# Soliloquies - Author: [Augustine of Hippo](https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/authors/augustine-of-hippo/) - Latin title: *Soliloquiorum libri duo* - Date: 386–387 (probable) - Source: J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina, vol. 32 (Paris, 1841), cols. 869–904 (Benedictine text of the Maurists) (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Latina, digitized by Open Greek and Latin (patrologia_latina-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0) - Translation: Claude, from the original text, unless a passage says otherwise; each passage below gives the translator - Work page: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/ - Passages: 35 ## Soliloquies 1.1 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-1 - Source: PL 32:870–871 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason urges Augustine to write down what he finds, and he opens with a long prayer to God as the source of truth, wisdom, life and happiness, asking to be healed and to return to him. ### Latin text Volventi mihi multa ac varia mecum diu, ac per multos dies sedulo quaerenti memetipsum ac bo­ num meum, quidve mali evitandum esset; ait mihi subito, sive ego ipse, sive alius quis extrinsecus, sive intrinsecus, nescio: nam hoc ipsum est quod magno­ pere scire molior: ait ergo mihi, R.. Ecce, fac te invenisse aliquid; cui commendabis, ut pergas ad alia? A. Memoriæ scilicet. R. Tantane illa est ut excogitata omnia bene servet? A. Difficile est, imo non potest. R. Ergo scribendum est. Sed quid agis, quod valetudo tua scribendi laborem recusat? Nec ista dictari debent; nam solitudinem meram deside­ rant. A. Verum dicis. Itaque prorsus nescio quid agam. R. Ora salutem et auxilium quo ad concupita pervenias, et hoc ipsum litteris manda, ut prole tua fias animosior. Deinde quod invenis paucis conclu­ siunculis breviter collige. Nec modo cures invitatio­ nem turbæ legentium; paucis ista sat erunt civibus tuis. A. Ita faciam. Deus universitatis conditor, praesta mihi primum ut bene te rogem, deinde ut me agam dignum quem exaudias, postremo ut liberes. Deus per quem omnia, que per se non essent, tendunt esse. Deus qui ne id quidem quod se invicem perimit, perire permittis. Deus qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti, quem omnium oculi sentiunt pulcherrimum. Deus qui malum non facis, et facis esse ne pessimum flat. Deus qui pau­ cis ad id quod vere est refugientibus, ostendis malum nihil esse. Deus per quem universitas etiam cum si­ nistra parte perfecta est. Deus a quo dissonantia us­ que in extremum nulla est, cum deteriora melioribus coniciunt. Deus quem amat omne quod potest amare, sive sciens, sive nesciens. Deus in quo sunt omnia, cui tamen universæ creaturæ nec turpitudo turpis cst, nec malitia nocet, nec error errat. Deus qui nisi mun­ dos verum scire noluisti. Deus pater veritatis, pa­ ter sapicntiae, pater veræ summa'que vitæ, pater bea­ titudinis, pater boni ct pulchri, pater intelligibilis lucis, pater evigilationis atque illuminationis nostræ, piter pignoris quo admonemur redire ad te. Te invoco, Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae vera sunt omnia. Deus sapien­ tia, in quo et a quo et per quem sapiunt, quæ sapiunt omnia. Deus vera et summa vita, in quo et a quo et per quem vivunt, quæ vere summeque vivunt omnia. Deus beatitudo, in quo et a quo et per quem beata sunt, quæ beata suntomnia. Deus bonum et pulchrum, in quo et a quo et per quem bona et pulchra sunt, quæ bona et pulchra sunt omnia. Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo et a quo et perquem intelligibiliter lucent, quae in­ telligibiliter lucent omnia. Deus cujus regnum est totus mundus, quem sensus ignorat. Deus de cujus regno lex etiam in ista regna describitur. Deus a quo averti, cadere; in quem converti, resurgere; in quo manere, consistere est. Deus a quo exire, emori; in quem re­ dire, reviviscere; in quo habitare, vivere est. Deus quem nemo amittit, nisi deceptus; quem nemo quærit, nisi ad­ monitus; qucm nemo invenit, nisi purgatus. Deus quem rclinqucre, hoc cst quod perire; quem attendere, hoc est quod amare; quem videre, hoc est quod habere. Deus cui nos fides excitat, spes erigit, charitas jungit, Deus per quem vincimus inimicum, te deprecor. Deus per quem accepimus ne omnino periremus. Deus a quo admonemur ut vigilemus. Deus per quem a ma­ lis bona separamus. Deus per quem mala fugimus, et bona scquilnur. Deus per quem non cedimus ad­ versitatibus. Deus per quem bene servimus et bene dominamur. Deus per quem discimus aliena esse quæ aliquando nostra, et nostra esse quæ aliquando aliena putabamus. Deus per quem malorum escis atque illecebris non hæremus. Deus per quem nos res minutæ non minuunt. Deus per quem melius nostrum deteriori subjectum non est. Deus per quem mors absorbetur in victoriam ( I Cor. xv, 54). Deus qui nos convertis. Deus qui nos eo quod non est cxuis, et eo quod est induis. Deus qui nos exaudibiles facis. Deus qui nos munis. Deus qui nos in omnem veri­ tatem inducis. Deus qui nobis omnia bona loqucris, nec insanos facis, nec a quoquam fieri sinis. Deus qui nos revocas in viam. Deus qui nos deducis ad januam. Deus qui facis ut pulsantibus aperiatur (Matth. vn, 8). Deus qni nobis das panem vitae. DeuS per quem sitimus potum, quo hausto nunquam sitia­ mus ( Joan. VI, 55). Deus qni arguis sæculum de pec­ cato, de justitia, et de judicio. Deus per quem nos non movent qui minimc credunt. Deus per quem improbamus eorum errorem, qui animarum mcrita nulla esse apud te putant. Deus per quem non si rvimus infirmis et egenis elementis. Deus qui nos purgas, et ad divina praeparas præmia, adveni mihi propitius tu. A. Quidquid a me dictum est, unus Deus tu, tu veni mihi in auxilium; una æterna vera substantia, ubi nulla discrepantia, nulla confusio, nulla transitio, nulla indigentia, nulla mors. Ubi summa concordia, summa evidentia, summa constantia, summa pleni­ ludo, summa vita. Ubi nihil deest, nihil redundat. Ubi qui gignit, et quem gignit unum est. Deus cui serviunt omnia, quæ serviunt; cui obtemperat omnis bona anima. Cujus legibus rotantur poli, cursus suos sidera pcragunl, sol exercet diem, luna temperat no­ clem omnisque mundus per dies, vicissitudine lucis et noctis; per menses, incrementis decrementisque lunaribus; per annos, veris, æstatis, autumni et hie­ mis successionibus; per lustra, perfectione cursus so­ laris; per magnos orbes, recursu in ortus suos side­ rum, magnam rerum constantiam, quantum sensibilis materia patitur, tempornm ordinibus replicationibus­ que custodit. Deus cujus legibus in ævo stantibus, motus instabilis rerum mutabilium perturbatus esse non sinitur,frenisque circumeuntium sæculorum sem­ per ad similitudinem stabilitatis revocatur: cujus le­ gibus arbitrium animæ liberum est, bonisque præmia ut malis pœnæ, fixis per onmia necessitatibus distri­ butæ sunt. Deus a quo manant usque ad nos omnia bona, a quo coercentur a nobis omnia mala. Deus su­ pra quem nihil, extra quem nihil, sine quo nihil est. Deus sub quo totum est, in quo totum est, cum quo to­ tum est. Qui fecisti hominem ad imaginem et simili­ tudinem tuam, quod qui se ipse novit agnoscit. Exaudi, exaudi, exaudi me, Deus meus, Domine meus, rex meus, pater meus, causa mea, spes mea, res mea, honor meus, domus mea, patria mea, salus mea, lux mea, vita mea. Exaudi, cxaudi, exaudi me more illo tuo paucis notissimo. Jam te solum amo, te solum sequor, te solum quæro, tibi soli servire paratus sum, quia tu solus juste dominaris; tui juris esse cupio. Jube, quaeso, atque impera quidquid vis, sed sana et aperi aures meas, quibus voces tuas audiam. Sana et aperi oculos mcos, quibus nutus tuos videam. Expelle a me insa­ niam, ut recognoscam te. Dic mihi qua attendam, ut aspiciam te, et omnia me spero quae jusseris esse facturum. Recipe, oro, fugitivum tuum, Domine, cle­ mentissime pater: jamjam satis poenas dederim, satis inimicis tuis, quos sub pedibus habes, servierim, sa­ tis fuerim fallaciarum ludibrium. Accipe me ab istis fugientem famulum tuum, quia et isti me quando a te fugiebam acceperunt alienum. Ad te mihi redeundum esse sentio: pateat mihi pulsanti janua tua; quomodo ad te perveniatur doce me. Nihil aliud habeo quam voluntatem; nihil aliud scio nisi fluxa et caduca sper­ nenda essc; certa et æterna requirenda. Hoc facio, Pater, quia hoc solum novi; sod unde ad te pervenia­ tur ignoro. Tu mihi suggere, tu ostende, tu viaticum praebe. Si fide te inveniunt qui ad te rcfugiunt, fidem da; si virtute, virtutem; si scientia, scientiam. Auge in me fidem, auge spem, auge charitatem. 0 admi­ nuda et singularis bonitas tua! Ad te ambio, et quibus rebus ad te ambiatur, a te rursum peto. Tu enim si deseris, peritur: sed non deseris, quia tu es summum bonum, quod nemo recte quæsivit, et minime invenit. Omnis autem recte quae­ sivit, quem tu recte quaerere fecisti. Fac me, Pater, quærere te, vindica me ab errore; quærenti te mihi nihil aliud pro te occurrat. Si nihil aliud desidero quam te, inveniam te jam, quæso, Pater. Si autem est in me superflui alicujus appetitio, tu ipse me munda, et fac idoneum ad videndum te. Caeterum de salute hujus mortalis corporis mei, quamdiu nescio quid mihi ex eo utile sit, vel eis quos diligo, tibi illud com­ mitto, Pater sapientissime atque optime, et pro eo quod red tempus admonueris deprecabor: tantum oro excellentissimam clementiam tuam, ut me penitus ad te convertas, nihilque mihi repugnare facias tendenti ad te, jubcasque me dum hoc ipsum corpus ago atque porto, purum, magnanimum, justam, prudentemque esse, perfectumque amatorem perceptoremquc sa­ pientiae tuae, et dignum habitatione, atque habitatorem beatissimi regni tui. Amen, amen. ### English translation (Claude) As I had long been turning over many and various things with myself, and for many days had been earnestly seeking myself and my good, and what evil was to be avoided, suddenly someone spoke to me (whether I myself or someone else, outside me or within, I do not know; for that is the very thing I am striving hard to know). Someone, then, said to me: R. Look, suppose you have found something: to whom will you entrust it, so that you may go on to other things? A. To memory, of course. R. Is memory so great that it keeps safe everything you have thought out? A. That is difficult; indeed it cannot. R. Then it must be written down. But what will you do, since your health refuses the labor of writing? Nor should these things be dictated, for they require pure solitude. A. You speak the truth. So I do not know at all what to do. R. Pray for health and for help, by which you may reach what you desire, and commit this very prayer to writing, so that you may become more courageous through your offspring. Then gather up briefly, in a few short conclusions, what you find. And do not concern yourself now with attracting a crowd of readers; these things will be enough for a few of your fellow citizens. A. I will do so. O God, founder of the universe, grant me first that I may pray to you well, then that I may conduct myself so as to be worthy for you to hear me, and lastly that you set me free. God, through whom all things that would not exist of themselves strive to exist. God, who do not allow to perish even that which destroys itself in turn. God, who created out of nothing this world, which the eyes of all perceive to be most beautiful. God, who do not make evil, and who cause it to exist so that it may not become the worst. God, who show to the few who take refuge in that which truly is that evil is nothing. God, through whom the universe is perfect even with its sinister part. God, from whom there is no discord at all, even to the very last, since the worse things harmonize with the better. God, whom everything that can love loves, whether knowingly or unknowingly. God, in whom all things are, to whom nevertheless the shame of the whole creation is not shameful, nor its wickedness harmful, nor its error erring. God, who willed that none but the pure should know the truth. God, Father of truth, Father of wisdom, Father of true and supreme life, Father of happiness, Father of the good and the beautiful, Father of intelligible light, Father of our awakening and illumination, Father of the pledge by which we are admonished to return to you. I call upon you, O God the Truth, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are true that are true. God the Wisdom, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are wise that are wise. God the true and supreme Life, in whom and from whom and through whom all things live that truly and supremely live. God the Happiness, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are happy that are happy. God the Good and the Beautiful, in whom and from whom and through whom all things are good and beautiful that are good and beautiful. God the intelligible Light, in whom and from whom and through whom all things shine intelligibly that shine intelligibly. God, whose kingdom is the whole world, of which sense knows nothing. God, from whose kingdom law is written down even for these kingdoms. God, from whom to turn away is to fall, to whom to turn back is to rise again, in whom to remain is to stand firm. God, from whom to depart is to die, to whom to return is to come to life again, in whom to dwell is to live. God, whom no one loses unless deceived, whom no one seeks unless admonished, whom no one finds unless purified. God, whom to abandon is the same as to perish, to whom to attend is the same as to love, whom to see is the same as to possess. God, to whom faith rouses us, hope lifts us up, love joins us. God, through whom we conquer the enemy, you I entreat. God, through whom we have received that we should not perish altogether. God, by whom we are admonished to keep watch. God, through whom we separate good things from evil. God, through whom we flee evil and follow good. God, through whom we do not yield to adversities. God, through whom we serve well and rule well. God, through whom we learn that the things we once thought ours belong to others, and the things we once thought belonged to others are ours. God, through whom we do not cling to the baits and allurements of the wicked. God, through whom petty things do not make us petty. God, through whom our better part is not subjected to the worse. God, through whom “death is swallowed up in victory.” God, who convert us. God, who strip us of that which is not and clothe us with that which is. God, who make us fit to be heard. God, who fortify us. God, who lead us into all truth. God, who speak all good things to us, and neither make us mad nor allow us to be made so by anyone. God, who call us back into the way. God, who lead us to the door. God, who cause it to be opened to those who knock. God, who give us the bread of life. God, through whom we thirst for the drink which, once drunk, we shall never thirst. God, who convict the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment. God, through whom those who do not believe at all do not move us. God, through whom we reject the error of those who think that souls have no merits before you. God, through whom we are not slaves to the weak and beggarly elements. God, who cleanse us and prepare us for divine rewards: come to me graciously. Whatever I have said, you, the one God, you come to my help: one eternal, true substance, where there is no discord, no confusion, no passing away, no need, no death; where there is supreme concord, supreme clarity, supreme constancy, supreme fullness, supreme life; where nothing is lacking and nothing is in excess; where he who begets and he whom he begets are one. God, whom all things serve that serve, whom every good soul obeys. By whose laws the poles revolve, the stars run their courses, the sun drives the day, the moon tempers the night; and the whole world, through days by the alternation of light and night, through months by the waxing and waning of the moon, through years by the succession of spring, summer, autumn and winter, through lustra by the completion of the sun's course, through great cycles by the return of the stars to their risings, preserves a great constancy of things, as far as sensible matter permits, by the orders and recurrences of the times. God, by whose laws, standing fast forever, the unstable motion of changeable things is not allowed to fall into disorder, and is always recalled, by the reins of the revolving ages, to a likeness of stability; by whose laws the choice of the soul is free, and rewards to the good and punishments to the evil are distributed by necessities fixed throughout all things. God, from whom all good things flow down even to us, by whom all evil things are held off from us. God, above whom there is nothing, outside whom there is nothing, without whom there is nothing. God, under whom the whole is, in whom the whole is, with whom the whole is. You who made man to your image and likeness, which he who knows himself recognizes. Hear, hear, hear me, my God, my Lord, my King, my Father, my cause, my hope, my wealth, my honor, my home, my country, my salvation, my light, my life. Hear, hear, hear me in that way of yours known to very few. Now I love you alone, you alone I follow, you alone I seek, you alone I am ready to serve, because you alone rule justly; I desire to be under your authority. Command, I pray, and order whatever you will, but heal and open my ears, that with them I may hear your voice. Heal and open my eyes, that with them I may see your nod. Drive madness from me, that I may know you again. Tell me where I should look, that I may behold you, and I hope that I shall do all that you command. Receive, I beg, your fugitive, Lord, most merciful Father. Surely I have now paid penalty enough; enough have I served your enemies, whom you have under your feet; enough have I been the plaything of deceptions. Receive me, your servant, as I flee from them, for they too received me, a stranger, when I was fleeing from you. I feel that I must return to you: let your door be opened to me as I knock; teach me how one comes to you. I have nothing but will; I know nothing except that fleeting and perishing things are to be spurned, and sure and eternal things are to be sought. This I do, Father, because this alone I know; but how one comes to you I do not know. You suggest it to me, you show it, you provide provision for the journey. If it is by faith that those who take refuge in you find you, give faith; if by virtue, virtue; if by knowledge, knowledge. Increase faith in me, increase hope, increase love. O how wonderful and singular is your goodness! I aspire to you, and the very means by which one aspires to you I ask again from you. For if you abandon, one perishes; but you do not abandon, because you are the supreme good, whom no one has rightly sought and failed to find. And everyone has rightly sought whom you have made to seek rightly. Make me, Father, seek you; deliver me from error; as I seek you, let nothing else present itself to me in place of you. If I desire nothing other than you, let me find you now, I pray, Father. But if there is in me the desire of anything superfluous, cleanse me yourself and make me fit to see you. As for the health of this mortal body of mine, so long as I do not know what use it is to me or to those I love, I entrust it to you, most wise and best Father, and I will pray for it as you shall admonish me at the time. Only this I beg of your most excellent mercy: that you turn me wholly to yourself, allow nothing to resist me as I strive toward you, and command me, while I bear and carry this body, to be pure, magnanimous, just and prudent, a perfect lover and receiver of your wisdom, and worthy of dwelling in, and to be a dweller of, your most blessed kingdom. Amen, amen. ### Scripture references - 1 Cor 15:54: quotation, high confidence - John 16:13: allusion, high confidence - Matt 7:8: allusion, high confidence - John 6:35: allusion, medium confidence - John 4:14: allusion, medium confidence - John 16:8: quotation, high confidence - Gal 4:9: allusion, high confidence - Gen 1:26: allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - The dialogue is between Augustine (A.) and Reason (R.). Biblical echoes: 1 Cor 15:54; John 16:13; Matt 7:7–8; John 6:35; John 4:14; John 16:8; Gal 4:9; Gen 1:26 (Migne's text prints references to 1 Cor 15:54, Matt 7:8, and John 6:55). ‘Through lustra’: five-year periods. The digital text reads ‘quod red tempus admonueris’; translated by sense (‘as you shall admonish me at the time’). ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.1 (PL 32:870–871; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-1). ## Soliloquies 1.2 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-2 - Source: PL 32:871–873 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Augustine says he desires to know only God and the soul, and Reason presses him on what knowledge of God would satisfy him and on what he loves in his friends. ### Latin text A. Ecce oravi Deum. R. Quid ergo scire vis? A. Hæc ipsa omnia quæ oravi. R. Breviter ea collige. A. Deum et animam scire cupio. R. Nihilne plus? A. Nihil omnino. R. Ergo incipe quærere. Sed prius explica quomodo tibi si de­ monstretur Deus, possis dicere, Sat est. A. Nescio quomodo mihi demonstrari debeat, ut dicam, Sat est: non enim credo me scire aliquid sic, quomodo scire Deum desidero. R. Quid ergo agimus? Nonne censes prius tibi esse sciendum, quomodo tibi Deum scire sa­ tis sit, quo cum perveneris non amplius quæras? A. Censeo quidem; sed quo pacto fieri possit, non video, Quid enim Deo simile unquam intellexi, ut possim dicere, Quomodo hoc intelligo, sic volo intelligere Deum? R. Qui nondum Deum nosti, unde nosti nihil te nosse Dco simile? A. Quia si aliquid Deo simile scirem, sinc dubio id amarem; nunc autem nihil aliud amo quam Deum et animam. quorum neutrum scio. R. Non igitur amas amicos tuos? A. Quo pacto eos possum, amans animam, non amare? R. Hoc modo ergo ct pulices et cimices amas? A. Animam me amare dixi, non animalia. R. Aut homines non sunt amici tui, aut eos non amas: omnis enim homo est animal, et animalia te non amare dixisti. A. Et homines sunt, ct eos amo, non eo quod animalia, sed eo quod ho­ mines sunt; id est, ex eo quod rationales animas ha­ bent, quas amo eliam in latronibus. Licet cnim mihi in quovis amare rationem, cum illum jure oderim qui male utitur eo quod amo. Itaque tanto magis amo amicos meos, quanto magis bene utuntur anima ra­ lionali, vel certe quantum desiderant ea bcne uti. ### English translation (Claude) A. Look, I have prayed to God. R. What then do you want to know? A. All these very things for which I prayed. R. Gather them up briefly. A. I desire to know God and the soul. R. Nothing more? A. Nothing at all. R. Then begin to seek. But first explain how, if God were demonstrated to you, you could say, “It is enough.” A. I do not know how he should be demonstrated to me so that I say, “It is enough”; for I do not believe that I know anything in the way I desire to know God. R. What then shall we do? Do you not think you must first know how it would be enough for you to know God, so that when you reach that point you seek no further? A. I think so indeed; but how it can be done I do not see. For what have I ever understood that is like God, so that I could say, “As I understand this, so I wish to understand God”? R. You who do not yet know God, how do you know that you know nothing like God? A. Because if I knew anything like God, I would undoubtedly love it; but as it is I love nothing other than God and the soul, neither of which I know. R. Then you do not love your friends? A. How can I, loving the soul, not love them? R. In that way, then, do you love fleas and bugs too? A. I said I love the soul, not animals. R. Either your friends are not men, or you do not love them; for every man is an animal, and you said you do not love animals. A. They are men, and I love them, not because they are animals but because they are men, that is, because they have rational souls, which I love even in robbers. For I may love reason in anyone, even while I justly hate the one who uses badly what I love. So I love my friends the more, the better they use the rational soul, or at least the more they desire to use it well. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.2 (PL 32:871–873; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-2). ## Soliloquies 1.3 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-3 - Source: PL 32:873 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason and Augustine distinguish knowing by the senses from knowing by the intellect, using the examples of his friend Alypius, his dinner, and the course of the moon. ### Latin text R. Accipio istud: sed tamen si quis tibi di­ ceret, Faciam te sic Deum nosse, quomodo nosti Alypium; nonne gratias ageres, et diceres, Satis est? A. Agerem quidem gratias, sed satis esse non dicerem. R. Cur, quæso? A. Quia Deum ne sic qui­ dem novi quomodo Alypium, et tamen Alypium non salis novi. R. Vide ergo ne impudenter velis sa­ tis Deum nosse, qui Alypium non salis nosti. A. Non scquitur. Nam in comparatione siderum, quid est mea cOena vilius? et tamen cras quid sim coenaturus igno­ ro; quo autein signo luna futura sit, non impudenter me scire profiteor. R. Ergo vel ila Deum nosse tibi satis est, ut nosti quo cras signo luna cursura sit? A. Non est satis: nam hoc sensibus approbo. Ignoro autcm utrum vcl Deus vel aliqua naturæ occultacausa subito lunæ ordinem cursumque comtnutet: quod si acciderit, totum iliud quod praesumpseram, falsum erit. R. Et credis hoc fieri posse? A. Non credo. Sed ego quid sciam quæro, non quid credam. Omne autem quod scimus, recte fortasse etiam credere dicimur; at non omne quod credimus, etiam scire. R. Respuis igitur in hac causa omne testimonium sensuum? A. Prorsus respuo. R. Quid? illum familiarem tuum quem te adhuc ignorare dixisti, sensu vis nosse, an intel­ lectu? A. Sensu quidem quod in eo novi, si tamen sensu aliquid noscitur, et vile est, ct satis est: illam vero parlenl qua mihi amicus'est, id est ipsum ani­ mum, intellectu assequi cupio. R. Potestnealiter nosci? A. Nullo modo. R. Amicum igitur tuum et ve­ hementer familiarem, audes tibi dicere esse ignotum? A. Quidni audeam? Illam enim legem amicitiae justis­ simamesse arbitror, qua præscribitur ut sicut non minus, ita nec plus quisque amicum quam scipsum diligat. Itaque cum memetipsum ignorem, qua potest a me affici contumelia, quem mihi esse dixero igno­ tum, cum præsertim, ut credo, ne ipse quidem se no­ verit? R. Si ergo ista quæ scire vis, ex eo sunt genere quæ intellectus assequitur, cum dicerem impudenter te velle Deum scire, cum Alypium nescias, non de­ buisti mihi cocnam tuam ct lunam proferre pro simili, si hæc, ut dixisti, ad sensum pertinent. ### English translation (Claude) R. I accept that. But still, if someone said to you, “I will make you know God as you know Alypius,” would you not give thanks and say, “It is enough”? A. I would give thanks, but I would not say it was enough. R. Why, pray? A. Because I do not know God even as I know Alypius, and yet I do not know Alypius well enough. R. See then that you do not impudently wish to know God sufficiently, when you do not know Alypius sufficiently. A. It does not follow. For compared with the stars, what is cheaper than my dinner? And yet what I shall dine on tomorrow I do not know; but in what sign the moon will be, I profess without impudence that I know. R. Then is it enough for you to know God as you know in what sign the moon will run tomorrow? A. It is not enough; for this I verify by the senses. And I do not know whether either God or some hidden cause in nature might suddenly change the moon's order and course; if that happened, all that I had presumed would be false. R. And do you believe this can happen? A. I do not believe it. But I am asking what I know, not what I believe. Everything we know we are perhaps rightly said also to believe; but not everything we believe do we also know. R. Do you then reject in this matter all testimony of the senses? A. I reject it entirely. R. What then? That intimate friend of yours whom you said you still do not know: do you want to know him by sense or by intellect? A. What I know in him by sense, if indeed anything is known by sense, is both cheap and sufficient; but that part by which he is my friend, that is, his very mind, I desire to grasp by the intellect. R. Can it be known otherwise? A. In no way. R. Then you dare to say that your friend, and a very intimate one, is unknown to you? A. Why should I not dare? For I think that law of friendship most just which prescribes that one should love a friend neither less nor more than oneself. So, since I do not know myself, what insult can I do to one whom I say I do not know, especially since, as I believe, he does not know himself either? R. If then the things you wish to know are of the kind that the intellect grasps, when I said it was impudent of you to wish to know God when you do not know Alypius, you should not have offered me your dinner and the moon as a comparison, if these, as you said, belong to sense. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.3 (PL 32:873; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-3). ## Soliloquies 1.4 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-4 - Source: PL 32:873–875 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason uses the geometer's line and sphere to show that very different things can be known with equal certainty, and asks whether Augustine would be content to know God in that way. ### Latin text Sed quid ad nos? Nunc illud responde: si ei quæ de Deo dixerunt Plato et Plotinus vera sunt, sa­ lisne tibi est ita Deum scire, ut illi sciebant? A. Non continuo, si ea quæ dixerunt, vera sunt, etiam scisse illos ea necesse est. Nam multi copiose dicunt quæ nesciunt, ut cgo ipse omnia quae oravi, me dixi scire cupere, quod non cuperem si jam scirem: num igitur eo minus illa dicere potui? Dixi enim non quae intellectu comprehendi, sed quæ undecumque collecta memoriæ mandavi, et quibus accommodavi quantam potui fidcm: scire autem aliud est. R. Dic, quæso, scisne saltem in geometrica disciplina quid sit linea? A. Istud plane scio. R. Nec in ista professione vereris Academicos? A. Non omnino. Illi enim sapientem er­ rare noluerunt; ego autem sapiens non sum. Itaque adhuc non vereor earum rerum quas novi, sciendam profiteri. Quod si, ut cupio, pervenero ad sapientiam, faciam quod illa monuerit. R. Nihil renuo: sed, ut quærere coeperam, ita ut lineam nosti, nosti etiam pilam quam sphæram nominant? A. Novi. R. Æque utrumque nosti, an aliud alio magis aut minus? A. Æque prorsus. Nam in utroque nihil fallor. R. Quid hæc, sensibusne percepisti, an intellectu? A. Imo sensus in hoc negotio quasi navim sum expertus. Nam cum ipsi me ad locum quo tendebam pervexe­ rint, ubi eos dimisi, et jam velut in solo positus cœpi cogitatione ista volvere, diu mihi vestigia titubarunt. Quare citius mihi vidctur in terra posse navigari, quam geometricam sensibus percipi, quamvis primo discentes aliquantum adjuvare videantur. R. Ergo istarum rerum disciplinam, si qua tibi est, non dubi­ tas vocari scientiam? A. Non, si Stoici sinant, qui scientiam tribuunt nulli, nisi sapienti. Perceptionem sane istorum me habere non nego, quam etiam stul­ titiæ concedunt: sed nec istos Quidquam pertimesco. Prorsus hæc quæ interrogasti scientia teneo: perge modo; videam quorsum ista quæris. R. Ne propcra, otiosi sumus. Intentus tantum accipe, ne quid temere concedas. Gaudentem te studeo reddere de rebus qui­ bus nullum casum pertimescas, et quasi parvum ne­ gotium sit, præcipitare jubes? A. Ita Deus faxit, ut dicis. Itaque arbitrio tuo rogato, et objurgato gravius, si quidquam tale posthac. R. Ergo lineam in duas lineas per longum scindi, manifestum tibi est nullo modo posse? A. Ma­ nifestum. R. Quid, transversim? A. Quid, nisi infi­ nite secari posse? R. Quid, sphaeram ex una qualibet parte a medio, ne duos quidem pares circulos habere posse pariter lucet? A. Pariter omnino. R. Quid linea et sphæra? unumne aliquid tibi videntur esse, an quid­ qnam inter se differunt? A. Quis non videat differre plurimum? R. At si æque illud atque hoc nosti, et ta­ men inter se, ut fateris, plurimum differunt, cst ergo differentium rerum scientia indifferens? A. Quis enim negavit? R. Tu paulo ante. Nam cum te rogassem quomodo velis Deum nosse, ut possis dicere, Satis cst; respondisti te ideo nequire hoc explicare, quia nihil haberes perceptum, similiter atquc Deum cupis percipere, nihil enim te scire Deo simile. Quid crgo nunc? linea vel sphæra similes sunt? A. Quis hoc di­ xerit? R. Sed ego quaesiveram, non quid tale scires, sed quid scires sic, quomodo Deum scire desideras. Sic enim nosti lineam ut nosti sphæram, cum se non sic habeat linea ut se habet sphæra. Quamobrem re­ spondc utrum tibi salis sit sic Deum nosse, ut pilam illam geometricam nosti; hoc est, ita de Deo nihil, ut de illa, dubitare. ### English translation (Claude) But what is that to us? Now answer this: if what Plato and Plotinus said about God is true, is it enough for you to know God as they knew him? A. It does not follow that, if what they said is true, they must also have known it. For many speak copiously of what they do not know, as I myself said that I desired to know all the things I prayed for, which I would not desire if I already knew them; was I any less able to say them for that? For I said not what I had grasped by intellect but what I had gathered from every quarter and committed to memory, and to which I gave as much faith as I could; but knowing is something else. R. Tell me, please, do you at least know in the discipline of geometry what a line is? A. That I plainly know. R. And in professing this you do not fear the Academics? A. Not at all. For they would not have the wise man err; but I am not wise. So I do not yet fear to profess knowledge of the things I know. But if, as I desire, I come to wisdom, I will do what it advises. R. I do not object at all. But, as I had begun to ask, as you know a line, do you also know the ball which they call a sphere? A. I know it. R. Do you know both equally, or one more or less than the other? A. Exactly equally; for in neither am I deceived. R. These things, did you perceive them by the senses or by the intellect? A. Rather, in this business I have found the senses to be like a ship. For when they had carried me to the place I was heading for, where I dismissed them and, as if set on solid ground, began to turn these things over in thought, my footsteps long staggered. So it seems to me that one could sooner sail on land than perceive geometry by the senses, although they seem to help beginners somewhat. R. Then you do not hesitate to call the discipline of these things, if you have it, knowledge? A. No, if the Stoics allow it, who attribute knowledge to no one but the wise man. I do not deny that I have the perception of these things, which they grant even to folly; but I do not fear them at all either. I hold these things you asked about by knowledge: go on now; let me see where you are going with these questions. R. Do not hurry; we are at leisure. Only listen attentively, lest you grant anything rashly. I am trying to make you rejoice over things in which you need fear no mishap, and you bid me rush headlong, as though it were a small matter? A. May God bring it about as you say. So question me at your discretion, and rebuke me more severely if I do anything of the kind hereafter. R. Then is it clear to you that a line can in no way be split lengthwise into two lines? A. It is clear. R. What about crosswise? A. What else, but that it can be cut infinitely? R. And is it equally clear that a sphere, cut from the center on any one side you please, cannot have even two equal circles? A. Entirely equally. R. What about a line and a sphere: do they seem to you to be one thing, or do they differ at all from each other? A. Who does not see that they differ very greatly? R. But if you know this and that equally, and yet, as you admit, they differ greatly from each other, then there is an undifferentiated knowledge of different things? A. Who denied it? R. You, a little while ago. For when I asked how you wished to know God, so that you could say, “It is enough,” you answered that you could not explain this because you had perceived nothing in the way you desire to perceive God, for you knew nothing like God. What now, then? Are a line and a sphere alike? A. Who would say that? R. But I had asked not what you knew that was like him, but what you knew in the way you desire to know God. For you know a line as you know a sphere, though a line is not as a sphere is. Therefore answer whether it is enough for you to know God as you know that geometrical ball; that is, to doubt nothing about God, as you doubt nothing about it. ### Extrabiblical texts - Plotinus (Plotinus, Enneads): allusion, low confidence ### Translation notes - The Academics held that the wise man assents to nothing, so as never to err; the Stoics granted knowledge (scientia) only to the wise man and allowed mere ‘perception’ to the foolish. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.4 (PL 32:873–875; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-4). ## Soliloquies 1.5 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-5 - Source: PL 32:875 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Augustine protests that knowing God must differ from knowing geometry, and Reason answers that the certainty can be the same though the objects and the joy differ, as with seeing earth and sky. ### Latin text A. Quæso te, quamvis vehementer urgeas at­ que convincas, non audeo tamen dicere ita me velle Deum scire, ut haec scio. Non solum enim res, sed ipsa etiam scicntia mihi videtur esse dissimilis Primo, quia nec linea et pila tantum inter se differunt, ut ta­ men corum cognitionem una disciplina non contineat: nullus autem gcometres Deum se docere professus est. Deinde, si Dei et istarum rerum scientia par cs­ set, tantum gauderem quod ista novi, quantum me Deo cognito gavisurum esse præsumo. Nunc autem permultum hæc in illius comparatione contemno, ut nonnunquam vidcatur mihi si illum intellexero, et modo illo quo videri potest videro, haec omnia de mea notitia esse peritura: siquidem nunc prae illius amore jam vix mihi veniunt in mentem. R. Esto plus tc ac multo plus quam de istis Deo cognito gavisurum, re­ rum tamen non intellectus dissimilitudine: nisi forte alio visu terram, alio serenum coelum intueris, cum ta­ mcn multo plus illius quam hujus aspectus te permul­ cent. Oculi autem si non falluntur, credo te interro­ gatum utrum tibi tam certum sit terram te videre quam coelum, tam tibi certum esse respondere de­ here, quamvis non lam terrae quam caeli pulchritu­ dioc atque splendore læteris. A. Movet me, fateor, hæc similitudo, adducorque ut assentiar quantum in suo generc a coelo terram, tantum ab intelligibili Dei majestate spectamina illa disciplinarum vera et certa differre. ### English translation (Claude) A. I beg you: however vehemently you press and convince me, I still do not dare to say that I wish to know God as I know these things. For not only the objects but the knowledge itself seems to me unlike. First, because the line and the ball do not differ so much from each other that one discipline does not contain the knowledge of both; but no geometer has professed to teach God. Next, if the knowledge of God and of these things were equal, I would rejoice as much that I know these things as I presume I shall rejoice when God is known. But as it is, I despise these things so greatly in comparison with him that it sometimes seems to me that, if I understand him and see him in the way in which he can be seen, all these will perish from my awareness; since even now, for love of him, they scarcely come into my mind. R. Granted that you will rejoice more, and much more, when God is known than over these things, yet that will be because of a difference in the objects, not in the understanding; unless perhaps you look at the earth with one kind of sight and at the clear sky with another, though the sight of the sky delights you much more than that of the earth. But if the eyes are not deceived, I believe that if you were asked whether you are as certain that you see the earth as that you see the sky, you would have to answer that you are equally certain, although you do not delight in the beauty and splendor of the earth as much as in those of the sky. A. This comparison moves me, I confess, and I am led to agree that as the earth differs in its kind from the sky, so those true and certain objects of the disciplines differ from the intelligible majesty of God. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.5 (PL 32:875; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-5). ## Soliloquies 1.6 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-6 - Source: PL 32:875 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason compares knowing God to the sun lighting what the eye sees, and explains that the soul needs healthy eyes, looking and seeing, and that faith, hope and love are required for its healing. ### Latin text R. Bene moveris. Promittit enim ratio quæ te­ cum loquitur, ita se demonstraturam Deum tuæ menti, utoculis sol demonstratur. Nam mentis quasi sui sunt oculi sensus animæ; disciplinarum autem quaque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut videri possint, veluti terra est atque terrena om­ uia: Deus autem est ipse qui illustrat. Ego autem ra­ tio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus. Non cnim hoc est habere oculos quod aspicere; aut item hoc est aspicere quod videre. Ergo animæ tribus qui­ busdam rebus opus est ut oculos habeat quibus jam bene uti possit, ut aspiciat, ut videat. Oculi sani mens est ab omni labe corporis pura, id est, a cupiditati­ bus rerum mortalium jam remota atquc purgata: quod ei nihil aliud præstat quam fides primo. Quod cnim adhuc ei demonstrari non potest vitiis inquinatæ at­ que ægrotanti, quia videre nequit nisi sana, si non credat aliter se non esse visuram, non dal operam suæ sanitati. Sed quid, si credat quidcm ita se rem habere ut dicitur, atque ita sc, si videre potuerit, esse visuram, sanari se tamen posse desperet; nonne se prorsus abjicit atque contemnit, nec praeceptis medici obtemperat? A. Omnino ita est, presertim quia ea praecepta necesse est ut morbus dura sentiat. R. Ergo fidei spes adjicicnda est. A. Ita credo. R. Quid, si et credat ita se habere omnia, et se speret posse sanari, ipsam tamen quae promittitur lucem non amet, non desideret, suisque tenebris, quæ jam consuetudine jucundæ sunt, se arbitretur debere interim esse con­ tentam; nonne medicum illum nihilominus respuit? A. Prorsus ita est. R. Ergo tertia charitas necessaria cst. A. Nihil omnino tam necessarium. R. Sine tribus istis igitur anima nulla sanatur, ut possit Deum suum videre, id est intelligere. Cum ergo sanos habuerit oculos, quid restat? A. Ut aspiciat. R. Aspectus animae, ratio est: sed quia non sequitur ut omnis qui aspicit videat, aspectus rectus atque perfectus, id est quum visio sequitur, virtus vocatur; est enim virtus vel recta vel perfecta ratio. Sed et ipse aspectus quamvis jam sanos oculos convertere in lucem non potest, nisi tria illa perma­ neant: fides, qua credat ita se rem habere, ad quam convertendus aspectus est, ut visa faciat beatum; spes quo cum bene aspexerit, se visurum esse praesumat; charitas, qua videre perfruique desideret. Jam aspe­ rlum sequitur ipsa visio Dei, qui est finis aspectus; non quod jam non sit, sed quod nihil amplius habeat quo se intendat: et hæc est vere perfecta virtus, ra­ tio perveniens ad finem suum, quam beata vita con-, sequitur. Ipsa autcm visio, intellectus cst ille qui in anima est, qui conficitur ex intelligente et eo quod intelligitur: ut in oculis vidcre quod dicitur, ex ipso sensu constat atque sensibili, quorum detracto quoli­ bct, videri nihil potest. ### English translation (Claude) R. You are rightly moved. For Reason, who speaks with you, promises to demonstrate God to your mind as the sun is demonstrated to the eyes. For the mind has, as it were, its own eyes, the senses of the soul; and the most certain truths of the disciplines are like the things lit by the sun so that they can be seen, such as the earth and all earthly things; but God is himself the one who illuminates. And I, Reason, am in minds as sight is in eyes. For to have eyes is not the same as to look, nor again is to look the same as to see. Therefore the soul needs three things: that it have eyes which it can now use well, that it look, and that it see. A healthy eye is a mind pure from every stain of the body, that is, already removed and cleansed from the desires of mortal things; and nothing gives it this, to begin with, but faith. For what cannot yet be shown to it while it is stained with vices and sick (since it cannot see unless healthy), if it does not believe that otherwise it will not see, it does not attend to its own health. But what if it believes that the matter is as stated, and that it will see if it can come to see, yet despairs of being able to be healed: does it not cast itself away entirely and despise itself, and not obey the physician's precepts? A. That is entirely so, especially because illness must feel those precepts to be harsh. R. So to faith hope must be added. A. So I believe. R. What if it both believes that all is so and hopes it can be healed, yet does not love or desire the very light that is promised, and thinks it ought meanwhile to be content with its own darkness, which by habit has become pleasant: does it not reject that physician nonetheless? A. Exactly so. R. So, third, love is necessary. A. Nothing at all is so necessary. R. Without these three, then, no soul is healed so that it can see, that is, understand, its God. When, then, it has healthy eyes, what remains? A. That it look. R. The soul's look is reason; but since it does not follow that everyone who looks sees, a right and perfect look, that is, one which sight follows, is called virtue; for virtue is right or perfect reason. But the look itself, even when the eyes are healthy, cannot turn toward the light unless those three remain: faith, by which it believes that the thing toward which the look must be turned is such that, when seen, it makes one happy; hope, by which it presumes that it will see if it looks well; love, by which it desires to see and to enjoy. Then upon the look follows the very vision of God, which is the end of looking: not that looking no longer exists, but that it has nothing further to strain toward. And this is truly perfect virtue, reason reaching its end, upon which the happy life follows. And that vision is the understanding which is in the soul, made up of the one who understands and what is understood; as in the eyes what is called seeing consists of the sense itself and the sensible thing, and if either is removed nothing can be seen. ### Scripture references - 1 Cor 13:13: echo, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Faith, hope and love echo 1 Cor 13:13. The numeral ‘13’ in the digital text is Migne's paragraph number. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.6 (PL 32:875; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-6). ## Soliloquies 1.7 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-7 - Source: PL 32:875–877 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason explains that once the soul sees God, faith and hope are no longer needed and only love remains, though in this life all three are still required. ### Latin text Ergo cum animae Deum videre, hoc est Deum intelligere contigerit, videamus utrum adhuc ci tria illa sint necessaria. Fides quare sit necessaria, cum jam videat? Spes nihilominus, quia jam tenet. Cha ritati vero non solum nihil detrahetur, sed addetur etiam plurimum. Nam et illam singularem veramque pulchritudinem cum viderit, plus amabit; et nisi in­ genti amore oculum infixerit, nec ab aspiciendo us­ piam declinaverit, manere in illa beatissima visione non poterit. Sed dum in hoc corpore est anima, etiam­ si plenissime videat, hoc est intelligat Deum; tamen, quia etiam corporis sensus utuntur opere proprio, si nihil quidem valent ad fallendum, non tamen nihil ad non ambigendum, potest adhuc dici fides ea qua his resistitur, et illud potius verum esse creditur. Item quia in ista vita, quanquam Deo intellecto anima jam beata sit; tamen, quia multas molestias corporis sustinet, sperandum cst ei post mortem omnia isla incommoda non futura. Ergo nec spes, dum in hac est vita, ani­ mam deserit. Sed cum post hanc vitam tota se in Deum collegerit, charitas restat qua ibi teneatur. Nam neque dicenda est fidem habere quod illa sint vera, quando nulla falsorum interpellatione sollicitatur; neque quidquam sperandum ei restat, cum totum se­ cura possideat. Tria igitur ad animam pertinent, ut sana sit, ut aspiciat, ut videat. Alia vero tria. fides, spes et charitas, primo illorum trium et secundo sem­ per sunt necessaria: tertio vero in hac vita, omnia; post hanc vitam, sola charitas. ### English translation (Claude) So when it befalls the soul to see God, that is, to understand God, let us see whether those three are still necessary to it. Why should faith be necessary, when it already sees? Nor hope, since it already holds. But from love not only will nothing be taken away, but very much will even be added. For when it has seen that singular and true beauty, it will love more; and unless it fixes its eye on it with immense love and never turns aside from beholding it, it will not be able to remain in that most blessed vision. But while the soul is in this body, even if it sees, that is, understands, God most fully, yet because the bodily senses also do their own work (if they have no power to deceive, yet they are not without power to cause doubt), that may still be called faith by which they are resisted and the other is believed rather to be true. Likewise, because in this life, although the soul is already happy when God is understood, yet since it bears many troubles of the body, it must hope that after death all these inconveniences will not exist. So neither does hope desert the soul while it is in this life. But when after this life it has gathered itself wholly in God, love remains, by which it is held there. For it cannot be said to have faith that those things are true, when it is troubled by no interference of falsehoods; nor does anything remain for it to hope for, since it securely possesses the whole. Three things, therefore, pertain to the soul: that it be healthy, that it look, and that it see. And the other three, faith, hope and love, are always necessary for the first and second of those three; but for the third, in this life all of them are; after this life, love alone. ### Scripture references - 1 Cor 13:13: echo, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Echoes 1 Cor 13:8–13 (love remains when faith and hope pass). ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.7 (PL 32:875–877; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-7). ## Soliloquies 1.8 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-8 - Source: PL 32:877 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason teaches that as the sun is, shines and illuminates, so God is, is understood, and makes other things understood, and Augustine accepts this as probable. ### Latin text Nunc accipe, quantum praesens tempus expo­ scit, ex illa similitudine sensibilium etiam de Deo aliquid nunc me docente. Intelligibilis nempe Deus est, intelligibilia etiam illa disciplinarum spectamina: tamen plurimum differunt. Nam et terra visibilis, et lux; sed terra, nisi luce illustrata, videri non potest. Ergo et illa quæ in disciplinis traduntur, quæ quis­ quis intelligit, verissima esse nulla dubitatione con­ cedit, credendum est ea non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur. Ergo quomodo in hoc sole tria quædam licet animadvertere; quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat: ita in illo secretissimo Deo quem vis intelligere, tria quædam sunt; quod est, quod intelligitur, et quod cætera facit intelligi. Hæc duo, id est, teipsum et Deum, ut intelligas, docere te audeo. Sed responde quomodo hæc acceperis; ut pro­ babilia, an ut vera? A. Plane ut probabilia; et in spem. quod fatendum est, majorem surrexi: nam praeter illa duo de linea et pila, nihil abs te dictum est quod me scire audeam dicere. R. Non est mirandum: non enim quidquam cst adhuc ita expositum, ut abs te sit flagitanda perceptio. ### English translation (Claude) Now receive, as far as the present time requires, something about God too, as I teach you from that comparison with sensible things. God is intelligible, and those objects of the disciplines are intelligible too; yet they differ very greatly. For the earth is visible, and so is light; but the earth cannot be seen unless lit by light. So too those things which are taught in the disciplines, which anyone who understands them grants without any doubt to be most true, must be believed to be incapable of being understood unless they are lit by another, as by their own sun. Therefore, as in this sun one may notice three things, that it is, that it shines, and that it illuminates, so in that most hidden God whom you wish to understand there are three things: that he is, that he is understood, and that he makes other things to be understood. I dare to teach you to understand these two, that is, yourself and God. But answer: how have you received these things, as probable or as true? A. Plainly as probable; and I have risen, I must confess, to greater hope; for apart from those two things about the line and the ball, nothing has been said by you that I would dare to say I know. R. That is no wonder; for nothing has yet been so set out that perception should be demanded of you. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.8 (PL 32:877; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-8). ## Soliloquies 1.9 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-9 - Source: PL 32:877 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason tests whether Augustine is healthy enough to see God, and he admits he is still moved by fear of losing friends, of pain, and of death. ### Latin text Sed quid moramur? Aggredicnda est via: vi­ deamus tamen, quod præcedit omnia, utrum sani simus. A. Hoc tu videris, si vel in te, vel in me ali­ quantum aspicere potes: ego quaerenti, si quid sentio, respondebo. R. Amasne aliquid præter tui Deique scientiam? A. Possem respondere, nihil me amare amplius, pro eo sensu qui mihi nunc est; sed tutius respondeo nescire me. Nam sæpe mihi usu venit ut cum alia nulla re me crederem commoveri, veniret tamen aliquid in mentem, quod me multo aliter atque præsumpseram pungeret. Item sepe, quamvis in co­ gitationem res aliqua incidens non me pervellerit, re. vera tamen vcniens perturbavit plus quam putabam: sed modo videor mihi tribus tantum rebus posse com­ movcri: metu amissionis eorum quos diligo, metu do­ loris, metu mortis. R. Amas ergo et vitam tecum clia­ rissimorum tuorum, ct bonam valetudincm tuam, el vi­ tam tuam ipsam in hoc corpore? neque enim aliter amis­ sionem horum metueres. A. Fateor, ita est. R. Modo ergo, quod non omnes tecum sunt amici tui, ct quod tua valetudo minus integra est, facit animo nonnul­ lam ægritudinem: nam et id esse consequens video. A. Recte vides; negare non possum. R. Quid, si te repente sano esse corpore sentias et probes, tecum- ' que omnes quos diligis concorditer, liberali otio frui videas, nonne aliquantum tibi etiam lætitia gestiendum est? A. Vere aliquantum; imo, si hæc præsertim, ut dicis, repente provenerint, quando me capiam, quando id genus gaudii vel dissimulare permittar? R. Omnibus igitur adhuc morbis animi et perturbationibus agita­ ris. Quænam ergo talium oculorum impudentia cst, velle illum solem videre? A. Ita conclusisti quasi prorsus non sentiam quantum sanitas mea promove. rit, aut quid pestium recesserit, quantumque restiterit. Fac me istud concedere. ### English translation (Claude) But why do we delay? The road must be taken. Let us see, however, first of all (for this comes before everything), whether we are healthy. A. You will see to this, if you can discern anything either in yourself or in me; I will answer what I feel when you ask. R. Do you love anything besides the knowledge of yourself and of God? A. I could answer that I love nothing more, judging by the feeling I have now; but it is safer to answer that I do not know. For it has often happened to me that when I believed I was moved by nothing else, something nevertheless came into my mind which stung me far otherwise than I had presumed. Likewise, often, though some matter occurring to my thought did not disturb me, yet when it came in reality it troubled me more than I thought. But at present I seem to myself capable of being moved by three things only: by fear of losing those I love, by fear of pain, and by fear of death. R. So you love both the life of your dearest ones with you, and your own good health, and your very life in this body; for otherwise you would not fear losing these. A. I admit it is so. R. So at present, the fact that not all your friends are with you, and that your health is less than sound, causes your mind some distress; for I see that this follows too. A. You see rightly; I cannot deny it. R. What if you suddenly felt and found yourself sound in body, and saw all whom you love with you in harmony, enjoying liberal leisure: would you not have to leap somewhat for joy? A. Truly, somewhat; indeed, especially if these things came about suddenly, as you say, how could I contain myself, how could I be allowed even to hide joy of that kind? R. You are still, then, tossed by all the diseases and disturbances of the mind. What impudence, then, for such eyes to wish to see that sun! A. You have concluded as though I had no sense at all of how far my health has advanced, or how much of the plague has receded and how much remains. Suppose I grant you this. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.9 (PL 32:877; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-1/#p-1-9). ## Soliloquies 1.10 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-10 - Source: PL 32:877–879 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Augustine tells Reason that he no longer desires riches or honors, has resolved not to marry, and seeks food and bodily comforts only as health requires. ### Latin text R. Nonne vides hos corporis oculos etiam sanos, luce solis istius sæpe repercuti et averti, atque ad illa sua obscura confugere? Tu autem quid promoveris cogitas, quid velis videre non cogitas: et tamen te­ cum hoc ipsum discutiam, quid profecisse nos putas. Divitias nullas cupis? A. Hoc quidem non nunc pri­ mum. Nam cum triginta tres annos agam, quatuor­ decim fere anni sunt ex quo ista cupere destiti, nec aliud quidquam in his, si quo casu offerrentur, præ­ ter necessarium victum liberalemque usum cogitavi. Prorsus mihi unus Ciceronis liber facillime persuasit, nullo modo appetendas esse divitias, sed si provene­ rint, sapientissime atque cautissime administrandas. R. Quid honores? A. Fateor, eos modo, ac pene his diebus cupere destiti. R. Quid uxor? Nonne te dele­ ctat interdum pulchra, pudica, morigera, litterata, vel quæ abs te facile possit erudiri, afferens etiam dotis tantum, quoniam contemnis divitias, quantum eam prorsus nihilo faciat onerosam otio tuo, preser­ tim si speres certusque sis nihil ex ea te molestia esse passurum? A. Quantumlibet velis eam pingere at­ que cumulare bonis omnibus, nihil mihi tam fugien­ dum quam concubitum esse decrevi: nihil esse sen­ tio quod magis ex arce dejiciat animum virilem, quam blandimenta feminea, corporumque ille contactus, sine quo uxor haberi non potest. Itaque, si ad offi­ cium pertinet sapientis ( quod nondum comperi) dare operam liberis, quisquis rei hujus tantum gratia con­ cumbit, mirandus mihi videri potest, at vero imi­ tandus nullo modo: nam tentare hoc periculosius est, quam posse felicius. Quamobrem, satis, credo, juste atque utiliter pro libertate animae meae mihi imperavi non cupere, non quærere, non ducere uxorem. R. Non ego nunc quaero quid decreveris, sed utrum adhuc lucteris, an vcro jam ipsam libidinem viceris. Agitur enim de sanitate oculorum tuorum. A. Prorsus nihil hujusmodi quæro, nihil desidero; etiam cum horrore atque aspernatione talia recordor. Quid vis amplius? Et hoc mihi bonum in dies crescit: nam quanto au­ getur spes videndæ illius qua vehementer aestuo pul­ chritudinis, tanto ad illam totus amor voluptasque convertitur. R. Quid ciborum jucunditas? quantæ tibi curæ est? A. Ea quæ statui non edere, nihil me com­ movent. His autem quæ non amputavi, delectari me præsentibus fateor, ita tamen ut sine ulla permotione animi vel visa vel gustata subtrahantur. Cum autem non adsunt prorsus, non audet hæc appetitio se in­ serere ad impedimentum cogitationibus meis. Sed omnino sive de cibo et potu, sive de balneis, caetera­ que corporis voluptate nihil interroges: tantum ba­ bere appeto, quantum in valetudinis opem conferri potest. ### English translation (Claude) R. Do you not see that these bodily eyes, even when healthy, are often struck back and turned away by the light of this sun, and flee to their own darkness? But you are thinking of how far you have advanced, not of what you wish to see; and yet I will discuss with you this very point, how far you think we have progressed. Do you desire no riches? A. This at least is not new for me. For since I am thirty-three years old, it is nearly fourteen years since I stopped desiring them, nor did I think of anything in them, if by some chance they were offered, beyond a necessary living and a use befitting a free man. One book of Cicero very easily persuaded me altogether that riches are in no way to be sought, but that if they come they are to be managed most wisely and cautiously. R. What about honors? A. I confess that I stopped desiring them only recently, almost in these very days. R. What about a wife? Does it not sometimes delight you to think of one who is beautiful, modest, compliant, educated, or who could easily be taught by you, bringing also a dowry just large enough (since you despise riches) that she would be no burden at all to your leisure, especially if you could hope and be sure that you would suffer no trouble from her? A. However much you wish to paint her and heap every good upon her, I have resolved that there is nothing I must flee so much as sexual union; I feel that nothing casts a man's mind down from its citadel more than a woman's caresses and that contact of bodies without which a wife cannot be had. Therefore, if it belongs to the duty of the wise man (which I have not yet discovered) to give attention to children, whoever has intercourse for this reason alone may seem to me worthy of admiration, but in no way of imitation; for it is more dangerous to attempt this than it is happy to be able to do it. Wherefore, I believe I have quite justly and usefully commanded myself, for the freedom of my soul, not to desire, not to seek, not to marry a wife. R. I am not asking now what you have resolved, but whether you are still struggling, or have now actually conquered lust itself. For the question is about the health of your eyes. A. I seek absolutely nothing of this kind, I desire nothing; I even recall such things with horror and disdain. What more do you want? And this good grows in me day by day; for the more the hope increases of seeing that beauty for which I burn so vehemently, the more all my love and delight are turned toward it. R. What about the pleasure of food? How much does it concern you? A. The foods I have resolved not to eat do not move me at all. Those I have not cut off I confess I enjoy when they are present, yet in such a way that they may be taken away, whether seen or tasted, without any disturbance of mind. And when they are not present at all, this appetite does not dare to insert itself to hinder my thoughts. But ask me nothing at all about food and drink, or baths, or the other pleasures of the body: I seek to have only as much as can contribute to the aid of health. ### Translation notes - The book of Cicero is the Hortensius (lost), which Augustine read at about nineteen (cf. Confessions 3.4). Augustine speaks here of his own resolve, at the time of his conversion, not to marry; the passage is translated as written. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.10 (PL 32:877–879; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-10). ## Soliloquies 1.11 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-11 - Source: PL 32:879 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason asks whether Augustine would still want wealth, honor, or a wealthy wife if they served the pursuit of wisdom, and Augustine answers that he would accept them only as means, not desire them for themselves. ### Latin text R. Multum profecisti: ea tamen quæ restant ad videndam illam lucem, plurimum impediunt. Sed mo­ lior aliquid quod mihi videtur facile ostendi; aut nihil edomandum nobis remanere, aut nihil nos omnino profecisse, omniumque illorum quae resecta credimus tabem manere. Nam quæro abs te, si tibi persuadea­ tur aliter cum multis charissimis tuis te in studio sa­ pientiae non posse vivere, nisi ampla res aliqua fami­ liaris necessitates vestras sustinere possit; nonne desiderabis divitias et optabis? A. Assentior. R. Quid, si etiam illud appareat, ct multis te persuasurum esse sapientiam, si tibi de honore auctoritas creverit; eosque ipsos familiares tuos non posse cupiditatibus suis modum imponere, seque totos convertere ad quærendum Deum, nisi et ipsi fuerint honorati, idque nisi per tuos honores dignitatemque fieri non posse? nonne ista etiam desideranda erunt, et ut proveniant magnopere instandum. A. Ita est ut dicis. R. Jam de uxore nihil disputo; fortasse enim non potest, ut du­ catur, existere talis necessitas: quanquam, si ejus amplo patrimonio certum sit sustentari posse omnes quos tecum in uno loco vivere otiose cupis, ipsa etiam concorditer id sinente, præsertim si generis nobili­ tale tanta polleat, ut honores illos quos esse necessarios jam dedisti, per eam facile adipisci possis, nescio utrum pertineat ad officium tuum ista contemnere. A. Quando ego istud sperare audeam? R. Ita istud dicis, quasi ego nunc requiram quid speres. Non quæro quid negatum non delectet, sed quid delectet oblatum. Aliud est enim exhausta pestis, aliud consopita. Ad hoc enim valet quod a quibusdam doctis viris dictum est, ita omnes stultos insanos esse, ut male olere omne coenum, quod non semper, sed dum commoves, sentias. Multum inter­ est utrum animi desperatione obruatur cupiditas, an sanitate pellatur. A. Quanquam tibi respondere non possum, nunquam tamen mihi persuadebis ut hac af­ fectione mentis, qua nunc me esse sentio, nihil me profecisse arbitrer. R. Credo propterea tibi hoc videri, quia quamvis ista optare posses, non tamen propter seipsa: sed propter aliud expetenda videren­ tur. A. Hoc est quod dicere cupiebam: nam quando desideravi divitias, ideo desideravi ut dives essem, honoresque ipsos, quorum cupiditatem modo me per­ domuisse respondi, eorum nescio quo nitore dele­ ctatus volebam; nihilque aliud in uxore semper at­ tendi, cum attendi, nisi quam mihi efficeret cum bona fama voluptatem. Tunc erat istorum in me vera cupiditas; nunc ea omnia prorsus aspernor: sed si ad illa quae cupio non nisi per haec mihi transitus datur, non amplectenda appeto, sed subeo toleranda. R. Optime omnino: nam nec ego ullarum rerum vo­ candam puto cupiditatem, quae propter aliud requi­ runtur. ### English translation (Claude) R. You have made much progress; yet the things that remain hinder you very greatly from seeing that light. But I am attempting something which seems to me easy to show: either that nothing remains for us to subdue, or that we have made no progress at all and the corruption of all those things we believe cut away remains. For I ask you: if you were persuaded that you could not otherwise live with your many dearest friends in the pursuit of wisdom unless some ample estate could sustain your needs, would you not desire and wish for riches? A. I agree. R. What if it also appeared that you would persuade many of wisdom if your authority grew through honor, and that those very friends of yours could not set a limit to their desires and turn themselves wholly to seeking God unless they too were honored, and that this could not happen except through your honors and dignity: would not these things also have to be desired, and pressed for earnestly so that they might come? A. It is as you say. R. About a wife I do not argue now; for perhaps no such necessity can arise that one must be married. And yet, if it were certain that by her ample patrimony all whom you wish to live with you at leisure in one place could be supported, she herself also harmoniously consenting, especially if she were so powerful by the nobility of her family that you could easily obtain through her those honors which you have already granted to be necessary, I do not know whether it belongs to your duty to despise these things. A. When would I dare hope for that? R. You say this as if I were now asking what you hope for. I am not asking what fails to delight when denied, but what delights when offered. For a plague exhausted is one thing, a plague lulled to sleep another. To this applies what some learned men have said, that all fools are mad in the way that all filth smells bad, which you do not always perceive, but only when you stir it. It makes a great difference whether desire is crushed by the mind's despair or driven out by its health. A. Although I cannot answer you, you will never persuade me that, with this disposition of mind in which I now feel myself, I have made no progress. R. I believe this seems so to you because, though you could wish for these things, they would seem to be sought not for their own sake but for the sake of something else. A. That is what I wanted to say. For when I desired riches, I desired them in order to be rich; and the honors themselves, the desire for which I answered that I have only now subdued, I wanted because I was delighted by some sort of splendor in them; and in a wife I always looked for nothing else, when I did look, than the pleasure she would afford me together with good reputation. Then there was in me a real desire for these things; now I spurn them all entirely. But if no passage is given me to the things I desire except through these, I do not seek them as things to embrace, but submit to them as things to be tolerated. R. Excellent indeed; for neither do I think that the seeking of things that are sought for the sake of something else should be called desire. ### Translation notes - ‘All fools are mad’ is a Stoic paradox (cf. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 4); the comparison with filth that smells only when stirred is not identified. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.11 (PL 32:879; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-11). ## Soliloquies 1.12 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-12 - Source: PL 32:879–881 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Augustine admits that he wants his friends and his own life only for the sake of finding wisdom, and that he fears bodily pain because it hinders the search, citing Cornelius Celsus on the supreme good and evil. ### Latin text Sed quæro abs te, cur eos homines quos dili­ gis, vel vivere, vel tecum vivere cupias? A. Ut animas nostras et Deum simul concorditer inquiramus. Ita enim facile cui priori contingit inventio, cæteros eo sine labore perducit. R. Quid, si nolunt hæc illi quæ­ rere?A. Persuadebo ut velint. R. Quid, si non possis, vel quod se invenisse jam, vel quod ista non posse inveniri arbitrantur, vel quod aliarum rerum curis et desiderio præpediuntur? A. Habebo eos, et ipsi me, sicut possumus. R. Quid, si te ab inquirendo etiam impediat eorum praesentia? nonne laborabis atque optabis, si aliter esse non possunt, non tecum esse potius quam sic esse? A. Fateor, ita est ut dicis. R. Non igitur eorum vel vitam vel praesentiam pro­ pter seipsam, sed propter inveniendam sapientiam cupis? A. Prorsus assentior. R. Quid? ipsam vitam tuam si tibi certum esset impedimento esse ad com­ prehendendam sapientiam, velles eam manere? A. Omnino eam fugerem. R. Quid? si docereris, tam te relicto isto corpore, quam in ipso constitutum, posse ad sapientiam pervenire, curares utrum hic, an in alia vita eo quod diligis fruereris? A. Si nihil me pe­ jus excepturum intelligerem, quod retroageret ab eo quo progressus sum, non curarem. R. Nunc ergo propterea mori times, ne aliquo pejore malo involvaris, quo tibi auferatur divina cognitio. A. Non so­ lam ne auferatur timeo, si quid forte percepi, sed etiam ne intercludatur mihi aditus eorum quibus per­ cipiendis inhio; quamvis quod jam teneo, mecum mansurum putem. R. Non igitur et vitam istam pro­ pter seipsam, sed propter sapientiam vis manere. A. Sic est. R. Dolor corporis restat, qui te fortasse vi sua commovet. A. Et ipsum non ob aliud vehementer for­ mido, nisi quia me impedit a quærendo. Quanquam enim acerrimo his diebus dentium dolore torquerer, non quidcm sinebar animo volvere, nisi ea quae jam forte didiceram; a discendo autem penitus impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat: tamen mihi videbatur, si se ille mentibus meis veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut me non sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo toleraturum. Sed quia etsi nihil majus aliquando pertuli, tamen sæpe cogitans quanto graviores possint accidere, cogor interdum Cornelio Celso assentiri, qui ait summum bonum esse sapien­ tiam, summum autem malum dolorem corporis. Nec ejus ratio mihi videtur absurda. Nam quoniam dua­ bus, inquit, partibus compositi sumus, ex animo sci­ licet et corpore, quarum prior pars est animus me­ lior, deterius corpus est; summum bonum est me­ lioris partis optimum, summum autem malum pessi­ mum deterioris: est autem optimum in animo sapien­ tia, est in corpore pessimum dolor. Summum igitur bonum hominis sapere, summum malum dolere, sine ulla, ut opinor, falsitate concluditur. R. Posterius ista videbimus. Aliud enim fortasse nobis ipsa ad quam pervenire nitimur sapientia persuadebit. Si au­ tcm hoc esse verum ostenderit, hanc de summo bono et summo malo sententiam sine dubitatione tenebimus. ### English translation (Claude) But I ask you, why do you desire the people you love either to live or to live with you? A. So that together, in harmony, we may inquire into our souls and God. For in this way whoever first attains discovery easily leads the others to it without labor. R. What if they do not wish to seek these things? A. I will persuade them to wish it. R. What if you cannot, either because they think they have already found them, or that these things cannot be found, or because they are hindered by the cares and desire of other things? A. I will keep them, and they me, as best we can. R. What if their presence even hinders you from inquiring? Will you not strive and wish, if they cannot be otherwise, that they not be with you rather than be with you thus? A. I admit it is as you say. R. So you desire neither their life nor their presence for its own sake, but for the sake of finding wisdom? A. I agree entirely. R. What then? If you were sure that your own life was a hindrance to grasping wisdom, would you wish it to remain? A. I would flee it altogether. R. What? If you were taught that you could reach wisdom as well having left this body as remaining in it, would you care whether you enjoyed what you love here or in another life? A. If I understood that nothing worse would befall me to drive me back from the point to which I have advanced, I would not care. R. So you now fear to die for this reason, lest you be entangled in some worse evil by which divine knowledge would be taken from you. A. I fear not only that what I may perhaps have perceived would be taken away, but also that the approach to those things I long to perceive would be shut off from me; although I think that what I already hold will remain with me. R. So you wish this life also to remain, not for its own sake, but for the sake of wisdom. A. So it is. R. Pain of body remains, which perhaps moves you by its force. A. I dread that too, and vehemently, for no other reason than that it hinders me from seeking. For although in these days I was tormented by a most acute toothache, so that I was not allowed to turn over in my mind anything but what I had perhaps already learned, and was entirely hindered from learning, for which I needed the whole attention of my mind, yet it seemed to me that if that brightness of truth opened itself to my mind, I would either not have felt that pain or at least would have endured it as nothing. But because, although I have never borne anything greater, yet, often thinking how much more grievous pains may befall, I am sometimes compelled to agree with Cornelius Celsus, who says that the supreme good is wisdom and the supreme evil bodily pain. Nor does his reasoning seem absurd to me. For since, he says, we are composed of two parts, namely mind and body, of which the former, the mind, is the better and the body the worse, the supreme good is the best thing of the better part and the supreme evil the worst thing of the worse part; and the best thing in the mind is wisdom, the worst in the body is pain. Therefore it is concluded, without any falsehood, I think, that man's supreme good is to be wise, and his supreme evil to suffer pain. R. We shall look at these things later. For perhaps wisdom itself, to which we are striving to attain, will persuade us of something else. But if it shows this to be true, we shall hold this opinion about the supreme good and the supreme evil without hesitation. ### Translation notes - Cornelius Celsus: the Roman encyclopaedist (1st century), whose philosophical books are lost; the argument is known only from this passage. Augustine mentions a recent toothache (cf. Confessions 9.4.12). ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.12 (PL 32:879–881; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-12). ## Soliloquies 1.13 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-13 - Source: PL 32:881 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason describes wisdom as a beloved to be loved for herself alone, and explains that minds must be trained by stages to bear her light, as weak eyes are led from dim objects to the sun. ### Latin text Nunc illud quærimus, qualis sis amator sapien­ tiae, quam castissimo conspectu atque amplexu, nullo interposito velamento quasi nudam videre ac tenere desideras, qualem se illa non sinit, nisi paucissimis et electissimis amatoribus suis. An vero si alicujus pulchræ feminae amore flagrares, jure se tibi non daret, si aliud abs te quidquam praeter se amari com­ perisset; sapientiæ se tibi castissima pulchritudo, nisi solam arseris, demonstrabit? A. Quid ergo adhuc suspendor infelix, et cruciatu miserabili differor? Jam certe ostendi nihil aliud me amare, siquidcm quod non propter se amatur, non amatur. Ego autem solam propter se amo sapientiam, cætera vero vel adesse mihi volo, vel deesse timeo propter ipsam; vitam, quietem, amicos. Quem modum autem potest habere illius pulchritudinis amor, in qua non solum non in­ video cateris, sed etiam plurimos quæro qui mecum appetant, mecum inhient, mecum teneant, mecum- ' que perfruantur; tanto mihi amiciores futuri, quanto erit nobis amata communior. R. Prorsus tales esse amatores sapientiae decet. Tales quaerit illa cujus vere casta est, et sine ulla contaminatione conjunctio. Sed non ad eam una via pervenitur. Quippe pro sua quisque sanitate ac fir­ mitate comprehendit illud singulare ac verissimum bonum. Lux est quædam ineffabilis et incomprehen­ sibilis mentium. Lux ista vulgaris nos doceat quantum potest, quomodo se illud habeat. Nam sunt nonnulli oculi tam sani et vegeti, qui se, mox ut aperti fuerint, in ipsum solem sine ulla trepidatione convertant. His quodammodo ipsa lux sanitas est, nec doctore indi­ gent, sed sola fortasse admonitione. His credere, sperare, amare satis est. Alii vero ipso quem videre vehementer desiderant, fulgore feriuntur, et eo non viso sæpe in tenebras cum delectatione redeunt. Quibus periculosum est, quamvis jam talibus ut sani recte dici possint, velle ostendere quod adhuc videre non valent. Ergo isti exercendi sunt prius, et eorum amor utiliter differendus atque nutriendus est. Primo enim quaedam illis demonstranda sunt quæ non per se lucent, sed per lucem vidcri possint, ut vestis, aut paries, aut aliquid horum. Deinde quod non per se quidem, sed tamen per illam lucem pulchrius effulgeat, ut aurum, argentum ct similia, nec tamen ita radiatum ut oculus laedat. Tunc fortasse terrenus iste ignis mo­ deste demonstrandus est, dcindc sidera, deinde luna, deinde auroræ fulgor, et albescentis caeli nitor. In quibus seu citius seu tardius, sive per totum ordinem, sive quibusdam contemptis, pro sua quisque valctu­ dine assuescens, sine trepidatione et cum magna vo­ luptate solem videbit. Tale aliquid sapientiæ studio­ sissimis, nec acute, jam tamen videntibus, magistri optimi faciunt. Nam ordine quodam ad eam pervenire bonae disciplinæ officium est, sine ordine autem vix credibilis felicitatis. Sed hodie satis, ut puto, scri­ psimus; parcendum est valetudini. ### English translation (Claude) Now we are asking what kind of lover you are of wisdom, whom you desire to see and to hold, as it were naked, with the most chaste gaze and embrace, with no veil between, as she does not allow herself to be seen except by her very few and most chosen lovers. If you were burning with love for some beautiful woman, she would rightly not give herself to you if she found that you loved anything besides her; will the most chaste beauty of wisdom show herself to you unless you burn for her alone? A. Why then am I still kept in suspense, unhappy, and put off with miserable torment? Surely I have already shown that I love nothing else, since what is not loved for its own sake is not loved. And I love wisdom alone for its own sake; the other things, life, quiet, friends, I either wish to be present to me or fear to lose for its sake. And what limit can there be to the love of that beauty, in which I not only do not begrudge others, but even seek as many as possible to seek it with me, long for it with me, hold it with me, and enjoy it with me, who will be the more my friends the more our beloved is shared among us? R. That is exactly what lovers of wisdom ought to be. Such she seeks, union with whom is truly chaste and without any defilement. But one does not reach her by a single way. For each grasps that singular and truest good according to his own health and strength. It is a certain ineffable and incomprehensible light of minds. Let this common light teach us, as far as it can, how that light is. For there are some eyes so healthy and vigorous that, as soon as they are opened, they turn toward the sun itself without any trembling. For them, in a way, light itself is health, and they need no teacher, but perhaps only admonition. For them it is enough to believe, hope, and love. But others are struck by the very brightness they vehemently desire to see, and often, not having seen it, return with delight into darkness. For them, although they are already such that they may rightly be called healthy, it is dangerous to wish to show what they are not yet able to see. So these must first be exercised, and their love usefully held back and nourished. For first some things must be shown them which do not shine of themselves but can be seen through light, like a garment or a wall or something of that kind. Next, what shines more beautifully, not indeed of itself but through that light, like gold, silver and the like, yet not so radiant as to hurt the eye. Then perhaps this earthly fire should be shown with moderation, then the stars, then the moon, then the brightness of dawn and the gleam of the whitening sky. Growing accustomed to these, whether faster or slower, whether through the whole sequence or skipping some, each according to his own health, he will see the sun without trembling and with great pleasure. Something of this sort the best teachers do for those most devoted to wisdom, who already see, though not sharply. For to come to her by a certain order is the task of good education; without order, it is the work of a scarcely credible good fortune. But we have written enough today, I think; we must spare your health. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.13 (PL 32:881; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-13). ## Soliloquies 1.14 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-14 - Source: PL 32:881–883 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason tells Augustine that he will see God when nothing earthly delights him, reminds him how a night's thoughts of a woman's caresses showed that he is not yet healed, and Augustine, weeping, commits himself to God's care. ### Latin text A. Et alio die: Da, quæso, inquam, jam si potes, illum ordinem. Duc, age qua vis, per quæ vis, quomodo vis. Impera quaevis dura, quolibet ardua, quae tamen in mea potestate sint, per quæ me quo desidero, perventurum esse non dubitem. R. Unum est quod tibi possum praecipere: nihil plus novi. Pe­ nitus esse ista sensibilia fugienda, cavendumque ma­ gnopere, dum hoc corpus agimus, ne quo eorum visco pennæ nostræ impediantur, quibus integris perfectis­ que opus est, ut ad illam lucem ab his tenebris evolemus: quæ se ne ostendere quidem dignatur in hac cavea inclusis, nisi tales fuerint ut ista vel effracti vel dissoluta possint in auras suas evadere. Itaque, quando fueris talis ut nihil te prorsus terrenorum delectet, mihi crede, eodem momento, eodem puncto temporis videbis quod cupis. A. Quando istud erit, oro te? Non enim puto posse mihi hæc in summum venire contemptum, nisi videro illud in cujus com­ paratione ista sordescant. R. Hoc modo posset et iste oculus corporis di­ cere: Tum tenebras non amabo, cum solem videro. Videtur enim quasi et hoc ad ordinem pertinere, quod longe est secus. Amat enim tenebras, eo quod sanus non est; solem autem nisi sanus videre non potest. Et in eo saepe fallitur animus, ut sanum se putet et sese jactet; et quia nondum videt, veluti jure conqueritur. Novit autem illa pulchritudo quando se ostendat. Ipsa enim medici fungitur munere, meliusque intelligit qui sint sani, quam iidem ipsi qui sanantur. Nos autem quan­ tum emerserimus, videmur nobis videre: quantum autem mersi eramus, ct quo progressi fueramus, nec cogitare, nec sentire permittimur, et in comparatione gravioris morbi sanos esse nos credimus. Nonne vides quam veluti securi hesterno die pronuntiaveramus, nulla jam nos peste detineri, nihilque amare nisi sapientiam; caetera vcro non nisi propter istam quærere aut velle? Quam tibi sordidus, quam foedus, quam exsecrabilis, quam horribilis complexus femineus vi­ debatur, quando inter nos de uxoris cupiditate quae­ situm est! Certe ista nocte vigilantes, cum rursus ea­ dem nobiscum ageremus, sensisti quam te aliter quam præsumpseras, imaginatæ illæ blanditiæ et amara sua­ vitas titillaverit; longe quidem longe minus quam solet, sed item longe aliter quam putaveras; ut sic tibi secretissimus ille medicus utrumque demonstra­ rei, et unde cura ejus evaseris, et quid curandum re­ maneat. A. Tace, obsecro, tace. Quid crucias? quid tantum fodis alteque descendis? Jam flere non duro, jamjam nihil promitto, nihil praesumo, ne me de istis rebus interroges. Certe dicis quod ille ipse quem vi­ dere ardeo, noverit quando sim sanus; faciat quod placet: quando placet sese ostendat; jam me totum ejus clementiæ curæque committo. Semel de illo cre­ didi quod sic erga se affectos sublevare non cesset. Ego nihil de mea sanitate, nisi cum illam pulchritu­ dinetn videro, pronuntiabo. R. Prorsus nihil aliud facias. Sed jam cohibe te a lacrymis, et stringe ani­ mum. Multum omnino flevisti, et hoc omnino morbus iste pectoris tui graviter accipit. A. Modum vis habere lacrymas meas, cum miseriæ meæ modum non videam? aut valetudinem corporis considerare me jubes, cum ego ipse tabe confectus sim? Sed, quæso te, si quid in me vales, ut me tentes per aliqua compendia ducere, at vel vicinitate nonnulla lucis illius, quam, si quid profeci, tolerare jam possum, pigeat oculos referre ad illas tenebras, quas reliqui; si tamen relictæ dicendae sunt, quæ caecitati meae adhuc blandiri audent. ### English translation (Claude) A. And on another day I said: Give me now, I beg, that order, if you can. Lead, come, where you will, through what you will, how you will. Command whatever hard things, however arduous, provided they are in my power, through which I may not doubt that I shall come where I desire. R. There is one thing I can prescribe to you; I know nothing more. These sensible things must be utterly fled, and great care must be taken, while we bear this body, that our wings are not entangled by any birdlime of theirs; we need them whole and perfect to fly from this darkness to that light, which does not deign even to show itself to those shut in this cage unless they are such that, whether it is broken or dissolved, they can escape into their own air. Therefore, when you are such that nothing earthly delights you at all, believe me, at the same moment, at the same point of time, you will see what you desire. A. When will that be, I beg you? For I do not think these things can come into utter contempt for me unless I see that in comparison with which they become vile. R. In this way the bodily eye too could say: I will not love darkness when I see the sun. For this too seems, as it were, to belong to the order, though it is far otherwise. For it loves darkness because it is not healthy; and it cannot see the sun unless it is healthy. And in this the mind is often deceived, thinking itself healthy and boasting; and because it does not yet see, it complains as if with right. But that beauty knows when to show itself. For it performs the office of physician, and understands better who are healthy than those very ones who are being healed. We seem to ourselves to see how far we have emerged; but how deeply we were sunk and how far we had progressed we are not permitted to think or feel, and in comparison with a graver disease we believe ourselves healthy. Do you not see how confidently, as it were, we declared yesterday that we were no longer held by any plague and loved nothing but wisdom, and sought or wanted other things only for its sake? How sordid, how foul, how execrable, how horrible the embrace of a woman seemed to you when we inquired between ourselves about the desire for a wife! Surely, lying awake this night, when we were again discussing the same things with ourselves, you felt how differently than you had presumed those imagined caresses and their bitter sweetness tickled you: far, far less indeed than usual, but also far otherwise than you had thought; so that that most secret physician showed you both things, from what his care has delivered you and what remains to be healed. A. Be silent, I beg you, be silent. Why do you torment me? Why do you dig so deep and go down so far? Now I can no longer hold back from weeping; from now on I promise nothing, I presume nothing; do not question me about these things. Surely you say that he whom I burn to see knows when I am healthy: let him do what pleases him; let him show himself when it pleases him; now I commit myself wholly to his mercy and care. Once for all I have believed of him that he does not cease to lift up those who are so disposed toward him. I will pronounce nothing about my health until I have seen that beauty. R. Do exactly that and nothing else. But now restrain yourself from tears and brace your mind. You have wept a great deal, and that sickness of your chest takes it badly. A. Do you want my tears to have a limit when I see no limit to my misery? Or do you bid me consider the health of my body when I myself am consumed with wasting? But I beg you, if you have any power over me, try to lead me by some shortcuts, so that by some nearness of that light, which, if I have made any progress, I can now bear, I may be ashamed to turn my eyes back to that darkness which I have left, if indeed it can be called left when it still dares to flatter my blindness. ### Translation notes - ‘The sickness of your chest’: Augustine's chest ailment of 386 (cf. Confessions 9.2.4). ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.14 (PL 32:881–883; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-14). ## Soliloquies 1.15 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-15 - Source: PL 32:883–885 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason begins to show that truth outlasts all true things that perish, so that truth must dwell in what is immortal, and urges Augustine to entrust himself wholly to God. ### Latin text R. Concludamus, si placet, hoc primum vo­ lumen, ut jam in secundo aliquam, quæ commoda occurrerit, aggrediamur viam. Non enim huic affe­ ctioni tuæ a moderata exercitatione cessandum est. A. Non sinam omnino concludi hunc libellum, nisi mihi modicum quo intentus sim de vicinæ lucis ape­ rueris. R. Gerit tibi ille medicus morem. Nam nescio quis me quo te ducam fulgor invitat et tangit. Itaque accipe intentus. A. Duc, oro te, ac rape quo vis. R. Animam te certe dicis, et Deum velle cognoscere? A. Hoc est totum negotium meum. R. Nihilne amplius? A. Nihil prorsus. R. Quid? veritatem non vis com­ prehendere? A. Quasi vero possim hæc nisi per illam cognoscere. R. Ergo prius ipsa cognoscenda est, per quam possunt illa cognosci. A. Nihil abnuo. R. Primo itaque illud videamus, cum duo verba sint veritas et verum, utrum tibi etiam res duæ istis verbis signi­ ficari, an una videatur. A. Duæ res videntur. Nam, ut aliud est castitas, aliud castum, et multa in hunc modum; ita credo aliud esse veritatem, et aliud quod verum dicitur. R. Quod horum duorum putas esse præstantius? A. Veritatem opinor. Non enim casto castitas, sed castitate fit castum; ita etiam, si quid verum est, veritate utique verum est. R. Quid? cum castus aliquis moritur, censes mori etiam castitatem? A. Nullo modo. R. Ergo, cum interit aliquid quod verum est, non interit ve­ ritas. A. Quomodo autem interit aliquid verum? Non enim video. R. Miror te istud quaerere: nonne ante oculos nostros millia rerum videmus interire? Nisi forte putas hanc arborem, aut esse arborem, sed veram non esse, aut certe interire non posse. Quamvis enim non credas sensibus, possisque respondere, ignorare te prorsus utrum arbor sit; tamen illud non negabis, ut opinor, veram esse arborem, si arbor est: non enim hoc sensu, sed intelligentia judicatur. Si enim falsa arbor est, non est arbor; si autem arbor est, vera sit necesse est. A. Concedo istud. R. Quid illud alterum? nonne concedis hoc genus rerum esse ar­ borem, quod nascatur et intereat? A. Negare non possum. R. Concluditur ergo aliquid quod verum sit. interire. A. Non contravenio. R. Quid illud? nonne tibi videtur intereuntibus rebus veris veritatem non interire, ut non mori casto mortuo castitatem? A. Jam et hoc concedo, et magnopere quid moliaris, exspecto. R. Ergo attende. A. Isthic sum. R. Verane tibi videtur ista sententia: Quid­ quid est, alicubi esse cogitur? A, Nihil me sic ducit ad consentiendum. R. Fateris autem esse veritatem? A. Fateor. R. Ergo ubi sit, necesse est quæramus; non est enim in loco, nisi forte aut esse in loco ali­ quid aliud præter corpus, aut veritatem corpus esse arbitraris. A. Nihil horum puto. R. Ubinam igitur illam esse credis? Non enim nusquam est quam esse concedimus. A. Si scirem ubi esset, nihil fortasse amplius quærerem. R. Saltem ubi non sit, potes cognoscere? A. si commemores, fortasse potero. R. Non est certe in rebus mortalibus. Quidquid enim est, in aliquo non potest manere, si non maneat illud in quo est: manere autem, etiam rebus veris inter­ euntibus, veritatem paulo ante concessum est. Non igitur est veritas in rebus mortalibus. Est autem ne­ ritas, et non est nusquam. Sunt igitur res immorta­ les. Nihil autem verum in quo veritas non est. Confi­ citur itaque non esse vera, nisi quæ sunt immorta­ lia. Et omnis falsa arbor, non est arbor, et falsum lignum non est lignum, et falsum argentum non est argentum, et omnino quidquid falsum est, non est. Omne autem quod verum non est, falsum est. Nulla igitur recte dicuntur esse, nisi immortalia. Hanc tu tecum ratiunculam diligenter considera, ne quid tibi concedendum non esse videatur. Si enim rata est, totum negotium pene confecimus, quod in alio for­ tasse libro melius apparebit. A. Habeo gratiam, et ista mecum atque adeo tecum, quando in silentio sumus, diligenter cauteque tractabo, si nullæ se tenebræ immittant, suique etiam, quod vehementer formido, mihi faciant deio­ ctalionem. R. Constanter Deo crede, eique te totum committe quantum potes. Noli esse velle quasi pro­ prius et in tua potestate; sed ejus clementissimi et utilissimi Domini te servum esse profitere. Ita enim te ad se sublevare non desinet, nihilque tibi evenire permittet, nisi quod tibi prosit, etiam si nescias. A. Audio, credo, et quantum possum obtempero; plurimumque ipsum deprecor, ut plurimum possim, nisi quid forte amplius a me desideras. R. Bene ha­ bel interim, facies postea quidquid jam visus ipse præceperit. ### English translation (Claude) R. Let us conclude this first volume, if you please, so that in the second we may now take up some convenient way that occurs to us. For this condition of yours must not give up moderate exercise. A. I will not allow this little book to be concluded at all unless you open to me a little of the nearby light, on which I may fix my attention. R. That physician humors you. For some brightness invites and touches me as to where I may lead you. So receive it attentively. A. Lead, I beg you, and carry me off where you will. R. You say, surely, that you wish to know the soul and God? A. That is my whole business. R. Nothing more? A. Nothing at all. R. What? Do you not wish to grasp truth? A. As if I could know these except through it. R. So it must first be known, through which those can be known. A. I object to nothing. R. First, then, let us see, since there are two words, ‘truth’ and ‘true,’ whether two things seem to you to be signified by these words, or one. A. Two things, it seems. For as chastity is one thing and what is chaste another, and many things of this kind, so I believe truth is one thing and what is called true another. R. Which of these two do you think is superior? A. Truth, I think. For chastity does not come from what is chaste, but what is chaste from chastity; so also, if anything is true, it is certainly true by truth. R. What? When some chaste person dies, do you think chastity also dies? A. In no way. R. So when something that is true perishes, truth does not perish. A. But how does something true perish? I do not see it. R. I am surprised that you ask this: do we not see thousands of things perish before our eyes? Unless perhaps you think that this tree either is a tree but not a true one, or certainly cannot perish. For although you do not trust the senses and could answer that you do not know at all whether it is a tree, yet you will not deny, I think, that it is a true tree if it is a tree; for this is judged not by sense but by intelligence. For if it is a false tree, it is not a tree; but if it is a tree, it must be true. A. I grant that. R. What about the other point? Do you not grant that a tree is the kind of thing that is born and perishes? A. I cannot deny it. R. So it is concluded that something that is true perishes. A. I do not oppose it. R. What about this? Does it not seem to you that when true things perish truth does not perish, as chastity does not die when a chaste person has died? A. I grant this too, and I am waiting eagerly to see what you are attempting. R. Then pay attention. A. I am here. R. Does this statement seem true to you: ‘Whatever exists must exist somewhere’? A. Nothing so leads me to consent. R. But you admit that truth exists? A. I admit it. R. Then we must ask where it is; for it is not in a place, unless perhaps you think either that something other than body is in a place or that truth is a body. A. I think neither. R. Where then do you believe it is? For what we grant exists is not nowhere. A. If I knew where it was, perhaps I would seek nothing further. R. Can you at least know where it is not? A. If you remind me, perhaps I can. R. It is certainly not in mortal things. For whatever exists cannot remain in something if that in which it is does not remain; and it was granted a little earlier that truth remains even when true things perish. Truth, therefore, is not in mortal things. But truth exists, and is not nowhere. Therefore there are immortal things. But nothing is true in which truth is not. It follows, then, that nothing is true except what is immortal. And every false tree is not a tree, and false wood is not wood, and false silver is not silver, and in general whatever is false is not. But everything that is not true is false. Therefore nothing is rightly said to be except immortal things. Consider this little argument carefully with yourself, lest anything in it seem to you not to be granted. For if it is valid, we have almost finished the whole business, which will perhaps appear better in another book. A. I thank you, and I will treat these things carefully and cautiously with myself, and indeed with you, when we are in silence, if no darkness intrudes and, as I greatly fear, makes me take delight in it. R. Believe God steadfastly and commit yourself wholly to him as far as you can. Do not wish to be, as it were, your own and in your own power; but profess yourself the servant of that most merciful and most beneficent Lord. For so he will not cease to lift you up to himself, and will allow nothing to happen to you but what is profitable to you, even if you do not know it. A. I hear, I believe, and I obey as far as I can; and I pray to him most earnestly that I may be able to do as much as possible, unless perhaps you desire something more of me. R. It is well for now; afterward you will do whatever he himself, once seen, shall command. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 1.15 (PL 32:883–885; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-1-15). ## Soliloquies 2.1 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-2-1 - Source: PL 32:885 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Opening the second book with a short prayer, Augustine says that he knows he thinks but not whether he is immortal, and that he wants to live forever in order to know. ### Latin text A. Satis intermissum est opus nostrum, et iin­ patiens est amor, nec lacrymis modus fit, nisi amori detur quod amatur: quare, aggrediamur librum se­ cundum. R. Aggrediamur. A. Credamus Deum affu­ turum. R. Credamus sane, si vel hoc in potestate nostra est. A. Potestas nostra ipse est. R. Itaque ora brevissime ac perfectissime, quantum potes. A. Deus semper idem, noverim me, noverim te. Oratum est. R. Tu qui vis te nosse, scis esse te? A. Scio. R. Unde scis? A. Nescio. R. Simplicem te sentis, anne multi­ plicem? A. Nescio. R. Moveri te scis? A. Nescio. R. Cogitare te scis? A. Scio. R. Ergo verum est co­ gitare te. A. Verum. R. Immortalem te esse scis? A. Nescio. R. Horum omnium quæ te nescire dixisti, quid scire prius mavis? A. Utrum immortalis sim. R. Vivere igitur amas? A. Fateor. R. Quid, cum te immortalem esse didiceris? satisne erit? A. Erit id quidem magnum, sed id mihi parum. R. Hoc tamen quod parum est quantum gaudebis? A. Plurimum. R. Nihil jam flebis? A. Nihil omnino. R. Quid, si ipsa vita talis esse inveniatur, ut in ea tibi nihil am­ plius quam nosti, nosse liceat? temperabis a lacrymis? A. Imo tantum flebo ut vita nulla sit. R. Non igitur vivere propter ipsum vivere amas, sed propter scire. A. Cedo conclusioni. R. Quid, si eadem ipsa rerum scientia miserum faciat? A. Nullo id quidem pacto fieri posse credo. Sed si ita est, nemo esse beatus potest; non enim nunc aliunde sum miser, nisi rerum ignorantia. Quod si et rerum scientia miserum facit, sempiterna miseria est. R. Jam video totum quod cti­ pis. Nam, quoniam neminem scientia miserum esse credis, ex quo probabile est ut intelligentia efficiat beatum; beatus autem nemo nisi vivens, et nemo vivit qui non est: esse vis, vivere et intelligere; sed esse ut vivas, vivere ut intelligas. Ergo esse te scis, vivere te scis, intelligere te scis. Sed utrum ista semper futura sint, an nihil horum futurum sit, an maneat aliquid semper, et aliquid intercidat, an minui et augeri hæc pos­ sint, cum omnia mansura sint, nosse vis. A. Ita est. R. Si igitur probaverimus semper nos esse victuros, seque­ tur etiam semper futuros. A. Sequetur. R. Restabit quærere de intelligendo. ### English translation (Claude) A. Our work has been interrupted long enough, and love is impatient, and there is no limit to tears unless love is given what it loves; so let us begin the second book. R. Let us begin. A. Let us believe that God will be present. R. Let us believe it indeed, if even this is in our power. A. He himself is our power. R. So pray, as briefly and perfectly as you can. A. O God, always the same, let me know myself, let me know you. I have prayed. R. You who wish to know yourself, do you know that you exist? A. I know. R. How do you know? A. I do not know. R. Do you feel yourself to be simple or manifold? A. I do not know. R. Do you know that you move? A. I do not know. R. Do you know that you think? A. I know. R. So it is true that you think. A. True. R. Do you know that you are immortal? A. I do not know. R. Of all these things you said you do not know, which would you rather know first? A. Whether I am immortal. R. So you love to live? A. I admit it. R. What, when you have learned that you are immortal: will that be enough? A. That will indeed be great, but for me it is too little. R. Yet how much will you rejoice in this which is too little? A. Very much. R. Will you weep no more? A. Not at all. R. What if life itself is found to be such that in it you may know nothing more than you know now: will you refrain from tears? A. On the contrary, I will weep so much that there will be no life. R. So you love to live not for the sake of living itself, but for the sake of knowing. A. I yield to the conclusion. R. What if this very knowledge of things should make you miserable? A. I believe that can in no way happen. But if it is so, no one can be happy; for now I am miserable from no other source than ignorance of things. And if knowledge of things also makes one miserable, misery is everlasting. R. Now I see all that you desire. For since you believe that no one is made miserable by knowledge, from which it is probable that understanding makes one happy, and no one is happy unless living, and no one lives who does not exist, you wish to exist, to live and to understand; but to exist in order to live, to live in order to understand. So you know that you exist, you know that you live, you know that you understand. But whether these will always be, or none of them will be, or something will remain always and something perish, or whether they can be diminished and increased while all remain, this you wish to know. A. That is so. R. If then we prove that we shall always live, it will follow also that we shall always exist. A. It will follow. R. It will remain to inquire about understanding. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.1 (PL 32:885; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-2-1). ## Soliloquies 2.2 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-2-2 - Source: PL 32:885 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason argues that truth cannot perish, since even its perishing would be true. ### Latin text A. Manifestissimum ordinem video atque brc­ vissimum. R. Hic ergo esto nunc, ut interroganti caute firmeque respondeas. A. Isthic sum. R. Si uta­ nebit semper mundus iste, verum est mundum sem­ per mansurum esse? A. Quis hoc dubitet? R. Quid, si non manebit? nonne ita verum est mundum non esse mansurum? A. Nihil resisto. R. Quid, cum in­ terieril, si interiturus est? nonne tunc id erit vcrum, mundum interisse? Nam quamdiu verum non est mundum occidisse, non occidit: repugnat igitur ut mundus occiderit, et verum non sit mundum occi­ disse. A. Et hoc concedo. R. Quid illud? Videturne tibi verum aliquid esse posse, ut veritas non sit? A. Nullo modo. R. Erit igitur veritas, etiamsi mundus intereat. A. Negare non possum. R. Quid, si ipsa veritas occidat? nonne verum erit veritatem occi­ disse? A. Et istud quis negat? R. Verum autem non potest esse, si veritas non sit. A. Jam hoc paulo ante concessi. R. Nullo modo igitur occidet veritas. A. Perge ut coepisti, nam ista collectione nihil est verius. ### English translation (Claude) A. I see a most clear and very brief order. R. Then be here now, so as to answer my questions carefully and firmly. A. I am here. R. If this world will always remain, is it true that the world will always remain? A. Who doubts that? R. What if it will not remain? Is it not then true that the world will not remain? A. I do not resist. R. What, when it has perished, if it is going to perish? Will it not then be true that the world has perished? For as long as it is not true that the world has perished, it has not perished; so it is contradictory that the world has perished and that it is not true that the world has perished. A. I grant this too. R. What about this? Does it seem to you that something can be true without truth existing? A. In no way. R. So there will be truth even if the world perishes. A. I cannot deny it. R. What if truth itself should perish? Will it not be true that truth has perished? A. And who denies that? R. But something true cannot exist if truth does not exist. A. I granted that a little while ago. R. In no way, then, will truth perish. A. Go on as you began, for nothing is truer than that inference. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.2 (PL 32:885; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/1-10/#p-2-2). ## Soliloquies 2.3 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-3 - Source: PL 32:885–887 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason argues that falsity exists only in sense, that sense requires a living soul, and that since falsity will always exist the soul must always live, and Augustine asks to go more slowly. ### Latin text R. Nunc respondeas mihi velim, utrum tibi sentire anima videatur, an corpus? A. Anima videtur. R. Quid? intellectus videtur tibi ad animam perti­ nere? A. Prorsus videtur. R. Ad solam animam, an ad aliquid aliud? A. Nihil aliud video præter animam, nisi Deum, ubi intellectum esse credam. R. Jam illud videamus. Si tibi quispiam istum parietem non esse parietem, sed arborem diceret, quid putares? A. Aut ejus sensum, aut meum falli, aut hoc nomine ab eo parietem vocari. R. Quid, si ct illi species arboris in eo appareat, et tibi parietis? nonne poterit utrumque verum esse? A. Nullo modo; quia una eademque res, et arbor et paries esse non potest. Quamvis enim singulis nobis singula esse videantur, necesse est unum nostrum imaginationem falsam pati. R. Quid, si nec paries nec arbor est, et ambo fallimini? A. Potest id quidem. R. Hoc ergo unum superius prætermiseras. A. Fateor. R. Quid, si agnoscatis aliud vobis videri quam est? numquidnam fallimini? A. Non. R. Potest igitur et falsum esse quod videtur, et non falli cui videtur. A. Potest. R. Confitendum est igitur non eum falli qui falsa videt, sed eum qui assentitur falsis. A. Plane confitendum. R. Quid ipsum falsum? quare falsum est? A. Quod aliter sese habet quam videtur. R. Si ergo non sint quibus videatur, nihil est falsum. A. Sequitur. R. Non igitur est in rebus falsitas, sed in sensu: non autem fallitur qui falsis non assentitur. Conficitur ut aliud simus nos, aliud sensus; siquidem, cum ipse fallitur, possumus nos non falli. A. Nihil habeo quod contradicam. R. Sed numquid, cum anima fallitur, audes te dicere non esse falsum? A. Quo pacto istud audeam? R. At nullus sensus sine anima, nulla falsitas sine sensu. Aut operatur igitur anima, aut cooperatur falsitati. A. Trahunt præcedentia con­ sensionem. R. Illud nunc responde, utrum tibi videatur posse fieri ut aliquando falsitas non sit. A. Quomodo mihi hoc videri potest, cum tanta sit difficultas inve­ niendæ veritatis, ut absurdius dicatur falsitatem quam veritatem esse non posse? R. Numquidnam arbitraris eum qui non vivit, posse sentire? A. Non potest fieri. R. Confectum est animam semper vivere. A. Nimis cito urges me in gaudia: pedetentim, quaeso. R. Atqui, si recte illa concessa sunt, nihil de hac re dubi­ tandum video. A. Nimis cito est, inquam. Itaque facilius adducor ut me temere aliquid concessisse ar­ bitrer, quam ut jam securus de immortalitate animæ fiam. Tamen evolve istam conclusionem, et quomodo id effectum sit ostende. R. Falsitatem dixisti sine sensu esse non posse, et eam non esse non posse: semper igitur est sensus. At nullus sensus sine anima: anima igitur sempiterna est. Nec valet sentire, nisi vivat. Semper igitur anima vivit. ### English translation (Claude) R. Now I would like you to answer me whether it seems to you that the soul perceives, or the body. A. The soul, it seems. R. What? Does the intellect seem to you to belong to the soul? A. Entirely. R. To the soul alone, or to something else? A. I see nothing besides the soul, except God, in which I would believe there is intellect. R. Now let us look at this. If someone told you that this wall is not a wall but a tree, what would you think? A. That either his sense or mine was deceived, or that he called a wall by this name. R. What if the appearance of a tree appeared in it to him, and of a wall to you? Could not both be true? A. In no way; because one and the same thing cannot be both a tree and a wall. For although to each of us it seems to be a different thing, one of us must suffer a false imagination. R. What if it is neither a wall nor a tree, and you are both deceived? A. That can indeed be. R. So this one possibility you had passed over above. A. I admit it. R. What if you both recognize that the thing seems to you other than it is? Are you deceived then? A. No. R. So what seems can be false, and the one to whom it seems not be deceived. A. It can. R. It must be admitted, then, that the one deceived is not the one who sees false things, but the one who assents to false things. A. Plainly it must be admitted. R. What is the false itself? Why is it false? A. Because it is otherwise than it seems. R. So if there were none to whom it seemed, nothing would be false. A. That follows. R. Falsity, then, is not in things but in sense; and one who does not assent to false things is not deceived. It follows that we are one thing and sense another, since when it is deceived we can avoid being deceived. A. I have nothing to say against it. R. But when the soul is deceived, do you dare say that you are not deceived? A. How could I dare that? R. But there is no sense without soul, no falsity without sense. So the soul either produces falsity or cooperates with it. A. What went before draws my consent. R. Now answer this: whether it seems to you possible that at some time there will be no falsity. A. How can that seem possible to me, when the difficulty of finding truth is so great that it would be more absurd to say that falsity cannot exist than that truth cannot? R. Do you think that one who does not live can perceive? A. It cannot happen. R. It is established that the soul always lives. A. You urge me too quickly into joy: step by step, I beg you. R. But if those things were rightly granted, I see nothing to doubt about this matter. A. It is too quick, I say. So I am more easily led to think I have granted something rashly than to become secure now about the immortality of the soul. Still, unfold that conclusion and show how it was reached. R. You said that falsity cannot exist without sense, and that it cannot fail to exist; therefore sense always exists. But there is no sense without soul; therefore the soul is everlasting. Nor can it perceive unless it lives. Therefore the soul always lives. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.3 (PL 32:885–887; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-3). ## Soliloquies 2.4 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-4 - Source: PL 32:887 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Augustine objects that the argument proves only that some soul always exists, not that each soul is immortal, and Reason goes on to argue that bodies cannot exist without a soul to perceive them. ### Latin text A. 0 plumbeum pugionem! Posses enim con­ cludere hominem esse immortalem, si tibi concessis­ sem nunquam istum mundum esse posse sine homine, eumque mundum esse sempiternum. R. Bene quidem vigilas. Sed tamen non parum est quod confecimus, rerum naturam sine anima esse non posse, nisi forte in rerum natura falsitas aliquando non erit. A. Istud quidem consequens esse confiteor. Sed jam amplius deliberandum censeo, utrum superius concessa non nutent. Non enim parvum gradum ad animæ immor­ talitatem factum esse video. R. Satisne considerasti, ne quid temere dederis? A. Satis quidem, sed nihil video quo me arguam temeritatis. R. Ergo confectum est rerum naturam sine anima viva esse non posse. A. Confectum hactenus, ut possint vicissim aliæ nasci, aliæ mori. R. Quid, si de natura rerum falsitas aufe­ ratur? nonne fiet ut vera sint omnia? A. Consequi video. R. Responde unde tibi videatur paries iste ve­ rus esse. A. Quia ejus non fallor aspectu. R. Ergo quia ita est ut videtur. A. Etiam. R. Si igitur aliquid inde falsum est quod aliter videtur atque est, inde verum quod ita ut est videtur; ablato eo cui videtur, nec falsum quidquam, nec verum est. At si falsitas in rerum natura non sit, vera sunt omnia. Nec videri quidquam nisi viventi animæ potest. Manet igitur anima in rerum natura, si auferri falsitas non potest; manet, si potest. A. Video robustius quidem esse fa­ ctum quod jam conclusum erat; sed nihil hac adje­ ctione promovimus. Nihilominus enim manet illud quod plurimum me movet, nasci animas et interire, atque ut non desint mundo, non earum immortalitate, sed successione provenire. R. Videnturne tibi quæque corporea, id est sen­ sibilia, intellectu posse comprehendi? A. Non viden­ tur. R. Quid illud? videtur tibi sensibus uti Deus ad res cognoscendas? A. Nihil audeo de hac re temere affirmare; sed quantum conjicere datur, nullo modo Deus utitur sensibus. R. Ergo concludimus non sen­ tire posse nisi animam. A. Conclude interim quantum probabiliter licet. R. Quid illud? dasne istum parie­ lem, si verus paries non sit, non esse parietem? A. Nihil hoc facilius dederim. R. Neque quidquam, si verum corpus non sit, corpus esse? A. Tale etiam hoc est. R. Ergo si nihil verum est, nisi ita sit ut videtur; nec quidquam corporeum videri nisi sensibus potest; nec sentire, nisi anima; nec, si verum corpus non sit, corpus esse: restat ut corpus esse non possit, nisi anima fuerit. A. Nimis urges, et quid resistam non habeo. ### English translation (Claude) A. O leaden dagger! For you could conclude that man is immortal if I had granted you that this world can never be without man, and that this world is everlasting. R. You are certainly alert. Yet what we have established is no small thing: that the nature of things cannot be without soul, unless perhaps at some time there will be no falsity in the nature of things. A. That I admit follows. But I think we must deliberate further whether what was granted above is not shaky. For I see that no small step has been taken toward the immortality of the soul. R. Have you considered sufficiently, lest you have granted anything rashly? A. Sufficiently indeed, but I see nothing for which to accuse myself of rashness. R. So it is established that the nature of things cannot be without a living soul. A. Established so far as that some souls may be born and others die in turn. R. What if falsity were taken from the nature of things? Would it not come about that all things are true? A. I see that it follows. R. Answer: how does this wall seem to you to be true? A. Because I am not deceived by the sight of it. R. So because it is as it seems. A. Yes. R. If, then, something is false because it seems otherwise than it is, and true because it seems as it is, then, when the one to whom it seems is removed, nothing is either false or true. But if there is no falsity in the nature of things, all things are true. And nothing can seem except to a living soul. So the soul remains in the nature of things if falsity cannot be removed; it remains if it can. A. I see that what had already been concluded has been made stronger; but by this addition we have made no progress. For there still remains what moves me most: that souls are born and perish, and that they are never lacking to the world not because they are immortal but because they succeed one another. R. Does it seem to you that any bodily, that is, sensible, things can be grasped by the intellect? A. It does not. R. What about this: does God seem to you to use the senses to know things? A. I dare affirm nothing rashly on this matter; but as far as one may conjecture, God in no way uses the senses. R. So we conclude that only the soul can perceive. A. Conclude for now as far as probability allows. R. What about this: do you grant that this wall, if it is not a true wall, is not a wall? A. I could grant nothing more easily. R. And that nothing is a body if it is not a true body? A. This is of the same kind. R. So if nothing is true unless it is as it seems, and nothing bodily can seem except to the senses, and none can perceive but the soul, and nothing is a body if it is not a true body, it remains that body cannot exist unless there is soul. A. You press too hard, and I have nothing with which to resist. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.4 (PL 32:887; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-4). ## Soliloquies 2.5 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-5 - Source: PL 32:887–889 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason shows that defining the true as what appears to a knower leads to absurd conclusions, while defining it as what is leaves nothing false, and Augustine is left without an answer. ### Latin text R. Attende in ista diligentius. A. En adsum. R. Certe hic lapis est; et ita verus est, si non se habet aliter ac videtur; et lapis non est, si verus non est; et non nisi sensibus videri potest. A. Etiam. R. Non sunt igitur lapides in abditissimo terrae gremio, nec omnino ubi non sunt qui sentiant: nec iste lapis esset, nisi eum videremus; nec lapis erit cum discesseri­ mus, nemoque alius eum præsens videbit. Nec, si loculos bene claudas, quamvis multa in eis incluseris, aliquid habebunt. Nec prorsus ipsum lignum intrin­ secus lignum est. Fugit enim omnes sensus quidquid in altitudine est corporis minime perlucentis, quod non esse omnino cogitur. Etenim si esset, verum es­ set; nec verum quidquam est, nisi quod ita est ut videtur: illud autem non videtur; non est igitur ve­ rum: nisi quid habes ad hæc quod respondeas. A. De iis quidem quæ concessi, hoc natum esse video; sed absurdum ita est, ut quidquid vis illorum facilius ne­ gem, quam hoc verum esse concedam. R. Nihil re­ pugno. Vide ergo quid dicere velis: corporea nisi sensibus videri posse, an sentire nisi animam, an esse lapidem vel quid aliud, sed verum non esse, an ipsum verum aliter esse definiendum. A. Isthuc ipsum, oro te, ultimum videamus. * R. Defini ergo verum. A. Verum est quod ita se habet ut cognitori videtur, si velit possitque cogno­ scere. R. Non erit igitur verum quod nemo potest cognoscere? Deinde, si falsum est quod aliter quam est, videtur; quid, si alteri videatur hic lapis, lapis; alteri lignum? eadem res et falsa et vera erit? A. Illud me magis superius movet, quomodo si quid cognosci non potest, eo fiat ut verum non sit. Nam quod simul una res, et vera et falsa est, non nimis curo. Etenim vi­ deo unam rem diversis comparatam, simul et majorem et minorem esse. Sed ex eo istud contingit, quod ni­ hil per se majus aut minus est. Comparationis enim sunt ista nomina. R. At si dicis nihil esse verum per se, non times ne sequatur ut nihil sit per se? Unde enim lignum est hoc, inde etiam verum lignum est. Nec fieri potest ut per seipsum, id est sine cognitore lignum sit, et verum lignum non sit. A. Ergo illud dico et sic definio, nec vereor ne definitio mea ob hoc improbetur, quod nimis brevis est: nam verum mihi videtur esse id quod est. R. Nihil ergo erit falsum, quia quidquid est, verum est. A. In magnas angustias me conjecisti, nec invenio prorsus quid respondeam. Ita fit ut cum aliter doceri nolim quam istis interro­ gationibus, verear jam tamen interrogari. ### English translation (Claude) R. Attend to these things more carefully. A. Here I am. R. Surely this is a stone; and it is true if it is not otherwise than it seems; and it is not a stone if it is not true; and it can be seen only by the senses. A. Yes. R. So there are no stones in the most hidden bosom of the earth, nor anywhere at all where there are none to perceive; nor would this be a stone unless we saw it; nor will it be a stone when we have gone away and no one else present sees it. Nor, if you shut a chest well, will it contain anything, however many things you have shut in it. Nor indeed is wood itself wood inside. For whatever is in the depth of a body that is not at all transparent escapes all the senses, and so is compelled not to exist at all. For if it existed, it would be true; and nothing is true except what is as it seems; but that is not seen; therefore it is not true, unless you have something to answer to this. A. I see that this has arisen from what I granted; but it is so absurd that I would more easily deny any of those things you like than grant that this is true. R. I do not object. See then what you wish to say: that bodily things can be seen otherwise than by the senses, or that something besides the soul perceives, or that a stone or anything else exists but is not true, or that the true itself must be defined otherwise. A. Let us look, I beg you, at this last one. R. Define the true, then. A. The true is that which is as it seems to the knower, if he wishes and is able to know. R. So what no one can know will not be true? Again, if the false is what seems otherwise than it is, what if to one person this stone seems a stone, to another wood? Will the same thing be both false and true? A. What moves me more is the earlier point, how, if something cannot be known, it follows that it is not true. For that one thing is at once both true and false I do not much mind. For I see that one thing compared with different things is at once both greater and smaller. But this happens because nothing is greater or smaller in itself; for these are terms of comparison. R. But if you say that nothing is true in itself, do you not fear that it follows that nothing exists in itself? For that by which this is wood is also that by which it is true wood. Nor can it be that it is wood in itself, that is, without a knower, and yet not true wood. A. Then I say this and define it thus, and I do not fear that my definition will be rejected for being too short: the true seems to me to be that which is. R. Then nothing will be false, because whatever is, is true. A. You have thrown me into great straits, and I find nothing at all to answer. So it happens that, though I do not wish to be taught otherwise than by these questions, I am nevertheless now afraid to be questioned. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.5 (PL 32:887–889; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-5). ## Soliloquies 2.6 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-6 - Source: PL 32:889 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: After Augustine prays for light, Reason shows from sight, hearing and the other senses that what we call false is always something that resembles the true. ### Latin text R. Deus cui nos commisimus, sine dubitatione fert opem, et de his angustiis liberat nos, modo cre­ damus, et eum rogemus devotissime. A. Nihil plane libentius hoc loco fecerim; nam nusquam tantam ca­ liginem pertuli. Deus, Pater noster, qui ut oremus hortaris, qui et hoc quod rogaris præstas; siquidem cum te rogamus, melius vivimus, melioresque sumus: exaudi me palpitantem in his tenebris, et mihi dexte­ ram porrige. Prætende mihi lumen tuum, revoca me ab erroribus; te duce in me redeam et in te. Amen. R. Hic esto quantum potes, et vigilantissime attende. A. Dic, quaeso, si quid tibi suggestum est, ne perea­ mus. R. Hic esto. A. Ecce habes me nihil aliud agentem. R. Prius quid sit falsum, etiam atque etiam ventilemus. A. Miror si quidquam aliud erit, quam quod non ita est ut videtur. R. Attende potius, et ipsos sensus prius interrogemus. Nam certe quod oculi vi­ dent, non dicitur falsum, nisi habeat aliquam simili­ tudinem veri. Ut verbi causa, homo quem videmus in somnis, non est utique verus homo, sed falsus, eo ipso quod habet veri similitudinem. Quis enim canem vi­ dcat, et recte se dicat hominem somniasse? Ergo et ille falsus canis est, ex eo quod similis vero est. A. Ita est ut dicis. R. Quid, vigilans quisque si viso equo putet se hominem videre? nonne eo fallitur quod ei appareat aliqua hominis similitudo? Nam si nihil ei appareat, nisi equi species, non potest arbitrari sese hominem videre. A. Prorsus cedo. R. Dicimus item falsam arborem quam pictam videmus, et falsam fa­ ciem quæ de speculo redditur, et falsum turrium mo­ tum navigantibus, falsamque infractionem remi, ob aliud nihil nisi quod verisimilia sunt. A. Fateor. R. Ita et in geminis fallimur, ita in ovis, ita in singulis si­ gillis uno annulo impressis, et in caeteris talibus. A. Sequor omnino atque concedo. R. Similitudo igitur rerum quæ ad oculos pertinet, mater est falsitatis. A. Negare non possum. R. Sed hæc omnis silva, nisi me fallit, in duo genera dividi potest. Nam partim æqualibus in rebus, partim vero in deterioribus est. Æqualia sunt, quando tam hoc illi quam illud huic simile esse dicimus, ut de geminis dictum est, vel de impressionibus annuli. In deterioribus autem, quando illud quod deterius est, simile esse dicimus meliori. Quis enim in speculum attendat, et recte dicat se esse illi imagini similem, ac non potius illam sibi? Hoc autem genus partim est in eo quod anima patitur, partim vero in iis rebus quæ videntur. Sed ipsum quod anima patitur, aut in sensu patitur, ut turris motum qui nullus est; aut apud se­ ipsam ex eo quod accepit a sensibus, qualia sunt visa somniantium, et fortassis etiam furentium. Porro illa quæ in ipsis rebus quas videmus apparent, alia a na­ tura, cætera ab animantibus exprimuntur atque fin­ guntur. Natura gignendo vel resultando similitudines deteriores facit. Gignendo, cum parentibus similes nascuntur; resultando, ut de speculis cujuscemodi. Quamvis enim pleraque specula homines faciant, non tamen ipsi effingunt eas quae redduntur imagines. Jam vero animantium opera sunt in picturis, et hujusce­ modi quibusque figmentis: in quo genere includi etiam illa possunt, si tamen fiunt, quæ daemones fa­ ciunt. Umbræ autem corporum, quia non nimis ab re abest ut corporibus similes et quasi falsa corpora dicantur, nec ad oculorum judicium pertinere negan­ dæ sunt; in illo eas genere poni placet, quod resultando a natura fit. Resultat enim omne corpus lumini objectum, et in contrariam partem umbram reddit. An tibi aliquid contradicendum videtur? A. Mihi vero ni­ hil. Sed quonam ista tendant, vehementer exspecto. R. Atqui oportet patienter feramus, donec no­ bis cæteri sensus renuntient in veri similitudine ha­ bitare falsitatem. Nam et in ipso auditu totidem fere genera veniunt similitudinum: veluti cum loquentis vocem, quem non videmus, audientes, putamus alium quempiam, cui voce similis cst; atque in deterioribus vel echo testis est, vel tinnitus ille ipsarum aurium, vel in horologiis merulae aut corvi quædam imitatio, vel quae sibi somniantes aut furentes videntur audire. Falsæ autem voculæ quæ dicuntur a musicis, incredi­ bile est quantum attestantur veritati, quod post appa­ rebit: tamen etiam ipsæ, quod sat est nunc, non absunt ab earum similitudine quas veras vocant. Se­ queris hæc? A. Et libentissime. Nam nihil laboro ut intelligam. R. Ergo, ne moremur, videturne tibi aut lilium a lilio posse odore, aut mel thyminum a melle thymino de diversis alveariis sapore, aut mollitudo plumarum cycni ab anseris tactu facile dijudicari? A. Non videtur. R. Quid, cum talia nos vel olfacere, vel gustare, vel tangere somniamus? nonne similitu­ dine imaginum eo deteriore quo inaniore decipimur? A. Verum dicis. R. Ergo apparet nos in omnibus sen­ sibus sive aequalibus, sive in deterioribus rebus, aut similitudine lenocinante falli; aut etiamsi non falli­ mur suspendentes consensionem, seu differentiam dignoscentes, tamen eas res falsas nominare quas ve­ risimiles deprehendimus. A. Dubitare non possum. ### English translation (Claude) R. God, to whom we have committed ourselves, without doubt brings help and frees us from these straits, provided we believe and ask him most devoutly. A. Nothing would I more gladly do at this point; for nowhere have I endured such darkness. O God, our Father, who urge us to pray, and who also grant what you are asked (since when we ask you we live better and are better): hear me trembling in this darkness, and stretch out your right hand to me. Hold out your light before me, call me back from errors; with you as my guide let me return into myself and into you. Amen. R. Be here as much as you can, and attend most watchfully. A. Tell me, I beg, if anything has been suggested to you, lest we perish. R. Be here. A. See, you have me doing nothing else. R. First let us winnow again and again what the false is. A. I will be surprised if it is anything other than what is not as it seems. R. Attend rather, and let us first question the senses themselves. For certainly what the eyes see is not called false unless it has some likeness of the true. For example, a man we see in sleep is certainly not a true man but a false one, precisely because he has a likeness of the true. For who would see a dog and rightly say he had dreamed of a man? So that dog too is false because it is like a true one. A. It is as you say. R. What if someone awake, seeing a horse, thinks he sees a man? Is he not deceived because some likeness of a man appears to him? For if nothing but the appearance of a horse appears to him, he cannot think he sees a man. A. I yield entirely. R. Likewise we call false a tree we see painted, and the face reflected from a mirror, and the motion of towers seen by those sailing, and the break in an oar, for no other reason than that they are like the true. A. I admit it. R. So we are deceived with twins, with eggs, with seals impressed by one ring, and in other such things. A. I follow entirely and grant it. R. So likeness of things, in what pertains to the eyes, is the mother of falsity. A. I cannot deny it. R. But this whole forest, unless I am mistaken, can be divided into two kinds. For it is partly in equal things, partly in inferior ones. Things are equal when we say this is as like that as that is like this, as was said of twins or of the impressions of a ring. In inferior things, when we say that what is inferior is like the better. For who would look into a mirror and rightly say that he is like that image, and not rather that it is like him? This kind, again, is partly in what the soul undergoes, partly in the things that are seen. And what the soul undergoes it undergoes either in sense, like the motion of a tower which does not move, or within itself from what it has received from the senses, such as the visions of dreamers and perhaps also of madmen. Further, the likenesses that appear in the things we see are expressed and formed some by nature, others by living beings. Nature makes inferior likenesses by begetting or by reflecting: by begetting, when children are born like their parents; by reflecting, as with mirrors of every kind. For although men make most mirrors, they do not themselves form the images that are reflected. And the works of living beings are in paintings and all fictions of this kind; in this kind may also be included the things which demons make, if indeed they make them. As for the shadows of bodies, since it is not far from the mark to call them like bodies and as it were false bodies, and it must not be denied that they belong to the judgment of the eyes, it seems best to put them in the kind that comes about by reflection from nature. For every body placed before light reflects, and casts a shadow on the opposite side. Does anything seem to you to need contradicting? A. Nothing to me. But I am eagerly waiting to see where all this is heading. R. But we must patiently bear it until the other senses also report to us that falsity dwells in likeness to the true. For in hearing itself there are almost as many kinds of likenesses: as when, hearing the voice of a speaker whom we do not see, we think it is someone else whose voice is like his; and among inferior things, there is the witness of the echo, or that ringing of the ears themselves, or in clocks a certain imitation of the blackbird or the crow, or what dreamers or madmen think they hear. And it is incredible how much the notes musicians call false bear witness to truth, as will appear later; yet even they, which is enough for now, are not far from the likeness of those which they call true. Do you follow this? A. And most gladly; for I have no trouble understanding. R. Then, not to delay, does it seem to you that one lily can easily be distinguished from another by smell, or thyme honey from thyme honey of different hives by taste, or the softness of swan's feathers from goose's by touch? A. It does not. R. What when we dream that we smell, taste or touch such things? Are we not deceived by a likeness of images, the more inferior as it is emptier? A. You speak the truth. R. So it appears that in all the senses, whether in equal or in inferior things, we are either deceived by the enticement of likeness, or, even if we are not deceived, suspending assent or recognizing the difference, we nevertheless call those things false which we find to be like the true. A. I cannot doubt it. ### Translation notes - ‘In clocks a certain imitation of the blackbird or the crow’: probably water-clocks with mechanical bird calls. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.6 (PL 32:889; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-6). ## Soliloquies 2.7 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-7 - Source: PL 32:889–891 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason shows that likeness can make things true as well as false, and explains that he calls the work Soliloquies because Augustine questions and answers himself, which spares the shame of being refuted. ### Latin text R. Nunc attende, dum eadem rursum recurri­ mus, quo fiat apertius quod conamur ostendere. A. Eccum, loquere quod vis. Nam ego circumitum istum semel statui tolerare, neque in eo defatiscar spe tanta perveniendi quo nos tendere sentio. R. Bene facis. Sed attende utrum tibi videatur, cum ova similia videmus, aliquod eorum falsum esse recte nos posse dicere. A. Nullo modo videtur. Omnia enim si ova sunt, vera ova sunt. R. Quid, cum de speculo resul­ tare imaginem videmus? quibus signis falsam esse comprehendimus? A. Scilicet quod non tenetur, non sonat, non per se movetur, non vivit, et cæteris innu­ merabilibus, quae prosequi longum est. R. Video te nolle immorari, et properationi tuae mos gerendus est. Itaque, ne singula repetam, si et illi homines quos videmus in somnis, vivere, loqui, teneri a vigilantibus possent, nihilque inter ipsos differret et eos quos ex­ pergefacti ac sani alloquimur et videmus, numquid­ nam eos falsos diceremus? A. Quo pacto istud recte diceretur? R. Ergo si eo veri essent, quo veri sirnilli­ mi apparerent, nihilque inter eos et veros omnino distaret, eoque falsi quo per illas vel alias differentias dissimiles convincerentur; nonne similitudinem veri­ tatis matrem, et dissimilitudinem falsitatis esse faten­ dum est? A. Non habeo quid dicam, et pudet me tam temerariæ consensionis meae superioris. R. Ridiculum est si te pudet, quasi non ob idipsum elegerimus hujusmodi sermocinationes: quae quoniam cum solis nobis loquimur, Soliloquia vocari et inscribi volo; novo quidem et fortasse duro nomi­ ne, sed ad rem demonstrandam satis idoneo. Cum enim neque melius quaeri veritas possit, quam interrogando et respondendo, et vix quisquam inveniatur quem non pudeat convinci disputantem, eoque pene semper eveniat ut rem bene inductam ad discutien­ dum inconditus pervicaciæ clamor explodat, etiam cum laceratione animorum, plerumque dissimulata, interdum et aperta; pacatissime, ut opinor, et com­ modissime placuit, a meipso interrogatum mihique respondentem, Deo adjuvante, verum quærere: quare nihil est quod vereare, sicubi te temere illigasti, re­ dire atque resolvere; aliter hinc enim evadi non potest. ### English translation (Claude) R. Now attend, while we run over the same things again, so that what we are trying to show may become clearer. A. Here I am; say what you will. For I have resolved once for all to bear this roundabout way, and I will not grow weary in it, with such hope of reaching where I feel we are heading. R. You do well. But attend whether it seems to you that, when we see similar eggs, we can rightly say that any of them is false. A. In no way. For if they are all eggs, they are true eggs. R. What when we see an image reflected from a mirror? By what signs do we grasp that it is false? A. Obviously because it cannot be held, does not make a sound, does not move of itself, does not live, and by countless other signs which it would take long to go through. R. I see that you do not want to linger, and your haste must be humored. So, not to repeat each point, if those men we see in dreams could live, speak, and be held by those awake, and there were no difference between them and those whom we address and see when awake and sane, would we call them false? A. How could that rightly be said? R. So if they were true because they appeared most like the true, and there were no difference at all between them and the true, and false because they were proved unlike through those or other differences, must it not be admitted that likeness is the mother of truth, and unlikeness the mother of falsity? A. I do not know what to say, and I am ashamed of my rash consent earlier. R. It is ridiculous to be ashamed, as if we had not chosen conversations of this kind for that very reason. Since we are speaking with ourselves alone, I want them to be called and entitled Soliloquies, a new and perhaps harsh name, but quite suitable to show what the thing is. For since truth cannot be better sought than by questioning and answering, and hardly anyone is found who is not ashamed to be refuted in argument, and so it almost always happens that a matter well introduced for discussion is driven off by an unruly clamor of obstinacy, even with wounded feelings, usually concealed, sometimes open, it seemed to me most peaceful and most convenient to seek the truth, with God's help, by questioning myself and answering myself. So there is nothing for you to fear: if anywhere you have rashly entangled yourself, go back and untie the knot; for otherwise there is no escape from here. ### Translation notes - Augustine coins the title Soliloquia here. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.7 (PL 32:889–891; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-7). ## Soliloquies 2.8 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-8 - Source: PL 32:891 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Augustine is perplexed that falsity seems to arise from both likeness and unlikeness, and finds every definition of the true leading back into difficulties. ### Latin text A. Recte dicis; sed quid male concesserim non plane video: nisi forte id recte dici falsum quod ha­ beat aliquam veri similitudinem, cum prorsus mihi nihil aliud dignum falsi nomine occurrat; et rursus tamen cogor fateri eo falsa vocari quæ vocantur, quo a veris differunt. Ex quo conficitur eam ipsam dissi­ militudinem causam esse falsitatis. Itaque conturbor; non enim mihi facile quidquam venit in mentem, quod contrariis causis gignatur. R. Quid, si hoc unum est in rerum natura genus et solum quod ita sit? An ignoras, cum per animalium innumerabilia genera cucurreris, solum crocodilum inveniri qui superiorem in mandendo partem moveat; præsertim cum pene reperiri nihil queat ita cuique rei simile, ut non in aliquo etiam dissimile sit? A. Video quidem ista; sed cum considero illud quod falsum vocamus, et simile aliquid habere veri et dissimile, ex qua potius parte meruerit falsi nomen, non valeo discernere. Si enim ex eo quod dissimile est, dixero; nihil erit quod non falsum dici possit: nihil enim est quod non alicui rei dissimile sit, quam veram esse conce­ dimus. Item, si dixero eo quod simile est, falsum ap­ pellandum; non solum ova illa reclamabunt quae vera eo ipso sunt quo simillima, sed etiam sic non effu­ giam eum qui me coegerit falsa esse omnia confiteri, quod omnia sibi ex aliqua parte similia esse negare non possum. Sed fac me non metuere illud respon­ dere, similitudinem ac dissimilitudinem simul efficere ut aliquid falsum recte nominetur; quam mihi eva­ dendi viam dabis? Instabitur enim nihilominus ut omnia falsa esse renuntiem; quippe omnia sibimet, ut supra dictum est, et similia quadam ex parte, et dis­ similia reperiuntur. Restaret ut nihil aliud falsum esse dicerem, nisi quod aliter se haberet atque videretur, nisi vererer illa tot monstra quae me dudum enavigasse arbitrabar. Nam eo rursum repellor vertigine inopinata, ut verum id esse dicam quod ita se habet ut videtur. Ex quo confit sine cognitore nihil verum esse posse: ubi mihi naufragium in scopulis occultissimis formidandum est, qui veri sunt, etiamsi nesciantur. Aut, si verum esse id quod est dixero, falsum non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante. Itaque redeunt illi æstus, nec quidquam tanta patientia mo­ rarum tuarum processisse me video. ### English translation (Claude) A. You are right; but I do not plainly see what I granted wrongly, unless perhaps that it is rightly called false which has some likeness of the true, since nothing else at all occurs to me worthy of the name of false; and yet again I am compelled to admit that the things that are called false are so called because they differ from the true. From which it follows that that very unlikeness is the cause of falsity. So I am confused; for nothing easily comes into my mind that is produced by contrary causes. R. What if this is the one and only kind in the nature of things that is so? Or do you not know that, when you have run through the countless kinds of animals, the crocodile alone is found to move its upper jaw in chewing, especially since almost nothing can be found so like another thing that it is not also unlike it in something? A. I see that indeed; but when I consider that what we call false has both something like the true and something unlike, I cannot discern from which part rather it has earned the name of false. For if I say it is from what is unlike, there will be nothing that cannot be called false; for there is nothing that is not unlike some thing which we grant to be true. Again, if I say it is to be called false from what is like, not only will those eggs protest, which are true precisely because they are most alike, but even so I will not escape one who forces me to admit that all things are false, because I cannot deny that all things are in some respect like one another. But suppose I am not afraid to answer that likeness and unlikeness together make something rightly be called false: what way of escape will you give me? For I will nonetheless be pressed to declare that all things are false, since all things are found, as was said above, both like and unlike one another in some respect. It would remain for me to say that nothing else is false except what is otherwise than it seems, did I not fear all those monsters which I thought I had sailed past long ago. For I am driven back there by an unexpected whirlpool, so as to say that the true is that which is as it seems. From which it follows that nothing can be true without a knower; and there I must fear shipwreck on most hidden rocks, which are true even if they are not known. Or, if I say that the true is that which is, it will be concluded, whoever objects, that the false is nowhere. So those tides return, and I see that I have made no progress at all for all my patience with your delays. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.8 (PL 32:891; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-8). ## Soliloquies 2.9 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-9 - Source: PL 32:891–893 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason distinguishes what is false by intent to deceive or by invention from what is false because it tends to be something it is not, such as reflections, pictures, and dreams. ### Latin text R. Attende potius; nam nullo modo in animum inducam, frustra nos auxilium divinum implorasse. Video enim, tentatis quantum potuimus omnibus re­ bus, non remansisse quod falsum jure dicatur, nisi quod aut se fingit esse quod non est, aut omnino esse lon­ dit ct non est. Sed illud superius falsi genus, vel fallax etiam, vel mendax est. Nam fallax id recte dicitur quod habet quemdam fallendi appetitum; qui sine anima intelligi non potest: sed partim ratione fit, partim natura; ratione, in animalibus rationalibus, ut in homine; natura, in bestiis, tanquam in vulpecula. Illud autem quod mendax voco, a mentientibus fit. Qui hoc differunt a fallacibus, quod omnis fallax ap­ petit fallere; non autem omnis vult fallere qui men­ titur: nam et mimi et comoediæ et multa poemata mendaciorum plena sunt, delectandi potius quam fallendi voluntate, et omnes fere qui jocantur, men­ tiuntur. Sed fallax vel fallens is recte dicitur, cujus negotium est ut quisque fallatur. Illi autem qui non id agunt ut decipiant, sed tamen aliquid fingunt, vel mendaces tantum, vel si ne hoc quidem, mentientes tamen vocari nemo ambigit: nisi quid habes adversus ista quod dicas. A. Perge, quaeso; nunc enim fortasse de falsis non falsa docere coepisti: sed jam illud genus exspo­ cto quale sit quod dixisti, esse tendit et non est. R. Quidni exspectes? Eadem illa sunt, quorum multa supra memoravimus. Annon tibi videtur imago tua de spe­ culo quasi tu ipse velle esse, sed ideo esse falsa, quod non est? A. Valde hoc videtur. R. Quid omnis pictura vel cujuscemodi simulacrum, et id genus omnia opifi­ cuni? nonne illud esse contendunt, ad cujus quidque similitudinem factum est? A. Prorsus adducor. R. Jam ea quibus vel dormientes vel furentes falluntur, concedis, ut opinor, in eo esse genere. A. Et nulla magis: nam nulla magis tendunt talia esse, qualia vel vigilantes vel sani cernunt; et eo tamen falsa sunt, quo id quod tendunt esse non possunt. R. Quid jam de turrium motu, vel de merso remo, vel de umbris corporum plura dicam? Planum est, ut arbitror, ex hac regula esse metienda. A. Planissimum. R. Taceo de cæteris sensibus; nam nemo considerans non hoc inveniet, falsam appellari in rebus ipsis quas sen­ limus, quod esse aliquid tendit et non est. ### English translation (Claude) R. Attend rather; for in no way will I bring myself to believe that we have implored divine help in vain. For I see, having tried all things as far as we could, that nothing remains which can rightly be called false except what either pretends to be what it is not, or tends to be and is not. But the former kind of false is either deceitful or lying. For that is rightly called deceitful which has a certain desire to deceive, which cannot be understood without a soul; but this comes about partly by reason, partly by nature: by reason in rational animals, as in man; by nature in beasts, as in the fox. What I call lying comes from those who tell untruths. They differ from the deceitful in this, that everyone deceitful seeks to deceive, but not everyone who tells an untruth wishes to deceive; for mimes and comedies and many poems are full of untruths, with the intention of delighting rather than deceiving, and almost all who joke tell untruths. But he is rightly called deceitful or deceiving whose business it is that someone should be deceived. Those, however, who do not aim to deceive but nevertheless invent something, no one doubts may be called liars, or, if not even that, at least tellers of untruths, unless you have something to say against this. A. Go on, I beg you; for now perhaps you have begun to teach things about falsehoods that are not false. But now I am waiting to learn what that kind is like which you described: it tends to be and is not. R. Why should you not wait? They are those very things, many of which we mentioned above. Does not your image in a mirror seem to you as it were to want to be you yourself, but to be false precisely because it is not? A. That seems very much so. R. What of every picture or likeness of any kind, and all such works of craftsmen? Do they not strive to be that in whose likeness each was made? A. I am wholly persuaded. R. And the things by which sleepers or madmen are deceived you grant, I think, to be of this kind. A. None more so; for none tend more to be such as those awake or sane see; and yet they are false precisely in that they cannot be what they tend to be. R. Why should I say more about the motion of towers, or the oar in water, or the shadows of bodies? It is plain, I think, that they must be measured by this rule. A. Most plain. R. I say nothing of the other senses; for no one who considers will fail to find this: that in the very things we perceive, that is called false which tends to be something and is not. ### Translation notes - Latin distinguishes fallax (deceitful), mendax (lying), and mentiens (telling an untruth); the English keeps the distinction as far as possible. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.9 (PL 32:891–893; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-9). ## Soliloquies 2.10 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-10 - Source: PL 32:893 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason observes that actors, pictures, and reflections are true in one respect only by being false in another, and Augustine replies that he seeks a truth that is not two-faced in this way. ### Latin text A. Recte dicis: sed miror cur ab hoc genere tibi secernenda illa poemata et joca visa sunt, cæte­ ræque fallaciæ. R. Quia scilicet aliud est falsum esse velle, aliud verum esse non posse. Itaque ipsa opera hominum velut comoedias aut tragoedias, aut mimos, et id genus alia possumus operibus pictorum fictorum­ que conjungere. Tam enim verus esse pictus homo non potest, quamvis in speciem hominis tendat, quam illa quæ scripta sunt in libris comicorum. Neque enim falsa esse volunt, aut ullo appetitu suo falsa sunt; sed quadam necessitate, quantum fingentis arbitrium se­ qui potuerunt. At vero in scena Roscius voluntate falsa Hecuba erat, natura verus homo; sed illa volun­ tate etiam verus tragoedus, eo videlicet quo implebat institutum: falsus autem Priamus, eo quod Priamum assimilabat, sed ipse non erat. Ex quo jam nascitur quiddam mirabile, quod tamen ita se habere nemo ambigit. A. Quidnam id est? R. Quid putas, nisi hæc omnia inde esse in quibusdam vera, unde in quibus­ dam falsa sunt, et ad suum verum hoc solum eis prod­ esse, quod ad aliud falsa sunt? Unde ad id quod esse aut volunt aut debent, nullo modo perveniunt, si falsa esse fugiunt. Quo pacto enim iste quem commemo­ ravi, verus tragoedus esset, si nollet esse falsus He­ ctor, falsa Andromache, falsus Hercules, et alia in­ numera? aut unde vera pictura esset, si falsus equus non esset? unde in speculo vera hominis imago, si non falsus homo? Quare, si quibusdam, ut verum ali­ quid sint, prodest ut sint aliquid falsum; cur tanto­ pere falsitates formidamus, et pro magno bono appe­ limus veritatem? A. Nescio, et multum miror, nisi quia in exemplis istis nihil imitatione dignum video. Non enim tanquam histriones, aut de speculis quaeque relucentia, aut tanquam Myronis buculæ ex ære, ita etiam nos ut in nostro quodam habitu veri simus, ad alienum habitum adumbrati atque assimilati, et ob hoc falsi esse debemus; sed illud verum quaerere, quod non quasi bifronte ratione sibique adversanti, ut ex aliqua parte verum sit, ex aliqua falsum sit. R. Magna et divina quædam requiris. Quæ tamen si invenerimus, nonne fatebimur his ipsam confici, et quasi conflari veritatem, a qua denominatur omne quod verum quoquo modo nominatur? A. Non invitus assentior. ### English translation (Claude) A. You are right; but I wonder why you thought those poems and jokes and other deceptions should be separated from this kind. R. Because, of course, it is one thing to wish to be false, another to be unable to be true. So we can join the works of men themselves, such as comedies or tragedies or mimes and other things of this kind, with the works of painters and sculptors. For a painted man can no more be true, although he tends toward the appearance of a man, than the things that are written in the books of the comic poets. For they do not wish to be false, nor are they false by any desire of their own, but by a certain necessity, insofar as they have been able to follow the will of the one who fashions them. But on the stage Roscius was by his will a false Hecuba, by nature a true man; and by that will also a true tragic actor, namely in that he fulfilled what he had set out to do; but a false Priam, in that he imitated Priam but was not Priam himself. From this there arises something wonderful, which yet no one doubts is so. A. What is it? R. What do you think, except that all these things are true in some respects precisely by being false in others, and that the only thing that helps them toward their own truth is that they are false with respect to something else? Hence they in no way reach what they wish or ought to be if they shun being false. For how would that man I mentioned be a true tragic actor if he were unwilling to be a false Hector, a false Andromache, a false Hercules, and countless others? Or how would a picture be true if it were not a false horse? How would the image of a man in a mirror be true, if not a false man? Therefore, if it helps some things to be something false in order to be something true, why do we so dread falsehoods and seek truth as a great good? A. I do not know, and I wonder greatly, except that in these examples I see nothing worthy of imitation. For we ought not, like actors, or things reflected in mirrors, or Myron's bronze heifers, to be true in some character of our own by being shaped and made like another's character, and so be false; but we should seek that truth which is not, as it were, two-faced and at odds with itself, true in one respect and false in another. R. You are asking for great and divine things. Yet if we find them, will we not admit that from them truth itself is made up and, as it were, forged, from which everything that is called true in any way takes its name? A. I assent not unwillingly. ### Translation notes - Roscius: the famous Roman actor of Cicero's time. Myron: the Greek sculptor whose bronze heifer was proverbial for its lifelikeness. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.10 (PL 32:893; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-3/#p-2-10). ## Soliloquies 2.11 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-11 - Source: PL 32:893–895 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason argues that grammar and every discipline are true because they are disciplines, formed by the definitions and divisions of the art of disputation, so that truth is true through itself. ### Latin text R. Quid tibi ergo videtur? disciplina disputandi verane, an falsa est? A. Quis dubitet veram? Sed vera est etiam grammatica. R. Itane ut illa? A. Non video quid sit vero verius. R. Illud profecto quod nihil falsi habet: quod intuens paulo ante offendebare ex iis rebus quae nescio quomodo nisi falsae essent, veræ esse non possent. An ignoras omnia illa fabu­ losa et aperte falsa ad grammaticam pertinere? A. Non ignoro istud quidem; sed, ut opinor, non per gram­ maticam falsa sunt, sed per eam qualiacumque sunt, demonstrantur. Siquidem est fabula compositum ad utilitatem delectationemve mendacium. Est autem grammatica vocis articulatæ custos et moderatrix di­ sciplina: cujus professionis necessitate cogitur huma­ næ linguæ omnia etiam figmenta colligere, quæ me­ moriæ litterisque mandata sunt, non ea falsa faciens, sed de his veram quamdam docens asserensque ratio­ nem. R. Recte sane: nihil nunc curo, utrum abs te ista bene definita atque distincta sint; sed illud quæro. utrum hoc ita esse ipsa grammatica, an vero illa di­ sciplina disputationis ostendat. A. Non nego vim pe­ ritiamque definiendi, qua nunc ego ista separare co­ natus sum, disputatoriæ arti tribui. R. Quid ipsa grammatica? nonne si vera est, eo vera est quo disciplina est? Disciplina enim a di­ scendo dicta est: nemo autem quæ didicit ac tenet, nescire dici potest; et nemo scit falsa. Omnis ergo vera est disciplina. A. Non video quidem quid in ista ra­ tiuncula temere concedatur. Movet me tamen ne per istam cuipiam videatur etiam illas fabulas veras esse; nam et has discimus et tenemus. R. Numquidnam magister noster nolebat nos credere quæ docebat, et nosse? A. Imo vehementer ut nossemus instabat. R. Numquid aliquando institit ut Dædalum volasse cre­ deremus? A. Hoc quidem nunquam. Sed plane nisi teneremus fabulam, vix nos posse aliquid manibus tenere faciebat. R. Tu ergo negas verum esse quod ista fabula sit, et quod ita sit Dædalus diffamatus? A. Hoc non nego verum esse. R. Non negas ergo te di­ dicisse verum, cum ista didiceris. Nam si volasse Dae­ dalum verum est, et hoc pueri pro ficta fabula accipe­ rent atque redderent, eo ipso falsa retinerent, quo vera essent illa quae redderent. Hinc enim exstitit illud quod superius mirabamur, de volatu Dædali veram fabulam esse non potuisse, nisi Dædalum volasse falsum esset. A. Jam teneo istud; sed quid ex eo proficiamus ex­ specto. R. Quid, nisi non esse falsam illam rationem, qua collegimus disciplinam, nisi vera doceat, discipli­ nam esse non posse? A. Et hoc quid ad rem? R. Quia volo dicas mihi unde sit disciplina grammatica: inde enim vera est, unde disciplina est. A. Nescio quid tibi respondeam. R. Nonne tibi videtur, si nihil in ea de­ finitum esset, et nihil in genera et partes distributum atque distinctum, eam nullo modo disciplinam esse potuisse? A. Jam intelligo quid dicas; nec ulla mihi occurrit cujusvis facies disciplinæ, in qua non defini­ tiones ac divisiones et ratiocinationes, dum quid quid­ que sit declaratur, dum sine confusione partium sua cuique redduntur, dum nihil prætermittitur proprium, nihil annumeratur alienum, totum hoc ipsum quo disciplina dicitur egerint. R. Ergo et totum ipsum quo vera dicitur. A. Video consequi. R. Responde nunc quæ disciplina contineat de­ finitionum, divisionum, partitionumque rationes. A. Jam superius dictum est haec disputandi regulis con­ tineri. R. Grammatica igitur eadem arte creata est, ut disciplina, et ut vera esset, quæ est abs te superius a falsitate defensa. Quod non de una grammatica mihi licet concludere, sed prorsus de omnibus disciplinis. Nam dixisti, vereque dixisti, nullam disciplinam tibi occurrere, in qua non definiendi jus atque distribuendi idipsum, ut disciplina sit, fecerit. At, si eo verae sunt quo sunt disciplinae, negabitne quispiam, veritatem ipsam esse per quam omnes veræ sunt disciplinae? A. Prope est omnino ut assentiar: sed illud me movet, quod etiam rationem disputandi inter easdem disci­ plinas numeramus. Quare illam potius existimo esse veritatem, qua et ista ipsa ratio vera est. R. Optime omnino ac vigilantissime: sed non negas, ut opinor, eo veram esse quo disciplina est. A. Imo idipsum est quod me movet. Adverti enim etiam disciplinam esse, et ob hoc veram dici. R. Quid ergo? istam putas aliter disciplinam esse potuisse, nisi omnia in ea definita es­ sent et distributa? A. Nihil aliud habeo quod dicam. R. At, si ad eam pertinet hoc officium, per seipsam disciplina vera est. Quisquamne igitur mirum putabit, si ea qua vera sunt omnia, per se ipsa et in seipsa vera sit veritas? A. Nihil mihi obstat quominus recta per­ gam in istam sententiam. ### English translation (Claude) R. What then do you think? Is the discipline of disputation true or false? A. Who would doubt that it is true? But grammar too is true. R. In the same way as that one? A. I do not see what is truer than the true. R. Surely that which has nothing false in it; looking at which a little while ago you were offended by those things which somehow could not be true unless they were false. Or do you not know that all those fabulous and openly false things belong to grammar? A. I am not unaware of that; but, as I think, they are not false through grammar; rather, through it, whatever they are, they are explained. For a fable is a lie composed for usefulness or delight. And grammar is the discipline that guards and regulates articulate speech; by the necessity of its profession it is compelled to collect even all the fictions of human language which have been committed to memory and writing, not making them false, but teaching and asserting a certain true account of them. R. Quite right; I do not care now whether these things have been well defined and distinguished by you; but I ask this: whether it is grammar itself that shows this to be so, or that discipline of disputation. A. I do not deny that the power and skill of defining, by which I have now tried to separate these things, is attributed to the art of disputation. R. What of grammar itself? If it is true, is it not true in that it is a discipline? For ‘discipline’ is named from ‘learning’; and no one can be said not to know what he has learned and holds; and no one knows false things. Every discipline therefore is true. A. I do not see that anything is rashly granted in that little argument. Yet it troubles me that someone might think through it that those fables are also true; for we learn and hold them too. R. Surely our teacher did not want us to believe what he taught, as well as know it? A. On the contrary, he pressed vehemently that we should know it. R. Did he ever press us to believe that Daedalus flew? A. Never that. But plainly, unless we held the fable fast, he saw to it that we could scarcely hold anything in our hands. R. Do you then deny that it is true that there is such a fable, and that Daedalus is so reported? A. I do not deny that this is true. R. Then you do not deny that you learned something true when you learned these things. For if it were true that Daedalus flew, and boys received and recited this as an invented fable, they would retain something false precisely because what they recited was true. Hence arose that which we wondered at above: that there could not have been a true fable about Daedalus's flight unless it were false that Daedalus flew. A. Now I grasp that; but I am waiting to see what we gain from it. R. What, except that that reasoning is not false by which we concluded that a discipline cannot be a discipline unless it teaches true things? A. And what has this to do with the matter? R. Because I want you to tell me from where grammar is a discipline; for from where it is a discipline, from there it is true. A. I do not know what to answer you. R. Does it not seem to you that, if nothing in it were defined, and nothing distributed and distinguished into kinds and parts, it could in no way have been a discipline? A. Now I understand what you mean; and no face of any discipline occurs to me in which definitions, divisions and reasonings (while what each thing is is declared, while its own parts are given to each without confusion, while nothing proper is left out and nothing foreign counted in) have not produced the very thing by which it is called a discipline. R. And so also the whole thing by which it is called true. A. I see that it follows. R. Answer now what discipline contains the principles of definitions, divisions and partitions. A. It was said above that these are contained in the rules of disputation. R. So grammar was created by the same art, both to be a discipline and to be true, which you defended above against falsity. And this I may conclude not of grammar alone but of all disciplines without exception. For you said, and said truly, that no discipline occurs to you in which the right of defining and distributing has not made it a discipline. But if they are true in that they are disciplines, will anyone deny that it is truth itself through which all disciplines are true? A. I am very nearly ready to assent; but this troubles me, that we also count the method of disputation among these same disciplines. So I think that rather to be truth by which this method itself is true. R. Excellent and most watchful; but you do not deny, I think, that it is true in that it is a discipline. A. That is exactly what troubles me. For I noticed that it too is a discipline, and for this reason is called true. R. What then? Do you think it could have been a discipline otherwise than by everything in it being defined and distributed? A. I have nothing else to say. R. But if this function belongs to it, the discipline is true through itself. Will anyone then think it strange if truth, by which all things are true, is true through itself and in itself? A. Nothing hinders me from going straight on to that conclusion. ### Translation notes - ‘Discipline’ (disciplina) is derived from ‘learning’ (discere). ‘He saw to it that we could scarcely hold anything in our hands’: an allusion to the schoolmaster's beatings on the hands. