; sed per substantiam suam non loqui nisi ad creandas omnes naturas, ad spiritales uero atque intellectuales non solum creandas, sed etiam inluminandas, cum iam possunt capere locutionem eius, qualis est in uerbo eius, quod in principio erat apud deum et deus erat uerbum, per quod facta sunt omnia. illis autem, qui eam capere non possunt, cum loquitur deus, nonnisi per creaturam loquitur aut tantummodo spiritalem siue in somnis siue in extasi in similitudine rerum corporalium aut etiam per ipsam corporalem, dum sensibus corporis uel aliqua species adparet uel insonant uoces. Si ergo Adam talis erat, ut posset capere illam locutionem dei, quam mentibus angelicis per suam praebet substantiam, non dubitandum est, quod eius mentem per tempus mouerit miro et ineffabili modo, non motus ipse per tempus, eique utile ac salubre praeceptum ueritatis inpresserit et quae transgressori poena deberetur ea ipsa ineffabili ueritate monstrauerit, sicut audiuntur uel uidentur omnia bona praecepta in ipsa incommutabili sapientia, quae in animas sanctas se transfert ex aliquo tempore, cum ipsius nullus sit motus in tempore. si autem ad eum modum Adam iustus erat, ut ei adhuc opus esset alterius creaturae sanctioris et sapientioris auctoritas, per quam cognosceret dei uoluntatem atque iussionem, sicut nobis prophetae, sicut ipsis angeli, cur ambigamus per aliquam eius modi creaturam ei esse locutum deum talibus uocum signis, quae intellegere posset? illud enim, quod postea scriptum est, cum peccassent, eos audisse uocem domini dei ambulantis in paradiso, quia non per ipsam dei substantiam, sed per subditam ei creaturam factum est, nullo modo dubitat, qui fidem catholicam sapit. ad hoc enim et aliquanto latius de hac re disserere uolui, quia nonnulli haeretici putant substantiam filii dei nullo adsumto corpore per se ipsam esse uisibilem et ideo, antequam ex uirgine corpus acciperet, ipsum uisum esse patribus opinantur, tamquam de solo deo patre dictum sit: quem nemo hominum uidit nec uidere potest, quia filius uisus sit ante acceptam serui formam etiam per ipsam substantiam suam: quae inpietas procul a catholicis mentibus repellenda est. sed de hoc plenius alias, si domino placuerit, disseremus; nunc terminato isto uolumine id, quod sequitur, quomodo sit mulier ex uiri sui latere creata, in consequenti sperandum est.

Therefore, when we hear Scripture saying, “And the Lord God commanded Adam, saying: From every tree that is in paradise you shall eat for food; but of the tree of knowing good and evil you shall not eat of it. On the day you eat of it, you shall die by death,” if we ask the manner in which God spoke these things, the manner itself cannot properly be grasped by us. Yet we ought to hold most certainly that God speaks either through his own substance or through a creature subject to him; but that he does not speak through his substance except to create all natures, and, for spiritual and intellectual natures, not only to create but also to enlighten them, when they can already grasp his speech as it is in his Word, which in the beginning was with God, and the Word was God, through whom all things were made. But to those who cannot grasp it, when God speaks, he speaks only through a creature: either only a spiritual one, whether in dreams or in ecstasy, in the likeness of bodily things, or else through the bodily creation itself, when some form appears to the bodily senses or voices sound. If, then, Adam was such that he could grasp that speech of God which he offers to angelic minds through his substance, there is no doubt that God moved his mind through time in a wonderful and ineffable way, not himself moved through time, and impressed on him the useful and wholesome command of truth, and by that same ineffable truth showed him what punishment was owed to the transgressor; just as all good commands are heard or seen in the unchangeable Wisdom itself, which passes into holy souls from a certain time, though there is no movement of it in time. But if Adam was just in such a way that he still needed the authority of another, holier and wiser creature, through which he might know God's will and command, as we need prophets and they need angels, why should we doubt that God spoke to him through some such creature with signs of voices that he could understand? For what is written afterwards, that when they had sinned they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise, was done not through the very substance of God but through a creature subject to him; no one who understands the catholic faith doubts this. For I wished to discuss this matter somewhat more at length for this reason, that some heretics think that the substance of the Son of God, without taking on any body, is visible in itself, and so suppose that before he received a body from the virgin he himself was seen by the fathers, as though it were said of God the Father alone, “whom no man has seen or can see,” because the Son was seen even through his own substance before he took the form of a servant: an ungodliness to be driven far from catholic minds. But of this we will speak more fully elsewhere, if it pleases the Lord; now, with this volume ended, what follows, how the woman was created from her husband's side, is to be looked for in the next.

Chapter 9

9.1CSEL 28.1:267–269

Et dixit dominus deus: non bonum est esse hominem solum; faciamus ei adiutorium secundum ipsum. et finxit deus adhuc de terra omnes bestias agri et omnia uolatilia caeli et adduxit illa ad Adam, ut uideret, quid uocabit illa. et omne quodcumque uocauit illud Adam animam uiuam, hoc est nomen eius. et uocauit Adam nomina omnibus pecoribus et omnibus uolatilibus caeli et omnibus bestiis agri. ipsi autem Adam non est inuentus adiutor similis ei et inmisit deus extasin in Adam, et obdormiuit. et accepit unam costarum eius et adinpleuit carnem in locum eius. et aedificauit dominus deus costam, quam accepit de Adam, in mulierem et adduxit eam ad Adam. et dixit Adam: hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea; haec uocabitur mulier, quoniam ex uiro suo sumta est. et propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem et conglutinabitur ad uxorem suam; et erunt duo in carne una. si aliquid adiuuant lectorem, quae libris superioribus considerata atque conscripta sunt, non debemus in hoc diutius inmorari, quod finxit adhuc deus de terra omnes bestias agri et omnia uolatilia caeli; cur enim dictum sit "adhuc". id est propter primam conditionem creaturarum sex diebus consummatam, in qua causaliter perfecta sunt omnia simul et inchoata, ut deinde ad effectus suos causae perducerentur, iam, quantum potuimus, in praecedentibus intimauimus. et si quis hoc aliter enodandum putat, tantum diligenter adtendat illa omnia, quae ut hoc sentiremus adtendimus; et si probabiliorem inde potuerit enucleare sententiam, non solum resistere non debemus, sed debemus etiam gratulari. Si quem autem mouet, quia non dixit: finxit deus adhuc de terra omnes bestias agri et de aquis omnia uolatilia caeli, sed tamquam utraque genera de terra finxerit, et finxit deus, inquit, adhuc de terra omnes bestias agri et omnia uolatilia caeli, uideat duobus modis esse intellegendum: aut tacuisse nunc, unde finxerit uolatilia caeli, quia et tacitum posset occurrere, ut non de terra utrumque accipiatur deum finxisse, sed tantummodo bestias agri, ut uolatilia caeli etiam tacente scriptura intellegamus unde finxerit, uelut qui sciamus in prima causalium rationum conditione ex aquis ea esse producta; aut terram uniuersaliter sic appellatam simul cum aquis, quemadmodum appellata est in illo psalmo, ubi caelestium laudibus terminatis ad terram facta est conuersio sermonis et dictum: laudate dominum de terra, dracones et omnes abyssi et cetera, nec postea dictum est "laudate dominum de aquis". ubi enim sunt omnes abyssi, quae tamen de terra laudant dominum? ubi etiam reptilia et uolatilia pennata, quae nihilominus de terra laudant dominum? secundum istam uniuersalem appellationem terrae, secundum quam etiam de toto mundo dicitur: deus, qui fecit caelum et terram, siue de terra siue de aquis quaecumque creata sunt, de terra creata ueraciter intelleguntur.

“And the Lord God said: It is not good for the man to be alone; let us make for him a helper corresponding to him. And God formed besides from the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky, and brought them to Adam, to see what he would call them. And whatever Adam called each living soul, that is its name. And Adam called names for all the cattle and for all the birds of the sky and for all the beasts of the field. But for Adam himself no helper like him was found. And God sent an ecstasy upon Adam, and he slept. And he took one of his ribs and filled up flesh in its place. And the Lord God built the rib which he took from Adam into a woman, and brought her to Adam. And Adam said: This now is bone from my bones and flesh from my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken from her husband. And for this reason a man will leave his father and mother and will be glued to his wife; and the two will be in one flesh.” If what was considered and written in the previous books helps the reader at all, we ought not to dwell longer on this, that God formed besides from the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky; for why “besides” was said, namely because of the first founding of creatures completed in six days, in which all things were causally completed and begun together, so that afterwards the causes might be brought to their effects, we have already shown in the preceding books as far as we could. And if anyone thinks this should be untied otherwise, let him only attend carefully to all those things which we attended to so as to hold this view; and if from them he can draw out a more probable view, we ought not only not to resist but even to rejoice. But if anyone is disturbed because it did not say, “God formed besides from the earth all the beasts of the field and from the waters all the birds of the sky,” but says, as though he formed both kinds from the earth, “And God formed besides from the earth all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky,” let him see that it can be understood in two ways: either that it was silent here about what he formed the birds of the sky from, because this could occur to the reader even unsaid, so that it is not taken that God formed both from the earth, but only the beasts of the field, and we understand, even with Scripture silent, from what he formed the birds of the sky, as people who know that in the first founding of the causal reasons they were produced from the waters; or that “earth” is used universally together with the waters, as it is used in that psalm where, the praises of the heavenly things ended, the speech turns to the earth and it is said, “Praise the Lord from the earth, dragons and all deeps,” and so on, and it is not afterwards said, “Praise the Lord from the waters.” For where are all the deeps, which nevertheless praise the Lord from the earth? Where too are the creeping things and the winged birds, which nonetheless praise the Lord from the earth? According to this universal use of “earth,” in which it is also said of the whole world, “God who made heaven and earth,” whatever was created, whether from the earth or from the waters, is truly understood as created from the earth.

9.2CSEL 28.1:269–271

Nunc iam uideamus, quomodo accipiendum sit, quod dixit deus: non est bonum esse hominem solum; faciamus ei adiutorium secundum ipsum, utrum temporaliter uocibus ac syllabis editis hoc dixerit deus, an ipsa ratio commemorata est, quae in uerbo dei principaliter erat, ut sic femina fieret: quam rationem suscipiebat etiam tunc scriptura, cum diceret "et dixit deus: fiat" hoc aut illud, quando primitus omnia condebantur. an forte in mente ipsius hominis hoc dixit deus, sicut loquitur quibusdam seruis suis in ipsis seruis suis? ex quo genere seruorum eius erat etiam ille, qui dixit in psalmo: audiam, quid loquetur in me dominus deus. an aliqua de hac re ipsi homini in ipso homine per angelum est facta reuelatio in similitudinibus uocum corporalium, quamuis tacuerit scriptura, utrum in somnis an in extasi? ita enim fieri haec solent. an aliquo alio modo sicut reuelatur prophetis? unde illud est: et dixit mihi angelus, qui loquebatur in me. an per corporalem creaturam uox ipsa sonuerit sicut de nube: hic est filius meus? quid ergo ex his omnibus factum sit, ad liquidum conprehendere non ualeamus; uerum tamen certissime teneamus et dixisse hoc deum et, si corporali uoce uel temporaliter expressa similitudine corporis dixit, non eum per suam substantiam, sed per aliquam imperio suo subditam dixisse creaturam, sicut in libro praecedente tractauimus. Nam uisus est deus etiam postea sanctis uiris alias capite albo sicut lana, alias inferiore parte corporis sicut aurichalcum, alias aliter atque aliter; non tamen illas uisiones hominibus per substantiam, qua ipse est, sed per sibi subdita, quae creauit, eum praebuisse et per similitudines formarum uocumque corporalium quod uoluit ostendisse ac dixisse certissimum est eis, qui substantiam trinitatis incommutabiliter aeternam nec per tempus nec per locum moueri et per tempus et per locum mouere uel fideliter credunt uel etiam excellenter intellegunt. non ergo iam quaeramus, quomodo istud dixerit deus, sed potius intellegamus quid dixerit. adiutorium quippe homini secundum ipsum fuisse faciendum aeterna ipsa ueritas habet, per quam creata sunt omnia; et in illa hoc audit, qui potest in ea cognoscere, quid quare creatum sit.

Now let us see how we are to take what God said, “It is not good for the man to be alone; let us make for him a helper corresponding to him”: whether God said this in time, with voices and syllables uttered, or whether the reason itself is recalled which was in the Word of God as in its source, that the woman should be made so; a reason which Scripture was also taking up when it said, “And God said: Let there be” this or that, when all things were first being founded. Or perhaps God said this in the mind of the man himself, as he speaks to some of his servants within those very servants? Of this kind of his servants was also the one who said in the psalm, “I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.” Or was some revelation about this made to the man himself within himself through an angel, in likenesses of bodily voices, though Scripture is silent as to whether it was in dreams or in ecstasy? For this is how such things usually happen. Or in some other way, as revelation is made to the prophets? Hence the saying, “And the angel who spoke in me said to me.” Or did the voice itself sound through a bodily creature, as from the cloud: “This is my Son”? Which of all these happened, we cannot grasp clearly; yet let us hold most certainly both that God said this, and that, if he said it with a bodily voice or with a likeness of a body expressed in time, he said it not through his own substance but through some creature subject to his command, as we treated in the previous book. For God was seen later too by holy men, sometimes with a head white as wool, sometimes with the lower part of the body like brass, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another; yet it is most certain, to those who either faithfully believe or even excellently understand that the substance of the Trinity, unchangeably eternal, is moved neither through time nor through place and moves things through time and place, that he did not present those visions to men through the substance by which he is, but through things subject to him which he created, and showed and said what he willed through likenesses of bodily forms and voices. Let us not then ask further how God said this, but rather understand what he said. That a helper corresponding to man had to be made, the eternal Truth itself contains, through which all things were created; and he hears this in it who can recognize in it what was created and why.

9.3CSEL 28.1:271–272

Si autem quaeritur, ad quam rem fieri oportuit hoc adiutorium, nihil aliud probabiliter occurrit quam propter filios procreandos, sicut adiutorium semini terra est, ut uirgultum ex utroque nascatur; hoc enim et in prima rerum conditione dictum erat: masculum et feminam fecit eos et benedixit eos deus dicens: crescite et multiplicamini et inplete terram et dominamini eius. quae ratio conditionis et coniunctionis masculi et feminae atque benedictio nec post peccatum hominis poenamque defecit. ipsa enim est, secundum quam nunc terra hominibus plena est dominantibus eius. Quamquam enim iam emissi de paradiso conuenisse et genuisse commemorantur, tamen non uideo, quid prohibere potuerit, ut essent eis etiam in paradiso honorabiles nuptiae et torus inmaculatus hoc deo praestante fideliter iusteque uiuentibus eique oboedienter sancteque seruientibus, ut sine ullo inquieto ardore libidinis, sine ullo labore ac dolore pariendi fetus ex eorum semine gigneretur; non ut morientibus parentibus filii succederent, sed ut illis, qui genuissent, in aliquo formae statu manentibus et ex ligno uitae, quod ibi plantatum erat, corporalem uigorem sumentibus et illi, qui gignerentur, ad eundem perducerentur statum, donec certo numero inpleto, si iuste omnes oboedienterque uiuerent, tunc fieret illa commutatio, ut sine illa morte animalia corpora conuersa in aliam qualitatem, eo quod ad omnem nutum regenti se spiritui deseruirent et solo spiritu uiuificante sine ullis alimentorum corporalibus sustentaculis uiuerent, spiritalia uocarentur. potuit hoc fieri, si non praecepti transgressio mortis subplicium mereretur. Qui enim hoc fieri potuisse non credunt, nihil aliud quam consuetudinem naturae iam post peccatum poenamque humanam sic currentis adtendunt; non autem in eorum genere nos esse debemus, qui non credunt, nisi quod uidere consuerunt. quis enim dubitet homini oboedienter et pie uiuenti praestari potuisse, quod diximus, qui non dubitat uestibus Israhelitarum inpertitum esse quendam in suo genere statum, ut per annos quadraginta nulla uetustatis detrimenta paterentur?

But if it is asked for what purpose this helper had to be made, nothing else occurs as probable than the procreation of children, just as the earth is a helper to the seed, so that a plant may be born from both; for this had also been said in the first founding of things: “Male and female he made them, and God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply and fill the earth and have dominion over it.” This reason for the founding and joining of male and female, and this blessing, did not fail even after man's sin and punishment. For it is that by which the earth is now full of men having dominion over it. For although they are recorded as having come together and had children only after they had been sent out of paradise, I still do not see what could have prevented their having, even in paradise, honorable marriage and an undefiled bed, God granting this to them as they lived faithfully and justly and served him obediently and holily, so that without any restless heat of lust, without any labor and pain of childbirth, offspring would be born from their seed; not so that children would succeed parents who died, but so that, those who had begotten remaining in some state of form and taking bodily vigor from the tree of life which was planted there, those who were begotten would also be brought to the same state, until, a certain number having been filled up, if all lived justly and obediently, then that change would take place, so that without death animal bodies would be turned into another quality, because they would obey at every signal the spirit ruling them and, living by the life-giving spirit alone, without any bodily supports of food, would be called spiritual. This could have happened, if the transgression of the command had not deserved the punishment of death. Those who do not believe this could have happened pay attention to nothing but the customary course of nature, which now runs so after sin and human punishment; but we ought not to be among those who believe nothing except what they are used to seeing. For who would doubt that what we have said could have been granted to man living obediently and piously, if he does not doubt that the clothes of the Israelites were given a certain state of their own kind, so that for forty years they suffered no damage from age?

9.4CSEL 28.1:272–273

Cur ergo non coierunt, nisi cum exissent de paradiso? cito responderi potest: quia mox creata muliere, prius quam coirent, facta est illa transgressio, cuius merito in mortem destinati etiam de loco illius felicitatis exierunt. non enim scriptura tempus expressit, quantum interfuerit inter eos factos et ex eis natum Cain. potest etiam dici, quia nondum deus iusserat, ut coirent. cur enim non ad hanc rem diuina expectaretur auctoritas, ubi nulla concupiscentia tamquam stimulus inoboedientis carnis urgebat? ideo autem hoc non iusserat deus, quia secundum suam praescientiam disponebat omnia, in qua et eorum casum procul dubio praesciebat, unde iam mortale genus propagandum esset humanum.

Why then did they not come together until they had left paradise? It can be answered quickly: because soon after the woman was created, before they came together, that transgression took place, by whose desert, destined for death, they also went out of the place of that happiness. For Scripture did not state the time, how long there was between their being made and Cain's being born of them. It can also be said that God had not yet commanded them to come together. For why should divine authority not be awaited for this, where no concupiscence, as the goad of disobedient flesh, was pressing? And God had not commanded this because he was arranging all things according to his foreknowledge, in which he without doubt also foreknew their fall, from which the human race, now mortal, was to be propagated.

9.5CSEL 28.1:273

Aut si ad hoc adiutorium gignendi filios non est facta mulier uiro, ad quod ergo adiutorium facta est? si, quae simul operaretur terram, nondum erat labor, ut adiumento indigeret, et, si opus esset. melius adiutorium masculus fieret. hoc et de solacio dici potest, si solitudinis fortasse taedebat. quanto enim congruentius ad conuiuendum et conloquendum duo amici pariter quam uir et mulier habitarent? quodsi oportebat alium iubendo, alium obsequendo pariter uiuere, ne contrariae uoluntates pacem cohabitantium perturbarent, nec ad hoc retinendum ordo defuisset, quo prior unus, alter posterior, maxime si posterior ex priore crearetur, sicut femina creata est. an aliquis dixerit de costa hominis deum feminam tantum, non etiam masculum, si hoc uellet, facere potuisse? quapropter non inuenio, ad quod adiutorium facta sit mulier uiro, si pariendi causa subtrahitur.

Or if the woman was not made for the man as a helper for begetting children, for what help then was she made? If it was to work the earth together with him, there was not yet toil, so as to need help; and if there were need, a male would be a better helper. The same can be said of companionship, if perhaps he grew weary of solitude. For how much more fittingly would two friends live together, on equal terms, for living and talking together, than a man and a woman? And if it was necessary for one to command and the other to obey as they lived together, so that opposed wills would not disturb the peace of those living together, an order to keep this would not have been lacking, by which one would be first and the other second, especially if the second were created from the first, as the woman was created. Or will anyone say that from the man's rib God could have made only a woman, and not a man too, if he wished? Therefore I do not find for what help the woman was made for the man, if the reason of childbearing is taken away.

9.6CSEL 28.1:273–275

Nam si parentes filiis suis cedere ex hac uita oportebat, ut ita omne humanum genus per decessiones et successiones certa numerositate inpleretur, potuerunt etiam homines genitis filiis perfectaque humani officii iustitia hinc ad meliora transferri non per mortem, sed per aliquam commutationem, aut illam summam, qua receptis corporibus fient sancti, sicut angeli in caelis, aut, si illam dari non oportet nisi omnibus simul in saeculi fine, aliqua inferiore quam illa erit: quae tamen haberet meliorem statum, quam uel hoc corpus habet uel illa etiam, quae primitus facta sunt, uiri ex limo terrae, mulieris ex uiri carne. Neque enim arbitrandum est Heliam uel sic esse iam, sicut erunt sancti, quando peracto operis die denarium pariter accepturi sunt, uel sic, quemadmodum sunt homines, qui ex ista uita nondum emigrarunt, de qua ille tamen non morte, sed translatione migrauit. iam itaque aliquid melius habet, quam in hac uita posset, quamuis nondum habeat, quod ex hac uita recte gesta in fine habiturus est; pro nobis enim meliora prouiderunt, ne sine nobis perfecti perficerentur. aut si quisquam putat hoc Heliam mereri non potuisse, si duxisset uxorem filiosque procreasset — creditur enim non habuisse. quia hoc scriptura non dixit, quamuis et de caelibatu eius nihil dixerit — quid de Enoch respondebit, qui filiis genitis deo placens non mortuus, sed translatus est? cur ergo et Adam et Eua, si iuste uiuentes caste filios procreassent, non eis possent translatione, non morte succedentibus cedere? nam si Enoch et Helias in Adam mortui mortisque propaginem in carne gestantes — quod debitum ut soluant, creduntur etiam redituri ad hanc uitam et, quod tamdiu dilatum est, morituri — nunc tamen in alia uita sunt, ubi ante resurrectionem carnis, antequam animale corpus in spiritale mutetur, nec morbo nec senectute deficiunt: quanto iustius atque probabilius primis illis hominibus praestaretur sine ullo suo parentumue peccato uiuentibus, ut in meliorem aliquem statum filiis genitis cederent, unde saeculo finito cum omni posteritate sanctorum in angelicam formam non per carnis mortem, sed per dei uirtutem multo felicius mutarentur!

For if parents had to give way to their children from this life, so that the whole human race would be filled up to a certain number by departures and successions, human beings could also, having begotten children and completed the justice of human duty, be transferred from here to better things, not by death but by some change: either that highest change by which, their bodies received back, the saints will become like the angels in heaven, or, if that is not to be given except to all together at the end of the age, some lower one than that; which would nevertheless have a better state than either this body has, or even those bodies have which were first made, the man's from the mud of the earth, the woman's from the man's flesh. For we are not to think that Elijah is either already as the saints will be when, the day of work done, they will receive the denarius together, or as men are who have not yet departed from this life, from which he departed nevertheless not by death but by being taken away. So he already has something better than he could in this life, although he does not yet have what he will have at the end because of a life well lived; for they foresaw better things for us, so that they would not be made perfect without us. Or if anyone thinks that Elijah could not have deserved this if he had taken a wife and had children (for he is believed not to have had them, because Scripture did not say so, although it said nothing about his celibacy either), what will he answer about Enoch, who, having begotten children and pleasing God, did not die but was taken away? Why then could not Adam and Eve too, if, living justly, they had chastely procreated children, give way to them as successors by being taken away, not by death? For if Enoch and Elijah, dead in Adam and bearing in their flesh the offspring of death (to pay which debt they are believed also to be going to return to this life and to die, what has been so long put off), are nevertheless now in another life, where, before the resurrection of the flesh, before the animal body is changed into a spiritual one, they do not fail by disease or old age: how much more justly and probably would it have been granted to those first human beings, living without any sin of their own or of their parents, that, having begotten children, they should give way into some better state, from which, at the end of the age, with all the posterity of the saints, they would be changed into angelic form, not through the death of the flesh but through the power of God, much more happily!

9.7CSEL 28.1:275–276

Non itaque uideo, ad quod aliud adiutorium mulier facta sit uiro, si generandi causa subtrahitur: quae nihilominus quare subtrahatur ignoro. unde enim magnum magnique honoris meritum apud deum fidelis et pia uirginitas habet, nisi quia isto iam tempore continendi ab amplexu, cum ex omnibus gentibus ad inplendum sanctorum numerum largissima subpetat copia, percipiendae sordidae uoluptatis libido non sibi uindicat, quod iam sufficiendae prolis non postulat necessitudo? denique utriusque sexus infirmitas propendens in ruinam turpitudinis recte excipitur honestate nuptiarum, ut, quod sanis esse posset officium, sit aegrotis remedium. neque enim quia incontinentia malum est, ideo conubium uel quo incontinentes copulantur, non est bonum; immo uero non propter illud malum culpabile est hoc bonum, sed propter hoc bonum ueniale est illud malum, quoniam id, quod bonum habent nuptiae et quo bonae sunt nuptiae, peccatum esse numquam potest. hoc autem tripertitum est: fides, proles, sacramentum. in fide adtenditur, ne praeter uinculum coniugale cum altera uel altero concumbatur; in prole, ut amanter suscipiatur, benigne nutriatur, religiose educetur; in sacramento, ut coniugium non separetur et dimissus aut dimissa nec causa prolis alteri coniungatur. haec est tamquam regula nuptiarum, qua uel naturae decoratur fecunditas uel incontinentiae regitur prauitas. unde quia satis disseruimus in eo libro, quem de bono coniugali nuper edidimus, ubi et continentiam uidualem et excellentiam uirginalem pro suorum graduum dignitate distinximus, diutius hic stilus noster non est occupandus.

So I do not see for what other help the woman was made for the man, if the reason of begetting is taken away; nor do I know why it should be taken away. For why does faithful and devout virginity have a great merit, and one of great honor, with God, except that in this present time of abstaining from embrace, when from all nations a most abundant supply is at hand for filling up the number of the saints, the desire for enjoying sordid pleasure does not claim for itself what the need of providing offspring no longer demands? Finally, the weakness of both sexes, inclining toward the ruin of shamefulness, is rightly caught by the honorableness of marriage, so that what could be a duty for the healthy is a remedy for the sick. For it is not because incontinence is an evil that marriage, even that by which the incontinent are joined, is not a good; on the contrary, this good is not blameworthy because of that evil, but that evil is pardonable because of this good, since that which is good in marriage, and by which marriage is good, can never be sin. And this is threefold: fidelity, offspring, sacrament. In fidelity, care is taken that there be no lying with another man or woman outside the marriage bond; in offspring, that it be lovingly received, kindly nourished, and religiously brought up; in the sacrament, that the marriage not be separated, and that a man or woman sent away not be joined to another, not even for the sake of offspring. This is, as it were, the rule of marriage, by which either the fruitfulness of nature is adorned or the depravity of incontinence is governed. And since we have discussed this sufficiently in the book we recently published on the good of marriage, where we also distinguished the continence of widows and the excellence of virgins according to the dignity of their ranks, our pen need not be occupied with it longer here.

9.8CSEL 28.1:276

Nunc enim quaerimus, cui adiutorio mulier facta sit uiro, si eis ad gignendos filios misceri sibimet in paradiso non licebat. qui enim hoc sentiunt, forte peccatum esse omnem concubitum putant. difficile est namque, ut, dum peruerse homines uitia deuitant, non in eorum contraria perniciter currant. etenim sicut exhorrens auaritiam fit profusus aut exhorrens luxuriam fit auarus aut inquietus fit, cuius pigritiam reprehenderis, aut cuius inquietudinem piger aut qui reprehensus odisse coeperit audaciam suam, ad timiditatem fugit aut qui timidus non esse conatur, tamquam abrupto uinculo fit temerarius, dum non ratione, sed opinione crimina metiuntur: ita dum nesciunt homines, quid in adulteriis et fornicationibus diuino iure damnetur, etiam causam procreandi coniugalem concubitum detestantur.

For we are now asking for what help the woman was made for the man, if they were not allowed to unite with each other in paradise to beget children. For those who hold this perhaps think that all intercourse is sin. For it is difficult for men, while perversely avoiding vices, not to run headlong into their opposites. For just as one who shudders at avarice becomes prodigal, or one who shudders at luxury becomes avaricious, or one whose laziness you rebuke becomes restless, or one whose restlessness you rebuke becomes lazy, or one who, rebuked, has begun to hate his rashness flees to timidity, or one who tries not to be timid becomes reckless as if a chain were broken, while they measure faults not by reason but by opinion: so, while men do not know what is condemned by divine law in adulteries and acts of sexual immorality, they detest even marital intercourse for the sake of procreation.

9.9CSEL 28.1:276–278

Quod qui non faciunt, sed tamen fecunditatem carnis propter successionem mortalitatis diuinitus datam sentiunt, nec ipsi putant primos illos homines potuisse concumbere, nisi propter peccatum, quod admiserant, morituri gignendo requirerent successores, nec adtendunt, si recte potuerunt successores quaeri morituris, multo rectius socios quaeri potuisse uicturis. inpleta enim terra genere humano recte proles, nonnisi quae morientibus succederet, quaereretur; ut autem per duos homines terra inpleretur, quomodo ipsi nisi gignendo officium societatis inplerent? an uero ita quis caecus est mente, ut non cernat, quanto terris ornamento sit genus humanum, etiam cum a paucis recte laudabiliterque uiuatur, quantumque ualeat ordo reipublicae in cuiusdam pacis terrenae uinculum coercens etiam peccatores? neque enim tantum deprauati sunt homines, ut non etiam tales pecoribus et uolatilibus antecellant; quorum tamen omnium generibus hanc infimam mundi partem pro sui loci sorte decoratam quem non considerare delectet? quis autem ita sit excors, ut putet minus eam ornari potuisse, si iustis non morientibus inpleretur? Nam quia numerosissima est superna ciuitas angelorum, ideo non recte conubio copularentur, nisi morerentur. hanc quippe numerositatem perfectam etiam in resurrectione sanctorum angelis sociandam dominus praesciens ait: in resurrectione neque nubent neque uxores ducent; non enim incipient mori, sed erunt aequales angelis dei; hic uero cum inplenda esset hominibus terra et eam propter cognationis artiorem necessitudinem et unitatis uinculum maxime commendandum ex uno oporteret inpleri, propter quid aliud secundum ipsum quaesitus est femineus sexus adiutor, nisi ut serentem genus humanum natura muliebris tamquam terrae fecunditas adiuuaret?

Others do not do this, but still think that the fruitfulness of the flesh was given by God for the succession of mortals, and they too think that those first human beings could not have lain together unless, because of the sin they had committed, they were going to die and so sought successors by begetting; and they do not notice that, if successors could rightly be sought for those who would die, companions could much more rightly have been sought for those who would live. For once the earth was filled with the human race, offspring would rightly be sought only to succeed those dying; but for the earth to be filled through two human beings, how could they fulfil the duty of society except by begetting? Or is anyone so blind in mind as not to see how great an adornment the human race is to the earth, even when only a few live rightly and praiseworthily, and how much the order of the commonwealth avails, holding even sinners in check in the bond of a certain earthly peace? For men are not so depraved that even such do not surpass beasts and birds; yet who would not delight to consider this lowest part of the world adorned, according to its place, with all their kinds? And who would be so senseless as to think that it could have been adorned less if it were filled with the just who do not die? For it is because the heavenly city of angels is most numerous that they would not rightly be joined in marriage unless they died. For the Lord, foreknowing that this number would be completed even in the resurrection of the saints, who are to be joined to the angels, says, “In the resurrection they will neither marry nor take wives; for they will not begin to die, but will be equal to the angels of God.” But here, since the earth was to be filled with human beings, and it was fitting that it be filled from one, for the sake of a closer bond of kinship and to commend most strongly the bond of unity, for what other purpose was the female sex sought as a helper corresponding to him than that woman's nature, like the fruitfulness of the earth, might help him as he sowed the human race?

9.10CSEL 28.1:278–280

Quamuis honestius meliusque credatur ita fuisse tunc illorum hominum corpus animale constitutorum in paradiso nondum mortis lege damnatum, ut non haberent adpetitum carnalis uoluptatis, qualem nunc habent ista corpora, quae iam ex mortis propagine ducta sunt. neque enim nihil est in eis factum, cum de ligno prohibito edissent, quandoquidem deus dixerat non "si ederitis, morte moriemini", sed: qua die ederitis, morte moriemini, ut hoc ipsum in eis illa faceret dies, quod apostolus gemit dicens: condelector legi dei secundum interiorem hominem, uideo autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae et captiuantem me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis. infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum. non enim sufficeret ei, si diceret: quis me liberabit de hoc mortali corpore? sed, de corpore, inquit, mortis huius. sicut etiam illud, corpus quidem, inquit, mortuum est propter peccatum; nec ibi ait mortale, sed mortuum, quamuis utique et mortale, quia moriturum. non ita credendum est fuisse illa corpora, sed licet animalia, nondum spiritalia, non tamen mortua, id est quae necesse esset ut morerentur: quod ea die factum est, qua lignum contra uetitum tetigerant. Sicut in ipsis nostris corporibus quaedam pro suo modo sanitas dicitur, quae si perturbata sic fuerit, ut letalis morbus iam uiscera depascatur, quo inspecto medici mortem inminere pronuntient, mortale utique corpus etiam tunc dicitur, sed aliter, quam cum esset sanum quamuis quandoque sine dubio moriturum: ita illi homines animalia quidem corpora gerentes, sed non moritura, nisi peccassent, acceptura autem angelicam formam caelestemque qualitatem, mox ubi praeceptum transgressi sunt, eorum membris uelut aliqua aegritudo letalis mors ipsa concepta est mutauitque illam qualitatem, qua corpori sic dominabantur, ut non dicerent: uideo aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, quia, etsi nondum spiritale, sed animale corpus erat. nondum tamen erat mortis huius, de qua et cum qua nati sumus. quid enim aliud, non dicam nati, sed omnino concepti, nisi aegritudinem quandam inchoauimus, qua sumus necessario morituri? neque enim tam necesse est eum ipso morbo mori, qui hydrops uel syntecticus uel elephantiosus factus fuerit. quam eum, qui hoc corpus habere coeperit, in quo omnes homines natura sunt filii irae, quia hoc non fecit nisi poena peccati. Quae cum ita sint, cur non credamus illos homines ante peccatum ita genitalibus membris ad procreandos filios imperare potuisse sicut ceteris, quae in quolibet opere anima sine ulla molestia et quasi pruritu uoluptatis mouet? si enim creator omnipotens ineffabiliterque laudandus, qui et in minimis suis operibus magnus est, apibus donauit, ut sic operentur generationem filiorum quemadmodum cerae speciem liquoremque mellis, cur incredibile uideatur primis hominibus talia fecisse corpora, ut, si non peccassent et morbum quendam, quo morerentur, continuo concepissent, eo nutu inperarent membris, quibus fetus exoritur, quo pedibus, cum ambulatur. ut neque cum ardore seminaretur neque cum dolore pareretur. nunc uero transgrediendo praeceptum motum legis illius, quae repugnat legi mentis, in membris conceptae mortis habere meruerunt, quem nuptiae ordinant, continentia cohibet et refrenat, ut, quemadmodum de peccato factum est subplicium, sic de subplicio fiat meritum.

Although it may be believed more honorably and better that the body of those human beings, then established as animal bodies in paradise, not yet condemned by the law of death, was such that they did not have the appetite for carnal pleasure which these bodies now have, which are now derived from the stock of death. For something did happen in them when they ate from the forbidden tree, since God had not said, “If you eat, you shall die by death,” but “On the day you eat of it, you shall die by death,” so that that day would bring about in them the very thing the apostle groans over when he says, “I delight in the law of God according to the inner man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and making me captive in the law of sin which is in my members. Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” For it would not be enough for him to say, “Who will deliver me from this mortal body?” but he says, “from the body of this death.” Just as he also says, “The body indeed is dead because of sin”; nor does he say there “mortal” but “dead,” although of course also mortal, because it will die. Those bodies are not to be believed to have been like this, but, though animal and not yet spiritual, still not dead, that is, not such that they had to die: which happened on the day they touched the tree against the prohibition. Just as in our own bodies a certain health according to their measure is spoken of, and if this is so disturbed that a lethal disease is already consuming the inner organs, and physicians, seeing it, declare that death is near, the body is certainly called mortal even then, but in a different sense than when it was healthy, though without doubt going to die at some time: so those human beings bore animal bodies, but not going to die if they had not sinned, and going to receive an angelic form and heavenly quality; but as soon as they transgressed the command, death itself was conceived in their members like some lethal illness, and changed that quality by which they ruled the body in such a way that they did not say, “I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind,” because, although the body was not yet spiritual but animal, it was not yet of this death, of which and with which we are born. For what else have we begun, I do not say by being born, but by being conceived at all, but a kind of illness by which we must necessarily die? For one who has become dropsical or consumptive or elephantiac is not so necessarily going to die of that disease as one who has begun to have this body, in which all men are by nature children of wrath; because nothing but the punishment of sin brought this about. Since this is so, why should we not believe that those human beings before sin could have commanded their genital members for procreating children as they commanded the others, which the soul moves in any work without any trouble and, so to speak, itch of pleasure? For if the almighty Creator, ineffably to be praised, who is great even in his least works, has granted to bees that they produce the generation of their young as they produce the form of wax and the liquid of honey, why should it seem incredible that he made such bodies for the first human beings that, if they had not sinned and at once conceived a kind of disease by which they would die, they would command the members from which offspring arises by the same signal as the feet when walking, so that there would be neither sowing with heat nor bearing with pain? But as it is, by transgressing the command, they deserved to have in their members, in which death was conceived, the motion of that law which fights against the law of the mind, a motion which marriage orders and continence restrains and reins in, so that, just as punishment came from sin, so merit may come from punishment.

9.11CSEL 28.1:280–281

Factam itaque feminam uiro de uiro in eo sexu, in ea forma et distinctione membrorum, qua feminae notae sunt, quae peperit Cain et Abel et omnes fratres eorum, ex quibus omnes homines nascerentur, in quibus peperit etiam Seth, per quem ad Abraham uentum est et ad populum Israhel gentemque omnibus iam notissimam gentibus et per Noe filios omnes gentes, quisquis dubitauerit, omnia cogit nutare, quae. credimus, longeque a fidelium mentibus repellendus est. cum ergo quaeritur, ad quod adiutorium factus sit ille sexus uiro, diligenter, quantum ualeo, cuncta consideranti nonnisi causa prolis occurrit, ut per eorum stirpem terra inpleretur, et non eo modo procreatam, quo nunc procreantur homines, cum inest peccati lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, etiamsi per dei gratiam uirtute superatur; hoc enim esse non potuisse credendum est nisi in corpore mortis huius, quod corpus mortuum est propter peccatum. et quid hac poena iustius, quam ut non ad omnem nutum seruiat corpus, id est suus famulus animae, sicut domino suo detrectauit ipsa seruire, siue utrumque ex parentibus creet deus, corpus ex corpore, animam ex anima, siue alio modo faciat animas, non utique ad opus inpossibile nec mercede parua. ut cum anima pietate deo subdita legem istam peccati, quae est in membris corporis mortis huius, quam primus homo accepit in poenam, uicerit ipsa per gratiam, praemium caeleste percipiat maiore gloria, demonstrans, quanta sit laus oboedientiae, quae alienae inoboedientiae poenam potuit uirtute superare?

So whoever doubts that the woman was made for the man from the man, in that sex and in that form and distinction of members by which women are known, the woman who bore Cain and Abel and all their brothers, from whom all human beings would be born, among whom she also bore Seth, through whom the line came to Abraham and to the people of Israel, a nation now very well known to all nations, and through the sons of Noah to all nations: whoever doubts this makes everything we believe totter, and is to be driven far from the minds of the faithful. When, then, it is asked for what help that sex was made for the man, to me, considering everything carefully as far as I can, nothing occurs but the reason of offspring, so that the earth would be filled through their stock; and offspring not procreated in the way human beings are now procreated, when the law of sin is in the members fighting against the law of the mind, even if by God's grace it is overcome by virtue; for it must be believed that this could not have been except in the body of this death, which body is dead because of sin. And what is more just than this punishment, that the body, its own servant, does not serve the soul at every signal, as the soul itself refused to serve its Lord; whether God creates both from the parents, body from body and soul from soul, or makes souls in some other way, certainly not for an impossible task nor for a small reward; so that when the soul, subject to God by piety, has itself conquered by grace this law of sin which is in the members of the body of this death, which the first man received as punishment, it may receive a heavenly reward with greater glory, showing how great is the praise of obedience, which by virtue could overcome the punishment of another's disobedience?

9.12CSEL 28.1:281–284

Sed quoniam, cui adiutorio femina facta sit uiro, satis, quantum existimo, requisitum est, illud iam uideamus, quare sit factum, quod adductae sunt ad Adam omnes bestiae agri et omnia uolatilia caeli, ut eis nomina inponeret, atque ita uelut necessitas oreretur creandi ei feminam ex eius latere, cum inter illa animalia simile illi adiutorium non fuisset inuentum. uidetur enim mihi propter aliquam significationem propheticam factum, sed tamen factum, ut re gesta confirmata figurae interpretatio libera relinquatur. quid est enim hoc ipsum, quod uolatilibus terrestribusque animantibus non etiam piscibus atque omnibus natatilibus Adam nomina inposuit? si enim linguae humanae consulantur, sic appellantur haec omnia. quemadmodum eis homines loquendo nomina posuerunt. non solum haec, quae sunt in aquis et terris, uerum etiam ipsa terra et aqua et caelum et quae uidentur in caelo et quae non uidentur, sed creduntur, pro diuersitate linguarum gentilium diuersis nominibus appellantur. unam sane linguam primitus fuisse didicimus, antequam superbia turris illius post diluuium fabricatae in diuersos signorum sonos humanam diuideret societatem, quaecumque autem illa lingua fuerit, quid adtinet quaerere? illa certe tunc loquebatur Adam et in ea lingua, si adhuc usque permanet, sunt istae uoces articulatae, quibus primus homo animalibus terrestribus et uolatilibus nomina inposuit. num igitur ullo modo credibile est in eadem lingua nomina piscium non ab homine, sed diuinitus instituta, quae deo docente homo postea disceret? quod si ita etiam factum esset, quare ita factum esset, procul dubio mystica significatio resonaret. sed credendum est paulatim cognitis piscium generibus nomina inposita; tunc autem, cum pecora et bestiae et uolatilia ad hominem adducta sunt, ut eis ad se congregatis generatimque distinctis nomina inponeret, quibus etiam ipsis paulatim et multo citius quam piscibus, si hoc factum non esset, posset nomina inponere, quid fuit causae, nisi ratio aliquid significandi, quod ad praenuntiationem futurorum ualeret? cui rei maxime ordo narrationis huius inuigilat. Deinde, numquid ignorabat deus nihil tale se creasse in naturis animalium, quod simile adiutorium posset esse homini? an opus erat, ut hoc etiam homo ipse cognosceret et eo commendatiorem haberet mulierem suam, quod in omni carne creata sub caelo et de hoc aere sicut ipse uiuente nihil eius simile inuenerit? mirum, si hoc scire non posset nisi omnibus ad se adductis atque perspectis. si enim deo credebat, posset hoc illi eo modo dicere, quo modo et praeceptum dedit, quo modo et peccantem interrogauit atque iudicauit; si autem non credebat, profecto neque hoc scire poterat, utrum ad eum ille omnia, cui non credebat, adduxerit, an forte in aliquibus ab illo remotioribus terrae partibus aliqua ei similia, quae non demonstrasset, absconderit. non itaque arbitror dubitandum hoc alicuius propheticae significationis gratia factum, sed tamen factum. Neque hoc opere suscepimus prophetica aenigmata perscrutari, sed rerum gestarum fidem ad proprietatem historiae commendare, ut quod inpossibile uideri uanis atque incredulis potest aut ipsi auctoritati sanctae scripturae uelut testificatione contraria repugnare id pro meis uiribus, quantum deus adiuuat, disserendo demonstrem neque inpossibile esse neque contrarium, quod autem possibile quidem adparet nec habet ullam speciem repugnantiae, sed tamen quasi superfluum uel etiam stultum quibusdam uideri potest, hoc ipsum disputando demonstrem, quod ideo non tamquam rerum gestarum naturali uel usitato ordine factum est, ut cordibus nostris fidelissima sanctarum scripturarum auctoritate praelata, quia stultum esse non potest, mysticum esse credatur, quamuis eius expositionem uel inquisitionem aut alibi iam exhibuerimus aut in tempus aliud differamus.

But since, as I think, we have inquired enough for what help the woman was made for the man, let us now see why it happened that all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky were brought to Adam for him to give them names, and so a need, as it were, arose for creating a woman for him from his side, since among those animals no helper like him had been found. For it seems to me that this was done for the sake of some prophetic signification, but done nevertheless, so that, the event being confirmed as having happened, the interpretation of the figure is left free. For what is the meaning of this very fact, that Adam gave names to the birds and land animals, but not also to the fishes and all swimming creatures? For if human languages are consulted, all these things are called as men have named them by speaking. Not only these things in the waters and on the land, but also the earth itself and water and sky, and the things seen in the sky and those not seen but believed, are called by different names according to the diversity of the languages of nations. We have indeed learned that there was one language at first, before the pride of that tower built after the flood divided human society into different sounds of signs; but whatever that language was, what does it matter to inquire? Certainly Adam spoke it then, and in that language, if it still survives, are those articulate words with which the first man gave names to the land animals and birds. Is it at all credible, then, that in the same language the names of fishes were established not by man but by God, for man to learn afterwards by God's teaching? Even if this had been done, the reason why it was done would without doubt echo some mystical signification. But it is to be believed that names were given to the kinds of fishes as they came gradually to be known; but when the cattle and beasts and birds were brought to man, so that he might give them names when they were gathered to him and distinguished by kinds, to which too he could have given names gradually, and much sooner than to the fishes, if this had not been done, what reason was there but the purpose of signifying something which would serve to foretell things to come? To this the order of this narrative is especially attentive. Then, did God not know that he had created nothing of the kind among the natures of animals that could be a helper like man? Or was it necessary that man himself should know this too, and hold his wife the more dear because in all flesh created under heaven and living from this air as he did, he found nothing like her? It would be strange if he could not know this except by having all of them brought to him and inspected. For if he believed God, God could tell him this in the way he gave the command, and in the way he questioned and judged him when he sinned; but if he did not believe, he certainly could not know this either, whether he whom he did not believe had brought all things to him, or perhaps had hidden in some parts of the earth more remote from him some creatures like him which he had not shown him. So I think it is not to be doubted that this was done for the sake of some prophetic signification, but done nevertheless. Nor have we undertaken in this work to examine prophetic riddles, but to commend the trustworthiness of things done according to the proper sense of history; so that what may seem impossible to the vain and unbelieving, or to contradict the very authority of holy Scripture as though by contrary testimony, I may show, according to my strength and as far as God helps, by discussion, to be neither impossible nor contrary; and what appears indeed possible and has no appearance of contradiction, yet may seem to some superfluous or even foolish, I may show by argument to have been done, not according to the natural or usual order of events, so that, the most trustworthy authority of the holy Scriptures being set before our hearts, it may be believed to be mystical because it cannot be foolish, although we have either already presented its exposition or inquiry elsewhere or put it off to another time.

9.13CSEL 28.1:284

Quid ergo sibi uult etiam illud, quod mulier uiro de latere facta est? uerum esto propter ipsius coniunctionis uim commendandam hoc ita fieri oportuisse credamus. numquid etiam, ut dormienti fieret, eadem ratio uel necessitas flagitabat, ut denique osse detracto, in cuius locum caro subpleretur? num enim non potuit ipsa caro detrahi, ut inde congruentius, quod sit sexus inferior, mulier formaretur? an uero tam multis additis costam deus aedificare potuit in mulierem et carnem pulpamue non potuit, qui de puluere ipsum hominem fecit? aut si iam costa fuerat detrahenda, cur non altera pro ea costa reposita est? cur etiam non dictum est "finxit" aut "fecit" sicut in omnibus supra operibus, sed aedificauit, inquit. dominus deus illam costam, non tamquam corpus humanum, sed tamquam domum? non est itaque dubitandum, quoniam haec facta sunt et stulta esse non possunt, ob aliquid significandum esse facta fructum futuri saeculi ab ipso iam primordio generis humani deo praescio in ipsis suis operibus misericorditer praedicante, ut certo tempore seruis suis siue per hominum successiones siue per suum spiritum uel angelorum ministerium reuelata atque conscripta et promittendis rebus futuris et recognoscendis inpletis testimonium perhiberent: quod magis magisque in consequentibus adparebit.

What, then, is meant also by the fact that the woman was made for the man from his side? Granted that we may believe it had to be done so in order to commend the force of their very union: did the same reason or necessity also require that it be done while he slept, and finally that a bone be taken out and flesh supplied in its place? Could not flesh itself have been taken out, so that from it the woman, being the weaker sex, might be more fittingly formed? Or could God, adding so many things, build a rib into a woman, and not flesh or soft tissue, he who made man himself from dust? Or if a rib had to be taken out, why was another rib not put back in its place? Why too was it not said “formed” or “made,” as in all the works above, but “the Lord God built,” it says, “that rib,” not as a human body but as a house? There is, then, no doubt that, since these things were done and cannot be foolish, they were done to signify something, God in his foreknowledge mercifully proclaiming in his very works, from the very beginning of the human race, the fruit of the age to come; so that at a fixed time, revealed to his servants and written down, whether through the succession of men or through his Spirit or the ministry of angels, they would bear witness both to future things to be promised and to fulfilled things to be recognized; which will appear more and more in what follows.

9.14CSEL 28.1:284–286

Uideamus ergo, quod isto opere suscepimus, non secundum praefigurationem rerum futurarum, sed secundum rerum gestarum non allegoricam, sed propriam significationem quemadmodum haec accipi possint. et finxit deus, inquit, adhuc de terra omnes bestias agri et omnia uolatilia caeli: unde iam quod uisum est et quantum uisum est disseruimus. et adduxit ea omnia ad Adam, ut uideret, quid ea uocaret. quomodo haec adduxerit deus ad Adam, ne carnaliter sapiamus, adiuuare nos debet, quod de bipertito opere diuinae prouidentiae in libro superiore tractauimus. neque enim sicut indagant atque adigunt uenantes uel aucupantes ad retia quaecumque animantia capiunt, ita hoc factum esse credendum est aut uox aliqua iussionis de nube facta est eis uerbis, quae rationales animae audientes intellegere atque oboedire adsolent. non enim hoc acceperunt ut possint bestiae uel aues; in suo tamen genere obtemperant deo, non rationali uoluntatis arbitrio, sed sicut mouet ille omnia temporibus oportunis, non ipse temporaliter motus, per angelica ministeria, quae capiunt in uerbo eius quid quo tempore fieri debeat, et illo non temporaliter moto mouentur ipsa temporaliter, ut in his, quae sibi subiecta sunt, iussa eius efficiant, Omnis enim anima uiua, non solum rationalis sicut in hominibus, uerum etiam inrationalis, sicut in pecoribus et uolatilibus et piscibus, uisis mouetur. sed anima rationalis uoluntatis arbitrio uel consentit uisis uel non consentit; inrationalis autem non habet hoc iudicium, pro suo tamen genere atque natura uiso aliquo tacta propellitur. nec in potestate ullius animae est, quae illi uisa ueniant siue in sensus corporis siue in ipsum spiritum interius, quibus uisis adpetitus moueatur cuiuslibet animantis. ac sic cum ea uisa per angelorum oboedientiam desuper ministrantur, peruenit iussio dei non solum ad homines nec solum ad aues et pecora, uerum etiam ad ea, quae sub aquis latent — sicut ad cetum, qui gluttiuit Ionam — nec solum ad ista maiora, uerum etiam ad uermiculum; nam et huic legimus diuinitus iussum, ut radicem cucurbitae roderet, sub cuius umbraculo propheta requieuerat. si enim homini donauit deus, sic eum instituens, ut etiam carnem peccati portans possit non solum pecora et iumenta suis usibus subdita nec tantum domesticas aues, sed etiam libere uolitantes quaslibet etiam saeuas feras et capere et mansuetas facere et eis mirabiliter imperare potentia rationis, non corporis, cum earum adpetitus et dolores captans paulatimque inlectando, premendo laxandoque moderans agresti eas exuit consuetudine et tamquam humanis moribus induit: quanto magis angeli hoc possunt, qui iussione dei in ipsa eius, quam sempiterne intuentur, incommutabili ueritate perspecta mouentes se per tempus et corpora sibi subdita per tempus et locum agilitate mirabili et uisa, quibus moueatur, et adpetitum carnalis indigentiae ualent efficere omni animae uiuae, ut quo eam uenire opus est nesciens adducatur!

Let us see, then, as we undertook in this work, how these things can be taken, not according to the prefiguring of things to come, but according to the proper, not allegorical, meaning of things done. “And God formed besides from the earth,” it says, “all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the sky”: on which we have already said what seemed right and as much as seemed right. “And he brought them all to Adam, to see what he would call them.” As to how God brought them to Adam, so that we may not think carnally, what we treated in the previous book about the twofold work of divine providence should help us. For it is not to be believed that this was done as hunters or fowlers track and drive into nets whatever animals they catch, or that some voice of command came from a cloud with words which rational souls are accustomed to hear, understand, and obey. For beasts and birds have not received the ability to do this; yet in their own way they obey God, not by the rational choice of will, but as he moves all things at fitting times, not himself moved in time, through the ministries of angels, which grasp in his Word what is to be done at what time, and, he not being moved in time, they themselves are moved in time so as to carry out his commands in the things subject to them. For every living soul, not only rational as in men, but also irrational, as in cattle and birds and fishes, is moved by things seen. But the rational soul, by the choice of will, either consents or does not consent to what is seen; the irrational has not this judgment, yet according to its kind and nature, touched by something seen, it is driven along. Nor is it in the power of any soul what sights come to it, whether into the senses of the body or into the spirit itself within, by which the appetite of any living being is moved. And so, when these sights are supplied from above through the obedience of angels, God's command reaches not only men, nor only birds and cattle, but also the things hidden under the waters, as the whale that swallowed Jonah, and not only these larger creatures but even the little worm; for we read that it too was commanded by God to gnaw the root of the gourd under whose shade the prophet had rested. For if God granted to man, establishing him so, that even bearing the flesh of sin he can not only subject cattle and beasts of burden to his uses, and not only domestic birds, but can also capture and tame any birds that fly freely, even fierce wild beasts, and wonderfully command them by the power of reason, not of body, as he catches their appetites and pains and, gradually enticing, pressing, and loosening, controls them, strips them of their wild habit and, as it were, clothes them with human manners: how much more can angels do this, who, at the command of God, beholding it in his unchangeable truth itself, which they look upon eternally, moving themselves through time and the bodies subject to them through time and place with wonderful swiftness, are able to produce in every living soul both the sights by which it is moved and the appetite of bodily need, so that it is brought, without knowing it, where it must come!

9.15CSEL 28.1:286–289

Iam ergo uideamus, ipsa mulieris formatio, quae mystice etiam aedificatio dicta est, quemadmodum facta sit. natura quippe mulieris creata est, quamuis ex uirili, quae iam erat, non aliquo motu iam existentium naturarum. angeli autem nullam omnino possunt creare naturam; solus enim unus cuiuslibet naturae, seu magnae seu minimae, creator est deus, id est ipsa trinitas, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. aliter ergo quaeritur, quemadmodum sit soporatus Adam costaque eius sine ullo doloris sensu a corporis conpage detracta sit. haec enim fortasse dicantur potuisse per angelos fieri; formare autem uel aedificare costam, ut mulier esset, usque adeo non potuit nisi deus, a quo uniuersa natura subsistit, ut ne illud quidem carnis subplementum in corpore uiri, quod in illius costae successit locum, ab angelis factum esse crediderim sicut nec ipsum hominem de terrae puluere: non quo nulla sit angelorum opera, ut aliquid creetur, sed non ideo creatores sunt. quia nec agricolas creatores segetum atque arborum dicimus. non enim qui plantat, est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, deus. ad hoc incrementum pertinet etiam in corpore humano, quod osse demto locus carne subpletus est, illo scilicet opere dei, quo naturas substituit, ut sint, quo ipsos quoque angelos creauit. Opus itaque agricolae est, ut aquam ducat, cum rigat; non autem opus eius est, ut aqua per decliuia prolabatur, sed illius, qui omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuit. item opus agricolae est, ut surculus auellatur ex arbore terraeque mandetur; at non eius opus est, ut sucum inbibat et germen emittat, ut aliud eius solo figat, quo radicem stabiliat, aliud in auras promoueat, quo robur nutriat ramosque diffundat, sed illius, qui dat incrementum. medicus etiam aegro corpori alimentum adhibet et uulnerato medicamentum: primum non de rebus, quas creauit, sed quas creatas opere creatoris inuenit; deinde cibum uel potum praeparare potuit et ministrare, emplastrum formare et medicamento inlitum adponere. num etiam ex his, quae adhibet, operari et creare uires uel carnem potest? natura id agit interiore motu nobisque occultissimo. cui tamen si deus subtrahat operationem intimam, qua eam substituit et facit, continuo tamquam extincta nulla remanebit. Quapropter cum deus uniuersam creaturam suam bipertito quodam modo opere prouidentiae, de quo in superiore libro locuti sumus, et in naturalibus et in uoluntariis motibus administret, creare naturam tam nullus angelus potest quam nec se ipsum. uoluntas uero angelica oboedienter deo subdita eiusque executa iussionem naturalibus motibus de rebus subiectis tamquam materiem ministrare, ut secundum illas principales in uerbo dei non creatas uel secundum illas in primis sex dierum operibus causaliter creatas rationes aliquid tempore creetur. more agricolandi uel medendi potest. quale itaque ministerium deo exhibuerint angeli in illa mulieris formatione, quis audeat adfirmare? certissime tamen dixerim subplementum illud carnis in costae locum ipsiusque feminae corpus et animam conformationemque membrorum, omnia uiscera, sensus omnes et quidquid erat, quo illa et creatura et homo et femina erat, nonnisi illo opere dei factum, quod deus non per angelos, sed per semet ipsum. non operatus est et dimisit, sed ita continuanter operatur, ut nec ullarum aliarum rerum nec ipsorum angelorum natura subsistat, si non operetur.

