To the Greeks, on Common Notions

To the Greeks, from Common Notions

If the name "God" were indicative of persons, then in speaking of three persons we would of necessity speak of three gods. But if "God" is a name signifying essence, then, confessing one essence of the Holy Trinity, we fittingly glorify one God, since "God" is the one name of one essence. Therefore, consistently with both the essence and the name, God is one, not three. For we do not say "God and God and God," as we say "Father and Son and Holy Spirit," joining the conjunction "and" to the names that signify the persons, because the persons are not the same, but rather of different kinds and differing from one another according to the meaning of their names. But to the name "God," which is indicative of the essence from some property belonging to it, we do not join the conjunction "and," so as to say "God and God and God," since the essence of the persons is the same, and it is this that the name "God" signifies; therefore God too is the same. And the same is never joined by "and" to a further indication of the same.

If we say "the Father God, and the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God," or "God the Father, and God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit," we join the conjunction "and" in sense to the names of the persons. For example, "to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit," so that it is "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," that is, person and person and person; therefore also three persons. But the name "God" is predicated absolutely and in the same way of each of the persons without the conjunction "and," so that we cannot say "God and God and God"; but we understand the name as spoken a third time in sound because of the underlying persons, but put forward in the second and third utterance without the conjunction "and," because God is not one and another.

For it is not in so far as the Father preserves his otherness toward the Son that the Father is God. For in that case the Son would not be God. For if the Father is God because the Father is Father, then, since the Son is not Father, the Son is not God. But if the Son is God, it is not because he is Son. Likewise the Father too is God not because he is Father, but because he is such an essence, by which [the Father] is one, and the Son God. And for the same reason by which the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. And since the essence is not divided in each of the persons, so as to make three essences according to the persons, it is plain that neither will the name that signifies the essence be divided, that is "God," into being three gods. But as the Father is essence, the Son essence, the Holy Spirit essence, and they are not three essences, so too the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Spirit God, and they are not three gods. For God is one and the same, since the essence too is one and the same, even if each of the persons is said to be both essential (ἐνούσιος) and God. For otherwise we would have to say three essences of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, because each of the persons is essence; which is unreasonable. For neither do we call Peter and Paul and Barnabas three essences; but, speaking of one and one essence of which the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are, we consistently say one God, even if we believe each of the persons to be both essential and God.

For as, because the Father differs from the Son and the Holy Spirit, we say three persons, so, since they do not differ in essence, but there is in it an identity of the persons, there will surely be identity also according to the name "God." For this name is indicative of the essence, not presenting what it is (since it is incomprehensible), but, taken from some property belonging to it, indicating it. For it is a property of the eternal essence, whose are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, to oversee and behold and know all things, even hidden things. The name "God," taken from this and spoken properly, signifies that essence.

Since, then, such an essence is one, and the name that indicates it is one (I mean "God"), God will properly be one, consistently with the account of the essence, since "God" indicates not a person but the essence. For if "God" indicated a person, only one of the persons would be called God, the one signified by such a name, just as only the Father is called "Father," because the name is indicative of a person.

If someone should say that we call Peter and Paul and Barnabas three essences, partial essences clearly, that is, particular ones (for this is the most proper way to put it), [we answer] that when we speak of a partial, that is particular, essence we wish to signify nothing else than an individual, which is a person. And "God" does not follow upon persons, as has been shown. What, then, must be said to this, that we call Peter and Paul and Barnabas three men? Not as though they were persons; for persons are not signified by the name that signifies the common essence. Nor is what is called the partial or particular essence the same as the person. Why, then, do we say three men, when they are of one essence, of which "man" is indicative? [We utter it] neither because of the persons nor because of their being called a partial or particular essence; we say this: that we say it by misuse and not properly, because of a certain habit which has prevailed from necessary causes, causes not seen in the Holy Trinity.

These are they. The definition of man is not always seen in the same individuals, that is, persons. For when the earlier ones die, others come into being in their place; and again, often while the same remain, others are added; so that it is seen now in these, now in those, and now in more, now in fewer. And because of the taking away, that is, the departure from life, and the birth of the individuals in whom the definition of man is seen, we are compelled to say "many men" and "few," the common usage being driven by the change and alteration of the persons even beyond the very account of the essence, so as in a way to number essences too along with the persons.

