Christian Questions to the Greeks

[Christian question 1] If the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good among human beings, and the greatest good among human beings is to know the one who truly is, God, then the greatest evil is to be ignorant of him. But since this evil is present in some human beings, which is more fitting for the Creator of the world: to change the present state of life and free human beings from the greatest evil, as the teaching of the Christians holds, or to let the world remain in the same state and human beings be held fast by the greatest evil?

[Greek answer] First, to the first difficulty it must be said that there is no greatest evil. For if the greatest of goods is God, then clearly, if anyone were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly. For it is absurd that God should not comprehend all things and should not shine his goodness on all. So there is no greatest evil. And ignorance, in fact, is often given to human beings for their good: we see in many cases that people more often despise what they know than what they do not know. Besides, the soul suffers ignorance of the one who truly is, God, from nothing else but its own forgetfulness. And knowledge of God comes to souls here as well, just as we see human beings here who know God. Indeed, if one wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance at all about God; for all agree, by a common notion, that God exists. That human beings can know God even while they are here, the faith of the orthodox also shows clearly, when it says that God himself came down and was known to human beings. If, then, it is possible for human beings to know God even while they are here, no greatest evil befalls them from being here. For those who are ignorant, as has been said, are ignorant of God because of their unbelieving nature. And if one should concede, absurd as it is, that the things here are the greatest evil, and that it would be better for the things here not to exist than to exist: if he says that the Creator made the things here evil through weakness, he is foolish, for he is saying that God's power does not comprehend all things; but if, being able to make the things here good, he allowed them to do evil, this too will be an accusation against God. For one who is able to stop something and looks on is more truly its doer himself. And if the God who made the things here is the same God, clearly, since the same God remains, the same things will be later and always. For what he could do of old he can do now. If now he can do something more than before, his power will be temporal, which is absurd; for what is temporal is perishable. And if, though he was able of old to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would be envious, which it is impious even to imagine. So he, being the same and remaining in the same state, must do the same things.

[Christian rebuttal] Refutation of the answer, which was not rightly given.

[1] The argument itself, once understood, would have been enough to refute its incoherence. For when he says at the beginning of the argument that there is no greatest evil, and at the end of the argument that to think things unworthy of God, even in imagination alone, is impious, how is the greatest evil not deliberately brought back in, after the answerer had thrown it out without judgment? If speaking is added to this impiety of imagination alone, the impiety becomes greater; and if writing is added to speaking, the impiety necessarily holds every excess of evil. If this is so, and there is impiety in everything said and written unworthily about God, or even only imagined, … the glory of God; therefore the greatest evil among human beings comes from ignorance. But since it pleased your piety that the incoherence of the argument should be refuted by us in writing as well, I write what follows in a volume. For to refute an obvious falsehood at greater length is wearisome both to the writer and to the reader.

[2] The answerer laid down in his answer two kinds of greatest evil and three kinds of ignorance of God: the former according to the Manichaeans, the latter according to the answerer himself. Of the two kinds of greatest evil, he spoke of one as according to essence, the other as according to the activity of what is according to essence. Of the three kinds of ignorance of God, he spoke of one as according to forgetfulness, one according to the unbelieving nature, and one according to a good gift. Making his refutation of those according to the Manichaeans and of those according to himself brief, he said, when he was refuting the opinion of the Manichaeans: “There is no greatest evil. If anyone were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly”; and when he says: “The soul suffers ignorance of the one who truly is, God, from nothing else but its own forgetfulness,” in the first he does away with the greatest evil according to essence, in the second with the one according to activity. And doing away also with the kinds of ignorance of God that he himself laid down, he says: “There is no ignorance at all about God; for all agree, by a common notion, that God exists.” If, then, there is no ignorance at all about God, it is clearly false that ignorance of God befalls human beings either through forgetfulness, or through the unbelieving nature, or through a good gift. And if he calls the notion common to all, which is destroyed by the specific notion of each heresy of wrong belief, not even so will there be knowledge of God in all. We, however, did not set down in the question either the greatest evil according to the Manichaeans or the ignorance of God according to the answerer himself; we called the greatest evil according to ignorance the falsehood against God, and ignorance of God the ignorance that has spoken the falsehood. This is the third kind of greatest evil, which befalls human beings from their own voluntary disobedience and unbelief. The answerer did away with the two kinds of greatest evil according to the Manichaeans, but did not do away with the one according to us. So we must say one of two things about the answerer: either he did not understand the third kind of greatest evil, ours, or he was not supplied with a just counterargument to refute it. That the greatest evil according to us befalls human beings from ignorance of God is shown as follows. The greatest evil, which does not exist according to essence, human beings through ignorance of God supposed to exist in their doctrines; and the answerer himself testifies to this … “and if anyone were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly. For it is absurd that God should not comprehend all things and should not shine his goodness on all. So there is no greatest evil.” In these words the greatest evil according to essence is done away with, but the one by supposition in doctrine, which we set down in the question, remains. But since the answerer, reaching out to do away with the greatest evil according to us, said, “There is no greatest evil,” the answerer clearly either did not understand, as has been said, the greatest evil according to us, or was not supplied with a just counterargument. And if this is so, clearly there is a greatest evil among human beings by supposition in doctrine.

[3] “For if,” he says, “God is the greatest of goods”: true and pious is the statement that God is the greatest of goods. But since some human beings, from ignorance of God, deprive the one who truly is God of his rightful titles and honors and attach them to those who are not gods, does it not seem to the answerer to be a plain impiety, than which there is none greater, to be ignorant of the one who truly is God and to honor one who is not with his titles and honors? And how can his denial hold, which says that there is no greatest evil among human beings, when the greatest impiety exists among human beings, unless perhaps he does not consider the greatest impiety to be the greatest evil? “If anyone,” he says, “were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly; for it is absurd that God should not comprehend all things and should not shine his goodness on all. So there is no greatest evil.” If there is no greatest evil among human beings, how did you accuse the Manichaeans of speaking evilly? For if the Manichaeans speak evilly what they say, then clearly what they say is evil; for whoever speaks evilly speaks what is evil. And the evil according to the Manichaeans is such that there is none greater. But if this is true, then truly there is an evil among human beings, if not according to essence, yet in supposition and doctrine.

[4] “For,” he says, “ignorance is often given to human beings for their good; we see at any rate in many cases that people more often despise what they know than what they do not know. Besides, the soul suffers ignorance of the one who truly is, God, from nothing else but its own forgetfulness; and knowledge of God comes to souls here as well, just as we see human beings here who know God. Indeed, if one wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance at all about God; for all agree, by a common notion, that God exists. That human beings can know God even while they are here, the faith of the orthodox also shows clearly, when it says that God himself came down and was known to human beings.” He said that ignorance is often given to human beings for their good. But if he means ignorance of God, which is what our argument is about, it is plainly absurd to say that ignorance of God is given for their good to those who are ignorant. For by this argument all the religions that are ignorant of God will be ignorant of God for their own good, while the religion that knows God is not for its own good. And if he means another ignorance, about which we had not set out to speak, the citation is out of place, offering the ignorance not under inquiry in place of the one under inquiry. He said that the soul suffers ignorance of God from its own forgetfulness; he said that knowledge of God comes to souls even here; he said that we see people even here who know God; he said that there is no ignorance at all about God, for all agree by a common notion that God exists; he said that human beings can know God even here; and as proof of this he cited the faith of the orthodox, which says that God himself came down and was known to human beings. But if it is true that the soul suffers ignorance of God through its own forgetfulness, then clearly it is false that “there is no ignorance at all about God, for all agree by a common notion that God exists.” And what need was there for knowledge of God to come to souls here, if all know God and agree by a common notion? And when he says, “We see human beings here as well who know God,” which human beings does he mean? If he means those who have known God, who came down and was made known to them according to the faith of the orthodox, the statement is true; for we see them. But how can one who used the presence of God among human beings as proof that human beings can know God even here himself disbelieve what he himself said about the re-creation of the world? For a proof that is not believed does not make credible the thing it is put forward to show. And if he does not mean those who have known God here from the teaching of the God who came down, the statement that says, “We see human beings here who have known God,” is false; for I do not see them. And if there was no ignorance at all about God, “for all agree by a common notion,” what knowledge of God has come to human beings here, except the specific knowledge by which all the religions on earth … the one honoring the true teaching, while the religions differ from one another not simply by falsehood but by the differences of their falsehood? But if this is so, then according to the answerer's argument it is not knowledge of God that comes to souls here but rather ignorance, if indeed the religions differ from one another not by the general knowledge of God that is in them, but rather by the specific knowledge here.