Now let us see how the forming of the woman itself, which is also called, mystically, a building, was done. For the nature of the woman was created, though from the man's, which already existed, not by any motion of natures already existing. Angels, however, can create no nature at all; for the one and only creator of any nature, great or least, is God, that is, the Trinity itself, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. It is a different question, then, how Adam was put to sleep and his rib taken out of the frame of his body without any sense of pain. For this might perhaps be said to have been possible through angels; but to form or build the rib so that it would be a woman, none but God could do, from whom all nature has its being, so much so that I would not believe even that filling up of flesh in the man's body, which took the place of the rib, to have been made by angels, any more than man himself from the dust of the earth: not that there is no work of angels in something being created, but they are not therefore creators, just as we do not call farmers the creators of crops and trees. For neither he who plants is anything nor he who waters, but God who gives the growth. To this growth belongs also the fact that in the human body, when the bone was taken out, the place was filled up with flesh, namely by that work of God by which he establishes natures so that they exist, by which he also created the angels themselves. The farmer's work, then, is to lead the water when he irrigates; but it is not his work that the water flows down slopes, but his who has arranged all things in measure and number and weight. Likewise it is the farmer's work that a cutting is torn from a tree and committed to the earth; but it is not his work that it drinks in sap and puts forth a shoot, fixing one part in the soil to establish its root and sending another up into the air to nourish its strength and spread its branches, but his who gives the growth. A physician too applies food to a sick body and medicine to a wounded one: first, not from things he created, but from things he found created by the Creator's work; next, he could prepare and serve food or drink, shape a plaster and apply it smeared with medicine. Can he also, from the things he applies, work and create strength or flesh? Nature does that by an inner motion most hidden from us. Yet if God withdraws from it the inmost working by which he establishes and makes it, it will at once be extinguished, as it were, and nothing will remain. Therefore, since God governs his whole creation by a kind of twofold work of providence, of which we spoke in the previous book, both in natural and in voluntary motions, no angel can create a nature, any more than he can create himself. But the angelic will, obediently subject to God and carrying out his command, can, by natural motions, supply things subject to it as material, so to speak, so that something may be created in time according to those principal reasons uncreated in the Word of God, or according to those reasons created causally in the first works of the six days, in the manner of farming or healing. What kind of service, then, the angels rendered to God in that forming of the woman, who would dare to affirm? Yet I would say most certainly that that filling up of flesh in the place of the rib, and the body and soul of the woman herself, and the shaping of her members, all her inner organs, all her senses, and whatever there was by which she was a creature, a human being, and a woman, was made only by that work of God which God works not through angels but through himself; and he did not work and then let go, but works so continuously that neither the nature of any other things nor of the angels themselves would subsist if he did not work.

9.16CSEL 28.1:289–290

Sed quoniam carnem animatam atque sentientem, quantum naturam rerum pro humano captu experiri potuimus, non nouimus nasci, nisi aut ex istis tamquam materialibus elementis, hoc est aqua et terra, aut ex fruticibus uel lignorum fructibus uel etiam ex carnibus animalium, sicut innumerabilia genera uermium siue reptilium, aut certe ex concubitu parentum, nullam autem carnem natam scimus ex carne cuiuslibet animantis, quae tam esset ei similis, ut sexu tantum discerneretur, quaerimus in rebus creationis huius similitudinem, qua mulier de uiri latere facta est, nec possumus inuenire, non ob aliud, nisi quia homines quemadmodum operentur in hac terra nouimus; quemadmodum autem angeli in hoc mundo quodammodo agricolentur, non utique nouimus. nam profecto si remota hominum industria fruticum genus naturae cursus operaretur, nihil aliud nossemus quam ex terra nasci arbores et herbas et ex earum seminibus, ab eis itidem in terram cadentibus, numquid innotesceret nobis quid ualeret insertio, ut alterius generis lignum radice propria poma portaret aliena et coalescente unitate iam sua? haec per agricolarum opera didicimus, cum ipsi creatores arborum nullo modo essent, sed naturae cursum deo creanti suum quoddam officium ministeriumque praeberent. nequaquam enim quidquam per eorum opera existeret, si hoc in dei opere intima naturae ratio non haberet. quid ergo mirum, si hominem ex osse hominis factam non nouimus, quando creanti deo quemadmodum angeli seruiant ignoramus? qui nec arborem ex arboris surculo in robore alieno factam nosse possemus, si et ista deo creanti quemadmodum agricolae seruiant, similiter nesciremus. Nullo modo tamen dubitamus et hominum et arborum nonnisi deum esse creatorem fideliterque credimus factam feminam ex uiro nullo interueniente concubitu, etiamsi forte. costa hominis ministrata sit per angelos in opere creatoris: sicut fideliter credimus etiam uirum factum ex femina nullo interueniente concubitu, cum semen Abrahae dispositum est per angelos in manu mediatoris. utrumque infidelibus incredibile est; fidelibus autem cur ad rei gestae proprietatem quod de Christo factum est et tantum ad figuratam significationem quod de Eua scriptum est credibile uideatur? an uero sine cuiusquam concubitu uir ex femina fieri potuit, femina ex uiro non potuit? et uirginalis uterus unde uir fieret habebat, uirile autem latus unde femina fieret non habebat, cum hic dominus de famula nasceretur, ibi de seruo famula formaretur? poterat et dominus de costa carnem suam uel de aliquo membro uirginis creare; sed qui posset ostendere in corpore suo hoc se iterum fecisse quod factum est, utilius in matris corpore ostendit nihil pudendum esse quod castum est.

But since, as far as we have been able to experience the nature of things according to human capacity, we do not know of animated and sensing flesh being born except either from these material elements, as it were, that is, water and earth, or from shrubs or the fruits of trees or even from the flesh of animals, as countless kinds of worms or creeping things, or certainly from the intercourse of parents, and we know of no flesh born from the flesh of any living being which was so like it as to be distinguished only by sex, we seek in the things of this creation a likeness to the way the woman was made from the man's side, and cannot find it, for no other reason than that we know how men work on this earth, but we certainly do not know how angels in a way farm in this world. For surely, if the course of nature produced the kinds of plants without human industry, we would know nothing else than that trees and plants are born from the earth and from their seeds falling likewise from them into the earth; would we ever have learned what grafting can do, so that a tree of one kind bears on its own root the fruits of another, which grow into a unity now its own? These things we learned through the work of farmers, though they were in no way creators of trees, but offered to God, who creates the course of nature, a certain duty and service of their own. For nothing at all would come into being through their work if the inmost reason of nature did not contain it in God's work. What wonder, then, if we have not known of a woman made from a man's bone, when we do not know how angels serve God as creator? We could not have known a tree made from a cutting of a tree in another's trunk either, if we likewise did not know how farmers serve God as creator. Yet in no way do we doubt that God alone is the creator both of human beings and of trees, and we faithfully believe that the woman was made from the man without any intercourse intervening, even if perhaps the man's rib was supplied through angels in the Creator's work: just as we faithfully believe also that a man was made from a woman without any intercourse intervening, when the seed of Abraham was ordained through angels in the hand of a mediator. Both are incredible to unbelievers; but why should what was done concerning Christ seem credible to the faithful in the proper sense of a thing done, and what is written about Eve credible only as a figurative signification? Or could a man be made from a woman without intercourse with anyone, and a woman not from a man? And did the virgin's womb have that from which a man might be made, and the man's side not have that from which a woman might be made, when here the Lord was born of his handmaid, and there a handmaid was formed from a servant? The Lord could also have created his flesh from a rib or from some member of the virgin; but he who could have shown in his own body that he had done again what had been done, showed more usefully in his mother's body that nothing that is chaste is shameful.

9.17CSEL 28.1:290–292

Quodsi quaeritur, quomodo se habeat causalis illa conditio, in qua primum deus hominem fecit ad imaginem ac similitudinem suam — ibi quippe et hoc dictum est: masculum et feminam fecit eos — utrum iam illa ratio, quam mundi primis operibus concreauit atque concreuit deus, id habebat, ut secundum eam iam necesse esset ex uiri latere feminam fieri, an hoc tantum habebat, ut fieri posset, ut autem ita fieri necesse esset, non ibi iam conditum, sed in deo erat absconditum: si hoc ergo quaeritur, dicam quid mihi uideatur sine adfirmandi temeritate; quod tamen cum dixero, fortasse prudenter ista considerantes, quos iam christiana fides inbuit, etiam si nunc primitus ista cognoscunt, dubitandum non esse iudicabunt. Omnis iste naturae usitatissimus cursus habet quasdam naturales leges suas, secundum quas et spiritus uitae, qui creatura est, habet quosdam adpetitus suos determinatos quodammodo, quos etiam mala uoluntas non possit excedere, et elementa mundi huius corporei habent definitam uim qualitatemque suam, quid unumquodque ualeat uel non ualeat, quid de quo fieri possit uel non possit. ex his uelut primordiis rerum omnia, quae gignuntur, suo quaeque tempore exortus processusque sumunt finesque et decessiones sui cuiusque generis. unde fit, ut de grano tritici non nascatur faba uel de faba triticum uel de pecore homo uel de homine pecus. super hunc autem motum cursumque rerum naturalem potestas creatoris habet apud se posse de his omnibus facere aliud, quam eorum quasi seminales rationes habent, non tamen id, quod non in eis posuit, ut de his fieri uel ab ipso possit. neque enim potentia temeraria, sed sapientiae uirtute omnipotens est; et hoc de unaquaque re in tempore suo facit, quod ante in ea fecit, ut possit. alius ergo est rerum modus, quo illa herba sic germinat, illa sic, illa aetas parit, illa non parit, homo loqui potest, pecus non potest. horum et talium modorum rationes non tantum in deo sunt, sed ab illo etiam rebus creatis inditae atque concretae. ut autem lignum de terra excisum, aridum, perpolitum, sine radice ulla, sine terra et aqua repente floreat et fructum gignat, ut per iuuentam sterilis femina in senecta pariat, ut asina loquatur et si quid eius modi est, dedit quidem naturis, quas creauit, ut ex his et haec fieri possent — neque enim ex eis uel ipse faceret, quod ex eis fieri non posse ipse praefigeret, quoniam se ipso non est nec ipse potentior — uerum tamen alio modo dedit, ut non haec haberent in motu naturali, sed in eo, quo ita creata essent, ut eorum natura uoluntati potentiori amplius subiaceret.

But if it is asked how matters stand with that causal founding in which God first made man to his image and likeness (for there it was also said, “Male and female he made them”): whether that reason which God created together with the first works of the world, and with which he grew them together, already contained this, that according to it the woman had necessarily to be made from the man's side, or contained only this, that it could be done so, while that it should necessarily be done so was not founded there but hidden in God: if this is asked, I will say what seems to me without rashness in affirming; and when I have said it, perhaps those who consider these things wisely, whom the Christian faith has already instructed, will judge that it is not to be doubted, even if they now learn these things for the first time. This whole most customary course of nature has certain natural laws of its own, according to which the spirit of life, which is a creature, has certain appetites of its own, in a way determined, which even an evil will cannot exceed, and the elements of this bodily world have their defined force and quality, what each can or cannot do, what can or cannot be made from what. From these, as from the first beginnings of things, all things that are generated take, each in its own time, their rise and progress and the ends and departures of each kind. Hence it is that a bean is not born from a grain of wheat, nor wheat from a bean, nor man from beast, nor beast from man. But above this natural motion and course of things, the Creator's power has in itself the ability to make from all these something other than what their seminal reasons, so to speak, contain; yet not that which he did not place in them, so that it could be made from them even by him. For he is almighty not by rash power but by the strength of wisdom; and he does with each thing in its own time what he earlier made in it to be possible. There is, then, one mode of things, by which this plant sprouts in this way and that in that, this age bears children and that does not, man can speak and a beast cannot. The reasons of these and such modes are not only in God, but have also been placed by him in created things and grown together with them. But that a piece of wood cut from the earth, dry, polished, without any root, without earth and water, should suddenly flower and bear fruit; that a woman barren in youth should give birth in old age; that a donkey should speak, and anything of that kind: he indeed gave to the natures he created that these things too could be made from them (for he would not make from them even himself what he had fixed beforehand could not be made from them, since he is not more powerful than himself); but he gave it in another way, so that they would not have these things in their natural motion, but in that by which they were so created that their nature would be further subject to a more powerful will.

9.18CSEL 28.1:292–294

Habet ergo deus in se ipso absconditas quorundam factorum causas, quas rebus conditis non inseruit, easque inplet non illo opere prouidentiae, quo naturas substituit, ut sint, sed illo, quo eas administrat, ut uoluerit, quas, ut uoluit, condidit. ibi est et gratia, per quam salui fiunt peccatores. nam quod adtinet ad naturam iniqua sua uoluntate deprauatam, recursum per semet ipsam non habet, sed per dei gratiam, qua adiuuatur et instauratur. neque enim desperandi sunt homines in illa sententia, in qua scriptum est: omnes, qui ambulant in ea, non reuertentur. dictum est enim secundum pondus iniquitatis suae, ut, quod reuertitur qui reuertetur, non sibi tribuat, sed gratiae dei, non ex operibus, ne forte extollatur. Propterea mysterium gratiae huius apostolus absconditum dixit non in mundo, in quo sunt absconditae causales rationes omnium rerum naturaliter oriturarum, sicut absconditus erat Leui in lumbis Abrahae, quando et ipse decimatus est, sed in deo, qui uniuersa creauit. quamobrem omnia, etiam quae ad hanc gratiam significandam non naturali motu rerum, sed mirabiliter facta sunt, eorum etiam causae in deo absconditae fuerunt: quorum si unum erat, quod ita mulier facta est de latere uiri, et hoc dormientis, quae per ipsum firma facta est, tamquam eius osse firmata, ille autem propter ipsam infirmus, quia in locum costae non costa sed caro subpleta est, non habuit hoc prima rerum conditio, quando sexto die dictum est: masculum et feminam fecit eos, ut femina omnino sic fieret, sed tantum hoc habuit, quia et sic fieri posset, ne contra causas, quas uoluntate instituit, mutabili uoluntate aliquid faceret. quid autem fieret, ut omnino aliud futurum non esset, absconditum erat in deo, qui uniuersa creauit. Sed quoniam sic dixit absconditum, ut innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus per ecclesiam multiformis sapientia dei, probabiliter creditur, sicut illud semen, cui promissum est, dispositum est per angelos in manu mediatoris, sic omnia, quae ad ipsius seminis aduentum uel praenuntiandum uel adnuntiandum in rerum natura praeter usitatum naturae cursum mirabiliter facta sunt, ministrantibus angelis esse facta, ut tamen ubique creator uel reparator creaturarum non sit, nisi qui plantatore et rigatore quolibet solus incrementum dat deus.

God, then, has hidden in himself the causes of certain deeds, which he did not insert in founded things, and he fulfils them not by that work of providence by which he establishes natures so that they exist, but by that by which he governs as he wills those natures which he founded as he willed. There too is grace, through which sinners are saved. For as regards a nature depraved by its own wicked will, it has no return through itself, but through the grace of God, by which it is helped and restored. Nor are men to be despaired of on account of that sentence in which it is written, “All who walk in it will not return.” For it was said according to the weight of their wickedness, so that he who returns may not attribute it to himself, but to the grace of God, “not from works, lest he be lifted up.” For this reason the apostle called the mystery of this grace hidden, not in the world, in which the causal reasons of all things that will arise naturally are hidden, as Levi was hidden in the loins of Abraham when he too was tithed, but in God, who created all things. Therefore all things which were done to signify this grace, not by the natural motion of things but wonderfully, had their causes also hidden in God; and if one of them was that the woman was made in this way from the man's side, and that while he slept, she who was made strong through him, strengthened as it were by his bone, and he made weak for her sake, because in place of the rib not a rib but flesh was supplied, then the first founding of things, when it was said on the sixth day, “Male and female he made them,” did not contain that the woman should certainly be made thus, but only this, that she could also be made thus, so that God would not do anything by a changeable will contrary to the causes which he established by his will. But what was to be done, so that nothing else would be, was hidden in God, who created all things. But since he said it was hidden in such a way that the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the church, it is probably believed that, just as that seed to whom the promise was made was ordained through angels in the hand of a mediator, so all the things that were done wonderfully in the nature of things, beyond the usual course of nature, to foretell or announce the coming of that seed, were done through the ministry of angels; yet so that nowhere is anyone the creator or restorer of creatures but God alone, who, whoever plants and waters, gives the growth.

9.19CSEL 28.1:294–295

Ac per hoc etiam illa extasis, quam deus inmisit in Adam, ut soporatus obdormiret, recte intellegitur ad hoc inmissa, ut et ipsius mens per extasin particeps fieret tamquam angelicae curiae et intrans in sanctuarium dei intellegeret in nouissima. denique euigilans tamquam prophetia plenus, cum ad se adductam mulierem suam uideret, eructuauit continuo, quod magnum sacramentum commendat apostolus: hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea. haec uocabitur mulier, quoniam de uiro suo sumta est. et propter hoc relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una. quae uerba cum primi hominis fuisse scriptura ipsa testetur, dominus tamen in euangelio deum dixisse declarauit; ait enim: non legistis, quia qui fecit ab initio masculum et feminam fecit eos? et dixit: propter hoc dimittet homo patrem et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una, ut hinc intellegeremus per extasin, quae praecesserat in Adam, hoc eum diuinitus tamquam prophetam dicere potuisse. sed iam iste huius libri terminus placet, ut ea, quae sequuntur, ab alio exordio renouent intentionem legentium.

And therefore that ecstasy too which God sent upon Adam, so that, put to sleep, he slept, is rightly understood to have been sent for this purpose, that his mind also might, through ecstasy, become a partaker, as it were, of the angelic court, and, entering into the sanctuary of God, understand the last things. Finally, waking up as if full of prophecy, when he saw his wife brought to him, he at once poured forth what the apostle commends as a great sacrament: “This now is bone from my bones and flesh from my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken from her husband. And for this reason a man will leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife, and the two will be in one flesh.” Though Scripture itself testifies that these were the words of the first man, the Lord nevertheless declared in the gospel that God said them; for he says, “Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female? And he said: For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife, and the two will be in one flesh”; so that from this we might understand that, through the ecstasy which had come upon Adam, he could say this by divine inspiration as a prophet. But now this end of the book pleases me, so that what follows may renew the readers' attention from another beginning.

Chapter 10

10.1CSEL 28.1:295–296

Iam quidem ordo ipse uidetur exposcere, ut de peccato primi hominis disseramus; sed quia de carne mulieris, quemadmodum facta sit, scriptura narrauit, tacuit autem de anima, multo magis nos fecit intentos, ut de hoc diligentius inquiramus, quonam modo refelli possint siue non possint, qui credunt animam de anima hominis sicut de carne carnem fieri a parentibus in filios utriusque rei transfusis seminibus. hinc enim primitus ad hoc mouentur, ut dicant, quod unam animam deus fecerit, quam sufflauit in faciem hominis, quem de puluere finxerat, ut ex illa iam ceterae crearentur animae hominum sicut ex illius carne omnis etiam caro hominum, quoniam primo Adam formatus est, deinde Eua. et ille quidem unde habuerit corpus, unde animam, dictum est: corpus uidelicet puluerem terrae, animam uero flatum dei; at illa de illius latere cum facta dicatur, non dicitur quod eam deus flando similiter animauerit, tamquam utrumque de illo ductum sit, qui iam fuerat animatus. aut enim taceri oportuit, inquiunt, etiam de anima uiri, ut eam, sicut possemus, datam diuinitus uel intellegeremus uel certe crederemus, aut, si hoc propterea scriptura non tacuit, ne animam quoque sicut hominis carnem de terra factam esse putaremus, debuit et de mulieris anima non taceri, ne putaretur ex traduce, si hoc uerum non est. quapropter ideo tacitum est, inquiunt, quod in eius faciem flauerit deus, quia illud est uerum, quod et anima ex homine propagata est. Huic suspicioni facile occurritur. si enim propterea putant animam mulieris ex anima uiri factam, quia non scriptum est, quod in mulieris faciem flauerit deus, cur credunt ex uiro animatam feminam, quando ne id quidem scriptum est? unde, si deus omnes animas hominum nascentium sicut primam facit, propterea scriptura de aliis tacuit quoniam posset, quod in una factum commemoratum est, etiam de ceteris prudenter intellegi. itaque si oportuit nos per hanc scripturam de hac re aliquid admoneri, magis, si aliquid aliud fiebat in femina, quod in uiro factum non erat, ut ex carne animata eius anima duceretur, non sicut uiri eius aliunde corpus, aliunde anima; hoc ipsum, quod alio modo fiebat, scriptura potius tacere non debuit, ne hoc itidem factum putaremus, quod iam de illo didiceramus. proinde quia non dixit ex anima uiri animam factam esse mulieris, conuenientius creditur eo ipso nos admonere uoluisse nihil hic aliud putare, quam de uiri anima noueramus, id est similiter datam esse mulieri, cum praesertim esset euidentissimae occasionis locus, ut, si non tunc, quando formata est, postea certe diceretur, ubi ait Adam: hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea. quanto enim carius amantiusque diceret: et anima de anima mea! non tamen hinc tam magna quaestio iam soluta est, ut unum horum manifestum certumque teneamus.

Now indeed the order itself seems to demand that we discuss the sin of the first man; but because Scripture narrated how the woman's flesh was made but was silent about her soul, it has made us much more intent on inquiring more carefully into this: in what way those can or cannot be refuted who believe that soul is made from the soul of a human being as flesh from flesh, the seeds of both being transmitted from parents to children. For this is what first moves them to say that God made one soul, which he breathed into the face of the man he had formed from dust, so that from it the other souls of human beings would be created, as all human flesh too came from his flesh, since Adam was formed first, then Eve. And of him it is said where he got his body and where his soul: his body, namely, from the dust of the earth, and his soul from the breath of God; but of her, though she is said to have been made from his side, it is not said that God animated her by breathing in the same way, as though both were drawn from him who had already been animated. “For either Scripture ought to have been silent,” they say, “about the man's soul too, so that we might understand, or at least believe, as best we could, that it was given by God; or, if Scripture did not keep silent about this so that we would not think that the soul too was made from the earth like man's flesh, it ought not to have been silent about the woman's soul either, so that it would not be thought to come by transmission, if this is not true. Therefore,” they say, “it was left unsaid that God breathed into her face, because it is true that the soul too was propagated from the man.” This suspicion is easily met. For if they think that the woman's soul was made from the man's soul because it is not written that God breathed into the woman's face, why do they believe that the woman was animated from the man, when this is not written either? Hence, if God makes all the souls of human beings who are born as he made the first, Scripture was silent about the others because what is recorded as done in one case could also be wisely understood of the rest. So if we were to be told anything about this matter through this Scripture, it would be rather if something else was being done in the woman that had not been done in the man, so that her soul was drawn from his animated flesh, and not, as with her husband, the body from one source and the soul from another; this very thing, which was being done in another way, Scripture ought rather not to have kept silent, lest we think it was done in the same way as we had already learned about him. Therefore, since it did not say that the woman's soul was made from the man's soul, it is more fittingly believed that by this very fact it wished to warn us to think nothing here other than what we had known about the man's soul, that is, that it was given to the woman in the same way; especially since there was a place of most evident opportunity, so that, if not then, when she was formed, it would certainly have been said afterwards, where Adam says, “This now is bone from my bones and flesh from my flesh.” How much more dearly and lovingly would he have said, “and soul from my soul”! Yet this does not already solve so great a question, so that we may hold one of these views as plain and certain.

10.2CSEL 28.1:296–298

Quamobrem primo uidendum est, utrum sancta scriptura libri huius, ab eius exordio pertractata, hinc nos dubitare permittat: tum recte fortasse requiremus, aut quaenam sententia potius eligenda sit aut in rei huius incerto quem modum tenere debeamus. certe enim sexto die fecit deus hominem ad imaginem suam; ubi etiam dictum est: masculum et feminam fecit eos. quorum illud superius, ubi imago dei commemorata est, secundum animam, hoc autem, ubi sexus differentia, secundum carnem accipiebamus. et quoniam tot ac tanta testimonia, quae ibi considerata atque tractata sunt, nos non sinebant eodem ipso sexto die etiam formatum de limo hominem mulieremque de latere eius accipere, sed hoc postea factum esse post illa primitus opera dei, in quibus creauit omnia simul, quaesiuimus. quid de hominis anima crederemus, discussisque omnibus disceptationis nostrae partibus illud credibilius uel tolerabilius dici uisum est. quod ipsa hominis anima in illis operibus facta est, corporis uero eius in mundo corporeo tamquam in semine ratio, ne cogeremur contra uerba scripturae aut sexto die totum factum dicere, id est et de limo uirum et de eius latere feminam, aut in illis sex dierum operibus nullo modo factum esse hominem, aut corporis humani causalem rationem tantummodo factam, animae autem nullam, cum potius secundum ipsam sit homo ad imaginem dei; aut certe etsi non contra uerba scripturae aperte posita, tamen dure atque intolerabiliter diceremus uel in ea creatura spiritali, quae ad hoc tantummodo creata esset, factam fuisse animae humanae rationem, cum ipsa creatura, in qua ista ratio facta diceretur, non commemoraretur in operibus dei, uel in aliqua creatura, quae in illis commemoraretur operibus, factam rationem animae - uelut in hominibus, qui iam sunt, facta ratio latet generandorum filiorum — ac sic eam uel angelorum filiam uel, quod est intolerabilius, alicuius elementi corporei crederemus.

Therefore we must first see whether the holy Scripture of this book, treated from its beginning, allows us to doubt about this; then perhaps we shall rightly ask either which view is to be preferred or what measure we ought to keep in the uncertainty of this matter. Certainly on the sixth day God made man to his image; where it was also said, “Male and female he made them.” Of these, we took the first, where the image of God is mentioned, as referring to the soul, and the second, where the difference of sex is mentioned, as referring to the flesh. And since so many and such weighty testimonies, which were considered and treated there, did not allow us to take it that on that same sixth day man was also formed from mud and the woman from his side, but that this was done afterwards, after those first works of God in which he created all things together, we asked what we should believe about man's soul; and after all the parts of our discussion had been examined, it seemed more credible or more acceptable to say that man's soul itself was made in those works, but the reason of his body was made in the bodily world as in a seed; so that we would not be compelled, against the words of Scripture, either to say that the whole was made on the sixth day, that is, both the man from mud and the woman from his side, or that man was in no way made in those works of the six days, or that only the causal reason of the human body was made and none of the soul, when it is rather according to the soul that man is to the image of God; or certainly, even if not against the plain words of Scripture, yet harshly and unacceptably, to say either that the reason of the human soul was made in that spiritual creature which had been created only for this purpose, when that very creature in which this reason was said to be made is not mentioned among the works of God, or that the reason of the soul was made in some creature mentioned in those works (as in men who already exist the reason of begetting children lies hidden, already made), and so believe the soul to be the daughter either of angels or, what is more unacceptable, of some bodily element.

10.3CSEL 28.1:298–300

Sed nunc, si ob hoc mulier non de uiro, sed similiter ut ille a deo factam animam adseritur accepisse, quia singulas singulis deus facit, non erat facta in illis primis operibus anima feminae; aut si generalis omnium animarum ratio facta fuerat, sicut in hominibus ratio gignendi, reditur ad illud durum ac molestum, ut uel angelorum uel, quod indignissimum est, caeli corporei uel alicuius etiam inferioris elementi filias animas hominum esse dicamus. ac per hoc uidendum est, etsi latet, quid uerum sit, quid saltem tolerabilius dici possit: utrum hoc, quod modo dixi, an in illis primis dei operibus unam animam primi hominis factam, de cuius propagine omnes hominum animae crearentur, an nouas subinde animas fieri, quarum nulla uel ratio facta praecesserit in primis illis sex dierum operibus dei. horum autem trium duo priora non repugnant primis illis conditionibus, ubi simul omnia creata sunt. siue enim in aliqua creatura tamquam in parente ratio animae facta sit, ut omnes animae ab illa generentur, a deo autem creentur, quando singulis hominibus dantur, sicut a parentibus hominibus corpora, siue non ratio animae uelut in parente ratio prolis, sed ipsa omnino, cum factus est dies, facta sit anima, sicut ipse dies, sicut caelum et terra et caeli lumina, congruenter dictum est: fecit deus hominem ad imaginem suam. Hoc uero tertium quomodo non repugnet ei sententiae, qua et sexto die factus accipitur homo ad imaginem dei et post diem septimum uisibiliter creatus, non tam facile uideri potest. nouas quippe animas fieri, quae neque ipsae neque ratio earum tamquam in parente prolis sexto illo die facta sit cum his operibus, a quibus consummatis et inchoatis deus in die septimo requieuit, si dixerimus, cauendum est, ne frustra tam diligenter scriptura commendet sex diebus consummasse deum omnia opera sua, quae fecit bona ualde, si aliquas adhuc naturas fuerat creaturus, quas nec ipsas nec earum ibi rationes causaliter fecerit, nisi intellegatur rationem quidem singillatim faciendarum animarum nascentibus quibusque dandarum in se ipso habere, non in creatura aliqua condidisse, sed, quia non alterius generis creatura est anima quam illius, secundum quam sexto die factus est homo ad imaginem dei, non recte dici deum ea facere nunc, quae tunc non consummauit. iam enim tunc animam fecerat, quales et nunc facit; et ideo non aliquod nouum creaturae genus nunc facit, quod tunc in suis consummatis operibus non creauit, nec contra illas causales rationes rerum futurarum, quas uniuersitati tunc indidit, haec eius operatio est, sed potius secundum ipsas, quandoquidem corporibus humanis, quorum ex illis primis operibus propagatio continuata successione protenditur, tales congruit animas inseri, quales nunc facit atque inserit. Quapropter nihil iam timentes, ne contra uerba libri huius, quae de prima illa sex dierum conditione conscripta sunt, quaelibet harum trium sententiarum probabilitas uicerit, sentire uideamur, suscipiamus diligentiorem quaestionis huius pertractationem, quantum adiuuat deus, ne forte fieri possit, ut, si non liquidam, de qua dubitari ultra non debeat, tam certe acceptabilem de hac re sententiam nanciscamur, ut eam tenere, donec certum aliquid elucescat, non sit absurdum. quodsi ne hoc quidem potuerimus, documentorum momentis undique pariterque nutantibus saltem non uidebitur nostra dubitatio laborem deuitasse quaerendi, sed adfirmandi temeritatem, ut me, si quis recte iam certus est, docere dignetur, si quem uero nec diuini eloquii nec perspicuae rationis auctoritas, sed sua praesumtio certum fecerat, dubitare mecum non dedignetur.

But now, if the woman is asserted to have received a soul not from the man but, like him, made by God, because God makes souls one by one for each person, then the woman's soul had not been made in those first works; or if a general reason of all souls had been made, as the reason of begetting is in men, we return to that hard and troublesome view that we should say that human souls are the daughters either of angels or, what is most unworthy, of the bodily heaven, or even of some lower element. And therefore we must see, though the truth is hidden, what at least can be said more acceptably: whether what I have just said, or that in those first works of God one soul of the first man was made, from whose stock all the souls of human beings would be created, or that new souls are made from time to time, of which not even a reason was made beforehand in those first works of God's six days. Of these three, the first two do not conflict with those first foundings, where all things were created together. For whether the reason of the soul was made in some creature as in a parent, so that all souls are generated from it but created by God when they are given to individual human beings, as bodies are from human parents; or whether not the reason of the soul, as the reason of offspring is in a parent, but the soul itself was wholly made when the day was made, like the day itself, like heaven and earth and the lights of heaven, it is fittingly said, “God made man to his image.” But how this third view does not conflict with the statement by which man is taken to have been made on the sixth day to the image of God and created visibly after the seventh day cannot be seen so easily. For if we say that new souls are made, neither they nor their reason having been made on that sixth day, as offspring is in a parent, along with those works, completed and begun, from which God rested on the seventh day, we must beware lest Scripture commend so carefully in vain that God completed in six days all his works, which he made very good, if he was still going to create some natures of which he did not make there either the natures themselves or their reasons causally; unless it is understood that he has in himself the reason for making souls one by one and giving them to each person as they are born, and did not found it in any creature; but that, since the soul is not a creature of another kind than that according to which man was made on the sixth day to the image of God, it is not rightly said that God now makes things which he did not complete then. For he had already then made the soul, such as he now makes souls; and therefore he does not now make some new kind of creature which he did not create then among his completed works; nor is this working of his contrary to those causal reasons of future things which he then placed in the universe, but rather according to them, since it is fitting that such souls as he now makes and puts in should be put into human bodies, whose propagation from those first works extends in continuous succession. Therefore, no longer fearing that we may seem to think against the words of this book written about that first founding of the six days, whichever of these three views prevails by probability, let us undertake a more careful treatment of this question, as far as God helps, to see whether perhaps it may be possible, if not to arrive at a clear view on this matter, about which there should be no further doubt, at least at one so acceptable that it is not absurd to hold it until something certain becomes clear. But if we cannot do even this, the weights of evidence on every side swaying equally, at least our doubt will not seem to have avoided the labor of inquiring, but the rashness of affirming; so that if anyone is already rightly certain, he may deign to teach me, but if anyone has been made certain not by the authority of divine speech or of clear reason but by his own presumption, he may not disdain to doubt with me.

10.4CSEL 28.1:300–301

Ac primum illud firmissime teneamus animae naturam nec in naturam corporis conuerti, ut quae iam fuit anima, fiat corpus, nec in naturam animae inrationalis, ut quae fuit anima hominis, fiat pecoris, nec in naturam dei, ut quae fuit anima, fiat quod est deus, atque ita uicissim nec corpus nec animam inrationalem nec substantiam, qua deus est, conuerti et fieri animam humanam. illud etiam non minus certum esse debet animam non esse nisi creaturam dei. quapropter, si neque de corpore neque de anima inrationali neque de se ipso deus animam fecit hominis, restat, ut aut de nihilo eam faciat aut de aliqua spiritali, tamen rationali creatura. sed de nihilo fieri aliquid consummatis operibus, quibus creauit omnia simul, uiolentum est uelle monstrare et, utrum perspicuis documentis obtineri possit, ignoro. nec exigendum est a nobis, quod uel conprehendere homo non ualet uel, si iam ualet, mirum, si persuadere cuiquam potest, nisi tali, qui etiam nullo homine docere conante potest etiam ipse tale aliquid intellegere. tutius est igitur de huius modi rebus non humanis agere coniecturis, sed diuina testimonia perscrutari.

And first let us hold most firmly that the nature of the soul is not turned into the nature of body, so that what was a soul becomes a body; nor into the nature of an irrational soul, so that what was the soul of a man becomes that of a beast; nor into the nature of God, so that what was a soul becomes what God is; and so, conversely, that neither body nor irrational soul nor the substance by which God is God is turned into and becomes a human soul. This too should be no less certain, that the soul is nothing but a creature of God. Therefore, if God made man's soul neither from body nor from irrational soul nor from himself, it remains that he makes it either from nothing or from some spiritual, yet rational, creature. But to try to show that something is made from nothing after the completion of the works in which he created all things together is forced, and whether it can be established by clear evidence I do not know. Nor is it to be demanded of us what man either cannot grasp or, if he can, it would be strange if he could persuade anyone of it, except someone who could understand such a thing himself even with no man trying to teach him. It is safer, then, not to deal with such matters by human conjectures, but to search the divine testimonies.

10.5CSEL 28.1:301–302

Quod ergo ex angelis tamquam parentibus deus creet animas, nulla mihi de canonicis libris occurrit auctoritas. multo minus itaque ex mundi corporeis elementis; nisi forte illud mouet, quod apud Ezechielem prophetam, cum demonstratur resurrectio mortuorum, redintegratis corporibus ex quattuor uentis caeli aduocatur spiritus, quo perflante uiuificantur, ut surgant. sic enim scriptum est: et dixit mihi dominus: propheta super spiritum, propheta, fili hominis, et dic ad spiritum: haec dicit dominus: a quattuor partibus uentorum caeli ueni et inspira in mortuos hos, et uiuant. et prophetaui, sicut praecepit mihi dominus, et introiuit spiritus uitae in eos, et reuixerunt et steterunt super pedes suos, congregatio multa ualde. ubi mihi uidetur prophetice significatum non ex illo tantum campo, ubi res ipsa demonstrabatur, sed ex toto orbe terrarum resurrecturos homines, et hoc per flatum quattuor mundi partium fuisse figuratum. neque enim etiam flatus ille ex corpore domini substantia erat spiritus sancti, quando sufflauit et ait: accipite spiritum sanctum, sed utique significatum est sic etiam ab ipso procedere spiritum sanctum, quomodo ab eius corpore flatus ipse processit. sed quia mundus non ita deo coaptatur ad unitatem personae, sicut caro illa uerbo eius unigenito filio, non possumus dicere ita esse animam de substantia dei, quemadmodum flatus ille a quattuor uentis de natura mundi factus est; sed tamen aliud eum fuisse, aliud significasse puto, quod exemplo flatus ex corpore domini procedentis recte intellegi potest, etiamsi Ezechiel propheta illo loco non resurrectionem carnis, qualis proprie futura est, sed inopinatam desperati populi reparationem per spiritum domini, qui repleuit orbem terrarum, figurata reuelatione praeuidit.

That God creates souls from angels as from parents, then, no authority from the canonical books occurs to me. Much less, then, from the bodily elements of the world; unless perhaps one is moved by the fact that in the prophet Ezekiel, when the resurrection of the dead is shown, after the bodies have been restored, the spirit is called from the four winds of heaven, by whose breathing they are brought to life so as to rise. For it is written thus: “And the Lord said to me: Prophesy over the spirit, prophesy, son of man, and say to the spirit: Thus says the Lord: Come from the four quarters of the winds of heaven and breathe into these dead, and let them live. And I prophesied as the Lord commanded me, and the spirit of life entered into them, and they lived again and stood upon their feet, a very great assembly.” Here, it seems to me, it is prophetically signified that men will rise not only from that plain where the thing itself was shown, but from the whole world, and that this was prefigured by the breath of the four quarters of the world. For neither was that breath from the Lord's body the substance of the Holy Spirit when he breathed and said, “Receive the Holy Spirit”; but it was certainly signified that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him in the way that the breath itself proceeded from his body. But since the world is not joined to God into unity of person as that flesh was joined to his Word, his only-begotten Son, we cannot say that the soul is from the substance of God in the way that that breath from the four winds was made from the nature of the world; but still I think that that breath was one thing and signified another, which can rightly be understood from the example of the breath proceeding from the Lord's body; even if the prophet Ezekiel in that place foresaw in figurative revelation not the resurrection of the flesh as it will properly be, but the unexpected restoration of a despairing people through the Spirit of the Lord, who has filled the whole world.

10.6CSEL 28.1:302–303

Illud ergo iam uideamus, cuinam potius sententiae diuina testimonia suffragentur: eine, qua dicitur unam animam deum fecisse et dedisse primo homini, unde ceteras faceret, sicut ex eius corpore cetera hominum corpora, an ei, qua dicitur singulas singulis facere, sicut illi unam, non ex illa ceteras. illud enim, quod per Esaiam dicit: omnem flatum ego feci, cum hoc eum de anima dicere quae sequuntur satis ostendant, ad utrumque accipi potest. nam siue ex una primi hominis anima siue ex aliquo suo secreto omnes procul dubio animas ipse facit. Et illud, quod scriptum est: qui finxit singillatim corda eorum, si nomine cordium uoluerimus animas intellegere, neque hoc repugnat cuiquam duorum, de quibus nunc ambigimus. siue enim ex una illa, quam flauit in faciem primi hominis, ipse utique singulas fingit, sicut etiam corpora, siue singulas uel fingat et mittat uel in eis ipsis, quibus miserit, eas fingat, quamquam hoc non mihi uideatur dictum, nisi ex eo, quod per gratiam nostrae animae ad imaginem dei renouatione formantur. unde dicit apostolus: gratia enim salui facti estis per fidem et hoc non ex uobis, sed dei donum est; non ex operibus, ne forte quis extollatur. ipsius enim sumus figmentum creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis. non enim per hanc gratiam fidei corpora nostra creata uel ficta possumus intellegere,. sed sicut in psalmo dictum est: cor mundum crea in me, deus. Hinc esse etiam illud puto: qui finxit spiritum hominis in ipso; tamquam aliud sit factam animam mittere, aliud in ipso homine facere, id est reficere ac renouare. sed etiam hoc si non de gratia, in qua renouamur, sed de natura, in qua nascimur, intellegamus, ad utramque sententiam duci potest, quia uel ex una illa primi hominis tamquam semen animae adtractum ipse fingit in homine, ut uiuificet corpus, siue spiritum uitae non ex illa propagine, sed aliunde corpori infusum ipse itidem fingit per mortales sensus carnis, ut fiat homo in animam uiuam.

Let us see now, then, which view the divine testimonies rather support: the one by which it is said that God made one soul and gave it to the first man, from which he would make the others, as the other human bodies from his body; or the one by which it is said that he makes souls one by one for each person, as he made one for him, not the others from it. For what he says through Isaiah, “Every breath I have made,” since what follows shows clearly enough that he says this of the soul, can be taken either way. For whether from the one soul of the first man or from some secret source of his own, he himself without doubt makes all souls. And what is written, “who formed their hearts one by one,” if we wish to understand souls by the word hearts, does not conflict with either of the two views we are now in doubt about. For whether from that one which he breathed into the face of the first man he himself certainly forms them one by one, as he does bodies too, or whether he forms them one by one and sends them, or forms them in the very persons to whom he has sent them; although this does not seem to me to have been said except from the fact that through grace our souls are formed by renewal to the image of God. Hence the apostle says, “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not from yourselves, but it is the gift of God; not from works, lest anyone be lifted up. For we are his handiwork, created in Christ Jesus for good works.” For we cannot understand that our bodies were created or formed through this grace of faith; but it is as was said in the psalm, “Create a clean heart in me, O God.” From this too, I think, comes the saying, “who formed the spirit of man within him,” as though it is one thing to send a soul already made, and another to make it within the man himself, that is, to remake and renew it. But even if we understand this not of the grace in which we are renewed but of the nature in which we are born, it can be applied to either view, because either he himself forms in the man, so that it may give life to the body, the seed, as it were, of the soul drawn from that one soul of the first man, or he likewise forms, through the mortal senses of the flesh, the spirit of life poured into the body not from that stock but from elsewhere, so that man becomes a living soul.

10.7CSEL 28.1:303–304

Illud sane de libro Sapientiae, ubi ait: sortitus sum animam bonam et, cum essem magis bonus, ueni ad corpus incoinquinatum, diligentiorem considerationem flagitat. magis enim uidetur adtestari opinioni, qua non ex una propagari, sed desuper animae uenire creduntur ad corpora. uerum tamen quid est: sortitus sum animam bonam? quasi aut in illo animarum fonte, si ullus est, aliae sint animae bonae, aliae non bonae, quae sorte quadam exeunt, quaenam cui homini tribuatur, aut alias deus ad horam conceptorum uel nascentium faciat bonas, alias non bonas, quarum quisque habeat sorte, quae acciderit. mirum, si hoc eos saltem adiuuat, qui credunt animas alibi factas singillatim mitti a deo singulis quibusque corporibus hominum, ac non illos potius, qui pro meritis operum, quae ante corpus egerunt, in corpora mitti animas dicunt. secundum quid enim aliae bonae, aliae non bonae uenire ad corpora possunt putari nisi secundum opera sua? neque enim secundum naturam, in qua fiunt ab illo, qui omnes naturas bonas facit. sed absit, ut contradicamus apostolo, qui dicit nondum natos nihil egisse boni aut mali, unde confirmat non potuisse se ex operibus dici, sed ex uocante: maior seruiet minori, cum de geminis ageret adhuc in Rebeccae utero constitutis. sequestremus ergo. paululum hoc de libro Sapientiae testimonium; neque enim neglegendi sunt, seu errent seu uerum sapiant, qui hoc specialiter et singulariter de anima illa dictum putant mediatoris dei et hominum hominis Christi Iesu. quod, si necesse fuerit, quale sit postea considerabimus, ut, si Christo conuenire non potuerit, quaeramus, quemadmodum id accipere debeamus, ne contra apostolicam fidem ueniamus putantes habere animas aliqua merita operum suorum, priusquam incipiant in corporibus uiuere.

But that passage of the book of Wisdom, where it says, “I received by lot a good soul, and, being rather good, I came into an undefiled body,” calls for more careful consideration. For it seems rather to support the opinion by which souls are believed not to be propagated from one, but to come to bodies from above. But what is meant by “I received by lot a good soul”? As though either in that fountain of souls, if there is one, some souls are good and others not good, which go out by a kind of lot as to which is given to which person; or God makes some good and others not good at the hour of conception or birth, and each has by lot whichever fell to him. It would be strange if this helped even those who believe that souls made elsewhere are sent by God one by one into each human body, and not rather those who say that souls are sent into bodies according to the merits of works they did before the body. For according to what can some be thought good and others not good when they come to bodies, except according to their works? For it is not according to nature, in which they are made by him who makes all natures good. But far be it from us to contradict the apostle, who says that those not yet born had done nothing good or evil, from which he confirms that “The elder will serve the younger” could not be said from works but from him who calls, when he was dealing with the twins still in Rebecca's womb. Let us set aside a little, then, this testimony from the book of Wisdom; for those are not to be neglected, whether they err or are right, who think this was said specially and uniquely of the soul of the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus. What this means we will consider afterwards, if necessary, so that, if it cannot fit Christ, we may ask how we ought to take it, so as not to go against the apostolic faith by thinking that souls have some merits of their own works before they begin to live in bodies.

10.8CSEL 28.1:304–305

Nunc illud uideamus quemadmodum dictum sit: auferes spiritum eorum, et deficient et in puluerem suum conuertentur. emittes spiritum tuum, et creabuntur; et innouabis faciem terrae. pro illis enim, qui arbitrantur animas ex parentibus sicut corpora creari, hoc uidetur sonare, cum sic intellegitur, ut spiritum eorum propterea dixerit, quod eum homines ex hominibus acceperint: qui cum mortui fuerint, non eis poterit ab hominibus reddi, ut resurgant, quia non rursus quemadmodum, quando nati sunt, a parentibus ducitur, sed deus eum reddet, qui resuscitat mortuos. ac per hoc eundem spiritum dixit eorum, cum moriuntur, dei autem, cum resurgunt. quod possunt illi, qui non ex parentibus, sed deo mittente animas uenire adserunt, pro sua opinione sic intellegere, ut eorum dixerit spiritum, cum moriuntur, quia in eis erat et ab eis exit, dei autem, cum resurgunt, quod ab ipso mittitur, ab ipso redditur. proinde etiam hoc testimonium neutri eorum aduersatur. Ego uero arbitror melius intellegi hoc dictum de gratia dei, qua interius renouamur. omnium enim superborum secundum terrenum hominem uiuentium et de sua uanitate praesumentium quodammodo aufertur spiritus proprius, cum exuunt se ueterem hominem et infirmantur, ut perficiantur expulsa superbia, dicentes domino per humilem confessionem: memento, quia puluis sumus, quibus dictum erat: quid superbit terra et cinis? per oculum quippe fidei contuentes dei iustitiam, ut non uelint constituere suam, semet ipsos despiciunt, sicut Iob dicit, et distabescunt et aestimant se terram et cinerem; hoc est enim: et in puluerem suum conuertentur. accepto autem spiritu dei dicunt: uiuo autem iam non ego, uiuit autem in me Christus. sic innouatur facies terrae per noui testamenti gratiam numerositate sanctorum.

Now let us see how it was said, “You will take away their spirit, and they will fail and return to their dust. You will send forth your Spirit, and they will be created; and you will renew the face of the earth.” For this seems to sound in favor of those who think that souls are created from parents like bodies, when it is understood thus: that he said “their spirit” because men received it from men; and when they have died, it cannot be given back to them by men so that they may rise, because it is not drawn from parents again as when they were born, but God will give it back, who raises the dead. And therefore he called the same spirit theirs when they die, but God's when they rise. But those who assert that souls come not from parents but by God's sending can understand this in favor of their own opinion, thus: that he called the spirit theirs when they die, because it was in them and goes out from them, but God's when they rise, because it is sent by him and given back by him. So this testimony too opposes neither of them. But I think this is better understood of the grace of God, by which we are renewed inwardly. For from all the proud, who live according to the earthly man and presume on their own vanity, their own spirit is in a way taken away when they strip off the old man and are weakened, so that, pride driven out, they may be made perfect, saying to the Lord in humble confession, “Remember that we are dust,” those to whom it had been said, “Why is earth and ashes proud?” For, beholding with the eye of faith the righteousness of God, so that they do not wish to establish their own, they despise themselves, as Job says, and waste away and regard themselves as earth and ashes; for this is “and they will return to their dust.” But having received the Spirit of God, they say, “Yet I live, no longer I, but Christ lives in me.” So the face of the earth is renewed through the grace of the new covenant, by the great number of the saints.

10.9CSEL 28.1:305–306

Illud etiam, quod apud Ecclesiasten scriptum est: et conuertatur puluis in terram, sicut fuit, et spiritus reuertatur ad deum, qui dedit eum, neutri sententiae contra alteram suffragatur, sed inter utramque consistit. cum enim isti dixerint hinc probari non a parentibus, sed a deo animam dari, quod conuerso puluere in terram suam, id est carne, quae de puluere facta est, reuerteretur spiritus ad deum, qui dedit illum, respondent illi: utique ita est. redit enim spiritus ad deum, qui eum dedit homini primo, quando in eius faciem sufflauit conuerso puluere, id est humano corpore, in terram suam, unde primitus factum est. neque enim ad parentes erat spiritus rediturus, quamuis inde sit creatus ex illo uno, qui homini primo datus est, sicut nec ipsa caro post mortem ad parentes reuertitur, a quibus eam constat certe esse propagatam. quemadmodum ergo caro non redit ad homines, ex quibus creata est, sed ad terram, unde primo homini formata est, ita et spiritus non redit ad homines, a quibus transfusus est, sed ad deum, a quo primae illi carni datus est. Quo testimonio sane satis admonemur ex nihilo deum fecisse animam, quam primo homini dedit, non ex aliqua iam facta creatura sicut corpus ex terra; et ideo, cum redit, non habet. quo redeat, nisi ad auctorem, qui eam dedit, non ad eam creaturam, ex qua facta est, sicut corpus ad terram. nulla est enim creatura, ex qua facta est, quia ex nihilo facta est, ac per hoc ad factorem redit, quae redit, a quo ex nihilo facta est. non enim omnes redeunt, quoniam sunt, de quibus dicitur: spiritus ambulans et non reuertens.,

That passage too which is written in Ecclesiastes, “And let the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit return to God who gave it,” supports neither view against the other, but stands between them. For when these say that it is proved by this that the soul is given not by parents but by God, because, when the dust has returned to its earth, that is, the flesh which was made from dust, the spirit returns to God who gave it, the others answer: “Certainly it is so. For the spirit returns to God, who gave it to the first man when he breathed into his face, when the dust, that is, the human body, has returned to its earth, from which it was first made. For the spirit was not going to return to the parents, although it was created from there, from that one which was given to the first man, just as the flesh itself does not return after death to the parents from whom it was certainly propagated. Just as, then, the flesh does not return to the human beings from whom it was created, but to the earth from which it was formed for the first man, so the spirit too does not return to the human beings from whom it was transmitted, but to God, by whom it was given to that first flesh.” By this testimony we are indeed sufficiently reminded that God made from nothing the soul which he gave to the first man, not from some creature already made as the body was from earth; and therefore, when it returns, it has nowhere to return to except to its author, who gave it, not to the creature from which it was made, as the body returns to the earth. For there is no creature from which it was made, because it was made from nothing, and therefore the soul that returns returns to its maker, by whom it was made from nothing. For not all return, since there are those of whom it is said, “a spirit that goes and does not return.”

10.10CSEL 28.1:306–307

Quocirca difficile est quidem omnia de hac re scripturarum sanctarum testimonia conligere: quod etsi fieri possit, ut non solum commemorentur sed etiam pertractentur, in magnam sermonis longitudinem pergunt; sed tamen, nisi aliquid tam certum proferatur, quam certa proferuntur, quibus ostenditur, quod deus animam fecerit uel quod eam primo homini dederit, quonam modo per diuini eloquii testimonium ista quaestio soluatur ignoro. si enim scriptum esset, quod similiter sufflauerit deus in faciem formatae mulieris et facta fuerit in animam uiuam, iam quidem plurimum lucis accederet, qua cuique formatae carni hominis non ex parentibus dari animam crederemus, adhuc tamen expectaretur, quid proprie teneretur in prole, qui nobis modus usitatus est hominis ex homine. prima uero mulier aliter facta est, et ideo adhuc dici posset animam propterea non ex Adam diuinitus Euae datam, quia non ex illo tamquam proles orta est. si autem homini, qui primus ex illis natus est, commemoraret scriptura non ex parentibus ductam, sed desuper animam datam, illud iam in ceteris etiam tacente scriptura oporteret intellegi.

Therefore it is indeed difficult to gather all the testimonies of the holy Scriptures on this matter; and even if it could be done, so that they were not only cited but also treated, they would run to a great length of discourse; but still, unless something is brought forward as certain as the things brought forward which show that God made the soul or that he gave it to the first man, I do not know how this question may be solved by the testimony of divine speech. For if it were written that God breathed likewise into the face of the woman when she was formed and she became a living soul, much light would indeed be added, by which we would believe that a soul is given to each formed human flesh not from the parents; yet it would still be awaited what properly holds in offspring, which is the usual way for us of man from man. For the first woman was made in another way, and so it could still be said that the soul was given by God to Eve not from Adam because she did not arise from him as offspring. But if Scripture recorded of the human being who was first born of them that his soul was not drawn from his parents but given from above, that would then have to be understood of the rest too, even with Scripture silent.

10.11CSEL 28.1:307–309

Nunc itaque et illud consideremus, utrum neutram confirmet sententiam, sed utrique possit adcommodari, quod scriptum est: per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intrauit et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccauerunt; et paulo post: sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, ita et per unius iustificationem in omnes homines ad iustificationem uitae. sicut enim per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi. ex his enim uerbis apostoli qui defendunt animarum propaginem sententiam suam sic adstruere moliuntur: si secundum solam carnem, inquiunt, potest intellegi peccatum uel peccator, non cogimur in his uerbis ex parentibus animam credere; si autem quamuis per inlecebram carnis non tamen peccat nisi anima, quomodo accipiendum est, quod dictum est: in quo omnes peccauerunt, si non ex Adam etiam anima sicut caro propagata est? aut quomodo per illius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt, si tantum secundum carnem in illo, non etiam secundum animam fuerunt? Cauendum est enim, ne uel deus uideatur auctor esse peccati, si dat animam carni, in qua eam peccare necesse sit, uel possit esse anima praeter ipsius Christi, cui liberandae a peccato non sit christiana gratia necessaria, quia non peccauit in Adam, si omnes in eo peccasse secundum carnem tantum, quae de illo creata est, non etiam secundum animam dictum est: quod usque adeo contrarium est ecclesiasticae fidei, ut parentes ad percipiendam gratiam sancti baptismi etiam cum paruulis atque infantibus currant, in quibus si hoc uinculum peccati soluitur, quod tantummodo carnis, non etiam quod animae est, merito quaeritur, quid eis obesset, si in illa aetate de corpore sine baptismo exirent. si enim per hoc sacramentum corpori eorum consulitur, non et animae, deberent et mortui baptizari; at cum uideamus hoc uniuersaliter ecclesiam retinere, ut cum uiuentibus curratur et uiuentibus succurratur, ne, cum mortui fuerint, nihil fieri possit quod prosit, non uidemus, quid aliud possit intellegi, nisi unumquemque paruulum non esse nisi Adam et corpore et anima et ideo illi Christi gratiam necessariam. aetas quippe illa in se ipsa nihil egit uel boni uel mali; proinde ibi anima innocentissima est, si ex Adam propagata non est. unde quomodo possit iuste ire in condemnationem, si de corpore sine baptismo exierit, quisquis istam sententiam de anima tenens potuerit demonstrare mirandus est.

Now, then, let us consider also whether this passage confirms neither view but can be fitted to both: “Through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned”; and a little later: “As through the trespass of one, to all men unto condemnation, so also through the justification of one, to all men unto justification of life. For as through the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many will be made righteous.” From these words of the apostle, those who defend the propagation of souls try to build up their view thus: “If sin or sinner can be understood according to the flesh alone,” they say, “we are not forced by these words to believe that the soul is from the parents; but if, though through the allurement of the flesh, it is still only the soul that sins, how is the saying ‘in whom all sinned’ to be taken, if the soul too was not propagated from Adam like the flesh? Or how were they made sinners through his disobedience, if they were in him only according to the flesh and not also according to the soul? For we must beware lest either God seem to be the author of sin, if he gives a soul to flesh in which it must necessarily sin, or there could be a soul, apart from that of Christ himself, for whose deliverance from sin Christian grace is not necessary, because it did not sin in Adam, if it was said that all sinned in him only according to the flesh which was created from him, and not also according to the soul: which is so contrary to the church's faith that parents run even with little children and infants to receive the grace of holy baptism; and if in them the bond of sin that is loosed is only that of the flesh and not also that of the soul, it is rightly asked what harm it would do them if at that age they left the body without baptism. For if by this sacrament their body is provided for and not their soul, the dead too ought to be baptized; but since we see that the church universally holds to this, that people run with the living and help the living, lest, when they have died, nothing can be done that would benefit them, we do not see what else can be understood but that each little child is nothing but Adam in both body and soul, and therefore Christ's grace is necessary for him. For that age in itself has done nothing either good or evil; so there the soul is most innocent, if it was not propagated from Adam. Hence whoever holds this view of the soul and can show how it can justly go into condemnation if it has left the body without baptism is to be wondered at.”

