# The Teacher

- Author: [Augustine of Hippo](https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/authors/augustine-of-hippo/)
- Latin title: *De magistro*
- Date: 389 (probable)
- Source: J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina, vol. 32 (Paris, 1841), cols. 1193–1220 (Benedictine text of the Maurists) (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Latina, digitized by Open Greek and Latin (patrologia_latina-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0)

- Translation: Claude, from the original text, unless a passage says otherwise; each passage below gives the translator
- Work page: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/
- Passages: 14

## The Teacher 1

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-1
- Source: PL 32:1194–1195
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine and his son Adeodatus agree that speech serves to teach or to remind, and that even prayer in words serves only to remind ourselves or others, since God dwells in the inner man.

### Latin text

AUGUSTINUS: Quid tibi videmur efficere velle cum loquiniur? ADEODATUS: Quantum quidem mibi nunc occurrit, aut docere, aut discere. Aug. Unum torum video et assentior: nam loquendo nos doccre velle manifestum est; discere autem quomodo? Ad. Quo tandem censes, nisi cum interrogamus? Aug. Etiam tunc nibil aliud quam docere nos velle intelligo. Nam quæro abs te, utrum ob aliam causam interroges. nisi ut eum quem interrogas doceas quid velis? Ad. Verum dicis. Aug. Vides ergo jam nihil nos locutione, nisi ut deccamus appetere. Ad. Non plane video:: nam si nihil est aliud loqui quam verba promcre, vidco nos id facere cum cantamus. Quod cum soli sxpe facimus, nullo praesente qui discat, non puto nos docere aliquid,.lle. Aug. At ego puto esse quoddam genus docendi per commemorationem, magnum sane, quod in nostra hac sermocinatione res ipsa indicabit. Sed si tu non arbitraris nos discere cum recordamur, nec docere illum qui commemorat, non rcsisto tibi: et duas jam loquendi causas constituo, aut ut doccamus, aut ut commemoremus vel alios vel nosmelipsos; quod etiam dum cantamus, efficimus: an tibi non videtur? Ad. Non prorsus: nam rarum admodum cst, ut ego can­ tcm commemorandi me gratia, sed tantummodo de­ lectandi. Aug. Videoquid sentias. Sed nonne attendis id quod te delectat in cantu modulationem quamdam esse soni; quæ quoniam verbis ct addi et detrahi po­ test, aliud est loqui, aliud est cantare? Nam ei tibiis et cithara cantatur, et aves cantant. et nos interdum sine verbis musicum aliquid sonamus, qui sonus can­ tus dlci potest, locutio non potest: an quidquam est quod contradicas? Ad. Nihil sane. Aug. Vidctur ergo tibi, nisi aut docendi, aut com­ memorandi causa non esse institutam locutionem? Ad. Videretur, nisi me moveret quod dum oramus, utique loquimur; nec tamen Deum aut doceri aliquid a no­ bis, aut commemorari £as est credere. Aug. Nescire te arbitror non ob aliud nobis præceptum esse ut in clausis cubiculis oremus, quo nomine si­ gnificantur mentis penetralia, nisi quod Deus, ut nobis quod cupimus præstet, commemorari aut doceri nostra locutione non quærit. Qui enim loquitur, suæ voluntatis signum foras dat per articulatum sonum: Deus autem in ipsis rationalis animae secretis, qui bomo interior vocatur, et quærendus et deprecandus est; hæc enim sua templa esse voluit. Anapud Apostolum uon legisti, Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et spiritus Dei habitat in vobis; et, In interiore homine habitare Christum?(Ephes. in, 16, 17.) Nee in propheta animad­ vertisti, Dicite in cordibus vestras, et in cubilibus vestris compungimini: sacrificate sacrificium justitiæ, et sperate in Domino? ( Psal. IV, 5, G.) Ubi putas sacrificium justitiæ sacrilicari, nisi in templo mentis, et in cubilibus cor­ dis? Ubi autem sacrificandum est, ibi et orandum. Quare non opus cst locutione cum oramus, id est sonantibus verbis, nisi forte, sicut sacerdotes faciunt, significandæ mentis suae causa, non ut Dens, sed ut homines au­ diant, et consensione quadam per commemorationem suspendantur in Deum: an tu aliud existimas? Ad, Omnino assentior. Aug. Non te ergo movct quod sum­ mus Magister cum orare doceret discipulos, verba quæ­ dam docuit; in quo nihil aliud videtur fecisse, quam docuisse quomodo in orando loqui opor­ teret? Ad. Nibil me omnino istud movct: non enim. verba, sed res ipsas eos verbis docuit, quibus ct seipsi commonefacerent, a quo, cl quid esse! orandum, cum in penetralibus, ut dictum est, mentis orarent. Aug. Recte intelligis: simul enim tc credo animadvertere, etiamsi quisquam contendat, quamvis nullum edamus sonum, tamen quia ipsa verba cogitamus, nos intus apud animum loqui, sic quoque locutione nibil aliud agcre quam commonere, cum memoria cui verba in­ hærent, ea revolvendo facit vcnire in mentem res ipsas quarum signa sunt verba. Ad. Intelligo ac sequor.

### English translation (Claude)

Augustine: What do you think we want to accomplish when we speak?
Adeodatus: As far as it occurs to me now, either to teach or to learn.
A. One of these I see and agree with: for it is plain that by speaking we want to teach; but to learn, how?
Ad. How else, do you think, but when we ask questions?
A. Even then I understand that we want nothing but to teach. For I ask you, do you ask a question for any other reason than to teach the person you ask what you want?
Ad. You are right.
A. So you see now that by speaking we seek nothing but to teach.
Ad. I do not quite see it: for if speaking is nothing but uttering words, I see that we do this when we sing. And since we often do that alone, with no one present to learn, I do not think we want to teach anything.
A. But I think there is a certain kind of teaching by reminding, a great one indeed, as the matter itself will show in this conversation of ours. But if you do not think that we learn when we remember, or that one who reminds teaches, I do not resist you; and I now set down two reasons for speaking: either to teach, or to remind others or ourselves; which we also do when we sing. Or do you not think so?
Ad. Not at all: for it is very rare that I sing to remind myself, but only to delight myself.
A. I see what you mean. But do you not notice that what delights you in singing is a certain modulation of sound; and since this can be added to words and taken away from them, speaking is one thing and singing another? For there is singing on flutes and on the lyre, and birds sing, and we sometimes produce a musical sound without words, a sound that can be called song but cannot be called speech. Is there anything you would say against this?
Ad. Nothing at all.
A. Then you think that speech was instituted only for the sake of teaching or reminding?
Ad. I would think so, if I were not troubled by the fact that when we pray we certainly speak; and yet it is not right to believe that God is taught or reminded of anything by us.
A. I think you do not know that we have been commanded to pray in closed rooms, by which name the inner places of the mind are meant, for no other reason than this: that God, in order to grant us what we desire, does not seek to be reminded or taught by our speech. For one who speaks gives an outward sign of his will by articulate sound; but God is to be sought and entreated in the very secret places of the rational soul, which is called the inner man; for he has willed these to be his temples. Or have you not read in the Apostle, “Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you?” and, “that Christ dwells in the inner man”? And have you not noticed in the prophet, “Speak in your hearts, and be pierced with sorrow on your beds: offer the sacrifice of righteousness, and hope in the Lord”? Where do you think the sacrifice of righteousness is offered, if not in the temple of the mind and on the beds of the heart? And where one must sacrifice, there one must also pray. So there is no need of speech when we pray, that is, of sounding words, except perhaps, as priests do, to signify one's mind, not that God may hear but that men may, and by a kind of agreement through being reminded may be lifted up to God. Or do you think otherwise?
Ad. I agree entirely.
A. Then you are not troubled that the supreme Teacher, when he taught his disciples to pray, taught certain words; in which he seems to have done nothing else but teach how one ought to speak in praying?
Ad. That does not trouble me at all: for he taught them not words but the things themselves by words, by which they might remind themselves to whom and for what they should pray, when they prayed, as has been said, in the inner places of the mind.
A. You understand rightly. For at the same time I believe you notice that, even if someone contends that, although we make no sound, yet because we think the words themselves we speak inwardly in the mind, even so by speech we do nothing but remind, since the memory, in which the words inhere, by turning them over makes the things themselves come to mind, of which words are signs.
Ad. I understand and follow.

### Scripture references

- Matt 6:6: allusion, high confidence
- 1 Cor 3:16: quotation, high confidence
- Eph 3:16–17: quotation, high confidence
- Ps 4:4–5 (4:5-Ps LXX): quotation, high confidence
- Matt 6:9–13: allusion, high confidence

### Translation notes

- The dialogue is between Augustine and his son Adeodatus, written about 389.
- Matt 6:6; 1 Cor 3:16; Eph 3:16–17; Ps 4:4–5 (4:5–6 LXX/Vulg.); the Lord's Prayer, Matt 6:9–13.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 1 (PL 32:1194–1195; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-1).

## The Teacher 2

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-2
- Source: PL 32:1195–1197
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Testing a line of Virgil word by word, Augustine and Adeodatus find that words like “if”, “nothing”, and “from” can be explained only by other words, not by showing the things they signify.

### Latin text

Aug. Constat ergo inter nos verba signa esse. Ad. Constat. Aug. Quid? signum, nisi aliquid significet, potest esse signum? Ad. Non potest. Aug. Quot verba sunt in hoc versu, si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui? j, (Æneid. tib. 2, v. 639.)! Ad. Octo. Aug. Octo ergo signa sunU Ad. Ita est, Aug. Credo te hunc versum intelligere. Ad. Satis arbitror. Aug. Dic mihi quid singula verba signi­ ficent. Ad. Video quidcm quid significet, Ii; sed nul­ lum aliud verbum, quo id exponi possit, invenio. Aug. Saltem illud invenis, quidquid significatur hoc verbo, ubinam sit? Ad. Videtur mihi quod, si, dubitationem significet: jam dubitatio, ubi nisi in animo est? Ang. Accipio interim; persequere caetera. Ad. Nihil, quid aliud significat, nisi id quod non est? Aug. Verum for­ tasse dicis; sed revocat me ab assenticndo quod supe­ rius concessisti, non esse signum nisi aliquid significet; quod autem non cst, nullo modo esse aliquid potest. Quare secundum verbum in hoc versu non cst signum, quia non signilicat aliquid; et falso inter nos constitit, quod omnia verba signa sint, aut omne signum aliquid significet. Ad. Nimis quidem urges; sed quando noa habemus quid significemus, omnino stulte verbum ali­ quod promimus: tu autem nunc mecum loquendo, cre­ do quod nullam sonum frustra emittis, sed omnibus quas ore tuo erumpunt, signum mihi das ut intelligam aliquid; quapropter non te oportet istas duas syllabas enuntiare dum loqueris, si per eas non significas quid­ quam. Si autem vides necessariam per eas enuntiatio­ nem fieri, nosque doceri vel commoneri cum auribus insonant, vidcs etiam profecto quid velim dicere, sed explicare non possum. Aug. Quid igitur facimus? An affectionem aniipi quamdam, cum rem non vidct, et tamen non esse invenit, aut invenisse se putat, hoc verbo significari dicimus potius, quam rem ipsam quæ nulla est? Ad. Istud ipsum est fortasse quod explicare moliebar. Aug. Transeamus ergo hinc, quoquo modo se habct, ne res absurdissima nobis accidat. Ad. Quæ tandem? Aug. Si nihil nos teneat, et moras patiamur. Ad. Ridiculum hocquidemesl, ettamen nescio quomo­ do video posse contingere; imo plene video contigisse. Aug. Suo loco genus hoc repugnantiæ, si Deus si­ verit, planius intelligemus: nune ad illum versum te re­ fer, et conare, ut potes, cætera ejus verba quid significetnt pandere. Ad. Tertia præpositio est, ex, pro qua, de. possumus, ut arbitror, dicere. Aug. Non id quæro, ut pro una voce notissima aliam vocem æque nitissimam, quæ idem significet dicas; si tamen idcm significat: sed interim concedamus ita esse. Certe si poeta iste non, ex tanta urbe, sed, de tanta, dixisset, quærerem que abs te quid. de, significaret; diceres, ex, cum hæc duo verba essent, id cst signa, unum aliquid, ut tu putas, significantia: ego autcm idipsum# nescio quid unum, qnod his duobus signis significatur, inquiro. Ad. Mihi videtur secretionem quamdam significare ab ea rc in qua fuerat aliquid, quod ex illa esse dicitur, sive il!a non mancat, ut in hoc versu, non manente urbe, poterant aliqui ex illa esse Trojani: sive manent, sicut ex urbe Roma dicimus esse negotiatores in Afri­ ca. Aug. Ut concedam tibi hæc ita esse, nec enume­ rem quam multa fortasse præter hanc tuam regulam reperiantur; illud certe tibi attendere facije est, ex­ posuisse te verbis verba, id est signis signa, eisdemque Hotissimis notissima: ego autcm illa ipsa quorum hæc signa sunt, mibi, si pr.sses, vellem ut ostenderes.