[5] “If, then, it is possible for human beings to know God even while they are here, no greatest evil befalls them from being here. For those who are ignorant, as has been said, are ignorant of God because of their own unbelieving nature.” The answerer wove together two statements that destroy each other and set them in his answer: “If it is possible for human beings to know God while they are here, no greatest evil befalls them,” and, “Those who are ignorant are ignorant of God because of their own unbelieving nature.” The greatest evil that he threw out by the first statement he brought in by the second, if the greatest evil is to act impiously toward the one who truly is God with a double impiety: to deprive him of the glory that is his by essence, and to honor falsely with his glory those who are not gods. This leaves no excess of evil untouched. And to say that because it is possible for human beings here to know God no greatest evil befalls them is not the removal of the greatest evil but its increase. For even where it is possible, human beings are made powerless by their own voluntary unbelief; and though they could practice the simple piety that saves human beings, they prefer the double impiety to it. Not to call this the greatest evil is the most absurd of all things.

[6] “And if one should concede, absurd as it is, that the things here are the greatest evil, and that it would be better for the things here not to exist than to exist: if he says that the Creator made the things here evil through weakness, he is foolish, for he is saying that God's power does not comprehend all things. But if, being able, … to do evil, this too is an accusation against God. For one who is able to stop something and looks on is more truly its doer himself.” If, according to what was said above, those who are ignorant of God are ignorant of God from their own unbelieving nature, which is an acknowledged greatest evil, how does the answerer now concede this by way of an absurd concession? And if it is not this, but he concedes another greatest evil by the absurd concession, that greatest evil is not ours but the Manichaeans'. For according to us all the things here are good, since they have the greatest of goods as their Creator; and there is no greatest evil in them according to essence, nor according to the activity of what is according to essence, but only according to the voluntary choice of human beings, which prefers falsehood to truth, by the double impiety already mentioned. To correct this, the Creator and God of the world has appointed the day on which he will make an end of all the evils in the world that come from unbelief and disobedience toward God, according to the faith of the orthodox who have come to know God here, and according to the answerer's own testimony. So the answerer, whose argument concerned the greatest evil according to us, ought not to have turned to the one according to the Manichaeans … this is a sign also of the refutation of the difficulty, as has been said. He permits us to do the evils that we voluntarily choose, not through weakness of his power, but so that our free will and his long-suffering may be shown; without these, neither could we be human beings nor could he be good, in the present state of things.

[7] “And if the God who made the things here is the same God, clearly, since the same God remains, the same things will be later and always. For what he could do of old he can do now; and if now he can do something more than before, his power will be temporal, which is absurd; for what is temporal is perishable.” Of whomever “having made” is said, “has made” and “will make” are said as well; and they can be substituted for one another without hindrance, as having the same force. But “having made” precedes “will make” by natural necessity, and these signify the two extremes of time. Whoever has the two extremes of time, that is, the past and the future, must also have what lies between the extremes of time, that is, the present. And since “having made” has a temporal sense, then necessarily God too, having made the things here, according to the answerer's own expression, made them in time. But God, having made the things here, made both the imperishable and the perishable, for these are parts of the things here. Hence clearly the answerer reasonably applied “having made” to God, but unreasonably distinguished the perishable from the imperishable by what is temporal, since by the word “having made” they are not distinguished from one another, if indeed he made both the perishable and the imperishable. If, then, whoever says of God “he will make” is speaking of the re-creation as the acquisition of a temporal power, then whoever says of him “having made” will also be speaking of the acquisition of a temporal power, since “having made” everywhere precedes “will make.” But if, having made, he did not make by acquiring a temporal power, neither will he make by acquiring a temporal power.

[8] “And if, though he was able of old to prevent this greatest evil, he did not prevent it, he would be envious, which it is impious even to imagine. So he, being the same and remaining in the same state, must do the same things.” That because of ignorance of God human beings act impiously in many ways, if they are ignorant of the one who truly is God, we have shown above. For either they set God aside, depriving him of his own glory, and falsely honor those who are not gods with his names and attributes; or they suppose the making and the providence of the world to belong to makers who fight one another; or they give the parts of the world the name “unbegotten,” which befits only God the Creator of the world, and, though the parts do not create, they toss at God the name of Creator; to pass over the other kinds of greatest evils among human beings, which carry an impiety equal to or greater than the impiety of those who imagine God to be envious. But if these and such things are the greatest evils among human beings, and the answerer disbelieves the re-creation preached by the Christians, in which all evils among human beings, in soul and in body, are done away with, how, according to him, is God not envious, who, though able to prevent the greatest evils among human beings, does not prevent them, but makes those who act impiously toward him and toward one another remain always in the same state? And for what reason does the answerer disbelieve the re-creation of the world? Because of the inability of the maker, or because the work would be unfitting? If because of the inability of the maker, then God is not a maker at all; for of the things whose remaking God does not have the power for, neither does he have the power for their making, since these follow one another and stand or fall together. But if because the work would be unfitting, then the better work is not fitting for him; which is absurd, to say that it is fitting for him to make perishable human beings but not fitting for him to make imperishable ones.

[Christian question 2] If it is impossible for one who has made nothing to be God, how is there a God, if the world is unbegotten, as you think?

[Greek answer] To say that it is impossible for one who has made nothing to be God is absurd. For here again the same argument applies, that nothing is temporal with God. And if nothing is temporal with God, clearly it is not fitting to attach the past of time to God. And if this is not fitting, neither is it fitting to say that God has made anything whatever. What then? Will you say that we err in calling God inactive? But that is not what we say; we say that God neither has made, nor makes, nor will make, in time. For he has no more made than he makes, nor again does he make more than he will make; rather, with God the past is in the present, and the future in having already come to be, since God has nothing in flux but always does the same things, because of his perfect and unchangeable power and activity. He makes the world, then, in this very thing that it is, providing it with unceasing motion by shining upon it through eternity. … that he who remains in the same state does the same things, the same one the same thing, having no beginning of his making so as to have no end either; since, if his activities have a beginning and an end, God will be perishable in his activity, which is absurd. For his power too will be changeable, using now one activity and now another; and his essence will be shaken, generating now some powers and now others, and not remaining in the same ones. So if these things hold throughout, clearly God will be changeable in essence, power, and activity, which is absurd. He, then, remaining the same, has nothing temporal; … the world, ordering it always; and the world, by being always guarded, comes into being, and by always being, the same world is unbegotten.

[Christian rebuttal] Refutation of the answer, which was not rightly given.

[1] “To say that it is impossible for one who has made nothing to be God is absurd. For here again the same argument applies, that nothing is temporal with God.” If, because nothing is temporal with God, it is absurd to say of him “he has made,” it is equally absurd to say “he makes,” which is as temporal as “he has made.” How then does the answerer say that “he has made” is unfitting for God but “he makes” is fitting? And if “having made” is equivalent to “has made,” and likewise “makes” to “will make,” and equivalent terms may be substituted for one another without hindrance, how is it that in the first answer the answerer applied “having made” and “makes” to God, but now removes both from him? “Having made” he applied to God thus: “If the God who made the things here is the same God”; and “to make” thus: “So he, being the same and remaining in the same state, must do the same things.” But removing in the second answer what was laid down in the first, he says: “It is absurd to say that it is impossible for one who has made nothing to be God”; and again: “God neither has made, nor makes, nor will make, in time.” But perhaps he came to contradict himself through his own forgetfulness, through which, as he said, ignorance befalls human beings. Let us examine in order what follows.