10.12CSEL 28.1:309–311

Uerissime quippe ac ueracissime scriptum est: caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem; sed tamen carnem sine anima concupiscere nihil posse puto quod omnis doctus indoctusque non dubitet. ac per hoc ipsius concupiscentiae carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. ex utroque enim fit: ex anima scilicet, quod sine illa delectatio nulla sentitur, ex carne autem, quod sine illa carnalis delectatio non sentitur. carnem itaque concupiscentem aduersus spiritum dicit apostolus carnalem procul dubio delectationem, quam de carne et cum carne spiritus habet aduersus delectationem, quam solus habet. solus quippe habet, ni fallor, illud desiderium non cum carnis uoluptate uel carnalium rerum cupiditate conmixtum, quo desiderat et deficit anima in atria domini; solus habet etiam illud, de quo ei dicitur: concupisti sapientiam: serua mandatum, et dominus praebebit illam tibi. nam cum spiritus imperat membris corporis, ut huic desiderio seruiant, quo solus accenditur, uelut cum adsumitur codex, cum aliquid scribitur, legitur, disputatur, auditur, cum denique panis frangitur esurienti et cetera humanitatis ac misericordiae praestantur officia, oboedientiam caro exhibet, non concupiscentiam mouet. his atque huius modi bonis desideriis, quibus sola anima concupiscit, cum aduersatur aliquid, quod eandem animam secundum carnem delectat, tunc dicitur caro concupiscere aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem. Sic enim dicta est caro in eo, quod secundum ipsam facit anima, cum ait: caro concupiscit, quemadmodum dictum est: auris audit et oculus uidet, quis enim nescit, quod anima potius et per aurem audiat et per oculum uideat? ita loquimur et cum dicimus; manus tua subuenit homini, cum aliquid porrecta manu datur, quo cuiquam subueniatur. quodsi de ipso etiam fidei oculo, ad quem pertinet credere, quae per carnem non uidentur, dictum est: uidebit omnis caro salutare dei, non utique nisi de anima, qua uiuit caro, cum etiam per ipsam carnem nostram Christum pie uidere, id est formam, qua indutus est propter nos, non pertineat ad concupiscentiam, sed ad ministerium carnis, ne forte aliquis ita uelit accipere, quod dictum est: uidebit omnis caro salutare dei: quanto congruentius dicitur caro concupiscere, quando anima non solum carni animalem uitam praebet, uerum etiam secundum ipsam carnem aliquid concupiscit, quod in potestate non est, ne concupiscat, quamdiu inest peccatum in membris, id est uiolenta quaedam carnis inlecebra in corpore mortis huius, ueniens de uindicta illius peccati, unde propaginem ducimus, secundum quam omnes ante gratiam filii sunt irae. contra quod peccatum militant sub gratia constituti, non ut non sit in eorum corpore, quamdiu ita mortale est, ut et mortuum iure dicatur, sed ut non regnet. non autem regnat, cum desideriis eius, id est his, quae secundum carnem contra spiritum concupiscuntur, non oboeditur. proinde apostolus numquid ait: non sit peccatum in uestro mortali corpore — sciebat quippe inesse peccati delectationem, quam peccatum uocat, deprauata scilicet ex prima transgressione natura - sed, non, inquit, regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore ad oboediendum desideriis eius, nec exhibeatis membra uestra arma iniquitatis peccato?

Most truly indeed and most truthfully is it written, “The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh”; yet I think that every learned and unlearned person would not doubt that the flesh can desire nothing without the soul. And therefore the cause of carnal desire itself is not in the soul alone, but much less is it in the flesh alone. For it arises from both: from the soul, because without it no delight is felt; from the flesh, because without it carnal delight is not felt. So by the flesh desiring against the spirit the apostle means without doubt the carnal delight which the spirit has from the flesh and with the flesh against the delight which it has alone. For it alone has, if I am not mistaken, that longing not mixed with the pleasure of the flesh or the craving for carnal things, by which the soul longs and faints for the courts of the Lord; it alone has also that of which it is told, “You have desired wisdom: keep the commandment, and the Lord will provide it for you.” For when the spirit commands the members of the body to serve this longing by which it alone is kindled, as when a book is taken up, when something is written, read, discussed, heard, when, finally, bread is broken for the hungry and the other duties of humanity and mercy are performed, the flesh shows obedience, it does not stir up desire. When something which delights the same soul according to the flesh opposes these and similar good desires, by which the soul alone desires, then the flesh is said to desire against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh. For it is called flesh in that which the soul does according to it when he says, “The flesh desires,” in the same way as it is said, “The ear hears and the eye sees”; for who does not know that it is rather the soul that hears through the ear and sees through the eye? So too we speak when we say, “Your hand helped a man,” when something is given with outstretched hand to help someone. And if of the very eye of faith, to which it belongs to believe what is not seen through the flesh, it is said, “All flesh will see the salvation of God,” certainly only of the soul, by which the flesh lives (since even to see Christ piously through our flesh itself, that is, the form with which he was clothed for us, belongs not to the desire but to the service of the flesh, lest anyone should want to take “All flesh will see the salvation of God” in that way): how much more fittingly is the flesh said to desire, when the soul not only gives animal life to the flesh, but also desires something according to the flesh itself, which it is not in its power not to desire as long as sin is in the members, that is, a certain violent allurement of the flesh in the body of this death, coming from the punishment of that sin from which we draw our descent, according to which all before grace are children of wrath. Against this sin those established under grace fight, not so that it may not be in their body as long as it is so mortal that it is rightly called even dead, but so that it may not reign. And it does not reign when its desires, that is, the things desired according to the flesh against the spirit, are not obeyed. So does the apostle say, “Let there be no sin in your mortal body”? For he knew that the delight of sin was in it, which he calls sin, nature having been depraved, that is, by the first transgression; but he says, “Let not sin reign in your mortal body so as to obey its desires, and do not present your members as weapons of wickedness to sin.”

10.13CSEL 28.1:311–312

Secundum hanc sententiam nec rem absurdissimam dicimus, quod caro sine anima concupiscat, nec Manichaeis consentimus, qui cum uiderent non posse carnem sine anima concupiscere aliam quandam animam suam ex alia natura deo contraria carnem habere putauerunt, unde concupiscat aduersus spiritum. nec alicui animae non esse necessariam Christi gratiam dicere cogimur, cum dicitur nobis: quid meruit anima infantis, unde illi perniciosum sit non percepto christiani baptismi sacramento exire de corpore, si nec proprium aliquod peccatum commisit nec ex illa est, quae in Adam prima peccauit? Non enim de pueris grandiusculis agimus, quibus quidem peccatum proprium nolunt adtribuere quidam nisi ab anni quarti decimi articulo, cum pubescere coeperint. quod merito crederemus, si nulla essent peccata, nisi quae membris genitalibus admittuntur. quis uero audeat adfirmare furta, mendacia, periuria non esse peccata, nisi qui -talia uult inpune committere? at his plena est puerilis aetas, quamuis in eis non ita ut in maioribus punienda uideantur, quod sperentur annis accedentibus, quibus ratio conualescat, posse praecepta salutaria melius intellegere eisque libentius oboedire. sed nunc de pueris non agimus, quorum carnalem ac puerilem uoluntatem uel corporis uel animi si ueritas et aequitas obpugnauerit, quibus possunt uiribus dictorum atque factorum repugnant. pro qua? nisi pro falsitate et iniquitate, quae suffragari uidebitur eis uel ad percipienda, quae alliciunt, uel ad uitanda, quae offendunt. de infantibus loquimur, non quia nascuntur plerumque de adulteris; neque enim in prauis moribus naturae dona culpanda sunt, aut propterea non debuerunt germinare frumenta, quod ea seuit furantis manus. aut uero ipsis parentibus obfutura sit iniquitas sua, si se ad deum conuertendo correxerint? quanto minus filiis, si recte uixerint!

According to this view we neither say the utterly absurd thing that the flesh desires without the soul, nor agree with the Manichees, who, seeing that the flesh cannot desire without a soul, thought that the flesh has some other soul of its own from another nature opposed to God, from which it desires against the spirit. Nor are we forced to say that Christ's grace is not necessary for some soul, when it is said to us: “What has the soul of an infant deserved, that it should be harmful to it to leave the body without having received the sacrament of Christian baptism, if it has neither committed any sin of its own nor comes from that soul which first sinned in Adam?” For we are not dealing with older boys, to whom some indeed are unwilling to attribute sin of their own except from the point of the fourteenth year, when they begin to reach puberty. We would rightly believe this if there were no sins except those committed with the genital members. But who would dare to affirm that thefts, lies, and perjuries are not sins, except one who wants to commit such things with impunity? Yet boyhood is full of them, although in them they do not seem to be punished as in older people, because it is hoped that as years come on, in which reason grows strong, they can better understand wholesome precepts and more willingly obey them. But we are not dealing now with boys, who, if truth and justice oppose their carnal and childish will, whether of body or of mind, resist with what strength of words and deeds they can; for what? Only for falsehood and wickedness, which will seem to them to support either the getting of what entices or the avoiding of what offends. We are speaking of infants; not because they are often born of adulterers; for the gifts of nature are not to be blamed in depraved morals, nor ought grain not to have sprouted because a thief's hand sowed it. Or will their wickedness harm the parents themselves, if they amend by turning to God? How much less the children, if they live rightly!

10.14CSEL 28.1:312–314

Sed illa aetas uehementem quaestionem monet, cuius anima, cum peccatum nullum habeat de proprio uoluntatis arbitrio, quaeritur quomodo possit iustificari per illius unius hominis oboedientiam, si per alterius unius inoboedientiam rea non est. haec uox eorum est, qui animas hominum ex hominibus parentibus creatas uolunt non quidem nisi a creatore deo, sed sicut etiam corpora. non enim et haec parentes creant, ac non ille, qui ait: priusquam te formarem in utero, noui te. Quibus respondetur animas quidem corporibus hominum deum nouas singillatim dare ad hoc, ut in carne peccati de originali peccato ueniente recte uiuendo carnalesque concupiscentias sub dei gratia subigendo meritum conparent, quo cum ipso corpore in melius transferantur tempore resurrectionis et in Christo in aeternum cum angelis uiuant; sed necesse esse, ut, cum membris terrenis atque mortalibus maximeque de peccati carne propagatis miro modo coaptantur, ut ea primitus uiuificare, post etiam aetatis accessu regere possint, tamquam obliuione praegrauentur. quae si esset quodammodo indigestibilis, creatori tribueretur; cum uero paulatim ab huius obliuionis torpore anima resipiscens possit conuerti ad deum suum eiusque misericordiam et ueritatem primo ipsa pietate conuersionis, deinde seruandi praecepti eius perseuerantia promereri, quid ei obest illo uelut somno paululum inmergi, unde paulatim euigilans in lucem intellegentiae, propter quam rationalis anima facta est, potest per uoluntatem bonam eligere uitam bonam? quod quidem non poterit, nisi adiuuerit gratia dei per mediatorem. hoc si neglexerit homo, non tantum secundum carnem, uerum etiam secundum spiritum erit Adam; si autem curauerit, erit Adam secundum carnem tantummodo; secundum spiritum autem recte uiuens illud etiam, quod de Adam culpabile tractum est, mundatum a labe peccati recipere merebitur illa conmutatione, quam sanctis resurrectio pollicetur. Sed antequam per aetatem possit secundum spiritum uiuere, necessarium habet mediatoris sacramentum, ut, quod per eius fidem nondum potest, per eorum, qui eum diligunt, fiat. eius enim sacramento soluitur etiam in aetate infantili originalis poena peccati, a quo nisi adiutus etiam iuuenis carnalem concupiscentiam non domabit nec ea subiugata aeternae uitae meritum adprehendet nisi eius dono, quem promereri studet. ideo uiuus oportet etiam infans baptizetur, ne obsit animae societas carnis peccati, qua participata fit, ut nihil possit anima infantis secundum spiritum sapere. ipsa quippe adfectio grauat etiam corpore exutam, nisi, cum in corpore est, per unicum sacrificium ueri sacerdotis expietur.

But that age raises a weighty question: since the soul of an infant has no sin from its own choice of will, it is asked how it can be justified through the obedience of that one man, if it is not guilty through the disobedience of the other one. This is the voice of those who hold that human souls are created from human parents, not indeed except by God the Creator, but in the way bodies are too. For parents do not create these either, but he who says, “Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you.” To them it is answered that God gives new souls one by one to human bodies for this purpose: that in the flesh of sin, coming from original sin, by living rightly and subduing carnal desires under God's grace, they may acquire merit, by which, together with the body itself, they may be transferred to a better state at the time of the resurrection and live in Christ for ever with the angels; but that it is necessary that, when they are wonderfully fitted to earthly and mortal members, and above all members propagated from the flesh of sin, so that they may first give them life and later, as age comes on, also rule them, they are weighed down, as it were, by forgetfulness. If this forgetfulness were in some way beyond digesting, it would be attributed to the Creator; but since the soul, gradually recovering from the torpor of this forgetfulness, can turn to its God and deserve his mercy and truth, first by the very piety of its turning and then by perseverance in keeping his command, what harm is it to it to be plunged for a little while in that sleep, as it were, from which, gradually waking into the light of understanding, for which the rational soul was made, it can choose a good life by a good will? This indeed it will not be able to do unless God's grace helps it through the mediator. If a man neglects this, he will be Adam not only according to the flesh but also according to the spirit; but if he takes care of it, he will be Adam only according to the flesh; and, living rightly according to the spirit, he will deserve to receive back, cleansed from the stain of sin, even what was guiltily drawn from Adam, by that change which the resurrection promises to the saints. But before, by reason of age, it can live according to the spirit, it needs the sacrament of the mediator, so that what it cannot yet do through its own faith may be done through the faith of those who love it. For by his sacrament the penalty of original sin is loosed even in infancy; and unless helped by him, even a young man will not tame carnal desire, nor, having subdued it, lay hold of the merit of eternal life except by the gift of him whom he strives to deserve. Therefore even an infant ought to be baptized while living, so that fellowship with the flesh of sin may not harm the soul, a fellowship by sharing in which it comes about that the infant's soul can think nothing according to the spirit. For this very condition weighs it down even when stripped of the body, unless, while it is in the body, it is expiated by the one sacrifice of the true priest.

10.15CSEL 28.1:314–315

Quid ergo, ait aliquis, si hoc non curauerint sui uel infidelitate uel neglegentia? hoc quidem etiam de maioribus dici potest. possunt enim uel repente emori uel apud eos aegrotare, ubi eis, quo baptizentur, nemo subueniat. sed illi, inquit, habent etiam propria peccata, quorum indigeant remissione, quae si dimissa non fuerint, nemo eos recte dicet inmerito plecti pro his, quae in sua uita sua uoluntate commiserint; illa uero anima, cui quaedam contagio tracta de carne peccati, si de illa prima anima peccatrice non creata est, nullo modo inputari potest - neque enim ullo peccato, sed natura, qua sic facta est, et deo dante carni data est — cur alienabitur ab aeterna uita, si baptizando infanti nemo subuenerit? an forte nihil oberit? quid ergo prodest ei, cui subuenitur, si nihil obest, cui non subuenitur? Hic pro sua causa quid respondere possint, qui secundum scripturas sanctas, uel quod apud eas inueniatur uel quod eis non aduersetur, conantur adserere animas nouas non de parentibus tractas corporibus dari, nondum me audisse uel uspiam legisse fateor. non ideo sane absentium negotium deserendum est, si quid mihi, quo adiuuari uideatur, occurrerit. possunt enim adhuc dicere deum praescium, quomodo quaeque anima uictura esset, si diutius in corpore uiueret, ei procurare lauacri salutaris ministrationem, cuius futuram fuisse praeuidet pietatem, cum ad annos fidei capaces ueniret, si nunc eum oporteret propter aliquam occultam causam morte praeueniri. occultum itaque est atque ab humano uel certe ab ingenio meo remotissimum, cur nascatur infans uel continuo uel cito moriturus; sed hoc ita occultum est, ut neutros adiuuet, de quorum nunc sententiis disceptamus. illa enim explosa opinione, qua putantur animae pro ante actae uitae meritis in corpora detrudi, ut ea citius solui meruisse uideatur, quae non multa peccauerat, ne contradicamus apostolo nihil nondum natos boni uel mali egisse testanti, nec illi, qui animae traducem adfirmant, possunt pro se ostendere, cur aliorum mors acceleretur, retardetur aliorum, nec qui eas dari nouas uolunt singulis singulas. occulta ergo ista causa est et utrisque pariter, quantum existimo, nec suffragatur nec aduersatur.

“What then,” someone says, “if their own people have not seen to this, through unbelief or neglect?” This indeed can be said of older people too. For they may either die suddenly or fall ill among people where no one helps them to be baptized. “But they,” he says, “also have sins of their own, which need remission, and if these have not been forgiven, no one will rightly say that they are punished undeservedly for what they committed in their own life by their own will; but that soul, to which a certain contagion has been drawn from the flesh of sin, if it was not created from that first sinful soul, can in no way be held guilty (for it was given to the flesh not by any sin, but by the nature in which it was so made, and by God's giving); why will it be estranged from eternal life if no one has helped by baptizing the infant? Or perhaps it will do no harm? What good is it, then, to the one who is helped, if it does no harm to the one who is not helped?” What those can answer here for their cause who try to assert, according to the holy Scriptures, either from what is found in them or from what is not contrary to them, that new souls not drawn from parents are given to bodies, I confess I have not yet heard or read anywhere. Yet the case of the absent is not to be abandoned for that reason, if anything occurs to me by which it may seem to be helped. For they can still say that God, foreknowing how each soul would live if it lived longer in the body, provides the administration of the saving washing for the one whose future piety he foresees, had it come to the years capable of faith, if now, for some hidden reason, it had to be overtaken by death. It is hidden, then, and very far from human understanding, or certainly from mine, why an infant is born either to die at once or soon; but this is so hidden that it helps neither of those whose views we are now discussing. For, the opinion having been exploded by which souls are thought to be thrust into bodies according to the merits of a previous life, so that a soul that had not sinned much would seem to have deserved to be released sooner (lest we contradict the apostle, who testifies that those not yet born had done nothing good or evil), neither those who affirm the transmission of the soul can show in their favor why the death of some is hastened and that of others delayed, nor those who hold that new souls are given one by one to each. This cause, then, is hidden, and, as far as I can judge, neither supports nor opposes either side.

10.16CSEL 28.1:315–317

Proinde qui de infantium mortibus urgebantur, cur omnibus sit necessarium baptismi sacramentum, quorum animae non ex illa ductae sunt, cuius inoboedientia peccatores constituti sunt multi, cum respondent peccatores quidem omnes constitui secundum carnem, secundum animam uero nonnisi eos, qui eo tempore male uixerunt, quo et bene potuissent, omnes autem animas, hoc est et infantum, ideo habere necessarium baptismi sacramentum, sine quo ex hac uita etiam in illa aetate emigrare non expedit, quia contagio peccati ex carne peccati, qua obruitur anima, cum his inseritur membris, oberit ei post mortem, nisi, cum adhuc in ipsa carne est, sacramento mediatoris expietur, eique diuinitus hoc auxilium procurari, quam deus praesciit, si usque ad annos fidei congruos hic uiueret, pie fuisse uicturam, quam propter aliquid, quod ipse nouit, et nasci uoluit in corpore et cito extraxit e corpore: cum ergo haec respondent, quid eis contradici potest. nisi incertos nos eorum salutis fieri qui hac uita bene gesta in ecclesiae pace defuncti sunt, si non solum secundum id, quod quisque uixit, uerum etiam secundum id, quod uicturus esset, si amplius uiuere potuisset, quisque iudicandus est? quandoquidem ualent apud deum merita mala non tantum praeteritorum, sed futurorum etiam delictorum, a quorum reatu nec mors liberat, si, antequam fuerint commissa, praeuenerit, nec aliquid ei praestitum est, qui raptus est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum eius. deus enim praescius illius futurae malitiae cur non eum secundum ipsam potius iudicaturus est, si moriturae animae infantis, ne obesset ei ex corpore peccati participata conluuies, ideo subueniendum iudicauit per baptismum, quia praesciuit eam, si uiueret, pie fideliterque fuisse uicturam? An ideo potius refelli hoc inuentum potest, quia meum est, illi autem, qui de hac sententia certos se esse confirmant, alia fortasse proferunt uel testimonia scripturarum uel documenta rationum, quibus hanc auferant ambiguitatem uel certe ostendant non esse contra id, quod sentiunt, illud apostoli, quo gratiam, qua salui efficimur, magna intentione commendans dicit: sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes uiuificabuntur, et: sicut per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi, sic per oboedientiam unius hominis iusti constituentur multi, eosdemque multos peccatores non quibusdam exceptis, sed omnes intellegi uolens superius ait de Adam: in quo omnes peccauerunt? unde utique infantum animas non posse secerni et eo, quod dictum est "omnes" et eo, quod eis per baptismum subuenitur non absurde credunt, qui animas ex unius traduce sapiunt, nisi aliqua manifesta et liquida uel ratione quae scripturis sanctis non repugnet, uel earum ipsarum scripturarum auctoritate redarguantur.

So those who were pressed about the deaths of infants, as to why the sacrament of baptism is necessary for all whose souls were not drawn from that one through whose disobedience many were made sinners, answer that all are indeed made sinners according to the flesh, but according to the soul only those who lived badly at a time when they could also have lived well; but that all souls, including those of infants, need the sacrament of baptism, without which it is not good to depart from this life even at that age, because the contagion of sin from the flesh of sin, by which the soul is overwhelmed when it is put into these members, will harm it after death unless, while it is still in that flesh, it is expiated by the sacrament of the mediator; and that this help is provided by God for the soul which God foreknew would have lived piously if it had lived here to the years suited to faith, a soul which for some reason known to him he both willed to be born in a body and soon took out of the body: when they answer this, what can be said against them, except that we would become uncertain of the salvation of those who, after a life well lived, have died in the peace of the church, if each is to be judged not only according to how he lived but also according to how he would have lived if he could have lived longer? For then the evil merits not only of past but also of future sins would count with God, from whose guilt not even death would free a man if it came before they were committed; and nothing would have been granted to him who was taken away lest wickedness change his understanding. For why would God, foreknowing his future wickedness, not rather judge him according to it, if he judged that the soul of an infant about to die should be helped by baptism, lest the filth shared from the body of sin harm it, because he foreknew that, if it lived, it would have lived piously and faithfully? Or can this invention be refuted the more readily because it is mine, while those who affirm that they are certain of this view perhaps bring forward other testimonies of the Scriptures or proofs of reason, by which they may remove this ambiguity, or at least show that what the apostle says does not contradict their view, when, commending with great earnestness the grace by which we are saved, he says, “As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive,” and, “As through the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so through the obedience of one man many will be made righteous,” and, wishing these same many sinners to be understood as all, with no exceptions, he says above of Adam, “in whom all sinned”? Hence those who hold that souls come by transmission from one believe, not absurdly, that the souls of infants cannot be set apart, both because it was said “all” and because they are helped by baptism, unless they are refuted by some manifest and clear reason which does not conflict with the holy Scriptures, or by the authority of those Scriptures themselves.

10.17CSEL 28.1:317–319

Iam itaque uideamus, quantum suscepti huius operis necessitas patitur; quale etiam illud sit, quod paulo ante distulimus. scriptum est enim in libro Sapientiae: puer autem eram ingeniosus et sortitus sum animam bonam. et cum essem magis bonus, ueni ad corpus incoinquinatum. cum enim uideatur illos adiuuare hoc testimonium, qui non ex parentibus creari, sed uenire ad corpus uel descendere deo mittente animas dicunt, rursus hoc inpedit eorum sententiam, quod ait: sortitus sum animam bonam, cum procul dubio uel ex uno fonte manare quodammodo tamquam riuulos uel pari natura fieri animas credunt, quas deus mittit in corpora, non autem alias bonas uel magis bonas et alias non bonas uel minus bonas. unde enim bonae aut magis bonae seu non bonae aut minus bonae animae, nisi uel moribus secundum liberum uoluntatis arbitrium uel differentia temperaturae corporum, dum aliae magis, aliae minus grauantur corpore, quod corrumpitur et adgrauat animam? sed neque actio erat aliqua singularum quarumque animarum, qua earum mores discernerentur, antequam uenirent ad corpora, nec ex corpore minus grauante potuit iste dicere animam suam bonam, qui ait: sortitus sum animam bonam. et cum essem magis bonus, ueni ad corpus incoinquinatum. accessisse enim dixit bonitati, qua bonus erat, sortitus uidelicet animam bonam, ut etiam ad corpus incoinquinatum ueniret. aliunde ergo bonus, antequam ueniret ad corpus; sed utique non differentia morum, quia nullum ante uitae gestae meritum, non differentia corporis, quia prius bonus, quam ueniret ad corpus. unde igitur? Hoc autem illis, qui ex traduce animae illius praeuaricatricis animas creari adserunt, quamuis pro eis sonare non uideatur, quod dictum est: ueni ad corpus, tamen in ceteris non incongrue coaptatur, ut, cum dixisset: puer autem eram ingeniosus, id ipsum explicans quibus causis ingeniosus esset, continuo subiungeret: et sortitus sum animam bonam, uidelicet ex paterno ingenio uel corporali temperamento. deinde, cum essem, inquit, magis bonus, ueni ad corpus incoinquinatum: quod si maternum intellegatur, ne hoc quidem, quod dictum est: ueni ad corpus, huic opinioni refragabitur, cum ex anima et corpore paterno uenisse ad maternum corpus accipitur incoinquinatum, uidelicet uel a cruore menstruo — dicuntur enim ex hoc ingenia grauari — uel a contaminatione adulterina. ita et haec uerba libri huius aut magis eis fauent, qui animarum traducem loquuntur, aut, si et isti ea possunt pro se interpretari, inter utrosque alternant.

Now, then, let us see, as far as the needs of this work we have undertaken allow, what that passage is which we put off a little earlier. For it is written in the book of Wisdom: “Now I was a gifted child and received by lot a good soul; and, being rather good, I came into an undefiled body.” For while this testimony seems to help those who say that souls are not created from parents but come or descend into the body at God's sending, it again hinders their view in saying, “I received by lot a good soul,” since they doubtless believe that the souls which God sends into bodies either flow in a way like streams from one fountain or are made of equal nature, not some good or better and others not good or less good. For from where would souls be good or better, or not good or less good, except either from their conduct according to free choice of will or from the difference in the constitution of bodies, some being more and others less weighed down by the body, which is corrupted and weighs down the soul? But neither was there any action of individual souls by which their conduct might be distinguished before they came to bodies, nor could he call his soul good on account of a less burdensome body, who says, “I received by lot a good soul, and, being rather good, I came into an undefiled body.” For he said that, to the goodness by which he was good, having received by lot a good soul, there was added that he also came into an undefiled body. So he was good from some other source before he came to the body; but certainly not by difference of conduct, because there was no merit of a life lived beforehand, nor by difference of body, because he was good before he came to the body. From where, then? But for those who assert that souls are created by transmission from the soul of that transgressor, although the saying “I came into a body” does not seem to sound in their favor, the rest fits not unsuitably: having said, “Now I was a gifted child,” and explaining by what causes he was gifted, he at once added, “and I received by lot a good soul,” namely from his father's gifts or bodily constitution. Then, “being rather good,” he says, “I came into an undefiled body”: and if this is understood as the mother's body, not even the saying “I came into a body” will go against this opinion, since it is taken that he came from the father's soul and body into the mother's undefiled body, undefiled, that is, either by menstrual blood (for it is said that natural gifts are weighed down by this) or by the contamination of adultery. So these words of this book too either favor rather those who speak of the transmission of souls, or, if the others too can interpret them in their favor, they waver between both.

10.18CSEL 28.1:319–321

Quae si de domino secundum humanam, quae a uerbo adsumta est, creaturam uelimus accipere, sunt quidem in eadem circumstantia lectionis, quae illi excellentiae non conueniant; maxime illud, quia idem ipse, qui haec in eodem libro loquitur, aliquanto superius, cum ista uerba, de quibus nunc agimus, diceret, confessus est ex semine uiri se in sanguine coagulatum: a quo nascendi modo utique alienus est uirginis partus, quam non ex uiri semine carnem concepisse Christi nullus ambigit christianus. sed quia et in Psalmis, ubi ait: foderunt manus meas et pedes, dinumerauerunt omnia ossa mea; ipsi uero considerauerunt et conspexerunt me. diuiserunt sibi uestimenta mea et super uestem meam miserunt sortem, quae proprie illi uni congruunt, ibi etiam dixit: deus, deus meus, respice me; ut quid me dereliquisti? longe a salute mea uerba delictorum meorum, quae rursus ei non conueniunt, nisi transfiguranti in se corpus humilitatis nostrae, quoniam membra sumus corporis eius, et quia in ipso euangelio, puer proficiebat aetate et sapientia, si possunt etiam ista, quae circum hanc sententiam in libro sapientiae leguntur, propter humilem formam serui et unitatem corporis ecclesiae cum capite suo, eidem ipsi domino coaptari, quid ingeniosius illo puero, cuius in annis duodecim seniores sapientiam mirabantur? et quid illa anima melius, quae, etiamsi uincant non certando, sed probando, qui animarum traducem adfirmant, non erit consequens, ut etiam ipsa ex illius praeuaricatoris traduce uenisse credenda sit, ne per illius hominis inoboedientiam etiam ipse peccator constituatur, per cuius unius oboedientiam ab illo reatu liberati iusti constituuntur multi? et quid incoinquinatius illo utero uirginis, cuius caro, etiamsi de peccati propagatione uenit, non tamen de peccati propagatione concepit, ut ne ipsum quidem corpus Christi ea lex seuerit in utero Mariae, quae in membris posita corporis mortis repugnat legi mentis? quam sancti patres coniugati refrenantes non quidem nisi quousque licebat in concubitum relaxarunt nec tamen tantummodo quousque licebat eius inpetum pertulerunt. proinde corpus Christi quamuis ex carne feminae adsumtum. est, quae de illa carnis peccati propagine concepta fuerat, tamen, quia non sic in ea conceptum est, quomodo fuerat illa concepta, nec ipsa erat caro peccati, sed similitudo carnis peccati. non enim accepit inde reatum moriendi, qui adparet in motu carnis non uoluntario, quamuis uoluntate superando, aduersus quem spiritus concupiscit, sed accepit inde, non quod contagioni praeuaricationis, sed quod exsoluendae indebitae morti et ostendendae promissae resurrectioni sufficeret: quorum unum nobis ad non timendum, alterum ad sperandum ualeret. Denique si a me quaeratur, unde acceperit animam Iesus Christus, mallem quidem hinc audire meliores atque doctiores; sed tamen pro meo captu libentius responderim "unde Adam quam de Adam". si enim puluis adsumtus ex terra, in qua nullus hominum fuerat operatus, meruit diuinitus animari, quanto magis corpus adsumtum ex carne, in qua itidem nullus hominum fuerat operatus, sortitum est animam bonam, cum illic erigeretur casurus, hic descenderet leuaturus! et fortasse ideo ait: sortitus sum animam bonam — si tamen hoc de illo oportet intellegi — quia solent quae sorte dantur diuinitus dari. aut, quod fidenter dicendum est, ne uel illa anima aliquibus operibus praecedentibus ad tantum apicem subuecta putaretur, ut cum ea uerbum caro fieret et habitaret in nobis, ad auferendam suspicionem praecedentium meritorum sortis nomen accessit.

If we wish to take these words of the Lord according to the human creature which was taken up by the Word, there are indeed things in the same context of the reading which do not befit that excellence; above all this, that the same person who speaks these words in the same book, somewhat earlier than when he said the words we are now discussing, confessed that he was curdled in blood from the seed of a man: a manner of birth from which the virgin's childbearing is certainly foreign, since no Christian doubts that she conceived the flesh of Christ not from the seed of a man. But since in the Psalms too, where it says, “They pierced my hands and feet, they numbered all my bones; they looked and stared at me. They divided my garments among them, and for my clothing they cast lots,” things which properly fit him alone, it also said there, “God, my God, look upon me; why have you forsaken me? Far from my salvation are the words of my sins,” which again do not befit him, except as one who transfigures into himself the body of our lowliness, since we are members of his body; and since in the gospel itself “the child advanced in age and wisdom”; if these things too which are read around this sentence in the book of Wisdom can be fitted to the same Lord, because of the lowly form of a servant and the unity of the body of the church with its head, what is more gifted than that child, whose wisdom his elders marveled at in his twelfth year? And what is better than that soul, which, even if those who affirm the transmission of souls should win, not by contending but by proving, it will not follow that it too must be believed to have come by transmission from that transgressor, lest he too be made a sinner through that man's disobedience, he through whose one obedience many, freed from that guilt, are made righteous? And what is more undefiled than that virgin's womb, whose flesh, even if it came from the propagation of sin, nevertheless did not conceive from the propagation of sin, so that not even the body of Christ was sown in Mary's womb by that law which, set in the members of the body of death, fights against the law of the mind? This law the holy fathers who were married reined in, relaxing it only as far as was allowed for intercourse, and yet did not merely suffer its impulse as far as was allowed. So the body of Christ, though it was taken from the flesh of a woman who had been conceived from that stock of the flesh of sin, nevertheless, because it was not conceived in her in the way she had been conceived, was not itself flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin. For he did not receive from there the guilt of dying, which appears in the involuntary motion of the flesh, though overcome by the will, against which the spirit desires; but he received from there not what would suffice for the contagion of the transgression, but what would suffice for paying an undue death and showing the promised resurrection: of which the one would avail for us not to fear, the other to hope. Finally, if I am asked from where Jesus Christ received his soul, I would rather hear better and more learned men on this; but still, according to my capacity, I would more willingly answer, “from where Adam did, rather than from Adam.” For if the dust taken from the earth, in which no man had worked, deserved to be animated by God, how much more did the body taken from flesh in which likewise no man had worked receive by lot a good soul, since there one was raised up who was going to fall, here one descended who was going to lift up! And perhaps it says, “I received by lot a good soul” (if indeed it ought to be understood of him) because things given by lot are usually given by God. Or, what may be said confidently, lest even that soul be thought to have been raised to so high a summit by some preceding works, so that with it the Word might become flesh and dwell among us, the word “lot” was added to remove any suspicion of preceding merits.

10.19CSEL 28.1:321–322

Est in epistula, quae inscribitur ad Hebraeos, locus quidam diligenti consideratione dignissimus. cum enim per Melchisedech, in quo huius rei futurae figura praecesserat, discerneret sacerdotium Christi a sacerdotio Leui, uidete ergo, inquit, qualis hic est, cui et decimam partem Abraham dedit de primitiis patriarcha. et hi quidem, qui de filiis sunt Leui, sacerdotium accipientes mandatum habent a decimis populi secundum legem, hoc est a fratribus suis, quamuis et ipsi ex lumbis Abrahae exierunt. qui autem non est ex genere eorum decimauit Abraham et habentem promissionem benedixit. sine ulla autem contradictione qui minor est a maiore benedicitur. et hic quidem decimas morientes homines accipiunt, ibi autem qui testificatur se uiuere. et, sicut oportet dicere, propter Abraham et Leui accipiens decimam decimatus est; adhuc enim in lumbis patris sui fuit. si ergo etiam hoc ualet ad istam distantiam, quantum praeemineat sacerdotio Leuitico sacerdotium Christi, quod sacerdos Christus per illum praefiguratus est, qui decimauit Abraham, in quo et ipse Leui decimatus est, profecto Christus ab eo non est decimatus. at si propterea decimatus est Leui, quia in lumbis erat Abrahae, propterea non est decimatus Christus, quia non erat in lumbis Abrahae. porro autem, si non secundum animam, sed tantum secundum carnem accipimus Leui fuisse in Abraham, ibi erat et Christus, quia et Christus secundum carnem ex semine est Abrahae; et ipse itaque decimatus est. quid est ergo, quod adfertur pro magna differentia sacerdotii Christi a sacerdotio Leui, quod Leui decimatus est a Melchisedech, cum esset in lumbis Abrahae, ubi et Christus erat, unde pariter decimati sunt, nisi quia necesse est intellegamus secundum aliquem modum ibi Christum non fuisse? quis autem neget eum secundum carnem ibi fuisse? ergo secundum animam ibi non fuit. non est igitur anima Christi de traduce praeuaricationis Adae, alioquin etiam ipsa ibi fuisset.

There is in the letter entitled To the Hebrews a passage most worthy of careful consideration. For when, through Melchizedek, in whom a figure of this future reality had gone before, he was distinguishing the priesthood of Christ from the priesthood of Levi, he says: “See, then, how great this man is, to whom even Abraham the patriarch gave a tenth of the first fruits. And those of the sons of Levi who receive the priesthood have a command to take tithes from the people according to the law, that is, from their brothers, though these too came out of the loins of Abraham. But he who is not of their descent tithed Abraham and blessed him who had the promise. And without any dispute the lesser is blessed by the greater. And here mortal men receive tithes, but there one of whom it is testified that he lives. And, as one may say, through Abraham even Levi, who receives tithes, was tithed; for he was still in the loins of his father.” If, then, this too serves to show how far the priesthood of Christ surpasses the Levitical priesthood, that Christ the priest was prefigured by him who tithed Abraham, in whom Levi himself was also tithed, surely Christ was not tithed by him. But if Levi was tithed because he was in the loins of Abraham, Christ was not tithed because he was not in the loins of Abraham. Further, if we take it that Levi was in Abraham not according to the soul but only according to the flesh, Christ too was there, because Christ too according to the flesh is of the seed of Abraham; and so he too was tithed. What then is the meaning of what is brought forward as a great difference between the priesthood of Christ and the priesthood of Levi, that Levi was tithed by Melchizedek when he was in the loins of Abraham, where Christ also was, so that they were tithed equally, unless we must understand that in some way Christ was not there? But who would deny that he was there according to the flesh? Therefore he was not there according to the soul. So the soul of Christ is not from the transmission of Adam's transgression; otherwise it too would have been there.

10.20CSEL 28.1:322–324

Hic existunt illi, qui traducem animarum defendunt, et dicunt confirmatam esse sententiam suam, si Leui constat etiam secundum animam fuisse in lumbis Abrahae, in quo eum decimauit Melchisedech, ut possit ab eo Christus in ista decimatione discerni: qui quoniam decimatus non est et tamen in lumbis Abrahae secundum carnem fuit, restat, ut secundum animam ibi non fuerit, et ideo sit consequens, ut ibi Leui secundum animam fuerit. hoc ad me non multum adtinet, qui utrorumque conlationem adhuc audire sum paratior quam utrorumlibet iam confirmare sententiam. interim Christi animam ab origine huius traducis per hoc testimonium secernere uolui. inuenient isti, quid eis pro ceteris fortasse respondeant, et dicant, quod etiam me non parum mouet, quamuis nullius hominis anima sit in lumbis patris sui, secundum carnem tamen in lumbis Abrahae constitutum. Leui decimatum et ibi constitutum secundum carnem Christum non decimatum. secundum rationem quippe illam seminalem ibi fuit Leui, qua ratione per concubitum uenturus erat in matrem, secundum quam rationem non ibi erat Christi caro, quamuis secundum ipsam ibi fuerit Mariae caro. quapropter nec Leui nec Christus in lumbis Abrahae secundum animam, secundum carnem uero et Leui et Christus; sed Leui secundum concupiscentiam carnalem, Christus autem secundum solam substantiam corporalem. cum enim sit in semine et uisibilis corpulentia et inuisibilis ratio, utrumque cucurrit ex Abraham uel etiam ex ipso Adam usque ad corpus Mariae, quia et ipsum eo modo conceptum et exortum est. Christus autem uisibilem carnis substantiam de carne uirginis sumsit; ratio uero conceptionis eius non a semine uirili, sed longe aliter ac desuper uenit. proinde secundum hoc, quod de matre accepit, etiam in lumbis Abrahae fuit. Ille est ergo decimatus in Abraham, qui, licet secundum carnem tantum, sic tamen fuit in lumbis eius, quemadmodum in sui patris etiam ipse Abraham, id est qui sic est natus de patre Abraham, quemadmodum de suo patre natus est. Abraham, per legem scilicet in membris repugnantem legi mentis et inuisibilem concupiscentiam, quamuis eam casta et bona iura nuptiarum non sinant ualere, nisi quantum ex ea possunt generi substituendo prospicere. non autem et ille ibi decimatus est, cuius caro inde non feruorem uulneris, sed materiam medicaminis traxit. nam cum ipsa decimatio ad praefigurandam medicinam pertinuerit, illud in Abrahae carne decimabatur, quod curabatur, non illud, unde curabatur. eadem namque caro non Abrahae tantum, sed ipsius primi terrenique hominis simul habebat et uulnus praeuaricationis et medicamentum uulneris: uulnus praeuaricationis in lege membrorum repugnante legi mentis, quae per omnem inde propagatam carnem seminali ratione quasi transcribitur; medicamentum autem uulneris in eo, quod inde sine opere concupiscentiali in sola materie corporali per diuinam conceptionis formationisque rationem de uirgine adsumtum est propter mortis sine iniquitate consortium et sine falsitate resurrectionis exemplum. quapropter quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce animae illius primae praeuaricatricis, puto, quod etiam ipsi, qui animarum traducem defendunt, consentiant — per semen quippe concumbentis patris transfundi etiam semen animae uolunt, a quo genere conceptionis Christus alienus est — et quod in Abraham, si secundum animam fuisset, etiam ipse decimatus esset; non esse autem decimatum scriptura testatur, quae hinc quoque sacerdotium eius a Leuitico sacerdotio distinguit.

Here those who defend the transmission of souls come forward and say that their view is confirmed, if it is clear that Levi was in the loins of Abraham also according to the soul, in whom Melchizedek tithed him, so that Christ can be distinguished from him in this tithing: since Christ was not tithed and yet was in the loins of Abraham according to the flesh, it remains that he was not there according to the soul, and so it follows that Levi was there according to the soul. This does not concern me much, since I am still more ready to hear both sides compared than to confirm the view of either. Meanwhile I wished to set apart Christ's soul from the origin of this transmission by this testimony. The others will perhaps find what to answer them on the rest, and they will say, what moves me too not a little, that although no man's soul is in the loins of his father, still Levi, set in the loins of Abraham according to the flesh, was tithed, and Christ, set there according to the flesh, was not tithed. For Levi was there according to that seminal reason by which he was to come into his mother through intercourse, a reason according to which Christ's flesh was not there, although according to it Mary's flesh was there. Therefore neither Levi nor Christ was in the loins of Abraham according to the soul, but according to the flesh both Levi and Christ; but Levi according to carnal concupiscence, Christ according to bodily substance alone. For since in seed there is both visible bulk and invisible reason, both ran from Abraham, or even from Adam himself, to the body of Mary, because it too was conceived and came forth in that way. But Christ took the visible substance of flesh from the flesh of the virgin; but the reason of his conception came not from a man's seed but in a far different way and from above. So according to what he received from his mother he too was in the loins of Abraham. He, then, was tithed in Abraham who, though only according to the flesh, was in his loins in the way that Abraham himself was in his father's, that is, who was born of his father Abraham in the way that Abraham was born of his own father, namely through the law in the members fighting against the law of the mind and the invisible concupiscence, although the chaste and good laws of marriage do not allow it to prevail except as far as they can provide from it for continuing the race. But he was not tithed there whose flesh drew from there not the fever of the wound but the material of the medicine. For since the tithing itself served to prefigure the medicine, what was tithed in Abraham's flesh was what was being healed, not that by which it was healed. For the same flesh, not only of Abraham but of the first and earthly man himself, had at once both the wound of the transgression and the medicine of the wound: the wound of the transgression in the law of the members fighting against the law of the mind, which is transcribed, as it were, by the seminal reason through all the flesh propagated from there; and the medicine of the wound in that which was taken from there from the virgin, without the work of concupiscence, in bodily material alone, by the divine reason of conception and formation, for the sake of sharing death without iniquity and of an example of resurrection without falsehood. Therefore I think that even those who defend the transmission of souls agree that the soul of Christ is not from the transmission of that first transgressing soul (for they hold that the seed of the soul too is transmitted through the seed of the father in intercourse, a kind of conception from which Christ is foreign), and that if he had been in Abraham according to the soul, he too would have been tithed; but Scripture testifies that he was not tithed, and by this too distinguishes his priesthood from the Levitical priesthood.

10.21CSEL 28.1:324–325

An forte dicent: sicut potuit ibi esse secundum carnem et non decimari, cur non etiam secundum animam sine decimatione potuerit? hic respondetur: quia utique simplicem animae substantiam incrementis augeri corporalibus nec illi putauerunt, qui eam corpus existimant, quorum in parte sunt maxime qui eam ex parentibus creari opinantur. proinde in corporis semine potest esse uis inuisibilis, quae incorporaliter numeros agit, non oculis, sed intellectu discernenda ab ea corpulentia, quae uisu tactuque sentitur. et ipsa quantitas corporis humani, quae utique modulum seminis inconparabiliter excedit, satis ostendit posse inde aliquid sumi, quod non habeat illam uim seminalem, sed tantum corporalem substantiam, quae diuinitus non de propagine concumbentium in carnem Christi adsumta atque formata est. hoc autem de anima quis ualeat adfirmare, quod utrumque habeat, et materiem seminis manifestam et rationem seminis occultam? sed quid laborem in re, quae persuaderi uerbis nemini forsitan potest, nisi tantum ac tale ingenium sit, quod possit loquentis praeuolare conatum nec totum expectare a sermone? breuiter itaque conligam: si potuit et de anima fieri - quod cum de carne diceremus, forsitan intellectum sit — ita est de traduce anima Christi, ut non secum labem praeuaricationis adtraxerit; si autem sine isto reatu non posset inde esse, non est inde. iam de ceterarum animarum aduentu, utrum ex parentibus an desuper sint, uincant qui potuerint. ego adhuc inter utrosque ambigo et moueor aliquando sic, aliquando autem sic, saluo eo dumtaxat, ut uel corpus esse animam uel aliquam corpoream qualitatem siue coaptationem, si ita dicenda est, quam Graeci appovCav uocant, non credam nec quolibet ista garriente me crediturum esse confidam adiuuante deo mentem meam.

Or will they perhaps say: “As he could be there according to the flesh and not be tithed, why could he not be there according to the soul without tithing?” Here the answer is: because surely not even those who think the soul is a body, among whom are chiefly those who think it is created from the parents, have supposed that the simple substance of the soul is increased by bodily growth. So in the seed of the body there can be an invisible force which works numbers in a bodiless way, to be distinguished not by the eyes but by the understanding from that bulk which is perceived by sight and touch. And the very size of the human body, which certainly exceeds incomparably the measure of the seed, shows clearly enough that something can be taken from there which does not have that seminal force but only bodily substance, which was taken up and formed by God into the flesh of Christ, not from the propagation of those who have intercourse. But who could affirm this of the soul, that it has both, the manifest material of the seed and the hidden reason of the seed? But why should I labor over a matter which perhaps cannot be put across in words to anyone, unless his mind is so great and such that it can fly ahead of the speaker's effort and not wait for everything from speech? So I will sum up briefly: if it could happen with the soul too (as perhaps was understood when we spoke of the flesh), the soul of Christ is from transmission in such a way that it did not draw with it the stain of the transgression; but if it could not come from there without that guilt, it does not come from there. As to the coming of the other souls, whether they are from the parents or from above, let those prevail who can. I still waver between both, and am moved sometimes this way and sometimes that; holding fast only to this, that I do not believe the soul to be a body or any bodily quality or arrangement, if it is to be so called, which the Greeks call harmonia, nor, with God helping my mind, am I confident that I will believe it, whoever chatters about such things.

10.22CSEL 28.1:325–326

Est aliud testimonium non neglegendum, quod pro se possunt proferre, qui uenire desuper animas credunt, dicente ipso domino: quod natum est ex carne, caro est; et quod natum est ex spiritu, spiritus est. quid hac, inquiunt, sententia determinatius non posse ex carne animam nasci? quid est enim aliud anima quam spiritus uitae, creatus utique, non creator? contra quos illi alii: quid enim, inquiunt, nos aliud sentimus, qui dicimus carnem ex carne, animam ex anima? nam ex utroque constat homo, de quo utrumque uenire sentimus, carnem de carne operantis, spiritum de spiritu concupiscentis, ut interim omittatur, quod illud dominus non de carnali generatione, sed de spiritali regeneratione dicebat.

There is another testimony not to be neglected, which those who believe that souls come from above can bring forward in their favor, the Lord himself saying, “What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the Spirit is spirit.” “What could state more definitely than this,” they say, “that the soul cannot be born of the flesh? For what else is the soul but a spirit of life, created, of course, not creator?” Against them the others say: “What else do we hold, who say flesh from flesh, soul from soul? For man consists of both, and we hold that both come from man: flesh from the flesh of the one who acts, spirit from the spirit of the one who desires”; to say nothing for now of the fact that the Lord was speaking not of carnal generation but of spiritual regeneration.

10.23CSEL 28.1:326–327

His igitur, quantum pro tempore potuimus, pertractatis omnia paria uel paene paria ex utroque latere rationum testimoniorumque momenta pronuntiarem, nisi eorum sententia, qui animas ex parentibus creari putant, de baptismo paruulorum praeponderaret. de quibus quid eis responderi possit, nondum mihi interim occurrit; si quid forte postea deus dederit, si quam etiam scribendi concesserit facultatem studiosis talium, non grauabor. nunc tamen non esse contemnendum testimonium paruulorum, ut quasi refelli, si ueritas contra est, neglegatur, ante denuntio. aut enim de hac re nihil quaerendum est, ut sufficiat fidei nostrae scire nos, quo pie uiuendo - uenturi sumus, etsi nesciamus, unde uenerimus; aut, si non inpudenter aestuat anima rationalis etiam hoc nosse de se ipsa, absit peruicacia contendendi, adsit diligentia requirendi, humilitas petendi, perseuerantia pulsandi, ut, si nobis hoc expedire nouit, qui melius quam nos quid nobis expediat utique nouit, det etiam hoc, qui dat bona data filiis suis. consuetudo tamen matris ecclesiae in baptizandis paruulis nequaquam spernenda est neque ullo modo superflua deputanda nec omnino credenda, nisi apostolica esset traditio. habet enim et illa parua aetas magnum testimonii pondus, quae prima pro Christo meruit sanguinem fundere.

Having treated these things, then, as far as we could for the present, I would declare all the weights of reasons and testimonies on either side equal or almost equal, were it not that the view of those who think souls are created from the parents outweighs the other on the baptism of little children. What can be answered to them about this has not yet occurred to me for the present; if God perhaps grants something later, and if he grants the ability of writing to those devoted to such matters, I will not be reluctant. Now, however, I declare beforehand that the testimony of little children is not to be despised, so as to be neglected as if refuted, if the truth is against it. For either nothing is to be asked about this matter, so that it is enough for our faith to know where we are going by living piously, even if we do not know where we have come from; or, if the rational soul is not shamelessly eager to know this too about itself, let there be no stubbornness in contending, but diligence in seeking, humility in asking, perseverance in knocking; so that, if he knows this is good for us, who certainly knows better than we what is good for us, he who gives good gifts to his children may give this too. Yet the custom of mother church in baptizing little children is by no means to be despised, nor in any way to be thought superfluous, nor would it be believed at all unless it were an apostolic tradition. For that little age too has great weight of testimony, which was the first to deserve to shed its blood for Christ.

10.24CSEL 28.1:327–328

Admoneo sane, quantum ualeam, si quos ista praeoccupauit opinio, ut animas credant ex parentibus propagari, quantum possunt se ipsos considerent et interim sapiant corpora non esse animas suas. nulla enim propior natura est, qua diligenter inspecta possit etiam deus, qui supra omnem creaturam suam incommutabilis permanet, incorporaliter cogitari, quam ea, quae ad ipsius imaginem facta est, et nihil uicinius aut fortasse nihil tam consequens, quam ut credito, quod anima corpus sit, etiam deus corpus esse credatur. propter hoc enim corporalibus adsuefacti et adfecti sensibus nolunt animam credere aliud esse quam corpus, ne, si corpus non fuerit, nihil sit, ac per hoc tanto magis timent etiam de deo credere, quod corpus non sit, quanto magis timent deum credere nihil esse. ita enim feruntur in phantasias uel phantasmata imaginum, quae cogitatio de corporibus uersat, ut his subtractis tamquam per inane pereundum sit reformident. ita necesse est, ut et iustitiam et sapientiam pingant quodammodo in cordibus suis cum formis et coloribus, quas non possunt incorporeas cogitare, nec tamen dicunt, quando iustitia uel sapientia mouentur, ut uel laudent eas uel secundum eas aliquid agant, quem colorem, quam staturam, quae liniamenta [uel quales formas] conspexerint. sed de his alias et multa iam diximus et, si deus uoluerit, ubi res uidebitur postulare, dicemus. nunc quod dicere coeperamus, si de traduce animarum a parentibus uel non dubitant quidam, quod ita sit, uel dubitant, an ita sit, animam tamen corpus esse non audeant credere aut dicere, maxime propter quod dixi, ne deum quoque ipsum nihil aliud opinentur esse quam corpus, etsi excellentissimum, etsi naturae cuiusdam propriae cetera supergredientis, corpus tamen.

I do indeed warn, as far as I can, any who have been taken up by this opinion, so as to believe that souls are propagated from parents, to consider themselves as much as they can and meanwhile to understand that their souls are not bodies. For there is no nearer nature, by careful inspection of which even God, who remains unchangeable above all his creation, can be thought of in a bodiless way, than that which was made to his image; and nothing is closer, or perhaps nothing follows so readily, than that, if the soul is believed to be a body, God too should be believed to be a body. For this is why those accustomed to and affected by the bodily senses are unwilling to believe that the soul is anything other than a body, lest, if it were not a body, it would be nothing; and therefore they fear all the more to believe that God is not a body, the more they fear to believe that God is nothing. For they are so carried away into fancies or phantoms of images, which thought about bodies turns over, that, when these are taken away, they dread perishing as though through emptiness. So they must paint, as it were, even justice and wisdom in their hearts with forms and colors, since they cannot think of them as bodiless; and yet, when they are moved by justice or wisdom, so as either to praise them or to do something according to them, they do not say what color, what height, what features they have seen. But of these things we have already said much elsewhere and, if God wills, we will speak where the matter seems to require it. Now, as we had begun to say, if some either do not doubt that souls come by transmission from parents, or doubt whether it is so, let them not dare to believe or say that the soul is a body, above all for the reason I gave, lest they think that God himself too is nothing other than a body, even if a most excellent one, even if of a nature of its own surpassing the rest, but still a body.

10.25CSEL 28.1:328–330

Denique Tertullianus, quia corpus esse animam credidit non ob aliud, nisi quod eam incorpoream cogitare non potuit et ideo timuit, ne nihil esset, si corpus non esset, nec de deo ualuit aliter sapere: qui sane quoniam est acutus interdum contra opinionem suam uisa ueritate superatur. quid enim uerius dicere potuit quam id, quod ait quodam loco: omne corporale passibile est? debuit ergo mutare sententiam, qua paulo superius dixerat etiam deum corpus esse. neque enim arbitror eum ita desipuisse, ut etiam dei naturam passibilem crederet, ut iam non Christus in carne tantum neque in carne et anima, sed in ipso uerbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, passibilis et commutabilis esse credatur: quod absit a corde christiano. item cum animae etiam colorem daret aerium ac lucidum, uentum est ad sensus, quibus eam membratim quasi corpus instruere conatus est et ait: hic erit homo interior, alius exterior, dupliciter unus; habens et ille oculos et aures suas, quibus populus dominum audire et uidere debuerat, habens et ceteros artus per quos et in cogitationibus utitur et in somnis fungitur. Ecce, quibus auribus et quibus oculis debuit audire et uidere deum populus, quibus anima in somnis fungitur, cum, si ipsum Tertullianum quisquam uideret in somnis, numquam se diceret ab eo uisum et cum eo locutum, quem uicissim ipse non uidisset. postremo, si anima se ipsam uidet in somnis, cum iacentibus utique uno loco membris corporis sui ipsa per uarias imagines euagatur, quas uidet, quis eam uidit aliquando in somnis aerii coloris et lucidi, nisi forte ut cetera, quae similiter falso uidet? nam et hoc potest uidere. sed absit, ut eam talem, cum euigilauerit, credat; alioquin quando se aliter uiderit, quod magis crebrum est, aut mutata erit anima eius, aut nec tunc animae uidetur substantia, sed imago corporis incorporea, quae miro modo sicut in cogitatione formatur. quis enim Aethiops non paene semper nigrum se uidit in somnis aut, si in alio colore se uidit, non magis miratus est, si fuit cum illo memoria? aerio tamen colore ac lucido nescio utrum se umquam uidisset, si numquam istum legisset uel audisset. Quid? quod ducuntur homines talibus uisis et de scripturis nobis uolunt praescribere tale aliquid esse non animam, sed ipsum deum, qualis figuraliter sanctorum spiritibus demonstratus est, qualis etiam in sermone allegorico ponitur. similia quippe sunt illa uisa talibus dictis. ac sic errant, constituentes in corde suo simulacra uanae opinionis nec intellegentes ita sanctos de suis uisis talibus iudicasse, qualiter iudicarent, si talia diuinitus in figuris dicta legerent uel audirent: sicut septem spicae et septem boues septem anni sunt, sicut linteum quattuor lineis alligatum uelut discus plenus uariis animalibus orbis terrarum est cum omnibus gentibus, sic omnia cetera et multo magis, quae de rebus incorporeis corporalibus significantur non rebus, sed imaginibus.