### English translation (Claude)

A. So it is agreed between us that words are signs.
Ad. It is agreed.
A. Well, can a sign be a sign unless it signifies something?
Ad. It cannot.
A. How many words are there in this line: “If it pleases the gods that nothing be left of so great a city”?
Ad. Eight.
A. So there are eight signs.
Ad. That is so.
A. I believe you understand this line.
Ad. Well enough, I think.
A. Tell me what each word signifies.
Ad. I see indeed what “if” signifies; but I find no other word by which it can be explained.
A. At least you find where whatever is signified by this word is?
Ad. It seems to me that “if” signifies doubt: and where is doubt, if not in the mind?
A. I accept that for the moment; go on with the rest.
Ad. What else does “nothing” signify but that which is not?
A. Perhaps you are right; but I am held back from agreeing by what you granted above, that a sign is not a sign unless it signifies something; and what is not can in no way be something. So the second word in this line is not a sign, because it does not signify something; and we wrongly agreed that all words are signs, or that every sign signifies something.
Ad. You press me too hard; but when we have nothing to signify, it is utterly foolish to utter any word. And you, in speaking with me now, I believe, utter no sound in vain, but by all that bursts from your mouth you give me a sign so that I may understand something; so you ought not to pronounce these two syllables when you speak, if by them you signify nothing. But if you see that a necessary statement is made by them, and that we are taught or reminded when they sound in our ears, you surely also see what I want to say, but cannot explain.
A. What then shall we do? Shall we say that this word signifies a certain state of mind, when it does not see a thing and yet finds, or thinks it has found, that it does not exist, rather than the thing itself, which is nothing?
Ad. Perhaps that is just what I was trying to explain.
A. Let us pass on from here, then, however the matter stands, so that something most absurd may not happen to us.
Ad. What, pray?
A. That nothing should detain us, and yet we should suffer delay.
Ad. That is ridiculous indeed, and yet somehow I see that it can happen; indeed, I see plainly that it has happened.
A. In its place, God willing, we shall understand this kind of contradiction more clearly: now go back to that line, and try, as best you can, to explain what its other words signify.
Ad. The third is the preposition “from” (ex), for which, I think, we can say “of” (de).
A. I am not asking you to give, for one very well known word, another equally well known word that signifies the same thing, if indeed it signifies the same; but for the moment let us grant that it is so. Certainly, if the poet had said not “from (ex) so great a city” but “of (de) so great a city,” and I asked you what “of” signified, you would say “from,” since these would be two words, that is, signs, signifying, as you think, one thing; but I am asking for that very one thing, whatever it is, which is signified by these two signs.
Ad. It seems to me to signify a certain separation from that thing in which something was, which is said to be “from” it; whether that thing no longer remains, as in this line, where, though the city did not remain, some Trojans could be from it; or whether it remains, as we say that there are merchants in Africa from the city of Rome.
A. Granting you that these things are so, and not listing how many things may perhaps be found outside this rule of yours, it is certainly easy for you to notice that you have explained words by words, that is, signs by signs, and very well known ones by very well known ones; but I would like you, if you could, to show me the very things of which these are signs.

### Extrabiblical texts

- Virgil, Aen. 2.659 (Virgil): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Virgil, Aen. 2.659 (Migne: 2.639). In Latin the line has eight words: si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui.
- “That nothing should detain us, and yet we should suffer delay”: a play on “nothing” (nihil) as if it were something.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 2 (PL 32:1195–1197; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-2).

## The Teacher 3

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-3
- Source: PL 32:1197
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Adeodatus first holds that nothing can be shown without signs, but Augustine shows that actions such as walking can be shown by doing them, provided one is asked when not already doing them.

### Latin text

Ad. Miror te nescire, vcj potius simulare ne­ scientem, responsione mea fieri quod vis omnino non posse; siquidem sermocinamur, ubi non possumus re­ spondere nisi verbis. Tu autem res quaeris eas quæ, quodlibet sint, verba certe non sunt, quas tamen ex me tu quoque verbis quæris. Prior itaque tu sine verbis quære, ulego deinde ista conditione respondeam. Aug. Jure agis, fateor: sed si quærerem istæ tres syllabas quid significent, cum dicitur, Parics, nonne posses digito ostendere, ut ego prorsus rem ipcam viderem, cujus signum est hoc trisyllabum verbum, demon­ strante te, nulla tamcn verba referente. Ad. Hoc in solis nominibus quibus corpora significantur, si eadem corpora praesentia sint, fleri posse concedo. Aug. Num colorem corpus dicimus, an non potius quamdam corporis qualitalem? Ad. Ita cst. Aug. Cur ergo et hic digito demonstrari potest? An addis corporibus eliam corporum qualitates, ut nihilominus etiam istae cum præsentes sunt, doceri sine verbis possint? Ad. Ego cum corpora dicerem, omnia corporalia intelligi vole­ bam, id est omnia quæ in corporibus sentiuntur. Aug. Considera tamen, utrum eliam binc aliqua tibi exci­ pienda sint. Ad. Bene admones: non enim omnia corporalia, sed omnia visibilia dicere debui. Fateor enim sonum, odorcm, saporem, gravitatem, calorem, et alia quæ ad caeteros sensus pertinent, quanquam sentiri sine corporibus nequeant, et propterea sint corporalia, non tamen digito posse monstrari. Aug. Nunquamne vidisti ut homines cum surdis gestu quasi sermecinentur, ipsique surdi non minus gestu, vel quaerant, vel respondeant, vel doceant, vel indicent aut omnia quae volunt, aut certe plurima? Quod cum fit, non utique sola visibilia sine. verbis ostenduntur, sed et soni et sapores, et caetera bujusmodi. Nam et histriones totas in theatris fabulas sine verbis saltando plerumque aperiunt et exponunt. Ad. Nihil habeo quod contradicam, nisi quod illud, ex, non modo ego, sed nec ipse quidem saltator histrio tibi sinc verbis quid significet posset ostendecre. Aug. Verum fortasse dicis: sed fingamus eum posse; non, ut arbitror, dubitas, quisquis illc motus corporis fucrit, quo mihi rem quæ hec verbo signi­ ficatur, demonstrare conabitur, non ipsam rem fu­ turam esse, sed signum. Quare hic quoque non quidem verbo verbum, sed tamen signo signum nihilominus indicabit; ut et hoc monosyllabum, ex, et ille gestus. anani rem quamdam significent, quam mihi ego vellem non significando monstrari. Ad. Qui potestquod quaeri oro te? Aug. Quomodo paries potuit. Ad. Ne ipse quidem, quantum ratio progrediens docuit, ostendi sine signo potest. Nam et intentio digiti non est utique paries, sed signum datur per quod paries possit videri. Nihil itaque video qnod sine signis ostendi queat. Aug. Quid, si ex te quaererem quid sit ambulare, surgeres­ que et id ageres? nonne re ipsa potius quam verbis ad me docendum, aus ullis aliis signis utereris? Ad. Fateor ita esse, et pudet me rem tam in promptu po­ sitam non vidisse: ex qua etiam mihi millia rerum jam occurrunt, quae ipsae per se valeant, non per signa monstrari, ut edere, bibcre, sedcre, stare, clar marc, et innumerabilia cætera. Aug. Age, nunc die mihi, si omnino nesciens hujus verbi vim, abs te ambulante quærerem quid sit ambulare, quomodo me doceres? Ad. Idipsum agerem aliquanto celerius, ut post interrogationem tuam aliqua novitate admone­ rcris; et tamen nihil aliud fieret, quam id quod deberet ostendi. Aug. Scisne aliud esse ambulare, aliud fe­ stinarc? Nam et qui ambulat, non statim festinat; et qui festinat, non continuo ambulat: dicimus enim et in scribendo ct in legendo, aliisque innumerabilibus rebus festinationem. Quare cum illud quod agebas, celerius ageres post interrogationem meam, putarent ambulare nihil esse aliud quam festinare: id enim novi addideras; et ob hoc fallerer. Ad. Fateor rem non posse nos monstrare sine signo, si cum id agimuf interrogemur: si enim nihil addamus, putabit qui rogat, nolle nos ostendere, contemptoque se, in eo quod agebamus perseverare. Sed si de his rogct quæ agcre possumus,,ncc eo tamen tem pore quo agimus roget, possumus post ejus interrogationem id agendo, re ipsa potius quam signo demonstrare quod rogat: nisi forte loquentem me interroget quid sit loqui; quidquid enim dixero, ut eum doceam, loquar necesse est: ex quo sccutus docebo, donec ei planum faciam quod vult, non recedens a re ipsa quam sibi voluit de­ monstrari, nec signa quærens quibus cam pstendam praeter ipsam.

### English translation (Claude)

Ad. I am surprised that you do not know, or rather pretend not to know, that what you want cannot possibly be done by my answer, since we are conversing, where we can answer only with words. But you ask for things which, whatever they are, are certainly not words, and yet you too ask me for them with words. So first ask without words, so that I may then answer on that condition.
A. You are within your rights, I admit: but if I asked what these three syllables signify when one says paries (“wall”), could you not point with your finger, so that I would see the very thing of which this three-syllable word is a sign, while you showed it but uttered no words?
Ad. I grant that this can be done only with names by which bodies are signified, if those bodies are present.
A. Do we call color a body, or not rather a certain quality of a body?
Ad. That is so.
A. Why then can it too be pointed out with the finger? Or do you add to bodies the qualities of bodies as well, so that these too, when present, can nevertheless be taught without words?
Ad. When I said bodies, I meant all bodily things to be understood, that is, all things perceived in bodies.
A. Consider, however, whether some exceptions must be made here too.
Ad. You are right to warn me: I should have said not all bodily things, but all visible things. For I admit that sound, smell, taste, weight, heat, and the other things that belong to the other senses, though they cannot be perceived without bodies and are therefore bodily, cannot be pointed out with the finger.
A. Have you never seen how people converse, as it were, with the deaf by gesture, and the deaf themselves, no less by gesture, ask, or answer, or teach, or indicate all or at least most of what they want? When this is done, not only visible things are shown without words, but also sounds and tastes and other things of this kind. Indeed actors in the theaters often reveal and set forth whole stories by dancing, without words.
Ad. I have nothing to say against this, except that neither I, nor even that dancing actor himself, could show you without words what “from” signifies.
A. Perhaps you are right: but let us suppose he could; you do not doubt, I think, that whatever that bodily movement was by which he tried to show me the thing signified by this word, it would not be the thing itself, but a sign. So here too he will indicate, not indeed a word by a word, but still a sign by a sign; so that both this monosyllable “from” and that gesture would signify one certain thing, which I wanted to be shown to me without signifying.
Ad. How can what you ask be done, I beg you?
A. In the way the wall could.
Ad. Not even that, as the advancing argument has shown, can be shown without a sign. For the pointing of the finger is certainly not the wall, but a sign is given by which the wall can be seen. So I see nothing that can be shown without signs.
A. What if I asked you what walking is, and you got up and did it? Would you not be using the thing itself to teach me, rather than words or any other signs?
Ad. I admit it is so, and I am ashamed not to have seen a thing so obvious; from which a thousand things now occur to me which can be shown by themselves, not by signs, such as eating, drinking, sitting, standing, shouting, and countless others.
A. Come, now tell me: if, wholly ignorant of the meaning of this word, I asked you while you were walking what walking is, how would you teach me?
Ad. I would do that very thing somewhat faster, so that after your question you would be alerted by something new; and yet nothing else would be done but what ought to be shown.
A. Do you know that walking is one thing and hurrying another? For one who walks does not necessarily hurry, and one who hurries does not necessarily walk: for we speak of hurrying in writing and reading and countless other things. So if, after my question, you did faster what you were doing, I would think that walking is nothing else than hurrying; for that is what you had added that was new; and so I would be deceived.
Ad. I admit that we cannot show a thing without a sign if we are asked while we are doing it: for if we add nothing, the one who asks will think that we do not want to show him and, scorning him, are continuing what we were doing. But if he asks about things we can do, and does not ask at the time we are doing them, we can, by doing it after his question, show what he asks by the thing itself rather than by a sign: unless perhaps he asks me while I am speaking what speaking is; for whatever I say to teach him, I must speak; and from there I will go on teaching until I make plain to him what he wants, not departing from the very thing he wanted shown to him, nor seeking signs by which to show it besides the thing itself.