[2] “Nothing,” he says, “is temporal with God. Clearly it is not fitting to attach the past of time to God. And if this is not fitting, neither is it fitting to say that God has made anything whatever.” Here the answerer, having laid down the absurd premise that nothing is temporal with God, brings in as reasonable what follows of necessity from the absurdity: that if nothing is temporal with God, clearly it is not fitting to attach the past of time to God; and if this is not fitting, neither is it fitting to say that God has made anything whatever. That he laid down absurdly that nothing is temporal with God, and used it as proof for what he brings in next, the answerer refutes himself in what he said in the first answer: “If,” he says, “the God who made the things here is the same God, clearly, since the same God remains, the same things will be later and always; for what he could do of old he can do now.” If, then, nothing is temporal with God, clearly neither “having made,” nor “makes,” nor “earlier” and “later,” nor “of old” and “now,” nor “could” and “can” apply to him. For “having made,” “earlier,” “of old,” and “could” indicate past time; and “makes,” “later,” “now,” and “can” signify present and future time. And if these words, applied to God, come to signify and assert that all God's works are temporal with him, clearly he laid down absurdly that nothing is temporal with him. And when this, as an absurd premise, is done away with, there is necessarily done away with it the claim that “he has made” does not fit God. For when this is done away with, its contrary is necessarily laid down, that is, that “he has made” fits God; for in every case either the affirmation or the denial must be true. And once it is laid down that “he has made” fits God, it is impossible to speak of a God who has made nothing; for this follows from that.

[3] … “What then? Will you say that we err in calling God inactive? … that God has made nothing, nor makes, nor will make, in time; for he has no more made than he makes, nor again does he make more than he will make; rather, with God the past is in the present, and the future in having already come to be, since God has nothing in flux but always does the same things, because of his perfect and unchangeable power and activity.” But to flee the error that calls God inactive, while saying of him that he “neither has made, nor makes, nor will make, in time,” is to fall into the same error. For if you had wanted to err and call God inactive, what more could you have said than what you have now said, though you did not want to err and call God inactive, namely, that God neither has made, nor makes, nor will make? For when the words that show and carry a temporal sense are removed from God's activity, God will be found inactive, and so not a maker either.

[4] If nothing is temporal with God, clearly neither the past of time is with him, nor the present, nor the future. How then does the answerer, while removing temporal things from God, apply temporal things to God when he says: “Rather, with God the past is in the present, and the future in having already come to be”? This means one of two things: either this, which is not with God, is in what is not; or this, which is not with God, is in what is. If the first, it is impossible; for to be in something, or not to be, belongs to what is. If the second, then with God what is not is in what is, that is, the past of time is in the present of time. Once this is laid down, it is shown that “nothing is temporal with God” was not rightly said, since the past in the present and the future in having already come to be are temporal. Even if he changed the manner in which the parts of time are with God, he still granted that the past of time, the present, and the future are with him; and also that he has no more made than he makes, nor again makes more than he will make, … since the makings … For what need was there to remove “more” from the makings that correspond to “has made,” “makes,” and “will make,” which differ from one another, if the makings taken as a whole do not differ from one another by more and less? To say “he has no more made than he makes” is not a denial of having made but rather an affirmation of “he has made.” Plainly, all the temporal things he removed from God in the opening of the second answer he left with him here: “since God has nothing in flux but always does the same things, because of his perfect and unchangeable power and activity.” One who removes temporal things does not lay down temporal things. How then, if according to the answerer nothing is temporal with God, does God make the same things? For “makes” cannot be conceived outside present time. And how does God have perfect power and activity, if he makes the same things unceasingly? For motion is called imperfect activity precisely because it is always in motion; and if God made in imitation of it, his activity would be imperfect and not perfect; for perfect activity is seen in a work already completed, not in one not yet completed. But if, because of the incompleteness of the activity and the endlessness of the process, the answerer says that God has made nothing, he will not speak the truth when he says that God's activity is perfect, since it has completed nothing either in whole or in part. And if it is impossible for the activity of one who is always making to be perfect without the work being completed, then clearly God does not have perfect activity, since he is always making what is being made.

[5] “He makes the world, then, in this very thing that it is, providing it with unceasing motion by shining upon it through eternity.” If God makes the world in providing motion, clearly he makes the world temporal; for the motion provided to the world by God for its own movement is not without time. If, then, making belongs to present time, and motion is temporal, how is it not false that “nothing is temporal with God”? And how is it possible for the world, which has not yet come to be, to be moved, unless it is in the process of being made, when God makes without time and the world lies in time? For as the maker makes, so must the thing made lie, without time. And if God makes the world by providing motion, and it is not fitting to say of him, “He has made the world,” then neither is it fitting for the world to be moved. For what is moved is one thing and motion another. Let the sun, for example, be what is moved, and its motion a passing by travel from place to place. If motion does not provide the sun with its essence but provides it with moving by travel, clearly the sun has two makings, one of its essence and another of its motion. For example, the sun is an ethereal condensation in essence, bright in form, spherical in shape; none of these does the sun have from motion. But if the sun has none of these through motion, clearly God does not make the sun, which is a part of the world, through the making of motion, as he makes the whole world; and what is movable must exist first, and the motion afterward. Either, then, the sun is unmade in its essence, or God made its essence by one making and its motion by another, having first made its essence and afterward provided it with motion. But if he always makes it move but does not always make its essence, clearly after the making of its essence he provides it with its unceasing motion; and the end of the making of its essence is the beginning of its motion. If this is so, clearly nothing is timeless with God; for a making that succeeds another making is not timeless.

[6] “So he has made nothing, nor …; but the same one always makes the same thing, having no beginning of his making, so as to have no end either.” Now that it has been shown that the making of the sun's essence is one thing and the making through motion, which the answerer called unceasing, another, and that the making of its essence precedes the making through motion, how is it not absurd to call beginningless the making of the sun through motion, when the sun had, before the unceasing making through motion, the making of its essence, which had come to an end? Either, then, God is not the maker of the sun's essence, or the making of the sun through motion is not beginningless. If the first, and God is not the maker of the sun's essence, neither is he the maker of its motion; for from whom a thing has its essence, from him it must also have its motion. If the second, God will be perishable in his activity, if indeed, according to the answerer, when God's activity ceases, God perishes in his activity. But if God is the maker of the sun's essence and does not always make it, clearly he made it before the sun was moved, so that nothing is timeless with God.

[7] “Since, if his activities have a beginning and an end, God will be perishable in his activity, which is absurd. And his power too will be changeable, putting forth now one activity and now another. And if the power is changeable, using now one activity and now another, the essence too will be shaken, generating now some powers and now others, and not remaining in the same ones. So if these things hold throughout, clearly God will be changeable in essence, power, and activity, which is absurd.” As God himself has no beginning or end, so neither, on this view, does his activity, nor do his works (for his activities are in his works). So, just as he himself does not need a maker, neither will his so-called works; and it will be false to call God the maker of things that, according to the answerer, are without beginning and without end. And if everywhere the maker precedes by the difference between prior and subsequent existence, … and as God himself … the difference between God and his works … deprives both, God and the things made, the one of the title of maker, the others of the title of things made. And if God's power is infinite, as indeed it is, but his works are finite, how is God, in respect of the powers that he has but does not exercise, not perishable in his activity, by the answerer's own judgment? But if, in respect of the powers that he has and does not exercise, he is not perishable, then neither, when the activity of God that brings forth the world ceases, does God perish in his activity. He acts as much as he wills, and not as much as he can; and the contraction of his activity does not make God perishable. Nor, when he contracts his activity, does he contract it by a change of his power; rather, God's power is always unchangeable, and he uses his activities as far as he wills. For God does not act as those things act which have their being in acting, and which cease to be when their activity ceases, like fire and snow. For if God acted in this way, he would act not for the sake of the things that come to be but for the sake of his own being, so that if he ceased acting he would also cease to be. But if this is absurd, it is absurd also to call God's power changeable by the contraction of his activity, or his essence shaken by putting forth now some and now other various activities. And just as God makes us first infants, then young men, then old men, not by a change of his power, nor by the corruption of his activity, nor by his essence being shaken, when he varies our ages at different times, which differ from one another as earlier and later, but by the putting forth and contracting of his activity, so his activity has a beginning and an end not by a change of his power but by putting forth and contracting. For if, when his activity was contracted, God could no longer use the activity that had ceased, it would rightly be called a corruption of activity; but if he can always use the same activity, the activity of God is not corrupted when it is contracted. For when the power is not corrupted, it is impossible for the activity to be corrupted. The corruption of activity is one thing, and the contraction of activity another; so that if the activity that makes the world were not contracted, worlds infinite in number would have come to be by an unceasing activity. But now, since only one world has come to be, the activity that made the world is shown to be finite by the finiteness of the work.