Finally Tertullian, because he believed the soul to be a body for no other reason than that he could not think of it as bodiless, and so feared that it would be nothing if it were not a body, could not think otherwise of God either; yet, being sharp, he is sometimes overcome by the truth he sees, against his own opinion. For what truer thing could he have said than what he says in one place: “Everything bodily is passible”? He ought, then, to have changed the view he had stated a little earlier, that God too is a body. For I do not think he was so foolish as to believe that even God's nature is passible, so that Christ would be believed passible and changeable no longer in the flesh only, nor in flesh and soul, but in the very Word through whom all things were made: which be far from a Christian heart. Likewise, when he gave the soul even an airy and bright color, he came to the senses, with which he tried to furnish it limb by limb like a body, and he says: “This will be the inner man, the other the outer, one person twofold; the inner too having its own eyes and ears, by which the people ought to have heard and seen the Lord, having also the other limbs, which it uses in thoughts and employs in dreams.” See with what ears and what eyes the people ought to have heard and seen God: those which the soul employs in dreams; though if anyone saw Tertullian himself in dreams, he would never say that he had been seen by him and had spoken with him, whom he himself had not seen in return. Finally, if the soul sees itself in dreams, when, the limbs of its body lying in one place, it wanders through the various images which it sees, who has ever seen it in dreams of an airy and bright color, unless perhaps as he sees the other things which he similarly sees falsely? For he can see this too. But far be it from him to believe, when he wakes up, that it is such; otherwise, when he sees himself otherwise, which is more frequent, either his soul will have been changed, or then too it is not the substance of the soul that is seen, but a bodiless image of a body, which is formed in a wonderful way as in thought. For what Ethiopian has not almost always seen himself black in dreams, or, if he saw himself in another color, did not rather wonder, if memory was with him? But whether he would ever have seen himself in an airy and bright color, I do not know, if he had never read or heard this. What of the fact that men are led by such visions and want to lay down for us from the Scriptures that such a thing is not the soul but God himself, as he was shown figuratively to the spirits of the saints, as he is also set forth in allegorical speech? For those visions are like such sayings. And so they err, setting up in their hearts idols of a vain opinion and not understanding that the saints judged of such visions of theirs as they would judge if they read or heard such things said by God in figures: as the seven ears of grain and the seven cows are seven years, as the sheet tied by four corners, like a dish full of various animals, is the whole world with all the nations; so all the rest, and much more, which are signified of bodiless things not by things but by images.

10.26CSEL 28.1:330–332

Noluit tamen Tertullianus animam crescere substantia sicut corpus, adserens etiam timoris sui causam: ne etiam decrescere dicatur substantia, inquit, atque ita et defectura credatur. et tamen, quia per corpus eam localiter tendit, non inuenit exitum incrementorum eius, quam uult de semine exiguo aequari corporis quantitati, et ait: sed uis eius, in quo naturalia peculia consita retinentur, saluo substantiae modulo, quo a primordio inflata est, paulatim cum carne producitur. hoc forte non intellegeremus, nisi adhibita similitudine planum faceret, quod dicebat. constitue, inquit, certum pondus auri uel argenti, rudem adhuc massam: conlectus habitus est illi et futuro interim minor, tamen continens intra lineam moduli totum quod natura est auri uel argenti. dehinc cum in lamminam massa laxatur, maior efficitur initio suo per dilatationem ponderis certi, non per adiectionem, dum extenditur, non dum augetur. etsi sic quoque augetur, dum extenditur; licet enim et habitu augeri, cum statu non licet. tunc et splendor ipse prouehitur auri uel argenti, qui prius fuerat quidem et in massa, sed obscurior, non tamen nullus. tunc. et alii atque alii habitus accedunt pro facilitate materiae, qua duxerit eam, qui agit, nihil conferens modulo nisi effigiem. proinde et animae crementa reputanda non substantiua, sed prouocatiua. Quis hunc crederet cum isto corde tam disertum esse potuisse? sed tremenda ista sunt, non ridenda. ad hoc enim numquid cogeretur, si aliquid cogitare posset, quod et sit et corpus non sit? quid autem absurdius quam putare massam cuiuspiam metalli ex aliqua parte crescere posse, dum tunditur, nisi decrescat ex altera, uel augeri latitudine, nisi crassitudine minuatur? aut ullum esse corpus manente naturae suae quantitate, quod undique crescat, nisi rarescat? quomodo igitur inplebit anima ex illa stilla seminis magnitudinem corporis, quod animat, si et ipsa corpus est, cuius substantia nullo accessu crescat? quomodo, inquam, inplebit carnem, quam uiuificat, nisi tanto rarior fuerit, quanto grandius, quod animauerit? timuit uidelicet, ne deficeret etiam minuendo, si cresceret, et non timuit, ne deficeret rarescendo, cum cresceret. sed quid amplius inmorer, quando et sermo pergit in prolixiorem modum, quam petit terminandi necessitas, et sententia mea iam satis nota sit, uel. quid certum teneam uel unde adhuc dubitem et quare dubitem? proinde et hoc uolumen iam concludatur, ut quae sequuntur deinde uideamus.

Yet Tertullian did not want the soul to grow in substance like the body, stating also the reason for his fear: “lest it be said also to decrease in substance,” he says, “and so be believed also to be going to fail.” And yet, because he stretches it locally through the body, he finds no way out concerning its growth, since he wants it to become equal from a tiny seed to the size of the body, and he says: “But its force, in which the natural endowments sown in it are kept, is gradually drawn out with the flesh, the measure of the substance with which it was breathed in from the beginning being preserved.” This we would perhaps not understand if he did not make plain what he was saying by using a comparison. “Take,” he says, “a certain weight of gold or silver, a mass still rough: its shape is compact and for the time smaller than it will be, yet containing within the line of its measure all that is by nature gold or silver. Then, when the mass is beaten out into a sheet, it is made greater than at its beginning by the spreading of the fixed weight, not by addition, while it is extended, not while it is increased. Although in this way too it is increased while it is extended; for it may be increased in shape, though not in state. Then too the very brightness of the gold or silver is brought out, which was indeed there before in the mass, but dimmer, yet not absent. Then too other and other shapes come, according to the ease of the material, as the worker has drawn it out, contributing nothing to its measure but form. So too the growths of the soul are to be reckoned not substantial but drawn forth.” Who would believe that, with such a mind, he could be so eloquent? But these things are to be trembled at, not laughed at. For would he be forced into this if he could think of something which both exists and is not a body? And what is more absurd than to think that a mass of any metal can grow in one part, while it is beaten, unless it decreases in another, or be increased in breadth unless it is lessened in thickness? Or that there is any body which, the quantity of its nature remaining, grows on every side without becoming thinner? How, then, will the soul fill from that drop of seed the size of the body it animates, if it too is a body, whose substance grows by no addition? How, I say, will it fill the flesh it gives life to, unless it becomes thinner in proportion as what it animates is larger? He feared, evidently, that it would fail by lessening if it grew, and did not fear that it would fail by thinning when it grew. But why should I dwell longer, when my discourse is running on at greater length than the need of finishing requires, and my view is now well enough known, both what I hold as certain and on what point I still doubt, and why I doubt? So let this volume too now be concluded, so that we may then see what follows.

Chapter 11

11.1CSEL 28.1:332–335

Et erant ambo nudi Adam et mulier eius et non pudebat illos. serpens autem erat prudentissimus omnium bestiarum quae sunt super terram quas fecit dominus deus. et dixit serpens mulieri: quid quia dixit deus: non edetis ab omni ligno paradisi? et dixit mulier serpenti: a fructu ligni, quod est in paradiso, edemus; de fructu autem ligni, quod est in medio paradisi, dixit deus: non edetis ex eo neque tangetis illud, ne moriamini. et dixit serpens mulieri: non morte moriemini; sciebat enim deus, quoniam qua die manducaueritis de eo aperientur uobis oculi et eritis tamquam dii, scientes bonum et malum. et uidit mulier, quia bonum lignum in escam et quia placet oculis uidere et decorum est cognoscere. et sumens de fructu eius edit et dedit et uiro suo secum, et ederunt. et aperti sunt oculi amborum, et agnosuerunt, quia nudi erant; et consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria. et audierunt uocem domini dei deambulantis in paradiso ad uesperam et absconderunt se Adam et mulier eius a facie domini dei in medio ligni paradisi. et uocauit dominus deus Adam et dixit illi: Adam ubi es? et dixit ei: uocem tuam audiui deambulantis in paradiso et timui, quia nudus sum, et abscondi me. et dixit illi: quis nuntiauit tibi, quia nudus es, nisi a ligno quod praeceperam tibi tantum ne ex eo manducares ab eo edisti? et dixit Adam: mulier, quam dedisti mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, et edi. et dixit dominus deus mulieri: quid hoc fecisti? et dixit mulier: serpens seduxit me, et manducaui. et dixit dominus deus serpenti: quia fecisti hoc, maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus et ab omnibus bestiis quae sunt super terram. super pectus tuum et uentrem tuum ambulabis et terram edes omnes dies uitae tuae. et inimicitias ponam inter te et inter mulierem et inter semen tuum et inter semen eius. ipsa tibi seruabit caput, et tu seruabis eius calcaneum. et mulieri dixit: multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas et gemitum tuum. in tristitiis paries filios, et ad uirum tuum conuersio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur. Adae autem dixit: quia audisti uocem mulieris tuae et edisti de ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi de eo solo non edere, maledicta terra in operibus tuis; in tristitiis edes illam omnes dies uitae tuae; spinas et tribulos edet tibi, et edes. fenum agri. in sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec conuertaris in terram, ex qua sumtus es, quia terra es et in terram ibis. et uocauit Adam nomen mulieris suae "Uita"-, quoniam haec est mater omnium uiuentium. et fecit dominus deus Adam et mulieri eius tunicas pelliceas et induit eos. et dixit dominus deus: ecce Adam factus est tamquam unus ex nobis in cognoscendo bonum et malum. et nunc ne aliquando extendat manum et sumat de ligno uitae et edat, et uiuat in aeternum. et dimisit illum dominus deus de paradiso uoluptatis operari terram, ex qua sumtus est. et eiecit Adam et conlocauit eum contra paradisum uoluptatis; et ordinauit Cherubin et flammeam rhomphaeam quae uertitur custodire uiam ligni uitae. Antequam huius propositae scripturae textum ex ordine pertractemus, admonendum arbitror, quod iam me et alibi in hoc opere memini praelocutum, illud a nobis esse flagitandum, ut ad proprietatem litterae defendatur, quod gestum narrat ipse qui scripsit. si autem in uerbis dei uel cuiusquam personae in officium propheticum adsumtae dicitur aliquid, quod ad litteram nisi absurde non possit intellegi, procul dubio figurate dictum ob aliquam significationem accipi debet; dictum tamen esse dubitare fas non est. hoc enim a fide narratoris et pollicitatione expositoris exigitur., Erant ergo ambo nudi: uerum est, omnino nuda erant corpora duorum hominum in paradiso conuersantium. nec pudebat eos: quid enim puderet, quando nullam legem senserant in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae? quae illos poena peccati post perpetrationem praeuaricationis secuta est usurpante inoboedientia prohibitum et iustitia puniente commissum. quod antequam fieret, nudi erant, ut dictum est, et non confundebantur; nullus erat motus in corpore, cui uerecundia deberetur; nihil putabant uelandum, quia nihil senserant refrenandum. quemadmodum propagaturi filios, iam antea disputatum est; non tamen eo modo credendum est, quo propagauerunt, posteaquam crimen admissi praedicta ultio consecuta est, cum, priusquam morerentur, iam in corpore inoboedientium hominum iustissimo reciprocatu inoboedientium membrorum tumultum mors concepta uersaret. nondum erant tales Adam et Eua, cum ambo nudi essent et non confunderentur.

“And they were both naked, Adam and his wife, and they were not ashamed. Now the serpent was the most prudent of all the beasts that are upon the earth, which the Lord God had made. And the serpent said to the woman, ‘Why is it that God said, You shall not eat from every tree of paradise?’ And the woman said to the serpent, ‘Of the fruit of the trees that are in paradise we shall eat; but of the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of paradise God said, You shall not eat of it, nor shall you touch it, lest you die.’ And the serpent said to the woman, ‘You shall not die the death; for God knew that on the day you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like gods, knowing good and evil.’ And the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasing to the eyes to look upon, and beautiful to know. And taking of its fruit she ate, and she gave also to her husband with her, and they ate. And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves girdles. And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise toward evening, and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the face of the Lord God in the midst of the trees of paradise. And the Lord God called Adam and said to him, ‘Adam, where are you?’ And he said to him, ‘I heard your voice as you walked in paradise, and I was afraid, because I am naked, and I hid myself.’ And he said to him, ‘Who told you that you were naked, unless you have eaten of the tree of which alone I had commanded you not to eat?’ And Adam said, ‘The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I ate.’ And the Lord God said to the woman, ‘Why have you done this?’ And the woman said, ‘The serpent deceived me, and I ate.’ And the Lord God said to the serpent, ‘Because you have done this, you are cursed above all cattle and above all the beasts that are upon the earth. Upon your breast and your belly you shall go, and earth you shall eat all the days of your life. And I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed. She will watch for your head, and you will watch for her heel.’ And to the woman he said, ‘I will greatly multiply your sorrows and your groaning. In sorrows you shall bear children, and your turning shall be to your husband, and he shall rule over you.’ But to Adam he said, ‘Because you listened to the voice of your wife and ate of the tree of which alone I had commanded you not to eat, cursed is the earth in your works; in sorrows you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you, and you shall eat the grass of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and to earth you shall go.’ And Adam called the name of his wife ‘Life,’ because she is the mother of all the living. And the Lord God made for Adam and his wife garments of skin and clothed them. And the Lord God said, ‘Behold, Adam has become like one of us in knowing good and evil. And now, lest at some time he stretch out his hand and take of the tree of life and eat, and live for ever’— and the Lord God sent him out of the paradise of delight to till the earth from which he was taken. And he cast Adam out and placed him opposite the paradise of delight; and he stationed the Cherubim and the flaming sword which turns, to guard the way to the tree of life.” Before we treat the text of this passage of Scripture in order, I think I should give a reminder of what I remember having said already elsewhere in this work: what we must strive for is that what the writer himself narrates as having been done be defended according to the proper sense of the letter. But if, in the words of God or of any person taken up into the prophetic office, something is said that cannot be understood literally except absurdly, then without doubt it must be taken as said figuratively for the sake of some meaning; yet that it was said, we may not doubt. For this is required by the trustworthiness of the narrator and by the undertaking of the expositor. “So they were both naked”: it is true; the bodies of the two human beings living in paradise were entirely naked. “And they were not ashamed”: for what should they be ashamed of, when they had not yet felt any law in their members warring against the law of their mind? That penalty of sin followed them after they had committed the transgression, when disobedience usurped what was forbidden and justice punished what was committed. Before this happened, they were naked, as was said, and were not abashed; there was no movement in the body that called for modesty; they thought nothing needed to be veiled, because they had felt nothing that needed to be reined in. How they would have propagated children has already been discussed earlier; yet it must not be believed that it would have been in the way in which they did propagate after the foretold punishment followed the committing of the crime, when, before they died, death, already conceived in the body of disobedient human beings, stirred up the tumult of disobedient members by a most just requital. Adam and Eve were not yet such when they were both naked and were not abashed.

11.2CSEL 28.1:335–337

Serpens autem erat ibi prudentissimus quidem, sed omnium bestiarum, quae erant super terram, quas fecerat dominus deus. translato enim uerbo dictum est,,prudentissimus" uel, sicut plures latini codices habent, sapientissimus", non proprio, quo in bonum accipi sapientia solet uel dei uel angelorum uel animae rationalis, tamquam si sapientes apes etiam formicasque dicamus propter opera uelut imitantia sapientiam. quamquam iste serpens non inrationali anima sua, sed alieno iam spiritu, id est diabolico, possit sapientissimus dici omnium bestiarum. quantumlibet enim praeuaricatores angeli de supernis sedibus suae peruersitatis et superbiae merito deiecti sint, natura tamen excellentiores sunt omnibus bestiis propter rationis eminentiam. quid ergo mirum, si suo instinctu diabolus iam inplens serpentem eique suum spiritum miscens eo more, quo uates daemoniorum inpleri solent, sapientissimum eum reddiderat omnium bestiarum secundum animam uiuam inrationalemque uiuentium? abusione quippe nominis ita sapientia dicitur in malo, quemadmodum in bono astutia, cum proprie magisque usitate in latina dumtaxat lingua sapientes laudabiliter appellentur, astuti autem male cordati intellegantur. unde nonnulli, sicut in plerisque codicibus inuenimus, ad usum latinae locutionis non uerbum, sed potius sententiam transferentes astutiorem omnibus bestiis istum serpentem quam sapientiorem dicere maluerunt. quid autem habeat hebraea proprietas, utrum illic in malo non abusiue, sed proprie possint dici et intellegi sapientes, uiderint, qui eam probe nouerunt. nos tamen aperte legimus alio scripturarum loco sanctarum sapientes ad malum, non ad bonum; et dominus dicit sapientiores esse filios saeculi filiis lucis ad consulendum sibimet in posterum quamuis fraude, non iure.

Now the serpent there was indeed the most prudent, but of all the beasts that were upon the earth, which the Lord God had made. For “most prudent,” or, as more Latin manuscripts have it, “most wise,” is said by a transferred use of the word, not in its proper sense, in which wisdom is usually taken in a good sense, whether of God or of angels or of the rational soul; just as if we were to call bees and ants “wise” because of works that seem to imitate wisdom. And yet this serpent can be called the wisest of all the beasts not by its own irrational soul but by a spirit not its own, namely the devil's. For however much the transgressing angels have been cast down from the heavenly seats in consequence of their perversity and pride, they are still by nature more excellent than all the beasts because of the eminence of reason. What wonder, then, if the devil, by his own prompting, filling the serpent and mingling his spirit with it in the way in which the soothsayers of demons are usually filled, had made it the wisest of all the beasts that live according to a living and irrational soul? For by a misuse of the name, wisdom is spoken of in a bad sense, just as cunning is spoken of in a good sense, although properly and more commonly, at least in the Latin language, people are called wise in praise, while the cunning are understood to be ill-minded. Hence some, as we find in very many manuscripts, rendering not the word but rather the sense for the sake of Latin usage, preferred to call this serpent “more cunning” than all the beasts rather than “wiser.” What the idiom of Hebrew has, whether there people can properly and not by misuse be called and understood to be wise in a bad sense, let those who know it well see to that. We, however, clearly read in another passage of the holy Scriptures of people who are wise for evil, not for good; and the Lord says that the children of this world are wiser than the children of light in providing for themselves for the future, though by fraud, not by right.

11.3CSEL 28.1:337

Nec sane debemus opinari, quod serpentem sibi. per quem temtaret persuaderetque peccatum, diabolus elegerit; sed cum esset in illo propter peruersam et inuidam uoluntatem decipiendi cupiditas, nonnisi per illud animal potuit, per quod posse permissus est. nocendi enim uoluntas potest esse a suo quoque animo praua; non est autem potestas nisi a deo et hoc abdita altaque iustitia, quoniam non est iniquitas apud deum.

Nor indeed should we suppose that the devil chose the serpent for himself as the one through which to tempt and persuade to sin; but since there was in him, because of his perverse and envious will, the desire to deceive, he could do it only through that animal through which he was permitted to be able to do it. For the will to harm can come from a person's own depraved mind; but the power comes only from God, and this by a hidden and profound justice, since there is no iniquity with God.

11.4CSEL 28.1:337–338

Si ergo quaeritur, cur deus temtari permiserit hominem. quem temtatori consensurum esse praesciebat, altitudinem quidem consilii eius penetrare non possum et longe supra uires meas hoc esse confiteor. est ergo aliqua causa fortassis occultior. quae melioribus sanctioribusque reseruatur illius gratia potius quam meritis eorum; sed tamen, quantum uel donat sapere uel sinit dicere, non mihi uidetur magnae laudis futurum fuisse hominem, si propterea posset bene uiuere. quia nemo male uiuere suaderet, cum et in natura posse et in potestate haberet uelle non consentire suadenti adiuuante tamen illo. qui superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam. cur itaque temtari non sineret, quem consensurum esse praesciebat, cum id facturus esset propria uoluntate per culpam et ordinandus esset illius aequitate per poenam, ut etiam. sic ostenderet animae superbae ad eruditionem futurorum sanctorum, quam recte ipse uteretur animarum uoluntatibus etiam malis, cum illae peruerse uterentur naturis bonis?

If, then, it is asked why God permitted the man to be tempted whom he foreknew would consent to the tempter, I cannot penetrate the depth of his counsel, and I confess that this is far beyond my powers. There may be some more hidden reason, reserved for those who are better and holier, by his grace rather than by their merits. Yet, so far as he grants me to understand or permits me to say, it does not seem to me that it would have been greatly to the man's praise if he could live well only because no one persuaded him to live badly; since he had it both in his nature to be able and in his power to will not to consent to the persuader, with the help, however, of him who resists the proud but gives grace to the humble. Why, then, should God not permit him to be tempted whom he foreknew would consent, since he was going to do it by his own will through fault and was to be set in order by God's equity through punishment, so that in this way too he might show to the proud soul, for the instruction of the saints to come, how rightly he himself uses the wills of souls, even evil ones, when they use good natures perversely?

11.5CSEL 28.1:338–339

Nec arbitrandum est, quod esset hominem deiecturus iste temtator, nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio conprimenda, ut per humiliationem peccati, quam de se falso praesumserit, disceret. uerissime quippe dictum est: ante ruinam exaltatur cor et ante gloriam humiliatur. et huius forte hominis uox est in psalmo: ego dixi in abundantia mea: non mouebor in aeternum. deinde iam expertus, quid mali habeat superba praesumtio propriae potestatis et quid boni adiutorium gratiae dei, domine, inquit, in uoluntate tua praestitisti decori meo uirtutem; auertisti autem faciem tuam et factus sum conturbatus. sed siue illud de hoc homine siue de alio dictum sit, extollenti se tamen animae et nimium tamquam de propria uirtute praefidenti etiam experimento poenae fuerat demonstrandum, quam non bene se habeat facta natura, si a faciente recesserit. hinc enim etiam maxime conmendatur, quale bonum sit deus, quando nulli ab eo recedenti bene est, quia et qui gaudent in mortiferis uoluptatibus esse sine dolorum timore non possunt et qui omnino malum desertionis suae maiore superbiae stupore non sentiunt aliis, qui haec discernere nouerunt, miseriores prorsus adparent, ut, si nolunt recipere medicinam talia deuitandi, ualeant ad exemplum, quo possint talia deuitari. sicut enim apostolus Iacobus dicit, unusquisque temtatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et inlectus. deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum; peccatum autem, cum consummatum fuerit, generat mortem. unde sanato superbiae tumore resurgitur, si uoluntas, quae ante experimentum defuit, ut permaneretur cum deo, saltem post experimentum adsit, ut redeatur ad deum.

Nor should it be thought that this tempter would have overthrown the man had there not first been in the man's soul a certain exaltation that needed to be checked, so that through the humiliation of sin he might learn how falsely he had presumed about himself. For it is most truly said, “Before a fall the heart is exalted, and before glory it is humbled.” And perhaps it is this man's voice in the psalm: “I said in my abundance, I shall not be moved for ever.” Then, having learned by experience what evil there is in proud presumption on one's own power and what good in the help of God's grace, he says, “Lord, in your will you gave strength to my beauty; but you turned away your face, and I became troubled.” But whether that was said of this man or of another, still the soul that exalts itself and trusts too much in its own strength, as it were, had to be shown, even by the experience of punishment, how badly a created nature fares if it departs from the one who made it. For hereby above all is it commended what a good God is, since it is well with no one who departs from him; because those who rejoice in deadly pleasures cannot be without fear of pain, and those who, in a greater stupor of pride, do not feel the evil of their desertion at all appear plainly more wretched to others who know how to discern these things; so that, if they will not accept the medicine for avoiding such things, they may serve as an example by which such things can be avoided. For as the apostle James says, “Each one is tempted by his own desire, being drawn away and enticed. Then desire, when it has conceived, gives birth to sin; and sin, when it is completed, brings forth death.” Hence, once the swelling of pride is healed, one rises again, if the will that was lacking before the experience, so as to remain with God, is at least present after the experience, so as to return to God.

11.6CSEL 28.1:339–340

Sic autem quidam mouentur de hac primi hominis temtatione, quod eam fieri permiserit deus, quasi nunc non uideant uniuersum genus humanum diaboli insidiis sine cessatione temtari. cur et hoc permittit deus? an quia probatur et exercetur uirtus et est palma gloriosior non consensisse temtatum quam non potuisse temtari? cum etiam ipsi, qui deserto creatore eunt post temtatorem, magis magisque temtent eos, qui in uerbo dei permanent, praebeantque illis contra cupiditatem deuitationis exemplum et incutiant contra superbiam timorem pium. unde dicit apostolus: intendens te ipsum. ne et tu temteris. mirum est enim, quantum ista humilitas, qua subdimur creatori, ne tamquam eius adiutorio non egentes de nostris uiribus praesumamus. per scripturas omnes diuinas cura continua commendatur. cum ergo etiam per iniustos iusti ac per inpios pii proficiant, frustra dicitur: non crearet deus, quos praesciebat malos futuros. cur enim non crearet, quos praesciebat bonis profuturos, ut et utiles eorum bonis uoluntatibus exercendis admonendisque nascantur et iuste pro sua mala uoluntate puniantur?

Some are troubled about this temptation of the first man, that God permitted it to happen, as though they did not now see the whole human race tempted without ceasing by the snares of the devil. Why does God permit this also? Is it not because virtue is proved and exercised, and the palm is more glorious for having been tempted and not consented than for having been unable to be tempted? For even those who forsake the Creator and go after the tempter tempt more and more those who remain in the word of God, and they offer them an example of what to avoid against desire and strike into them a godly fear against pride. Hence the apostle says, “Considering yourself, lest you too be tempted.” For it is remarkable how constantly, through all the divine Scriptures, that humility is commended by which we are subject to the Creator, lest we presume on our own strength as though we did not need his help. Since, then, the just make progress even through the unjust and the godly through the ungodly, it is idle to say, “God should not create those whom he foreknew would be evil.” For why should he not create those whom he foreknew would benefit the good, so that they may be born useful for exercising and admonishing the good wills of others, and be justly punished for their own evil will?

11.7CSEL 28.1:340

Talem, inquiunt, faceret hominem, qui nollet omnino peccare. ecce nos concedimus meliorem esse naturam, quae omnino peccare nolit; concedant et ipsi non esse malam naturam, quae sic facta est, ut posset non peccare, si nollet. et iustam esse sententiam, qua punita est, quae uoluntate. non necessitate peccauit. sicut ergo ratio uera docet meliorem esse creaturam, quam prorsus nihil delectat inlicitum, ita ratio uera nihilominus docet etiam illam bonam esse, quae habet in potestate inlicitam delectationem, si extiterit, ita cohibere, ut non solum de ceteris licitis recteque factis. uerum etiam de ipsius prauae delectationis cohibitione laetetur. cum ergo haec natura bona sit, illa melior, cur illam solam et non utramque potius faceret deus? ac per hoc qui parati erant de illa sola deum laudare, uberius eum debent laudare de utraque; illa quippe est in sanctis angelis, haec in sanctis hominibus. qui autem sibi partes iniquitatis elegerunt laudabilemque naturam culpabili uoluntate deprauarunt, non quia praesciti sunt, ideo creari minime debuerunt. habent enim et ipsi locum suum, quem in rebus inpleant pro utilitate sanctorum. nam deus nec iustitia cuiusquam recti hominis eget. quanto minus iniquitate peruersi!

“He should have made man such,” they say, “that he would not will to sin at all.” Look, we grant that the nature that does not will to sin at all is better; let them grant too that the nature is not evil that was made such that it could not sin if it did not will to, and that the sentence was just by which it was punished, since it sinned by will, not by necessity. Just as true reason teaches that the creature that no unlawful thing delights at all is better, so true reason teaches no less that the creature is also good that has it in its power to restrain unlawful delight, if it arises, in such a way that it rejoices not only in other lawful and rightly done deeds but also in the very restraint of the wicked delight. Since, then, this nature is good and that one better, why should God make only that one and not rather both? And so those who were ready to praise God for that one alone ought to praise him more richly for both; for that one is in the holy angels, this one in holy human beings. But those who chose for themselves the part of iniquity and depraved a praiseworthy nature by a culpable will ought not, simply because they were foreknown, to have been left uncreated. For they too have their place, which they fill in the order of things for the benefit of the saints. For God does not need the righteousness of any upright man; how much less the iniquity of the perverse!

11.8CSEL 28.1:340–342

Quis autem sobria consideratione dicat: melius non crearet, quem praesciebat ex alterius iniquitate posse corrigi, quam crearet etiam, quem praesciebat pro sua iniquitate debere damnari? hoc est enim dicere: melius non esset, qui alterius malo bene utendo misericorditer coronaretur, quam esset etiam malus, qui pro suo merito iuste puniretur. cum enim ratio certa demonstrat duo quaedam non aequalia bona, sed unum superius, alterum inferius, non intellegunt tardicordes, cum dicunt: utrumque tale esset", nihil se aliud dicere quam: „solum illud esset". ac sic cum aequare uolunt genera bonorum, numerum minuunt et inmoderate augendo unum genus, alterum tollunt. quis autem hos audiret, si dicerent: quoniam excellentior sensus est uidendi quam audiendi, quattuor oculi essent et aures non essent? ita, si excellentior est creatura illa rationalis, quae sine ullius poenae conparatione, sine ulla superbia deo subditur, aliqua uero in hominibus ita creata est, ut in se dei beneficium non possit agnoscere nisi alterius uidendo subplicium, ut non altum sapiat, sed timeat, id est non de se praefidat, sed confidat in deum: quis recte intellegens dicat: "talis esset ista, qualis illa", nec uideat se nihil aliud dicere quam: "non esset ista, sed sola esset illa"? quod si inerudite atque insipienter dicitur, cur ergo non crearet deus etiam quos malos futuros esse praesciebat, uolens ostendere iram et demonstrare potentiam suam et ob hoc sustinens in multa patientia uasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem, ut notas faceret diuitias gloriae suae in uasa misericordiae, quae praeparauit in gloriam? sic enim qui gloriatur, nonnisi in domino glorietur, cum cognoscit non suum, sed illius esse non solum, ut sit, uerum etiam, ut nonnisi ab illo bene sibi sit, a quo habet, ut sit. Nimis itaque inportune dicitur: non essent, quibus deus tantam beneficientiam misericordiae suae tribueret, si aliter esse non possent, nisi essent et hi, in quibus uindictae iustitiam demonstraret.

But who, considering soberly, would say, “It would have been better not to create the one whom he foreknew could be corrected by another's iniquity than to create also the one whom he foreknew must be condemned for his own iniquity”? For this is to say, “It would be better that there not exist one who would be mercifully crowned by making good use of another's evil than that there should also exist an evil one who would be justly punished according to his desert.” For when sure reason demonstrates two goods that are not equal, but one higher and the other lower, the slow of heart, when they say, “Let both be like that,” do not understand that they are saying nothing else than, “Let only that one exist.” And so, wishing to make the kinds of good equal, they reduce their number, and by immoderately increasing one kind they remove the other. Who would listen to them if they said, “Since the sense of sight is more excellent than that of hearing, there should be four eyes and no ears”? So, if that rational creature is more excellent which is subject to God without comparison with anyone's punishment and without any pride, while another, among human beings, was created such that it cannot recognize God's benefit in itself except by seeing another's punishment, so that it may not be high-minded but fear, that is, not presume on itself but trust in God—who, understanding rightly, would say, “Let this one be like that one,” and not see that he is saying nothing else than, “Let this one not exist, but only that one”? But if this is said ignorantly and foolishly, why then should God not create even those whom he foreknew would be evil, wishing to show his wrath and to make known his power, and for this reason enduring with much patience the vessels of wrath that are fitted for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory toward the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory? For thus “let him who boasts boast only in the Lord,” when he recognizes that it is not his own doing but God's, not only that he exists but also that it is well with him only from the one from whom he has his existence. So it is quite out of place to say, “Those to whom God would grant such great kindness of his mercy should not exist, if they could not exist otherwise than if those also existed in whom he would display the justice of his vengeance.”

11.9CSEL 28.1:342

Cur enim non utrique potius essent, quando in utrisque et bonitas dei et aequitas iure praedicatur? - At enim: si deus uellet, etiam isti boni essent. quanto melius hoc deus uoluit, ut quod uellent essent, sed boni infructuose, mali autem inpune non essent et in eo ipso. aliis utiles essent! sed praesciebat, quod eorum futura esset uoluntas mala. praesciebat sane et, quia falli non potest eius praescientia, ideo non ipsius, sed eorum est uoluntas mala. cur ergo eos creauit, quos tales futuros esse praesciebat? quia, sicut praeuidit, quid mali essent facturi, sic etiam praeuidit de malis factis eorum quid boni esset ipse facturus. sic enim eos fecit, ut eis relinqueret, unde et ipsi aliquid facerent, quo quidquid etiam culpabiliter eligerent illum de se laudabiliter operantem inuenirent. a se quippe habent uoluntatem malam, ab illo autem et naturam bonam et iustam poenam, sibi debitum locum, aliis exercitationis adminiculum et timoris exemplum.

For why should both kinds not exist instead, since in both God's goodness and his equity are rightly proclaimed? “But if God willed it, these too would be good.” How much better did God will this: that they should be what they willed, but that the good should not be fruitless nor the evil unpunished, and that in this very thing they should be useful to others! “But he foreknew that their will would be evil.” He did foreknow it, indeed; and because his foreknowledge cannot be deceived, the evil will is therefore not his but theirs. Why, then, did he create those whom he foreknew would be such? Because, just as he foresaw what evil they would do, so also he foresaw what good he himself would do from their evil deeds. For he made them in such a way as to leave them something they themselves might do, so that whatever they chose, even culpably, they would find him working praiseworthily in their regard. For from themselves they have the evil will; but from him both their good nature and their just punishment, their due place, a help in exercise for others, and an example to make them fear.

11.10CSEL 28.1:342–343

Sed posset, inquit, etiam ipsorum uoluntatem in bonum conuertere, quoniam omnipotens est. posset plane. cur ergo non fecit? quia noluit. cur noluerit, penes ipsum est. debemus enim non plus sapere quam oportet sapere. puto tamen paulo ante satis nos ostendisse non parui boni esse rationalem creaturam, etiam istam, quae malorum conparatione cauet malum. quod genus bonae creaturae utique non esset, si omnium malas uoluntates in bonum deus omnipotens conuertisset et nulli iniquitati poenam debitam infligeret; ac sic non esset nisi solum illud genus, quod nulla uel peccati uel subplicii malorum conparatione proficeret. ita uelut aucta numerositate excellentioris generis ipsorum generum bonorum numerus minueretur.

“But,” someone says, “he could have turned even their will to good, since he is almighty.” He could indeed. Why, then, did he not do it? Because he did not will to. Why he did not will to rests with him. For we ought not to think more highly than we ought to think. Yet I think I showed sufficiently a little earlier that a rational creature is no small good, even that one which avoids evil by comparison with evil people. That kind of good creature would certainly not exist if almighty God had turned the evil wills of all to good and inflicted on no iniquity its due punishment; and so there would be only that kind which makes progress without any comparison with sin or with the punishment of the wicked. Thus, as though by increasing the number of the more excellent kind, the number of kinds of good itself would be lessened.

11.11CSEL 28.1:343–344

Ergo, inquiunt, est aliquid in operibus dei, quod alterius malo indigeat, quo proficiat ad bonum? itane obsurduerunt et excaecati sunt homines nescio quo studio contentionis, ut non audiant uel uideant, quibusdam punitis quam plurimi corrigantur? quis enim paganus, quis Iudaeus, quis haereticus non hoc in domo sua cotidie probet? uerum cum uenitur ad disputationem inquisitionemque ueritatis, nolunt aduertere sensus suos homines, ex quo opere diuinae prouidentiae in eos ueniat inponendae commotio disciplinae, ut, si non corriguntur qui puniuntur, eorum tamen exemplum ceteri metuant ualeatque ad eorum salutem iusta pernicies aliorum. num enim malitiae illorum uel nequitiae deus auctor est, de quorum iusta poena consulit, quibus hoc modo consulendum esse constituit? non utique. sed cum eos uitiis propriis malos futuros esse praesciret, non eos tamen creare destitit, utilitati deputans eorum, quos in hoc genere creauit, ut ad bonum proficere nisi malorum conparatione non possent. si enim non essent, nulli rei utique prodeessent. parumne boni actum est ut sint, qui certe illi generi utiles sunt? quod genus quisquis non uult ut sit, nihil aliud agit, nisi ut ipse in eo non sit. Magna opera domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius! praeuidet bonos futuros et creat, praeuidet malos futuros et creat, se ipsum ad fruendum praebens bonis, multa munerum suorum largiens et malis, misericorditer ignoscens, iuste ulciscens, itemque misericorditer ulciscens, iuste ignoscens, nihil metuens de cuiusquam malitia, nihil indigens de cuiusquam iustitia, nihil sibi consulens nec de operibus bonorum et bonis consulens etiam de poenis malorum. cur ergo non permitteret temtari hominem illa temtatione prodendum, conuincendum, puniendum, cum superba concupiscentia propriae potestatis quod conceperat pareret suoque fetu confunderetur iustoque subplicio a superbiae atque inoboedientiae malo posteros deterreret, quibus ea conscribenda et adnuntianda parabantur?

“So,” they say, “there is something in God's works that needs another's evil in order to advance to good?” Have people become so deaf and blind through some zeal for contention, I know not what, that they do not hear or see how very many are corrected when certain people are punished? For what pagan, what Jew, what heretic does not prove this daily in his own household? But when it comes to the discussion and investigation of truth, people will not attend with their minds to the work of divine providence from which there comes upon them the impulse to impose discipline, so that, even if those who are punished are not corrected, others may fear their example and the just ruin of some may serve the salvation of others. Is God, then, the author of the malice or wickedness of those by whose just punishment he provides for those for whom he has decided that provision must be made in this way? Certainly not. But though he foreknew that they would be evil by their own vices, he still did not refrain from creating them, assigning them to the benefit of those whom he created in such a kind that they could not advance to good except by comparison with the evil. For if they did not exist, they would certainly benefit nothing. Is it a small good that has been done, that there should exist those who are certainly useful to that kind? Whoever does not want that kind to exist is doing nothing else than seeing to it that he himself is not in it. “Great are the works of the Lord, sought out in all his wills!” He foresees that some will be good and creates them; he foresees that some will be evil and creates them; offering himself to the good to be enjoyed, bestowing many of his gifts also on the evil; mercifully pardoning, justly punishing, and likewise mercifully punishing, justly pardoning; fearing nothing from anyone's malice, needing nothing from anyone's righteousness; providing nothing for himself even from the works of the good, and providing for the good even by the punishments of the evil. Why, then, should he not permit the man to be tempted by that temptation by which he was to be exposed, convicted, and punished, when proud desire for its own power would give birth to what it had conceived and be confounded by its own offspring, and by a just punishment deter from the evil of pride and disobedience his descendants, for whom these things were being prepared to be written and proclaimed?

11.12CSEL 28.1:344–345

Si autem quaeritur, cur potissimum per serpentem diabolus temtare permissus sit, iam hoc significandi gratia factum esse quem non admoneat scriptura tantae auctoritatis, - tantis diuinitatis documentis agens in prophetando, quantis effectis iam mundus inpletus est? non quo diabolus aliquid ad instructionem nostram significare uoluerit, sed cum accedere ad temtandum non posset nisi permissus, num per aliud posset, nisi per quod permittebatur accedere? quidquid igitur serpens ille significauit. ei prouidentiae tribuendum est, sub qua et ipse diabolus suam quidem habet cupiditatem nocendi, facultatem autem nonnisi quae datur uel ad subuertenda ac perdenda uasa irae uel ad humilianda siue probanda uasa misericordiae. natura itaque serpentis unde sit, nouimus; produxit enim terra in uerbo dei omnia pecora, et serpentes et bestias: quae uniuersa creatura habens in se animam uiuam inrationalem uniuersae rationali creaturae siue bonae siue malae uoluntatis lege diuini ordinis subdita est. quid ergo mirum, si per serpentem aliquid agere permissus est diabolus, cum daemonia in porcos intrare Christus ipse permiserit?

But if it is asked why the devil was permitted to tempt through a serpent in particular, whom does Scripture not remind that this was done for the sake of signifying something, Scripture of such great authority, acting in its prophesying with proofs of divinity as great as the fulfilments with which the world is now filled? Not that the devil wished to signify anything for our instruction; but since he could not approach to tempt unless he was permitted, could he do it through anything other than that through which he was permitted to approach? Whatever, then, that serpent signified must be attributed to the providence under which the devil himself has his own desire to harm, but no power except what is given him, either to overthrow and destroy the vessels of wrath or to humble or test the vessels of mercy. So we know where the nature of the serpent comes from: for the earth brought forth at the word of God all cattle, both serpents and beasts; and this whole creation, having in itself a living, irrational soul, is subject by the law of the divine order to every rational creature, whether of good or of evil will. What wonder, then, if the devil was permitted to do something through a serpent, when Christ himself permitted demons to enter swine?

11.13CSEL 28.1:345–346

Magis de ipsa natura diaboli scrupulosius quaeri solet, quam totam quidam haeretici, offensi molestia malae uoluntatis eius, alienare conantur a creatura summi et ueri dei et alterum ei dare principium, quod sit contra deum. non enim ualent intellegere omne, quod est, in quantum aliqua substantia est, et bonum esse et nisi ab illo deo uero, a quo omne bonum est, esse non posse, malam uero uoluntatem inordinate moueri bona inferiora superioribus praeponendo, atque ita factum esse, ut rationalis creaturae spiritus sua potestate propter excellentiam delectatus tumesceret superbia, per quam caderet a beatitudine spiritalis paradisi, et inuidentia contabesceret. in quo tamen bonum est hoc ipsum, quod uiuit et uiuificat corpus, siue aerium, sicut ipsius diaboli uel daemonum spiritus, siue terrenum, sicut hominis anima cuiusuis, etiam maligni atque peruersi. ita dum nolunt aliquid quod deus fecerit propria uoluntate peccare, ipsius dei substantiam dicunt primo necessitate et post inexpiabiliter uoluntate corruptam atque peruersam. sed de istorum dementissimo errore alias iam multa diximus.

A more scrupulous question is usually raised about the very nature of the devil, which certain heretics, offended by the trouble his evil will causes, try to remove entirely from the creation of the supreme and true God, giving him another principle that is opposed to God. For they are not able to understand that everything that exists, in so far as it is some substance, is both good and cannot exist except from that true God from whom every good comes; and that an evil will is moved in a disordered way, by preferring lower goods to higher ones; and that so it came about that the spirit of a rational creature, delighted with its own power because of its excellence, swelled with pride, through which it fell from the happiness of the spiritual paradise, and wasted away with envy. Yet in it this very thing is good, that it lives and gives life to a body, whether an airy body, like the spirit of the devil himself or of the demons, or an earthly one, like the soul of any human being, even a malicious and perverse one. Thus, while they will not have anything that God made sin by its own will, they say that the substance of God himself was corrupted and perverted, first by necessity and afterwards, beyond expiation, by will. But we have already said much elsewhere about the utterly insane error of these people.

11.14CSEL 28.1:346–347

In hoc autem opere quaerendum est secundum sanctam scripturam, quid de diabolo dicendum sit. primo, utrum ab initio ipsius mundi sua potestate delectatus abstiterit ab illa societate et caritate, qua beati sunt angeli, qui fruuntur deo, an aliquo tempore in sancto coetu fuerit angelorum etiam ipse pariter iustus et pariter beatus. nonnulli enim dicunt ipsum ei fuisse casum a supernis sedibus, quod inuiderit homini facto ad imaginem dei. porro autem inuidia sequitur superbiam, non praecedit; non enim causa superbiendi est inuidia, sed causa inuidendi superbia. cum igitur superbia sit amor excellentiae propriae, inuidentia uero sit odium felicitatis alienae, quid unde nascatur satis in promtu est. amando enim quisque excellentiam suam uel paribus inuidet, quod ei coaequentur, uel inferioribus, ne sibi coaequentur, uel superioribus, quod eis non coaequetur. superbiendo igitur inuidus, non inuidendo quisque superbus est.

In this work, however, we must ask what is to be said about the devil according to holy Scripture. First, whether from the very beginning of the world, delighted with his own power, he held aloof from that fellowship and love by which the angels who enjoy God are happy, or whether for some time he too was in the holy company of the angels, equally righteous and equally happy. For some say that his fall from the heavenly seats came about because he envied man, made in the image of God. But envy follows pride; it does not precede it. For envy is not the cause of being proud; pride is the cause of envying. Since, then, pride is the love of one's own excellence, while envy is hatred of another's happiness, it is plain enough which springs from which. For in loving his own excellence a person envies either his equals, because they are made equal with him, or his inferiors, lest they be made equal with him, or his superiors, because he is not made equal with them. So it is by being proud that someone is envious, not by being envious that he is proud.

11.15CSEL 28.1:347–348

Merito initium omnis peccati superbiam scriptura definiuit dicens: initium omnis peccati superbia. cui testimonio non inconuenienter aptatur etiam illud, quod apostolus ait: radix omnium malorum est auaritia, si auaritiam generalem intellegamus, qua quisque adpetit aliquid amplius quam oportet propter excellentiam suam et quendam propriae rei amorem. cui sapienter nomen latina lingua indidit, cum appellauit priuatum, quod potius a detrimento quam ab incremento dictum elucet; omnis enim priuatio minuit. unde itaque uult eminere superbia, inde in angustias egestatemque contruditur. cum a communi ad proprium damnoso sui amore redigitur. specialis est autem auaritia, quae usitatius appellatur amor pecuniae. cuius nomine apostolus per speciem genus significans uniuersalem auaritiam uolebat intellegi dicendo: radix omnium malorum est auaritia. hac enim et diabolus cecidit, qui utique non amauit pecuniam, sed propriam potestatem. proinde peruersus sui amor priuat sancta societate turgidum spiritum eumque coartat miseria iam per iniquitatem satiari cupientem. hinc alio loco cum dixisset: erunt enim homines se ipsos amantes, continuo subiecit: amatores pecuniae, ab illa generali auaritia, cuius superbia caput est, ad hanc specialem descendens, quae propria hominum est. neque enim essent etiam homines amatores pecuniae, nisi eo se putarent excellentiores quo ditiores. cui morbo contraria caritas non quaerit, quae sua sunt, id est non priuata excellentia laetatur; merito ergo et non inflatur. Hi duo amores — quorum alter sanctus est, alter inmundus, alter socialis, alter priuatus, alter communi utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem, alter etiam rem communem in potestatem propriam redigens propter adrogantem dominationem, alter subditus, alter aemulus deo, alter tranquillus, alter turbulentus, alter pacificus, alter seditiosus, alter ueritatem laudibus errantium praeferens, alter quoquo modo laudis auidus, alter amicalis, alter inuidus, alter hoc uolens proximo quod sibi, alter subicere proximum sibi, alter propter proximi utilitatem regens proximum, alter propter suam - praecesserunt in angelis, alter in bonis, alter in malis, et distinxerunt conditas in genere humano ciuitates duas sub admirabili et ineffabili prouidentia dei cuncta, quae creat, administrantis et ordinantis, alteram iustorum, alteram iniquorum. quarum etiam quadam temporali conmixtione peragitur saeculum, donec ultimo iudicio separentur, et altera coniuncta angelis bonis in rege suo uitam consequatur aeternam, altera coniuncta angelis malis in ignem cum rege suo mittatur aeternum. de quibus duabus ciuitatibus latius fortasse alio loco, si dominus uoluerit, disseremus.

Rightly has Scripture defined pride as the beginning of all sin, saying, “The beginning of all sin is pride.” To this testimony that saying of the apostle is also fittingly applied: “The root of all evils is avarice,” if we understand avarice in a general sense, by which anyone seeks something more than is fitting because of his own excellence and a certain love of what is his own. To this the Latin language has wisely given a name when it called it “private,” a word that plainly is derived from loss rather than from increase; for every privation diminishes. So the very place from which pride wants to stand out is the place where it is thrust into straits and want, when by a ruinous love of itself it is reduced from what is common to what is its own. But there is a particular avarice, more usually called the love of money. By its name the apostle, signifying the genus by the species, meant universal avarice to be understood when he said, “The root of all evils is avarice.” For it was by this that the devil too fell, who certainly did not love money but his own power. Hence perverse love of self deprives the swollen spirit of holy fellowship and confines it in misery, though it longs to be sated through iniquity. Hence in another place, when he had said, “For men will be lovers of themselves,” he at once added, “lovers of money,” descending from that general avarice, of which pride is the head, to this particular one, which is proper to human beings. For people would not be lovers of money either unless they thought themselves the more excellent the richer they are. Opposed to this disease is love, which “does not seek its own,” that is, does not rejoice in private excellence; rightly, then, it is also “not puffed up.” These two loves—of which one is holy, the other unclean; one social, the other private; one taking thought for the common good for the sake of the heavenly fellowship, the other reducing even the common good to its own power for the sake of arrogant domination; one subject to God, the other a rival of God; one tranquil, the other turbulent; one peaceable, the other seditious; one preferring the truth to the praises of those who err, the other greedy for praise by any means; one friendly, the other envious; one wishing for its neighbour what it wishes for itself, the other wishing to subject its neighbour to itself; one ruling its neighbour for the neighbour's benefit, the other for its own—these two loves appeared first in the angels, the one in the good, the other in the evil, and they have distinguished the two cities founded in the human race under the wonderful and ineffable providence of God, who administers and orders all that he creates: the one city of the just, the other of the wicked. With a certain temporal intermingling of these two the age runs its course, until they are separated at the last judgment, and the one, joined to the good angels, attains eternal life in its king, while the other, joined to the evil angels, is sent with its king into eternal fire. About these two cities we shall perhaps discourse more fully in another place, if the Lord wills.

11.16CSEL 28.1:348–349

Quando ergo deiecerit superbia diabolum, ut naturam suam bonam praua uoluntate peruerteret, scriptura non dicit; ante tamen factum fuisse et ex hac eum homini inuidisse ratio manifesta declarat. in promtu est enim omnibus haec intuentibus non ex inuidentia superbiam nasci, sed ex superbia potius inuidentiam. non autem frustra putari potest ab initio temporis diabolum superbia cecidisse nec fuisse ullum antea tempus, quo cum angelis sanctis pacatus uixerit et beatus, sed ab ipso exordio creaturae a suo creatore apostatasse, ut illud, quod dominus ait: ille homicida erat ab initio et in ueritate non stetit. utrumque ab initio intellegamus. non solum quod homicida fuit. sed etiam quod in ueritate non stetit. et homicida quidem ab illo initio, ex quo homo potuit occidi; non autem potuit occidi. antequam esset, qui occideretur. ab initio ergo homicida diabolus. quia ipse occidit hominem primum, ante quem nullus hominum fuit. in ueritate autem non stetit et hoc ab initio. ex quo ipse creatus est. qui staret, si stare uoluisset.

When, then, pride cast the devil down, so that he perverted his good nature by a depraved will, Scripture does not say; but plain reason declares that it happened before, and that it was from this that he envied man. For it is evident to all who consider these things that pride does not spring from envy, but rather envy from pride. And it can be thought, not without reason, that the devil fell through pride from the beginning of time, and that there was no previous time in which he lived at peace and happy with the holy angels, but that from the very first moment of his creation he apostatized from his Creator; so that we understand both parts of what the Lord said—“He was a murderer from the beginning, and he did not stand in the truth”—as being “from the beginning”: not only that he was a murderer, but also that he did not stand in the truth. He was a murderer, indeed, from that beginning from which man could be killed; and man could not be killed before there existed someone to be killed. So the devil was a murderer from the beginning, because he killed the first man, before whom there was no human being. But he did not stand in the truth, and this too from the beginning, from the time when he himself was created, he who would have stood had he willed to stand.

11.17CSEL 28.1:349–350

Quomodo enim duxisse uitam beatam inter beatos angelos credi potest, qui futuri sui peccati atque subplicii. id est desertionis et ignis aeterni. praescius non fuit? si praescius non fuit, merito quaeritur, cur non fuerit. neque enim sancti angeli aeternae suae uitae ac beatitatis incerti sunt. nam quomodo beati, si incerti? an dicemus hoc deum diabolo reuelare noluisse, cum adhuc esset angelus bonus. uel quid facturus uel quid passurus esset, ceteris autem reuelasse, quod essent in aeternum in eius ueritate mansuri? quod si ita est, ideo iam non aequaliter beatus, immo iam nec plene beatus fuit, quandoquidem plene beati de sua beatitudine certi sunt, ut eam nullus perturbet metus. quo autem malo merito ita discernebatur a ceteris, ut ei deus nec ea, quae ad ipsum pertinerent, futura reuelaret? numquid ille prius ultor quam iste peccator? absit. neque enim deus damnat innocentes. an forte ex alio genere angelorum fuit, quibus deus non dedit uel de se ipsis praescientiam futurorum? qui quonam modo beati possint esse non uideo, quibus incerta est ipsa sua beatitudo. nam et hoc quidam senserunt non fuisse diabolum in illa sublimi natura angelorum, quae supercaelestis est, sed in eorum, qui aliquanto inferius in mundo facti sunt et per sua officia distributi. tales enim fortasse posset aliquid etiam inlicitum delectare: quam tamen delectationem si peccare nollent, libero arbitrio cohiberent, sicut homo, maxime ille primus, qui peccati poenam nondum habebat in membris, quandoquidem et ipsa a sanctis uiris deo subditis per eius gratiam pietate superatur.

For how can he be believed to have led a happy life among the happy angels, who did not foreknow his future sin and punishment, that is, his desertion and the eternal fire? If he did not foreknow them, it is rightly asked why he did not. For the holy angels are not uncertain of their eternal life and happiness; for how would they be happy if uncertain? Or shall we say that God was unwilling to reveal to the devil, while he was still a good angel, either what he would do or what he would suffer, but revealed to the others that they would remain for ever in his truth? If so, then he was no longer equally happy, indeed not even fully happy, since those who are fully happy are certain of their happiness, so that no fear disturbs it. But by what evil desert was he so distinguished from the others that God would not reveal to him even the future things that concerned himself? Was God an avenger before the devil was a sinner? Far from it. For God does not condemn the innocent. Or was he perhaps of another kind of angels, to whom God did not give foreknowledge of the future even concerning themselves? How they could be happy, when their very happiness is uncertain to them, I do not see. For some have also held this view: that the devil was not in that sublime nature of the angels that is above the heavens, but among those who were made somewhat lower, in the world, and assigned to their offices. Such beings, perhaps, might be delighted even by something unlawful; yet, if they did not will to sin, they would restrain that delight by free choice, as a man does, especially that first man, who did not yet have the penalty of sin in his members; since even that penalty is overcome by holy men subject to God, through godliness, by his grace.

11.18CSEL 28.1:350–351

Porro ista quaestio de beata uita, utrum eam quisquam iam habere dicendus sit, cuius incertus est utrum secum permansura sit an ei miseria quandoque succedat, potest et de ipso primo homine oriri. nam si futuri sui peccati conscius erat diuinaeque uindictae, beatus esse unde poterat? ergo erat in paradiso non beatus. sed enim non erat futuri peccati sui praescius. ergo per hanc ignorantiam aut eiusdem beatitudinis incertus, et quomodo iam uere beatus? aut falsa spe certus, non scientia, et quomodo non stultus? Sed tamen hominis adhuc in corpore animali constituti, cui oboedienter uiuenti dandum adhuc esset angelorum consortium et mutatio corporis ex animali in spiritale, possumus intellegere beatam uitam secundum quendam modum, etiamsi non erat praescius futuri sui peccati. neque enim et illi praescii fuerunt, quibus apostolus dicit: uos, qui spiritales estis, instruite huius modi in spiritu lenitatis, intendens te ipsum, ne et tu temteris; non absurde tamen nec inprobe dicimus beatos iam fuisse hoc ipso, quod spiritales essent non corpore, sed iustitia fidei, spe gaudentes, in tribulatione patientes. quanto magis ergo et ampliore modo beatus erat homo in paradiso ante peccatum, quamuis incertus futuri sui casus, qui spe ita gaudebat propter praemium futurae commutationis, ut nulla esset tribulatio, cui tolerandae patientia militaret! quamuis enim non uana praesumtione de incerto certus uelut stultus, sed spe non infidelis, antequam adprehenderet illam uitam, ubi certissimus ipsius aeternae uitae suae futurus esset, posset exsultare, quemadmodum scriptum est: cum tremore, et hac exsultatione multo abundantius in paradiso quam sancti in his terris beatus esse modo quodam inferiore quam in illa uita aeterna sanctorum supercaelestiumque angelorum, non tamen nullo.

Moreover, this question about the happy life—whether anyone should be said to have it already who is uncertain whether it will remain with him or whether misery will at some time succeed it—can arise also about the first man himself. For if he was aware of his future sin and of divine punishment, how could he be happy? So he was in paradise and not happy. But in fact he did not foreknow his future sin. So through this ignorance either he was uncertain of that happiness, and then how was he truly happy? Or he was certain by false hope, not by knowledge, and then how was he not foolish? Yet in the case of a man still established in an animal body, to whom, if he lived obediently, the fellowship of the angels was still to be given and the change of the body from animal to spiritual, we can understand a happy life in a certain manner, even though he did not foreknow his future sin. For neither did those foreknow theirs to whom the apostle says, “You who are spiritual, instruct such a one in a spirit of gentleness, considering yourself, lest you too be tempted”; and yet we say, neither absurdly nor wrongly, that they were already happy by the very fact that they were spiritual, not in body but in the righteousness of faith, “rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation.” How much more, then, and in a fuller way, was the man in paradise happy before sin, though uncertain of his future fall, who so rejoiced in hope because of the reward of the change to come that there was no tribulation for patience to fight in enduring! For although he was not certain of what was uncertain by vain presumption, like a fool, yet in hope, not without faith, before he laid hold of that life where he would be most certain of his eternal life, he could exult, as it is written, “with trembling”; and by this exultation he could be happy in paradise far more abundantly than the saints on this earth, in a manner lower than in that eternal life of the saints and of the angels above the heavens, yet not in none.

11.19CSEL 28.1:351–352

Dicere autem de aliquibus angelis, quod in suo quodam genere beati esse possint, futurae suae iniquitatis et damnationis uel certe perpetuae salutis incerti, quibus nec spes subesset, quod aliquando et ipsi aliqua in melius mutatione certi de hac re futuri essent, uix ferenda praesumtio est; nisi forte et hoc dicatur ita creatos istos angelos mundanis ministeriis distributos sub aliis sublimioribus et beatioribus. ut pro recte gestis praeposituris suis accipiant illam uitam beatam ac sublimiorem, de qua possint esse certissimi, cuius utique spe gaudentes possint non incongrue dici iam beati. ex quorum numero si diabolus cecidit cum sociis iniquitatis suae, simile est hoc ei, quod cadunt a iustitia fidei etiam homines simili superbia praeuaricati, uel se ipsos seducentes uel illi seductori consentientes. Sed adserant haec duo genera bonorum angelorum qui potuerint, unum supercaelestium, in quibus numqam fuit, qui cadendo diabolus factus est, alterum autem mundanorum, in quibus fuit; mihi autem. fateor, unde hoc secundum scripturas adseram, non interim occurrit, sed coartatus quaestione illa, qua quaeritur, utrum sui casus praescius, antequam caderet, fuerit, ne suae beatitudinis incertos esse uel aliquando fuisse angelos dicerem, non sine causa putari posse dixi diabolum ab ipso creaturae, hoc est ab ipso uel temporis uel suae conditionis initio cecidisse nec aliquando in ueritate stetisse.