### Translation notes

- “these three syllables … paries”: the Latin word for “wall” has three syllables.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 3 (PL 32:1197; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-3).

## The Teacher 4

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-4
- Source: PL 32:1197–1201
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine and Adeodatus classify signs: written words are signs of spoken words, every name is a word but not every word a name, and some signs, like “sign,” “word,” and “name,” also signify themselves.

### Latin text

Aug. Acutissime omnino: quare vide utrum conveniat jam inter nos ea posse demonstrari sine signis, quæ aut non agimus cum interrogamur, et tamen statim agere possumus, aut ipsa signa forte agimus. Cum enim loquimur, signa facimus, de quo dictum est significare. 4d. Convenit. Aug. Cum ergo de quibusdam signis quæritur, possunt signis signa monstrari. cum autem de rebus quae signa non sunt, aut eas agendo post inquisitionem si agi possunt, auf signa dando per quae animadverti queant. Ad. Ila est. Aug. In hac igitur tripartita distributione priuS illud consideremus, si placet, quod signis signa monstran­ tur: num cnim sola verba sunt sina' A4. Non. Aug. Videtur ergo mihi loquendo nos aut verba ipsa signare verbis, aut alia signa, vclul gestum cum dicimus ant lilleram; nam his duobus verbis quæ significantur, nihilominus signa sunt: aut aliquid aliud quod signum non sit, velut cum dicimus, Lapis; hoc enim verbum signum est, nam significat aliquid, sed id quod eo si­ gnificatur, non continuo signum est: quod tamen genus, id cst cum verbis ea quae signa non sunt signi­ ficantur, non pertiuet ad hanc partem quam discutere proposuimus. Suscepimus enin considerare illud, quod signis signa monstrantur, ct partes in eo duas comperimus, cum aut eadem aut alia signa signis do­ cemus vcl commemoramus: an non tibi videtur? Ad. Manifestum est. Avg. Dic ergo signa quæ verba sunt, ad quem sensum pertineant. Ad. Ad auditum. Aug. Quid gestus? Ad. Ad visum. Aug. Quid, cum verba scripta inve­ nimus? num verba non sunt, an signa verborum verius intelliguntur? ut verbum sit quod cum ali­ quo significatu articulata voce profertur; vot au­ tem nullo alio sensu quam auditu percipi potest: ila lit ut cnm scribitur verbum, signum fiat oculis, quo illud quod ad aures pertinet, veniat in mentem. Ad. Omnino assentior.Aug. Id quoque te arbitror assentiri, cum dicimus, Nomen, significare nos ali­ quid. Ad. Verum est. Alp. Quid tandem? Ad. Id sci. i <ct quod quidque appellatur, vclut Romulus, Roma, virtus, fluvias, ct innumerabilia cætera. Aug. Num ista quatuor nomina nullas res significant? Ad. Imo aliquas. Aug. Num nihil distat inter hæc nomina, et cas res quæ his significantur? Ad. Imo plurimum. Aug. Vel­ lom abs te audire, quidnam id sit. Ad. noc vel in primis, quod hæc signa sunt, illa non sunt. Aug. Pla­ cetne appellemus significabilia ea quæ signis signi­ ficari possunt ct signa non sunt, sicut ea quæ videri possunt, visibilia nominamus, ut de his deinceps com­ modius disseramus? Ad. Placet vero. Aug.. Quid? illa quatuor signa quæ paulo ante pronuntiasti, nullone alio signo significantur? Ad. Miror quod jam mihi exci­ isse arbitraris, quod ea quæ scribuntur, eorum quæ voce proferuntur, signorum signa esse comperimus. Aug. Dic inter ista quid dislel? Ad. Quod illa visibilia sunt, hæc audibilia. Cur enim et hoc nomen non admittas, si admisimus significabiJia? Aug. Prorsus admitto, ct gratum habeo. Sed rursus quæro, quatuor hæc signa nullone alio signo audibili significari queant, ut visibilia recordatus es? Ad. IIoc quoque recentius dictum recordor. Nam noinen responderam significare aliquid, et huic significationi quatuor ista subjeceram; et illud autem et hæc, si quidem voce proferuntur, audibilia esse cognosco. Aug. Quid ergo inter audibile signum et audibilin significata, quæ rursus signa sunt, intrest? Ad. Inler illud quidem quod dicimus, Nomen, et hæc quatuor quæ significationi ejus subjecimus, noc distare video, quod illud audibile signum est si­ gnorum audibilium: hæc vero audibilia quidem signa sunt, non tanicn signorum, sed rerum partim visi­ hilium, sicut csi Romulus, Roma. fluvius; partim intelligibilium, sicut est virtus. Aug. Accipio et probo: sed scisne omnia qua voce ariiculata cum aliquo significatu proferuntur, verba appellari? Ad. Scio. Aug. Ergoetnomen verbum est, quandoqnidcm id videmus cum aliquo significatu articulata voce proferri; et cum dicimus disertum ho­ minem bonis verbis uti, etiam nominibusnlique utitur; et cum seni domino apud Terentium servus retulit, Bona verba quælo (In Andria, act. i, 'cen. 2, v. 33), multa illc etiam nomina dixerat. Ad. Assentior. Aug. Concedis igitur iis duabus syllabis quas edimus, cum dicimus, Verbum, nomen quoque significari, et ob hoc illud hujus signum esse. Ad. Concedo. Aug. Hoc quoque respondeas velim. Cum verbum signum sit nominis, et nomen signum sit fluminis, et flumen si­ gnum sit rei quæ jam videri potest, ut inter hanc rem et flumen, id est signum ejus, et inter hoc signum et nomen quod hujus signi signum est dixisti quid intersil; quid interesse arbitraris inter signum no­ minis, quod vcrbum esse comperimus, et ipsum no­ men cujus signum est? Ad. Hoc distare intelligo, quod ea quæ significantur nomine, etiam verbo significantur; ut enim nomen est verbum, ita et flumen verbum ea: quae autcm verbo significantur, non omnia signifi­ cantur et nomine. Nam et illud, si, quod in capite habet abs te propositus versus, et hoc, ex, de quo jam diu agentes in ba:c duce ratione pervenimus, verba suut, ncc tamen nomina; et talia multa inve­ niuntur. Quamobrem cum omnia nomina verba sint, non autem omnia verba nomina sint, planum esse arbitror quid inter verbum distet et nomen, id est inter signum signi ejus quod nulla alia signa signi­ ficat, ct signum signi ejus quod rursus alia significat. Aug. Concedisne omnem equum animal esse, nec tamen omne animal equum esse? Ad. Quis dubita­ vtrit? Aug. Hoc ergo inter nomen et verbum, quod inter equum et animai interest. Nisi forte ab assen­ ticndo id te rcvocat, quod dicimus ct alio modo ver­ bum, quo significantur ea quae per tempora decli­ nantur, ut scribo scripsi, lego legi, quæ manifestum est non esse nomina. Ad. Dixisti omnino quod me do­ bitare faciebat. Aug. Ne te istud moveat. Dicimus enim et signa universalitcr omnia quae significant ali­ quid, ubi cliam verba esse invenimus. Dicimus item signa militaria, quæ jam proprie signa nominantur, quo verba non pertinent. Et tamen si tibi dicerem, ut omnis equus animal, non alitem omne animal equus cst, ila omne verbum signum, non autem omne signum verbum est, nihil, ut opinor, dubitares. Ad. Jain intel­ ligo, et prorsus assemior, hoc interesse inter uni­ versale illud verbum et nomen, quod inter animal et equum. Aug. Scisne etiam, cum dicimus, Animal, aliud esse hoc trisyllabum nomen, quod voce prolatum est, aliud id quod significatur? Ad. Jam line supra con­ cessi de omnibus signis et significabilibus. Aug. Num omnia signa tibi videntur aliud significare quam sunt, sicut hoc trisyllabum, cum dicimus, Animal, nullo modo idem significat quod est ipsum? Ad. Non sane: uam cum dicimus, Signum, non solum signa cætera quæcumque sunt, sed etiam seipsum significat; est enim verbum, et utique omnia verba sigua sunt. Aug. Quid? in hoc disyllabo cum dicimus, Verbum, nonne tale aliquid contingit? Nam si omne quod cnm aliquo significatu articulata voce profertur, hoe disyllabo si­ gnificatur, etiam ipsum hoc genere includitur. Ad. Ita est. Aug. Quid? nomen nonne similiter habet? Nam et omnium generum nomina signilicat, et ipsum no­ men generis neutri nomen est. An, si ex te quærerem quæ pars orationis nomen, posses milii respondere recte, nisi, nomen? Ad. Verum dieM. Aug. Sunt crgo signa quae inter alia quæ significant, et scipsa signi- Beent. Ad. Sunt. Aug. Num tale tibi videtur luc qua­ drisyllabum signum, cum dicimus, Conjunctio? Ad. Nullomodo: nam ea quæ significat, non sunt nomina; hoc autem nomen est.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Very acutely said: so see whether we now agree that those things can be shown without signs which we are not doing when we are asked, and yet can do at once, or when the signs themselves are perhaps what we do. For when we speak we make signs, from which the word “signify” is derived.
Ad. Agreed.
A. So when the question is about certain signs, signs can be shown by signs; but when it is about things that are not signs, they can be shown either by doing them after the inquiry, if they can be done, or by giving signs through which they can be noticed.
Ad. That is so.
A. In this threefold division, then, let us first consider, if you please, that signs are shown by signs: are words the only signs?
Ad. No.
A. It seems to me, then, that in speaking we signify by words either words themselves, or other signs, as when we say “gesture” or “letter” (for what is signified by these two words is nevertheless signs), or something else that is not a sign, as when we say “stone”: for this word is a sign, since it signifies something, but what is signified by it is not therefore a sign. That kind, however, in which things that are not signs are signified by words, does not belong to the part we proposed to discuss. For we undertook to consider the showing of signs by signs, and we found two parts in it: when we teach or remind by signs either the same signs or other signs. Or do you not think so?
Ad. It is plain.
A. Tell me, then, to what sense the signs that are words belong.
Ad. To hearing.
A. What about gesture?
Ad. To sight.
A. What about when we find words written? Are they not words, or are they more truly understood as signs of words? So that a word is what is uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning; and a voice cannot be perceived by any sense other than hearing; so it comes about that when a word is written, it becomes a sign to the eyes, by which what belongs to the ears comes to mind.
Ad. I agree entirely.
A. I think you also agree that when we say “name” (nomen), we signify something.
Ad. That is true.
A. What, then?
Ad. That by which each thing is called, such as Romulus, Rome, virtue, river, and countless others.
A. Do these four names signify no things?
Ad. On the contrary, they signify some.
A. Is there no difference between these names and the things they signify?
Ad. On the contrary, a very great one.
A. I would like to hear from you what it is.
Ad. This, first of all: that these are signs, those are not.
A. Shall we call “signifiables” the things that can be signified by signs and are not signs, as we call “visibles” the things that can be seen, so that we may discuss them more conveniently from now on?
Ad. By all means.
A. Well, are those four signs you pronounced a little while ago signified by no other sign?
Ad. I am surprised that you think I have already forgotten that we found that written things are signs of the signs uttered by the voice.
A. Tell me what difference there is between them.
Ad. That the former are visible, the latter audible. For why should you not admit this name too, if we have admitted “signifiables”?
A. I admit it entirely, and gladly. But again I ask: can these four signs be signified by no other audible sign, as you remembered the visible ones?
Ad. I remember that this too was said quite recently. For I had answered that “name” signifies something, and had placed these four under its signification; and I recognize that both that word and these, since they are uttered by the voice, are audible.
A. What difference, then, is there between an audible sign and the audible things signified, which are again signs?
Ad. Between what we say, “name,” and these four which we placed under its signification, I see this difference: that the former is an audible sign of audible signs; while these are indeed audible signs, yet not of signs but of things, partly visible, such as Romulus, Rome, river, partly intelligible, such as virtue.
A. I accept and approve: but do you know that everything uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning is called a word (verbum)?
Ad. I know.
A. So a name too is a word, since we see that it is uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning; and when we say that an eloquent man uses good words, he certainly uses names too; and when the slave in Terence said to his old master, “Good words, I pray,” he had spoken many names too.
Ad. I agree.
A. You grant, then, that by these two syllables we utter when we say verbum (“word”), “name” too is signified, and therefore that the former is a sign of the latter.
Ad. I grant it.
A. I would like you to answer this too. Since “word” is a sign of “name,” and “name” is a sign of “river,” and “river” is a sign of a thing that can now be seen, and you have said what difference there is between this thing and “river,” that is, its sign, and between this sign and “name,” which is the sign of this sign: what difference do you think there is between the sign of “name,” which we found to be “word,” and “name” itself, of which it is the sign?
Ad. I understand the difference to be this: that the things signified by “name” are also signified by “word”; for as “name” is a word, so “river” is a word; but not all the things signified by “word” are also signified by “name.” For both that “if,” which stands at the head of the line you proposed, and this “from,” about which we have been dealing so long and have reached these points by reason as our guide, are words, yet not names; and many such are found. So since all names are words, but not all words are names, I think it is plain what difference there is between “word” and “name,” that is, between the sign of a sign that signifies no other signs, and the sign of a sign that again signifies others.
A. Do you grant that every horse is an animal, yet not every animal is a horse?
Ad. Who would doubt it?
A. So there is the same difference between “name” and “word” as between horse and animal. Unless perhaps you are held back from agreeing because we also use “word” (verbum) in another way, for what is inflected by tenses, such as scribo (“I write”), scripsi (“I wrote”), lego (“I read”), legi (“I have read”), which are plainly not names.
Ad. You have said exactly what was making me doubt.
A. Do not let that trouble you. For we call “signs” in general all things that signify something, among which we also find words. We also speak of military standards (signa), which are already called signa in a proper sense, and to which words do not belong. And yet if I said to you that, as every horse is an animal but not every animal is a horse, so every word is a sign but not every sign is a word, you would not, I think, doubt it at all.
Ad. Now I understand, and agree entirely, that the difference between that general term “word” and “name” is the same as between animal and horse.
A. Do you also know that when we say “animal,” this three-syllable name uttered by the voice is one thing, and what is signified is another?
Ad. I already granted this above about all signs and signifiables.
A. Do all signs seem to you to signify something other than what they are, as this three-syllable word, when we say “animal,” in no way signifies the same thing that it is itself?
Ad. Not at all: for when we say “sign,” it signifies not only all other signs whatever, but also itself; for it is a word, and certainly all words are signs.
A. Well, does not something similar happen with this two-syllable word, when we say verbum? For if everything uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning is signified by this two-syllable word, it too is included in this class.
Ad. That is so.
A. Well, is not “name” in a similar case? For it signifies names of all genders, and the name nomen itself is a name of the neuter gender. Or if I asked you what part of speech nomen is, could you answer me correctly except “a name”?
Ad. You are right.
A. So there are signs which, among the other things they signify, also signify themselves.
Ad. There are.
A. Does this four-syllable sign seem to you to be of that kind, when we say conjunctio (“conjunction”)?
Ad. Not at all: for the things it signifies are not names; but this is a name.