[8] “He, then, remaining the same, has nothing temporal. He makes the world, then, ordering it always; and the world, by being always guarded, comes into being, and by always being, the same world is unbegotten.” If God has nothing temporal, neither does he have making; for making is temporal. And if God makes the world … in his activity … not by themselves but accidentally. For the world is not a world without essence. And if the world has essence, it is necessarily unmade and unguarded. For what does not need anything in order to come into being in its essence does not need anything in order to be guarded either; for the unbegotten nature admits nothing from outside itself. And if in every case either the affirmation or the denial must be true, how did the answerer lay down both about the coming into being of the world, the affirmation and the denial, saying that it is both originated and unoriginated? Further, if, as he said in the third answer, God, being unbegotten, makes all things unbegottenly, not as coming into being but as subsisting together with him: since everything that subsists together with something is preserved by the preservation of that with which it subsists, needing no other guarding than the preservation of that thing (for when that is preserved, it too is preserved), therefore, if there is need of guarding for preservation, it is the thing with whose subsistence the co-subsisting things subsist that needs guarding, not the co-subsisting things. But if this is so, then it is not the world, which subsists together with God, that needs guarding, but God himself, with whom the world subsists. But if this is absurd, it is absurd also to say that the world subsists together with God. One must say, then, that the world subsists by the will of God, and by the will of God the same world endures, even if not forever. For things that subsist together with the subsistence of something are preserved by its preservation, not by their own. For example, angles subsist together with the composition of lines; while the composition remains, the angles remain too; and when the composition is destroyed, the angles are destroyed too; and if there is need for the angles to endure, it is necessary to give guarding to the composition of the lines, not to the angles: to the angles accidentally, but to the composition of the lines in itself. In the same way one must think of the world, if it subsists unbegottenly together with God, as the answerer says.

[Christian question 3] If God makes by his being and not by his willing, as fire heats by its being, how is it that he himself is simple and uniform, yet the maker of different essences?

[Greek answer] We must not suppose that, as in us being is one thing and willing another, so it is also in God; rather, in God being and willing are plainly one and the same. For what he is, he also wills; and what he wills, he is; and there is no division in God, because God is self-produced. So the division of being from willing in God must be thrown out. Yet neither must we suppose that God makes by his being in the way that fire heats. For fire, even if it has heat essentially, still has it as something that has come to belong to it; but in God nothing has come to belong to him, either essentially or accidentally. Since, then, nothing has come to belong to him, and being and willing are the same in God, he is simple and uniform, making the things that exist unbegottenly. For just as we see that begotten things, for example a particular human being who has come to be by begetting, being begotten, make begotten things, and in general begotten things that come to be by begetting make begotten things, and things from themselves, in the same way God too, being unbegotten, makes all things unbegottenly, not as things that come into being but as things that subsist together with him; and by the infinity of his power he makes different things. Let us not think of God's making in a human way. For as we, having first been in one condition and afterward changing to another, are said to make, God does not make so; rather, making all things without time by an unspeakable and surpassing power, he brings all things to completion; and at the same moment as he himself is, he also makes the things that exist, not needing, as we do, first to come into being and be brought to completion and then to make, because there is nothing earlier and later in him. We see nature too making by its very being, and always working its change all at once; as in the curdling of milk we observe the curdling coming upon the milk all at once. Much more, then, must we suppose that God makes all things all at once and without time, being himself one, but by the infinity of his power bringing forth different things, which themselves are wholly self-produced.

[Christian rebuttal] [1] “We must not suppose,” he says, “that, as in us being is one thing and willing another, so it is also in God. For what he is, he also wills; and what he wills, he is; and there is no division in God, because God is self-produced. So the division of being from willing in God must be thrown out.” Since God has essence for existing and will for making, whoever throws out the difference between essence and will throws out both God's existence and his making: his existence, his own; his making, that of things that do not exist. That God's essence is one thing and his will another is shown from the answerer's own words when he said: “For what he is, he also wills; and what he wills, he is.” He converted will with essence and essence with will. But conversion can in no way take place unless the terms converted are one thing and another, either in definition or in number. Nothing prevents what is one in number from being one thing and another in definition; for example, a straight line is one in number in its subsistence, but in the definition of “straight” and of “line” it is one thing and another; so too the nature of God is one thing and another in the definition of essence and of will. To exist is one thing and to exist in something another; God's essence exists, and the will exists in the essence; therefore the essence of God is one thing and the will another. If God's will is from his essence, but his essence is not from his will, then God's essence is one thing and his will another. God's essence does not admit of not being essence; but God's will admits of not willing. For example, God willed to make one sun; he did not will to make a second sun, because just as it was profitable for the things that exist that there be one sun, so it was not profitable for them that a second sun come to be; and he willed what was profitable and did not will what was not profitable. But if this is so, then God's essence is one thing and his will another. If what God is, that he also wills, clearly he is the object of will and not will. How then is will the same as essence, when the object of will and the will are one thing and another, just as the object of sense and sense? If God is without beginning and eternal, he is neither self-produced nor produced by another; for what is simply self-produced is in no way eternal and without beginning. The answerer by one statement does away with the difference between God's essence and his will, and by another statement lays it down. Doing away with the difference between God's essence and his will, he said: “We must not suppose that, as in us being is one thing and willing another, so it is also in God.” Laying down the difference, he says: “Rather, they are plainly the same”; and again: “Being and willing are the same in God.” For just as what is different is different, one thing from another, so too what is the same is plainly the same, one thing with another; and likewise what is “plainly” so is plainly so, one thing in relation to another. But if God's essence and will are the same, let them plainly be one thing and another; otherwise, if the “one thing and another” is done away with, the sameness of God's essence and will will necessarily be done away with too, and the “plainly” as well. As being moved is the activity of motion, so willing is the activity of will; and the difference that power has from activity, will has from willing. But it is impossible for willing to differ from will and not to differ from the one who wills. And if in no way can willing, will, and the one who wills be the same, clearly whoever throws out the distinction between God and his willing throws out the difference between the one who acts and the activity, which is absurd. If what subsists in itself is one thing and what does not subsist is another, and God is the former and willing the latter, clearly whoever throws out the distinction between God and willing throws out either what subsists or what does not subsist. If, by the opponent's argument, what God is he also wills, and what he wills he is, then clearly, if God did not will that his activity should not perish, … Therefore God is not what he wills. If making comes from God's will, clearly, as … differs, so being differs from willing.