But in the Holy Trinity nothing of the kind ever happens, because the same persons, and not others and others, are spoken of, being always the same and in the same state; it admits no addition to make a four, nor diminution to a two. For no one is begotten or proceeds from the Father or from one of the persons, so that the Trinity should ever become a four; nor does one of these three persons ever die, so that the Trinity should become a two. Since no addition or diminution, change or alteration, ever happens to the three persons, it is absurd to say three gods in addition to the three persons.

Again, all the persons of man do not have their being directly from the same person; some are from this one, others from that one, [so that the persons come to be] many and different, the causes too [being many] besides the things caused. But in the Holy Trinity it is not so. For the person of the Father is one and the same, from whom the Son is begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeds. Therefore we properly say that the one who is the one cause of those caused by him is one God, since he also coexists with them. For the persons of the Godhead are not divided from one another by time, nor by place, nor by will, nor by occupation, nor by activity, nor by any passion of the kind seen among men; except only that the Father is Father and not Son, the Son is Son and not Father, and likewise the Holy Spirit is neither Father nor Son. Therefore no necessity compels us to call the three persons three gods, as among us we call the many persons "many men" for the causes stated; and it is not according to reason necessary [to say so, since] it is not possible for the same thing, according to the same respect, to be one and many. Peter and Paul and Barnabas are, according to "man," one man, and according to this same thing, according to "man," they cannot be many. They are called "many men" by misuse and not properly; and what is said by misuse would not be preferred by the right-minded to what is said properly. Therefore one must not say of the three persons of the divine essence that they are three gods according to "God"; but God is one and the same, because of the identity of the essence of which "God" is significant, as we have said.

If someone should say, "And how does Scripture number three men in addition?", let him see that Scripture, handing down the Son and the Holy Spirit as God, and God the Word, and God who is not the Word, that is, God the Father, and God the Holy Spirit: handing down [each as] God, it wholly declines to say three gods, holding polytheism to be impiety, and proclaiming one God throughout, neither confusing the persons nor dividing the Godhead, but rather keeping the identity of the Godhead in the properties of the hypostases, or as of three persons. But if the one who says such things wishes to learn the truth, let him know that Scripture says "three [men]," although it [knows] all together as one man, according to "Man, his days are as grass," like a good nurse who reckons men as her own infants, and sometimes lisps along with them, using some of the names as they do, not failing to know what is perfect. For the same Scripture, saying that God has ears and eyes and the other parts of a body, does not hand down such a thing as doctrine, defining the Divine as composite; but in the manner described, by transferring our own things, for the lifting up of those who cannot advance directly to things bodiless, it sets out the doctrines, saying that God is Spirit, and teaching us his simplicity and uncircumscribed character, that he is present wherever anyone goes. So too it says "three men" because of habit, so that what is common and in use among the many may not seem strange; and it says "one" [by nature], so as not to shake what is perfect and is seen in the nature of things. The former we regard as a condescension for the use and benefit of those [who hear]; the latter we define as doctrine, set out for the confirmation and handing down of what is perfect.

But again some say that, as we say "hypostasis does not differ from hypostasis in so far as it is hypostasis," and yet not for this reason are all the hypostases one hypostasis; and as "essence does not differ from essence," and yet not for this reason are all the essences one essence; so we might say, "God does not differ from God," and yet not for this reason are the three hypostases, of which "God" is predicated, one God. And again, in saying "man does not differ from man," we do not do away with Peter and Paul and Barnabas being three men. For essence differs from essence, not in so far as it is essence, but in so far as it is such an essence; and hypostasis from hypostasis, in so far as it is such a hypostasis; and man from man in so far as he is such a man. And again God from God in so far as he is such a God; and "such" or "such" is usually said of two or more.