### Extrabiblical texts

- Terence, Andr. 204 (Terence): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Terence, Andr. 204 (1.2.33): bona verba, quaeso.
- Latin nomen covers both nouns and names; it is rendered “name” throughout to keep the argument. “Signifiables” (significabilia) is Augustine's coinage.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 4 (PL 32:1197–1201; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/1/#p-4).

## The Teacher 5

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/5/#p-5
- Source: PL 32:1201–1203
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine shows that “word” and “name” signify each other and differ only in their reason (from striking the ear and from knowing), and proves from Paul, from Greek equivalents, and from the logic of propositions that every part of speech is in some sense a name.

### Latin text

Aug. Bene attendisti: nunc illud vide, utrum veniantur signa quæ se invicem signiflcent, ut quemadmodum boc ab illo, sic illud ab hoc significe­ tur: non enim ita sunt inter se hoc quadrisyllabum, cum dicimus, Conjunctio, et illa quæ ab hoc signifi­ cantur, cum dicimus, Si, vel, nam, namque, nisi, ergo, quoniam, et similia; nam hæc illo uno significantur, nullo antem horum unum ilud quadrisyllabum si­ gnificatur. Ad. Video, ct quænam signa sint se invicem fignificautia, cupio cognoscere. Aug. Tu ergo nescis, cum dicimus, Nomen et verbum, duo verba nos dicere? Ad. Scio. Aug. Quid? illud nescis, cum dicimus, Nomen et verbum, duo nomina nos dicere? Ad. Id quoque scio. Aug. Scis igitur tam nomen verbo, quam etiam verbum nomine significari. Ad. Assen- Hor. Aug. Potesnc diccre, excepto eo quod diverse scribuntur et sonant, quid inter se differant? Ad. Possum fortasse; nam id esse video quod paulo ante dixi. Verba enim cum dicimus, omne quod articulata voce cum aliquo significatu profertur, significamus; unde omne nomen, et ipsum cum dichnus, Nomen, verbum est: at non omne verbum nomen est, quam­ vis nomen sit, cum dicimus, Verbum. Aug. Quid, siquisquam tibi affirmet et probet, ut omne nomen verbum est, ita Qmne verbum nomen esse? poterisne invenire quiddislent, praeter diversum in lit­ teris sonum? Ad. Non potero, nec omnino distare aliquid puto. Aug. Quid, si omnia quidem quæ voce articulata eum aliquo significatu proferuntur, et verba sunt et nomina; sed tamen alia de causa verba, et alia de causa nomina sunt? nihilne distabit inter nomcn et verbum? Ad. Quomodo istud sit non intelligo. Aug. Hec saltem intelligis, omne coloratum visibile esse, et omne visibile coloratum, quamvis hæc duo verba distincte differenterque significent. Ad. Intelligo. Aug. Quid si ergo ita et omne verbum nomen, et omne no­ men verbum est, quamvis hæc ipsa dno nomina, veF duo verba, id est nomen et verbum, differentem ha­ beant significationem? Ad. Jam video posse id acci­ dere: sed quomodo id accidat, exspecto ut ostendas. Avg. Oinne quod cum aliquosiguificatu articulata voce prorumpit, animadvertis, ut opinor, et aurem verbe­ rare, ut sentiri; et momoriæ mandari, ut nosci possit. Ad., Animadverto. Aug. Dno ergo quædam contin­ gunt, cum aliquid tati voce proferimus, Ad. Ita est. Aug. Quid, si horum duorum ex uno appellata sinit verbar ex altero nomina; verba scilicet a verberando, nomina vero a noscendo, ut illud primum ab nuribus; hoc autem secundum ab animo vocari meruerit? Ad. Concedam, cum ostenderis quomodo recte possimus omnia verba nomina dicere. Aug. Facile est: nam credo te accepisse ac tenere pronomen di­ ctum, quod pro ipso nomine valeat, rem tamen nolet minus plena significatione quam nomen. Nam, u! opi­ nor, definivit ille ita, quem grammatico reddidisti: Pronomen est pars orationis, quæ pro ipso posita no­ mine, minus quidem plene, idem tamen significat. Ad. Recordor et probo. Aug. Vides igitur secundum hanc definitionem nullis nisi nominibus servire, ct pro his solis poni posse pronomina, velut cum dici­ mus, Hic vir, ipse rex, eadem mulier, hoc aurum, il­ lud argentum: hic, ipse, eadem, boc, illud pronomi­ na esse; vir, rex, mulier, aurum, argentum, nomina, qnibus plenius quam illis pronomibus res significa­ tæ sunt. Ad Video et assentior. Aug. Tu ergo nunc mihi paucas conjunctiones quaslibet enuntia. Ad. Et; que, a!, atque. Aug. Hæc omnia quæ dixisti, nonne tibi videntur esse nomina? Ad. Non omnino. Aug. Ego saltem tibi recte locutus vidcor, cum dicercm, Hæc omnia quae dixisti? Ad. Recto prorsus; ct j;un intel­ ligo quam mirabiliter ostenderis inc nomina enun­ tiasse: non enim aliter de Iris recte dici potuisset, Hæc omnia. Scd enim vercor adJfuc, ne propterea milii recte locutus videaris, quod has quatuor con­ junctiones etiam verba esse non nego;,ut ideo de his recte dici potuerit, Hæc omnia, quoniam recte dici­ tur, Ilac verba omnia. Si autem a me quæras quæ sit pars orationis, Verba; nihil aliud respondebo quam, Nomen. Quare huic nomini fortasse pronomen ad­ junctum est, ut illa recta esset locutio tua. 1 i. Aug. Acute quidem falleris, sed ut falli desinas, acutius attende quod dicam, si tamen id dicere. ut volo, valuero: nam verbis de verbis agcre tam impli catum est, quam digitos digiti inserere et confricare; ubi vix dignoscitur, nisi ab eo ipso qui id agit, qui di­ giti pruriant, et qui auxilientur pruricntibus. Ad. En toto animo adsum, nam ista haec similitudo me inten­ tissimum fecit. Aug. Verba certe sono, et litteris con­ stant. Ad. Ita cst. Aug. Ergo ut ea potissimum aucto­ ritate utamur, quæ nobis charissima est, cum ait paulus apostolus, Nor erat in Christo Ext et Non 1, sed Est in ilto eral, non opinor, putandum est tres istas litteras, quas enuntiamus cum dicimus est, fuisse in Christo, sed ittud potius quod islis tri­ bus litteris significatur. Ad. Verum dicis. Aug. Intelli­ gis igitur eum qui ait, Est in illo erat, nihil aliud dixisse quam, Est appellatur quod in illo erat: tanquam si dixisset, Virtus in illo erat; non utique aliud dixisse acciperetur, nisi, virtus appellatur quod in illo erat: ne duas istas syllabas quas enuntiamus, cum dicimus, Viruis, cl non illud quod his dUabUs syllabis signif - tatur, in illo fuisse arbitraremur. Ad. Intelligo ac se­ quor. Aug. Quid? illud nonne intelligis etiam nibil interesse utrum quisque dicat, Virtus appcilalur, an, Virtus nominalur? Ad. Manifestum est. Aug. Ergo ita manifestum est, nihil interesse utrum quis dicat, Est appellatur, an, Est nominatur quod in illo erat. Ad. Yideo et hic nihil distare. Aug. Jamne etiam vides quid velim ostendere? Ad. Nondum sane. Aug. Itane tu non vides nomen esse id quo rcs aliqua nomina­ tur? Ad. Hoc plane nihil certius video. Aug. Vides ergo, Est nomen esse, siquidem illud quod erat in illo, Est nominatur. Ad. Negare non possum. Aug. At si eX te quærerem qu:c sit pars orationis, Est; non opi­ not homen, sed verbum esse diceres, cum id ratio etiam nomen esse docucrit. Ad. Ita est prorsus ut di­ cis. Aug. Num adhuc dubitas alias quoque partes ora­ tionis codem modo, quo demonstravimus, nomina esse? Ad. Non dubito, quandoquidem fateor ea signi­ ficare aliquid. Si autcm res ipsæ quas significant, quid singulæ appellentur, id est nominentur, interroges; respondere non possum, nisi cas ipsas partes oratio­ nis, quas nomina uon vocamus, sed, ut cerno, vocare convincimur. Aug. Nihilne tc movet, ne quis existat qui no­ stram istam rationem labefactet dicendo, Apostolo non verborum, sed rerum auctoritatem esse tribuen­ dam; quamobrem fundamentum persuasionis hujus non tam esse firmum quam putamus: fieri enim posse ut Paulus, quanquam vixerit præceperitque re­ ctissime 1, minus tamen recte locutus sit, cum ait, Ea, in illo erat; præsertim cum se ipse imperitum sermone fateatur? quo tandem modo istum refellendum arbitraris? Ad. Nihil habeo quod contradicam, et te oro ut aliquem de illis reperias, quibus verborum notitia summa conceditur, cujusau­ ctoritatc potius id quod cupis efficias. Aug. Minus enim tibi videtur idonea, remotis auctoritatibus, ipsa ratio, qua demonstratur omnibus partibus orationis si­ gnificari aliquid, et ex eo appellari; si autem appellari, et nominari; si nominari, nomine utique nominari: quod in diversis linguis facillime judicatur. Quis enim non videat, si quæras quid Graeci nominem quod nos nominamus, Quis, responderi, τίς • quid Gradi nomi­ nent quod nos nominamus, Volo, responderi, θέλω• quid Græci nominent quod nos nominamus, Bene, responderi, ϰαλω̃; • quid Græci nomincut quod nos nominamus, Scriptum, responderi, τὸ γεγραμμένον* quid Græci nominent quod nos nominamus, Et, rc­ sponderi, ϰαὶ. quid Græci nominent quod nos nomi­ namus, Ab, responderi, ἀπό. quid Græci nominent quod nosnominamus, Heu, responderi, ot• atque in his omnibus partibus orationis, quas nunc enumcravi, re­ cte loqui eumqui sic interroget: quod, nisinomina es­ sent, fiori non posset? Hac ergo ratione Paulum aposto­ lum recte loculum esse, cum remotis omnium cioquen­ tium auctoritatibus obtinere possimus; quid opus est quarere cujus persona sententia nostra falciatur? Sed ne quis tardior aut impudentior nondum cedat, asseratque, nisi illis auctoribus, quibus verbo­ rum leges consensu omnium tribuuntur, nullo modo esse cessurum; quid in latina lingua excellentius Ci­ cerone inveniri potest? At hie in suis nobilissimis orationibus quas Verrinas vocant, Coram, praeposi­ tionem, sive illo loco adverbium sit, nomen appellavit. Verumtamen quia fieri potest ut ego illum locum nri­ nus bene intelligam, exponaturquc alias aliter, vel a ure vul ab alio; est ad quod responderi pos.e nihil puto. Tradunt enim nobilissimi disputationum magi­ siri, nomine et verbo plenam constare sententiam, quan afirmari negarique possit: quod genus idem Tullius quodam loco pronuntiatum vocat: et cum verbi tertia persona est, nominativum cum ea casun. nominis aiunt esse oportere; et recte aiunt: quod mecum si consideres, velut cum dicimus, nomo sedet, Equus currit, agnoscis, ut opinor, duo esse pronun­ tiata. Ad. Agnosco. Aug. Cernis in singulis singula esse nomina, in uno homo, in altero equus; et verba singula, in uno sedet, in allero currit? Ad. Cerno. Aug. Ergo si dicerem, sedet tantum, aut currit tau­ tum, recte a me quæreres, quis vel quid; ut respon­ dcrem, Homo, vel equus, vel animal, vel quodlibet aliud, quo possit nomen redditum verbo implere pro­ nuntiatum, id est illam sententiam qux affirmari et negari potest. Ad. Intelligo. Aug. Attende cætera, et finge nos vidcre aliquid longius, ct incertum habere utrum animal sit an saxum, vcl quid aliud, meque tibi dicere, Quia homo est, animal est; nonne temnere dicercm? Ad. Temere omnino: sed non temnere plane diceres, Si homo est, animal est. Aug. Recte dicis. itaque in locutione tua placet mihi, Si; placet et tibi: utrique autem nostrum in mea displicet, Quia. Ad. Assentior. Aug. Vide jam utrum istæc duæ sententiæ plena pronuntiata sim: Placet si, displicet, quia. Ad. Plena omnino. Aug. Age, nunc dic mihi quæ ibi sint verba, quæ nomina. Ad. Verba ibi video esse, placet, et, displicel: nomina vero quid aliud quam, si, ct, quia? Aug. Uas ergo duas conjunctiones etiam nomina esse salis probatum est. Ad. Prorsus satis. Aug. Potesne ipse per tc in aliis partibus orationis hoc idcin ad camdem regulam docere? Ad. Possum.