But to say of certain angels that they can be happy in their own kind while uncertain of their future iniquity and damnation, or of their perpetual salvation, with no hope beneath them that they too would some day become certain of this by some change for the better, is a scarcely tolerable presumption; unless perhaps it is also said that these angels were created assigned to ministries in the world under other, more sublime and happier angels, so that for rightly fulfilling their charges they might receive that happy and more sublime life of which they could be most certain, and rejoicing in the hope of it they could, not unfittingly, be called already happy. If the devil fell from their number with the companions of his iniquity, this is like the way in which people also fall from the righteousness of faith, transgressing through a similar pride, either deceiving themselves or consenting to that deceiver. But let those who can assert these two kinds of good angels: one of those above the heavens, among whom he who by falling became the devil never was, and another of those in the world, among whom he was. For my part, I confess, nothing occurs to me for the present from which I could assert this according to the Scriptures. But pressed by that question in which it is asked whether he foreknew his fall before he fell, so as not to say that angels are, or ever were, uncertain of their happiness, I said that it can be thought, not without reason, that the devil fell from the very beginning of creation, that is, from the very beginning either of time or of his own making, and never stood in the truth.

11.20CSEL 28.1:352–353

Unde nonnulli eum non in hanc malitiam libero arbitrio uoluntatis esse deflexum, sed in hac omnino creatum putant quamuis a domino deo summo et uero naturarum omnium creatore adhibentque testimonium de libro Iob, quoniam ibi scriptum est, cum de illo sermo esset: hoc est initium figmenti domini, quod fecit ut inludatur ab angelis eius: cui sententiae congruit, quod in psalmo scriptum est: draco hic, quem finxisti ad inludendum ei, nisi quod hic "quem finxisti" dixit, non autem sicut ibi, hoc est initium figmenti domini, tamquam initio eum ita finxisset, ut malus, ut inuidus, ut seductor, ut omnino diabolus esset non uoluntate deprauatus, sed ita creatus.

Hence some think that he was not turned aside into this malice by the free choice of his will, but was created in it altogether, though by the Lord God, the supreme and true creator of all natures; and they bring forward a testimony from the book of Job, since there it is written, when he was being spoken of, “This is the beginning of the Lord's fashioning, which he made to be mocked by his angels.” With this opinion agrees what is written in the psalm: “This dragon, which you fashioned to mock it,” except that here it says “which you fashioned,” and not, as there, “This is the beginning of the Lord's fashioning”; as though at the beginning he had so fashioned him that he was evil, envious, a seducer, altogether a devil, not depraved by will but created so.

11.21CSEL 28.1:353–354

Haec opinio quomodo non sit aduersa ei, quod scriptum est: fecit deus omnia; et ecce bona ualde, ubi inuenitur diabolus non propria uoluntate deprauatus, sed ab ipso domino deo factus malus ualde, quamuis conentur ostendere nec insulse etiam uel inerudite adseratur non tantum conditione prima, sed etiam nunc deprauatis tot uoluntatibus in summa tamen omnia, quae creata sunt, id est uniuersam omnino creaturam bonam esse ualde, non quo boni sint in ea mali, sed quod non efficiant malitia sua, ut sub dei administratoris imperio, uirtute, sapientia decus et ordo uniuersitatis aliqua ex parte turpetur siue turbetur, cum suis quibusque uoluntatibus, etiam malis, tribuantur certi et congrui limites potestatum et pondera meritorum, ut etiam cum ipsis conuenienter iusteque ordinatis uniuersitas pulchra sit: tamen, quia cuilibet occurrit et uerum est atque manifestum iustitiae ipsi esse contrarium, ut nullo praecedente merito hoc ipsum in quoque deus damnet, quod in eo ipse creauerit, certaque et euidens damnatio diaboli et angelorum eius ex euangelio recitatur, ubi se dicturum dominus praenuntiauit eis qui a sinistris sunt: ite in ignem aeternum, qui praeparatus est diabolo et angelis eius, nullo modo in eo naturam, quam deus creauit, sed malam propriam uoluntatem poena ignis aeterni plectendam esse credendum est.

How could this opinion not be contrary to what is written: “God made all things, and behold, they were very good”? Here the devil would be found not depraved by his own will but made very evil by the Lord God himself. They try to show—and it is not foolishly or ignorantly asserted—that not only in the first creation but even now, though so many wills have been depraved, all things that were created, that is, the whole creation altogether, are on the whole very good: not that the evil in it are good, but that they do not by their malice bring it about that the beauty and order of the universe, under the rule, power, and wisdom of God who administers it, is in any part defiled or disturbed, since to each of their wills, even the evil ones, are assigned fixed and fitting limits of power and weights of desert, so that even with them fittingly and justly ordered the universe is beautiful. Nevertheless, since it occurs to anyone, and is true and plain, that it is contrary to justice itself that God should condemn in anyone, with no preceding desert, the very thing he himself created in him; and since the certain and evident condemnation of the devil and his angels is read from the Gospel, where the Lord foretold that he would say to those on the left, “Depart into the eternal fire, which has been prepared for the devil and his angels”; we must believe that it is by no means the nature God created in him, but his own evil will, that is to be punished with the penalty of eternal fire.

11.22CSEL 28.1:354–355

Nec eius naturam esse significatam, quod dictum est: hoc est initium figmenti domini, quod fecit ut inludatur ab angelis eius, sed uel corpus aerium, quod tali uoluntati congruenter aptauit, uel ipsam ordinationem, in qua eum fecit etiam nolentem utilem bonis, uel, quod praesciens eum propria uoluntate malum futurum fecit eum tamen non abstinens bonitatem suam in praebenda uita atque substantia futurae etiam noxiae uoluntati, simul praeuidens, quanta de illo bona esset sua mirabili bonitate ac potestate facturus. initium autem figmenti domini dictus est, quod fecit ut inludatur ab angelis eius, non quia ipsum primitus condidit uel initio malum condidit, sed quia, cum sciret eum ad hoc propria uoluntate malum futurum, ut bonis noceret, creauit eum ad hoc, ut de illo bonis ipse prodesset. hoc est enim: ut inludatur ab angelis eius, quoniam sic inluditur, cum sanctis prosunt temtationes eius, quibus eos deprauare conatur, ut malitia, in qua ipse esse uoluit, eo nolente sit utilis seruis dei, qui hoc praeuidens eum finxit. ideo initium ad inludendum, quia et mali homines, uasa eiusdem diaboli et tamquam capitis corpus, quos nihilominus deus malos futuros praeuidens creauit tamen ad utilitatem sanctorum, similiter inluduntur, cum et ipsis nocere uolentibus praestatur sanctis ex eorum conparatione cautela et pia sub deo humilitas et intellegentia gratiae et exercitatio ad tolerandos malos et probatio ad diligendos inimicos. sed ille est initium figmenti, quod sic inluditur, quia praecedit istos et temporis antiquitate et principatu malitiae. hoc autem illi deus per sanctos angelos facit illo opere prouidentiae, quo creatas naturas administrat, subdens uidelicet angelos malos angelis bonis, ut malorum inprobitas non quantum nititur sed quantum sinitur possit; nec tantum angelorum malorum, uerum et hominum, donec etiam ista iustitia, qua uiuitur ex fide, quae nunc patienter in hominibus exercetur, conuertatur in iudicium, ut possint et ipsi non solum duodecim tribus Israhel, sed etiam angelos iudicare.

Nor is it his nature that is signified by the words, “This is the beginning of the Lord's fashioning, which he made to be mocked by his angels,” but either the airy body that he suitably fitted to such a will; or the very ordering in which he made him useful to the good even against his will; or the fact that, foreknowing that he would be evil by his own will, he nevertheless made him, not withholding his goodness in granting life and substance even to a will that would be harmful, foreseeing at the same time how many goods he himself would bring about from him by his wonderful goodness and power. He is called “the beginning of the Lord's fashioning, which he made to be mocked by his angels,” not because God created him first or created him evil at the beginning, but because, knowing that he would become evil by his own will so as to harm the good, he created him in order that through him he himself might benefit the good. For this is the meaning of “to be mocked by his angels”: he is mocked in this way when his temptations, by which he tries to deprave the saints, benefit them, so that the malice in which he chose to be is, against his will, useful to the servants of God, who foresaw this when he fashioned him. He is called the beginning of what is to be mocked because evil men also, the devil's vessels and, as it were, the body of that head—whom God, foreseeing that they would be evil, nevertheless created for the benefit of the saints—are mocked in the same way, when, even while they wish to harm, the saints are given through comparison with them caution, godly humility under God, understanding of grace, exercise in bearing with the wicked, and proof in loving their enemies. But he is the beginning of the fashioning that is mocked in this way, because he precedes these men both in antiquity of time and in primacy of malice. God does this to him through the holy angels, by that work of providence by which he administers created natures, subjecting the evil angels to the good angels, so that the wickedness of the evil can do not as much as it strives to but as much as it is permitted; and not only of evil angels, but of men too, until this righteousness by which one lives from faith, which is now patiently exercised among men, is turned into judgment, so that they too may judge not only the twelve tribes of Israel but also angels.

11.23CSEL 28.1:355–356

Quod ergo putatur numquam diabolus in ueritate stetisse, numquam cum angelis beatam duxisse uitam, sed ab ipso suae conditionis initio cecidisse, non sic accipiendum est, ut non propria uoluntate deprauatus, sed malus a bono deo creatus putetur: alioquin non ab initio cecidisse diceretur; neque enim cecidit, si talis est factus. sed factus continuo se a luce ueritatis auertit, superbia tumidus et propriae potestatis delectatione corruptus. unde beatae atque angelicae uitae dulcedinem non gustauit: quam non utique acceptam fastidiuit, sed nolendo accipere deseruit et amisit. proinde nec sui casus praescius esse potuit, quoniam sapientia pietatis est fructus. ille autem continuo inpius consequenter et mente caecus non ex eo, quod acceperat, cecidit, sed ex eo, quod acciperet, si subdi uoluisset deo: quod profecto quia noluit, et ab eo quod accepturus erat cecidit et potestatem illius, sub quo esse noluit, non euasit, factumque in illo est pondere meritorum, ut nec iustitiae possit lumine delectari nec ab eius sententia liberari.

When, then, it is thought that the devil never stood in the truth and never led a happy life with the angels, but fell from the very beginning of his making, this is not to be taken as meaning that he was not depraved by his own will but was created evil by the good God; otherwise he would not be said to have fallen from the beginning; for he did not fall if he was made such. Rather, as soon as he was made, he turned himself away from the light of truth, swollen with pride and corrupted by delight in his own power. Hence he did not taste the sweetness of the happy, angelic life; it is not that he received it and disdained it, but by being unwilling to receive it he forsook and lost it. Accordingly he could not foreknow his fall either, since wisdom is the fruit of godliness. But he, ungodly from the first and consequently blind in mind, fell not from what he had received but from what he would have received if he had been willing to be subject to God. Because he was not willing, he both fell from what he was to receive and did not escape the power of him under whom he refused to be; and it came about in him by the weight of his deserts that he can neither delight in the light of righteousness nor be freed from its sentence.

11.24CSEL 28.1:356–357

Quod ergo per Esaiam prophetam in eum dicitur: quomodo cecidit de caelo lucifer mane oriens? contritus est in terram qui mittebat ad omnes gentes. tu autem dixisti sensu tuo: in caelum ascendam, super sidera caeli ponam thronum meum, sedebo in monte excelso super montes excelsos, qui sunt ad aquilonem, ascendam super nubes, ero similis altissimo. nunc autem ad inferos descendes et cetera, quae in figura regis uelut Babylonis in diabolum dicta intelleguntur, plura in eius corpus conueniunt, quod etiam de humano genere congregat, et in eos maxime, qui ei per superbiam cohaerent apostatando a mandatis dei. sicut enim qui erat diabolus homo dictus est, ut in euangelio: inimicus homo hoc fecit, ita qui homo erat diabolus dictus est, ut rursus in euangelio: nonne ego uos duodecim elegi? et unus ex uobis diabolus est. et sicut corpus Christi, quod est ecclesia, dicitur Christus, sicut illud est: uos Abrahae semen estis, cum paulo superius dixisset: Abrahae dictae sunt promissiones et semini eius. non dicit: et seminibus tamquam in multis, sed tamquam in uno: et semini tuo, quod est Christus, et iterum: sicut enim corpus unum est et membra habet multa, omnia autem membra corporis cum sint multa unum est corpus, ita et Christus: eo modo etiam corpus diaboli, cui caput est diabolus, id est ipsa inpiorum multitudo maximeque eorum, qui a Christo uel de ecclesia sicut de caelo decidunt, dicitur diabolus et in ipsum corpus figurate multa dicuntur, quae non tam capiti quam corpori membrisque conueniant. itaque lucifer, qui mane oriebatur et cecidit, potest intellegi apostatarum genus uel a Christo uel ab ecclesia: quod ita conuertitur ad tenebras amissa luce, quam portabat, quemadmodum qui conuertuntur ad deum a tenebris ad lucem transeunt, id est qui fuerunt tenebrae lux fiunt.

As for what is said against him through the prophet Isaiah: “How has Lucifer, who rose in the morning, fallen from heaven? He who sent to all the nations has been crushed to the earth. But you said in your heart: I will ascend into heaven, above the stars of heaven I will set my throne, I will sit on a lofty mountain above the lofty mountains which are to the north, I will ascend above the clouds, I will be like the Most High. But now you will go down to the underworld,” and the rest, which are understood as said against the devil under the figure of the king of Babylon: most of it fits his body, which he gathers even from the human race, and above all those who cleave to him through pride by apostatizing from the commandments of God. For just as he who was the devil is called a man, as in the Gospel, “An enemy, a man, has done this,” so he who was a man is called the devil, as again in the Gospel: “Did I not choose you twelve? And one of you is a devil.” And just as the body of Christ, which is the church, is called Christ—as in the words, “You are the seed of Abraham,” when shortly before he had said, “The promises were spoken to Abraham and to his seed. He does not say ‘and to seeds,’ as of many, but as of one, ‘and to your seed,’ which is Christ”; and again, “For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so also is Christ”—in the same way the body of the devil, whose head is the devil, that is, the very multitude of the ungodly, and above all of those who fall from Christ or from the church as from heaven, is called the devil, and many things are said figuratively about that body which fit not so much the head as the body and its members. So Lucifer, who rose in the morning and fell, can be understood as the race of apostates either from Christ or from the church; which turns to darkness when it has lost the light it bore, just as those who turn to God pass from darkness to light, that is, those who were darkness become light.

11.25CSEL 28.1:357–358

Item in figura principis Tyri per Ezechielem prophetam in diabolum dicta intelleguntur: tu es signaculum similitudinis et corona decoris; in deliciis paradisi dei fuisti. omni lapide pretioso ornatus es et cetera, quae non tam in ipsum principem spiritum nequitiae quam in corpus eius dicta conueniunt. paradisus enim dicta est ecclesia, sicut legitur in Cantico canticorum: hortus conclusus, fons signatus, puteus aquae uiuae, paradisus cum fructu pomorum. inde ceciderunt uel aperta et corporali separatione omnes haeretici uel occulta et spiritali, quamuis in ea corporaliter esse uideantur, omnes conuersi ad uomitum suum cum post remissionem omnium peccatorum paululum ambulassent in uia iustitiae, in quibus facta sunt posteriora deteriora prioribus et quibus expediebat non cognoscere uiam iustitiae quam cognoscentibus retrorsum reflecti a tradito sibi sancto mandato. hanc pessimam generationem dominus describit, cum dicit spiritum nequam exire ab homine et cum aliis septem redire et in domo, quam mundatam iam inuenerat intrare, ut sint nouissima hominis illius peiora prioribus. tali enim generi hominum, quod iam factum est corpus diaboli, possunt haec uerba congruere: a die, qua creatus es tu cum cherub, id est cum sede dei, quae interpretatur "multiplicata scientia", et posui te in monte sancto dei, hoc est in ecclesia — unde est: et exaudiuit me de monte sancto suo - fuisti in medio lapidum flammeorum, id est sanctorum spiritu feruentium, lapidum uiuorum, ambulasti sine uitio tu in diebus tuis, ex quo die creatus es tu, donec inuenta sunt delicta tua in te. possunt diligentius ista tractari, ut fortassis ostendant non solum et hunc intellectum esse in his uerbis posse, sed omnino alium esse non posse.

Likewise, what is said through the prophet Ezekiel under the figure of the prince of Tyre is understood as said against the devil: “You are the seal of likeness and a crown of beauty; you were in the delights of the paradise of God; you were adorned with every precious stone,” and the rest, which fit not so much the prince himself, the spirit of wickedness, as his body. For the church is called paradise, as we read in the Song of Songs: “A garden enclosed, a fountain sealed, a well of living water, a paradise with the fruit of apples.” From it have fallen, either by open and bodily separation, all heretics, or by hidden and spiritual separation, though they seem to be in it bodily, all who have returned to their vomit after walking a little while in the way of righteousness following the remission of all their sins; in whom the last state has become worse than the first, and for whom it would have been better not to know the way of righteousness than, having known it, to turn back from the holy commandment delivered to them. This most wicked generation the Lord describes when he says that an unclean spirit goes out of a man and returns with seven others and enters the house it had found cleaned, so that the last state of that man is worse than the first. To such a kind of people, which has already become the body of the devil, these words can fit: “From the day on which you were created with the cherub”—that is, with the seat of God, which is interpreted “multiplied knowledge”—“and I set you on the holy mountain of God”—that is, in the church, whence comes, “And he heard me from his holy mountain”—“you were in the midst of fiery stones”—that is, of the saints fervent in spirit, living stones—“you walked without fault in your days, from the day on which you were created, until your offences were found in you.” These things can be treated more carefully, so as perhaps to show not only that this sense can be in these words, but that no other at all can be.

11.26CSEL 28.1:358–359

Uerum quia longum est et alium sermonem exigit eidem tantum quaestioni deputatum, nunc sufficiat ista conplexio aut ab initio conditionis suae diabolum a beatitudine, quam si uoluisset percepturus fuerat, inpia superbia cecidisse aut alios esse angelos inferioris ministerii in hoc mundo, inter quos secundum eorum quandam non praesciam beatitudinem uixerat et a quorum societate cum sibi subditis angelis suis tamquam archangelus cecidit per superbam inpietatem — si hoc ullo modo adseri potest, quod mirum si potest — aut certe rationem requirendam, quemadmodum omnes sancti angeli, si inter illos aliquando pariter beatus cum suis angelis diabolus uixit, nondum habuerint etiam ipsi certam praescientiam perpetuae felicitatis suae, sed eam post casum eius acceperint, aut quo merito ante peccatum suum diabolus cum sociis suis a ceteris angelis discretus fuerit, ut ipse sui futuri casus esset ignarus, illi autem certi permansionis suae, dum tamen et peccatores angelos minime dubitemus detrusos tamquam in carcerem caliginis huius aeriae circa terras secundum apostolicam fidem in iudicio puniendos seruari et in illa superna beatitate sanctorum angelorum non esse incertam uitam aeternam nec nobis secundum dei misericordiam et gratiam et fidelissimam pollicitationem incertam futuram, cum fuerimus eis post resurrectionem et istorum mutationem corporum copulati. ad hanc enim spem uiuimus et eius promissionis gratia recreamur. quidquid autem etiam de diabolo dici potest, cur eum deus creauerit, cum talem praesciret futurum, et cur omnipotens eius uoluntatem non conuertat in bonum, secundum ea, quae disseruimus. cum de malis hominibus similiter quaereremus, siue intellegatur siue credatur siue quid melius inueniri potest inueniatur.

But since this is a long matter and calls for another treatise devoted to that question alone, for now let this summary suffice. Either the devil fell by ungodly pride from the very beginning of his making, from the happiness he would have received had he willed to; or there are other angels of a lower ministry in this world, among whom he had lived in a certain happiness of theirs that does not foreknow, and from whose fellowship he fell, as an archangel with the angels subject to him, through proud ungodliness—if this can in any way be asserted, and it would be surprising if it can; or else we must seek a reason how all the holy angels, if the devil once lived among them equally happy with his angels, did not yet themselves have sure foreknowledge of their perpetual happiness but received it after his fall; or by what desert the devil with his companions was distinguished from the other angels before his sin, so that he was ignorant of his future fall while they were certain of their abiding. Meanwhile, let us by no means doubt that the sinning angels have been thrust down, as into a prison, into the gloom of this air around the earth, and are kept, according to the apostolic faith, to be punished at the judgment; and that in that heavenly happiness of the holy angels eternal life is not uncertain, nor will it be uncertain for us, according to God's mercy and grace and his most faithful promise, when we have been joined to them after the resurrection and the change of these bodies. For we live for this hope, and are refreshed by the grace of this promise. And whatever can be said also about the devil—why God created him when he foreknew he would be such, and why the Almighty does not turn his will to good—may be understood or believed according to what we discussed when we were asking similar questions about evil men, or, if something better can be found, let it be found.

11.27CSEL 28.1:359–360

Ab illo ergo, cuius super omnia, quae creauit, summa potestas est, per angelos sanctos, a quibus inluditur diabolus, cum et de ipsius maliuolentia consulitur ecclesiae dei, non est permissus temtare feminam nisi per serpentem nec uirum nisi per feminam. sed in serpente ipse locutus est utens eo uelut organo mouensque eius naturam eo modo, quo mouere ille et moueri illa potuit ad exprimendos uerborum sonos et signa corporalia, per quae mulier suadentis intellegeret uoluntatem. in ipsa uero muliere, quia illa rationalis creatura erat, quae motu suo posset uti ad uerba facienda, non ipse locutus est, sed eius operatio atque persuasio, quamuis occulto instinctu adiuuaret interius, quod exterius egerat per serpentem. quod quidem si solo instinctu occultius ageret, sicut egit in Iuda, ut traderet Christum, posset efficere in anima superbo amore suae potestatis induta. sed, sicut iam dixi, temtandi uoluntatem habet diabolus, in potestate autem nec ut faciat habet nec quomodo faciat. quia permissus est ergo, temtauit et, quomodo permissus est, ita temtauit; cui autem generi hominum prodeesset quod faciebat, neque sciebat neque uolebat et eo ipso inludebatur ab angelis.

So by him whose power over all that he created is supreme, acting through the holy angels by whom the devil is mocked when even his ill will is turned to the good of the church of God, the devil was not permitted to tempt the woman except through the serpent, nor the man except through the woman. In the serpent, he himself spoke, using it as an instrument and moving its nature in the way in which he could move it and it could be moved, to produce the sounds of words and bodily signs through which the woman would understand the will of the persuader. But in the woman herself, since she was a rational creature who could use her own movement to form words, it was not he who spoke but his working and persuasion, although by a hidden prompting he assisted inwardly what he had done outwardly through the serpent. Indeed, if he had acted by hidden prompting alone, as he did in Judas so that he would betray Christ, he could have accomplished it in a soul clothed with proud love of its own power. But, as I have already said, the devil has the will to tempt, but it is not in his power either that he does it or how he does it. Because he was permitted, then, he tempted; and as he was permitted, so he tempted. But for what kind of people what he was doing would be a benefit, he neither knew nor wished; and by this very fact he was mocked by the angels.

11.28CSEL 28.1:360–361

Non itaque serpens uerborum sonos intellegebat, qui ex illo fiebant ad mulierem. neque enim conuersa credenda est anima eius in naturam rationalem, quandoquidem nec ipsi homines, quorum rationalis natura est, cum daemon in eis loquitur ea passione, cui exorcista requiritur, sciunt, quid loquantur: quanto minus ille intellegeret uerborum sonos, quos per eum et ex eo diabolus illo modo faciebat, qui hominem loquentem non intellegeret, si eum a diabolica passione inmunis audiret! nam et quod putantur audire et intellegere serpentes uerba Marsorum, ut eis incantantibus prosiliant plerumque de latebris, etiam illic diabolica uis operatur, ad agnoscendam ubique prouidentiam quam rem cui rei naturali ordine subiciat et quid etiam uoluntatibus malis sapientissima potestate permittat, ut hoc magis habeat usus serpentes moueri carminibus hominum quam ullum aliud genus animantium. etiam haec enim non parua testatio est naturam primitus humanam serpentis seductam esse conloquio. gaudent enim daemones hanc sibi potestatem dari. ut ad incantationem hominum serpentes moueant, ut quolibet modo fallant quos possunt. hoc autem permittuntur ad primi facti memoriam commendandam, quo sit eis quaedam cum hoc genere familiaritas. porro ipsum primum factum ad hoc permissum est, ut per naturam serpentis significaretur generi hominum, cui erudiendo haec gesta conscribi oportebat, omnis diabolicae temtationis similitudo: quod adparebit, cum in serpentem proferri coeperit diuina sententia.

So the serpent did not understand the sounds of the words that came from it to the woman. For we must not believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even human beings, whose nature is rational, know what they are saying when a demon speaks in them in that affliction for which an exorcist is required. How much less would the serpent understand the sounds of words that the devil produced through it and out of it in that way, when it would not understand a man speaking if it heard him while free from diabolical affliction! For even in the fact that serpents are thought to hear and understand the words of the Marsi, so that at their incantations they often leap out of their hiding places, there too a diabolical power is at work; so that providence may everywhere be recognized, which subjects one thing to another in the order of nature, and what it permits even to evil wills by its most wise power; so that it is more customary for serpents to be moved by the spells of men than any other kind of animal. For this too is no small testimony that human nature was first seduced by the speech of a serpent. For demons rejoice that this power is given them, to move serpents at the incantation of men, so as to deceive whom they can in any way. And this is permitted them so as to keep alive the memory of the first deed, by which they have a certain familiarity with this kind of animal. Further, that first deed itself was permitted so that through the nature of the serpent there might be signified to the human race, for whose instruction these deeds had to be written down, the likeness of every diabolical temptation; this will appear when the divine sentence begins to be pronounced against the serpent.

11.29CSEL 28.1:361–362

Proinde prudentissimus omnium bestiarum, hoc est astutissimus, ita dictus est serpens propter astutiam diaboli, quae in illo et de illo agebat dolum, quemadmodum dicitur prudens uel astuta lingua, quam prudens uel astutus mouet ad aliquid prudenter astuteque suadendum. non enim est haec uis seu uirtus membri corporalis, quod uocatur lingua, sed utique mentis, quae utitur ea. ita etiam dictus est stilus mendax scribarum; neque enim esse mendacem pertinet nisi ad uiuentem atque sentientem. sed stilus mendax dictus est, quod per eum mendax mendaciter operetur, quemadmodum si et iste serpens mendax diceretur, quod eo diabolus tamquam stilo mendaciter uteretur. Hoc ideo commendandum putaui, ne quisquam existimans animantia rationis expertia humanum habere intellectum uel in animal rationale repente mutari seducatur in illam opinionem ridiculam et noxiam reuolutionis animarum uel hominum in bestias uel in homines bestiarum. sic ergo locutus est serpens homini, sicut asina, in qua sedebat Balaam, locuta est homini, nisi quod illud opus fuit diabolicum, hoc angelicum. habent enim quaedam boni et mali angeli opera similia, sicut Moyses et magi Pharaonis. uerum in his etiam boni angeli potentiores sunt nec mali angeli etiam talium operum quidquam possunt, nisi quod per bonos angelos permiserit deus, ut retribuatur unicuique secundum cor eius uel secundum gratiam dei utrumque iuste ac benigne per altitudinem diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae dei.

Accordingly, the serpent was called the most prudent of all the beasts, that is, the most cunning, because of the cunning of the devil, which practised deceit in it and by means of it; just as a tongue is called prudent or cunning which a prudent or cunning person moves to persuade someone prudently and cunningly. For this power or faculty does not belong to the bodily member called the tongue, but certainly to the mind that uses it. So too the pen of the scribes has been called lying; for being a liar belongs only to one who lives and perceives. But the pen is called lying because through it a liar works lyingly; just as if this serpent too were called lying, because the devil used it lyingly, like a pen. I have thought it necessary to stress this so that no one, supposing that animals without reason have human understanding or are suddenly changed into a rational animal, should be led astray into that ridiculous and harmful opinion of the transmigration of souls, whether of human beings into beasts or of beasts into human beings. So, then, the serpent spoke to the human being as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to a human being, except that that was a diabolical work and this an angelic one. For good and evil angels have some similar works, as did Moses and Pharaoh's magicians. But even in these the good angels are more powerful, and the evil angels can do nothing even of such works except what God has permitted through the good angels, so that it may be rendered to each according to his heart or according to the grace of God, both justly and kindly, through the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God.

11.30CSEL 28.1:362–364

Dixit ergo serpens mulieri: quid quia dixit deus: non edetis ab omni ligno paradisi? et dixit mulier serpenti: a fructu ligni, quod est in paradiso, edemus; de fructu autem ligni, quod est in medio paradisi, dixit deus: non edetis ex eo neque tangetis illud, ne moriamini. ideo prius interrogauit serpens et respondit hoc mulier, ut praeuaricatio esset inexcusabilis neque ullo modo dici posset id, quod praeceperat deus, oblitam fuisse mulierem, quamquam et obliuio praecepti, maxime unius et tam necessarii, ad maximam culpam damnabilis neglegentiae pertineret. uerum tamen euidentior eius transgressio est, cum memoria retinetur et tamquam in illo deus adsistens praesensque contemnitur. unde necessarium fuit, cum in psalmo diceretur: et memoria retinentibus mandata eius, addere: ut faciant ea. multi enim memoria retinent, ut contemnant ea praeuaricationis maiore peccato, ubi obliuionis nulla est excusatio. Dixit ergo serpens mulieri: non morte moriemini. sciebat enim deus, quoniam qua die manducaueritis de eo aperientur uobis oculi et eritis sicut dii, cognoscentes bonum et malum. quando his uerbis crederet mulier a bona atque utili re diuinitus se fuisse prohibitos, nisi iam inesset menti amor ille propriae potestatis et quaedam de se superba praesumtio, quae per illam temtationem fuerat conuincenda et humilianda? denique uerbis non contenta serpentis considerauit lignum uiditque bonum ad escam et decorum ad aspectum et non credens posse inde se mori, arbitror, quod putauerit deum alicuius significationis causa dixisse: si manducaueritis, morte moriemini. atque ideo sumsit de fructu eius et manducauit et dedit etiam uiro suo secum, fortassis etiam cum uerbo suasorio, quod scriptura tacens intellegendum relinquit. an forte nec suaderi iam opus erat uiro, quando illam eo cibo mortuam non esse cernebat?

So the serpent said to the woman, “Why is it that God said, You shall not eat from every tree of paradise?” And the woman said to the serpent, “Of the fruit of the trees that are in paradise we shall eat; but of the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of paradise God said, You shall not eat of it, nor shall you touch it, lest you die.” The serpent asked first, and the woman answered this, so that the transgression might be inexcusable and it could in no way be said that the woman had forgotten what God had commanded; although forgetting the commandment, especially a single one and so necessary, would have amounted to the very great guilt of damnable negligence. Still, the transgression is more evident when the commandment is kept in memory and God is despised as though standing by and present in it. Hence, when the psalm said, “And to those who keep his commandments in memory,” it was necessary to add, “to do them.” For many keep them in memory only to despise them, by the greater sin of transgression, where there is no excuse of forgetfulness. So the serpent said to the woman, “You shall not die the death. For God knew that on the day you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like gods, knowing good and evil.” When would the woman have believed from these words that they had been forbidden by God from a good and useful thing, unless there was already in her mind that love of her own power and a certain proud presumption about herself, which had to be exposed and humbled through that temptation? Finally, not content with the serpent's words, she considered the tree and saw that it was good for food and beautiful to look upon; and not believing that she could die from it, she thought, I suppose, that God had said, “If you eat, you shall die the death,” for the sake of some figurative meaning. And so she took of its fruit and ate, and gave also to her husband with her, perhaps also with a persuasive word, which Scripture passes over in silence and leaves to be understood. Or perhaps the man no longer needed to be persuaded, when he saw that she had not died from that food?

11.31CSEL 28.1:364–365

Ergo ederunt. et aperti sunt oculi amborum. quo nisi ad inuicem concupiscendum, ad peccati poenam carnis ipsius morte conceptam, ut iam esset corpus non animale tantum, quod poterat, si oboedientiam conseruarent, in meliorem spiritalemque habitum sine morte mutari, sed iam corpus mortis, in quo lex in membris repugnaret legi mentis? neque enim clausis oculis facti erant et in paradiso deliciarum caeci palpantesque oberrabant, ut uetitum lignum etiam nescientes adtingerent palpantesque fructus prohibitos ignorando. quomodo autem animalia et uolatilia adducta sunt ad Adam, ut uideret, quid ea uocaret, si non uidebat? et quomodo ipsa mulier ad uirum adducta est, quando facta est, ut de illa, quam non uidebat, diceret: hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea et cetera? postremo, quomodo uidit mulier, quia bonum est lignum in escam et quia placet oculis ad uidendum et decorum est cognoscere, si eorum clausi erant oculi? Nec tamen ideo propter unius uerbi translationem totum figurate accipiendum est. uiderit enim, quemadmodum dixerit serpens: aperientur uobis oculi. hoc enim eum scriptor libri dixisse narrauit; in qua uero significatione uel sententia dixerit, lectori considerare permisit. hoc autem, quod scriptum est: et aperti sunt oculi eorum et cognouerunt, quia nudi erant, ita scriptum est, quemadmodum omnia, quae gesta narrantur, nec tamen ideo in allegoricam narrationem nos debent ducere. neque enim et euangelista narrator dicta cuiusquam figurata ex eius persona inserebat, ac non ex persona sua, quae fuerant gesta, narrabat, cum diceret de illis duobus, quorum erat unus Cleophas, quod, cum fregisset eis dominus panem, aperti sunt oculi eorum et cognouerunt eum, quem per uiam non cognouerant, non utique clausis oculis ambulantes, sed eum cognoscere non ualentibus. sicut ergo ibi, sic nec isto loco narratio figurata est, quamuis translato uerbo scriptura usa sit, ut apertos diceret oculos, qui et antea patebant: apertos utique ad aliquid intuendum. et cogitandum, quod antea numquam aduerterant. ubi enim ad transgrediendum praeceptum audax curiositas mota est, auida experiri latentia, quidnam tacto uetito sequeretur, et noxia libertate habenas prohibitionis rumpere delectata, probabilius existimans non esse mortem, quam timuerant, secuturam — tale quippe pomum credendum est fuisse in illa arbore, cuius generis poma iam in aliis arboribus innoxia senserant — magis crediderunt posse deum peccantibus facile ignoscere, quam patienter tulerunt non cognoscere, quidnam esset uel cur eos inde cibum sumere uetuisset. mox ergo ut praeceptum transgressi sunt intrinsecus gratia deserente omnino nudati, quam typho quodam et superbo amore suae potestatis offenderant, in sua membra oculos iniecerunt eaque motu eo, quem non nouerant, concupiuerunt. ad hoc ergo aperti sunt oculi, ad quod antea non patebant, quamuis ad alia paterent.

So they ate, “and the eyes of both were opened.” To what, if not to desiring each other—the penalty of sin conceived by the death of the flesh itself—so that the body was now not only animal, which could have been changed without death into a better and spiritual condition if they had kept obedience, but now a body of death, in which the law in the members would fight against the law of the mind? For they had not been made with their eyes closed, nor were they wandering blind and groping in the paradise of delights, so that they touched the forbidden tree without knowing it and groped at the forbidden fruit in ignorance. How were the animals and birds brought to Adam to see what he would call them, if he did not see? And how was the woman herself brought to the man when she was made, so that he said of her, whom he did not see, “This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh,” and the rest? Finally, how did the woman see that the tree was good for food and that it was pleasing to the eyes to look at and beautiful to know, if their eyes were closed? Yet the whole is not to be taken figuratively because of the transferred use of one word. Let the serpent see in what sense he said, “Your eyes will be opened”; for the writer of the book narrated that he said this, but in what meaning or sense he said it, he left to the reader to consider. But what is written, “And their eyes were opened, and they knew that they were naked,” is written in the same way as all the things that are narrated as done, and yet it should not on that account lead us to an allegorical narrative. For the evangelist, as narrator, was not inserting someone's figurative words in that person's character, but was narrating in his own character what had been done, when he said of those two, one of whom was Cleopas, that when the Lord had broken bread for them their eyes were opened and they recognized him whom they had not recognized on the way—not because they were walking with closed eyes, but because they were unable to recognize him. As there, so in this place the narrative is not figurative, though Scripture used a transferred word in saying that eyes were opened that had been open before: opened, that is, to look at and think about something they had never noticed before. For when bold curiosity was stirred to transgress the commandment, eager to try hidden things, to see what would follow on touching what was forbidden, delighted to break the reins of prohibition by a harmful freedom, thinking it more probable that the death they had feared would not follow—for we must believe that the fruit on that tree was of a kind they had already found harmless on other trees—they believed more readily that God could easily forgive sinners than they patiently bore not knowing what it was, or why he had forbidden them to take food from it. As soon, then, as they had transgressed the commandment, they were stripped bare inwardly, the grace deserting them which they had offended by a certain vanity and proud love of their own power; they cast their eyes on their own members and desired them with a movement they had not known. To this, then, their eyes were opened, to which they had not been open before, though they were open to other things.

11.32CSEL 28.1:365–367

Haec mors ea die accidit, qua factum est quod deus uetuit. amisso quippe statu mirabili corpus ipsum — qui status etiam de ligno uitae uirtute mystica praebebatur, per quem nec morbo temtari nec mutari aetate potuissent, ut hoc in eorum carne quamuis adhuc animali et in melius postea commutanda iam tamen significaretur per escam ligni uitae, quod ex ipso spiritali alimento sapientiae, cuius sacramentum illud lignum erat, fit in angelis per aeternitatis participationem, ut in deterius non mutentur — hoc ergo amisso statu corpus eorum duxit morbidam et mortiferam qualitatem, quae inest etiam pecorum carni, ac per hoc etiam eundem motum, quo fit in pecoribus concumbendi adpetitus, ut succedant nascentia morientibus, sed tamen etiam in ipsa iam poena suae generositatis index anima rationalis bestialem motum in membris suae carnis erubuit eique incussit pudorem non solum, quia hoc ibi sentiebat, ubi numquam antea tale aliquid senserat, uerum etiam quod ille pudendus motus de praecepti transgressione ueniebat. ibi enim sensit, qua prius gratia uestiretur, quando in sua nuditate nihil indecens patiebatur. ibi conpletum est: domine, in uoluntate tua praestitisti decori meo uirtutem. auertisti autem faciem tuam, et factus sum conturbatus. denique illa conturbatione ad folia ficulnea cucurrerunt, succinctoria consuerunt et quia glorianda deseruerant pudenda texerunt. nec arbitror eos cogitasse aliquid in illis foliis, quod talibus congrueret contegi iam membra prurientia; sed occulto instinctu ad hoc illa conturbatione conpulsi sunt, ut etiam talis poenae suae significatio a nescientibus fieret, quae peccatorem facta conuinceret et doceret scripta lectorem.

This death befell them on the day on which what God forbade was done. For when they lost their wonderful condition—a condition provided even for the body by the tree of life through a mystical power, by which they could neither be assailed by disease nor changed by age, so that this was already signified in their flesh, though still animal and later to be changed for the better, through the food of the tree of life; which happens in the angels from the spiritual nourishment of wisdom itself, of which that tree was a sacrament, through participation in eternity, so that they are not changed for the worse—when, then, this condition was lost, their body took on a diseased and death-bearing quality, which is present also in the flesh of cattle, and therefore also the same movement by which in cattle the appetite for mating arises, so that those being born may succeed those who die. Yet even in that punishment the rational soul, showing its noble birth, blushed at the bestial movement in the members of its flesh and struck shame into it, not only because it felt this there where it had never before felt anything of the kind, but also because that shameful movement came from the transgression of the commandment. For there it felt with what grace it had been clothed before, when in its nakedness it suffered nothing unseemly. There was fulfilled: “Lord, in your will you gave strength to my beauty; but you turned away your face, and I became troubled.” Finally, in that trouble they ran to the fig leaves, sewed girdles, and, because they had deserted what was to be gloried in, covered what was to be ashamed of. Nor do I think they had in mind anything in those leaves that made them fit for covering members that now itched; but by a hidden prompting they were driven to this in that trouble, so that even such a signification of their punishment might be made by people who did not know it, which as an act would convict the sinner and as a writing would teach the reader.

11.33CSEL 28.1:367–368

Et audierunt uocem domini dei ambulantis in paradiso ad uesperam. ea quippe hora tales iam conuenerat uisitari, qui defecerant a luce ueritatis. fortassis autem aliis intrinsecus uel effabilibus uel ineffabilibus modis deus cum illis antea loquebatur, sicut etiam cum angelis loquitur ipsa incommutabili ueritate inlustrans mentes eorum, ubi est intellectus nosse simul quaecumque etiam per tempora non fiunt simul: forte, inquam, sic cum eis loquebatur, etsi non tanta participatione diuinae sapientiae, quantam capiunt angeli, tamen pro humano modulo, quantumlibet minus, sed ipso genere uisitationis et locutionis; fortassis etiam illo qui fit per creaturam siue in extasi spiritus corporalibus imaginibus siue ipsis sensibus corporis aliqua specie praesentata uel ad uidendum uel ad audiendum, sicut in angelis suis solet uideri deus uel sonare per nubem. nunc tamen quod audierunt uocem dei ambulantis in paradiso ad uesperam, nonnisi per creaturam uisibiliter factum est, ne substantia illa inuisibilis et ubique tota, quae patris et filii est et spiritus sancti, corporalibus eorum sensibus locali et temporali motu adparuisse credatur. Et absconderunt se Adam et mulier eius a facie domini in medio ligno, quod est in paradiso. cum deus auertit intrinsecus faciem suam et fit homo conturbatus, non miremur haec fieri, quae similia sunt dementiae, per nimium pudorem ac timorem illo quoque occulto instinctu non quiescente, ut ea nescientes facerent, quae aliquid significarent quandoque scituris posteris, propter quos ista conscripta sunt.

“And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise toward evening.” That hour was now fitting for visiting such people, who had fallen away from the light of truth. Perhaps before this God used to speak with them inwardly in other ways, whether expressible or inexpressible, as he also speaks with the angels, illuminating their minds by the unchangeable truth itself, where there is understanding to know at once all things, even those that do not happen at once in time. Perhaps, I say, he spoke with them in this way, even if not with as great a participation in divine wisdom as the angels receive, yet in human measure, however much less, but in the very same kind of visitation and speech. Perhaps also in that kind which happens through a creature, whether in ecstasy of the spirit through bodily images or to the bodily senses themselves, some appearance being presented to be seen or heard, as God is often seen in his angels or makes his voice sound through a cloud. Now, however, their hearing the voice of God walking in paradise toward evening was done visibly only through a creature, lest it be believed that the invisible substance, everywhere whole, which is of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, appeared to their bodily senses by movement in place and time. “And Adam and his wife hid themselves from the face of the Lord in the midst of the trees that are in paradise.” When God turns away his face inwardly and a man becomes troubled, let us not wonder that these things happen, which are like madness, through excessive shame and fear—that hidden prompting also not being at rest—so that without knowing it they did things that would signify something to descendants who would one day know, for whose sake these things were written.

11.34CSEL 28.1:368–369

Et uocauit dominus deus Adam et dixit illi: Adam ubi es? increpantis uox est, non ignorantis. et hoc sane ad aliquam pertinet significationem, quod sicut praeceptum uiro datum est, per quem perueniret ad feminam, ita uir prior interrogatur; praeceptum enim a domino per uirum usque ad feminam, peccatum autem a diabolo per feminam usque ad uirum. haec mysticis significationibus plena sunt non id agentibus, in quibus facta sunt, sed de his agente potentissima sapientia dei. non autem nunc significata reseramus, sed gesta defendimus. Respondit ergo Adam: uocem tuam audiui in paradiso et timui, quia nudus sum, et abscondi me. satis probabile est solere deum per creaturam tali actioni congruam in forma humana primis illis hominibus adparere; quos tamen numquam permisit aduertere nuditatem suam eorum intentionem in superna sustollens, nisi post peccatum pudendum in membris motum poenali membrorum lege sensissent. sic ergo adfecti sunt, ut solent adfici homines sub oculis hominum; et talis adfectio de peccati poena erat eum latere uelle, quem latere nihil potest, et ab eo carnem occultare, qui cordis inspector est. sed quid mirum, si superbe uolentes esse sicut dii euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum? se quippe dixerunt esse sapientes in abundantia sua et illo auertente faciem stulti facti sunt. quod enim iam ipsos pudebat erga se ipsos, unde sibi et succinctoria fecerant, multo uehementius ab illo etiam sic succincti uideri uerebantur, qui tamquam familiari temperamento ad eos uidendos per creaturam uisibilem uelut humanos oculos adferebat. si enim propterea sic adparebat, ut homines tamquam cum homine loquerentur, quemadmodum Abraham ad quercum Mambrae, illa ipsa prope amicitia pudore onerabat post peccatum, quae fiduciam dabat ante peccatum; nec iam illam nuditatem audebant ostendere talibus oculis, quae displicebat et suis.

“And the Lord God called Adam and said to him, Adam, where are you?” It is the voice of one rebuking, not of one ignorant. And this certainly bears on some meaning: that just as the commandment was given to the man, through whom it was to reach the woman, so the man is questioned first. For the commandment came from the Lord through the man to the woman, but sin from the devil through the woman to the man. These things are full of mystical meanings, not because those in whom they happened intended them, but because the most powerful wisdom of God was at work concerning them. Now, however, we are not unlocking the meanings but defending the events. So Adam answered, “I heard your voice in paradise and was afraid, because I am naked, and I hid myself.” It is quite probable that God was accustomed to appear to those first human beings in human form through a creature suited to such an action; yet he never allowed them to notice their nakedness, raising their attention to things above, until after their sin they had felt the shameful movement in their members by the penal law of the members. So they were affected as people usually are under the eyes of other people; and such an affection, coming from the penalty of sin, was to want to hide from him from whom nothing can be hidden, and to conceal their flesh from him who is the inspector of the heart. But what wonder if, proudly wishing to be like gods, they became futile in their thoughts and their foolish heart was darkened? For they said they were wise in their abundance, and when he turned away his face they became fools. For what they were already ashamed of before each other, for which they had also made themselves girdles, they feared much more vehemently to be seen by him, even girdled as they were, who, with a kind of familiar adaptation, brought something like human eyes through a visible creature to look upon them. For if he appeared in such a way that human beings spoke as with a man, as Abraham did at the oak of Mamre, that very nearness of friendship which gave them confidence before sin weighed them down with shame after sin; and they no longer dared to show to such eyes that nakedness which displeased even their own.

11.35CSEL 28.1:369–370

Dominus ergo uolens iam peccatores more iustitiae interrogatos punire amplius quam illa erat poena, de qua iam cogebantur erubescere, quis nuntiauit, inquit, tibi, quia nudus es, nisi a ligno quod praeceperam tibi tantum ne ex eo manducares ab eo edisti? hinc enim mors concepta propter dei sententiam, qui sic fuerat comminatus, fecit aduerti concupiscentialiter membra, ubi dicti sunt aperti oculi, et secutum est, quod puderet. et dixit Adam: mulier, quam dedisti mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, et edi. superbia! numquid dixit: peccaui? habet deformitatem confusionis et non habet confessionis humilitatem. ad hoc ista conscripta sunt, quia et ipsae interrogationes nimirum ad hoc factae sunt, ut et ueraciter et utiliter scriberentur, quia, si mendaciter, non utique utiliter, ut aduertamus, quo morbo superbiae laborent homines hodie nonnisi in creatorem conantes referre, si quid egerint mali, cum sibi uelint tribui, si quid egerint boni. mulier, inquit, quam dedisti mecum, id est quam dedisti, ut esset mecum, haec mihi dedit a ligno, et edi: quasi ad hoc data sit, ut non ipsa potius oboediret uiro et ambo deo. Et dixit dominus deus mulieri: quid hoc fecisti? et dixit mulier: serpens seduxit me, et manducaui. nec ista confitetur peccatum, sed in alterum refert inpari sexu, pari fastu. ex his tamen natus est nec eos imitatus est. sed plane pluribus malis exercitus, qui dixit et dicet usque ad terminum saeculi: ego dixi: domine, miserere mei; sana animam meam, quoniam peccaui tibi. quanto melius sic et isti! sed adhuc ceruices peccatorum non conciderat dominus. restabant labores, dolores, mortes et omnis contritio saeculi et gratia dei, qua tempore oportuno subuenit hominibus, quos adflictos docuit non de se ipsis debere praesumere. serpens, inquit, seduxit me, et manducaui: quasi cuiusquam suasio praecepto dei debuerit anteponi.

So the Lord, wishing now to punish the sinners, questioned in the manner of justice, more than by that penalty at which they were already compelled to blush, said, “Who told you that you were naked, unless you have eaten of the tree of which alone I had commanded you not to eat?” For from this, death conceived because of the sentence of God, who had so threatened, caused them to notice their members with concupiscence, where their eyes are said to have been opened, and there followed what made them ashamed. “And Adam said, The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I ate.” Pride! Did he say, “I have sinned”? He has the deformity of confusion and not the humility of confession. These things were written down for this purpose—since the questions themselves were surely asked so that they might be written both truly and usefully, for if falsely, then certainly not usefully—that we may notice with what disease of pride people labour today, trying to refer to the Creator whatever evil they have done, while they want whatever good they have done credited to themselves. “The woman,” he says, “whom you gave to be with me,” that is, whom you gave so that she might be with me, “she gave me of the tree, and I ate”: as though she had been given for this, and not rather that she should obey her husband and both obey God. “And the Lord God said to the woman, Why have you done this? And the woman said, The serpent deceived me, and I ate.” Neither does she confess her sin, but refers it to another: of unequal sex, of equal arrogance. Yet from them was born, though he did not imitate them, but was plainly exercised by many evils, he who said and will say to the end of the age, “I said, Lord, have mercy on me; heal my soul, for I have sinned against you.” How much better if these two had spoken so! But the Lord had not yet cut off the necks of sinners. There still remained toils, griefs, deaths, and all the crushing of the age, and the grace of God, by which at the fitting time he comes to the help of human beings, whom by affliction he taught not to presume on themselves. “The serpent,” she says, “deceived me, and I ate”: as though anyone's persuasion ought to have been put before the commandment of God.

11.36CSEL 28.1:370–371

Et dixit dominus deus serpenti: quia fecisti hoc, maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus et ab omnibus bestiis, quae sunt super terram. super pectus tuum et uentrem tuum ambulabis et terram edes omnes dies uitae tuae. et inimicitias ponam inter te et inter mulierem et inter semen tuum et inter semen eius. ipsa tibi seruabit caput, et tu seruabis eius calcaneum. tota ista sententia figurata est nec aliud ei debet scriptoris fides narrationisque ueritas, nisi ne illam dictam fuisse dubitemus. quod enim positum est: et dixit dominus deus serpenti, uerba scribentis sunt; haec exigenda sunt per proprietatem. hoc ergo uerum est dictum esse serpenti. iam cetera uerba dei sunt, quae libero lectoris intellectui relinquuntur, utrum proprie an figurate accipi debeant, sicut in exordio uoluminis huius nostri praelocuti sumus. proinde quod serpens, cur hoc fecerit, non est interrogatus, potest uideri, quod non ipse utique id in sua natura et uoluntate fecerat, sed diabolus de illo et per illum et in illo fuerat operatus, qui iam ex peccato inpietatis ac superbiae suae igni destinatus fuerat sempiterno. nunc ergo quod serpenti dicitur et ad eum, qui per serpentem operatus est, utique refertur, procul dubio figuratum est; nam his uerbis temtator ille describitur, qualis generi humano futurus esset, quod genus humanum propagari tunc coepit, quando haec in diabolum est tamquam in serpentem prolata sententia. haec itaque uerba quomodo figuris expositis accipienda sint, et in illis duobus aduersus Manichaeos editis libris de Genesi, quantum potuimus, disseruimus et, si quid diligentius et congruentius alias potuerimus, deus aderit, ut efficiamus; nunc tamen nostra intentio in aliud quam suscepimus nullo exigente auertenda est.

“And the Lord God said to the serpent, Because you have done this, you are cursed above all cattle and above all the beasts that are upon the earth. Upon your breast and your belly you shall go, and earth you shall eat all the days of your life. And I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed. She will watch for your head, and you will watch for her heel.” This whole sentence is figurative, and the writer's trustworthiness and the truth of the narrative require nothing of it except that we not doubt that it was spoken. For the words “And the Lord God said to the serpent” are the writer's words; these must be taken in their proper sense. This, then, is true: that it was said to the serpent. The rest are now God's words, which are left to the free understanding of the reader, whether they should be taken properly or figuratively, as we said at the beginning of this volume. Accordingly, the fact that the serpent was not asked why it did this may be seen as indicating that it had not done this in its own nature and will, but that the devil had worked by it, through it, and in it, the devil who was already destined for everlasting fire because of the sin of his ungodliness and pride. Now, then, what is said to the serpent, and is certainly referred to him who worked through the serpent, is beyond doubt figurative; for by these words that tempter is described, such as he would be to the human race, which began to be propagated only when this sentence was pronounced against the devil as against the serpent. How these words are to be taken, with their figures explained, we have discussed as far as we could in those two books on Genesis published against the Manichaeans, and if we can do so more carefully and fittingly elsewhere, God will be present to help us accomplish it; but now our purpose must not be turned aside to something other than what we have undertaken, when nothing requires it.

11.37CSEL 28.1:371–373

Et mulieri dixit: multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas et gemitum tuum; in tristitiis paries filios, et ad uirum tuum conuersio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur. haec quoque in mulierem dei uerba figurate ac prophetice multo commodius intelleguntur. uerum tamen. quia nondum pepererat femina nec dolor et gemitus parientis nisi ex corpore mortis est, quae illa praecepti transgressione concepta est, animalibus quidem etiam tunc membris, sed si homo non peccasset, non utique morituris et alio quodam statu feliciore uicturis, donec post uitam bene gestam in melius mutari mererentur, sicut iam supra pluribus locis insinuauimus, refertur haec poena et ad proprietatem litterae, nisi quia id, quod dictum est: et ad uirum tuum conuersio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur, uidendum est, quemadmodum proprie possit accipi. neque enim et ante peccatum aliter factam fuisse decet credere mulierem, nisi ut uir ei dominaretur et ad eum ipsa seruiendo conuerteretur. sed recte accipi potest hanc seruitutem significatam, quae cuiusdam condicionis est potius quam dilectionis, ut etiam ipsa talis seruitus, qua homines hominibus postea serui esse coeperunt, de poena peccati reperiatur exorta. dixit quidem apostolus: per caritatem seruite inuicem; sed nequaquam diceret: inuicem dominamini. possunt itaque coniuges per caritatem seruire inuicem; sed mulierem non permittit apostolus dominari in uirum. hoc enim uiro potius sententia dei detulit et maritum habere dominum meruit mulieris non natura, sed culpa: quod tamen nisi seruetur, deprauabitur amplius natura et augebitur culpa.

“And to the woman he said, I will greatly multiply your sorrows and your groaning; in sorrows you shall bear children, and your turning shall be to your husband, and he shall rule over you.” These words of God against the woman too are much more suitably understood figuratively and prophetically. Nevertheless, since the woman had not yet given birth, and the pain and groaning of one giving birth come only from the body of death, which was conceived through that transgression of the commandment—members that were animal even then, but which, if man had not sinned, would certainly not have died and would have lived in another, happier condition, until after a well-spent life they deserved to be changed for the better, as we have already suggested above in several places—this punishment is referred also to the proper sense of the letter. Only the words “and your turning shall be to your husband, and he shall rule over you” must be examined, as to how they can be taken in the proper sense. For it is not fitting to believe that even before sin the woman was made otherwise than that the man should rule her and she should turn to him in service. But it can rightly be taken that the servitude signified here is one of a certain condition rather than of love, so that even that servitude by which human beings later began to be slaves to human beings is found to have arisen from the punishment of sin. The apostle did indeed say, “Through love serve one another”; but he would by no means say, “Rule one another.” So spouses can serve one another through love; but the apostle does not permit the woman to rule over the man. For God's sentence conferred this rather on the man, and it was not by nature but by fault that the woman deserved to have her husband as lord; yet unless this is kept, nature will be depraved further and the fault increased.

11.38CSEL 28.1:373

Dixit ergo et ad uirum eius: quia audisti uocem mulieris tuae et edisti de ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi de eo solo non edere, maledicta terra in operibus tuis; in tristitiis edes illam omnes dies uitae tuae. spinas et tribulos edet tibi, et edes fenum agri. in sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec conuertaris in terram, ex qua sumtus es, quia terra es, et in terram ibis. hos esse in terra labores humani generis quis ignorat? et quia non essent, si felicitas quae in paradiso fuerat teneretur, non est utique dubitandum; ac per hoc etiam proprie uerba haec primitus accipere ne pigeat. seruanda tamen est et expectanda significatio prophetiae, quam maxime hic intuetur dei loquentis intentio. neque enim frustra et ipse Adam miro quodam instinctu tunc uocauit nomen mulieris suae "Uitam", subiciens etiam: quoniam ista est mater omnium uiuentium. nam et haec non scriptoris narrantis uel adfirmantis, sed ipsius primi hominis uerba intellegenda sunt, ut diceret: quoniam haec est mater omnium uiuentium, tamquam nominis a se inpositi causam inferens, cur eam uocauerit "Uitam".