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.11 (PL 32:893–895; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-11). ## Soliloquies 2.12 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-12 - Source: PL 32:895 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason and Augustine agree that what is inseparably in a subject, as a discipline is in the mind, cannot remain if the subject ceases to exist. ### Latin text R. Ergo attende pauca quæ restant. A. Profer si quid habes, modo tale sit quod intelligam, libenter­ que concedam. R. Esse aliquid in aliquo, non nos fugit duobus modis dici. Uno quo ita est, ut etiam se­ jungi atque alibi esse possit, ut hoc lignum in hoc loco, ut sol in oriente: altero autem quo ita est ali­ quid in subjecto, ut ab eo nequeat separari, ut in hoc ligno forma et species quam videmus, ut in sole lux, ut in igne calor, ut in animo disciplina, et si qua sunt alia similia. An tibi aliter videtur? A. Ista quidem ve­ tustissima sunt nobis, et ab ineunte adolescentia stu­ diosissime percepta et cognita: quare non possum de his interrogatus, quin ea sine ulla deliberatione con­ cedam. R. Quid illud? nonne concedis, quod in sub­ jecto est inseparabiliter, si subjectum ipsum non ma­ neat, manere non posse? A. Hoc quoque video neces­ sarium; nam manente subjecto, posse id quod in subjecto est non manere, quisquis diligenter res ad­ vertit, intelligit. Siquidem hujus corporis color potest vel valetudinis ratione vel ætate immutari, cum ipsum corpus necdum interierit. Et hoc non peraeque in omnibus valet, sed in his in quibus, non ut sint ipsa subjecta, ea quae in subjectis sunt coexistunt. Non enim ut sit iste paries, paries hoc colore fit, quem in eo videmus; cum etiam si quo casu nigrescat aut al­ bescat, vel aliquem alium mutet colorem, nihilominus tamen maneat paries ac dicatur. At vero ignis si ca­ lore careat, ne ignis quidem erit: nec nivem vocare, nisi candidam, possumus. ### English translation (Claude) R. Then attend to the few points that remain. A. Bring out whatever you have, provided it is such that I can understand and gladly grant. R. We are not unaware that something is said to be in something in two ways. One, in which it is so that it can also be separated and be elsewhere, as this wood in this place, as the sun in the east; the other, in which something is so in a subject that it cannot be separated from it, as in this wood the form and appearance we see, as light in the sun, as heat in fire, as a discipline in the mind, and any other similar things. Or does it seem otherwise to you? A. These things are very old to us, learned and known most diligently from early youth; so when asked about them I cannot but grant them without any deliberation. R. What about this: do you not grant that what is inseparably in a subject cannot remain if the subject itself does not remain? A. This too I see is necessary; for anyone who carefully considers things understands that, while the subject remains, what is in the subject may fail to remain. For the color of this body can be changed by reason of health or age, though the body itself has not yet perished. And this does not hold equally in all cases, but in those in which the things in the subjects do not coexist with them in order that the subjects themselves may exist. For this wall is not a wall by having the color we see in it; for even if by some chance it grows black or white or changes to some other color, it nonetheless remains a wall and is called one. But fire, if it lacks heat, will not even be fire; nor can we call snow snow unless it is white. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.12 (PL 32:895; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-12). ## Soliloquies 2.13 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-13 - Source: PL 32:895–897 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason concludes that, since truth always remains and discipline, which is truth, is inseparably in the mind, the mind must be immortal, while Augustine voices his fear that the soul may be extinguished like a light. ### Latin text Illud vero quod interrogasti, quis concesserit, aut cui posse fieri videatur, ut id quod in subjecto est, maneat ipso intereunte subjecto? Monstruosum enim et a veritate alienissimum est, ut id quod non esset nisi in ipso esset, etiam cum ipsum non fuerit possit esse. R. Illud igitur quod quærebamus inven­ tum est. A. Quid narras? R. Id quod audis. A. Jamne ergo liquido constat animum esse immortalem? R. Si ea quae Concessisti vera sint, liquidissime: nisi forte animum dicis, etiamsi moriatur, animum esse. A. Nun­ quam equidem hoc dixerim; sed eo ipso quo interit, fieri ut animus non sit, dico. Nec me ab hac sententia revocat, quod a magnis philosophis dictum est, eam rem quæ, quocumque venerit, vitam præstat, mortem in se admittere non posse. Quamvis enim lumen quo­ cumque intrare potuerit, faciat id lucere, tenebrasque in se propter memorabilem illam vim contrariorum non possit admittere; tamen exstinguitur, locusque ille exstincto lumine tenebratur. Ita illud quod tene­ bris resistebat, neque ullo modo in se tenebras ad­ misit, et sic eis intereundo locum fecit, ut poterat etiam discedendo. Itaque timeo ne mors ita contingat corpori, ut tenebræ loco, aliquando discedente animo ut lumine, aliquando autem ibidem exstincto; ut jam non de omni morte corporis securitas sit, sed aliquod genus mortis sit optandum, quo anima ex corpore in­ columis educatur, perducaturque ad locum, si est ul­ lus talis locus, ubi non possit exstingui. Aut, si ne hoc quidem potest, atque in ipso corpore anima quasi lu­ men accenditur, nec alibi potest durare, omnisque mors est exstinctio quaedam animae in corpore vel vitæ; aliquod genus eligendum est quantum homo si­ nitur, quo idipsum quod vivitur, cum securitate ac tranquillitate vivatur, quanquam nescio quomodo istud possit fieri si anima moritur. O multum beatos, quibus sive ab ipsis, sive abs quolibet, non esse me­ tuendam mortem, etiamsi anima intereat, persuasum est! At mihi misero nullæ adhuc rationes, nulli libri persuadere potuerunt. R. Noli gemere, immortalis est animus huma­ nus. A. Unde hoc probas? R. Ex iis quæ cum magna cautione, ut arbitror, superius concessisti. A. Nihil quidem me minus vigilanter interroganti tibi memini dedisse: sed collige jam ipsam summam, oro te; videamus quo tantis ambagibus pervenerimus, nec me jam interroges volo. Si enim ea breviter enumeratu­ rus es quæ concessi, quonam rursus responsio mea desideratur? An ut moras gaudiorum mihi frustra in­ feras, si quid boni forte confecimus? R. Faciam quod te velle video, sed attende diligentissime. A. Loquere jam, hic sum; quid enecas? R. Omne quod in subjecto est, si semper manet, ipsum etiam subjectum maneat semper necesse est. Et omnis in subjecto est animo disciplina. Necesse est igitur semper ut animus ma­ neat, si semper manet disciplina. Est autem disci­ plina veritas, et semper, ut in initio libri hujus ratio persuasit, veritas manet. Semper igitur animus ma­ net, nec animus mortuus dicitur. Immortalem igitur animum solus non absurde negat, qui superiorum aliquid non recte concessum esse convincit. ### English translation (Claude) A. But as for what you asked: who would grant, or to whom would it seem possible, that what is in a subject remains when the subject itself perishes? For it is monstrous and most foreign to truth that what would not exist unless it were in something could exist even when that thing does not exist. R. Then what we were seeking has been found. A. What are you saying? R. What you hear. A. Is it now clearly established, then, that the mind is immortal? R. If what you have granted is true, most clearly; unless perhaps you say that the mind, even if it dies, is a mind. A. I would never say that; but I say that by the very fact that it perishes, it comes about that it is not a mind. Nor am I called back from this opinion by what great philosophers have said, that a thing which brings life wherever it comes cannot admit death into itself. For although light makes shine whatever place it can enter, and cannot admit darkness into itself because of that memorable power of contraries, yet it is extinguished, and that place is darkened when the light is extinguished. So that which resisted darkness, and in no way admitted darkness into itself, nevertheless made room for it by perishing, as it could also have done by departing. So I fear that death may befall the body as darkness befalls a place, the mind sometimes departing like the light, but sometimes being extinguished on the spot; so that there is no security about every death of the body, but some kind of death must be wished for by which the soul may be led out of the body unharmed and brought to a place, if there is any such place, where it cannot be extinguished. Or if not even this is possible, and the soul is kindled in the body like a light and cannot last elsewhere, and every death is a kind of extinction of the soul, or of life, in the body, then some kind of life must be chosen, as far as a man is allowed, by which this very living may be lived with security and tranquillity, although I do not know how that could happen if the soul dies. O how happy are those who have been persuaded, whether by themselves or by anyone else, that death is not to be feared even if the soul perishes! But I, wretched as I am, have not yet been persuaded of it by any reasons or any books. R. Do not groan; the human mind is immortal. A. How do you prove this? R. From what you granted above, with great caution, I think. A. I do not remember having granted you anything without vigilance when you questioned me; but now gather up the sum itself, I beg you; let us see where we have arrived by such windings, and I do not want you to question me any more. For if you are going to list briefly what I granted, why is my answer wanted again? Or is it to inflict on me useless delays of joy, if perhaps we have achieved something good? R. I will do what I see you want, but attend most carefully. A. Speak now, I am here; why do you torture me? R. Everything that is in a subject, if it always remains, the subject itself must also always remain. And every discipline is in the mind as in a subject. So the mind must always remain, if discipline always remains. But discipline is truth, and truth always remains, as reason persuaded us at the beginning of this book. So the mind always remains, and the mind is not said to be dead. Therefore only he can deny without absurdity that the mind is immortal who proves that some of the earlier points were not rightly granted. ### Extrabiblical texts - Plato, Phaed. 105d (Plato (works)): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - ‘Great philosophers’: the argument of Plato, Phaedo 105c–106e, that the soul, which brings life, cannot admit death. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.13 (PL 32:895–897; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-13). ## Soliloquies 2.14 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-14 - Source: PL 32:897 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Augustine raises two doubts about the proof, the long way it took and how a discipline can be in untaught minds, and wishes for help from two men whose writings might settle the question. ### Latin text A. Jam me volo in gaudia mittere, sed duabus aliquantum revocor causis. Nam primum me movet quod circuitu tanto usi sumus, nescio quam ratioci­ nationum catenam sequentes, cum tam breviter totum de quo agebatur, demonstrari potuerit, quam nunc demonstratum est. Quare, me sollicitum facit quod tam diu quasi ad insidiandum obambulavit oratio. Deinde non video quomodo in animo semper sit disci­ plina, praesertim disputandi, cum et tam pauci ejus gnari sint, et quisquis eam novit, tanto ab infantia tempore fuerit indoctus. Non enim possumus dicere aut imperitorum animos non esse animos, aut esse in animo eam quam nesciant disciplinam. Quod si vehementer absurdum est, restat ut aut non semper in animo sit veritas, aut disciplina illa veritas non sit. R. Vides quam non frustra tantos circuitus egerit nostra ratiocinatio. Quærebamus enim quid sit veritas, quod ne nunc quidem in hac quadam silva rerum, omnibus pene callibus oberratis, video nos investigare potuisse. Sed quid facimus? An incepta omittimus, et exspectamus ecquid nobis librorum alienorum in manus incidat, quod huic quæstioni sa­ tisfaciat? Nam et multos ante nostram aetatem scriptos esse arbitror, quos non legimus: et nunc, ut nihil quod nescimus opinemur, manifestum habemus, et carmine de hac re scribi, et soluta oratione; et ab iis viris quorum nec scripta latere nos possunt, et eorum ingenia talia novimus, ut nos in eorum litteris quod volumus, inventuros desperare non possimus: prae­ sertim cum hic ante oculos nostros sit ille, in quo ipsam eloquentiam quam mortuam dolebamus, per­ fectam revixisse cognovimus. Hicne nos sinet, cum scriptis suis vivendi modum docuerit, vivendi igno­ rare naturam? A. Non arbitror equidem et multum inde spero, sed unum doleo quod vel erga se, vel erga sapientiam studium nostrum non ei ut volumus, valemus aperire. Nam profecto ille misereretur sitim nostram, et exundaret multo citius quam nunc. Se­ curus enim est, quod sibi jam totum de animæ im­ mortalitate persuasit, nec scit aliquos esse fortasse, qui hujus ignorationis miseriam satis cognoverunt, et quibus præsertim rogantibus non subvenire crudele sit. Ille autem alius novit quidem pro familiaritate ardorem nostrum; sed ita longe abest, et ita nunc constituti sumus, ut vix ad eum vel epistolæ mittendae facultas sit. Quem credo jam otio Transalpino per­ fecisse carmen quo mortis metus excantatus effugiat, et antiqua glacie duratus animæ stupor frigusque pellatur. Sed interim dum ista proveniunt, quæ in nostra potestate non sunt, nonne turpissimum est perire otium nostrum, et totum ipsum animum ex incerto arbitrio pendere deligatum? ### English translation (Claude) A. Now I want to throw myself into joy, but I am held back somewhat by two reasons. First, it troubles me that we used such a long roundabout way, following some chain of reasonings, when the whole matter in question could have been demonstrated as briefly as it has now been demonstrated. So it makes me anxious that the discourse walked about so long, as if laying an ambush. Next, I do not see how a discipline is always in the mind, especially that of disputation, when so few are acquainted with it, and whoever knows it was untaught for so long a time from infancy. For we cannot say either that the minds of the unskilled are not minds, or that a discipline they do not know is in their mind. And if that is extremely absurd, it remains either that truth is not always in the mind, or that that discipline is not truth. R. You see that our reasoning did not take such long ways around in vain. For we were seeking what truth is, which even now, in this forest of things, having wandered down almost every path, I do not see that we have been able to track down. But what shall we do? Shall we abandon what we have begun, and wait to see whether some book by others falls into our hands that will satisfy this question? For I think many were written before our time which we have not read; and now, not to suppose anything we do not know, we have it as certain that things are being written on this matter both in verse and in prose, and by men whose writings cannot escape us and whose talents we know to be such that we cannot despair of finding in their writings what we want; especially since here before our eyes is that man in whom we have recognized eloquence itself, which we were mourning as dead, come to life again perfected. Will he, who by his writings has taught the way of living, allow us to remain ignorant of the nature of living? A. I do not think so, and I hope much from that source; but one thing grieves me, that we cannot disclose to him, as we would wish, our zeal either toward him or toward wisdom. For surely he would pity our thirst, and would overflow much more quickly than now. For he is secure, because he has already fully persuaded himself about the immortality of the soul, and does not know that there may be some who have known well enough the misery of this ignorance, and whom it would be cruel not to help, especially when they ask. And that other man knows our ardor indeed, from our friendship; but he is so far away, and we are now so situated, that there is scarcely an opportunity even of sending him a letter. I believe that in his Transalpine leisure he has by now finished the poem by which the fear of death may be charmed away and flee, and the numbness and chill of the soul, hardened by ancient ice, may be driven out. But meanwhile, until these things come about, which are not in our power, is it not most shameful for our leisure to be wasted and our whole mind to hang bound on an uncertain will? ### Translation notes - The man ‘before our eyes’ in whom eloquence lives again is probably Ambrose of Milan; the identity of the friend writing a poem in ‘Transalpine leisure’ is uncertain (Zenobius, to whom On Order is dedicated, has been suggested). ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.14 (PL 32:897; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-14). ## Soliloquies 2.15 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-15 - Source: PL 32:897–899 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason restates the proof that truth cannot perish, then shows that something is called false only when it imitates the true, as a false statement imitates true ones or lead imitates silver. ### Latin text Ubi est quod Deum et rogavimus et rogamus, ut nobis non divitias, non corporis voluptates, non populares suggestus atque honores, sed animam no­ stram seque ipsum quærentibus, iter aperiat? Itane nos deseret, aut a nobis deseretur? R. Alienissimum quidem ab ipso est ut eos qui talia desiderant dese­ rat: unde a nobis quoque alienum esse debet ut tan­ tum ducem deseramus. Quare, si placet, repetamus breviter unde illa duo confecta sint, aut semper ma­ nere veritatem, aut veritatem esse disputandi ra­ tionem. Hæc enim vacillare dixisti, quo minus nos faciat totius rei summa securos. An potius illud quaeremus, quomodo esse possit in imperito animo disciplina, quem non possumus non animum dicere? Hinc enim commotus videbare, ut de illis quae con­ cesseras, dubitare rursus necesse fuerit. A. Imo discu­ tiamus prius illa, deinde hoc quale sit videbimus. Ita enim, ut opinor, nulla controversia remanebit. R. Ita fiat, sed adesto totus atque cautissimus. Scio enim quid tibi eveniat attendenti, dum nimis pendes in con­ clusionem, et ut jam jamque inferatur exspectas, ea quæ interrogantur non diligenter examinata concedis. A. Verum fortasse dicis; sed enitar contra hoc genus morbi quantum possum: modo jam tu incipe quæ­ rere, ne superfluis immoremur. R. Ex eo, quantum memini, veritatem non posse interire conclusimus, quod non solum si totus mundus intereat, sed etiam si ipsa veritas, verum erit et mundum et veritatem interisse. Nihil autem verum sine veritate: nullo modo igitur interit veritas. A. Agnosco ista, et multum miror si falsa sunt. R. Ergo illud alterum videamus. A. Sine me paululum consi­ derare, oro te, ne huc iterum turpiter redeam. R. Er­ gone interisse veritatem verum non erit? Si non erit verum, non ergo interit. Si verum erit, unde post occasum veritatis verum erit, cum jam veritas nulla est? A. Nihil habeo quid plus cogitem atque conside­ rem; perge ad aliud. Certe faciemus, quantum pos­ sumus, ut docti atque prudentes viri legant haec, et nostram, si qua est, corrigant temeritatem: nam me nec modo, nec aliquando arbitror quid contra hoc dicatur posse invenire. R. Numquidnam ergo dicitur veritas, nisi qua verum est quidquid verum est? A. Nullo modo. R. Numquidnam recte dicitur verum, nisi quod non est falsum? A. Hinc vero dubitare dementia est. R. Num falsum non est quod ad similitudinem alicujus accom­ modatum est, neque id tamen est cujus simile appa­ ret? A. Nihil quidem aliud video quod libentius falsum vocem. Sed tamen solet falsum dici, etiam quod a veri similitudine longe abest. R. Quis negat? sed ta­ men quod habeat ad verum nonnullam imitationem. A. Quomodo? Non enim cum dicitur, junctis alitibus anguibus Medeam volasse, ulla ex parte res ista verum imitatur; quippe quæ nulla sit, nec imitari aliquid possit ea res quae omnino non sit. R. Recte dicis; sed non attendis eam rem quæ omnino nulla sit, ne falsum quidem posse dici. Si enim falsum est, est: si non est, non est falsum. A. Non ergo dicemus illud de Medea, nescio quod monstrum, falsum esse? R. Non utique; nam si falsum est, quomodo monstrum est? A. Miram rem video: itane tandem cum audio, Angues ingentes alites junctos jugo. (Poeta apud Cic., de Invent. I, 19.) non dico falsum? R. Dicis plane: est enim quod fal­ sum esse dicas. A. Quid, quaeso? R. Illam scilicet sententiam quae ipso versu enuntiatur. A. Et quam tandem habet ista imitationem veri? R. Quia similiter enuntiaretur, etiamsi vere illud Medea fecisset. Imi­ tatur ergo ipsa enuntiatione veras sententias falsa sententia. Quæ si non creditur, eo solo imitatur veras quod ita dicitur, estque tantum falsa, non etiam fal­ lens. Si autem fidem impetrat, imitatur etiam creditas veras. A. Jam intelligo multum interesse inter illa quæ dicimus, et illa de quibus dicimus aliquid; quare jam assentior: nam hoc solo revocabar, quidquid falsum dicimus non recte dici, nisi habeat veri alicu­ jus imitationem. Quis enim lapidem falsum argentum esse dicens non jure rideatur? tamen si quisquam lapidem argentum esse dicat, dicimus falsum eum dicere, id est falsam proferre sententiam. Stannum autem vel plumbum non absurde, ut opinor, falsum argentum vocamus, quod id res ipsa velut imitatur: neque ex eo falsa est nostra sententia, sed illud ipsum de quo enuntiatur. ### English translation (Claude) A. What becomes of our having asked, and still asking, God to open the way for us, not to riches, not to bodily pleasures, not to popular platforms and honors, but as we seek our soul and himself? Will he so desert us, or be deserted by us? R. It is most foreign to him to desert those who desire such things; hence it ought also to be foreign to us to desert so great a guide. So, if you please, let us briefly go back over how those two points were established: that truth always remains, and that the method of disputation is truth. For you said these were wavering, so that the sum of the whole matter did not make us secure. Or shall we rather inquire how a discipline can be in an unskilled mind, which we cannot but call a mind? For you seemed disturbed by this, so that it became necessary to doubt again what you had granted. A. Rather let us first discuss those points; then we shall see what this is. For so, I think, no controversy will remain. R. So be it; but be present wholly and most cautiously. For I know what happens to you when you attend: while you hang too eagerly on the conclusion and wait for it to be drawn any moment, you grant what is asked without examining it carefully. A. Perhaps you speak the truth; but I will strive against this kind of disease as much as I can; only begin your questions now, so that we do not linger over superfluous things. R. As far as I remember, we concluded that truth cannot perish from this: that not only if the whole world perishes, but even if truth itself perishes, it will be true that both the world and truth have perished. But nothing is true without truth; in no way, therefore, does truth perish. A. I recognize these things, and I would be very surprised if they are false. R. Then let us look at the other point. A. Let me consider a little, I beg you, lest I come back here again shamefully. R. Will it then not be true that truth has perished? If it will not be true, then it does not perish. If it will be true, how will anything be true after the fall of truth, when there is no longer any truth? A. I have nothing further to think over and consider; go on to the next. Certainly we will do what we can so that learned and wise men may read these things and correct our rashness, if there is any; for I think that neither now nor at any time can I find what might be said against this. R. Is anything called truth except that by which whatever is true is true? A. In no way. R. Is anything rightly called true except what is not false? A. To doubt this is madness. R. Is not that false which is fashioned to the likeness of something, and yet is not that which it appears like? A. I see nothing else which I would more gladly call false. But yet that also is commonly called false which is far from likeness to the true. R. Who denies it? But still it is what has some imitation of the true. A. How? For when it is said that Medea flew with winged serpents yoked, that thing in no respect imitates the true; for it is nothing, and a thing which does not exist at all cannot imitate anything. R. You speak rightly; but you do not notice that a thing which is nothing at all cannot even be called false. For if it is false, it is; if it is not, it is not false. A. Shall we not then say that that monster, whatever it is, about Medea is false? R. Certainly not; for if it is false, how is it a monster? A. I see an amazing thing: when I hear, “Huge winged serpents joined beneath the yoke,” do I not say something false? R. You certainly do; for there is something that you can say is false. A. What, I ask? R. The statement, of course, which is expressed by the verse itself. A. And what imitation of the true does that have? R. That it would be expressed in the same way even if Medea had really done it. So the false statement imitates true statements by its very expression. If it is not believed, it imitates true statements only in that it is so said, and it is merely false, not also deceiving. But if it gains belief, it imitates also true statements that are believed. A. Now I understand that there is a great difference between the things we say and the things about which we say something; so now I assent; for I was held back only by this, that whatever we call false is not rightly so called unless it has an imitation of something true. For who would not rightly be laughed at for saying that a stone is false silver? Yet if anyone says that a stone is silver, we say that he is speaking falsely, that is, putting forth a false statement. But tin or lead we call false silver, not absurdly I think, because the thing itself imitates it, as it were; and it is not our statement that is false on that account, but the very thing of which it is spoken. ### Extrabiblical texts - Pacuvius (Pacuvius (fragments)): quotation, low confidence ### Translation notes - The verse about Medea is from a Latin tragedy quoted by Cicero, De inventione 1.19.27 (often assigned to Pacuvius's Medus); Migne's text gives the reference. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.15 (PL 32:897–899; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-15). ## Soliloquies 2.16 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-16 - Source: PL 32:899 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason and Augustine note that lead may be called false silver but not silver false lead, and touch on men who wear women's dress before returning to the point that the false always imitates the true. ### Latin text R. Bene intelligis. Sed illud vide, utrum et ar­ gentum falsi plumbi nomine congruenter appellare possimus. A. Non mihi placet. R. Quid ita? A. Ne­ scio; nisi illud video, vehementer contra voluntatem meam dici. R. Num forte propterea quod argentum melius est, et quasi in contumeliam ejus dicitur; plumbi autem quidam velut honor est, si falsum ar­ gentum vocetur? A. Prorsus explicasti quod volebam. Et ideo credo jure infames intestabilesque haberi, qui muliebri habitu se ostentant, quos nescio utrum fal­ sas mulieres, an falsos viros melius vocem. Veros ta­ men histriones, verosque infames sine dubitatione possumus vocare; aut, si latent nec infame quidquam nisi a turpi fama nominatur, veros nequam non sine veritate dicimus, ut opinor. R. Alius locus nobis erit de istis rebus disserendi: multa enim fiunt, quae quasi facie populari turpia videntur, aliquo tamen fine lau­ dabili honesta monstrantur. Et magna quæstio est utrum patriæ liberandæ causa muliebri tunica indutus, debeat hostem decipere, hoc ipso quo mulier falsa sit, fortasse verior vir futurus: et utrum sapiens qui ali­ quo modo certum habeat necessariam fore vitam suam rebus humanis, malit emori frigore, quam femineis vestibus, si aliud non sit, amiciri. Sed de hoc, ut dictum est, alias videbimus. Profecto enim cernis quan­ tae inquisitionis indigeat, quatenus ista progredi de­ beant, ne in quasdam inexcusabiles turpitudines deci­ datur. Nunc autem quod præsenti quæstioni satis est, jam puto apparere, neque dubitari non esse falsum quidquam nisi veri aliqua imitatione. ### English translation (Claude) R. You understand well. But see whether we can also fittingly call silver by the name of false lead. A. I do not like it. R. Why so? A. I do not know; except that I see it is said very much against my will. R. Perhaps because silver is better, and it is said as an insult to it, while it is a kind of honor to lead if it is called false silver? A. You have explained exactly what I wanted. And therefore I believe that those who show themselves in women's dress are rightly held infamous and disqualified from giving testimony; I do not know whether I should better call them false women or false men. Yet we can without hesitation call them true actors and truly infamous; or, if they are hidden, and nothing is called infamous except from evil fame, we say not without truth, I think, that they are truly worthless. R. We shall have another occasion to discuss these things; for many things are done which seem shameful in the eyes of the people, but are shown to be honorable by some praiseworthy end. And it is a great question whether a man, for the sake of freeing his country, ought to put on a woman's tunic and deceive the enemy, perhaps to be a truer man by the very fact of being a false woman; and whether a wise man who somehow held it certain that his life was necessary for human affairs should prefer to die of cold rather than be clothed in women's garments, if nothing else were available. But of this, as was said, we shall see another time. For surely you see how much inquiry is needed as to how far such things may go, lest one fall into certain inexcusable disgraces. But now, what is enough for the present question, I think it already appears, nor is it doubted, that nothing is false except by some imitation of the true. ### Translation notes - In Roman law actors were ‘infamous’ and could not serve as witnesses; Augustine applies this to men who appear in women's dress. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.16 (PL 32:899; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-16). ## Soliloquies 2.17 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-17 - Source: PL 32:899 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason argues that the void cannot be true, since it is nothing and truth cannot produce it, and Augustine agrees to set it aside. ### Latin text A. Proficiscere ad reliqua; nam hoc mihi bene persuasum est. R. Ergo illud quæro, utrum praeter disciplinas quibus erudimur, et quibus etiam ipsum studium sapientiæ annumerari decet, possimus quid­ quam ita verum invenire, quod non sicut theatricus Achilles ex aliqua parte falsum sit, ut ex alia verum esse possit? A. Mihi videntur multa inveniri. Non enim disciplinae istum habent lapidem, nec tamen, ut verus sit lapis, imitatur aliquid secundum quod falsus dica­ tur. Quo uno commemorato, vides jam innumerabili­ bus supersedendum esse, quae sponte occurrant cogi­ tantibus. R. Video prorsus. Sed nonne tibi videntur uno corporis nomine includi? A. Viderentur, si aut inane nihil esse certum haberem, aut ipsum animum inter corpora numerandum arbitrarer, aut etiam Deum corpus aliquod esse crederem. Quæ omnia si sunt, ad nullius imitationem falsa et vera esse video. R. In lon­ gum nos mittis, sed utar quantum possum compendio. Certe enim aliud est quod inane appellas, aliud quod veritatem. A. Longe aliud. Quid enim me inanius, si veritatem inane aliquid puto, aut tantopere aliquid inane appeto? Quid enim aliud quam veritatem inve­ nire desidero? R. Ergo et illud fortasse concedis, ni­ hil verum esse quod non veritate fiat ut verum sit. A. Jam hoc olim manifestum est. R. Num dubitas ni­ hil esse inane præter ipsum inane, aut certe corpus? A. Prorsus non dubito. R. Opinor ergo, veritatem corpus esse aliquod credis. A. Nullo modo. R. Quid in corpore? A. Nescio; nihil ad rem: arbitror enim vel illud te scire, si est inane, magis illud esse ubi nul­ lum sit corpus. R. Hoc sane planum est. A. Quid igi­ tur immoramur? R. An tibi aut veritas videtur fecisse inane, aut aliquid verum esse ubi veritas non sit? A. Non videtur. R. Non est ergo inane verum, quia ne­ que ab eo quod inane non est, inane fieri potest: et quod veritate caret, verum non esse manifestum est; et omnino ipsum quod inane dicitur, ex eo quod nihil sit dicitur. Quomodo igitur potest verum esse quod non est? aut quomodo potest esse quod penitus nihil est? A. Age nunc, inane tanquam inane deseramus. ### English translation (Claude) A. Proceed to the rest; for of this I am well persuaded. R. Then I ask this: whether, besides the disciplines in which we are instructed, among which the very pursuit of wisdom ought to be counted, we can find anything so true that it is not, like the Achilles of the theater, false in one respect in order to be true in another? A. Many things seem to me to be found. For the disciplines do not contain this stone, and yet in order to be a true stone it does not imitate anything according to which it might be called false. Having mentioned this one, you see that we may pass over countless others which occur of themselves to those who think. R. I see entirely. But do they not seem to you to be included under the one name of body? A. They would, if I either held it certain that the void is nothing, or thought that the mind itself should be counted among bodies, or also believed that God is some body. If all these exist, I see that they are false and true by imitation of nothing. R. You are sending us on a long journey, but I will use as short a way as I can. Certainly what you call the void is one thing, and what you call truth another. A. Very different. For what would be more void than I, if I thought truth something void, or sought so eagerly something void? For what else do I desire to find but truth? R. So perhaps you also grant that nothing is true which is not made true by truth. A. That has long been clear. R. Do you doubt that nothing is void except the void itself, or at any rate body? A. I do not doubt at all. R. Then, I suppose, you believe truth is some body. A. In no way. R. What, something in a body? A. I do not know; it is nothing to the point; for I think you know at least this, that if there is a void, it is rather where there is no body. R. That is plain indeed. A. Why then do we linger? R. Does it seem to you either that truth has made a void, or that something is true where truth is not? A. It does not. R. So the void is not true, because neither can a void be made by what is not void; and what lacks truth is clearly not true; and the very thing called void is so called from being nothing. How then can that be true which does not exist? Or how can that exist which is nothing at all? A. Come now, let us leave the void as void. ### Translation notes - ‘Do you doubt that nothing is void except the void itself, or at any rate body?’ The Latin is obscure; translated literally. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.17 (PL 32:899; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-17). ## Soliloquies 2.18 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-18 - Source: PL 32:899–901 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason shows that bodies are only imitations of truth, since the figures in bodies fall short of the true figures of geometry, which dwell in truth itself. ### Latin text R. Quid de cæteris dicis? A. Quid? R. Quod vides mihi plurimum suffragari. Restat enim animus et Deus, quae duo si propterea vera sunt quod in his est veritas, de immortalitate Dei nemo dubitat. Ani­ mus autem immortalis creditur, si veritas quæ interire non potest, etiam in illo esse probatur. Quare jam il­ lud ultimum videamus, utrum corpus non sit vere verum, id est non in eo sit veritas, sed quasi quædam imago veritatis. Nam si et in corpore, quod satis cer­ tum est recipere interitum, tale verum invenerimus, quale est in disciplinis, non continuo erit disputandi disciplina veritas, qua omnes verae sunt disciplinæ. Verum est enim et corpus quod non videtur disputandi ratione esse formatum. Si vero et corpus imitatione aliqua verum est, et ob hoc non ad liquidum verum, nihil erit fortasse quod impediat disputandi rationem, quominus ipsa veritas esse doceatur. A. Interim quae­ ramus de corpore; nam ne hoc quidem cum consti­ terit, video istam controversiam terminatam. R. Unde scis quid velit Deus? Itaque attende: nam ego puto corpus aliqua forma et specie contineri, quam si non haberet, corpus non esset; si veram haberet, animus esset. An aliter putandum est? A. Assentior in parte, de cætero dubito; nam, nisi teneatur aliqua figura, corpus non esse concedo. Quomodo autem, si eam veram haberet, animus esset, non satis intelligo. R. Nihilne tandem de primi libri exordio, et de illa tua geometrica recordaris? A. Bene commemorasti; re­ cordor prorsus, ac libentissime. R. Talesne in corpo­ ribus figuræ inveniuntur, quales illa disciplina demon­ strat? A. Imo incredibile est quanto deteriores esse convincuntur. R. Quas ergo istarum veras putas? A. Ne quæso, etiam istuc me interrogandum putes. Quis enim mente tam caecus est qui non videat, istas quae in geometrica docentur, habitare in ipsa veritate, aut in his etiam veritatem; illas vero corporis figuras, si­ quidem quasi ad istas tendere videntur, habere ne­ scio quam imitationem veritatis, et ideo falsas esse? Jam enim totum illud quod ostendere moliebaris in­ telligo. ### English translation (Claude) R. What do you say about the other things? A. What? R. That you see they strongly support me. For there remain the mind and God; and if these two are true because truth is in them, no one doubts the immortality of God. And the mind is believed immortal if truth, which cannot perish, is proved to be in it too. So let us now look at this last point: whether body is not truly true, that is, whether truth is not in it, but as it were a certain image of truth. For if in body too, which quite certainly undergoes destruction, we find something true of the kind that is in the disciplines, the discipline of disputation will not straightway be the truth by which all disciplines are true. For body too is true, which does not seem to be formed by the method of disputation. But if body too is true by some imitation, and for that reason not clearly true, there will perhaps be nothing to prevent the method of disputation from being shown to be truth itself. A. Meanwhile let us inquire about body; for not even when this is settled do I see that controversy ended. R. How do you know what God wills? So attend: for I think that body is held together by some form and appearance, and if it did not have it, it would not be body; if it had a true one, it would be mind. Or should we think otherwise? A. I agree in part; about the rest I doubt; for I grant that unless it is held by some figure it is not body. But how, if it had a true one, it would be mind, I do not quite understand. R. Do you remember nothing at all from the beginning of the first book, and that geometry of yours? A. You have reminded me well; I remember entirely, and most gladly. R. Are such figures found in bodies as that discipline demonstrates? A. On the contrary, it is incredible how much inferior they are proved to be. R. Which of them, then, do you think are true? A. Please do not think you must question me even on that. For who is so blind in mind as not to see that the figures taught in geometry dwell in truth itself, or truth in them, while those figures of body, since they seem as it were to tend toward these, have some sort of imitation of truth, and are therefore false? For now I understand the whole thing you were laboring to show. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.18 (PL 32:899–901; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-18). ## Soliloquies 2.19 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-19 - Source: PL 32:901 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason concludes that since the true figures of geometry, and so truth, are in the mind as in a subject, the soul is immortal, and defers the question of the untaught mind to another book. ### Latin text R. Quid ergo jam opus est ut de disciplina dis­ putationis requiramus? Sive enim figura geomelri­ cæ in veritate, sive in eis veritas sit, anima nostra, id est intelligentia nostra, contineri nemo ambigit, ac per hoc in nostro animo etiam veritas esse cogitur. Quod si quælibet disciplina ita est in animo, ut in subjecto inseparabiliter, nec interire veritas potest; quid, quæso, de animi perpetua vita, nescio qua mor­ tis familiaritate dubitamus? An illa linea vel quadra­ ura vel rotunditas habent alia quæ imitentur ut vera sint? A. Nullo modo id possum credere, nisi forte aliud sit linea quam longitudo sine latitudine, et aliud circulus quam linea circumducta undique ad mediam æqualiter vergens. R. Quid ergo cunctamur? An ubi ista sunt, veritas non est? A. Avertat Deus amentiam. R. An disciplina non est in animo? A. Quis hoc dixerit? R. Sed forte potest, intereunte subjecto, id quod in sub­ jecto est permanere? A. Quando mihi hoc persuadetur? R. Restat ut occidat veritas. A. Unde fieri potest? R. Immortalis est igitur anima: jamjam crede rationibus tuis, crede veritati; clamat et in te esse habitare, et im­ mortalem esse, nec sibi suam sedem quacumque corporis morte posse subduci. Avertere ab umbra tua, rever­ tere in te; nullus est interitus tuus, nisi oblitum te esse quod interire non possis. A. Audio, resipisco, recolere incipio. Sed, quaeso, illa quae restant expedias, quomodo in animo imperito, non enim eum mortalem dicere possumus, disciplina et veritas esse intelligan­ tur. R. Aliud ista quaestio volumen desiderat, si eam vis tractari diligenter: simul et illa quae, ut potuimus, investigata sunt, recensenda tibi esse video; quia si nihil eorum quae concessa sunt dubium est, multum nos egisse arbitror, nec cum parva securitate cætera quærere. ### English translation (Claude) R. What need is there now, then, to inquire about the discipline of disputation? For whether the geometrical figures are in truth or truth in them, no one doubts that they are contained in our soul, that is, in our intelligence, and by this truth too is compelled to be in our mind. And if any discipline is in the mind as inseparably in a subject, and truth cannot perish, why, I ask, do we doubt about the perpetual life of the mind, through some kind of familiarity with death? Or do that line or square or roundness have other things that they imitate in order to be true? A. In no way can I believe that, unless perhaps a line is something other than length without breadth, and a circle something other than a line drawn round, everywhere equally inclined to the middle. R. Why then do we hesitate? Or is truth not where these are? A. God forbid such madness. R. Or is discipline not in the mind? A. Who would say that? R. But perhaps, when the subject perishes, what is in the subject can remain? A. When would I be persuaded of that? R. It remains that truth perishes. A. How can that happen? R. So the soul is immortal. Now believe your reasonings, believe the truth; it cries out that it dwells in you, and that it is immortal, and that its seat cannot be taken from it by any death of the body. Turn away from your shadow, turn back into yourself; there is no perishing for you, except to forget that you cannot perish. A. I hear, I come to my senses, I begin to recollect. But I beg you, settle what remains: how discipline and truth are to be understood to be in an unskilled mind, for we cannot call it mortal. R. That question needs another volume, if you want it treated carefully; at the same time I see that you should review the things that have been investigated as far as we could; because if nothing of what has been granted is doubtful, I think we have done much, and may seek the rest with no small security. ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.19 (PL 32:901; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-11/#p-2-19). ## Soliloquies 2.20 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-20/#p-2-20 - Source: PL 32:901–903 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Reason explains the difference between true figures known by the intelligence and the images formed by thought, using the kinds of forgetting and remembering, and closes by promising that God will grant a blessed life full of truth after this body. ### Latin text A. Ita est ut dicis, et obtempero praeceptis tuis libens. Sed illud saltem impetrem, antequam termi­ num volumini statuas, ut quid intersit inter veram figuram, quæ intelligentia continetur, et eam quam sibi fingit cogitatio, quæ graece sive phantasia sive phantasma dicitur, breviter exponas. R. Hoc quæris quod videre nisi mundissimus non potest, et ad cujus rei visionem parum es exercitatus; neque nunc per istos circuitus aliud quam exercitationem tuam, ut il­ lud videre sis idoneus, operamur: tamen interesse plu­ rimum quomodo possit doceri, fortasse breviter pla­ num facio. Fac enim te aliquid esse oblitum, aliosque te velle quasi in memoriam revocare. Dicunt ergo illi: Numquidnam hoc est, aut illud? diversa velut si­ milia proferentes. Tu vero nec illud vides quod recor­ diri cupis, et tamen vides non hoc esse quod dicitur. Numquidnam tibi cum hoc evenit, omni modo videtur oblivio? Nam ipsa discretio, qua non admittitur quod falso admoneris, pars quædam recordationis est. A. Ita videtur. R. Tales ergo nondum verum vident; falli tamen decipique non possunt; et quid quaerant, satis norunt. At si tibi quispiam dicat te post paucos dies risisse quam natus es, non audes dicere falsum esse: et si auctor sit cui fides habenda est, non recordatu­ rus, sed crediturus es; totum enim tempus illud validissima oblivione tibi sepultum est: an aliter putas? A. Prorsus consentio. R. Hæc igitur ab illa oblivione plurimum differt, sed illa media est. Nam est aliud re­ cordationi revisendæque veritati propior atque vici­ nior: cui simile est quando videmus aliquid, certoque recognoscimus id nos vidisse aliquando, atque nosse affirmamus; sed ubi, aut quando, aut quomodo, aut apud quem nobis in notitiam venerit, satagimus re­ petere atque recolere. Ut si de homine nobis contige­ rit, etiam quaerimus ubi eum noverimus: quod cum ille commemoraverit, repente tota res memoriæ quasi lumen infunditur, nihilque amplius, ut reminiscamur, laboratur. An hoc genus ignotum tibi est, aut obscu­ rum? A. Quid hoc planius? aut quid crebrius mihi ac­ cidere solet? R. Tales sunt qui bene disciplinis liberalibus eruditi; siquidem illas sine dubio in se oblivione ob­ rutas eruunt discendo, et quodammodo refodiunt: nec tamen contenti sunt, nec se tenent donec totam faciem veritatis, cujus quidam in illis artibus splendor jam subrutilat, latissime atque plenissime intuean­ tur. Sed ex his quidam falsi colores atque formæ, velut in speculum cogitationis se fundunt, falluntque inqui­ rentes sæpe, ac decipiunt putantes illud totum esse quod norunt vel quod inquirunt. Ipsæ sunt illæ ima­ ginationes magna cautione vitandæ; quæ deprehen­ duum fallaces, cum cogitationis variato quasi speculo variantur, cum illa facies veritatis una et immutabilis maneat. Tum enim alterius atque alterius magnitudi­ nis quadratum sibi cogitatio depingit, et quasi ante oculos præfert; sed mens interior quai vult verum vi­ dcre, ad illud se potius convertat, si potest, secundum quod judicat illa omnia esse quadrata. A. Quid, si nobis quispiam dicat secundum id eam judicare, quod videre oculis solet? R. Quare ergo judicat, si tamen bene erudita est, quantamvis pilam veram vera pla­ nitie puncto tangi? Quid tale unquam oculus vidit, aut videre potest, cum ipsa imaginatione cogitationis fingi quidquam hujusmodi non potest? Annon hoc probamus, cum etiam minimum circulum imaginando animo describimus, et ab eo lineas ad centrum duci­ mus? Nam cum duas duxerimus, inter quas quasi acu vix pungi possit, alias jam in medio non possumus ipsa cogitatione imaginaria ducere, ut ad centrum sine ulla commixtione perveniant; cum clamet ratio innu­ merabilcs posse duci, nec sese in illis incredibilibus angustiis nisi centro posse contingere, ita ut in omni earum intervallo scribi etiam circulus possit. Hoc cum illa phantasia implere non possit, magisque quam ipsi oculi, deficiat, siquidem per ipsos est animo inflicta, manifestum est et multum eam differre a veritate, et illam, dum hæc videtur, non videri. Hæc dicentur operosius atque subtilius, cum de intelligendo disserere cœperimus, quæ nobis pars proposita est, cum de animæ vita quidquid sollicitat, fuerit quantum valemus enucleatum atque discussum. Non enim credo te parum formidare ne mors humana, etiamsi non interimat animam, rerum tamen omnium, et ipsius, si qua comperta fuerit, veritatis oblivionem inferat. A. Non potest satis dici quantum hoc malum metuendum sit. Qualis enim erit illa aeterna vita, vel quae mors non ei præponenda est, si sic vivit anima, ut videmus eam vivere in puero mox nato? ut de illa vita nihil dicam quæ in utero agitur; non enim puto esse nullam. R. Bono animo esto; Deus aderit, ut jam sentimus, quærentibus nobis, qui beatissimum quid­ dam post hoc corpus, et veritatis plenissimum sine ullo mendacio pollicetur. A. Fiat ut speramus. ### English translation (Claude) A. It is as you say, and I gladly obey your precepts. But let me obtain at least this before you set an end to the volume: that you briefly explain the difference between the true figure, which is contained in the intelligence, and that which thought forms for itself, which in Greek is called phantasia or phantasma. R. You are asking about what no one can see unless most pure, and for the sight of which you are too little exercised; and by these roundabout ways we are now working at nothing else than your exercise, so that you may become fit to see it. Yet perhaps I can briefly make plain how it can be taught that the difference is very great. Suppose you have forgotten something, and others wish to recall it, as it were, to your memory. They say: Is it this, or that?, bringing forward different things as if similar. And you do not see what you wish to remember, and yet you see that it is not what is said. When this happens to you, does it seem to be complete forgetting? For that very discernment, by which what you are wrongly reminded of is not admitted, is a certain part of remembering. A. So it seems. R. Such people, then, do not yet see the truth; yet they cannot be misled and deceived, and they know well enough what they are seeking. But if someone tells you that you laughed a few days after you were born, you do not dare to say it is false; and if the source is one to be trusted, you will not remember but believe; for that whole time is buried for you in the deepest forgetfulness. Or do you think otherwise? A. I agree entirely. R. This forgetfulness, then, differs greatly from that one; but that one is in the middle. For there is another, nearer and closer to remembering and seeing the truth again; like it is when we see something and recognize with certainty that we saw it at some time and affirm that we knew it, but take pains to recover and recall where, or when, or how, or through whom it came into our knowledge. As if it happens with a man, we even ask where we knew him; and when he has reminded us, suddenly the whole thing pours into memory like light, and no more labor is needed to remember. Or is this kind unknown or obscure to you? A. What is plainer than this? Or what usually happens to me more often? R. Such are those who are well educated in the liberal disciplines; for in learning they undoubtedly dig out these things, buried in forgetfulness within them, and in a way unearth them; yet they are not content, nor do they stop until they behold most widely and most fully the whole face of truth, of which a certain splendor already gleams in those arts. But from these some false colors and forms pour themselves, as it were, into the mirror of thought, and often mislead the inquirers, and deceive them into thinking that this is the whole of what they know or what they seek. These are the very imaginations which must be avoided with great caution; they are detected as deceptive when they vary as the mirror of thought varies, while that face of truth remains one and unchangeable. For then thought paints for itself a square of now one size, now another, and holds it as it were before its eyes; but the inner mind, which wishes to see the true, should turn rather, if it can, to that according to which it judges that all these are squares. A. What if someone tells us that it judges according to what it is accustomed to see with the eyes? R. Why then does it judge, if it is well educated, that a true sphere of any size touches a true plane at a point? What eye has ever seen anything such, or can see it, when nothing of the kind can be formed even by the imagination of thought? Do we not prove this when we describe in imagination even the smallest circle in the mind, and draw lines from it to the center? For when we have drawn two, between which a needle could scarcely prick, we can no longer draw others in the middle by imaginary thought so that they reach the center without any merging; though reason cries out that countless lines can be drawn, and that they cannot touch one another in those incredible narrows except at the center, so that in every interval between them a circle could even be drawn. Since that phantasy cannot accomplish this, and fails more than the eyes themselves, since it is through them that it was imprinted on the mind, it is clear both that it differs greatly from truth and that, while it is seen, truth is not seen. These things will be discussed more laboriously and subtly when we begin to treat of understanding, which is the part we have set before us, once whatever troubles us about the life of the soul has been explained and discussed as far as we are able. For I believe you are not a little afraid that human death, even if it does not kill the soul, may still bring forgetfulness of all things, and of truth itself, if any has been found. A. It cannot be said enough how much this evil is to be feared. For what kind of eternal life will that be, or what death is not to be preferred to it, if the soul lives as we see it live in a newborn child? Not to speak of that life which is lived in the womb; for I do not think there is none. R. Be of good courage; God will be present, as we already feel as we seek, who promises something most blessed after this body, and most full of truth, without any falsehood. A. May it be as we hope. ### Translation notes - The comparison of learning with recovering what is buried in forgetfulness recalls Plato's doctrine of recollection; Augustine later qualified this passage (Retractations 1.4.4). ### Citation (SBL) Augustine, Sol. 2.20 (PL 32:901–903; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-20/#p-2-20).