### English translation (Claude)

A. You have paid good attention: now see whether signs are found that signify each other, so that as this is signified by that, so that is signified by this. For this four-syllable word, when we say “conjunction,” and the things signified by it, when we say “if,” “or,” “for,” “for indeed,” “unless,” “therefore,” “since,” and the like, are not so related to each other; for these are signified by that one word, but that one four-syllable word is signified by none of them.
Ad. I see, and I want to know which signs signify each other.
A. Do you not know, then, that when we say “name and word,” we say two words?
Ad. I know.
A. Well, do you not know that when we say “name and word,” we say two names?
Ad. I know that too.
A. So you know that “name” is signified by “word” just as “word” is signified by “name.”
Ad. I agree.
A. Can you say how they differ from each other, apart from the fact that they are written and sound differently?
Ad. Perhaps I can; for I see that it is what I said a little while ago. For when we say “words,” we signify everything uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning; so every name, and the very word “name” when we say it, is a word: but not every word is a name, although “word” is a name when we say it.
A. What if someone affirmed and proved to you that, as every name is a word, so every word is a name? Could you find how they differ, apart from the different sound of their letters?
Ad. I could not, and I think they do not differ at all.
A. What if all things uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning are both words and names, yet they are words for one reason and names for another? Will there be no difference between name and word?
Ad. I do not understand how that could be.
A. You understand this at least: that everything colored is visible and everything visible is colored, although these two words signify distinctly and differently.
Ad. I understand.
A. What if, then, in the same way every word is a name and every name a word, although these two names, or two words, that is, “name” and “word,” have different meanings?
Ad. Now I see that this can happen; but I wait for you to show how it happens.
A. You notice, I think, that everything that bursts forth with some meaning from an articulate voice both strikes the ear, so that it can be perceived, and is committed to memory, so that it can be known.
Ad. I notice it.
A. So two things happen when we utter something with such a voice.
Ad. That is so.
A. What if words (verba) are named from one of these two and names (nomina) from the other: words from striking (verberare), names from knowing (noscere), so that the first has deserved its name from the ears, the second from the mind?
Ad. I will grant it when you have shown how we can rightly call all words names.
A. That is easy: for I believe you have learned and remember that a pronoun is so called because it stands for a name itself, though it denotes a thing with a less full meaning than the name. For, I think, the man whose lessons you recited to your grammar teacher defined it thus: “A pronoun is a part of speech which, put in place of a name itself, signifies the same thing, though less fully.”
Ad. I remember and approve.
A. You see, then, that according to this definition pronouns serve only names and can be put in place of them alone, as when we say “this man,” “the king himself,” “the same woman,” “this gold,” “that silver”: “this,” “himself,” “the same,” “this,” “that” are pronouns; “man,” “king,” “woman,” “gold,” “silver” are names, by which the things are signified more fully than by those pronouns.
Ad. I see and agree.
A. Now, then, say a few conjunctions for me, any you like.
Ad. And, and (-que), but, and also.
A. All these that you have said, do they not seem to you to be names?
Ad. Not at all.
A. Did I at least seem to you to speak correctly when I said, “All these that you have said”?
Ad. Quite correctly; and now I understand how wonderfully you have shown that I uttered names: for otherwise it could not rightly have been said of them, “all these.” But I am still afraid that you seemed to me to speak correctly because I do not deny that these four conjunctions are also words; so that it could rightly be said of them, “all these,” because it is rightly said, “all these words.” But if you ask me what part of speech “words” is, I will answer nothing but “a name.” So perhaps the pronoun was joined to this name, so that your expression was correct.
A. You are acutely mistaken; but so that you may stop being mistaken, attend more acutely to what I say, if only I can say it as I wish: for to deal with words by words is as entangled as to interlace and rub fingers with fingers, where it is hard for anyone but the one doing it to tell which fingers itch and which help the itching ones.
Ad. Look, I am here with all my mind, for this comparison has made me most attentive.
A. Words certainly consist of sound and letters.
Ad. That is so.
A. So, to use above all the authority that is dearest to us, when the apostle Paul says, “In Christ there was not Is and Is not, but Is was in him,” we must not think, I believe, that those three letters which we pronounce when we say est (“is”) were in Christ, but rather what is signified by those three letters.
Ad. You are right.
A. You understand, then, that he who said, “Is was in him,” said nothing else than, “What was in him is called Is”; just as, if he had said, “Virtue was in him,” he would surely be taken to have said nothing else than, “What was in him is called virtue”; lest we should think that those two syllables we pronounce when we say virtus, and not what is signified by those two syllables, were in him.
Ad. I understand and follow.
A. Well, do you not also understand that it makes no difference whether someone says, “It is called virtue,” or “It is named virtue”?
Ad. That is plain.
A. So it is equally plain that it makes no difference whether one says that what was in him “is called Is” or “is named Is.”
Ad. I see that here too there is no difference.
A. Do you now see what I want to show?
Ad. Not yet, really.
A. Do you not see that a name is that by which some thing is named?
Ad. I see nothing more certain than this.
A. So you see that “is” is a name, since what was in him is named “Is.”
Ad. I cannot deny it.
A. But if I asked you what part of speech “is” is, you would say, I think, not a name but a verb, though reason has shown that it is also a name.
Ad. It is exactly as you say.
A. Do you still doubt that the other parts of speech too are names in the same way that we have shown?
Ad. I do not doubt it, since I admit that they signify something. But if you ask what each of the things they signify is called, that is, named, I can answer only with those very parts of speech which we do not call names, but, as I see, are proved bound to call them.
A. Are you not troubled lest someone arise who might shake our reasoning by saying that authority must be ascribed to the Apostle in matters, not in words; and that therefore the foundation of this conviction is not as firm as we think? For it may be that Paul, although he lived and taught most rightly, yet spoke less correctly when he said, “Is was in him”; especially since he himself admits that he is unskilled in speech. How do you think he should be refuted?
Ad. I have nothing to say against it, and I beg you to find someone among those to whom the highest knowledge of words is granted, by whose authority you may rather accomplish what you want.
A. Does reason itself, apart from authorities, seem to you less adequate, by which it is shown that something is signified by all the parts of speech, and that they are called by it; and if called, then named; and if named, then named by a name? And this is very easily judged in different languages. For who does not see that if you ask what the Greeks name what we name quis, the answer is τίς; what the Greeks name what we name volo, the answer is θέλω; what the Greeks name what we name bene, the answer is καλῶς; what the Greeks name what we name scriptum, the answer is τὸ γεγραμμένον; what the Greeks name what we name et, the answer is καί; what the Greeks name what we name ab, the answer is ἀπό; what the Greeks name what we name heu, the answer is οἴ; and that in all these parts of speech I have just listed, the one who asks in this way speaks correctly, which could not be unless they were names? Since, then, by this reasoning we can establish that the apostle Paul spoke correctly, apart from the authority of all the eloquent, what need is there to look for someone in whose person our view may be supported?

But lest someone slower or more impudent should not yet yield, and should assert that he will by no means yield except to those authors to whom the laws of words are granted by common consent: what can be found more excellent in the Latin language than Cicero? Yet in his most famous speeches, which are called the Verrines, he called coram, a preposition, or in that place perhaps an adverb, a name. However, since it may be that I understand that passage less well, and it may be explained otherwise by me or by someone else, there is something to which I think no answer can be made. For the most distinguished masters of logic teach that a complete sentence, which can be affirmed or denied, consists of a name and a verb, a kind of sentence which the same Tullius somewhere calls a “proposition”; and they say that when the verb is in the third person, the name with it must be in the nominative case; and they are right. If you consider this with me, as when we say, “The man sits,” “The horse runs,” you recognize, I think, that these are two propositions.
Ad. I recognize it.
A. You see that in each there is one name, in one “man,” in the other “horse”; and one verb each, in one “sits,” in the other “runs”?
Ad. I see.
A. So if I said only “sits” or only “runs,” you would rightly ask me “who” or “what,” so that I might answer “the man,” or “the horse,” or “the animal,” or anything else by which a name given to the verb may complete the proposition, that is, the sentence that can be affirmed and denied.
Ad. I understand.
A. Attend to the rest, and suppose that we see something rather far off and are uncertain whether it is an animal or a stone or something else, and I say to you, “Because it is a man, it is an animal”: would I not speak rashly?
Ad. Rashly indeed; but you would plainly not speak rashly if you said, “If it is a man, it is an animal.”
A. You are right. So in your statement “if” pleases me, and it pleases you too; but in mine “because” displeases us both.
Ad. I agree.
A. Now see whether these two sentences are complete propositions: “If pleases,” “Because displeases.”
Ad. Quite complete.
A. Come, now tell me which are the verbs there, which the names.
Ad. I see that the verbs there are “pleases” and “displeases”; and what are the names but “if” and “because”?
A. So it has been sufficiently proved that these two conjunctions are also names.
Ad. Quite sufficiently.
A. Can you yourself show the same thing, by the same rule, for the other parts of speech?
Ad. I can.