That is what they say. But we shall show that the whole is a sophism, using what has been said itself, and showing that one must not say "such a God and such," or "such a man and such," but rather "such a hypostasis of God and such," "such a hypostasis of man." For we rightly speak of many hypostases of the one man and three hypostases of the one God. What is called "such" wishes to distinguish one thing from another which shares with it in that name to which "such" is added: for example, we call man "such a living being," wishing to distinguish him from a horse, say, which shares with him the name "living being" but differs by rationality and irrationality. And one thing is distinguished from another either by essence, or by hypostasis, or by essence and hypostasis: by essence, man is distinguished from horse; by hypostasis, Paul from Peter; by essence and hypostasis, this hypostasis of man from that hypostasis of horse.

When the account is made plain of things that differ simply in essence, and of those that differ in hypostasis and not in essence, the account of those distinguished [in both] will also be evident. For that things differing in essence are called two or three essences, and things differing in hypostasis are likewise called two or three hypostases, both they and we agree. But we differ in this: they say that of Peter and Paul one must say "men"; we, that this is said not properly nor according to the scientific account. For no argument now [is drawn] from common and loose usage; for this has no force either for refuting anything or for establishing it.

Let it be made clear to us first, then, why we say that man and horse, or horse and dog, differ in so far as each is such an essence. Is it not plain that it is because they differ from one another in the things that usually separate essences, such as rational and irrational, neighing, barking, and the like? For in saying "such an essence," we say nothing else than an existence that shares in life, in contrast to one that does not; or an existence that is by nature able to reason, to distinguish it from one that differs by irrationality; or an existence that has neighing as its characteristic, and the like. For "such" is put before the essence instead of such differences and properties; or before every genus, to distinguish the species under it: "such a living being" instead of "rational" or "irrational."

And again we say, "Peter differs from Paul in so far as each of them is such a hypostasis," since they differ from one another in some of the things that by nature constitute a hypostasis and not an essence: such as baldness, tallness, sonship, and the like. [For] form and individual are not the same; that is, essence and hypostasis. For "hypostasis" at once leads the hearer's mind to look for a scar, grey eyes, father, son, and the like. And by form I mean essence, that is, for knowing, clearly, "rational mortal living being, receptive of mind and knowledge," or "irrational mortal living being, able to neigh," and such things. If essence and individual, which is hypostasis, are not the same, neither are the things that characterize the one and the other the same. And if [the things characterizing] this and that are not the same, neither can they be joined to the same names; but the one kind are joined to the names that belong to essence or are set for essences, the others to those said of the individual.

There are, then, three names about which the inquiry is: essence, individual, man. To essence we join and yoke "such," to distinguish, as I said, the species under it that differ from one another in essence. To hypostasis again we likewise yoke "such," to distinguish the persons that share with one another this name, that is, hypostasis, differing from one another not by the characteristics of essence but by what are called accidents. In what way, then, do they wish to join "such" to the name "man"? For what is disputed receives its solution from what is commonly agreed. [If] as to essence, then the things under it will be distinguished from one another by an essential difference; which is not so. For Paul does not differ in essence from Peter, of whom "man" is predicated; [but only] as to the hypostasis of the person. Then "man" would be indicative not of essence, which is absurd to say; for "man" signifies what is common to the essence, and not a particular person, Paul for example, or Barnabas. In no way, then, does "such" follow upon "man," according to the scientific account at least.

If common usage is at a loss in these matters and misuses the names of essence to indicate persons, it has nothing to do with the exact rule of logical science. [Who] is unaware of the habitual misuse in such things: that often, not having proper names at our disposal, we too misuse other names loosely to present what is meant? But let this be clear to us: that if we were saying of Peter and Paul, "Man does not differ from man in so far as he is man, but in so far as he is such a man," we could also say of them, "Essence does not differ from essence in so far as it is essence, but in so far as it is such an essence." But if this cannot be said, since the essence of Peter and Paul is the same, then neither can the other, since the name "man" is indicative of essence. And if it is not consistent to join "such" to the name "man," then neither do we properly say two or three men. And if this has been shown in the case of man, how much more properly will it fit in the case of the eternal and divine essence that each of the hypostases is not called "such a God" and "such," nor that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are uttered as "God and God and God," nor that three are taught as doctrine even in thought.

It has been established, then, by our just, consistent, and scientific account, that we say that the maker of all things is one God, even if he is seen in three persons or hypostases, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.