[2] “Yet neither must we suppose that God makes by his being in the way that fire heats. For fire, even if it has heat essentially, still has it as something that has come to belong to it. But in God nothing … Since, then, nothing has come to belong to him, and being and willing are the same in God, he is simple and uniform, making the things that exist unbegottenly.” How heat has come to belong to fire, as the answerer wishes to say, I leave aside. For our inquiry now is not about how heat has come to belong to it, but simply about making, … what and how many and when he makes, … but about the activity without will, by which he acts by his being. Willing is either the essence or something added to the essence. But if it is the essence, it is not the one who wills; and if it is added to the essence, it is necessarily one thing and another; for what is and what is added are not the same. If God wills many things but is not many things, then being is not the same as willing in God. If God can make as many things as he wills to make, but does not will to make as many as he can make, then being is not the same as willing in him. If God is one, simple and uniform, but wills many things, and also does not will many things (for example, he wills that the things that exist be many in their variety, but does not will that they be infinite in number), then being is not the same as willing in him. If God does not make what he is, but makes what he wills, and he wills to make the world, then being is not the same as willing in him. If unbegotten things do not come into being unbegottenly, neither then does God make unbegotten things unbegottenly; for it is impossible for a thing made to be unbegotten. As teaching is the activity of the teacher in the learner, so making is the activity of the maker in the thing made. Therefore whoever does away with coming into being in the thing made also does away with activity in the making of the maker. In vain does God exercise the activity of making, if there is nothing that comes into being. If God does not make without making, neither does he make unbegottenly. “God makes” is the affirmation of making; but “he makes without making” is in effect the denial of the affirmation. “Unbegotten” and “made” are words that fight each other. If what comes through making is begotten, then what does not come through making is not begotten. There is no difference between saying, “The maker made, but the thing made did not come into being,” and saying, “God makes unbegotten things.” If it is reasonable to say, “God makes unbegotten things unbegottenly,” then it is reasonable also to say, “Unbegotten things come into being unbegottenly”; for “comes into being” follows “makes” by natural necessity. But if the second is absurd, the first is absurd too. If coming into being is temporal, being made is temporal too; for they are equivalent; for it is impossible, while the maker is making, for the thing made not to come into being. If nothing comes into being unbegottenly, neither then is anything made unbegottenly; for coming into being and being made are not the same in word, but are the same in fact. If God makes by his being, he makes what he makes by compulsion; but if he makes by willing, he makes with sovereign authority; and making with sovereign authority, he makes as many things as he wills, and such things as he wills, and when he wills. If God makes by his being, his willing is of no use to him, since he can in no way use it. The answerer lays down two incompatible things about God: he calls him the maker of the things that exist, and attaches to him making unbegottenly. For if he himself makes unbegottenly, but the thing made in no way comes into being, neither by begetting nor without begetting, neither as made nor as unmade, then just as the thing made does not come into being, so neither does the maker make.

[3] “For just as,” he says, “we see that begotten things, for example a human being who has come to be by begetting, being begotten, make begotten things, and in general begotten things that come to be by begetting make begotten things, and things from themselves, in the same way God too, being unbegotten, makes all things unbegottenly, not as things that come into being but as things that subsist together with him; and by the infinity of his power he makes different things.” Who, then, is the maker of the human being who, by the answerer's own expression, came to be by begetting, and who, being himself begotten, makes begotten things by begetting? If it is God, how did the answerer not speak falsely when he said, “God, being unbegotten, makes unbegotten things unbegottenly”? But if it is not God, how does God not exercise providence over what belongs to others, when he exercises providence over human beings, of whom he is not the maker? But if it is absurd not to call God the maker of the human being, it is absurd also to say that God makes unbegotten things unbegottenly; for see, he has made the human being, who by begetting is begotten. If the part of something is begotten, the whole of it is necessarily begotten too; and the human being, who by the answerer's own expression came to be by begetting, is a part of the world; therefore the world too is begotten. If God is unbegotten and makes unbegotten things, how does he not bear the name “unbegotten” in common with them, distinguishing himself from nothing? If God does not make what he is (for that is impossible), but makes what he is not, then he makes begotten things, being himself unbegotten. We do not first inquire how God makes, but what he makes; for once what he makes is found, how he makes is found too. If God, being unbegotten, makes unbegotten things unbegottenly, then, being without a master, he makes things without a master, in a masterless way. But if the second is absurd, the first is absurd too. Of things that subsist together with one another without interval, none can be the maker of any; otherwise they will be makers of one another. But if this is absurd, it is absurd also to call God the maker of things that subsist together with him without interval. If God can make infinite things, but by willing; and God cannot be different things, for he is one, simple, and uniform; but he wills different things; then he does not make by being but by willing. If the world subsists together with God as angles subsist together with the composition of lines, then God makes the world by compulsion and without willing, accidentally and not in itself; for … by compulsion … the lines. Whoever makes, makes what is not; for what is has no need of a maker. But if this is so, God is not the maker of the things that subsist together with him, as the answerer says. God did not make a house; he made the human being and gave him the power to make a house. Neither of these, then, is unbegotten with God, neither the making of the human being nor the giving of that power. The answerer laid down two rules: one for the making of things that are unbegotten and make unbegottenly, and one for the making of things that are begotten and make by begetting. The works of the unbegotten, he says, subsist together with their makers unbegottenly; but the works of the begotten are temporal. Since, then, none of the unbegotten makes temporally, clearly begotten things have neither come into being from the unbegotten nor will they come into being.

[4] “Let us not think of God's making in a human way. For as we, having first been in one condition and afterward changing to another, are said to make, God does not make so; rather, making all things without time by an unspeakable and surpassing power, he brings all things to completion; and at the same moment as he himself is, he also makes the things that exist, not needing, as we do, first to come into being and be brought to completion and then to make, because there is nothing earlier and later in him.” We change what is earlier into what is later by finding what is better; but God does not do so; rather, as is fitting, he makes from the beginning, not changing the earlier into the later. For if he had resolved from the beginning to change the earlier into the later and did not change it, it would be thought either weakness of power, or that he had found something better than what was resolved; neither of which belongs to God, neither weakness of power nor finding later something better than what came before. If God makes all things not as coming into being but as subsisting together with him, it was superfluous to make the things that exist at the same moment as he himself is. For just as, when the composition of lines exists, it would be superfluous to make the angles, so, since God exists together with the world, it would be superfluous to make the world, if indeed it subsists together with God, as the answerer says. If the world exists at the same moment as God exists, and the world is always in motion, and motion is in time, then God is in time together with the world. If God, being unbegotten, makes unbegotten things unbegottenly, not things that come into being but things that subsist together with him, then the human being too, being a part of the world, is unbegotten. How then does the answerer call him begotten? And if God, being unbegotten, makes unbegotten things unbegottenly, clearly, being simple, he makes all things that subsist together with him simple. But if so, the world does not subsist together with God, since it is composite both as a whole and in its parts. If God is one, and what subsists together with him is not one, then neither do begotten things subsist together with him, who is unbegotten. If God … accidentally the angles subsist together with the position … If God is beyond intelligible and sensible things, neither then, being unbegotten, does he make unbegotten things. If it is impossible for anything to subsist together with what is beyond it, how did the world come to subsist together with God, who is beyond it? If it is impossible for composite things to be unbegotten, how are the heaven, the sun, and the world unbegotten, since they are composite, having their matter from one source and their form from another?