### Scripture references

- 2 Cor 1:19: quotation, high confidence
- 2 Cor 11:6: allusion, high confidence

### Extrabiblical texts

- Cicero, Verr. 2.2.104 (Cicero): allusion, medium confidence
- Cicero, Tusc. 1.14 (Cicero): allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- 2 Cor 1:19 (Augustine's Latin, “In Christ there was not Is and Is not, but Is was in him”); 2 Cor 11:6.
- The etymologies verbum from verberare and nomen from noscere are Augustine's (and Varro's tradition). The definition of the pronoun is that of the grammarian Donatus (Ars minor), probably the teacher meant by “the man whose lessons you recited” (uncertain).
- Cicero, Verr. 2.2.104, where Augustine takes Cicero's phrase hoc nomen, coram as calling coram a name, as he himself allows he may be misreading; “proposition” (pronuntiatum) is Cicero's term (Tusc. 1.14).
- οἴ: the digital text has “ot”, read as the Greek interjection “alas”.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 5 (PL 32:1201–1203; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/5/#p-5).

## The Teacher 6

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/5/#p-6
- Source: PL 32:1203–1205
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine and Adeodatus find a further class of signs, such as Latin nomen and Greek ὄνομα, which signify themselves and each other and differ only in sound.

### Latin text

Aug. Transeamus ergo hinc. et jam dic mihi utrum sicut omnia verba nomina, cet omnia nomina verba esse comperimus, ita libi ct omnia nomina vocabula, et omnia vocabula nurnina esse videantur. Ad. Plane inter hxc quid distet præter diversum syl­ labarum sonum non video. Aug. Nec ego interim re­ sisto, quanquam non desint qui etaiu significatione ista discernunt, quorum sententiam modo considerare non opus est. Sed certe auimadvei tis ad ea jan si­ gna nos pervenisse, quæ se inviccm significent, nulla præter sonum distantia, et quæ scipsa significent cum cæteris omnibus partibus orationis. Ad. Non intelligo. Aug. Non ergo intelligis et nomen vocabulo et voca­ bulum nomine significari; et ita ut præter sonum lit­ terarum nihil intersit, quantum ad generale nomen pertinet: nam ct speciale nomen dicimus, qnod inter octo partes orationis ita est, ut alias septem non con­ tiurat. Ad. Intelligo. Aug. At boc ost qnod dixi, se invicem significare vocabulum et nomen. i8. Ad. Teneo, sed quæro quid dixeris, Cum etiam scipsa significant cum. aliis partibus orationis. Aug. Nonne superior ratio docuit nos, omwes partes oratio­ uis, et nomina posse dici et vocabula, id est et no­ mine et vocabulo posse signiGcari? Ad. Ita est. Aug. Quid? ipsum nomen, id est sonum istum duabus syl­ labis expressum, si ex te quæram quid appelles, nonne recte milii respondebis, Nomen? Ad. Recte. Aug. Num ita se significat hoc signum quod quatuor syllabis enuntiamus cum dicimus, Conjunctio? Hoc enim utinen inter illa qua; significat, numerari non potest. Ad. Recte accipio. Aug. It! est quod dictum est nomen seipsum significare cum aliis quæ signifi­ cat; quod etiam dc vocabulo licet per teipsum intel­ ligas. Ad. Jam facile est: sed illud mihi nunc venit in mentem, nomen et generaliter et specialiter dici; vocabulum autcm inter octo partes orationis non ac­ cipi: quare hoc qnoque inter se præter diversum so­ num differre arbitror. Aun. Quid? noincn et ὄνομα distare inter se aliquid putas præter sonum, quo etiam linguæ discernuntur latina atque græca? Ad. Hic vero nihil aliud intelligo. Aug. Perventum est ergo ad ca signa quæ et seipsa significent, et aliud ab alio invi­ cem siguificelur, et quidquid ab uno hoc et ab alio; cl nibil præter sonum inter se differant: nam hoc quartum modo invenimos; tria enim superiora, et de nomine et verbo intelliguntur. Ad. Omnino perventum.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Let us pass on, then, and now tell me whether, just as we found that all words are names and all names words, so all names seem to you to be terms (vocabula) and all terms names.
Ad. I plainly see no difference between them except the different sound of their syllables.
A. Nor do I resist for the moment, although there are some who distinguish them in meaning too, whose view we need not consider now. But surely you notice that we have now come to those signs which signify each other with no difference but sound, and which signify themselves along with all the other parts of speech.
Ad. I do not understand.
A. Do you not understand, then, that “name” is signified by “term” and “term” by “name,” and in such a way that there is no difference but the sound of the letters, as far as the general sense of “name” is concerned: for we also speak of “name” in the special sense in which it is among the eight parts of speech so as not to include the other seven.
Ad. I understand.
A. But this is what I said: that “term” and “name” signify each other.
Ad. I grasp that, but I ask what you meant by “since they also signify themselves along with the other parts of speech.”
A. Did not the earlier reasoning teach us that all parts of speech can be called both names and terms, that is, can be signified both by “name” and by “term”?
Ad. That is so.
A. Well, if I asked you what you call “name” itself, that is, this sound expressed in two syllables, would you not rightly answer me, “a name”?
Ad. Rightly.
A. Does the sign we pronounce in four syllables when we say “conjunction” signify itself in this way? For this name cannot be counted among the things it signifies.
Ad. I take that rightly.
A. That is what was meant by saying that “name” signifies itself along with the other things it signifies; and you may understand the same of “term” by yourself.
Ad. Now it is easy: but it now occurs to me that “name” is used both in a general and in a special sense, while “term” is not counted among the eight parts of speech: so I think they differ in this too, besides the different sound.
A. Well, do you think nomen and ὄνομα differ in anything except the sound, by which the Latin and Greek languages too are distinguished?
Ad. Here indeed I understand nothing else.
A. So we have come to those signs which both signify themselves, and are signified each by the other, and whatever is signified by one is signified by the other, and which differ in nothing but sound: for we have just found this fourth kind; the three earlier ones are understood of both “name” and “word.”
Ad. We have quite come to it.

### Translation notes

- “term”: vocabulum, a near-synonym of nomen.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 6 (PL 32:1203–1205; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/5/#p-6).

## The Teacher 7

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/5/#p-7
- Source: PL 32:1205–1207
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Adeodatus summarizes the dialogue so far: speech teaches or reminds, words are signs, some things can be shown without signs, and signs can be classified by how they signify one another.

### Latin text

Aug. Jam quæ sermocinando invenerimus, ve­ lin recenseas. Ad. Faciam quantum possuln. Nam primo omnium rccordor aliquandiu nos quæsisse quam ob causam loquamur, iuventumquc esse docendi com­ memorandive gratia nos loqui, quandoquidem nec cum interrogamus, aliud agimus quam ut ille qui in­ terrogatur discat quid velimus audire; et in cantando, quod delectationis causa facere videmur, uon sit pro­ prium locutionis; in orando Dco, quem doceri aut commemorari existimare non possumus, id verba va­ leant, ut vel nos ipsos commonefaciamus, vel alii commoneantur doceanturve per nos. Deinde cum sa­ tis constitisset verba nihil aliud esse quam signa; ea vero quæ non aliquid significent, signa esse non posse, proposuisti veroum, cujus verba singula quid signifi­ carent, conarer ostendere: is autem erat: si nihil ex tanta Superis placet urbe relinqui. Cujus secundum verbum quamvis notissimum et Ina... nifestissimum, quid tamen significaret, non rcpe­ rlebamus. Cumque mihi videretur non frustra nos id in loquendo interponere, sed quod eo aliquid docea­ nius audientem, ipsam mentis affectionem, ctmi rem quam quærit, non esse invenit, vcl invenisse se putat, hoc verbo fortasse indicari; respondisti tu quidem, sed tamen nescio quam profunditalcm quæstionis joco evitans, in aliud tempus illustrandam distulisti: nec me debiti quoque tui oblitum putes. Inde tertium in versu verbum cum satagerom expouere, urgetwr abs te, ilL non verbum aliud quod idem valerct, sed ren ipsam potius qtue per verba significaretur osten­ derem. Cumque id sermocinantibus nobis fieri non posse dixissem, ventum est ad ea quae interrogantibus digito monstrantur. Hæc ego corporalia esse omuia arbitrabar, sed invenimus sola visibilia. Hinc nescio quomodo ad surdos et histriones devenimus, qui non qu:c sola videri possunt, sed multa præterea ac prope omnia quae loquimur, gestu sine voce signifi­ cant; eosdem tamen gestus signa esse comperimus. THiu rursus quaercre coepimus, quomodo res ipsas quæ signis significantur, sine ullis signis valeremus oscndere, cum et ille paries, et color, ct omne visi­ bile, quod inteutione digiti ostenditur, signo quodam convinceretur ostendi. Ilic ego errans cum inveniri tale nihil posse dixissem, tandem inter nos constitit, ca pos­ se demonstrari siue signo, quae cum a nobis quærun­ tur, non agimus, et post inquisitionem agere possumus; locutionem tamen ex eo non esse genere: siquidem et loquentes cnm interrogamur quid sit locutio, istam per seipsam demonstrare facile esse satis apparuit. Ex quo admoniti sumus aut signis signa mon­ sLrari, aut signis alia quæ signa non sunt, aut etiam sine signo res quas agere post interrogationem pos­ sumus: horumque trium primum diligentius conside­ randum discutiendumque suscepimus. Qua disputa­ tionc declaratum est, partim esse signa, quæ ab iis signis quai significarent, signiticari vicissim nou pus­ sent, ut cst hoc quadrisyllabum cum, Conjunctio, dicimus: partim qu:c possent, ut cum dicimus, Si­ gnuin, ctiam verbum significamus; et cum dicimus, Verbum, eliam signum significamus; nam signum et verbum, et dno signa, et duo verba sunt. In hoc au­ ten genere, quo invicem se signa significant, quæ­ dam non tantum, quaedam tantum, quacdam vero etiam idem valere monstratum est. Etenim hoc disyl­ labum, quod sonat cum dicimus, Signum, prorsus omnia quibus quidque significatur significat: non au­ tem omuium signorum signum est cum dicimus, Ver­ bum, sed tantum eorum quae articulata voce profc­ runtur. Uude manifestum est, quamvis et verbuli signo, et signum verbo, id est et duas istæ syllabas illis, et illæ istis significentur, plus tamen signunt valere quam verbum, plura scilicet illis duabus syl­ labis, quam istis significantibus. Tantumdem autem valet generale verbum, et generale nomen. Docuit enim ratio omnes partes orationis etiam nomina esse, quod et pronomina his addi possunt, et de omnibus dici potest quod aliquid nominent, ct nulla earum sit quæ non verbo adjuncto pronuntiatum possit implerc. Sed cum tantumdem valeant nomen ct verbum, co quod omnia quæ verba sunt, sint ctiam nomina; non tamen idem valent. Alia quippe de causa verba, et alia nomina nuncupari, satis probabiliter disputatum cst. Siquidem alterum horum ad auris verberationem, alterum nd animi commemorationem notandam esse compertum, vel ex hoc intelligi potest, quod in lo­ qucndo rectissime dicimus, Quod cst huic rei nomen, rem memoriæ mandare cupientes; Quod est autem huic rei verbum, dicere noti solemus. Quae vero non solum tantumdem, sed eliam idem omnino signiOcent, ct inter quæ nihil præter litterarum distet sonum, nomen et ὄνομα invenimus. Illud sane mihi elapsum crat in hoc genere, in quo invicem se significant, nullum nos signum comperisse, quod non inter cætera quæ significat, se quoque significet. Haec quantum potui recordatus sum. Tu jam videris, quem nibil pulo in hoc sermone nisi scientem certumque dixisse, utrum ista bene ordinateque digesserim.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Now I would like you to review what we have found in our conversation.
Ad. I will do it as well as I can. For first of all I remember that we inquired for some time why we speak, and found that we speak in order to teach or to remind, since even when we ask questions we do nothing but let the person asked learn what we want to hear; and in singing, which we seem to do for delight, it is not proper to speech; in praying to God, whom we cannot think is taught or reminded, words serve either to remind ourselves or so that others may be reminded or taught through us. Then, when it was well established that words are nothing but signs, and that things which do not signify something cannot be signs, you proposed a line, the meaning of whose single words I was to try to show; it was: “If it pleases the gods that nothing be left of so great a city.” Its second word, though very well known and very plain, we could not find what it signified. And when it seemed to me that we do not insert it in speaking in vain, but in order to teach the hearer something by it, perhaps the very state of the mind when it finds, or thinks it has found, that the thing it seeks does not exist, is indicated by this word; you indeed answered, but, avoiding by a joke some depth or other of the question, you put off its explanation to another time: and do not think I have forgotten that you owe me this. Then, when I was busy explaining the third word in the line, I was pressed by you to show, not another word of the same force, but rather the very thing signified by the words. And when I had said that this could not be done while we were conversing, we came to the things that are pointed out with the finger to those who ask. I thought these were all bodily things, but we found they were only visible things. From there somehow we came to the deaf and to actors, who signify by gesture without voice not only things that can be seen but many others besides, almost all that we speak of; yet we found that those gestures are signs. Then again we began to ask how we could show the very things that are signified by signs without any signs, since that wall, and color, and everything visible that is shown by pointing the finger, was proved to be shown by a sign. Here, going astray, I said that nothing of the kind could be found; at last we agreed that those things can be shown without a sign which we are not doing when we are asked about them and can do after the inquiry; yet speech is not of that kind: for it was clear enough that even when we are asked while speaking what speech is, it is easy to show it by itself.