So he said also to her husband, “Because you listened to the voice of your wife and ate of the tree of which alone I had commanded you not to eat, cursed is the earth in your works; in sorrows you shall eat of it all the days of your life. Thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you, and you shall eat the grass of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread, until you return to the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and to earth you shall go.” Who does not know that these are the toils of the human race on earth? And that they would not exist if the happiness that had been in paradise had been kept, there is certainly no doubt; and so let us not be reluctant to take these words first in their proper sense. Yet the prophetic meaning must be kept in mind and looked for, which the intention of God as he speaks has chiefly in view here. For it was not for nothing that Adam himself then, by some wonderful prompting, called the name of his wife “Life,” adding also, “because she is the mother of all the living.” For these too are to be understood as the words not of the writer narrating or affirming, but of the first man himself, so that he said, “because she is the mother of all the living,” as if giving the reason for the name he had given her, why he called her “Life.”

11.39CSEL 28.1:373–374

Et fecit dominus deus Adae et mulieri eius tunicas pelliceas et induit eos. et hoc significationis gratia factum est, sed tamen factum, sicut illa, quae significationis gratia dicta sunt, sed tamen dicta sunt. hoc enim, quod saepe dixi nec me saepius piget dicere, a narratore rerum proprie gestarum exigendum est, ut ea narret facta esse quae facta sunt et dicta esse quae dicta sunt. sicut autem in factis quaeritur, quid factum sit et quid significet, ita in uerbis, et quid dictum sit et quid significet. siue enim figurate siue proprie dictum sit, quod dictum esse narratur, dictum tamen esse non debet putari figuratum. Et dixit deus: ecce Adam factus est tamquam unus ex nobis in cognoscendo bonum et malum. quoniam hoc, per quodlibet et quomodolibet dictum sit, deus tamen dixit, non aliter intellegendum est, quod ait: unus ex nobis, nisi propter trinitatem numerus pluralis accipiatur, sicut dictum erat: faciamus hominem, sicut etiam dominus de se et patre: ueniemus ad eum et mansionem apud eum faciemus. replicatum est igitur in caput superbi, quo exitu concupiuerit quod a serpente suggestum est: et eritis sicut dii, ecce, inquit, Adam factus est tamquam unus ex nobis. uerba enim sunt haec dei, non tam huic insultantis quam ceteros, ne ita superbiant, deterrentis, propter quos ista conscripta sunt. factus est, inquit, tamquam unus ex nobis in cognoscendo bonum et malum. quid aliud intellegendum nisi exemplum timoris incutiendi esse propositum, quod non solum non fuerit factus, qualis fieri uoluit, sed nec illud, quod factus fuerat, conseruauit?

“And the Lord God made for Adam and his wife garments of skin and clothed them.” This too was done for the sake of a meaning, but nevertheless done; just as those things which were said for the sake of a meaning were nevertheless said. For this, which I have often said and do not mind saying more often, must be required of a narrator of things done in the proper sense: that he narrate as done what was done and as said what was said. And just as with deeds one asks both what was done and what it signifies, so with words one asks both what was said and what it signifies. For whether what is narrated as said was said figuratively or properly, that it was said must not be thought figurative. “And God said, Behold, Adam has become like one of us in knowing good and evil.” Since this, through whatever means and in whatever way it was said, was nevertheless said by God, the words “one of us” are to be understood in no other way than that the plural number is taken because of the Trinity, as it had been said, “Let us make man,” and as the Lord also said of himself and the Father, “We will come to him and make our dwelling with him.” So there was turned back upon the head of the proud man the outcome of his desire for what the serpent had suggested, “And you will be like gods”: “Behold,” he says, “Adam has become like one of us.” For these are words of God not so much mocking him as deterring others, for whose sake these things were written, from being proud in the same way. “He has become,” he says, “like one of us in knowing good and evil.” What else is to be understood but that an example was set forth to strike fear, because not only did he not become what he wanted to become, but he did not even keep what he had been made?

11.40CSEL 28.1:374–375

Et nunc, inquit deus, ne aliquando extendat manum et sumat de ligno uitae et edat et uiuat in aeternum. et dimisit illum dominus deus de paradiso uoluptatis operari terram, ex qua sumtus est. superiora uerba dei sunt; hoc autem factum propter ipsa uerba secutum est. alienatus enim a uita non solum quam fuerat, si praeceptum seruasset, cum angelis accepturus, sed ab illa etiam, quam ducebat in paradiso felici quodam corporis statu, separari utique debuit a ligno uitae. siue quod ex ipso illi subsisteret felix ille ipse status corporis ex re uisibili, uirtute inuisibili, siue quod in eo esset et sacramentum uisibile inuisibilis sapientiae, alienandus inde utique fuerat uel iam moriturus uel etiam tamquam excommunicatus, sicut etiam in hoc paradiso, id est ecclesia solent a sacramentis altaris uisibilibus homines disciplina ecclesiastica remoueri. Et eiecit Adam et conlocauit eum contra paradisum uoluptatis. et hoc significandi gratia factum est, sed tamen factum, ut contra paradisum, quo beata uita etiam spiritaliter significabatur, habitaret peccator utique in miseria. et ordinauit Cherubin et flammeam romphaeam, quae uertitur, custodire uiam ligni uitae. hoc per caelestes utique potestates etiam in paradiso uisibili factum esse credendum est, ut per angelicum ministerium esset illic ignea quaedam custodia: non tamen frustra factum esse nisi quia significat aliquid etiam de spiritali paradiso non est utique dubitandum.

“And now,” God said, “lest at some time he stretch out his hand and take of the tree of life and eat, and live for ever.” “And the Lord God sent him out of the paradise of delight to till the earth from which he was taken.” The first are words of God; this deed followed because of those words. For, estranged from life—not only from the life that he would have received with the angels had he kept the commandment, but also from that which he was leading in paradise in a certain happy condition of the body—he certainly had to be separated from the tree of life; whether because that very happy condition of the body was sustained for him by it, from a visible thing by an invisible power, or because there was in it also a visible sacrament of invisible wisdom; he certainly had to be estranged from it, either as one now going to die or also as one excommunicated, just as also in this paradise, that is, the church, people are customarily removed by church discipline from the visible sacraments of the altar. “And he cast Adam out and placed him opposite the paradise of delight.” This too was done for the sake of signifying, but nevertheless done: that the sinner should dwell in misery opposite the paradise by which the happy life was also signified spiritually. “And he stationed the Cherubim and the flaming sword which turns, to guard the way to the tree of life.” We must believe that this was done through heavenly powers in the visible paradise as well, so that through the ministry of angels there was a kind of fiery guard there; yet we must certainly not doubt that it was not done in vain, but because it signifies something also about the spiritual paradise.

11.41CSEL 28.1:375–376

Non autem ignoro quibusdam esse uisum festinatione praeuertisse illos homines adpetitum scientiae boni et mali et inmaturo tempore percipere uoluisse, quod eis dilatum oportunius seruabatur idque egisse temtatorem, ut praecerpendo, quod nondum talibus congruebat, offenderent deum et ab eius rei utilitate alienarentur exclusi atque damnati, ad quam si suo tempore, sicut deus uolebat, accederent, possent ea salubriter perfrui. hoc, si forte lignum illud non ad proprietatem ut uerum lignum et uera poma eius, sed ad figuram uelint accipere, habeat exitum aliquem rectae fidei ueritatique probabilem. Uisum est et quibusdam duos illos primos homines nuptias suas fuisse furatos et ante mixtos esse concubitu, quam eos qui creauerat copulasset: quam rem nomine ligni fuisse significatam, unde prohibiti erant, donec oportuno tempore iungerentur. quasi uero in ea aetate facti esse credendi sunt, ut expectanda esset maturitas pubertatis, aut non illud tunc legitimum esset, cum primum fieri potuisset, cum autem non potuisset, non utique fieret; nisi forte sponsa erat a patre tradenda et expectanda erat uotorum sollemnitas et conuiuii celebritas et dotis aestimatio et conscriptio tabularum. ridiculum istuc est; praeter quod a rerum gestarum proprietate discedit, quam suscepimus adserendam et, quantum deus donare uoluit, adseruimus.

I am not unaware that some have thought that those human beings anticipated in haste their desire for the knowledge of good and evil and wished to receive at an unripe time what was being kept for them, postponed, for a more suitable time; and that the tempter brought this about so that, by plucking prematurely what did not yet suit such as they were, they would offend God and, excluded and condemned, be estranged from the benefit of that thing, which, had they approached it in its own time as God willed, they could have enjoyed to their salvation. If such people choose to take that tree not literally, as a real tree with real fruit, but figuratively, this view may have some outcome that is probable and consistent with right faith and truth. It has also seemed to some that those first two human beings stole their marriage and came together in intercourse before he who had created them joined them; and that this was signified by the name of the tree from which they had been forbidden, until they should be joined at the fitting time. As though they are to be believed to have been made at an age when the maturity of puberty had to be awaited; or as though it would not have been lawful then, as soon as it could first be done, whereas when it could not be done it certainly would not be done! Unless perhaps the bride had to be given away by her father, and the solemnity of vows and the celebration of a banquet, the valuation of the dowry and the drawing up of the marriage contract had to be awaited. That is ridiculous; besides which it departs from the proper sense of the events, which we undertook to assert and have asserted as far as God was pleased to grant.

11.42CSEL 28.1:376–379

Illud magis mouet, si iam spiritalis erat Adam, quamuis mente, non corpore, quomodo credere potuerit, quod per serpentem dictum est, ideo deum prohibuisse, ne fructu ligni illius uescerentur, quia sciebat eos, si fecissent, futuros ut deos propter dinoscentiam boni et mali, tamquam hoc tantum bonum creaturae suae creator inuiderit. hoc mirum si homo spiritali mente praeditus credere potuisset. an quia hoc credere ipse non posset, propterea mulier addita est, quae parui intellectus esset et adhuc fortasse secundum sensum carnis, non secundum spiritum mentis uiueret, et hoc est, quod ei apostolus non tribuit imaginem dei? sic enim ait: uir quidem non debet uelare caput, cum sit imago et gloria dei; mulier autem gloria uiri est, non quo mens feminae eandem imaginem capere non possit, cum in illa gratia nos dicat nec masculum esse nec feminam, sed quod fortassis illa hoc nondum perceperat, quod fit in agnitione dei et uiro regente ac dispensante paulatim fuerat perceptura neque enim frustra et illud, quod apostolus ait: Adam enim primus formatus est, deinde Eua. et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praeuaricatione facta est, id est ut per illam etiam uir praeuaricaretur. nam et ipsum dicit praeuaricatorem, ubi ait: in similitudinem praeuaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri, seductum tamen negat. nam et interrogatus non ait: mulier, quam dedisti mecum, seduxit me, et manducaui, sed, ipsa mihi, inquit, dedit a ligno, et manducaui; illa uero, serpens, inquit, seduxit me. Ita Salomon, uir tantae sapientiae, numquidnam credendum est, quod in simulacrorum cultu credidit esse aliquid utilitatis? sed mulierum amori ad hoc malum trahenti resistere non ualuit, faciens quod sciebat non esse faciendum, ne suas, quibus deperibat atque defluebat, mortiferas delicias contristaret. ita et Adam, posteaquam de ligno prohibito seducta mulier manducauit eique dedit, ut simul ederent, noluit eam contristare, quam credebat posse sine suo solacio contabescere, si ab eius alienaretur animo, et omnino illa interire discordia, non quidem carnis uictus concupiscentia, quam nondum senserat in resistente lege membrorum legi mentis suae, sed amicali quadam beniuolentia, qua plerumque fit, ut offendatur deus, ne homo ex amico fiat inimicus: quod eum facere non debuisse diuinae sententiae iustus exitus indicauit. Ergo alio modo quodam etiam ipse deceptus est; sed dolo illo serpentino, quo mulier seducta est, nullo modo illum arbitror potuisse seduci. hanc autem proprie seductionem appellauit apostolus, qua id, quod suadebatur, cum falsum esset, uerum putatum est, id est quod deus ideo lignum illud tangere prohibuerit, quod sciebat eos, si tetigissent, uelut deos futuros, tamquam eis diuinitatem inuideret, qui eos homines fecerat. sed etiam si uirum propter aliquam mentis elationem, quae deum internorum scrutatorem latere non poterat, sollicitauit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum mulierem uideret accepta illa esca non esse mortuam, secundum ea, quae superius tractauimus, non tamen eum arbitror, si iam spiritali mente praeditus erat, ullo modo credere potuisse, quod eos deus ab esca illius ligni inuidendo uetuisset. sed quid plura? persuasum est illud peccatum, sicut persuaderi talibus posset; conscriptum est autem, sicut legi ab omnibus oporteret, etsi a paucis haec intellegerentur, sicut oporteret.

This is more troubling: if Adam was already spiritual, in mind though not in body, how could he have believed what was said through the serpent, that God had forbidden them to eat the fruit of that tree because he knew that if they did they would be like gods through discerning good and evil, as though the Creator begrudged his creature so great a good? It would be a wonder if a man endowed with a spiritual mind could have believed this. Or was it because he could not believe it himself that the woman was added, who was of small understanding and perhaps still lived according to the sense of the flesh, not according to the spirit of the mind; and is this why the apostle does not attribute the image of God to her? For he says, “A man ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man.” This is not because a woman's mind cannot receive the same image, since he says that in that grace there is neither male nor female, but because perhaps she had not yet received what comes about in the knowledge of God, and was to receive it gradually under the man's guidance and direction. For not in vain is that too which the apostle says: “For Adam was formed first, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and came to be in transgression,” that is, so that through her the man also transgressed. For he calls him too a transgressor, where he says, “in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a type of the one to come”; yet he denies that he was deceived. For when questioned, Adam did not say, “The woman whom you gave to be with me deceived me, and I ate,” but, “She gave me of the tree, and I ate”; whereas she said, “The serpent deceived me.” So, Solomon, a man of such great wisdom—are we to believe that he believed there was any use in the worship of idols? But he could not resist his love for women, which drew him to this evil, doing what he knew should not be done, lest he grieve the deadly delights for which he was pining away and wasting. So too Adam, after the deceived woman had eaten from the forbidden tree and given it to him so that they might eat together, did not want to grieve her, whom he believed might waste away without his comfort if she were estranged from his affection, and perish altogether in that discord; not indeed overcome by the concupiscence of the flesh, which he had not yet felt in the law of the members resisting the law of his mind, but by a certain friendly goodwill, by which it very often happens that God is offended lest a friend be made an enemy. That he ought not to have done this the just outcome of the divine sentence showed. So he too was deceived in some other way; but by that serpent's guile by which the woman was deceived I think he could by no means have been deceived. The apostle properly called it deception when what was being urged, though false, was thought true: namely, that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because he knew that if they touched it they would be like gods, as though he who had made them human begrudged them divinity. But even if some desire to try it stirred the man, because of some exaltation of mind that could not be hidden from God, the searcher of inward things, when he saw that the woman had not died after taking that food, according to what we discussed above, still I do not think that, if he was already endowed with a spiritual mind, he could in any way have believed that God had forbidden them the food of that tree out of envy. But why say more? That sin was urged as it could be urged on such as they were; and it was written down as it ought to be read by all, even if these things would be understood by few as they ought to be.

Chapter 12

12.1CSEL 28.1:379–380

Ab exordio scripturae sanctae, quae inscribitur Genesis, donec homo primus de paradiso dimissus est, undecim libris siue adserendo atque defendendo, quae certa nobis sunt, siue inquirendo, arbitrando, ambigendo de incertis, quae potuimus et sicut potuimus, disseruimus atque conscripsimus, non tam praescribentes de rebus obscuris unicuique quid sentiat, quam nos docendos in quibus dubitauimus ostendentes temeritatemque adfirmandi amouentes a lectore, ubi non ualuimus praebere scientiae firmitatem. iste autem duodecimus liber ea iam cura expeditus, qua nos pertractandus textus sacrarum litterarum occupabat, liberius atque prolixius uersabit de paradiso quaestionem, ne putemur euitasse, quod uidetur apostolus in tertio caelo insinuare paradisum, ubi ait: scio hominem in Christo ante annos quattuordecim, siue in corpore nescio, siue extra corpus nescio, deus scit, raptum eius modi usque in tertium caelum. et scio eius modi hominem, siue in corpore siue extra corpus nescio, deus scit, quia raptus est in paradisum et audiuit ineffabilia uerba, quae non licet homini loqui. In his uerbis primum quaeri solet, quid dicat tertium caelum, deinde, utrum illic uoluerit intellegi paradisum, an, posteaquam raptus est in tertium caelum, raptum esse et in paradisum, ubicumque sit paradisus, non ut hoc fuerit rapi in tertium caelum, quod in paradisum, sed prius in tertium caelum et post inde in paradisum. et hoc sic ambiguum est, ut non mihi uideatur posse dissolui, nisi aliquis non ex praesentibus apostoli uerbis, sed ex aliis forte scripturarum locis uel ratione perspicua inueniat aliquid, quo doceat siue in tertio caelo esse paradisum siue non esse, cum et ipsum tertium caelum quid sit non liquido adpareat, utrum in rebus corporalibus, an forte in spiritalibus intellegendum sit. posset quidem dici nonnisi in locum aliquem corporalem hominem rapi potuisse cum corpore; sed quia et hoc ita posuit, ut nescire se dixerit, utrum in corpore an extra corpus raptus sit, quis audeat dicere se scire, quod se nescire apostolus dixit? uerum tamen si neque spiritus sine corpore ad loca corporalia rapi potest nec corpus ad spiritalia, haec ipsa dubitatio eius uelut cogit intellegi — siquidem de se ipso haec eum scripsisse nemo ambigit — tale fuisse illud, quo raptus est, quod, utrum corporale an spiritale esset, dinosci discernique non posset.

From the beginning of the holy Scripture entitled Genesis until the first man was sent out of paradise, we have discussed and written down in eleven books what we could and as we could, either asserting and defending what is certain to us, or inquiring, conjecturing, and hesitating about what is uncertain; not so much prescribing to each person what he should think about obscure matters as showing that we ourselves need to be taught where we have been in doubt, and keeping the reader from rashness in affirming where we could not provide the firmness of knowledge. This twelfth book, however, now freed from the care that occupied us in treating the text of the sacred writings, will deal more freely and at greater length with the question of paradise, lest we be thought to have avoided the fact that the apostle seems to suggest that paradise is in the third heaven, where he says, “I know a man in Christ fourteen years ago—whether in the body I do not know, or out of the body I do not know, God knows—such a one caught up to the third heaven. And I know that such a man—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows—was caught up into paradise and heard ineffable words, which it is not lawful for a man to speak.” In these words the first question usually asked is what he means by the third heaven; and next, whether he meant paradise to be understood as there, or whether, after he was caught up into the third heaven, he was also caught up into paradise, wherever paradise may be—so that being caught up into the third heaven was not the same as being caught up into paradise, but first into the third heaven and afterwards from there into paradise. And this is so ambiguous that it does not seem to me it can be resolved, unless someone finds something, not from the apostle's words in this passage but perhaps from other places in the Scriptures or by clear reason, by which to show either that paradise is in the third heaven or that it is not; since even what the third heaven itself is does not clearly appear, whether it is to be understood among bodily things or perhaps among spiritual ones. It could indeed be said that a man could not have been caught up with his body except to some bodily place; but since he put this too in such a way as to say that he did not know whether he was caught up in the body or out of the body, who would dare to say that he knows what the apostle said he did not know? Nevertheless, if a spirit without a body cannot be caught up to bodily places, nor a body to spiritual ones, his very doubt seems to compel us to understand—since no one doubts that he wrote these things about himself—that what he was caught up to was such that it could not be distinguished and discerned whether it was bodily or spiritual.

12.2CSEL 28.1:380–382

Cum enim uel in somnis uel in extasi corporum exprimuntur imagines, non discernuntur omnino a corporibus, nisi cum homo redditus sensibus corporis recognoscit se in illis fuisse imaginibus, quas non per sensus corporis hauriebat. quis enim, cum a somno euigilauerit, non continuo sentiat imaginaria fuisse, quae uidebat, quamuis, cum ea uideret dormiens, a uigilantium corporalibus uisis discernere non ualebat? quamquam mihi accidisse scio et ob hoc etiam aliis accidere potuisse uel posse non dubito, ut in somnis uidens in somnis me uidere sentirem illasque imagines, quae ipsam nostram consensionem ludificare consuerunt, non esse uera corpora, sed in somnis eas praesentari firmissime etiam dormiens tenerem atque sentirem. hoc tamen fallebar aliquando, quod amico meo, quem similiter in somnis uidebam, id ipsum persuadere conabar non esse illa corpora, quae uidebamus, sed esse imagines somniantium, cum et ipse utique inter illa sic mihi adpareret, quomodo illa: cui tamen et hoc dicebam neque id uerum esse, quod pariter loqueremur, sed etiam ipsum tunc aliud aliquid uidere dormientem et, utrum ista ego uiderem, omnino nescire. uerum cum eidem ipsi persuadere moliebar, quod ipse non esset, adducebar ex parte etiam putare esse ipsum, cui profecto non loquerer, si omni modo sic adficerer, quod ipse non esset. ita non poterat quamuis mirabiliter uigilans anima dormientis nisi duci imaginibus corporum, ac si corpora essent ipsa. In extasi autem unum audire potui et eum rusticanum uix ualentem quod sentiebat exprimere, qui et uigilare se sciret et uidere quiddam non oculis corporis. nam, ut eius uerbis utar, quantum recolere possum, "anima mea, inquit, uidebat eum, non oculi mei; non tamen sciebam, utrum corpus esset an imago corporis". non enim erat talis, ut ista discerneret, uerum tamen simpliciter fidelis, ut eum sic audirem, ac si illud, quod se uidisse narrabat, ipse uidissem. Ac per hoc si paradisum Paulus ita uidit, ut adparuit Petro ille discus submissus e caelo, ut Iohanni quidquid in Apocalypsi se uidisse conscripsit, ut Ezechieli campus ille cum ossibus mortuorum et illa eorum resurrectio, ut Esaiae sedens deus et in conspectu eius Seraphin et ara, unde carbo adsumtus prophetae labia mundauit: manifestum eum est ignorare potuisse, utrum in corpore an extra corpus ea uiderit.

For when images of bodies are formed, whether in sleep or in ecstasy, they are not distinguished at all from bodies, except when the person, restored to the senses of the body, recognizes that he has been among images which he was not taking in through the senses of the body. For who, when he wakes from sleep, does not at once perceive that what he was seeing was imaginary, although while seeing it asleep he could not distinguish it from the bodily things seen by those awake? Yet I know that it has happened to me—and so I do not doubt that it could have happened, or can happen, to others too—that while seeing in sleep I perceived that I was seeing in sleep, and even while asleep I held and perceived most firmly that those images which are accustomed to mock our very assent were not true bodies but were being presented in sleep. Yet in this I was sometimes deceived: that I tried to persuade a friend of mine, whom I was likewise seeing in sleep, of this very thing, that those were not bodies which we were seeing, but images of dreamers; when he himself, of course, appeared to me among them in the same way as they did. To him I also said that it was not true that we were speaking together, but that he too was then seeing something else in his sleep and did not know at all whether I was seeing these things. But while I was striving to persuade him that he did not exist, I was led in part also to think that it was he, to whom I would certainly not have been speaking if I had been entirely convinced that he did not exist. So the soul of the sleeper, though wonderfully awake, could not but be led by the images of bodies as if they were bodies themselves. In ecstasy I have been able to hear only one person, and he a countryman scarcely able to express what he perceived, who knew both that he was awake and that he was seeing something not with the eyes of the body. For, to use his words as far as I can recall them, “My soul,” he said, “saw him, not my eyes; yet I did not know whether it was a body or the image of a body.” For he was not such as to distinguish these things, but he was so simply faithful that I listened to him as if I myself had seen what he said he had seen. And therefore, if Paul saw paradise in the way in which that sheet let down from heaven appeared to Peter, or as John saw whatever he wrote in the Apocalypse that he had seen, or as Ezekiel saw that plain with the bones of the dead and their resurrection, or as Isaiah saw God seated and the Seraphim in his sight and the altar from which a coal was taken to cleanse the prophet's lips, it is plain that he could have been ignorant whether he saw these things in the body or out of the body.

12.3CSEL 28.1:382–383

Sed, si extra corpus uisa sunt et corpora non fuerunt, adhuc quaeri potest, utrum imagines corporum fuerint an ea substantia, quae nullam corporis similitudinem gerit, sicut deus, sicut ipsa mens hominis uel intellegentia uel ratio, sicut uirtutes, prudentia, iustitia, castitas, caritas, pietas et quaecumque aliae sunt, quas intellegendo atque cogitando enumeramus, discernimus, definimus, non utique intuentes liniamenta earum uel colores aut quomodo sonent aut quid oleant aut quid in ore sapiant aut quid contrectantibus de calore seu frigore, mollitudine seu duritia, lenitate seu asperitate renuntient, sed alia quadam uisione, alia luce, alia rerum euidentia et ea longe ceteris praestantiore atque certiore. Rursus igitur ad eadem ipsa apostoli uerba redeamus et ea diligentius perscrutemur hoc sine dubitatione primitus constituto multo magis atque inconparabiliter amplius apostolum scisse, quod de incorporea corporeaque natura nos ut sciamus utcumque conamur. si ergo sciebat spiritalia per corpus, corporalia extra corpus uideri omnino non posse, cur non per ea ipsa, quae uidit, quomodo etiam potuerit uidere, discreuit? si enim certus erat illa esse spiritalia, cur non consequenter extra corpus ea se uidisse certus nihilominus erat? si autem corporalia esse nouerat, nonnisi per corpus uideri potuisse cur non etiam nouerat? unde ergo dubitat, utrum in corpore an extra corpus ea uiderit, nisi forte ita etiam dubitat, utrum illa corpora an similitudines corporum fuerint? prius itaque uideamus, quid sit in uerborum istorum contextione, unde non dubitet, atque ita, cum remanserit unde dubitet, fortassis ex his, de quibus non dubitat, quomodo etiam illud dubitet adparebit. Scio, inquit, hominem in Christo ante annos quattuordecim, siue in corpore nescio, siue extra corpus nescio, deus scit, raptum eius modi usque in tertium caelum. scit ergo ante annos quattuordecim in Christo raptum hominem usque ad tertium coelum. hoc omnino non dubitat, nec nos ergo debemus. sed utrum in corpore an extra corpus, dubitat: unde illo dubitante quis nostrum certus esse audeat? num forte hinc etiam illud consequens erit, ut tertium caelum fuisse dubitemus, quo raptum hominem dixit? si enim res ipsa demonstrata est, tertium caelum demonstratum est; si autem imago aliqua corporalium similis facta est, non erat illud tertium caelum, sed illa ostensio sic ordinata est, ut uideretur sibi ascendere primum caelum, super quod uideret alterum, quo rursus ascendens iterum alterum uideret superius, quo cum peruenisset, posset dicere se in tertium caelum raptum. sed illud, quod tertium caelum esset, quo raptus est, neque dubitauit neque dubitare nos uoluit. ad hoc enim praemisit "scio" et inde coepit, ut quod se scire apostolus dicit, solus ille non credat uerum esse, qui non credit apostolo.

But if they were seen out of the body and were not bodies, it can still be asked whether they were images of bodies or that substance which bears no likeness to a body, like God, like the human mind itself or understanding or reason, like the virtues—prudence, justice, chastity, love, godliness—and whatever others there are, which we enumerate, distinguish, and define by understanding and thinking; not, of course, by looking at their outlines or colours, or how they sound or smell or taste in the mouth, or what they report to those who touch them of heat or cold, softness or hardness, smoothness or roughness, but by another kind of vision, another light, another evidence of things, and one far more excellent and certain than the others. Let us, then, return again to those very words of the apostle and examine them more carefully, having first established without doubt that the apostle knew much more, and incomparably more fully, what we are trying in some way to know about incorporeal and corporeal nature. If, then, he knew that spiritual things cannot be seen through the body at all, nor bodily things outside the body, why did he not distinguish, through the very things he saw, how he could also have seen them? For if he was certain that they were spiritual, why was he not consequently certain, just the same, that he had seen them out of the body? And if he knew they were bodily, why did he not also know that they could be seen only through the body? Why, then, does he doubt whether he saw them in the body or out of the body, unless perhaps he also doubts in the same way whether they were bodies or likenesses of bodies? So let us first see what there is in the sequence of these words about which he has no doubt; and then, when what he doubts remains, perhaps from the things he does not doubt it will appear how he also doubts that. “I know,” he says, “a man in Christ fourteen years ago—whether in the body I do not know, or out of the body I do not know, God knows—such a one caught up to the third heaven.” So he knows that fourteen years ago a man in Christ was caught up to the third heaven. This he does not doubt at all; nor, then, should we. But whether in the body or out of the body he doubts; and since he doubts, which of us would dare to be certain? Does it perhaps also follow from this that we should doubt that it was the third heaven to which he said the man was caught up? For if the thing itself was shown, the third heaven was shown; but if some image resembling bodily things was formed, that was not the third heaven, but the showing was so arranged that he seemed to himself to ascend the first heaven, above which he saw a second, to which ascending again he saw yet another higher, and when he had reached it he could say he had been caught up into the third heaven. But that it was the third heaven to which he was caught up he neither doubted nor wished us to doubt. For this reason he put “I know” first and began from there, so that only one who does not believe the apostle would not believe to be true what the apostle says he knows.

12.4CSEL 28.1:383–385

Scit ergo hominem raptum esse usque in tertium caelum. proinde illud, quo raptus est, uere tertium caelum est, non signum aliquod corporale, quod cum ostenderetur Moysi, usque adeo sentiebat aliud esse ipsam dei substantiam, aliud uisibilem creaturam, in qua se deus humanis et corporalibus sensibus praesentabat, ut diceret: ostende mihi temet ipsum, nec aliqua imago rei corporalis, quam cum Iohannes uideret in spiritu quaerebat, quid esset, eique respondebatur uel: ciuitas est uel: populi sunt uel aliquid aliud, cum uideret ille bestiam siue mulierem siue aquas siue quid eius modi, sed, scio, inquit, raptum hominem usque in tertium caelum. Quodsi spiritalem imaginem corporali similem caelum appellare uoluisset, sic erat etiam imago corporis eius, in qua illuc raptus ascenderat. sic ergo et suum corpus appellaret quamuis imaginem corporis, quomodo illud caelum quamuis imaginem caeli, neque curaret discernere, quid sciret et quid nesciret, id est quia sciret raptum hominem usque ad tertium caelum, nesciret autem, utrum in corpore an extra corpus, sed simpliciter narraret uisionem earum rerum nominibus appellans illa, quae uidit, quarum erant similia. nam et nos dicimus, cum somnia nostra narramus uel aliquam in eis reuelationem: uidi montem, uidi fluuium, uidi tres homines et si quid eius modi ea nomina tribuentes illis imaginibus, quae habent res ipsae, quarum similes erant; apostolus autem, illud, inquit, scio, illud nescio. At si utrumque imaginaliter adparuit, utrumque pariter scitur pariterue nescitur; si autem proprie caelum — et ideo scitur — quomodo potuit imaginaliter corpus illius hominis adparere? Nam si caelum corporeum uidebatur, quare latebat, utrum corporeis oculis uideretur? si autem incertum erat, utrum oculis corporis an spiritu uideretur — et ideo dictum est: siue in corpore siue extra corpus nescio — quomodo non incertum erat et illud, utrum uere caelum corporeum uideretur an imaginaliter ostenderetur? itemque, si substantia incorporea uidebatur, non in aliqua imagine corporis, sed sicut uidetur iustitia, sapientia et si quid eius modi, et hoc erat caelum, id quoque manifestum est oculis huius corporis uideri aliquid tale non posse. ac per hoc, si aliquid tale se uidisse sciebat, non per corpus se uidisse dubitare non poterat. scio, inquit, hominem in Christo ante annos quattuordecim. hoc scio nemo dubitet, qui mihi credit; sed, utrum in corpore an extra corpus nescio, deus scit.

He knows, then, that the man was caught up to the third heaven. Accordingly, that to which he was caught up is truly the third heaven; not some bodily sign, like that shown to Moses, who perceived so clearly that the very substance of God was one thing and the visible creature in which God presented himself to human and bodily senses another, that he said, “Show me yourself”; nor some image of a bodily thing, like those John saw in the spirit and asked what they were, and was answered, “It is a city,” or “They are peoples,” or something else, when he saw a beast or a woman or waters or something of the kind. But “I know,” he says, “that a man was caught up to the third heaven.” If he had wished to call a spiritual image resembling a bodily one “heaven,” then in the same way the image of his body too, in which he had been caught up and ascended there, would have been such. So he would have called it his body, though it was an image of his body, just as he called that heaven, though it was an image of heaven, and he would not have taken care to distinguish what he knew and what he did not know—namely that he knew that the man was caught up to the third heaven, but did not know whether in the body or out of the body—but would simply have narrated the vision, calling the things he saw by the names of those things they resembled. For we too say, when we tell our dreams or some revelation in them, “I saw a mountain, I saw a river, I saw three men,” and so on, giving to those images the names that the things themselves have which they resembled; but the apostle says, “This I know, that I do not know.” But if both appeared as images, both are equally known or equally not known; and if it was properly heaven—and therefore known—how could that man's body appear as an image? For if a bodily heaven was being seen, why was it hidden whether it was seen with bodily eyes? And if it was uncertain whether it was seen with the eyes of the body or by the spirit—and therefore it is said, “whether in the body or out of the body I do not know”—how was it not also uncertain whether a heaven was truly seen as a body or was shown as an image? Again, if an incorporeal substance was seen, not in some image of a body but as justice, wisdom, and the like are seen, and this was the heaven, it is also plain that such a thing cannot be seen with the eyes of this body. And therefore, if he knew he had seen something of this kind, he could not doubt that he had not seen it through the body. “I know,” he says, “a man in Christ fourteen years ago.” Let no one who believes me doubt this “I know”; “but whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows.”

12.5CSEL 28.1:385–386

Quid ergo scis, quod discernis ab eo, quod nescis, ne credentes fallantur? raptum, inquit, eundem hominem usque in tertium caelum. at illud caelum aut corpus erat aut spiritus. si corpus erat et corporeis oculis uisum est, cur illud caelum esse scitur et in corpore uisum esse nescitur? si autem spiritus erat, aut corporis imaginem praebuit et tam incertum est utrum corpus fuerit, quam incertum est utrum in corpore uisum sit; aut sic uisum est, quomodo uidetur mente sapientia sine ullis imaginibus corporum, et nihilominus certum est uideri non potuisse per corpus. aut ergo utrumque certum est aut utrumque incertum aut quomodo certum, quod uisum est, incertum autem, per quod uisum est? manifestum est enim incorpoream naturam ab eo uideri non potuisse per corpus. corpora uero, etiam si non possent uideri sine corpore, non utique sic uidentur per corpus, sed longe ille dispar modus est, si quis est. unde mirum, si posset apostolum tamquam simillimus fallere aut ad dubitationem cogere, ut, si corporeum caelum non corporeis oculis uidit, incertum sibi esse diceret, utrum in corpore an extra corpus id uiderit. Restat ergo fortasse, ut, quoniam mentiri non posset apostolus, qui tanta cura egit, ut discerneret quid sciret et quid nesciret, hoc ipsum eum intellegamus ignorasse, utrum, quando in caelum tertium raptus est, in corpore fuerit, quomodo est anima in corpore, cum corpus uiuere dicitur, siue uigilantis siue dormientis siue in extasi a sensibus corporis alienata, an omnino de corpore exierit, ut mortuum corpus iaceret, donec peracta illa demonstratione membris mortuis anima redderetur et non quasi dormiens euigilaret aut extasi alienatus denuo rediret in sensus, sed mortuus omnino reuiuisceret. proinde, quod uidit raptus usque in tertium caelum — quod etiam se scire confirmat — proprie uidit, non imaginaliter. sed quia ipsa a corpore alienatio, utrum omnino mortuum corpus reliquerit an secundum modum quendam uiuentis corporis ibi anima fuerit, sed mens eius ad uidenda uel audienda ineffabilia illius uisionis abrepta sit, hoc incertum erat, ideo forsitan dixit: siue in corpore siue extra corpus nescio, deus scit.

What, then, do you know, which you distinguish from what you do not know, so that believers may not be deceived? “That the same man,” he says, “was caught up to the third heaven.” But that heaven was either a body or a spirit. If it was a body and was seen with bodily eyes, why is it known to be heaven and not known to have been seen in the body? But if it was a spirit, either it presented the image of a body, and then it is as uncertain whether it was a body as it is uncertain whether it was seen in the body; or it was seen as wisdom is seen by the mind without any images of bodies, and then it is certain all the same that it could not have been seen through the body. So either both are certain, or both uncertain; or how is what was seen certain, but that through which it was seen uncertain? For it is plain that an incorporeal nature could not have been seen by him through the body. Bodies, even if they could not be seen without a body, are certainly not seen through the body in that way; rather, that mode is very different, if there is any such. Hence it would be a wonder if, being so very similar, it could deceive the apostle or force him into doubt, so that, if he saw a bodily heaven with eyes not bodily, he would say that it was uncertain to him whether he saw it in the body or out of the body. It remains, then, perhaps, that—since the apostle could not lie, who took such care to distinguish what he knew from what he did not know—we should understand that he was ignorant of just this: whether, when he was caught up to the third heaven, he was in the body as the soul is in the body when the body is said to be alive, whether of one awake or asleep or in ecstasy estranged from the senses of the body; or whether he went out of the body altogether, so that the body lay dead until, that showing completed, the soul was restored to the dead members, and he did not wake as from sleep or return to his senses as one estranged in ecstasy, but came back to life altogether, having been dead. Accordingly, what he saw when caught up to the third heaven—which he also affirms that he knows—he saw properly, not as an image. But because it was uncertain whether that estrangement from the body left the body altogether dead, or whether the soul was there in the manner of a living body while his mind was snatched away to see or hear the ineffable things of that vision, perhaps for that reason he said, “whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows.”

12.6CSEL 28.1:386–387

Quod autem non imaginaliter, sed proprie uidetur et non per corpus uidetur, hoc ea uisione uidetur, quae omnes ceteras superat. harum species atque differentias, quantum me dominus adiuuerit, explicare curabo. ecce in hoc uno praecepto cum legitur: diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum, tria uisionum genera occurrunt: unum per oculos, quibus ipsae litterae uidentur, alterum per spiritum hominis, quo proximus et absens cogitatur, tertium per contuitum mentis, quo ipsa dilectio intellecta conspicitur. in his tribus generibus illud primum manifestum est omnibus; in hoc enim uidetur caelum et terra et omnia, quae in eis conspicua sunt oculis nostris. nec illud alterum, quo absentia corpora corporalia cogitantur, insinuare difficile est; ipsum quippe caelum et terram et ea, quae in eis uidere possumus, etiam in tenebris constituti cogitamus, ubi nihil uidentes oculis corporis, animo tamen corporales imagines intuemur, seu ueras, sicut ipsa corpora uidimus et memoria retinemus, seu fictas, sicut cogitatio formare potuerit. aliter enim cogitamus Carthaginem, quam nouimus, aliter Alexandriam, quam non nouimus. tertium uero illud, quo dilectio intellecta conspicitur, eas res continet, quae non habent imagines sui similes, quae non sunt quod ipsae. nam homo uel arbor uel sol et quaecumque alia corpora, siue caelestia siue terrestria, et praesentia uidentur in suis formis et absentia cogitantur in imaginibus animo inpressis et faciunt duo genera uisorum: unum per corporis sensus, alterum per spiritum, quo illae imagines continentur. dilectio autem numquid aliter uidetur praesens in specie, qua est, et aliter absens in aliqua imagine sui simili? non utique. sed quantum mente cerni potest, ab alio magis, ab alio minus ipsa cernitur; si autem aliquid corporalis imaginis cogitatur, non ipsa cernitur.

What is seen not as an image but properly, and not through the body, is seen by that vision which surpasses all the others. I shall try to explain the kinds and differences of these visions as far as the Lord helps me. Look: when this one commandment is read, “You shall love your neighbour as yourself,” three kinds of vision occur. One is through the eyes, by which the letters themselves are seen; another through the spirit of man, by which the neighbour is thought of even when absent; the third through the intuition of the mind, by which love itself is understood and beheld. Of these three kinds, the first is plain to all; for by it are seen heaven and earth and all things in them that are visible to our eyes. Nor is it hard to point out the second, by which absent bodily things are thought of; for we think of heaven and earth themselves and the things we can see in them even when we are in darkness, where, seeing nothing with the eyes of the body, we still behold bodily images in the mind, whether true ones, as we have seen the bodies themselves and keep them in memory, or invented ones, as thought has been able to form them. For we think of Carthage, which we know, in one way, and of Alexandria, which we do not know, in another. But the third, by which love is understood and beheld, contains those things which have no images resembling them that are not what they themselves are. For a man or a tree or the sun, and any other bodies, whether heavenly or earthly, are both seen when present in their own forms and thought of when absent in images impressed on the mind, and they produce two kinds of things seen: one through the senses of the body, the other through the spirit in which those images are held. But is love seen in one way when present, in the form in which it exists, and in another when absent, in some image resembling it? Certainly not. Rather, so far as it can be discerned by the mind, it is discerned more by one, less by another; but if something of a bodily image is thought of, it is not love itself that is discerned.

12.7CSEL 28.1:387–390

Haec sunt tria genera uisionum, de quibus et in superioribus libris aliquid diximus, sicut res postulare uidebatur, non tamen earum numerum commemorauimus; et nunc breuiter eis insinuatis, quoniam suscepta quaestio flagitat, ut de his aliquanto uberius disseramus, debemus ea certis et congruis signare nominibus, ne adsidue circumloquendo moras faciamus. primum ergo appellemus corporale, quia per corpus percipitur et corporis sensibus exhibetur; secundum spiritale: quidquid enim corpus non est et tamen aliquid est, iam recte spiritus dicitur et utique non est corpus, quamuis corpori similis sit, imago absentis corporis, nec ille ipse obtutus, quo cernitur; tertium uero intellectuale ab intellectu, quia mentale a mente ipsa uocabuli nouitate nimis absurdum est ut dicamus. Horum uocabulorum rationem si subtilius reddam, et prolixior et perplexior sermo erit, cum hoc uel nulla uel certe non tanta necessitas exigat. satis est ergo scire corporale aliquid uel proprie dici, cum de corporibus agitur, uel etiam translato uocabulo, sicut dictum est: quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo diuinitatis corporaliter. neque enim diuinitas corpus est, sed quia sacramenta ueteris testamenti appellat umbras futuri, propter umbrarum conparationem corporaliter dixit habitare in Christo plenitudinem diuinitatis, quod in illo inpleantur omnia, quae illis umbris figurata sunt, ac sic quodammodo umbrarum illarum ipse sit corpus, hoc est figurarum et significationum illarum ipse sit ueritas. sicut ergo ipsae figurae significatiue translato utique uocabulo non proprie dictae sunt umbrae, ita et quod ait plenitudinem diuinitatis corporaliter habitare translato uerbo usus est. Spiritale autem pluribus modis dicitur. nam et corpus quod futurum est in resurrectione sanctorum, spiritale appellat apostolus, ubi ait: seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale, eo quod miris modis ad omnem facilitatem et incorruptionem spiritui subdatur et sine ulla indigentia corporalium alimentorum solo uiuificetur spiritu, non quod incorpoream substantiam sit habiturum; neque enim et hoc corpus, quale nunc habemus, animae habet substantiam et hoc est quod anima, quia dictum est animale. item spiritus dicitur uel aer iste uel flatus eius, id est motus eius, sicut dictum est: ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis. dicitur etiam spiritus anima siue pecoris siue hominis, sicut scriptum est: et quis scit, spiritus filiorum hominis si ascendat ipse sursum, et spiritus pecoris si descendat ipse deorsum in terram? dicitur spiritus et ipsa mens rationalis, ubi est quidam tamquam oculus animae, ad quem pertinet imago et agnitio dei. unde dicit apostolus: renouamini spiritu mentis uestrae et induite nouum hominem, qui secundum deum creatus est, cum et alibi dicat de interiore homine: qui renouatur in agnitione dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creauit eum. item cum dixisset: igitur ipse ego mente seruio legi dei, carne autem legi peccati, alio loco eandem sententiam commemorans, caro, inquit, concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem, ut non ea quae uultis faciatis, quam dixit mentem, hunc etiam spiritum appellauit. dicitur spiritus etiam deus, sicut ait dominus in euangelio: spiritus est deus; et eos, qui adorant eum, in spiritu et ueritate oportet adorare.

These are the three kinds of vision, about which we said something in the earlier books too, as the matter seemed to require, though we did not mention their number. And now that we have briefly pointed them out, since the question undertaken demands that we discuss them somewhat more fully, we must mark them with fixed and fitting names, so as not to cause delay by constant circumlocution. Let us call the first, then, bodily, because it is perceived through the body and presented to the senses of the body; the second spiritual, for whatever is not a body and yet is something is already rightly called spirit; and certainly the image of an absent body, though it resembles a body, is not a body, nor is the very gaze by which it is discerned; and the third intellectual, from intellect, since to say “mental,” from mind, would be too absurd because of the novelty of the word. If I were to give a more subtle account of these terms, the discussion would be longer and more involved, when there is no necessity requiring it, or certainly not so great a one. It is enough, then, to know that something is called bodily either properly, when bodies are in question, or by a transferred use of the word, as it is said, “For in him dwells the whole fullness of divinity bodily.” For divinity is not a body; but because he calls the sacraments of the old covenant shadows of what was to come, he said, in comparison with the shadows, that the fullness of divinity dwells bodily in Christ, because in him are fulfilled all the things prefigured by those shadows, and so in a certain way he is himself the body of those shadows, that is, he is the truth of those figures and significations. Just as the figures themselves, which signify, are called shadows by a transferred use of the word and not properly, so in saying that the fullness of divinity dwells bodily he used a transferred word. “Spiritual,” however, is said in several ways. For the apostle calls even the body that will be in the resurrection of the saints spiritual, where he says, “It is sown an animal body, it will rise a spiritual body,” because in wonderful ways it will be subject to the spirit with complete ease and incorruption, and, without any need of bodily nourishment, will be given life by the spirit alone; not because it will have an incorporeal substance; for neither does this body, such as we have now, have the substance of the soul and is what the soul is, because it is called animal. Again, “spirit” is said either of this air or of its blowing, that is, its movement, as it is said, “Fire, hail, snow, ice, spirit of the storm.” “Spirit” is also said of the soul, whether of a beast or of a man, as it is written, “And who knows whether the spirit of the sons of men goes upward, and whether the spirit of the beast goes downward into the earth?” The rational mind itself is also called spirit, in which there is a kind of eye of the soul, to which the image and knowledge of God belong. Hence the apostle says, “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind and put on the new man, who is created according to God,” while elsewhere he says of the inner man, “who is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him.” Again, when he had said, “So then I myself serve the law of God with the mind, but with the flesh the law of sin,” recalling the same thought in another place he says, “The flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, so that you do not do what you will”; what he called mind, this he also called spirit. God too is called spirit, as the Lord says in the Gospel, “God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.”

12.8CSEL 28.1:390–391

Ex his omnibus modis, quos commemorauimus, quibus appellatur spiritus, non traximus hoc uocabulum, quo appellauimus spiritale hoc uisionis genus, de quo nunc agimus, sed ex illo uno modo, quem inuenimus in epistula ad Corinthios, quo spiritus a mente distinguitur euidentissimo testimonio. si enim orauero, inquit, lingua, spiritus meus orat; mens autem mea infructuosa est. cum ergo lingua intellegatur hoc loco dicere obscuras et mysticas significationes, a quibus si intellectum mentis remoueas nemo aedificatur audiendo, quod non intellegit — unde etiam dicit: qui enim loquitur lingua, non hominibus loquitur, sed deo; nemo enim audit, spiritus autem loquitur mysteria - satis indicat eam se linguam hoc loco appellare, ubi sunt significationes uelut imagines rerum ac similitudines, quae ut intellegantur indigent mentis obtutu. cum autem non intelleguntur, in spiritu eas dicit esse, non in mente: unde apertius ait: si benedixeris spiritu, qui subplet locum idiotae quomodo dicet "amen" super tuam benedictionem, quandoquidem nescit, quid dicas? quia ergo etiam lingua, id est membro corporis, quod mouemus in ore, cum loquimur, signa utique rerum dantur, non res ipsae proferuntur, propterea translato uerbo linguam appellauit quamlibet signorum prolationem, priusquam intellegantur: quo cum intellectus accesserit, qui mentis est proprius, fit reuelatio uel agnitio uel prophetia uel doctrina. proinde ait: si uenero ad uos linguis loquens, quid uobis prodero, nisi loquar uobis in reuelatione aut in agnitione aut in prophetia aut in doctrina? id est: cum signis, hoc est linguae accesserit intellectus, ut non spiritu tantum, sed etiam mente agatur quod agitur.

From all these ways that we have mentioned in which “spirit” is used, we did not take this word by which we have called this kind of vision, which we are now treating, “spiritual,” but from that one way which we found in the letter to the Corinthians, in which spirit is distinguished from mind by a most evident testimony. “For if I pray,” he says, “in a tongue, my spirit prays, but my mind is unfruitful.” Since “tongue” in this place is understood to mean obscure and mystical significations, from which, if you remove the understanding of the mind, no one is edified by hearing what he does not understand—hence he also says, “For one who speaks in a tongue speaks not to men but to God; for no one hears, but the spirit speaks mysteries”—he shows clearly enough that he calls “tongue” in this place that in which there are significations like images and likenesses of things, which need the gaze of the mind to be understood. But when they are not understood, he says they are in the spirit, not in the mind; hence he says more plainly, “If you bless with the spirit, how will one who fills the place of the uninstructed say ‘Amen’ to your blessing, since he does not know what you are saying?” Since, then, it is also with the tongue, that is, with the bodily member that we move in the mouth when we speak, that signs of things are given, and not the things themselves brought forth, he therefore called by a transferred word any utterance of signs before they are understood a “tongue”; and when understanding is added to it, which is proper to the mind, there comes revelation or knowledge or prophecy or teaching. Accordingly he says, “If I come to you speaking in tongues, how shall I benefit you, unless I speak to you in revelation or in knowledge or in prophecy or in teaching?”—that is, when understanding is added to the signs, that is, to the tongue, so that what is done is done not only with the spirit but also with the mind.

12.9CSEL 28.1:391–392

Proinde, quibus signa per aliquas rerum corporalium similitudines demonstrabantur in spiritu, nisi accesserat mentis officium, ut etiam intellegerentur, nondum erat prophetia; magisque propheta erat, qui interpretabatur, quod alius uidisset, quam ipse qui uidisset. unde adparet magis ad mentem pertinere prophetiam quam ad istum spiritum, qui modo quodam proprio uocatur spiritus, uis animae quaedam mente inferior, ubi corporalium rerum similitudines exprimuntur. itaque magis Ioseph propheta, qui intellexit, quid significarent septenae spicae et septenae boues, quam Pharao, qui eas uidit in somnis; illius enim spiritus informatus est, ut uideret, huius mens inluminata, ut intellegeret. ac per hoc in illo erat lingua, in isto prophetia, quia in illo rerum imaginatio, in isto imaginationum interpretatio. minus ergo propheta, qui rerum, quae significantur, sola ipsa signa in spiritu per rerum corporalium imagines uidet, et magis propheta, qui solo earum intellectu praeditus est; sed maxime propheta, qui utroque praecellit, ut et uideat in spiritu corporalium rerum significatiuas similitudines et eas uiuacitate mentis intellegat, sicut Danihelis excellentia temtata est et probata qui regi et somnium, quod uiderat, dixit et, quid significaret, aperuit. et ipsae quippe imagines corporales in spiritu eius expressae sunt et earum intellectus reuelatus in mente. ex hoc ergo modo, quo appellatur in ista distinctione spiritus, secundum quem dixit apostolus: orabo spiritu, orabo autem et mente, ut et signa rerum formarentur in spiritu et eorum refulgeret intellectus in mente: secundum hanc, inquam, distinctionem spiritale nunc appellauimus tale genus uisorum, quali etiam corporum absentium imagines cogitamus.

Accordingly, for those to whom signs were shown in the spirit through likenesses of bodily things, unless the work of the mind was added so that they were also understood, there was not yet prophecy; and he who interpreted what another had seen was more a prophet than he who had seen it. Hence it appears that prophecy belongs more to the mind than to this spirit, which in a certain proper sense is called spirit: a power of the soul lower than the mind, where likenesses of bodily things are formed. So Joseph, who understood what the seven ears of grain and the seven cows signified, was more a prophet than Pharaoh, who saw them in dreams; for the spirit of the one was formed so that he saw, the mind of the other illuminated so that he understood. And therefore in the one there was tongue, in the other prophecy, because in the one there was imagination of things, in the other interpretation of the imaginings. He, then, is less a prophet who sees in the spirit only the signs of the things signified, through images of bodily things; and he is more a prophet who is endowed only with the understanding of them; but he is most a prophet who excels in both, so that he both sees in the spirit the signifying likenesses of bodily things and understands them by the liveliness of the mind; as the excellence of Daniel was tested and proved, who both told the king the dream he had seen and disclosed what it signified. For the bodily images themselves were formed in his spirit, and the understanding of them was revealed in his mind. From this way, then, in which spirit is spoken of in this distinction—according to which the apostle said, “I will pray with the spirit, but I will pray with the mind also,” so that the signs of things are formed in the spirit and their understanding shines out in the mind—according to this distinction, I say, we have now called “spiritual” that kind of things seen by which we also think of the images of absent bodies.

12.10CSEL 28.1:392

Intellectuale autem illud excellentius, quod mentis est proprium. nec mihi occurrit omnino ita pluribus modis dici posse intellectum, sicut spiritum multis modis appellatum esse conperimus; siue autem intellectuale dicamus siue intellegibile, hoc idem significamus. quamquam nonnihil interesse nonnulli uoluerint, ut intellegibilis sit res ipsa, quae solo intellectu percipi potest. intellectualis autem mens, quae intellegit; sed esse aliquam rem quae solo intellectu cerni possit ac non etiam intellegat magna et difficilis quaestio est. esse autem rem, quae intellectu percipiat et non etiam intellectu percipi possit, non arbitror quemquam uel putare uel dicere; mens quippe non uidetur nisi mente. quia ergo uideri potest, intellegibilis, quia et uidere, intellectualis est secundum illam distinctionem. quapropter sequestrata illa difficillima quaestione, utrum sit aliquid, quod tantum intellegatur nec intellegat, nunc intellectuale et intellegibile sub eadem significatione appellamus.

The intellectual kind, however, is more excellent, being proper to the mind. Nor does it occur to me at all that “intellect” can be used in as many ways as we have found “spirit” to be used; and whether we say “intellectual” or “intelligible,” we mean the same thing. Some, however, have wanted there to be some difference, so that the intelligible is the thing itself that can be perceived by the intellect alone, while the intellectual is the mind that understands. But whether there is anything that can be discerned by the intellect alone and does not also understand is a great and difficult question. That there is a thing which perceives by the intellect and cannot also be perceived by the intellect, I do not think anyone either thinks or says; for the mind is seen only by the mind. Because, then, it can be seen, it is intelligible; because it can also see, it is intellectual, according to that distinction. Therefore, setting aside that most difficult question, whether there is anything that is only understood and does not understand, we now use “intellectual” and “intelligible” with the same meaning.

12.11CSEL 28.1:392–395

Tria igitur ista genera uisorum, corporale, spiritale, intellectuale, singillatim consideranda sunt, ut ab inferioribus ratio ad superiora conscendat. iam quidem superius exemplum proposuimus, quo in una sententia omnia tria genera uideantur. cum enim legitur: diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum, corporaliter litterae uidentur, spiritaliter proximus cogitatur, intellectualiter dilectio conspicitur. sed et litterae absentes possunt spiritaliter cogitari et proximus praesens potest corporaliter uideri, dilectio autem nec per substantiam suam potest oculis corporis cerni nec per imaginem corpori similem spiritu cogitari, sed sola mente, id est intellectu, cognosci et percipi. corporalis sane uisio nulli horum generi praesidet, sed quod per eam sentitur, illi spiritali tamquam praesidenti nuntiatur. nam cum aliquid oculis cernitur, continuo fit imago eius in spiritu; sed non dinoscitur facta, nisi cum ablatis oculis ab eo, quod per oculos uidebamus, imaginem eius in animo inuenerimus. et siquidem spiritus inrationalis est, ueluti pecoris, hoc usque oculi nuntiant; si autem anima rationalis est, etiam intellectui nuntiatur, qui et spiritui praesidet, ut, si illud, quod hauserunt oculi atque id spiritui, ut eius illic imago fieret, nuntiauerunt, alicuius rei signum est, aut intellegatur continuo, quid significet, aut quaeratur, quoniam nec intellegi nec requiri nisi officio mentis potest. Uidit rex Baltasar articulos manus scribentis in pariete continuoque per corporis sensum imago rei corporaliter factae spiritui eius inpressa est atque ipso uiso facto ac praeterito illa in cogitatione permansit. uidebatur in spiritu et non intellegebatur, nec tunc intellectum erat hoc signum, cum corporaliter fieret atque oculis corporalibus adpareret, iam tamen signum esse intellegebatur id habens ex mentis officio. et quia requirebatur, quid significaret, etiam ipsam inquisitionem utique mens agebat. quo non conperto Danihel accessit et spiritu prophetico mente inlustrata perturbato regi, quid illo signo portenderetur, aperuit, ipse potius propheta per hoc genus uisionis, quod mentis est proprium, quam ille, qui et signum corporaliter factum corporaliter uiderat et transacti eius imaginem in spiritu cogitando cernebat nec aliquid intellectu poterat nisi nosse signum esse et, quid significaret, inquirere. Uidit Petrus in alienatione mentis uas quattuor lineis alligatum submitti de caelo, plenum uariis animalibus, cum audiuit et uocem: macta et manduca. qui cum redditus sensibus de uisu disceptaret, ecce quos Cornelius miserat nuntiauit ei spiritus dicens: ecce, uiri quaerunt te; sed surge, descende et uade cum illis, quia ego misi eos. qui cum uenisset ad Cornelium, quid in illa uisione intellexerit, ubi audierat: quae deus mundauit, tu ne communia dixeris, ipse indicauit dicens: et mihi deus ostendit neminem communem aut inmundum dicere hominem. cum ergo illum discum uideret alienatus a corporis sensibus, et illas uoces „macta et manduca" et "quae deus mundauit, tu communia ne dixeris" in spiritu audiebat. redditus autem corporis sensibus id ipsum, quod uisum atque auditum memoria tenuerat, in eodem spiritu cogitando cernebat. quae omnia non corporalia, sed corporalium imagines erant, siue cum primum in ipsa alienatione uisae sunt siue cum postea recordatae atque cogitatae. cum uero disceptabatur et requirebatur, ut illa signa intellegerentur, mentis erat actio conantis, sed deerat effectus, donec nuntiati sunt qui uenerunt a Cornelio; hac uero corporali etiam accedente uisione, cum et spiritus sanctus rursus in spiritu ei diceret: uade cum eis, ubi et illud signum ostenderat et inpresserat uoces, adiuta diuinitus mens intellexit, quid illis signis omnibus ageretur. his atque huius modi rebus diligenter consideratis satis adparet corporalem uisionem referri ad spiritalem eamque spiritalem referri ad intellectualem.