[5] “We see nature too making by its very being, and always working its change all at once; as in the curdling of milk we observe the curdling coming upon the milk all at once. Much more, then, must we suppose that God makes all things all at once and without time, being himself one, but by the infinity of his power bringing forth different things, which themselves are wholly self-produced.” Nature works its change all at once not to make an essence but to make an affection; for curdling in milk is an affection of the milk; but nature in no way makes an essence all at once. How then has the answerer not used an inappropriate example, the working of nature, to illustrate God's timeless working, since God is the Creator of many and different essences? And even if God makes all at once, not even so does he make without time; for “all at once” is the indivisible instant of time. The will of God does not rule over self-produced things … the sun and the world. The will of God rules over all things; nothing, then, is self-produced. The answerer calls both God and the world self-produced. But if the world is self-produced, subsisting together with the cause of its own subsistence, then God too, being self-produced, must subsist together with the cause of his own subsistence. But if this is absurd, it is absurd also to call God and the world self-produced and subsisting together with one another without interval. If God is self-produced in himself, and the world subsists together with him accidentally, how is it not false that “nothing has come to belong to God,” if indeed, when God was self-produced, the world subsisted together with him as self-produced? If what comes to belong to something by natural necessity comes to belong to it without its willing, how, if the world subsists together with God by natural necessity, does it not subsist together with him without his willing, accidentally? If being is the same as willing in God, clearly where God does not will, there he is not. How then, where he is not, does the world subsist together with him? For the world subsists together with him without his willing. If the unbegotten makes unbegotten things unbegottenly, clearly the uncompounded also makes uncompounded things in an uncompounded way. But if not the second, neither the first; for the world is composite. If God does not make gods in a divine way, how does the unbegotten make unbegotten things unbegottenly? For the unbegotten itself is not something other: the one exists, while the other is distinguished from begotten things. God exists as making; he makes; he is not separated. And if he also makes that from which he is separated, but accidentally and not in himself, how does nothing come to belong to God when he makes accidentally? If the world subsists together with God as the concave and the convex subsist together in a sphere, then they are causes of each other, God of the world and the world of God, just as those are. If no one makes by will what he would have made even without willing, how then did God make the world by will, when even without willing to make it he made it of necessity? If God is one in essence but infinite in power, and the things that subsist together with him are neither one in his essence nor infinite in his power, neither then do they subsist together with him. God is always perfect, always powerful; and in him there is nothing earlier and later, but in his works there are both. His works are composite; and every composite thing is composed of simple things, and it is impossible for the simple things to exist at the same time as the composite; for the simple things come first and the composite afterward. Just as God cannot be accused of weakness of power because he did not make several worlds, but having made one world ceased from making, so God cannot be accused of imperfection of power because he did not make the world at the same moment as he himself is, but when he willed. “Self-produced” differs in nothing from “self-originated.” But if God is self-produced and the world self-produced, both God and the world will be self-originated. If the world receives being all at once, as we see the curdling come upon the milk all at once, then the world is begotten and changeable from non-essence to essence; for “comes upon” shows coming into being. If God is self-produced and the world self-produced, the self-production of each will be the beginning of the existence of each. How then are God and the world without beginning and eternal, if they have their self-productions as the beginnings of their existence? “Self-produced” carries the sense of production of what is brought forth by itself. But since everything that is brought forth is brought forth either in its presence, by a removal from place to place, or in its essence, by a making that leads from non-existence to existence, and neither of these belongs to God, clearly the answerer did not rightly call him self-produced; for in what is wholly self-produced the self-produced differs in nothing from what is produced by another. If it is impossible for the unbegotten to be unmade, it is impossible for the world to be unbegotten and for God to be its maker. And if the world differs from God by being made, it necessarily differs also by being begotten; for the world is made and God is unmade. If what subsists together with the unbegotten by natural necessity is unmade, how is it not false that “God made a made world,” when according to him it is unmade and unbegotten? … necessarily it is also self-made. “Self-produced” differs in nothing from “self-begotten” and “self-made.” But if both God and the world are self-produced, they will be self-begotten and self-made. But if this is absurd, it is absurd also to call the God who is without beginning and eternal self-produced, and the made world unbegotten and self-produced. If the world is self-produced, it is not produced by God; and if it is not produced by God, then God did not bring it forth. How then is the answerer not saying false and incompatible things when he says that God brings forth, while the world is self-produced? “Much more, then,” he says, “must we suppose that God makes all things all at once and without time, being himself one, but by the infinity of his power bringing forth different things, which themselves are wholly self-produced.” And if “makes” is equivalent to “will make,” how does one who removes “will make” from God as carrying the sense of future time now apply “makes” to him, which carries the same sense of time? And if “makes,” besides the sense of the future, also carries the sense of the past, how are not all the parts of time present in God's working?

[Christian question 4] If it is impossible for what formerly was not but later is to be co-eternal with what always is, how, if the world is begotten, is it co-eternal with God?

[Greek answer] That it is impossible for what is temporal (for this is what “formerly not being but later being” means) to be eternal and co-eternal with what always is, is clear; and that from this argument too the world is shown to be unbegotten is surely clear to everyone. But if someone should wish to say that some of the ancients call the world begotten: if people examined their words superficially, they would justly blame those who say this; but if they considered accurately the depth of what was said, they would find these men declaring accurately and clearly that the world is unbegotten. For when they say that the exemplary cause and the efficient cause are unbegotten, they clearly declare that the world too, being their product, is unbegotten. For the ancients have demonstrated that what are called relatives exist simultaneously by nature. Since, then, the image is relative to the exemplar and the exemplar to the image, and the product to the craftsman and the craftsman to the product, they will exist simultaneously by nature. If, then, the craftsman is unbegotten and the exemplar unbegotten, so is the world, being the image of the exemplar and the product of the craftsman. That relatives exist simultaneously by nature has been clearly demonstrated and agreed by all, and it is easy to see at once; for right and left are relatives. Just as there cannot be a right if there is no left, nor a left apart from the right, so there cannot be a craftsman without the product, or the product without the craftsman. If, then, the craftsman is unbegotten, the product too is unbegotten. And if someone should wish to say that the craftsman existed first and the product came into being later, he will fall into another absurdity. For he will be found saying that the craftsman is a craftsman in potency and not in act, which is nothing other than calling God imperfect; and besides, the product will nonetheless subsist together with the craftsman, being in potency as the craftsman is, since relatives everywhere subsist on equal terms. If, then, the craftsman is in potency, the product is in potency; if the craftsman is in act and perfect, the product is likewise. So it is clear to everyone that the product subsists together with the craftsman insofar as he is a craftsman.

[Christian rebuttal] Refutation of the answer, which was not rightly given.

[1] As though he had shown in his other answers that the world is unbegotten, the answerer promises in the present answer also to show that the world is unbegotten. Yet in his other answers he neither established the unbegottenness of the world from what is evident and known about the world, nor laid it down by demonstration, but only declared what seemed good to him on his own authority. Coming to this present answer, in which he tries to show that the world is unbegotten, he first mentions the ancients who said that the world is begotten; and these he called worthy of just blame for saying that the world is begotten, unless by their other statements they had overturned their own statements that the world is begotten. But this does not free them from just blame; rather it makes them deserving of great and just blame, to lay down both the affirmation and the denial about the coming into being of the world, and to fight against oneself with one's own words. Let this be said to show that the answerer had no right to use mutually conflicting statements as a demonstration establishing that the world is unbegotten. Let us now examine the statements of those ancients in which, as the answerer says, they declare demonstrably that the world is unbegotten.