From this we were reminded that either signs are shown by signs, or other things that are not signs are shown by signs, or even, without a sign, things we can do after being asked; and of these three we undertook to consider and discuss the first more carefully. By this discussion it was made clear that there are some signs which cannot in turn be signified by the signs they signify, such as this four-syllable word when we say “conjunction”; and some which can, as when we say “sign” we also signify “word,” and when we say “word” we also signify “sign”; for “sign” and “word” are both two signs and two words. In this class, in which signs signify each other, it was shown that some are not equal in force, some equal in force, and some even the same in meaning. For this two-syllable word that sounds when we say “sign” signifies absolutely everything by which anything is signified; but when we say “word,” it is not a sign of all signs, but only of those uttered by an articulate voice. From this it is plain that, although “word” is signified by “sign” and “sign” by “word,” that is, these two syllables by those and those by these, yet “sign” extends further than “word,” that is, these two syllables signify more things than those. But the general “word” and the general “name” are equal in force. For reason taught that all parts of speech are also names, since pronouns can be added to them, and it can be said of all that they name something, and there is none of them which, with a verb added, cannot complete a proposition. But although “name” and “word” are equal in force, because all things that are words are also names, they do not mean the same thing. For it was argued quite plausibly that they are called words for one reason and names for another. Since it was found that one of them is meant to mark the striking of the ear, the other the reminding of the mind, this can be understood even from the fact that in speaking we say very correctly, “What is the name of this thing?” when we want to commit the thing to memory, but we do not usually say, “What is the word for this thing?” And we found that the signs which signify not only an equal range but altogether the same thing, between which there is no difference but the sound of the letters, are nomen and ὄνομα. I had quite forgotten that in this class, in which signs signify each other, we found no sign that does not also signify itself among the other things it signifies. This is what I could remember. Now you will judge, since I think you have said nothing in this conversation except with knowledge and certainty, whether I have set these things out well and in order.

### Extrabiblical texts

- Virgil, Aen. 2.659 (Virgil): quotation, high confidence

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 7 (PL 32:1205–1207; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/5/#p-7).

## The Teacher 8

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/8/#p-8
- Source: PL 32:1207–1209
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine explains that their exercise prepares the mind for the happy life, then uses the sophism “you are not a man” to show that we naturally attend to the things words signify rather than to the words themselves.

### Latin text

Aug. Satis tu quidem memoriter omnia quae vellem recoluisti; et, ut tibi fatear, multo evidentius mihi nunc videntur ista distincta, quam cum ea in­ quirendo ac disserendo de nescio quibus latebris ambo crueremus. Sed quonam tantis ambagibus tecum per­ venire moliar, difficile dictu est hoc loco. Tu enim fortasse aut ludere nos, et a seriis rebus avocare ani­ mum, quasi quibusdam puerilibus quæstiunculis, ar­ hitraris, aut parvam vel mediocrem aliquam utilita­ tem requirere; aut si magnum quiddam parturire istam disputationem suspicaris, jamjamque id scire sive saltem audire desideras. Ego autem credas ve­ lim, neque me vilia ludicra hoc instituissc sermone, quamvis fortasse ludamus, idque ipsum tamen non pucrili sensu æstimandum sit; neque parva bona vel mediocria cogitare. Et tamen si dicain vitam esse quamdam beatam, eamdemque sempiternam, quo nos Deo duce, id est ipsa veritate, gradibus quibus­ dam infirmo gressui nostro accommodatis perduci cu­ piam; vereor ne ridiculus videar, qui non rerum ipsarum quæ significantur, sed consideratione signo­ rum tantam viam ingredi cœpcrim. Dabis igitur re­ piam, si pracludo tecum non ludendi gratia, sed exercendi vires et mentis acicm,quibus regionis illius, ubi beata vita est, calorem ac lucem non modo sus tinere, verum ctiam amare possimus. Ad. Perge po­ tius ut cœpisti: nam nunquam ego contemnenda pu­ tem quæ tu dicenda vel agenda putaveris. Aug. Age, jati ergo illam partem considere­ mus, cuna signis non a!ia signa significantur, sed ca quæ significabilia vocamus. Et primum die mihi utrum homo, homo sit. Ad. Nunc vero an ludas nc­ scio. Aug. Quid ita? Ad. Quia quærendum ct me censes, utrum homo aliud sit quam homo. Aug. Ita credo te illudi arbitrareris, si etiam quærerem utrum prima hujus nominis syllaba aliud sit quam, ho, ct aliud secunda quam, mo. Ad. Iia omnino. Aug. At istæ duæ syllabæ conjunctæ, humo ct: an negabis? Ad. Quis neget? Aug. Quæro ergo, num tu dux istæ syllabæ conjunctæ sis. Ad. Nullo modo: sed video quo tendas. Aug. Dicito ergo, ne mc contumeliosum putcs. Ad. Concludi existimas quod bomo non sim. Aug. Quid, tu non idein existimas, qui omnia supc­ riora cx quibus hoc coufectum est, vera esse conce­ dis? Ad. Non tibi ego dicam quid exstimem, nisi prius abs te audiero, cum quærercs utrum homo. bomo sit, de duabus istis syllabis, an de re ipsa quam significant, me interrogaveris? Aug. Tu potius re­ sponde ex qua parte accepcris interrogationcm meam: nam si est ambigua, prius hoc cavere debuisti, ne­ que mihi respondere antequam certus fieres quonam modo rogaverim. Ad. Quid enim me impediret hæc ambigultas, cum ego ad utrumque responderim; homo enim prorsus homo est: nam et ist-e dux svl­ labæ nihil aliud sunt quam istæ dum syllabae; ct id quod significant, nihil aliud est, quam id quod est. Aug. Scite hoc quidem: sed cur hoc solum quod di­ ctuin est homo, non etiam cætera quæ locuti sumus, ad utrumque accepisti? Ad. Unde enim convincor quod et caetera non sic acceperim? Aug. Ut alia omittam, eam ipsam primam rogationem meam, si totam ex ea parte accepisses, qua syllabæ sonari, nihil mihi respondisses; possem tibi cnim vidcri nibil eliam interrogasse: DUnC vero cum tria verba sonue­ rim, quorum unum in medio repetivi dicens utrum homo, homo sit, primum et ultimum verbum, non secundum ipsa signa., sed secundum ea quæ his signi­ ficantur te accepisse, vel hoc solo manifestum est, quod statim certus ac fidens rogationi respondendum putasti. Ad. Verum dicis. Aug. Cur ergo id lautum quod in medio positum est, et secundum id quod sonat, et secundum id quod signilicat, te accipere libuit? Ad. Ecce jam totum ex ea tantum parte qua signi­ ficatur accipio: assentior enim tibi, sermocinari nos omnino non posse, nisi auditis verbis ad ea furatur animus, quorum ista sunt signa. Quare ostende nunc, quomodo ista ratiocinatione deceptus sim, qua me hominem non esse concluditur. Aug. Imo eadem rursus interrogabo, ut ipse invenias ubi lapsus sis- Ad. Bene facis. Aug. Illud ergo quod primo quæsieram, quia jam dcdisti,non quæram. Vide igitur diligentius, utrum syllaba, ho, nihil aliud sit quam, iro; et utrum, mo, nihil aliud sit quam, mo. Ad. Hie prorsus nihil aliud video. Aug. Vide etiam num istis duabus junctis, homo, fiat. Ad. Nequaquam hoc concesserim: placuit euim, et recte placuit, signo dato id quod significa­ tur attendere, et ex ejus consideratione vel dare, vcl negare quod dicitur. Illæ autem separatim enuntiatæ syllabæ, quia sinc ulla significatione sonuerunt, hoc cas esse quod sonuere concessum est. Aug. Placet igilur, firmumque animo tenes non respondendum esse interrogationibus, nisi ex iis rebus quæ verbis significantur. Ad. Non intelligo cur displiceat, si modo verba sint. Aug. Vellem scire quomodo illi re­ sisteres, de quo jocantes solemus audire, quod ex cjus ore cum quo disputabat, lconem processisse con­ cluscriL. Cum enim quæsisset, utrum ea qua: loque­ rcmur, nostro ore procederent, atquc ille non po­ tuisset negare; quod facile fuit, egit cum homine, ut in loquendo leonem nominaret: hoc ubi factum est, ridicule insultare cœpit ct premcre, ut quoniam quid­ quid loquimur, ore nostro exire confessus crat, et leonem se locutum csse ucquibat abnuere, homo non malus tam immanem bestiam videretur vomuisse. Ad. Minime vero crat arduum scurrx huic resistere; non cnim concederem ore nostro exire quodcumque loquimur. Nam quæ loquimur, ea significamus; non autem quæ res significatur, sed signum quo signifi­ catur loqucntis ore procedit, nisi cum ipsa signa si­ gnificantur: quod genus paulo ante tractavimus. Aug. Bene tu quidcm hoc modo adversus illum esses pnratus: verumtamen mihi quid respondehis, utrum homo nomen sit requirenti? Ad. Quid, nisi esse nomen? Aug. Quid? cum te video, num nomen video? Ad. Non. Avg. Visne igitur dicam quod scqui­ tUI.? Ad. Ne quaeso; nam mihi ipse rcnuntio, me ho­ niincm non esse. qui nomen esse responderim, cum homo utrum nomen esset inquireres. Jam enim pla­ cuerat, ex ca re qu:u significaretur, aut assentiri, ant negare quod dicilur. Aug. At mihi videtur non te frustra in hanc responsionem decidisse; nam vigi­ lanliam tuam mentibus nostris indita ipsa lex rationis evicit: nam si quærerem quid esset homo, respon­ deres fortasse, Animal; si autem quærerem quæ pars orationis esset homo, nullo modo posses recte respondere nisi, Nomen: quamobrem cum homo et nomen, et animal esse inveniatur, illud dicitur ex ea parte qua signum est, hoc ex parte rei quam signifi­ cat. Qui ergo quxrit utrum homo nomen sit, nihil ei aliud quam esse respondeam: satis euim significat ex ca parte se velle audire, qua signum cst. Si autcm quærit utrum animal sit, multo proclivius annuam: quoniam si tacens et nomen et animal, tantum quid esset homo rcquirerct, placita ilIa loqucndi regula ad id quod duabus syllabis significatur, animus curreret; neque quidquam responderetur nisi animal, vel cHam tota definitio diceretur, id est animal rationale mor­ tale: an tibi non videtur! Ad. Prorsus videtur: sed cum esse nomen concesserimus, quomodo iliam conclusioncm nimis contumeliosam evitabimus, qua nos bomines non esse conficitur? Aug. Quomodo putas, nisi docendo non ex ea parte illatam, qua interroganti assentiebamur? Ant si ex ea parte illam se fatetur inferre e, nullo modo est formidanda: quid enim metuam hominem, id est tres istas sylla­ bas non esse me confiteri? Ad, Nibil est verius. Cur ergo animum offendit, cam dicitur, Non ea igitur ho. mo; cum secundum illa concessa, nUtU vcrius dici potuerit? Aug. Quia non possum non putare ad id conclusionem referri, quod his duabus syllabis si­ gnificatur, simul atque ista verba sonnerint, ea scili­ cet regula, quae naturaliter plurimum valet, ut au­ ditis signis ad res significatas feratur intentio. Ad. Accipio quod dicis.