These three kinds of things seen, then—bodily, spiritual, intellectual—must be considered one by one, so that reason may ascend from the lower to the higher. We have already given an example above in which all three kinds are seen in one sentence. For when one reads, “You shall love your neighbour as yourself,” the letters are seen bodily, the neighbour is thought of spiritually, love is beheld intellectually. But the letters, when absent, can also be thought of spiritually, and the neighbour, when present, can be seen bodily; love, however, can neither be discerned by the eyes of the body in its own substance nor thought of by the spirit through an image resembling a body, but is known and perceived by the mind alone, that is, by the intellect. Bodily vision certainly presides over neither of these kinds; rather, what is perceived through it is reported to the spiritual as to one presiding. For when something is discerned by the eyes, its image is at once formed in the spirit; but it is not recognized as formed until, having taken our eyes off what we were seeing through the eyes, we find its image in the soul. And if the spirit is irrational, as in a beast, the eyes' report goes only that far; but if the soul is rational, it is reported also to the intellect, which presides over the spirit too; so that, if what the eyes have taken in and reported to the spirit, so that its image is formed there, is the sign of something, either what it signifies is understood at once or it is sought; since it can be neither understood nor sought except by the work of the mind. King Belshazzar saw the fingers of a hand writing on the wall, and at once, through the sense of the body, the image of the thing done bodily was impressed on his spirit; and when the sight itself was done and past, that image remained in his thought. It was seen in the spirit and not understood; nor was this sign understood when it happened bodily and appeared to the bodily eyes; yet it was already understood to be a sign, and this he had from the work of the mind. And because it was sought what it signified, the mind was certainly conducting the inquiry itself too. When this was not found, Daniel came forward, and with his mind illuminated by the prophetic spirit he disclosed to the troubled king what was portended by that sign; he himself being more a prophet through this kind of vision, which is proper to the mind, than the king, who had seen bodily the sign done bodily, and discerned its image in the spirit by thinking of it after it had passed, and could do nothing with his intellect except know that it was a sign and ask what it signified. Peter, in a rapture of mind, saw a vessel tied by four cords let down from heaven, full of various animals, when he also heard the voice: “Kill and eat.” When, restored to his senses, he was pondering the vision, behold, the Spirit announced to him those whom Cornelius had sent, saying, “Behold, men are seeking you; but rise, go down and go with them, for I have sent them.” When he came to Cornelius, he himself showed what he had understood in that vision, where he had heard, “What God has cleansed, do not call common,” saying, “And God has shown me that I should call no man common or unclean.” So when he saw that sheet, estranged from the senses of the body, he heard those words, “Kill and eat” and “What God has cleansed, do not call common,” in the spirit. But when restored to the senses of the body, he discerned in the same spirit, by thinking, the very thing that he had kept in memory as seen and heard. All these were not bodily things but images of bodily things, both when they were first seen in the rapture itself and when they were afterwards recalled and thought of. But when he was pondering and seeking to understand those signs, it was the action of the mind striving, but the result was lacking, until those who came from Cornelius were announced; and when this bodily vision was also added, and the Holy Spirit again said to him in the spirit, “Go with them,” where he had also shown that sign and impressed the words, the mind, divinely helped, understood what was being done in all those signs. When these and similar things are carefully considered, it is clear enough that bodily vision is referred to spiritual, and spiritual to intellectual.

12.12CSEL 28.1:395–397

Sed cum uigilantes neque mente a sensibus corporis alienata in uisione corporali sumus, discernimus ab ea uisione spiritalem, qua corpora absentia imaginaliter cogitamus, siue memoriter recordantes, quae nouimus, siue quae non nouimus et tamen sunt in ipsa spiritus cogitatione utcumque formantes siue quae omnino nusquam sunt pro arbitrio uel opinatione fingentes. ab his omnibus ita discernimus illa corporalia, quae uidemus et in quibus praesentibus sunt sensus corporis nostri, ut non dubitemus haec esse corpora, illas uero imagines corporum. cum autem uel nimia cogitationis intentione uel aliqua ui morbi, ut phreneticis per febrem accidere solet, uel conmixtione cuiusquam alterius spiritus seu mali seu boni ita corporalium rerum in spiritu exprimuntur imagines, tamquam ipsis corporis sensibus corpora praesententur manente tamen etiam in sensibus corporis intentione, sic uidentur, quae in spiritu fiunt imagines corporum, quemadmodum corpora ipsa per corpus, ita ut simul cernatur et homo aliquis praesens oculis et absens alius spiritu tamquam oculis. nam experti sumus sic adfectos et cum eis locutos, qui uere aderant, et cum aliis, qui non aderant, tamquam adessent. resipiscentes autem aliqui referunt, quod uidissent, aliqui non possunt; sic enim et somnia quidam obliuiscuntur, quidam meminerunt. quando autem penitus auertitur atque abripitur animi intentio a sensibus corporis, tunc magis dici extasis solet. tunc omnino quaecumque sint praesentia corpora etiam patentibus oculis non uidentur nec ullae uoces prorsus audiuntur: totus animi contuitus aut in corporum imaginibus est per spiritalem aut in rebus incorporeis nulla corporis imagine figuratis per intellectualem uisionem. Sed cum spiritalis uisio penitus alienato a sensibus corporis animo imaginibus corporalium detinetur siue in somnis siue in extasi, si nihil significant, quae uidentur, ipsius animae sunt imaginationes, sicut etiam uigilantes et sani et nulla alienatione moti multorum corporum, quae non adsunt sensibus corporis, cogitatione imagines uersant. uerum hoc interest, quod eas a praesentibus uerisque corporibus constanti adfectione discernunt. si autem aliquid significant, siue dormientibus exhibeantur siue uigilantibus, cum et oculis uident praesentia corpora et absentium imagines cernunt spiritu, tamquam oculis praesto sint, siue illa quae extasis dicitur alienato prorsus animo a sensibus corporis, mirus modus est, si conmixtione alterius spiritus fieri potest, ut ea, quae ipse scit, per huius modi imagines ei, cui miscetur, ostendat, siue intellegenti siue ut ab alio intellecta pandantur. si enim demonstrantur haec nec utique a corpore demonstrari possunt, quid restat, nisi ut ab aliquo spiritu demonstrentur?

But when we are awake and not estranged in mind from the senses of the body, and are in bodily vision, we distinguish from that vision the spiritual one, by which we think of absent bodies through images: whether recalling from memory those we know, or forming in some way, in the spirit's very thinking, those we do not know but which exist, or inventing at will or by opinion those that exist nowhere at all. From all these we distinguish those bodily things which we see and in whose presence the senses of our body are, in such a way that we do not doubt that these are bodies and those images of bodies. But when, either through excessive intensity of thought, or through some force of disease, as usually happens to those delirious with fever, or through the intermingling of some other spirit, whether evil or good, images of bodily things are so formed in the spirit as if bodies were presented to the very senses of the body, while the attention still remains in the senses of the body, then the images of bodies formed in the spirit are seen just as bodies themselves are seen through the body; so that at the same time one man who is present is discerned by the eyes and another who is absent by the spirit as if by the eyes. For we have known people so affected, and they spoke both with those who were truly present and with others who were not present, as if they were present. When they come to themselves, some report what they saw, some cannot; just as some forget their dreams and some remember them. But when the attention of the soul is wholly turned away and snatched from the senses of the body, then it is more usually called ecstasy. Then whatever bodies are present are not seen at all, even with the eyes open, and no voices whatever are heard: the whole gaze of the soul is either on the images of bodies through spiritual vision or on incorporeal things, figured by no image of a body, through intellectual vision. But when spiritual vision, with the soul wholly estranged from the senses of the body, is held by images of bodily things, whether in sleep or in ecstasy, then if what is seen signifies nothing, these are the soul's own imaginings; just as people who are awake and healthy and moved by no estrangement turn over in thought images of many bodies which are not present to the senses of the body. But there is this difference, that these people distinguish them from present and true bodies by a steady disposition. If, however, they signify something—whether they are presented to people asleep, or to people awake, when they both see present bodies with their eyes and discern images of absent ones by the spirit as though they were before their eyes, or in what is called ecstasy, with the soul wholly estranged from the senses of the body—it is a wonderful thing if it can happen through the intermingling of another spirit, that it shows what it itself knows, through images of this kind, to the one with whom it is mingled, whether he understands them or so that they may be disclosed to him as understood by another. For if these things are shown, and they certainly cannot be shown by a body, what remains but that they are shown by some spirit?

12.13CSEL 28.1:397–398

Nonnulli quidem uolunt animam humanam habere uim quandam diuinationis in se ipsa. sed si ita est, cur non semper potest, cum semper uelit? an, quia non semper adiuuatur, ut possit? cum ergo adiuuatur, numquid a nullo aut a corpore hoc adiuuari potest? proinde restat, ut ab spiritu adiuuetur. deinde quomodo adiuuatur? utrum in corpore fit aliquid, ut inde quasi relaxetur et emicet eius intentio, quo in id ueniat, ubi in se ipsa uideat significantes similitudines, quae ibi iam erant nec uidebantur, sicut multa habemus et in memoria, quae non semper intuemur? an fiunt illic, quae ante non fuerant, uel in aliquo spiritu sunt, quo illa erumpens et emergens ibi eas uideat? sed si iam in illa erant quasi proprie, cur eas etiam non consequenter intellegit? aliquando enim, immo plerumque non intellegit. an sicut spiritus eius adiutus est, ut eas in se uideret, ita et mens nisi adiuuetur ea, quae habet spiritus, intellegere non potest? an forte non corporea remouentur uel quasi relaxantur inpedimenta, ut suo inpetu anima in ea, quae uidenda sunt, exeratur, sed ipsa prorsus in haec adsumitur, siue tantum spiritaliter cernenda siue etiam intellectualiter cognoscenda? an aliquando in se ipsa uidet ista, aliquando per alterius spiritus conmixtionem? quidquid horum est, temere adfirmari non oportet. illud tamen dubium esse non debet corporales imagines, quae spiritu cernuntur, non semper signa esse aliarum rerum siue in uigilantibus siue in dormientibus siue in aegrotantibus; mirum est autem, si aliquando extasis fieri potest, ut non illae corporalium rerum similitudines aliquid significent. Non sane mirum est, si et daemonium habentes aliquando uera dicunt, quae absunt a praesentium sensibus: quod certe nescio qua occulta mistura eiusdem spiritus fit, ut tamquam unus sit patientis atque uexantis. cum autem spiritus bonus in haec uisa humanum spiritum adsumit aut rapit, nullo modo illas imagines signa rerum aliarum esse dubitandum est, et earum, quas nosse utile est; dei enim munus est. discretio sane difficillima est, cum spiritus malignus quasi tranquillius agit ac sine aliqua uexatione corporis adsumto humano spiritu dicit quod potest. quando etiam uera dicit et utilia praedicat, transfigurans se, sicut scriptum est: uelut angelum lucis, ad hoc, ut, cum illi in manifestis bonis creditum fuerit, seducat ad sua. hunc discerni non arbitror nisi dono illo, de quo ait apostolus, cum de diuersis dei muneribus loqueretur: alii diiudicatio spirituum.

Some indeed hold that the human soul has in itself a certain power of divination. But if so, why can it not always do it, since it always wants to? Or is it because it is not always helped so as to be able? When, then, it is helped, can it be helped by no one, or by a body? It remains, therefore, that it is helped by a spirit. Then, how is it helped? Does something happen in the body by which its attention is, as it were, released and darts forth, so that it comes to the point where it sees in itself the signifying likenesses that were already there but were not seen, as we have many things in memory too that we do not always look at? Or are things formed there that were not there before? Or are they in some spirit, into which the soul, breaking out and emerging, sees them there? But if they were already in it as its own, why does it not also understand them consequently? For sometimes, indeed usually, it does not understand them. Or, just as its spirit was helped to see them in itself, so too the mind cannot understand what the spirit has unless it is helped? Or perhaps it is not that bodily hindrances are removed or, as it were, loosened, so that the soul by its own impulse is thrust out toward what is to be seen, but that it is itself wholly taken up into these things, whether they are only to be discerned spiritually or also to be known intellectually? Or does it sometimes see these things in itself, sometimes through the intermingling of another spirit? Whichever of these it is, it should not be rashly affirmed. But this should not be doubtful: that the bodily images discerned by the spirit are not always signs of other things, whether in people awake or asleep or ill; but it would be a wonder if there can ever be an ecstasy in which those likenesses of bodily things do not signify something. It is certainly no wonder if even those who have a demon sometimes tell true things that are absent from the senses of those present: this certainly happens by some hidden mixture, I know not what, of the same spirit, so that the spirit of the sufferer and of the tormentor is as though one. But when a good spirit takes up or snatches the human spirit into these visions, there is no doubt at all that those images are signs of other things, and of things it is useful to know; for it is a gift of God. Discernment is indeed most difficult when the malign spirit acts more quietly, as it were, and, without any torment of the body, having taken up the human spirit, says what it can; when it even says true things and foretells useful ones, transforming itself, as it is written, as if into an angel of light, so that, once it has been believed in things plainly good, it may seduce people to its own. I do not think this spirit is discerned except by that gift of which the apostle speaks, when he was speaking of the various gifts of God: “to another, the discernment of spirits.”

12.14CSEL 28.1:398–400

non enim magnum est tunc eum dinoscere, cum ad aliqua peruenerit uel perduxerit, quae sunt contra bonos mores uel regulam fidei; tunc enim a multis discernitur. illo autem dono in ipso primordio, quo multis adhuc bonus adparet, continuo diiudicatur an malus sit. Tamen et per corporalem uisionem et per imagines corporalium, quae demonstrantur in spiritu, et boni instruunt et mali fallunt. intellectualis autem uisio non fallitur; aut enim non intellegit, qui aliud opinatur quam est, aut, si intellegit, continuo uerum est. quid enim faciant oculi non habent, cum simile corpus uiderint, quod ab alio discernere non possint, aut quid faciat animi intentio, cum in spiritu facta fuerit corporis similitudo, quam non ualeat distinguere a corpore. sed adhibetur intellectus quaerens, quid illa significent uel utile doceant, et aut inueniens ad fructum suum peruenit aut non inueniens in disceptatione se tenet, ne aliqua perniciosa temeritate prolabatur in exitiabilem errorem. Iudicat autem sobrius intellectus diuinitus adiutus, quae uel quanta sint, in quibus etiam aliud putare quam est non sit animae perniciosum. neque enim putantium periculo et non potius exitio suo quisque a bonis putatur bonus, etiamsi occultus sit malus, si in rebus ipsis, id est in ipso bono, quo fit quisque bonus, non erretur, aut aliquid obest omnibus hominibus, quod, cum dormiunt, uera corpora esse arbitrantur, quorum similitudines in somnis uident; aut aliquid Petro obfuit, quod solutus a uinculis seque angelo deducente factum est repentino miraculo, ut putaret se uisum uidere. uel cum in illa extasi respondit: nequaquam, domine, quia numquam manducaui omne commune et inmundum, putans ea ipsa, quae in disco demonstrabantur, tamquam uera animalia. haec quando aliter inuenta fuerint quam putata sunt, cum uiderentur, non nos paenitet ita nobis fuisse uisa, ad non arguatur uel infidelitas dura uel opinatio uana siue sacrilega. quapropter et cum uisis corporalibus diabolus fallit, nihil obest, quod ludificantur oculi, si non erratur in ueritate fidei et intellegentiae sanitate, quae docet deus subditos sibi. aut si ludificet animam spiritali uisione imaginibus corporum, ut putet corpus esse, quod non est, aliquid obest animae, si perniciosae suasioni non consentiat.

For it is no great thing to recognize him when he has arrived at, or led people to, things that are contrary to good morals or to the rule of faith; for then he is discerned by many. But by that gift he is judged at once, at the very beginning, when to many he still appears good, whether he is evil. Yet both through bodily vision and through the images of bodily things shown in the spirit, good spirits instruct and evil ones deceive. But intellectual vision is not deceived; for either one who thinks something other than what is does not understand, or, if he understands, it is at once true. For the eyes have nothing they can do when they have seen a similar body which they cannot distinguish from another; nor has the attention of the soul anything it can do when a likeness of a body has been formed in the spirit which it cannot distinguish from a body. But the intellect is applied, asking what these things signify or what useful thing they teach, and either it finds it and reaches its fruit, or, not finding it, it keeps itself in suspense, lest by some ruinous rashness it slip into deadly error. And a sober intellect, divinely helped, judges what and how great are the things in which even to think something other than what is is not harmful to the soul. For when someone is thought good by good people even though he is secretly evil, it is not to the peril of those who think so, but rather to his own ruin, if there is no error about the things themselves, that is, about the very good by which anyone becomes good. Nor does it harm all human beings that, when they sleep, they suppose to be true bodies those whose likenesses they see in dreams. Nor did it harm Peter that, when he had been freed from his chains and was being led by an angel, it happened by a sudden miracle that he thought he was seeing a vision; or when in that ecstasy he answered, “By no means, Lord, for I have never eaten anything common and unclean,” thinking that the things shown in the sheet were real animals. When these things are found to be other than they were thought when they were seen, we do not regret that they so appeared to us, and no hard unbelief or vain or sacrilegious opinion is charged against us. Therefore, even when the devil deceives with bodily sights, it does no harm that the eyes are mocked, if there is no error in the truth of faith and in the soundness of understanding which God teaches those subject to him. Or if he mocks the soul in spiritual vision with images of bodies, so that it thinks to be a body what is not, does it harm the soul at all, if it does not consent to a ruinous persuasion?

12.15CSEL 28.1:400–401

Unde aliquando fit quaestio de consensionibus somniantium, cum etiam concumbere sibi uidentur uel contra propositum suum uel contra etiam licitos mores: quod non contingit, nisi cum ea, quae uigilantes etiam cogitamus, non cum placito consensionis, sed, sicut etiam talia propter aliquid loquimur, sic admonentur in somnis et exprimuntur, ut eis caro naturaliter moueatur et, quod naturaliter conligit, per genitales uias emittat, sicut hoc ipsum dicere utique non possem, nisi etiam cogitarem. porro imagines rerum corporalium, quas necessario cogitaui, ut haec dicerem, si tanta expressione praesentarentur in somnis, quanta praesentantur corpora uigilantibus, fieret illud, quod sine peccato fieri a uigilante non posset. quis enim uel cum loquitur et postulante necessitate sermonis de suo concubitu aliquid dicit, possit non cogitare, quod dicit? porro ipsa phantasia, quae fit in cogitatione sermocinantis, cum ita expressa fuerit in uisione somniantis, ut inter illam et ueram conmixtionem corporum non discernatur, continuo mouetur caro et sequitur, quod eum motum sequi solet, cum hoc tam sine peccato fiat, quam sine peccato a uigilante dicitur, quod ut diceretur sine dubio cogitatum est. uerum tamen propter animae adfectionem bonam, quae desiderio meliore mundata multas interficit cupiditates, quae ad naturalem carnis motum non pertinent, quem casti uigilantes cohibent et refrenant, dormientes autem ideo non possunt, quia non habent in potestate quae admoueatur expressio corporalis imaginis, quae discerni non possit a corpore: propter illam ergo adfectionem animae bonam etiam in somnis quaedam eius merita clarent. nam etiam dormiens Salomon sapientiam praeposuit omnibus rebus eamque neglectis ceteris est precatus a domino; et, sicut scriptura testatur, placuit hoc coram domino nec distulit retributionem bonam pro desiderio bono.

Hence a question sometimes arises about the consent of dreamers, when they seem to themselves even to lie with someone, either against their resolve or even against lawful morals. This happens only when things that we also think of while awake—not with the approval of consent, but as we also speak of such things for some reason—are recalled in dreams and so vividly formed that the flesh is naturally moved by them and emits through the genital passages what it has naturally collected; just as I certainly could not say this very thing unless I also thought of it. Further, if the images of bodily things that I necessarily thought of in order to say this were presented in dreams as vividly as bodies are presented to those awake, there would happen what could not happen without sin to one awake. For who, when he speaks and, as the needs of discourse require, says something about his own intercourse, could not think of what he is saying? Further, when that very fantasy which occurs in the thought of the speaker is so vividly formed in the vision of the dreamer that it is not distinguished from a true union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved and there follows what usually follows that movement; though this happens as much without sin as what is said by one awake without sin, which in order to be said was undoubtedly thought of. Nevertheless, because of the good disposition of the soul, which, cleansed by a better desire, kills many desires that do not pertain to the natural movement of the flesh—which the chaste restrain and rein in while awake, but cannot while asleep, because they do not have in their power what vivid bodily image, indistinguishable from a body, is presented to them—because of that good disposition of the soul, then, some of its merits shine out even in dreams. For even when asleep Solomon preferred wisdom to all things and, neglecting the rest, asked the Lord for it; and, as Scripture testifies, this pleased the Lord, and he did not delay a good reward for a good desire.

12.16CSEL 28.1:401–403

Quae cum ita sint, pertinet corporis sensus ad uisa corporalia, qui per quinque quasi riuulos distanter ualentes distribuitur, cum illud, quod est subtilissimum in corpore et ob hoc animae uicinius quam cetera, id est lux primum per oculos sola diffunditur emicatque in radiis oculorum ad uisibilia contuenda, deinde mixtura quadam primo cum aere puro, secundo cum aere caliginoso atque nebuloso, tertio cum corpulentiore humore, quarto cum terrena crassitudine quinque sensus cum ipso, ubi sola excellit, oculorum sensu efficit, sicut in libro quarto itemque in septimo disseruisse me recolo. est autem hoc caelum oculis conspicuum, unde luminaria et sidera effulgent, excellentius utique omnibus corporeis elementis, sicut oculorum sensus excellit in corpore. quia uero spiritus omnis omni est corpore sine dubitatione praestantior, sequitur, ut non loci positione, sed naturae dignitate praestantior sit natura spiritalis isto corporeo caelo etiam illa, ubi rerum corporalium exprimuntur imagines. Hic existit quiddam mirabile, ut, cum prior sit corpore spiritus et posterior corporis imago quam corpus, tamen, quia illud, quod tempore posterius est, fit in eo, quod natura prius est, praestantior sit imago corporis in spiritu quam ipsum corpus in substantia sua. nec sane putandum est facere aliquid corpus in spiritu, tamquam spiritus corpori facienti materiae uice subdatur. omni enim modo praestantior est qui facit ea re, de qua aliquid facit. neque ullo modo spiritu praestantius est corpus, immo perspicuo modo spiritus corpore. quamuis ergo prius uideamus aliquod corpus, quod antea non uideramus, atque inde incipiat imago eius esse in spiritu nostro, quo illud cum absens fuerit recordemur, tamen eandem eius imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in se ipso facit celeritate mirabili, quae ineffabiliter longe est a corporis tarditate; cuius imago mox, ut oculis uisum fuerit, in spiritu uidentis nullius puncti temporalis interpositione formatur. itemque in auditu, nisi auribus perceptae uocis imaginem continuo spiritus in se ipso formaret ac memoria retineret, ignoraretur secunda syllaba utrum secunda esset, cum iam prima utique nulla esset, quae percussa aure transierat. ac sic omnis locutionis usus, omnis cantandi suauitas, omnis postremo in actibus nostris corporalis motus dilapsus occideret neque ullum progressum nancisceretur, si transactos corporis motus memoriter spiritus non teneret, quibus consequentes in agendo conecteret: quos utique non tenet nisi imaginaliter a se factos in se. ipsarum etiam futurarum motionum imagines praeueniunt fines actuum nostrorum. quid enim agimus per corpus, quod non cogitando praeoccupauerit spiritus omniumque uisibilium operum similitudines in se ipso primitus uiderit et quodammodo disposuerit?

This being so, the sense of the body pertains to bodily things seen; it is distributed through five channels, as it were, of differing strength, since that which is subtlest in the body and therefore nearer to the soul than the rest, namely light, is first diffused alone through the eyes and darts out in the rays of the eyes to behold visible things; then, by a certain mixture, first with pure air, second with misty and cloudy air, third with a more corporeal moisture, fourth with earthy grossness, it produces the five senses together with the sense of the eyes itself, where it excels alone—as I remember having discussed in the fourth and again in the seventh book. Now this heaven visible to the eyes, from which the luminaries and stars shine, is certainly more excellent than all the bodily elements, just as the sense of the eyes excels in the body. But since every spirit is without doubt more excellent than every body, it follows that, not by position in place but by dignity of nature, the spiritual nature is more excellent than this bodily heaven, even that spiritual nature in which images of bodily things are formed. Here something wonderful arises: although spirit is prior to body, and the image of a body is posterior to the body, yet because what is later in time comes about in what is prior by nature, the image of a body in the spirit is more excellent than the body itself in its own substance. Nor indeed should it be thought that the body produces anything in the spirit, as though the spirit were subject to the body as its maker in the manner of matter. For in every way the maker is more excellent than the thing from which he makes something; and in no way is body more excellent than spirit; on the contrary, plainly spirit is more excellent than body. So although we first see some body that we had not seen before, and from then its image begins to be in our spirit, by which we remember it when it is absent, yet it is not the body that makes this image of it in the spirit, but the spirit itself in itself, with a wonderful speed which is ineffably far from the slowness of the body; the image of which, as soon as it has been seen by the eyes, is formed in the spirit of the one seeing without the interval of any point of time. Likewise in hearing, unless the spirit at once formed in itself the image of the sound perceived by the ears and kept it in memory, one would not know whether the second syllable was the second, since the first would certainly no longer exist, having passed away after striking the ear. And so all use of speech, all the sweetness of singing, finally every bodily movement in our actions would fall apart and perish and achieve no progress, if the spirit did not hold in memory the past movements of the body, to which to connect the following ones in acting; and it certainly holds them only as images made by itself in itself. Even images of future movements go before the completion of our actions. For what do we do through the body that the spirit has not anticipated by thinking, first seeing in itself and in a way arranging the likenesses of all visible works?

12.17CSEL 28.1:403–406

Quae spiritales corporalium similitudines in animo nostro quemadmodum innotescant spiritibus etiam inmundis uel quid obstaculi anima nostra patiatur ex isto terreno corpore, ut eas inuicem in nostro spiritu uidere nequeamus, inuenire et explicare difficile est. certissimis tamen indiciis apud nos constitit enuntiatas a daemonibus cogitationes hominum: qui tamen, si uirtutum internam speciem possent in hominibus cernere, non temtarent; sicut illam in Iob nobilem ac mirabilem patientiam procul dubio si posset diabolus cernere, nollet a temtato utique superari. ceterum alicubi longe iam facta quod nuntiant, quae post aliquot dies uera esse firmentur, non est mirandum. possunt enim hoc efficere non solum acrimonia cernendi etiam corporalia inconparabiliter praestantiore quam nostra est, sed etiam ipsorum corporum longe utique subtiliorum mira uelocitate. Conperimus etiam in domo constitutum patientem spiritum inmundum dicere solere, quando ad eum uenire coepisset ex duodecim milibus presbyter et per omnia loca itineris ubi esset et quam propinquaret et quando ingrederetur et fundum et domum et cubiculum, donec in conspectu eius adstaret. quae omnia, etsi non oculis patiens ille cernebat, tamen nisi aliquo modo cerneret, non tam ueraciter enuntiaret. erat autem iste febriens et tamquam in phrenesi ista dicebat. et forte reuera phreneticus erat, sed propter ista daemonium pati putabatur. nullum refectionis cibum accipiebat a suis, sed a solo illo presbytero. resistebat etiam suis uiolenter, quantum ualebat; illo solo presbytero ueniente quiescebat, illi tantum subditus erat et subdite respondebat. nec tamen eidem saltem presbytero illa cessit mentis alienatio siue daemonium, nisi cum sanus esset a febribus, sicut phrenetici sanari solent, nec aliquando postea tale aliquid passus est. Nouimus etiam sine dubitatione phreneticum futuram mortem cuiusdam feminae praedixisse, non sane specie diuinandi, sed tamquam factum ac praeteritum recolens. nam cum eius apud eum commemoratio fieret, "mortua est", inquit, "ego eam uidi efferri, hac cum eius corpore transierunt", cum illa incolumis uiueret; post paucos autem dies repente defuncta est et per eum locum elata est, qua ille praedixerat. Fuit item apud nos puer, qui in exordio pubertatis dolorem acerrimum genitalium patiebatur medicis nequaquam ualentibus, quid illud esset, agnoscere, nisi quod neruus ipse introrsum reconditus erat, ita ut nec praeciso praeputio, quod inmoderata longitudine propendebat, adparere potuerit, sed postea uix esset inuentus. humor autem uiscosus et acer exudans testes et inguina urebat. sed acutum dolorem non continuum patiebatur: at cum patiebatur, eiulabat uehementer cum iactatione membrorum mente sanissima, sicut in cruciatibus corporalium dolorum fieri solet. deinde inter uoces suas abripiebatur ab omnibus sensibus et iacebat patentibus oculis neminem circumstantium uidens, ad nullam uellicationem se mouens. post aliquantum tamquam euigilans nec iam dolens quae uiderat indicabat. tum interpositis paucis diebus eadem patiebatur. in omnibus sane uel paene omnibus uisionibus suis duos se dicebat uidere, unum prouectioris aetatis, alterum puerum, a quibus ei uel dicebantur uel demonstrabantur, quae se audisse et uidisse narrabat. Uidit quodam die piorum psallentium laetitiam in luce mirabili et inpiorum in tenebris diuersas et atrocissimas poenas illis ducentibus et ostendentibus et felicitatis aliorum aliorumque infelicitatis meritum insinuantibus. hoc autem uidit die dominico paschae, cum per totam quadragesimam nihil doluisset, cui uix interuallo tridui antea parcebatur. uiderat autem in ipso ingressu quadragesimae illos promittentes sibi, quod per quadraginta dies nullum sensurus esset dolorem; postea ipsi ei dederunt tamquam medicinale consilium, ut ei praeputii longitudo praecideretur, quo facto diu non doluit. cum uero iterum similiter doleret et similia uidere coepisset, accepit ab eis rursus consilium, ut in mare pube tenus intraret et post aliquantam moram inde discederet, promittentibus sane, quod iam deinceps uehementem illum dolorem non esset passurus, sed solius illius uiscosi humoris molestiam; atque ita secutum est. nec umquam talem aliquam postea passus est auersionem mentis a sensibus nec tale aliquid uidit nisi antea cum in mediis doloribus et horrendis uocibus repente obmutescens abriperetur. postea tamen medicis cetera curantibus et sanantibus non permansit in proposito sanctitatis.

How these spiritual likenesses of bodily things in our soul become known even to unclean spirits, or what hindrance our soul suffers from this earthly body so that we cannot see them in one another's spirit, is difficult to find out and explain. Yet it has been established among us by the most certain evidence that people's thoughts have been declared by demons; yet if they could discern the inner beauty of the virtues in people, they would not tempt them; just as the devil, if he could have discerned that noble and wonderful patience in Job, would certainly not have wished to be overcome by the one he tempted. As for their announcing things that have already happened somewhere far away, which are confirmed as true after some days, this is no wonder. For they can do this not only by a keenness in discerning even bodily things incomparably superior to ours, but also by the wonderful speed of their own bodies, which are certainly far subtler. We have also learned that a man who was suffering from an unclean spirit, while he was at home, used to say when a presbyter had set out to come to him from twelve miles away, and through all the places on the journey where he was, and how near he was coming, and when he was entering the estate and the house and the bedroom, until he stood in his sight. All this, even though the sufferer did not discern it with his eyes, he would nonetheless not have declared so truly unless he discerned it in some way. He was feverish and said these things as if in delirium. And perhaps he really was delirious, but because of these things he was thought to be suffering from a demon. He took no nourishing food from his own family, but only from that presbyter. He even resisted his own family violently, as far as he was able; only when that presbyter came was he quiet; to him alone he was submissive and answered submissively. Yet that estrangement of mind, or demon, did not yield even to that presbyter until he was healed of the fever, as the delirious usually are healed; nor did he ever suffer anything of the kind afterwards. We also know without doubt that a delirious man foretold the future death of a certain woman, not indeed in the manner of divining, but as though recalling something done and past. For when she was mentioned in his presence, he said, “She is dead; I saw her carried out; they passed this way with her body,” when she was alive and well; but a few days later she died suddenly and was carried out by the place he had foretold. There was also with us a boy who at the beginning of puberty suffered most acute pain in the genitals, the physicians being quite unable to recognize what it was, except that the member itself was drawn back inward, so that it could not appear even when the foreskin, which hung down to an immoderate length, was cut off, and afterwards was found only with difficulty. A sticky, acrid fluid oozing out burned the testicles and groin. But he did not suffer the sharp pain continuously; when he did suffer it, he wailed vehemently, tossing his limbs, with his mind perfectly sound, as usually happens in the torments of bodily pain. Then, in the midst of his cries, he would be snatched away from all his senses and would lie with eyes open, seeing none of those standing around, not moving at any pinching. After a while, as if waking and no longer in pain, he would tell what he had seen. Then, after a few days, he would suffer the same things. In all, or nearly all, his visions he said he saw two persons, one older, the other a boy, by whom were said or shown to him the things he reported having heard and seen. One day he saw the joy of the godly singing psalms in a wonderful light, and the various and most terrible punishments of the ungodly in darkness, those two leading him and showing him and suggesting the desert of the happiness of the one and the unhappiness of the other. He saw this on the Lord's day of Easter, after he had felt no pain throughout Lent, when before he had scarcely been spared for an interval of three days. At the very beginning of Lent he had seen those two promising him that for forty days he would feel no pain; afterwards they themselves gave him, as it were, medical advice, that the excessive length of his foreskin should be cut off; when this was done he was free from pain for a long time. When he again suffered pain in the same way and began to see similar things, he received advice from them again, that he should go into the sea up to his groin and after some delay come out; and they promised that from then on he would not suffer that violent pain, but only the trouble of that sticky fluid; and so it followed. Nor did he ever afterwards suffer any such turning of the mind from the senses, or see any such thing, as before, when in the midst of his pains and dreadful cries he would suddenly fall silent and be snatched away. Afterwards, however, when the physicians treated and healed the rest, he did not persevere in his resolve to holy life.

12.18CSEL 28.1:406–407

Istarum uisionum et diuinationum causas et modos uestigare si quis potest certoque conprehendere, eum magis audire uellem quam de me expectari, ut ipse dissererem. quid tamen putem, ita ut nec docti me tamquam confirmantem derideant nec indocti tamquam docentem accipiant, sed utrique disceptantem et quaerentem potius quam scientem, non occultabo. ego uisa ista omnia uisis conparo somniantium. sicut enim aliquando et haec falsa, aliquando autem uera sunt, aliquando perturbata, aliquando tranquilla, ipsa autem uera aliquando futuris omnino similia uel aperte dicta, aliquando obscuris significationibus et quasi figuratis locutionibus praenuntiata, sic etiam illa omnia. sed amant homines inexperta mirari et causas insolitorum requirere, cum cotidiana plerumque talia saepe etiam latentioris originis nosse non curent. nam quemadmodum in uocibus, hoc est signis, quibus in loquendo utimur, audito uerbo inusitato quaerunt primo, quid sit, hoc est quid significet, quo cognito deinde quaerunt, unde ita dictum sit, cum tam multa sine cura nesciant, quae in usu sermonis habent, unde ita sint dicta: sic cum aliquid inusitatum in rebus acciderit siue corporalibus siue spiritalibus, causas rationemque sollicite inquirunt et sibi reddi a doctoribus flagitant. Soleo autem, cum me quisque interrogat, uerbi gratia, quid sit catus, et respondeo "prudens uel acutus", nec ei sufficit, sed pergit quaerere, unde dictus sit catus, uicissim referre et quaerere, unde dictus sit acutus. quod nihilominus utique ignorabat, sed, quia usitatum nomen erat, patienter eius originem nesciebat; quod autem nouum insonuit auribus, parum putat nosse, quid significando ualet, nisi etiam unde dicatur exquirat. quisquis ergo ex me quaerit, unde uisa corporalibus similia in extasi adpareant, quae raro accidit animae, uicissim quaero, unde adpareant dormientibus, quae cotidie sentit anima, et nemo istuc aut non multum curat inquirere. quasi ideo minus mira sit talium natura uisorum, quia cotidiana est, aut ideo minus curanda, quia omnium est; aut si recte faciunt, qui ista non quaerunt, rectius fecerint, si nec in illa curiosi sint. ego uero multo amplius admiror multoque maxime stupeo, quanta celeritate ac facilitate in se anima fabricetur imagines corporum, quae per corporis oculos uiderit, quam somniantium uel etiam in extasi uisiones. quaecumque tamen illa natura uisorum est, procul dubio corpus non est. hoc nosse cui non sufficit, unde etiam existant inquirat ab aliis; me ignorare confiteor.

If anyone can track down the causes and modes of these visions and divinations and grasp them with certainty, I would rather listen to him than be expected to discourse on them myself. Yet what I think I will not hide—so that the learned may not laugh at me as if I were asserting, nor the unlearned receive me as if I were teaching, but both may take me as discussing and inquiring rather than knowing. I compare all these visions with the visions of dreamers. For just as these are sometimes false and sometimes true, sometimes disturbed and sometimes calm, and the true ones themselves sometimes entirely like the future events or plainly stated, sometimes foretold by obscure significations and figurative expressions, as it were, so too are all those. But people love to marvel at what they have not experienced and to seek the causes of unusual things, while they mostly do not care to know everyday things of the same kind, often of even more hidden origin. For just as with words, that is, the signs we use in speaking, when they hear an unusual word they first ask what it is, that is, what it means; and when they know this, they then ask where it comes from, though they are ignorant, without concern, of so many words they have in daily use, as to where they come from; so when something unusual happens in things, whether bodily or spiritual, they anxiously inquire into its causes and reason and demand that teachers render them an account. When someone asks me, for example, what catus means, and I answer “prudent” or “sharp,” and that does not satisfy him but he goes on to ask where catus comes from, I usually ask in turn where acutus comes from. Of this he was nonetheless ignorant, but because it was a familiar word he was content not to know its origin; but because the other sounded new in his ears, he thinks he hardly knows what it means unless he also finds out where it comes from. So whoever asks me where the things seen in ecstasy, resembling bodily things, come from—which rarely happens to the soul—I ask in turn where the things seen by those asleep come from, which the soul experiences daily, and no one cares, or cares much, to inquire into that. As if the nature of such visions were less wonderful because it is daily, or less worth caring about because it belongs to everyone! Or if those who do not inquire into these do right, they would do more rightly not to be curious about those either. For my part, I marvel far more, and am most of all amazed, at the speed and ease with which the soul fabricates in itself images of bodies it has seen through the eyes of the body, than at the visions of dreamers or even of those in ecstasy. But whatever the nature of these things seen, it is beyond doubt not a body. Whoever is not satisfied to know this, let him ask others where they come from; I confess I do not know.

12.19CSEL 28.1:407–409

Illud plane exemplorum experimentis conligi datur. sicut corporum pallor, rubor, tremor, uel etiam morbus aliquando a corpore habet causas, aliquando ab anima — et a corpore quidem, cum uel humor suffunditur uel cibus uel aliquid aliud corporis iniectum extrinsecus; ab anima uero, cum uel timore turbatur uel pudore confunditur uel irascitur uel amat uel si quid huius modi; nec inmerito, si id, quod animat et regit, etiam cum uehementius mouetur uehementius exagitat — ita et ipsi animae, ut in ea uisa pergat, quae non ei per sensus corporis nuntiantur, sed per incorporalem substantiam, et ita pergat, ut non discernat, utrum corpora sint an similitudines corporum, aliquando a corpore accidit, aliquando ab spiritu: et a corpore quidem siue naturali uicissitudine, ut sunt uisa somniantium — dormire quippe a corpore est homini — siue aliqua mala ualetudine sensibus perturbatis, ut, cum a phreneticis simul et corpora uidentur et uisa similia corporibus, tamquam et ipsa prae oculis adsint, aut penitus interclusis, sicut saepe male facti morbo aliquo ingrauescente praesente corpore diu absentes, deinde hominibus redditi multa se uidisse dixerunt; ab spiritu uero, cum omnino sano atque integro corpore in alienationem rapiuntur, siue ita, ut et per sensus corporis corpora uideant et in spiritu quaedam similia, quae a corporibus non discernant, siue penitus auertantur a sensibus carnis et nihil per eos omnino sentientes illa spiritali uisione habitent in similitudinibus corporum. sed cum malus in haec arripit spiritus, aut daemoniacos facit aut arrepticios aut falsos prophetas; cum autem bonus, fideles mysteria loquentes aut accedente etiam intellegentia ueros prophetas aut ad tempus, quod per eos oportet ostendi, uidentes atque narrantes.

This much, at least, can be gathered from the experience of examples. Just as pallor, blushing, trembling, or even disease in bodies sometimes has its causes from the body and sometimes from the soul—from the body when some fluid spreads or food or something else is introduced into the body from outside; from the soul when it is disturbed by fear or confused by shame or angry or in love or something of the kind; and not without reason, if what animates and rules the body also agitates it more vehemently when it is itself moved more vehemently—so too it happens to the soul itself, that it passes into visions which are not reported to it through the senses of the body but through an incorporeal substance, and passes so that it does not distinguish whether they are bodies or likenesses of bodies, sometimes from the body and sometimes from the spirit. From the body, either by natural alternation, as are the visions of dreamers—for sleeping comes to a man from the body—or through some bad health, when the senses are disturbed, as when the delirious see at once both bodies and things like bodies as if they too were present before their eyes; or when the senses are entirely shut off, as people who have fallen gravely ill, when some disease grows worse, being long absent though the body is present, and then restored to human company, have said that they saw many things. From the spirit, when with a body entirely sound and whole people are snatched into rapture, either in such a way that they see bodies through the senses of the body and in the spirit certain likenesses which they do not distinguish from bodies, or in such a way that they are wholly turned away from the senses of the flesh and, perceiving nothing at all through them, dwell by that spiritual vision among likenesses of bodies. But when an evil spirit seizes people into these things, it makes them demoniacs, or the possessed, or false prophets; when a good spirit does so, it makes believers speaking mysteries, or, when understanding is also added, true prophets, or people who see and tell for a time what must be shown through them.

12.20CSEL 28.1:409–411

Sed cum a corpore causa est, ut talia uisa cernantur, non ea corpus exhibet; neque enim habet eam uim, ut formet aliquid spiritale, sed sopito aut perturbato aut etiam intercluso itinere intentionis a cerebro, qua dirigitur sentiendi modus, anima ipsa, quae motu proprio cessare ab hoc opere non potest, quia per corpus non sinitur uel non plene sinitur corporalia sentire uel ad corporalia uim suae intentionis dirigere, spiritu corporalium similitudines agit aut intuetur obiectas. et si quidem ipsa eas agit, phantasiae tantum sunt, si autem obiectas intuetur, ostensiones sunt. denique cum oculi dolent uel extincti sunt, quia non est causa in sede cerebri, unde ipsa dirigitur intentio sentiendi, non fiunt huius modi uisiones, quamuis cernendis corporalibus obstaculum existat a corpore. magis enim caeci aliquid dormientes quam uigilantes uident; dormientibus quippe in cerebro consopitur uia sentiendi, quae intentionem ad oculos ducit, ideoque ipsa intentio in aliud auersa cernit uisa somniorum, tamquam species corporales adsint, ut sibi dormiens uigilare uideatur et non similia corporibus, sed ipsa corpora intueri se putet: cum autem uigilant caeci, ducitur per illa itinera intentio cernendi, quae cum ad loca uenerit oculorum non exeritur foras, sed ibi remanet, ut uigilare se sentiant potiusque esse in tenebris uigilando etiam per diem quam dormiendo siue per diem siue per noctem. nam et qui caeci non sunt, plerique patentibus oculis dormiunt nihil per eos uidentes, sed non ideo nihil uidentes. cum spiritu cernant uisa somniorum, si autem clausis oculis uigilent, neque dormientium praesto sunt uisionibus neque uigilantium. tantum tamen ualet, quod usque ad oculos eorum nec sopita nec perturbata nec interclusa peruenit a cerebro uia sentiendi et animae intentionem usque ad ipsas quamuis clausas fores corporis ducit, ut cogitentur quidem imagines corporum, sed nullo modo pro eis habeantur corporibus, quae per oculos sentiuntur. Tantum interest, ubi fiat inpedimentum sentiendi corporalia, cum fit in corpore. si enim non fit nisi in ipsis aditibus et quasi ianuis sensuum, uelut in oculis, in auribus ceterisque sensibus corporis, sola inpeditur perceptio corporalium, non autem animae intentio in aliud sic auertitur, ut pro corporibus habeat imagines corporum; si autem causa est intus in cerebro, unde dirigantur uiae ad ea, quae foris sunt, sentienda, ipsius intentionis uasa sopiuntur uel turbantur uel intercluduntur, quibus nititur anima in ea, quae foris sunt, intuenda uel sentienda. quem nisum quoniam non amittit, tanta expressione format similia, ut imagines corporalium a corporalibus discernere non ualens, utrum in illis an in istis sit, nesciat et cum scit longe alio modo sciat, quam dum in cogitando uersantur siue occurrunt similitudines corporum: qui modus nisi ab expertis capi utcumque non potest. hinc enim erat, quod me dormiens in somnis uidere sciebam nec tamen illas corporalium rerum similitudines, quas uidebam, sic ab ipsis corporalibus discernebam, quemadmodum eas cogitantes etiam clausis oculis uel in tenebris constituti discernere solemus. tantum ualet ipsa animi intentio utrum perducatur usque ad sensus licet clausos an in ipso cerebro, unde in haec nititur, aliqua causa existente in aliud auertatur, ut, quamuis aliquando se nouerit non corpora, sed corporum similitudines cernere uel minus erudita etiam ipsa esse corpora existimans sentiat se non ea corpore, sed spiritu uidere, longe sit tamen ab effectione, qua suo corpori praesentatur: unde se norunt et caeci uigilare, cum similitudines corporum cogitatas a corporibus, quae uidere non possunt, certa notione discernunt.

But when the cause of seeing such things is from the body, it is not the body that presents them; for it does not have the power to form anything spiritual. Rather, when the path of attention from the brain, by which the manner of perceiving is directed, is lulled or disturbed or even shut off, the soul itself, which cannot by its own movement cease from this work, since through the body it is not allowed, or not fully allowed, to perceive bodily things or to direct the force of its attention to bodily things, produces likenesses of bodily things in the spirit or beholds them presented to it. And if it produces them itself, they are only fantasies; but if it beholds them presented, they are showings. Finally, when the eyes are diseased or destroyed, since the cause is not in the seat of the brain, from which the attention of perceiving is directed, visions of this kind do not occur, though an obstacle to discerning bodily things arises from the body. For the blind see something more when asleep than when awake; for in those asleep the path of perceiving in the brain, which leads the attention to the eyes, is lulled, and so the attention itself, turned to something else, discerns the sights of dreams as though bodily forms were present, so that the sleeper seems to himself to be awake and thinks he is beholding not things like bodies but bodies themselves. But when the blind are awake, the attention of seeing is led along those paths, and when it has come to the place of the eyes it is not thrust out but remains there, so that they perceive that they are awake and are rather in darkness when awake, even by day, than when asleep, whether by day or by night. For many who are not blind also sleep with their eyes open, seeing nothing through them, yet not on that account seeing nothing, since they discern the sights of dreams by the spirit; but if they are awake with their eyes closed, they are present neither to the visions of sleepers nor to those of the waking. Yet it makes so much difference that the path of perceiving, neither lulled nor disturbed nor shut off, reaches from the brain to their eyes and leads the soul's attention right up to the doors of the body, though closed, that images of bodies are indeed thought of, but are in no way taken for the bodies that are perceived through the eyes. So much does it matter where the hindrance to perceiving bodily things occurs, when it occurs in the body. For if it occurs only at the entrances and, as it were, doors of the senses, as in the eyes, the ears, and the other senses of the body, only the perception of bodily things is hindered; but the soul's attention is not turned to something else in such a way that it takes images of bodies for bodies. But if the cause is within, in the brain, from which the paths are directed to perceive what is outside, then the very vessels of attention are lulled or disturbed or shut off, by which the soul strives to look at or perceive what is outside. And since it does not lose this striving, it forms likenesses so vividly that, unable to distinguish images of bodily things from bodily things, it does not know whether it is among the former or the latter; and when it does know, it knows in a very different way than when likenesses of bodies are turned over in thought or occur to it; a way that cannot be grasped at all except by those who have experienced it. Hence it was that, while asleep, I knew that I was seeing in dreams, and yet I did not distinguish the likenesses of bodily things that I saw from bodily things themselves in the way we usually distinguish them when thinking of them, even with eyes closed or in darkness. So much does it matter whether the soul's attention is led right up to the senses, though closed, or, some cause arising in the brain itself from which it strives toward them, is turned to something else; so that, although the soul sometimes knows that it is discerning not bodies but likenesses of bodies, or, less instructed, thinking them to be bodies themselves, perceives that it sees them not with the body but with the spirit, it is still far from the vividness with which things are presented to its body. By this the blind too know that they are awake, when they distinguish with sure knowledge the likenesses of bodies they think of from the bodies they cannot see.

12.21CSEL 28.1:411–412

Cum autem sano corpore nec somno sensibus consopitis aliquo occulto opere spiritali in ea uisa, quae similia sunt corporalibus, anima rapitur, non, quia modus diuersus est, ideo est etiam diuersa natura uisorum, cum et in illis causis, quae de corpore existunt, sit utique differentia et aliquando a contrario. nam phrenetici non dormiendo potius perturbatas habent sentiendi uias in capite, ut talia uideant, qualia somniantes uident, quorum dormiendo auertitur intentio a sensu uigilandi et in ea uidenda conuertitur. cum ergo illud fiat non dormiendo, hoc autem dormiendo, non tamen ea, quae uidentur, ex alio genere sunt quam ex natura spiritus, de quo uel in quo fiunt similitudines corporum. ita quamuis diuersa sit causa intentionis alienatae, quando sano corpore uigilantis occulta quadam ui spiritali anima rapitur, ut uice corporum expressas corporalium rerum similitudines in spiritu uideat, eadem tamen est natura uisorum. neque enim dici potest, cum causa in corpore est, tunc animam sine ulla praesensione futurorum ex se ipsa uersare imagines corporum, sicut etiam cogitando adsolet, cum uero in ea uidenda spiritu adsumitur, diuinitus haec demonstrari, quandoquidem aperte scriptura dicit: effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem, et iuuenes uisa uidebunt, et senes somnia somniabunt, diuinae operationi utrumque tribuens, et: angelus domini adparuit homini in somnis dicens: noli timere accipere Mariam coniugem tuam, et iterum: tolle puerum et uade in Aegyptum.

But when, with the body sound and the senses not lulled by sleep, the soul is snatched by some hidden spiritual work into those sights that are like bodily things, the nature of the things seen is not different just because the mode is different; since even among those causes which arise from the body there is certainly a difference, and sometimes an opposite one. For the delirious, rather than by sleeping, have the paths of perceiving in the head disturbed so as to see such things as dreamers see, whose attention is turned away in sleep from the waking sense and turned to seeing these things. Although, then, the one happens not by sleeping and the other by sleeping, the things seen are not of any other kind than of the nature of the spirit, of which or in which the likenesses of bodies are formed. So, although the cause of the estranged attention is different when, with the body of a waking person sound, the soul is snatched by some hidden spiritual power so as to see in the spirit likenesses of bodily things formed in place of bodies, the nature of the things seen is still the same. For it cannot be said that when the cause is in the body, then the soul turns over images of bodies from itself without any foreknowledge of the future, as it usually does in thinking, but that when it is taken up by a spirit to see them, these are shown divinely; since Scripture plainly says, “I will pour out of my Spirit on all flesh, and young men shall see visions, and old men shall dream dreams,” attributing both to divine operation; and, “An angel of the Lord appeared to a man in sleep, saying, Do not fear to take Mary your wife”; and again, “Take the child and go into Egypt.”

12.22CSEL 28.1:412–414

Itaque bono quidem spiritu adsumi spiritum hominis ad has uidendas imagines, nisi aliqua significent, non puto; cum uero in corpore causa est, ut in eas expressius intuendas humanus intendatur spiritus, non semper aliquid significare credendum est, sed tunc significant, cum inspirantur a demonstrante spiritu siue dormienti siue aliquid aliud ex corpore, ut a carnis sensibus alienaretur, patienti. uigilantibus etiam neque ullo morbo adflictis nec furore exagitatis occulto quodam instinctu ingestas esse cogitationes, quas promendo diuinarent, non solum aliud agentes, sicut Caiphas pontifex prophetauit, cum eius intentio non haberet uoluntatem prophetandi, uerum etiam id suscipientes, ut diuinandi modo aliquid dicerent, nouimus. Nam quidam iuuenes iocando, ut fallerent, ubi peregrini iter agebant, mathematicos se esse finxerunt, ignorantes omnino, utrum duodecim signa dicerentur. qui cum hospitem suum mirari cernerent, quae dicebant, et adtestari esse uerissima, audacius in plura progressi sunt. at ille adtestans ad omnia mirabatur. postremo ab eis de filii salute quaesiuit, quem diu absentem desiderabat et, quod inopinate tardaret, ne quid ei accidisset, sollicitus erat. at illi non curantes, quid post eorum abscessum ueri cognosceretur, dum tamen in praesentia laetum hominem redderent, mox profecturi responderunt saluum ac propinquantem et eo ipso die, quo haec loquebantur, esse uenturum; neque enim metuebant, ne cum totus dies peractus esset eos ille redarguendos postera die sequeretur. quid multa? dum iam abire disponerent, ecce, subito adhuc eis illic positis uenit. Item alius ante symphoniacum saltabat, ubi erant multa idola per quandam paganorum sollemnitatem, non aliquo spiritu adreptus, sed imitatione ludicra adrepticios aemulatus scientibus circumstantibus et spectantibus. moris enim erat, ut ante prandium peractis sacrificiis agitatisque fanaticis, si qui adulescentes post prandium uellent eo more ludere, nullus prohiberetur. ille ergo inter saltandum facto sibi silentio iocabundus et ridente multitudine circumseptus ea nocte, quae inpendebat, in ea silua, quae iuxta erat, hominem a leone interemtum iri, ad cuius cadauer spectandum inlucescente die confluxuram turbam et illius sollemnitatis locum deserturam praedixit. et factum est, cum satis cunctis, qui aderant, in omnibus eius motibus claruisset hoc eum ludendo et iocando nusquam perturbata uel alienata mente dixisse ipso etiam tanto amplius mirante, quod accidit, quanto magis nosset, quo id animo atque ore protulerit. Quonam modo haec uisa in spiritum hominis ueniant, utrum ibi primitus formentur an formata ingerantur et quadam coniunctione cernantur, ut sic hominibus angeli ostendant cogitationes suas et corporalium rerum similitudines, quas in suo spiritu futurorum cognitione praeformant, quemadmodum et ipsi nostras cogitationes non utique oculis, quia non corpore, sed spiritu uident, uerum hoc intersit, quod illi nostras, etiam si nolimus, nouerunt, nos autem ipsorum, nisi ostendantur, nosse non possumus — quia sic eas, ut opinor, habent in potestate occultare spiritalibus modis, quemadmodum nos quibusdam interiectis obstaculis nostra corpora, ne aliorum oculis uideantur, abscondimus — et quid fiat in spiritu nostro, ut aliquando cernantur tantummodo significantes imagines sed, utrum aliquid significent, ignoretur, aliquando autem aliquid significare sentiantur, sed quid significent nesciatur, aliquando uero tamquam pleniore demonstratione anima humana et spiritu ipsas et mente quid significent uideat: et scire difficillimum est et, si iam sciamus, disserere atque explicare operosissimum.

So I do not think that the spirit of a man is taken up by a good spirit to see these images unless they signify something. But when the cause is in the body, so that the human spirit is directed to beholding them more vividly, we must not believe that they always signify something; they signify, however, when they are inspired by a showing spirit, whether to one asleep or to one suffering something else from the body so as to be estranged from the senses of the flesh. We know also that to people who are awake and afflicted by no disease nor stirred by frenzy, thoughts have been introduced by some hidden prompting, by uttering which they divined; not only when they were doing something else, as the high priest Caiaphas prophesied though his intention had no will to prophesy, but even when they undertook to say something in the manner of divining. For certain young men, travelling as strangers, in fun and to deceive, pretended to be astrologers, though entirely ignorant even whether the signs were said to be twelve. When they saw their host marvelling at what they said and testifying that it was most true, they went on more boldly to more. And he, testifying to everything, marvelled. Finally he asked them about the safety of his son, whom he had long missed in his absence and about whom he was anxious that something might have happened to him, because he was unexpectedly delayed. They, not caring what truth would be known after their departure, so long as they made the man happy for the present, being about to set out, answered that he was safe and approaching and would come that very day on which they were speaking. For they did not fear that, when the whole day had passed, he would follow them the next day to refute them. In short: while they were already preparing to leave, behold, suddenly, while they were still there, he came. Again, another man was dancing before a musician, where there were many idols, during some festival of the pagans; he was not seized by any spirit, but in playful imitation was mimicking the possessed, as those standing around and watching knew. For it was the custom that, when the sacrifices had been completed before the meal and the frenzied devotees had been worked up, if any young men wished to play in that manner after the meal, no one was prevented. So while dancing, when silence had been made for him, joking and surrounded by the laughing crowd, he foretold that in the coming night a man would be killed by a lion in the wood that was nearby, and that at daybreak the crowd would flock to see his corpse and desert the place of that festival. And it happened, though it had been clear enough to all who were present, in all his movements, that he had said this playing and joking, with his mind nowhere disturbed or estranged; he himself marvelling at what happened all the more, the better he knew with what intention and in what tone he had uttered it. In what way these visions come into a man's spirit—whether they are first formed there, or are introduced already formed and discerned by some kind of conjunction, so that angels show to human beings their own thoughts and the likenesses of bodily things which they preform in their spirit by knowledge of the future; just as they themselves see our thoughts, not with eyes, since they see not by a body but by the spirit; yet with this difference, that they know ours even if we do not wish it, while we cannot know theirs unless they are shown, because, I think, they have it in their power to hide them by spiritual means, just as we hide our bodies by interposing obstacles so that they are not seen by others' eyes—and what happens in our spirit, so that sometimes signifying images alone are discerned but it is not known whether they signify anything, sometimes they are perceived to signify something but what they signify is not known, and sometimes, by a fuller showing as it were, the human soul sees both the images themselves with the spirit and what they signify with the mind: all this is most difficult to know and, even if we already knew it, most laborious to discuss and explain.