[2] “And that from this argument too,” he says, “the world is shown to be unbegotten is surely clear to everyone. … the world begotten: if people attend superficially to the words, they would justly blame those who say this; but if they understood the depth, they would find these men accurately and clearly declaring the world unbegotten. For when they say that the exemplary cause and the efficient cause are unbegotten, they clearly declare that the world too, being their product, is unbegotten.” If the ancients have laid down that the world is begotten, and what is laid down remains unchanged when it is understood superficially but turns into its opposite when it is understood deeply, why did the answerer not apply the same kinds of attention, the superficial and then the deep, to the exemplary and efficient cause laid down by the ancients, turning it into its opposite, just as he turned the begotten world laid down by the ancients into an unbegotten one? But if it is absurd to do this, one must understand the words of the ancients by the natures of the things, and not change what is laid down into its opposite by different kinds of attention. The exemplar is one thing and what is made according to the exemplar another; for the exemplar is simple, and what is made according to the exemplar composite. What is thus one thing and another is necessarily at one time and another; and what is at one time and another, earlier and later, cannot be simultaneous by nature; therefore the exemplar and what is made according to the exemplar are not simultaneous by nature. The answerer sometimes calls the world the common product of the exemplary cause and the efficient cause, saying, “Clearly the world too, being their product”; and sometimes the product of the efficient cause and the image of the exemplary cause. From this it is clear that the world is not relative to the craftsman insofar as it is an image, nor to the exemplar insofar as it is a product. But if this is so, it is not true that the world is the product of both. If the craftsman crafts the world by means of the exemplar, he crafts it by willing; but if he crafts it by his being, the exemplar is superfluous, since God's being suffices to make what is made, and it sets aside the will. For things that would have come into being even if the maker did not will them are not objects of will; such is the work of those who make by their being. God himself is unbegotten; but he begot the exemplar from his own thought, and he crafted the world from matter according to the exemplar. But if, according to the answerer, the world is unbegotten because it is the product of the unbegotten craftsman, then the exemplar too will be unbegotten, since it is the offspring of the unbegotten. But if it is absurd to call the offspring unbegotten, it is absurd also to call what is begotten unbegotten. If, because the craftsman is unbegotten, the product too must be unbegotten, clearly in the same way the product must be uncrafted, since the craftsman is uncrafted. But if this is absurd, it is absurd also … the unbegotten … into the begotten. “Crafted” and “begotten” differ only in word, but in fact they do not differ; hence they convert with one another universally, because they are equal. For if something is begotten, it is necessarily crafted; and if it is crafted, it is necessarily begotten. But since it is impossible for the world to be both unbegotten and begotten (for in every case either the affirmation or the denial is true), how then can the world be called unbegotten? How can something be both crafted and unbegotten? The same thing existing in one thing and in another is necessarily at one time and at another. For example, the exemplar is in God and in matter: in God it is unmade, but in matter it is made; and in God it is not a world but the exemplar of the world, while in matter it is a world. But if it is at one time and another, and in one way and another, it is necessarily earlier and later; and if earlier and later, clearly not co-eternal.

[3] “The ancients have demonstrated that what are called relatives exist simultaneously by nature. Since, then, the image is relative to the exemplar and the exemplar to the image, and the product to the craftsman and the craftsman to the product, such things exist simultaneously by nature. If, then, the craftsman and the exemplar are unbegotten, the world too is unbegotten, being the image of the exemplar and the product of the craftsman.” The same ancients by whom relatives were shown to be simultaneous by nature have also given the definition of an image: “An image,” they say, “is that whose coming into being is by imitation.” But if, according to the answerer, the world is unbegotten, clearly the world has lost the name of image, both the name and the thing; for in unbegottenness the world cannot keep the definition of an image. Whoever calls the product unbegotten because its craftsman is unbegotten ought also to call the product uncrafted, because the craftsman is uncrafted; for these follow one another necessarily, “uncrafted” following “unbegotten” and “unbegotten” following “uncrafted.” But if this is absurd, it is absurd also to call the product unbegotten. If relatives are simultaneous by nature, and for this reason the product must be co-unbegotten with the craftsman, as the answerer thinks, then in the same way one must call what is begotten co-unbegotten with the unbegotten; for these too are relatives, the unbegotten being relative to the begotten and the begotten to the unbegotten. But if, while the begotten does not exist, the unbegotten is unbegotten in potency, and when the begotten exists the unbegotten is unbegotten in act, then one must understand the craftsman, the product, the exemplar, and the image in the same way; and no absurdity follows. For the nature that relation has in the case of the craftsman and the product, it has also in the case of the begotten and the unbegotten. “First” and “later” too are relatives; for the later is relative to the first, and the first to the later; and they are simultaneous by nature either in potency or in act. … For God is first and what is begotten is later; and if, according to the answerer, the product is co-unbegotten with the unbegotten craftsman because it is a relative and simultaneous by nature, then in the same way what is begotten will be co-unbegotten with the unbegotten God, because the earlier and the later are relatives and simultaneous by nature. But if, unless they are now in potency and now in act, it is impossible for the first and the later to be simultaneous by nature, then neither is the product co-eternal with the craftsman, nor the image with the exemplar.

[4] “That relatives exist simultaneously by nature has been clearly demonstrated and agreed by all, and it is easy to see at once. For right and left are relatives. Just as there cannot be a right if there is no left, nor a left apart from the right, so there cannot be a craftsman without the product … the craftsman is unbegotten, the product too is unbegotten.” If, just as right and left exist in the same essence, in the whole and its part, relative to each other, so the craftsman and the product existed in the same essence, in the whole and its part, relative to each other, the example by which the answerer tried to show that the product is co-unbegotten with the craftsman would have had a place. But since right and left are in the same essence, in the whole and its part, relative to each other, while the craftsman and the product are not of this kind, clearly the answerer used an inappropriate example, one with no analogy, in the nature of the thing, to what it was meant to illustrate. Of relatives, some are called what they are called of one another: for example, the father is called father of the son, and the son is called son of the father. Others are not called what they are called of one another, like the straight and the curved, for which it is common that one of them is sometimes called what it is called in potency and sometimes in act. Others are both always either in potency or in act, like the concave and the convex; others always in act, like up and down. Since these are the divisions of relatives, when we wish to solve a difficulty in some question by means of relation, we must first learn to which division of relatives the thing in question belongs, and then, according to the nature of that division, construct the analogy that the example has to what it illustrates; otherwise the example will be found inappropriate and the difficulty unsolved. The craftsman and the product belong to the relatives that are called what they are called of one another (for the product is the craftsman's, and the craftsman is the product's). But the answerer, wishing to show by an example that the begotten is co-unbegotten with the unbegotten, failed to notice that he used for this purpose a relation not among those called of one another (for the right is not called the right of the left, nor the left the left of the right). Clearly, then, he used an example inappropriate to the nature of what was to be shown, one that has no analogy to what it illustrates by which the question could be solved.

[5] “And if someone should wish to say that the craftsman existed first and the product came into being later, he will fall into another absurdity. For he will be found saying that the craftsman is a craftsman in potency and not in act (which is nothing other than calling God imperfect); and besides, the product will nonetheless subsist together with the craftsman, being in potency as the craftsman is, since relatives everywhere subsist on equal terms. If, then, the craftsman is in potency, the product is in potency; if the craftsman is in act and perfect, the product is likewise. So it is clear to everyone that the product subsists together with the craftsman insofar as he is a craftsman.” God has the same relation, as a relative, to the product as craftsman, as he has to what is begotten as unbegotten, or to later things as first; and there is nothing imperfect in him, either in his unbegottenness or in his being first (for there is no way to say that God is imperfectly unbegotten or imperfectly first because he was once both, unbegotten and first, in potency). How, then, can it be said that God is imperfect because he was earlier a craftsman in potency? But if, because he is first a craftsman in potency and later in act, he is accused of imperfection, then necessarily also, because he is first unbegotten and first in potency and later in act, he must be accused of imperfection. But if it is absurd to accuse God of imperfection in his unbegottenness and his being first, it is absurd also to accuse him of imperfection in his creative power because he did not make the world at the same moment as his own being, but later, when he willed. For it is not possible that one who is imperfect in one relation should not be likewise imperfect in all the other relations.

[Christian question 5] If the heaven is unbegotten and God is unbegotten, and God dwells in heaven, how is God not insulted by dwelling in what is not his? For the heaven that he did not make is not his.

[Greek answer] That God is unbegotten and the heaven unbegotten is clear both from what has just been said in passing and from what has been nobly demonstrated by many. But that it is not reasonable to say that God dwells in heaven, let us consider as follows. First, what is dwelt in exists for the preservation of what dwells in it. So if the world is a dwelling and God the dweller, clearly the world preserves God and God is preserved by the world, which is the most absurd of all things. Besides, the stronger contains the weaker, and the weaker is contained by the stronger. But what dwells is contained by the dwelling; so the dwelling will contain God; or by this argument God will be in the worse position … Besides, what is contained is in a place; and what is in a place is a body; so God too, if he is in a place, will be a body. How then will he, being a body, hold together the greater body, insofar as he is contained by it? It is absurd … That what dwells is contained in a place, in a house, is surely clear even to one who is blind. What then, you might say: how does Homer call the heaven the dwelling of God? Perhaps because, having observed a certain shining forth of God everywhere around the world, he called the world the dwelling of God, as being the receptacle of all God's making and creation; and they name the heaven especially, because the heaven is held by all to be the highest part of the whole world.