12.23CSEL 28.1:414–416

Quod autem nunc insinuare satis arbitror, certum est esse spiritalem quandam naturam in nobis, ubi corporalium rerum formantur similitudines, siue cum aliquod corpus sensu corporis tangimus, et continuo formatur eius similitudo in spiritu memoriaque reconditur; siue cum absentia corpora iam nota cogitamus, ut ex eis formetur quidam spiritalis aspectus, quae iam erant in spiritu et antequam ea cogitaremus; siue cum eorum corporum, quae non nouimus, sed tamen esse non dubitamus, similitudines non ita ut sunt illa, sed ut occurrit, intuemur; siue cum alia, quae uel non sunt uel esse nesciuntur, pro arbitrio uel opinatione cogitamus; siue unde unde neque id agentibus neque uolentibus nobis uariae formae corporalium similitudinum uersantur in animo; siue cum aliquid corporaliter acturi ea ipsa disponimus, quae in illa actione futura sunt, et omnia cogitatione antecedimus; siue iam in ipso actu, uel cum loquimur uel cum facimus, omnes corporales motus, ut exeri possint, praeueniuntur similitudinibus suis intus in spiritu: neque enim ulla uel breuissima syllaba in ordine suo nisi prospecta sonuisset; siue cum a dormientibus somnia uidentur uel nihil uel aliquid significantia; siue cum ualetudine corporali turbatis intrinsecus itineribus sentiendi imagines corporum spiritus ueris corporibus ita miscet, ut internosci uel uix possint uel omnino non possint et aut significent aliquid aut sine ulla significatione oboriantur; siue prorsus ingrauescente aliquo morbo uel dolore corporis et intercludente intus uias, quibus animae, ut per carnem sentiret, exerebatur ac nitebatur intentio, altius quam somno absentato spiritu corporalium rerum existunt aut monstrantur imagines uel significantes aliquid uel sine ulla significatione adparentes; siue nulla ex corpore causa existente, sed adsumente atque rapiente aliquo spiritu tollitur anima in huius modi uidendas similitudines corporum, miscens eis uisa corporalia, cum simul etiam corporis sensibus utitur; siue ita spiritu adsumente alienatur ab omni corporis sensu et auertitur, ut solis similitudinibus corporum spiritali uisione teneatur, ubi nescio utrum possint aliqua nihil significantia uideri.

What I think it enough to point out now is this: it is certain that there is in us a certain spiritual nature in which likenesses of bodily things are formed: whether when we touch some body with a sense of the body and its likeness is at once formed in the spirit and stored in memory; or when we think of absent bodies already known, so that from them a certain spiritual sight is formed, which were already in the spirit even before we thought of them; or when we behold likenesses of bodies we do not know but do not doubt exist, not as they are but as they occur to us; or when we think at will or by opinion of other things that either do not exist or are not known to exist; or when, from wherever, without our doing or willing it, various forms of likenesses of bodies turn over in the soul; or when, about to do something bodily, we arrange the very things that will be in that action and go ahead of them all in thought; or when, already in the act itself, whether we are speaking or doing, all bodily movements, so that they can be carried out, are anticipated by their likenesses within in the spirit—for not even the shortest syllable would have sounded in its order unless it had been foreseen; or when dreams are seen by sleepers, signifying nothing or something; or when, the inner paths of perceiving disturbed by bodily ill health, the spirit so mingles images of bodies with true bodies that they can scarcely or not at all be told apart, and either signify something or arise without any signification; or when some disease or bodily pain grows heavier and shuts off within the paths by which the soul's attention was thrust out and strove to perceive through the flesh, and, the spirit being withdrawn more deeply than in sleep, images of bodily things arise or are shown, either signifying something or appearing without any signification; or when, with no cause arising from the body, but some spirit taking up and snatching it, the soul is lifted to see likenesses of bodies of this kind, mingling bodily sights with them, when it is also using the senses of the body at the same time; or when, a spirit so taking it up, it is estranged and turned away from every sense of the body, so that it is held by likenesses of bodies alone in spiritual vision, where I do not know whether any things can be seen that signify nothing.

12.24CSEL 28.1:416–417

Haec igitur natura spiritalis, in qua non corpora, sed corporum similitudines exprimuntur, inferioris generis uisiones habet quam illud mentis atque intellegentiae lumen, quo et ista inferiora diiudicantur et ea cernuntur, quae neque sunt corpora nec ullas gerunt formas similes corporum, uelut ipsa mens et omnis animae adfectio bona, cui contraria sunt eius uitia, quae recte culpantur atque damnantur in hominibus. quo enim alio modo ipse intellectus nisi intellegendo conspicitur? ita et caritas, gaudium, pax, longanimitas, benignitas, bonitas, fides, mansuetudo, continentia et cetera huius modi, quibus propinquatur deo, et ipse deus, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia. Quamquam itaque in eadem anima fiant uisiones, siue quae sentiuntur per corpus, sicut hoc corporeum caelum et terra et quaecumque in eis nota esse possunt, quemadmodum possunt, siue quae spiritu uidentur similia corporum, de quibus multa iam diximus, siue cum mente intelleguntur, quae nec corpora sunt nec similitudines corporum, habent utique ordinem suum et est aliud alio praecellentius. praestantior est enim uisio spiritalis quam corporalis et rursus praestantior intellectualis quam spiritalis. corporalis enim sine spiritali esse non potest, quandoquidem momento eodem, quo corpus sensu corporis tangitur, fit etiam in animo tale aliquid, non quod hoc sit, sed quod simile sit: quod si non fieret, nec sensus ille esset, quo ea, quae extrinsecus adiacent, sentiuntur. neque enim corpus sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo uelut nuntio utitur ad formandum in se ipsa, quod extrinsecus nuntiatur. non potest itaque fieri uisio corporalis, nisi etiam spiritalis simul fiat; sed non discernitur, nisi cum fuerit sensus ablatus a corpore, ut id, quod per corpus uidebatur, inueniatur in spiritu. at uero spiritalis uisio etiam sine corporali fieri potest, cum absentium corporum similitudines in spiritu adparent et finguntur multae pro arbitrio uel praeter arbitrium demonstrantur. item spiritalis uisio indiget intellectuali, ut diiudicetur, intellectualis autem ista spiritali inferiore non indiget. ac per hoc spiritali corporalis, intellectuali autem utraque subiecta est. cum ergo legimus: spiritalis omnia diiudicat, ipse autem a nemine diiudicatur, non secundum spiritum, a quo mens discernitur, sicut illud quod dictum est: orabo spiritu, orabo et mente, sed ea illa notione debemus accipere, qua dictum est: renouamini autem spiritu mentis uestrae. iam enim supra docuimus alio modo et ipsam mentem spiritum dici, secundum quam spiritalis omnia diiudicat. quapropter non absurde neque inconuenienter arbitror spiritalem uisionem inter intellectualem et corporalem tamquam medietatem quandam obtinere. puto enim non incongruenter medium dici, quod corpus quidem non est, sed simile est corporis, inter illud, quod uere corpus est, et illud, quod nec corpus est nec simile corporis.

This spiritual nature, then, in which not bodies but likenesses of bodies are formed, has visions of a lower kind than that light of the mind and intelligence by which both these lower things are judged and those things are discerned which neither are bodies nor bear any forms resembling bodies: such as the mind itself and every good disposition of the soul, to which are opposed its vices, which are rightly blamed and condemned in human beings. For in what other way is the intellect itself beheld except by understanding? So too love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, self-control, and the rest of this kind, by which one draws near to God; and God himself, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things. Although, then, the visions happen in the same soul—whether those perceived through the body, like this bodily heaven and earth and whatever in them can be known, so far as they can; or those seen by the spirit, likenesses of bodies, about which we have already said much; or those understood by the mind, which are neither bodies nor likenesses of bodies—they certainly have their order, and one is more excellent than another. For spiritual vision is more excellent than bodily, and again intellectual more excellent than spiritual. For bodily vision cannot exist without spiritual, since at the same moment at which a body is touched by a sense of the body, something of the same kind happens in the soul, not that it is this but that it is like it; and if this did not happen, there would be no sense by which things lying outside are perceived. For it is not the body that perceives, but the soul through the body, which it uses as a messenger to form in itself what is reported from outside. So bodily vision cannot happen unless spiritual vision happens at the same time; but it is not distinguished until the sense has been withdrawn from the body, so that what was seen through the body is found in the spirit. But spiritual vision can happen even without bodily vision, when likenesses of absent bodies appear in the spirit, and many are invented at will or shown beyond the will. Again, spiritual vision needs intellectual vision in order to be judged, but intellectual vision does not need this lower, spiritual vision. And therefore bodily vision is subject to spiritual, and both to intellectual. When, then, we read, “The spiritual man judges all things, but he himself is judged by no one,” we must take it not according to the spirit from which the mind is distinguished, as in the saying, “I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the mind,” but in that sense in which it is said, “But be renewed in the spirit of your mind.” For we have already shown above that in another way the mind itself is called spirit, and it is according to this that the spiritual man judges all things. Therefore I think it neither absurd nor unfitting to say that spiritual vision holds a kind of middle place between intellectual and bodily. For I think it not unfitting to call that middle which is not a body but is like a body, between that which is truly a body and that which is neither a body nor like a body.

12.25CSEL 28.1:417–418

Inluditur autem anima similitudinibus rerum non earum uitio, sed opinionis suae, cum adprobat quae similia sunt pro his, quibus similia sunt, ab intellegentia deficiens. fallitur ergo in uisione corporali, cum in ipsis corporibus fieri putat, quod fit in corporis sensibus — sicut nauigantibus uidentur in terra moueri quae stant et intuentibus caelum stare sidera, quae mouentur, et diuaricatis radiis oculorum duae lucernae species adparere et in aqua remus infractus et multa huius modi — aut cum putat hoc esse, quod similiter coloratum est uel similiter sonat uel olet uel sapit uel tangitur — hinc enim et medicamentum aliquod ceratum coctum in caccabo putatur legumen et sonitus transeuntis uehiculi putatur ex tonitru et, si nullis aliis sensibus exploretur, sed soli adiaceat olfactui, citrium putatur herba, quae uocatur apiaria, et cibus aliquo dulciculo suco adfectus putatur melle conditus et ignotus anulus contrectatus in tenebris putatur aureus, cum sit aereus uel argenteus — aut cum repentinis inopinatisque corporalibus uisis anima turbata uel in somnis uidere se putat uel aliquo eius modi spiritali uiso adfici: unde in omnibus corporalibus uisis et aliorum sensuum contestatio et maxime ipsius mentis atque rationis adhibetur, ut, quod in hoc rerum genere uerum est, inueniatur quantum inueniri potest. in uisione autem spiritali, id est in corporum similitudinibus, quae spiritu uidentur, fallitur anima, cum ea, quae sic uidet, ipsa corpora esse arbitratur uel, quod sibi suspicione falsaque coniectura finxerit, hoc etiam in corporibus putat, quae non uisa coniectat. at uero in illis intellectualibus uisis non fallitur. aut enim intellegit, et uerum est; aut, si uerum non est, non intellegit: unde aliud est in his errare, quae uidet, aliud ideo errare, quia non uidet.

The soul is mocked by likenesses of things not through their fault but through its own opinion, when, failing in understanding, it approves things that are like as if they were the things they are like. It is deceived, then, in bodily vision, when it thinks that what happens in the senses of the body happens in the bodies themselves—as to those sailing, things on land that stand still seem to move, and to those looking at the sky the stars, which move, seem to stand still; and when the rays of the eyes are spread apart, two images of a lamp appear; and an oar seems broken in water; and many things of this kind—or when it thinks a thing to be what is similarly coloured, or sounds or smells or tastes or feels similar. Hence a waxy medicine cooked in a pot is thought to be a vegetable; the sound of a passing cart is thought to come from thunder; if it is explored by no other senses but left to smell alone, the citron is thought to be the herb called balm; food flavoured with some sweetish juice is thought to be preserved in honey; and an unknown ring handled in the dark is thought to be gold when it is bronze or silver. Or when the soul, disturbed by sudden and unexpected bodily sights, thinks it is seeing in dreams or affected by some spiritual sight of that kind. Hence in all bodily sights the testimony of the other senses too is applied, and above all that of the mind itself and of reason, so that what is true in this kind of things may be found as far as it can be found. But in spiritual vision, that is, in likenesses of bodies seen by the spirit, the soul is deceived when it supposes that what it sees in this way are bodies themselves, or when it thinks that what it has invented for itself by suspicion and false conjecture exists also in the bodies it conjectures without seeing them. But in those intellectual sights it is not deceived. For either it understands, and it is true; or, if it is not true, it does not understand; hence it is one thing to err about what one sees, another to err because one does not see.

12.26CSEL 28.1:418–420

Quapropter cum rapitur anima in ea uisa, quae spiritu cernuntur similia corporalibus, ita ut omnino a sensibus corporis auertatur amplius quam in somno solet, sed minus quam in morte, iam diuinae admonitionis est et adiutorii, ut se non corpora, sed uisa corporum similia spiritaliter nouerit cernere, sicuti qui se in somnis uidere, etiam antequam euigilent, sciunt. ibi si etiam uidentur futura, ita ut omnino futura noscantur, quorum imagines praesentes uidentur siue ipsa hominis mente diuinitus adiuta siue aliquo inter ipsa uisa quid significent exponente, sicut in Apocalypsi Iohanni exponebatur, magna reuelatio est, etiamsi forte ignoret ille, cui haec demonstrantur, utrum e corpore exierit an adhuc sit in corpore, sed spiritu a sensibus corporis alienato ista uideat; potest enim sic raptus id ignorare, si ei et hoc non ostendatur. Porro autem, si quemadmodum raptus est a sensibus corporis, ut esset in istis similitudinibus corporum, quae spiritu uidentur, ita et ab ipsis rapiatur ut in illam quasi regionem intellectualium uel intellegibilium subuehatur, ubi sine ulla corporis similitudine perspicua ueritas cernitur, nullis opinionum falsarum nebulis offuscatur, ibi uirtutes animae non sunt operosae ac laboriosae; neque enim opere temperantiae libido frenatur aut opere fortitudinis tolerantur aduersa aut opere iustitiae iniqua puniuntur aut opere prudentiae mala deuitantur. una ibi et tota uirtus est amare quod uideas et summa felicitas habere quod amas. ibi enim beata uita in fonte suo bibitur, unde aspergitur aliquid huic humanae uitae, ut in temtationibus huius saeculi temperanter, fortiter, iuste prudenterque uiuatur. propter illud quippe adipiscendum, ubi secura quies erit et ineffabilis uisio ueritatis, labor suscipitur et continendi a uoluptate et sustinendi aduersitates et subueniendi indigentibus et resistendi decipientibus. ibi uidetur claritas domini non per uisionem significantem siue corporalem, sicut uisa est in monte Sina, siue spiritalem, sicut uidit Esaias uel Iohannes in Apocalypsi, sed per speciem non per aenigmata, quantum eam capere humana mens potest, secundum adsumentis dei gratiam, ut os ad os loquatur deus ei quem dignum tali conloquio fecerit, non os corporis, sed mentis, sicut intellegendum arbitror, quod de Moyse scriptum est.

Therefore, when the soul is snatched into those sights which are discerned by the spirit as like bodily things, so that it is turned away from the senses of the body more fully than usually happens in sleep, but less than in death, it is now a matter of divine admonition and help that it should know that it is discerning spiritually not bodies but sights like bodies; just as those who know they are seeing in dreams, even before they wake. There, if future things are also seen, so that the future things whose images are seen as present are fully known, whether the man's mind itself is divinely helped or someone among the sights themselves explains what they signify, as was explained to John in the Apocalypse, it is a great revelation, even if perhaps the one to whom these things are shown does not know whether he has gone out of the body or is still in the body but sees them with the spirit estranged from the senses of the body; for one so snatched away can be ignorant of this, if this too is not shown to him. Further, if, just as he was snatched from the senses of the body so as to be among these likenesses of bodies seen by the spirit, he is also snatched from these so as to be carried up into that region, as it were, of intellectual or intelligible things, where the clear truth is discerned without any likeness of a body and is darkened by no mists of false opinions, there the virtues of the soul are not toilsome and laborious. For there lust is not reined in by the work of temperance, nor adversities borne by the work of fortitude, nor wrongs punished by the work of justice, nor evils avoided by the work of prudence. There the one and whole virtue is to love what you see, and the highest happiness is to have what you love. For there the happy life is drunk at its source, from which something is sprinkled on this human life, so that amid the temptations of this world one may live temperately, bravely, justly, and prudently. For it is in order to attain that—where there will be secure rest and the ineffable vision of truth—that the labour is undertaken of refraining from pleasure, of enduring adversities, of helping the needy, and of resisting deceivers. There the glory of the Lord is seen, not through a signifying vision, whether bodily, as it was seen on Mount Sinai, or spiritual, as Isaiah or John in the Apocalypse saw it, but by sight, not through enigmas, so far as the human mind can grasp it, according to the grace of God who takes it up, so that God speaks mouth to mouth with him whom he has made worthy of such converse—not the mouth of the body but of the mind, as I think is to be understood what is written of Moses.

12.27CSEL 28.1:420–422

Concupiuerat enim, sicut in Exodo legimus, uidere deum, non utique sicut uiderat in monte nec sicut uidebat in tabernaculo, sed in ea substantia, qua deus est, nulla adsumta corporali creatura, quae mortalis carnis sensibus praesentetur, neque in spiritu figuratis similitudinibus corporum, sed per speciem suam, quantum eam capere creatura rationalis et intellectualis potest seuocata ab omni corporis sensu, ab omni significatiuo aenigmate spiritus. sic enim scriptum est: si ergo inueni gratiam in conspectu tuo, ostende mihi temet ipsum, manifeste uideam te, cum paulo superius legatur: et locutus est dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem, sicut quis loquitur ad amicum suum. sentiebat ergo, quid uidebat et quod non uidebat desiderabat. nam et paulo post, cum dixisset ei deus: inuenisti enim gratiam in conspectu meo, et scio te prae omnibus, respondit ei: ostende mihi claritatem tuam. et tunc quidem responsum accepit a domino figuratum, de quo nunc longum est disputare, quando ei dixit: non poteris uidere faciem meam et uiuere; non enim uidebit homo faciem meam et uiuet. deinde subiecit et ait illi: ecce locus penes me, et stabis supra petram; statim ut transiet mea maiestas, et ponam te in specula petrae et tegam manu mea super te, donec transeam; et auferam manum et tunc uidebis posteriora mea; nam facies mea non adparebit tibi. nec tamen secuta scriptura hoc etiam corporaliter factum esse narrauit satisque per hoc demonstratum est figurate dictum esse in ecclesiae significationem. ipse est enim locus penes dominum, quia ecclesia est templum eius et ipsa aedificata est super petram, et cetera, quae ibi dicta sunt, eidem intellegentiae congruunt. nisi tamen concupitam et desideratam dei claritatem Moyses uidere meruisset, non in libro Numerorum diceret deus ad Aaron et Mariam fratres eius: audite uerborum meorum: si fuerit propheta uester, in uisione illi dominus cognoscar et in somno loquar illi! non ita, quomodo famulus meus Moyses in tota domo mea fidelis est; os ad os loquar ad illum in specie et non per aenigmata, et claritatem domini uidit. neque enim hoc secundum substantiam corporis, quae carnis sensibus praesentatur, intellegendum est; nam utique sic loquebatur ad Moysen facie ad faciem, contra in contra, quando tamen dixit ei: ostende mihi temet ipsum, et nunc etiam ad ipsos, quos obiurgabat et quibus Moysi meritum ita praeferebat, sic loquebatur per creaturam corporalem praesentatam sensibus carnis. illo ergo modo in illa specie, qua deus est, longe ineffabiliter secretius et praesentius loquitur locutione ineffabili, ubi eum nemo uiuens uidet uita ista, qua mortaliter uiuitur in istis sensibus corporis, sed nisi ab hac uita quisque quodammodo moriatur siue omnino exiens de corpore siue ita auersus et alienatus a carnalibus sensibus, ut merito nesciat, sicut apostolus ait, utrum in corpore an extra corpus sit, cum in illam rapitur et subuehitur uisionem.

For he had desired, as we read in Exodus, to see God, not as he had seen him on the mountain nor as he saw him in the tabernacle, but in that substance by which God is God, with no bodily creature taken up to be presented to the senses of mortal flesh, nor in likenesses of bodies figured in the spirit, but in his own form, so far as a rational and intellectual creature can grasp it, called away from every sense of the body and from every signifying enigma of the spirit. For so it is written: “If, then, I have found favour in your sight, show me yourself, that I may see you plainly”; whereas a little earlier we read, “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as one speaks to his friend.” So he perceived what he was seeing, and desired what he was not seeing. For a little later, when God had said to him, “For you have found favour in my sight, and I know you above all,” he answered him, “Show me your glory.” And then indeed he received a figurative answer from the Lord, which it would take long to discuss now, when he said to him, “You cannot see my face and live; for man shall not see my face and live.” Then he added and said to him, “Behold, there is a place by me, and you shall stand upon the rock; as soon as my majesty passes, I will put you in a cleft of the rock and cover you with my hand until I pass; and I will take away my hand, and then you will see my back; for my face will not appear to you.” Yet the Scripture that follows did not narrate that this also happened bodily, and by this it is shown clearly enough that it was said figuratively, signifying the church. For the church is the place by the Lord, since it is his temple and is itself built upon the rock; and the other things said there fit the same understanding. Yet unless Moses had been found worthy to see the glory of God which he had longed and desired for, God would not have said in the book of Numbers to Aaron and Miriam, his brother and sister, “Hear my words: if there is a prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known to him in a vision and will speak to him in sleep. Not so with my servant Moses: he is faithful in all my house; I will speak to him mouth to mouth, by sight and not through enigmas, and he has seen the glory of the Lord.” For this is not to be understood according to the substance of a body, which is presented to the senses of the flesh; for in that way, certainly, he was speaking to Moses face to face, opposite to opposite, at the very time when Moses said to him, “Show me yourself”; and now too, to those very people whom he was rebuking and to whom he was so preferring the merit of Moses, he was speaking in that way, through a bodily creature presented to the senses of the flesh. In that other way, then, in that form by which God is God, he speaks far more ineffably, more secretly and more presently, by an ineffable speech, where no one living sees him with this life that is lived mortally in these senses of the body, unless he in some way dies to this life, whether going out of the body altogether or so turned away and estranged from the fleshly senses that he rightly does not know, as the apostle says, whether he is in the body or out of the body, when he is snatched and carried up into that vision.

12.28CSEL 28.1:422–423

Quapropter si hoc tertium uisionis genus, quod superius est non solum omni corporali, quo per corporis sensus corpora sentiuntur, uerum etiam omni illo spiritali, quo similitudines corporum spiritu, non mente cernuntur, tertium caelum appellauit apostolus, in hoc uidetur claritas dei, cui uidendae corda mundantur. unde dictum est: beati mundicordes, quia ipsi deum uidebunt, non per aliquam corporaliter uel spiritaliter figuratam significationem tamquam per speculum in aenigmate, sed facie ad faciem, quod de Moyse dictum est "os ad os", per speciem scilicet, qua deus est quidquid est, quantulumcumque eum mens, quae non est quod ipse, etiam ab omni terrena labe mandata, ab omni corpore et similitudine corporis alienata et abrepta capere potest: a quo peregrinamur mortali et corruptibili onere grauati, quamdiu per fidem ambulamus, non per speciem et cum hic iuste uiuimus. cur autem non credamus, quod tanto apostolo gentium doctori, rapto usque ad istam excellentissimam uisionem, uoluerit deus demonstrare uitam, in qua post hanc uitam uiuendum est in aeternum? et cur non dicatur iste paradisus excepto illo, in quo corporaliter uixit Adam inter ligna nemorosa atque fructuosa? quandoquidem et ecclesia, quae nos congregat in caritatis sinum, paradisus dicta est cum fructu pomorum. sed hoc figurate dictum est, tamquam illo paradiso, ubi proprie fuit Adam, ecclesia significata sit per formam futuri. quamquam diligentius considerantibus fortassis occurrat illo paradiso corporali, in quo Adam corporaliter fuit, et istam uitam sanctorum significatam, quae nunc agitur in ecclesia, et illam, quae post hanc erit in aeternum: sicut Hierusalem, quae interpretatur "uisio pacis" et tamen terrena quaedam ciuitas demonstratur, significat Hierusalem matrem nostram aeternam in caelis siue in his, qui spe salui facti sunt et quod non uident sperantes per patientiam expectant, secundum quos multi filii desertae magis quam eius, quae habet uirum, siue in ipsis angelis sanctis per ecclesiam multiformis sapientiae dei, cum quibus post hanc peregrinationem sine labore et sine fine uiuendum est.

Therefore, if the apostle called the third heaven this third kind of vision, which is higher not only than all bodily vision, by which bodies are perceived through the senses of the body, but also than all that spiritual vision by which likenesses of bodies are discerned by the spirit, not the mind, then in this the glory of God is seen, for the seeing of which hearts are cleansed. Hence it is said, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God”; not through some signification figured bodily or spiritually, as through a mirror in an enigma, but face to face—what was said of Moses, “mouth to mouth”—that is, by that form by which God is whatever he is, however little of him the mind, which is not what he is, can grasp, even when cleansed from every earthly stain, estranged and snatched away from every body and likeness of a body. From him we are absent on pilgrimage, weighed down by a mortal and corruptible burden, as long as we walk by faith, not by sight, even when we live righteously here. But why should we not believe that God willed to show to so great an apostle, the teacher of the Gentiles, snatched up to that most excellent vision, the life in which, after this life, we are to live for ever? And why should this not be called paradise, apart from that one in which Adam lived bodily among shady and fruitful trees? Since the church too, which gathers us into the bosom of love, has been called a paradise with the fruit of apples. But this was said figuratively, as if by that paradise, where Adam properly was, the church was signified in the manner of a type of what was to come. Although to those who consider more carefully it may perhaps occur that by that bodily paradise, in which Adam was bodily, there was signified both this life of the saints which is now led in the church and that which will be after this for ever: just as Jerusalem, which is interpreted “vision of peace,” and yet is shown to be an earthly city, signifies Jerusalem our eternal mother in the heavens, whether in those who have been saved in hope and, hoping for what they do not see, wait for it with patience—according to whom “many are the children of the desolate, more than of her who has a husband”—or in the holy angels themselves, to whom the manifold wisdom of God is made known through the church, with whom, after this pilgrimage, we are to live without toil and without end.

12.29CSEL 28.1:423–424

Si autem sic accipimus tertium caelum, quo apostolus raptus est, ut quartum etiam et aliquot ultra superius caelos esse credamus, infra quos est tertium hoc caelum, sicut eos alii septem, alii octo, alii nouem uel etiam decem perhibent et in ipso uno, quod dicitur firmamentum, multos gradatim esse confirmant ac per hoc corporeos esse uel ratiocinantur uel opinantur — de quorum ratione atque opinione nunc disserere longum est; potest autem fieri, ut etiam in spiritalibus uel intellectualibus multos quosdam gradus quisquam esse contendat aut, si possit, ostendat eosque distinctos iuxta aliquem prouectum magis minusue inlustrium reuelationum — sed utcumque se ista habeant et accipiantur, ut libet, ab alio sic, ab alio autem sic, ego uisorum uel uisionum praeter ista tria genera aut corpore aut spiritu aut mente usque adhuc uel nosse uel docere non possum. sed quot et quantae singulorum generum sint differentiae, ut in unoquoque aliud alio gradatim superferatur, ignorare me fateor.

But if we take the third heaven, to which the apostle was caught up, in such a way as to believe that there are also a fourth and several more heavens above, below which this third heaven is—as some maintain there are seven, others eight, others nine or even ten, and assert that within that one called the firmament there are many in degrees, and therefore reason or opine that they are bodily; it would take long to discuss their reasoning and opinion now; and it may be that someone contends, or if he can shows, that even among spiritual or intellectual things there are many degrees, distinguished according to some advance of more or less illuminated revelations—however these things stand, and let them be taken as one pleases, by one this way and by another that way, I for my part cannot, up to now, either know or teach any kinds of things seen or of visions besides these three: by body, by spirit, or by mind. But how many and how great are the differences within each kind, so that in each one thing is raised above another by degrees, I confess I do not know.

12.30CSEL 28.1:424–425

Sicut autem in ista luce corporea est caelum, quod super terras suspicimus, unde luminaria clarent et sidera, quae corpora longe sunt meliora terrestribus, sic in illo genere spiritali, in quo uidentur corporum similitudines luce quadam incorporali ac sua, sunt quaedam excellentia et merito diuina. quae demonstrant angeli miris modis: utrum uisa sua facili quadam et praepotenti iunctione uel conmixtione etiam nostra esse facientes, an scientes nescio quomodo nostram in spiritu nostro informare uisionem, difficilis perceptu et difficilior dictu res est. sunt autem alia uisa usitata et humana, quae siue ex ipso spiritu nostro multipliciter existunt siue ex corpore spiritui quodammodo suggeruntur, sicut fuerimus adfecti uel carne uel animo. non solum enim uigilantes homines curas suas cogitando uersant in similitudinibus corporum, uerum etiam dormientes hoc saepe somniant, quo indigent; nam et negotia sua gerunt ex animi cupiditate et epulis poculisque inhianter instant, si forte esurientes sitientesque dormierunt. quae omnia puto conparata illis angelicis demonstrationibus sic habenda, ac si in ista natura corporum terrena caelestibus conparentur.

Just as, in this bodily light, there is the heaven that we look up to above the earth, from which the luminaries and stars shine, bodies far better than earthly ones, so in that spiritual kind, in which likenesses of bodies are seen by a certain incorporeal light of its own, there are certain excellent things, rightly called divine. These the angels show in wonderful ways: whether by making their own sights ours too through some easy and very powerful union or intermingling, or by knowing, in some way I know not, how to form our vision in our spirit, is a thing hard to perceive and harder to say. But there are other, ordinary and human sights, which either arise in many ways from our spirit itself or are in some way suggested to the spirit from the body, according as we have been affected in flesh or in mind. For not only do people who are awake turn over their cares in thought in likenesses of bodies, but even when asleep they often dream of what they need; for they carry on their business out of the soul's desire, and greedily press upon feasts and cups if they happen to have gone to sleep hungry and thirsty. All these, I think, compared with those angelic showings, are to be regarded as earthly things are compared with heavenly ones in the nature of bodies.

12.31CSEL 28.1:425–426

Sic etiam in illo genere intellectualium uisorum alia sunt, quae in ipsa anima uidentur, uelut uirtutes, quibus uitia sunt contraria, siue permansurae, ut pietas, siue utiles huic uitae et postea non futurae, sicut fides, qua credimus ea, quae nondum uidemus, et spes, qua futura cum patientia expectamus, et ipsa patientia, qua omnia toleramus aduersa, donec quo uolumus ueniamus. istae quippe et huius modi uirtutes, quae nunc propter transigendam istam peregrinationem ualde necessariae sunt, non erunt in illa uita, propter quam adipiscendam sunt necessariae, et tamen etiam ipsae intellectualiter uidentur; neque enim aut corpora sunt aut species habent similes corporum. aliud autem est ipsum lumen, quo inlustratur anima, ut omnia uel in se uel in illo ueraciter intellecta conspiciat. nam illud iam ipse deus est, haec autem creatura, quamuis rationalis et intellectualis ad eius imaginem facta, quae cum conatur lumen illud intueri palpitat infirmitate et minus ualet. inde est tamen quidquid intellegit sicut ualet. cum ergo illuc rapitur et a carnalibus subtracta sensibus illi expressius uisioni praesentatur non spatiis localibus, sed modo quodam suo, etiam supra se uidet, quo adiuta uidet quidquid etiam in se intellegendo uidet.

So too in that kind of intellectual things seen, some are seen in the soul itself, such as the virtues, to which the vices are opposed: whether those that will remain, like godliness, or those useful for this life and not to exist afterwards, like faith, by which we believe what we do not yet see; and hope, by which we wait with patience for what is to come; and patience itself, by which we bear all adversities until we come where we wish. These and similar virtues, which are now very necessary for completing this pilgrimage, will not exist in that life for the attaining of which they are necessary; and yet they too are seen intellectually; for they neither are bodies nor have forms resembling bodies. But the light itself by which the soul is illuminated, so that it beholds all things truly understood either in itself or in that light, is something else. For that light is God himself, whereas the soul is a creature, though rational and intellectual, made in his image; when it tries to gaze on that light, it trembles with weakness and is less able. Yet from there comes whatever it understands, as it is able. When, then, it is snatched there and, withdrawn from the fleshly senses, is presented more vividly to that vision—not by spaces of place but in a certain way of its own—it sees even above itself that by whose help it sees whatever it also sees in itself by understanding.

12.32CSEL 28.1:426–428

Si autem quaeritur, cum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur an ad incorporalia corporalibus similia, an uero nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud, quod et corporibus et similitudinibus corporum est excellentius, cito quidem responderim ad corporalia loca eam uel non ferri nisi cum aliquo corpore uel non localiter ferri. iam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, cum de hoc corpore exierit, ostendat qui potest; ego autem non puto. ad spiritalia uero pro meritis fertur aut ad loca poenalia similia corporibus, qualia saepe demonstrata sunt his, qui rapti sunt a corporis sensibus et mortuis similes iacuerunt et infernas poenas uiderunt, cum et ipsi in se ipsis gererent quandam similitudinem corporis sui, per quam possent ad illa ferri et talia similibus experiri. neque enim uideo, cur habeat anima similitudinem corporis sui, cum iacente sine sensu ipso corpore nondum tamen penitus mortuo uidet talia, qualia multi ex illa subductione uiuis redditi narrauerunt, et non habeat, cum perfecta morte penitus de corpore exierit. aut ergo ad illa fertur poenalia aut ad illa itidem similia corporalibus nec tamen poenarum, sed quietis atque gaudiorum. Neque enim recte dici potest uel illas falsas esse poenas uel illam falsam requiem atque laetitiam: tunc enim et falsa sunt, quando per opinationis errorem alia pro aliis putantur. nam Petrus non solum cum discum illum uidebat et in eo non similitudines corporum, sed corpora putabat, in hoc utique fallebatur, uerum etiam cum alio tempore ab angelo solutus e uinculis ibat in corpore ambulans et praesentatus corporalibus formis et putabat se uisum uidere, nihilominus fallebatur. nam et illae in disco erant spiritales formae corporalibus similes et ista corporalis expressio soluti de uinculis propter miraculum spiritali similis erat. fallebatur autem anima in utrisque, nonnisi cum alia pro aliis adprobaret. quamuis ergo non sint corporalia, sed similia corporalibus, quibus animae corporibus exutae adficiuntur seu bene seu male, cum et ipsae corporibus suis similes sibimet adpareant, sunt tamen et uera laetitia est et uera molestia facta de substantia spiritali. nam et in somnis magni interest, utrum in laetis an in tristibus simus. unde quidam in rebus, quas concupiuerant, constituti se euigilasse doluerunt et rursus grauibus terroribus atque cruciatibus exagitati atque uexati, cum expergefacti essent, dormire timuerunt, ne in eadem mala reuocarentur. et utique dubitandum non est, quod expressiora sint illa, quae inferna dicuntur, atque ob hoc uehementius sentiantur. nam et qui subtracti sunt sensibus corporis, minus quidem quam si omni modo morerentur, sed tamen amplius quam si dormirent, expressiora se uidisse narrarunt, quam si somnia narrauissent. est ergo prorsus inferorum substantia, sed eam spiritalem arbitror esse, non corporalem.

But if it is asked, when the soul has gone out of the body, whether it is carried to some bodily places, or to incorporeal places like bodily ones, or indeed to neither, but to that which is more excellent than both bodies and likenesses of bodies, I would readily answer that it is not carried to bodily places except with some body, or else is not carried locally. Whether it has some body when it has gone out of this body, let him show who can; I do not think so. But it is carried, according to its deserts, to spiritual places: either to places of punishment resembling bodies, such as have often been shown to those who have been snatched from the senses of the body and lain like the dead and seen the punishments of the underworld, since they too bore in themselves a certain likeness of their own body, through which they could be carried to those places and experience such things in likenesses; for I do not see why the soul should have a likeness of its body when, the body itself lying without sense but not yet entirely dead, it sees such things as many have related who were restored to the living from that withdrawal, and should not have it when, death being complete, it has gone out of the body entirely. So it is carried either to those places of punishment or to places likewise resembling bodily ones, yet not of punishment but of rest and joys. For it cannot rightly be said either that those punishments are false or that that rest and gladness are false; for things are false when, through error of opinion, some are thought to be others. For Peter was certainly deceived not only when he saw that sheet and thought there were in it not likenesses of bodies but bodies; but also at another time, when, freed from his chains by an angel, he was going along walking in the body and presented to bodily forms and thought he was seeing a vision, he was nonetheless deceived. For those forms in the sheet were spiritual forms resembling bodily ones, and this bodily appearance of one freed from his chains was, because of the miracle, like a spiritual one. The soul was deceived in both cases only because it approved some things for others. So, although the things by which souls stripped of their bodies are affected, well or ill, are not bodily but resemble bodily things, while the souls themselves appear to themselves like their own bodies, yet they exist; and the gladness is true and the distress is true, made of spiritual substance. For even in dreams it makes a great difference whether we are in joyful or sad circumstances. Hence some, placed among things they had desired, have grieved that they woke up; and others, agitated and vexed by grievous terrors and torments, when they woke up feared to sleep lest they be called back into the same evils. And certainly there is no doubt that those things called infernal are more vivid, and therefore felt more vehemently. For those too who have been withdrawn from the senses of the body—less, indeed, than if they had died altogether, but more than if they were asleep—have related that they saw things more vivid than if they had been relating dreams. So the underworld is real; but I think its substance is spiritual, not bodily.

12.33CSEL 28.1:428–430

Nec audiendi sunt, qui adfirmant inferos in hac uita explicari nec esse post mortem; uiderint enim, quemadmodum poetica figmenta interpretentur. nos ab auctoritate diuinarum scripturarum, quibus solis de hac re fides habenda est, recedere non debemus. quamquam possimus ostendere illorum quoque sapientes de inferorum substantia minime dubitasse, quae post hanc uitam excipit animas mortuorum. unde autem sub terris esse dicantur inferi, si corporalia loca non sunt, aut unde inferi appellentur, si sub terris non sunt, merito quaeritur. animam uero non esse corpoream non me putare, sed plane scire audeo profiteri; tamen habere posse similitudinem corporis et corporalium omnino membrorum quisquis negat potest negare animam esse, quae in somnis uidet uel ambulare se uel sedere uel hac atque illac gressu aut etiam uolatu ferri ac referri, quod sine quadam similitudine corporis non fit. proinde, si hanc similitudinem etiam apud inferos gerit non corporalem, sed corpori similem, ita etiam in locis uidetur esse non corporalibus, sed corporalium similibus siue in requie siue in doloribus. Quamquam et illud me nondum inuenisse confiteor inferos appellatos, ubi iustorum animae requiescunt. et Christi quidem animam uenisse usque ad ea loca, in quibus peccatores cruciantur, ut eos solueret a tormentis, quos esse soluendos occulta nobis sua iustitia iudicabat, non inmerito creditur. quomodo enim aliter accipiendum sit, quod dictum est: quem deus suscitauit a mortuis solutis doloribus inferorum, quia non poterat teneri ab eis, non uideo, nisi ut quorundam dolores apud inferos eum soluisse accipiamus ea potestate, qua dominus est, cui omne genu flectitur caelestium, terrestrium et infernorum, per quam potestatem etiam illis doloribus, quos soluit, non potuit adtineri. neque enim Abraham uel ille pauper in sinu eius, hoc est in secreto quietis eius, in doloribus erat, inter quorum requiem et illa inferna tormenta legimus magnum chaos firmatum, sed nec apud inferos esse dicti sunt; contigit enim, inquit, mori inopem illum et auferri ab angelis in sinum Abrahae; mortuus est autem et diues et sepultus est. et cum apud inferos in tormentis esset et cetera. uidemus itaque inferorum mentionem non esse factam in requie pauperis, sed in subplicio diuitis. Illud etiam, quod Iacob dicit ad filios suos, deducetis senectam meam cum tristitia ad inferos, uidetur hoc magis timuisse, ne nimia tristitia sic perturbaretur, ut non ad requiem beatorum iret, sed ad inferos peccatorum. neque enim paruum animae malum est tristitia, cum et apostolus cuidam tam sollicite timuerit, ne maiore tristitia absorberetur. proinde, ut dixi, nondum inueni et adhuc quaero nec mihi occurrit inferos alicubi in bono posuisse scripturam dumtaxat canonicam; non autem in bono accipiendum sinum Abrahae et illam requiem, quo ab angelis pius pauper ablatus est, nescio utrum quisquam possit audire. et ideo quomodo eam apud inferos credamus esse non uideo.

Nor should we listen to those who assert that the underworld is worked out in this life and does not exist after death; let them see how they interpret the fictions of the poets. We must not depart from the authority of the divine Scriptures, which alone are to be believed on this matter. Yet we could show that the wise men among them too did not at all doubt the reality of the underworld, which receives the souls of the dead after this life. But why the underworld is said to be under the earth, if it is not a bodily place, or why it is called the underworld if it is not under the earth, is rightly asked. That the soul is not bodily I dare to profess, not as my opinion but as plain knowledge; yet whoever denies that it can have a likeness of a body and of bodily members altogether can deny that it is the soul that in dreams sees itself walking or sitting or carried here and there, going and returning on foot or even in flight, which does not happen without some likeness of a body. Accordingly, if it bears this likeness also in the underworld, not bodily but like a body, so too it seems to be in places that are not bodily but like bodily ones, whether in rest or in pains. I confess, however, that I have not yet found the place where the souls of the righteous rest called the underworld. And it is not without reason believed that the soul of Christ came even to those places where sinners are tormented, in order to free from torments those whom, by his justice hidden from us, he judged should be freed. For how else is to be understood what is said, “whom God raised from the dead, having loosed the pains of the underworld, because he could not be held by them,” I do not see, unless we take it that he loosed the pains of certain people in the underworld, by that power by which he is Lord, to whom every knee bows of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth; by which power he also could not be held by those pains which he loosed. For neither Abraham, nor that poor man in his bosom, that is, in the secret place of his rest, was in pains; between their rest and those infernal torments we read that a great chasm is fixed; nor are they said to be in the underworld. For it says, “It happened that the poor man died and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom; and the rich man also died and was buried. And when he was in torments in the underworld,” and so on. So we see that the underworld is not mentioned in connection with the poor man's rest, but in connection with the rich man's punishment. As for what Jacob says to his sons, “You will bring down my old age with sorrow to the underworld,” he seems rather to have feared this: that he would be so disturbed by excessive sorrow that he would go not to the rest of the blessed but to the underworld of sinners. For sorrow is no small evil for the soul, since the apostle too feared so anxiously for someone, lest he be swallowed up by excessive sorrow. Accordingly, as I said, I have not yet found, and I am still seeking, nor does it occur to me, that Scripture—the canonical Scripture, at least—has anywhere used “the underworld” in a good sense. But I do not know whether anyone could bear to hear that Abraham's bosom and that rest to which the godly poor man was carried by angels is not to be taken in a good sense. And therefore I do not see how we can believe it to be in the underworld.

12.34CSEL 28.1:430–432

Uerum hoc dum quaerimus et aut inuenimus aut non inuenimus, urget nos longitudo libri huius eum aliquando concludere. quapropter quoniam de paradiso sermonem instituimus propter illud, quod apostolus ait scire se raptum hominem usque in tertium caelum, nescire autem siue in corpore siue extra corpus, et quia raptus est in paradisum et audiuit ineffabilia uerba, quae non licet homini loqui, non temere adfirmamus, utrum in tertio caelo sit paradisus, an et in tertium caelum et inde rursus in paradisum raptus sit. si enim proprie quidem nemorosus locus, translato autem uerbo omnis etiam spiritalis quasi regio, ubi animae bene est, merito paradisus dici potest, non solum tertium caelum, quidquid illud est, quod profecto magnum sublimiterque praeclarum est, uerum etiam in ipso homine laetitia quaedam bonae conscientiae paradisus est. unde et ecclesia sanctis temperanter et iuste et pie uiuentibus paradisus recte dicitur, pollens adfluentia gratiarum castisque deliciis, quandoquidem et in tribulationibus gloriatur de ipsa patientia plurimum gaudens, quia secundum multitudinem dolorum in corde eius consolationes dei iucundant animam eius. quanto magis ergo post hanc uitam etiam sinus ille Abrahae paradisus dici potest, ubi iam nulla temtatio, ubi tanta requies post omnes dolores uitae huius neque enim et lux ibi non est propria quaedam et sui generis, et profecto magna, quam diues ille de tormentis et tenebris inferorum tam utique de longinquo, cum magnum chasma esset in medio, sic tamen uidit, ut ibi illum quondam contemtum pauperem agnosceret. Quae si ita sunt, ideo sub terris dicuntur inferi uel creduntur, quia congruenter in spiritu per illas corporalium rerum similitudines sic demonstrantur, ut, quoniam defunctorum animae inferis dignae carnis amore peccarunt, hoc eis per illas corporum similitudines exhibeatur, quod ipsi carni mortuae solet, ut sub terra recondatur. denique inferi eo, quod infra sint, latine appellantur; sicut autem secundum corpus si ponderis sui ordinem teneant inferiora sunt omnia grauiora, ita secundum spiritum inferiora sunt omnia tristiora: unde et in graeca lingua origo nominis, quo appellantur inferi, ex eo quod nihil suaue habeant, resonare perhibetur. nec ipsam tamen rerum partem noster saluator mortuus pro nobis uisitare comtemsit, ut inde solueret. quos esse soluendos secundum diuinam secretamque iustitiam ignorare non potuit. quapropter animae illius latronis, cui dixit: hodie mecum eris in paradiso, non utique inferos praestitit, ubi poenae sunt peccatorum, sed aut illam requiem sinus Abrahae — non enim alicubi non est Christus, cum ipse sit sapientia dei adtingens ubique propter suam munditiam — aut illum paradisum siue in tertio caelo siue ubicumque alibi est, quo post tertium caelum est raptus apostolus, si tamen non aliquid unum est diuersis nominibus appellatum, ubi sunt animae beatorum. Si ergo caelum primum recte accipimus hoc omne corporeum generali nomine quidquid est super aquas et terram, secundum autem in similitudine corporali quod spiritu cernitur, sicut illud, unde animalibus plenus in extasi Petro discus ille submissus est, tertium uero quod mente conspicitur ita secreta et remota et omnino abrepta a sensibus carnis atque mundata, ut ea, quae in illo caelo sunt, et ipsam dei substantiam uerbumque deum, per quod facta sunt omnia, per caritatem spiritus sancti ineffabiliter ualeat uidere et audire: non incongruenter arbitramur et illuc esse apostolum raptum et ibi fortassis esse paradisum omnibus meliorem et, si dici oportet, paradisum paradisorum. si enim animae bonae laetitia in rebus bonis est in omni creatura, quid ea laetitia praestantius, quae in uerbo dei est, per quod facta sunt omnia?

But while we are seeking this, and either finding or not finding, the length of this book urges us at last to conclude it. Therefore, since we began our discussion of paradise because of what the apostle says—that he knows that a man was caught up to the third heaven, but does not know whether in the body or out of the body, and that he was caught up into paradise and heard ineffable words which it is not lawful for a man to speak—we do not rashly affirm whether paradise is in the third heaven, or whether he was caught up both into the third heaven and from there again into paradise. For if paradise properly means a wooded place, but by a transferred use of the word any spiritual region, as it were, where it is well with souls can rightly be called paradise, then not only the third heaven, whatever it is—and surely it is something great and sublimely glorious—but even within man himself a certain gladness of a good conscience is a paradise. Hence the church too is rightly called a paradise for the saints who live temperately, justly, and godly, rich in the abundance of graces and chaste delights; since even in tribulations it glories, rejoicing greatly in patience itself, because according to the multitude of sorrows in its heart God's consolations gladden its soul. How much more, then, after this life can that bosom of Abraham also be called paradise, where there is no longer any temptation, where there is such great rest after all the sorrows of this life! For there is a light there too, of its own and of its own kind, and surely a great one, which that rich man, from the torments and darkness of the underworld, so far away, with a great chasm in between, yet saw in such a way that he recognized there that once despised poor man. If these things are so, the underworld is said or believed to be under the earth because it is fittingly shown in the spirit through those likenesses of bodily things in such a way that, since the souls of the dead who deserve the underworld sinned through love of the flesh, there is shown to them through those likenesses of bodies what usually happens to the dead flesh itself, that it is buried under the earth. Finally, inferi is the Latin name because they are below (infra); and just as with respect to body, if they keep the order of their weight, all heavier things are lower, so with respect to spirit all sadder things are lower. Hence in the Greek language too the origin of the name by which the underworld is called is said to echo the fact that it has nothing sweet. Yet our Saviour, having died for us, did not disdain to visit even that part of things, in order to free from there those whom, according to divine and secret justice, he could not fail to know were to be freed. Therefore to the soul of that thief to whom he said, “Today you will be with me in paradise,” he did not grant the underworld, where the punishments of sinners are, but either that rest of Abraham's bosom—for there is nowhere that Christ is not, since he is the Wisdom of God reaching everywhere because of his purity—or that paradise, whether in the third heaven or wherever else it is, to which the apostle was caught up after the third heaven, if indeed it is not one thing called by different names, where the souls of the blessed are. If, then, we rightly understand the first heaven to be, by a general name, all this bodily world, whatever is above the waters and the earth; the second, what is discerned by the spirit in bodily likeness, like that from which the sheet full of animals was let down to Peter in ecstasy; and the third, what is beheld by the mind so secluded and removed and wholly snatched from the senses of the flesh and cleansed that it can, ineffably, see and hear the things that are in that heaven, and the very substance of God, and God the Word through whom all things were made, through the love of the Holy Spirit; then we think, not unfittingly, both that the apostle was caught up there and that perhaps there is the paradise better than all others and, if it may be said, the paradise of paradises. For if the gladness of a good soul in good things is found in every creature, what is more excellent than that gladness which is in the Word of God, through whom all things were made?

12.35CSEL 28.1:432–433

Sed, si quem mouet, quid opus sit spiritibus defunctorum corpora sua in resurrectione recipere, si potest eis etiam sine corporibus summa illa beatitudo praeberi, difficilior quidem quaestio est, quam ut perfecte possit hoc sermone finiri; sed tamen minime dubitandum est et raptam hominis a carnis sensibus mentem et post mortem ipsa carne deposita transcensis etiam similitudinibus corporalium non sic uidere posse incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti angeli uident, sine alia latentiore causa siue ideo, quia inest ei naturalis quidam adpetitus corpus administrandi: quo adpetitu retardatur quodammodo, ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum caelum, quamdiu non subest corpus, cuius administratione adpetitus ille conquiescat. porro autem, si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et grauis administratio, sicut haec caro, quae corrumpitur et adgrauat animam, de propagine transgressionis existens, multo magis auertitur mens ab illa uisione summi caeli: unde necessario abripienda erat ab eiusdem carnis sensibus, ut ei quomodo capere posset illud ostenderetur. proinde, cum hoc corpus iam non animale, sed per futuram commutationem spiritale receperit angelis adaequata, perfectum habebit naturae suae modum oboediens et inperans, uiuificata et uiuificans tam ineffabili facilitate, ut sit ei gloriae, quod sarcinae fuit.

But if anyone is troubled about what need there is for the spirits of the dead to receive their bodies in the resurrection, if that highest happiness can be given them even without bodies, the question is indeed too difficult to be settled perfectly in this discussion. Yet there should be no doubt at all that the mind of a man, whether snatched from the senses of the flesh, or after death, when the flesh itself has been laid aside and even the likenesses of bodily things have been transcended, cannot see the unchangeable substance as the holy angels see it; whether for some other more hidden reason, or because there is in it a certain natural appetite for governing a body. By this appetite it is in a way held back, so that it does not go with its whole attention into that highest heaven, so long as the body is not there, in whose governance that appetite may rest. Further, if the body is such that its governance is difficult and heavy, like this flesh, which is corrupted and weighs down the soul, coming from the stock of the transgression, the mind is much more turned away from that vision of the highest heaven; hence it had necessarily to be snatched from the senses of that flesh so that that vision might be shown to it as it could grasp it. Accordingly, when it has received this body, no longer animal but, through the change to come, spiritual, it will be made equal to the angels and will have the perfect measure of its nature, obeying and commanding, given life and giving life, with such ineffable ease that what was its burden will be its glory.

12.36CSEL 28.1:433–434

Nimirum enim erunt et tunc ista tria genera uisionum, sed nulla falsitate pro alio aliud adprobabitur nec in corporalibus nec in spiritalibus uisis, multo minus in intellectualibus, quibus ita praesentatis et perspicuis perfruetur, ut longe minore euidentia nunc nobis adiaceant istae species corporales, quas sensu carnis adtingimus et eis multi ita sunt dediti, ut solas esse arbitrentur et, quidquid tale non est, putent omnino non esse. sapientes autem ita sunt in his corporalibus uisis, ut, quamuis ea praesentiora uideantur, certiores sint tamen in illis, quae praeter corporis speciem praeterque corporis similitudinem intellegendo utcumque praespiciunt, quamuis ea non ualeant ita mente conspicere, ut haec sensu corporis intuentur. sancti uero angeli et his corporalibus iudicandis atque administrandis praesunt nec eis tamquam praesentioribus familiaribus inclinantur et eorum significatiuas similitudines in spiritu ita discernunt et tanta potentia quodammodo tractant, ut eas possint etiam hominum spiritibus reuelando miscere, et illam incommutabilem substantiam creatoris ita conspiciunt, ut uisione atque amore et eam praeponant omnibus et secundum eam iudicent de omnibus et in eam dirigantur, ut agantur, et ex ea dirigant quidquid agunt. denique quamuis abrepto apostolo a carnis sensibus in tertium caelum et paradisum hoc ipsum certe defuit ad plenam perfectamque cognitionem rerum, quae angelis inest, quod, siue in corpore siue extra corpus esset, nesciebat. hoc utique non deerit, cum receptis corporibus in resurrectione mortuorum corruptibile hoc induetur incorruptione et mortale hoc induetur inmortalitate. omnia enim euidentia erunt sine ulla falsitate, sine ulla ignorantia suis ordinibus distributa, et corporalia et spiritalia et intellectualia, in natura integra et beatitate perfecta.

For then too, surely, there will be these three kinds of vision, but by no falsity will one thing be approved for another, neither in bodily sights nor in spiritual ones, much less in intellectual ones, which the soul will enjoy so present and clear that, compared with them, these bodily forms which we touch with the sense of the flesh lie before us now with far less evidence; yet many are so given over to them that they suppose they alone exist and think that whatever is not of that kind does not exist at all. The wise, however, are so placed among these bodily sights that, although these seem more present, they are nevertheless more certain about the things which, apart from bodily form and apart from the likeness of a body, they foresee in some way by understanding, though they cannot behold them with the mind as they look at these with the sense of the body. But the holy angels both preside over judging and governing these bodily things and are not bent toward them as toward more present and familiar things; and they discern their signifying likenesses in the spirit and handle them, in a way, with such power that they can even mingle them with the spirits of human beings by revealing; and they so behold that unchangeable substance of the Creator that by vision and love they prefer it to all things, judge all things according to it, and are directed toward it to be moved, and from it direct whatever they do. Finally, even though the apostle was snatched from the senses of the flesh into the third heaven and paradise, this certainly was lacking to him for that full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels: that he did not know whether he was in the body or out of the body. This will certainly not be lacking when, the bodies received back in the resurrection of the dead, this corruptible shall put on incorruption and this mortal shall put on immortality. For all things will be evident, without any falsity, without any ignorance, arranged in their orders, the bodily and the spiritual and the intellectual, in a nature made whole and a happiness made perfect.

12.37CSEL 28.1:434–435

Scio quidem nonnullos eorum, qui scripturas sanctas ante nos in fide catholica tractasse laudantur, etiam sic exposuisse, quod ait apostolus tertium caelum, ut corporalis et animalis et spiritalis hominis hic differentias accipi uellent atque ad illud incorporearum rerum genus excellenti euidentia contemplandum esse apostolum raptum: quod genus etiam in hac uita spiritales homines prae ceteris rebus diligunt eoque perfrui concupiscunt. ego autem cur maluerim spiritale et intellectuale dicere, quod illi fortasse animale et spiritale dixerunt, ut earundem rerum alia tantummodo nomina ponerem, iam in primis huius libri partibus me disseruisse suffecerit. quae si rite pro modulo nostro disputauimus, aut spiritalis lector haec adprobabit aut etiam, ut sit spiritalis, adiuuante spiritu sancto aliquid ex ista lectione proficiet. sed iam uniuersum hoc opus, quod duodecim uoluminibus continetur, isto tandem fine concludimus.

I know, indeed, that some of those who are praised for having treated the holy Scriptures before us in the catholic faith have also explained what the apostle calls the third heaven in such a way that they took it to mean the differences between the bodily, the animal, and the spiritual man, and held that the apostle was caught up to contemplate with excellent evidence that kind of incorporeal things which even in this life spiritual people love above all other things and long to enjoy. Why I preferred to say “spiritual” and “intellectual” where they perhaps said “animal” and “spiritual,” so that I would only be giving other names to the same things, it will suffice that I have discussed in the first parts of this book. If we have argued these things rightly, according to our small measure, either the spiritual reader will approve them, or, so that he may become spiritual, he will make some progress from this reading with the help of the Holy Spirit. But now at last we conclude with this ending this whole work, which is contained in twelve volumes.