[Christian rebuttal] Refutation of the answer, which was not rightly given.

[1] To say that God is a craftsman but the world uncrafted (for “uncrafted” is equivalent to “unbegotten,” and equivalents may be substituted without hindrance); and to say that the uncrafted makes uncrafted things in an uncrafted way, which is the same as saying that the unbegotten God makes unbegotten things unbegottenly; and to say that God is eternal and the world co-eternal, yet that God and the world are brought from non-existence into existence as self-produced (for “self-produced,” said of God and of the world, has this meaning); and to say that the world is self-produced and yet guarded by another (for “guarded by God” means “guarded by another,” since the world is one thing and God who guards the world another, whereas, being self-produced, it ought necessarily to be self-guarded as well); and to say that God and the world are unbegotten and self-begotten (for “self-produced,” said of God and of the world, signifies “self-begotten”); and to say “God, having made the things here,” and again that he did not make them (for “he made” is temporal, and so is “having made”); and to say that the world subsists eternally together with God without interval, though it received its existence from the craftsman by begetting, through the composition of matter and form; and to say that the world is imperishable and perishable, imperishable by its being and perishable by being guarded; and to say that the world comes into being, while what is begotten is temporal; and to say that the world is the receptacle of God's making and creation, and that God is not the Creator of perishable things (for, according to the answerer, God makes nothing temporal, while all begotten and temporal things, according to him, are always perishable): these and such things are not the sayings of men who, from a knowledge of the nature of things, demonstrate by sound demonstration what concerns God and the world, but of reckless men, who shamelessly declare whatever seems good to them about God and the world.

[2] To disparage the expression about God's dwelling in heaven as unfitting for God belongs to people who hold the absurd notion of what is said; for an ill-sounding expression has an ill-sounding sense. But we did not set down in the question the manner of God's dwelling in heaven, which the answerer disparaged, but this: “If the heaven is unbegotten, it is not God's; and those who say that God dwells in it say so to the insult of God, as dwelling in a heaven that is not his own.” We call the heaven God's house and throne, not because God needs it for a dwelling or for a seat, since he is wholly uncircumscribed and without need, but so that we may not look at the greatness of its subsistence and the imperishability of its essence and suppose it to be God, or equal in honor to God. For this reason we call it the house and throne of God, separating it by these names from all communion with God in essence and in the titles that belong to his essence. For as a house and a throne are later than the one who made them, so the heaven is later than God, as the begotten is later than the unbegotten. And if we call the heaven imperishable now, we do not call it imperishable in the same sense as God. For God has his imperishability uncreatedly, from his own essence, and eternally; but the heaven has its imperishability in a created way, from the will of God, for the needs of the things here; and when that need is fulfilled, it is transferred to another mode of imperishability. For God, who gave it the magnitude of its body as great as he willed and not as great as he could (for he could have made it far greater in magnitude than it is), has now himself ordained it to remain in imperishability within its proper limit, until the time of the transformation of all things for the better, according to the faith of the orthodox, who have known God from the teaching of the God who made himself known to them, and according to the testimony of the answerer.

[1] Nature, which makes natural things, unless it comes into being by design from one who does not make according to nature, neither exists nor makes.

[2] That not every begotten and perishable thing without qualification has in its coming into being the fourfold time, beginning and growth, prime and decline, but only what comes into being by nature or by art.

[3] If God is called by our names (if he is called anything at all), it is not necessary that everything that follows from our name should follow for God together with the name. God is called both truth and good; and to truth falsehood is opposed, and to the good evil; but to God nothing is opposed. Not understanding this, Plato laid down something opposed to God, an evil that is necessary and eternal.

[4] There is nothing that exists that is not a particular something; for example, there is no body that is not this particular body. But if matter does not have being a particular thing, neither does it have being; for being a particular thing is inseparable from being.

[5] Nature and art make what they make from essences. For example, nature makes the human being from seed and seed from the human being; and the seed and the human being are essences. Likewise the arts make a statue from bronze and a house from bricks; and the bronze and the bricks are essences. Since, then, matter is not an essence, who will be the one who made from it the things that have come into being from it, since nature and art cannot make anything except from essences?

[6] If, as Aristotle says, there is a body that is neither heavy nor light, neither one of the four elements nor composed of the four elements, then clearly, if this is true, there will be a body that is neither hot nor cold, neither by nature nor by being acted upon; for what is hot or cold by nature or by being acted upon is either one of the four elements or composed of the four elements. And if there is no body that is neither hot nor cold, either by nature or by being acted upon, neither then is there a body that is neither heavy nor light, neither one of the four elements nor composed of the four elements. How then do you say that the ether is hot because of the motion of the heavenly body and of the bodies that move in it? For bodies that heat by their motions are themselves heated before the things heated by them. But if it is heated, clearly it is heated by being acted upon; and if by being acted upon, clearly also by alteration; and if by alteration, clearly also by change; and if by change, clearly it changes from a contrary to a contrary. The contrary of hot is cold; so it changes from cold to hot. But since there is no body that changes from cold to hot by being acted upon and is neither one of the four elements nor composed of the four elements, the heavenly body is not another element besides the four elements; for it is heated by being acted upon, changing from cold to hot.

[7] If bodies heated by motion are heated more by more motion, how is it that the sun, if according to Aristotle it is a body hot not by nature but by motion, is neither heated more nor heats more by more motion, but always has an equal heat with an unequal motion?

[8] If, according to Aristotle, the definition of essence is that which is receptive of contraries in turn, how does the same Aristotle say again that matter is not an essence, though it is receptive of contraries in turn, namely of privation and possession? If what is deprived of being a particular thing is in this way deprived of being as well, how does Aristotle say that it is impossible for anything to come into being from what in no way is, when matter, according to him, is deprived of both, of being and of being a particular thing?

[9] If nothing comes into being from what in no way is, clearly something comes into being from what is. But since matter is this, how does Aristotle speak truly when he says that matter is not being?

[10] If matter is not altered, it is not possible for anything to come into being from it. But if everything that is altered is altered from this to that, and matter is not a this, then it is not altered; and so nothing comes into being from it.

[11] If change does not take place from any chance thing to any chance thing, but to the contrary within the same genus (for example, in quality change does not take place from white to large, but to black), in respect of what, then, does matter change in the coming into being of the essences that arise from it, when it has nothing that can be changed?

[12] If, as the animal is in animate things and color in colored things, so matter is in material things, how is it that when animate things are destroyed the animal is destroyed with them, and when colored things are destroyed the color is destroyed, but when material things are destroyed matter is not destroyed? And if matter is destroyed together with material things, how does matter exist before material things?

[13] If abstaining from and participating in belong to things that are, clearly what in no way is neither abstains from anything nor participates in anything. How then does matter participate in privation, if it is not among the things that are?

[14] If it is impossible for the same thing in the same respect to be moved with both motions, that according to nature and that contrary to nature, how is the sun moved according to nature from east to west, but contrary to nature from west to east because of its sphere? For the same thing in the same respect cannot be moved by contrary motions according to nature.

[15] If the sun did not exist, the eye would be superfluous; and if the eye did not exist, the sun would be superfluous. But since each is necessary because of the other, each is therefore originated. For what is unoriginated is unoriginated because of nothing, but only because of itself; or rather, not even because of itself, for the uncaused is uncaused.

[16] … to come into being by cause but not by time, how … but not by time?

[17] … not from something eternal, but having its being from the circuit of many days?

[18] If the year is originated, how are the things in the year unoriginated?