### English translation (Claude)

A. You have recalled from memory well enough everything I wanted; and, to confess it to you, these distinctions now seem much clearer to me than when we both dug them out, by inquiring and discussing, from some hiding places or other. But where I am trying to arrive with you by such long detours is hard to say at this point. For perhaps you think either that we are playing and calling the mind away from serious things with childish little questions, or that we are seeking some small or moderate benefit; or, if you suspect that this discussion is giving birth to something great, you want to know or at least hear it right away. But I would like you to believe that I have not undertaken this conversation for cheap amusement, although perhaps we are playing, and even that is not to be judged with a childish mind; nor am I thinking of small or moderate goods. And yet if I say that there is a happy life, and an everlasting one, to which I want us to be led, with God as guide, that is, Truth itself, by certain steps suited to our weak gait, I fear I may seem ridiculous for having set out on so long a road by considering, not the things themselves that are signified, but signs. You will pardon me, then, if I play a prelude with you, not for the sake of playing, but to exercise the strength and keenness of mind by which we may be able not only to endure but even to love the warmth and light of that region where the happy life is.
Ad. Go on rather as you have begun: for I would never think contemptible what you have thought worth saying or doing.
A. Come, then, let us now consider that part in which by signs are signified not other signs but the things we call signifiables. And first tell me whether man is man.
Ad. Now I really do not know whether you are joking.
A. Why so?
Ad. Because you think I need to be asked whether man is anything other than man.
A. In the same way, I believe, you would think you were being made fun of if I also asked whether the first syllable of this name is anything other than “ho,” and the second anything other than “mo.”
Ad. Quite so.
A. But these two syllables joined make homo (“man”): or will you deny it?
Ad. Who would deny it?
A. I ask, then: are you these two syllables joined?
Ad. By no means: but I see where you are heading.
A. Say it, then, so that you may not think me insulting.
Ad. You think it is concluded that I am not a man.
A. Well, do you not think the same, since you grant that all the earlier statements from which this is drawn are true?
Ad. I will not tell you what I think until I have first heard from you whether, when you asked whether man is man, you were asking me about those two syllables or about the very thing they signify.
A. Rather, you answer in which sense you took my question: for if it was ambiguous, you ought to have guarded against this first, and not have answered me before you were sure how I had asked.
Ad. Why should this ambiguity hinder me, since I answered in both senses? For man is certainly man: for those two syllables are nothing but those two syllables, and what they signify is nothing but what it is.
A. Cleverly said indeed: but why did you take in both senses only what was said, “man,” and not also the other things we said?
Ad. How am I proved not to have taken the rest so too?
A. To pass over other things, if you had taken that very first question of mine wholly in the sense in which syllables sound, you would have answered me nothing; for I might have seemed to you to have asked nothing. But since I sounded three words, of which I repeated one in the middle, saying “whether man is man,” it is plain from this alone that you took the first and last words not as the signs themselves but as the things they signify, since you at once, sure and confident, thought the question should be answered.
Ad. You are right.
A. Why, then, did you choose to take only the one placed in the middle both as it sounds and as it signifies?
Ad. Look, I now take the whole only in the sense in which it is signified: for I agree with you that we cannot converse at all unless, when we hear words, the mind is carried to the things of which they are signs. So now show me how I was deceived by that reasoning which concludes that I am not a man.
A. Rather, I will ask the same questions again, so that you may find for yourself where you slipped.
Ad. That is good of you.
A. I will not ask again what I asked first, since you have already granted it. Look more carefully, then, whether the syllable “ho” is nothing other than “ho,” and “mo” nothing other than “mo.”
Ad. Here I see nothing other at all.
A. See also whether when these two are joined “homo” is made.
Ad. I would by no means grant this: for we agreed, and rightly agreed, that when a sign is given we should attend to what is signified, and from considering it either grant or deny what is said. But those syllables pronounced separately, because they sounded without any meaning, were granted to be what they sounded.
A. So you are satisfied and hold firmly in mind that questions are to be answered only from the things signified by the words.
Ad. I do not understand why it should not satisfy me, provided they are words.
A. I would like to know how you would resist the man we usually hear of in jest, who concluded that a lion had come out of the mouth of the man he was disputing with. For when he had asked whether the things we speak come out of our mouth, and the other could not deny it, he contrived, which was easy, that the man should name a lion in speaking: when this was done, he began to mock and press him absurdly, so that, since he had confessed that whatever we speak comes out of our mouth and could not deny that he had spoken “lion,” this not wicked man seemed to have vomited so savage a beast.
Ad. It would not be at all hard to resist this buffoon; for I would not grant that whatever we speak comes out of our mouth. For what we speak we signify; and what comes out of the speaker's mouth is not the thing signified but the sign by which it is signified, except when signs themselves are signified, a class we dealt with a little earlier.
A. In this way you would be well prepared against him: yet what will you answer me if I ask whether “man” is a name?
Ad. What but that it is a name?
A. Well, when I see you, do I see a name?
Ad. No.
A. Do you want me to say, then, what follows?
Ad. Please do not; for I declare myself that I am not a man, since I answered that it is a name when you asked whether “man” is a name. For we had already agreed to grant or deny what is said according to the thing signified.
A. But it seems to me that you did not fall into this answer for nothing; for the very law of reason implanted in our minds overcame your watchfulness. For if I asked what man is, you would perhaps answer, “an animal”; but if I asked what part of speech “man” is, you could in no way answer rightly except “a name.” So, since “man” is found to be both a name and an animal, the former is said in the sense in which it is a sign, the latter in the sense of the thing it signifies. So to one who asks whether “man” is a name I would answer nothing but that it is: for he signifies plainly enough that he wants to hear in the sense in which it is a sign. But if he asks whether it is an animal, I would agree much more readily: for if, saying nothing of name or animal, he asked only what man is, the mind would run, by that agreed rule of speaking, to what is signified by the two syllables; and nothing would be answered but “an animal,” or even the whole definition would be given, that is, “a rational mortal animal.” Or do you not think so?
Ad. I think so entirely: but since we have granted that it is a name, how shall we avoid that too insulting conclusion by which it is made out that we are not men?
A. How do you think, except by teaching that it was drawn not in the sense in which we agreed with the questioner? Or if he admits that he draws it in that sense, it is not to be feared at all: for why should I fear to admit that I am not “man” (hominem), that is, those three syllables?
Ad. Nothing is truer. Why, then, does it offend the mind when it is said, “So you are not a man,” though, according to what was granted, nothing truer could have been said?
A. Because I cannot help thinking that the conclusion refers to what is signified by these two syllables as soon as these words have sounded, by that rule which naturally has the greatest force, that when signs are heard the attention is carried to the things signified.
Ad. I accept what you say.

### Translation notes

- “those three syllables”: the accusative hominem, which has three syllables, as against the two of homo.
- “rational mortal animal”: the standard definition of man in ancient logic.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 8 (PL 32:1207–1209; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/8/#p-8).

## The Teacher 9

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/8/#p-9
- Source: PL 32:1209–1211
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine argues that what exists for the sake of something else is worth less than it, so that knowledge of things is worth more than the signs by which we learn them, even when a word like “filth” or “vice” is better than the thing it names.

### Latin text

Aug. Jam ergo iulelligas volo, res quæ signifi­ cantur, pluris quam signa esse pendendas. Quidquid enim propter aliud est, vilius sit necesse cst quam id propter quod est; nisi tu aliud existimas. Ad. Vi­ detur mihi non temere hic esse assentiendum: nam cum dicimus, Cœnum longe hoc nomen arbitror rci quam significat antecellere. Quod enim nos offendit audientes, non ad ipsius verbi pertinet sonum; cœ­ num enim nomen, mutata una littera cœlum esi; in­ ter illa vero quoe his nominibus significantur, quar­ tum distet videmus. Quamobrem nequaquam huic signo tribuerim, quod in re quam significat odimus; et propterea hoc illi jure antepono: libentius enim hoc audimus, quam ullo sensu illud attingimus. Aug. Vigilantissime omnino. Itaque falsum est. omnes res pluris quam earum signa esse pendend as. Ad. Iia vi­ detur. Aug. Dic ergo mihi quid arbitreris cos secutos esse, qui huic rei lam fœdæ atque aspernabili nomen indiderunt; vel utrum eos probes, an iinprob -s. Ad. Ego vero illos nec probare, nec improbare audeo, nec quid fuerint secuti scio. Ang. Potesne saltem scire quid tu sequaris, cum hoc numen enunlias? Ad. Hoc plane possum: nam significare volo, ut cum cum quo loquor, doceam vel admoneam de re illa, quod eum doceri vel admoncri oportere arbitror. Aug. Quid? ipsum docere aut admonere, sive doceri aut admo­ neri, quod vel tu cxhibcs commode per hoc no­ men, vel exhibetur tibi; nonne charius quam ipsum nomen habendum est? Ad. Concedo ipsam scientiam, quae per hoc signum evenit, eidem signo esse ante­ ponendam; sed non ideo etiam rem ipsam puto. Aug. In illa igitur sententia nostra, quanquam sit falsum, res omnes signis suis præponi oportere; non tamen falsum est, omne quod propter aliud est, vilius esse quam id propter quod est. Cognitio quippe coeni, propur quam hoc nomen est institutum, pluris habenda est ipso nomine, quod eidem coeno præpo­ nendum esse comperimus. Non enim ob aliud ista cognitio signo, de quo agimus, antelata est, nisi quia illud propter hanc, nun hæc propter illud esse con­ vincitur. Nam ita cum quidaln vorator, ventrisque, ut ab Apostolo dicitur, cultor, diceret ideo se vivere, ut vescereLur; non tulit qui audiebat frugi homo, et, Quanto, inquit, metius ideo vescereris ul viveres? quod utique ex eadem ista regula locutus est 1. Nam naque alia de causa ille displicuit, nisi quod vitam suam tam parvipenderet, ut cam duceret gutturis voluptate viliorem, dicendo se propter epulas vivere: neque hic ob aliud jure laudatur, nisi quod in iis duobus quid propter quid fieret, hoc est quid cui subjectum esset intelligens, cibandum potius ut vivamus, quam vivendum utcibemur, admonuit. Si­ militer et tu fortasse, et quilibet hominum non impe­ ritc res æstimantium, dicenti cuipiam loquaci ama­ torique verborum, Idco doceo ut loquar, respondere­ tis, Homo, cur non potius ideo loqueris ut doceas? Quod si hæc vera sunt, sicuti esse cognoscis, vides profecto quanto verba minoris habenda siut, quam id propter quod utimur verbis; cum ipse usus verborum jam sit verbis anteponendus: verba eum sunt ut his utamur; utimur autem his ad docendum. Quanto est ergo melius doccre quam loqui, tanto melior est quam verba, locutio. Multo ergo melior doctrina quam verba Sed cupio audire quia forte contradicendum putes. Ad. Assentior quidem mcliorem quam verba esse doctrinam; scd utrum adversus istam regulam qua dicitur, Omne quod propter aliud est, inferius esse quam id propter quod est, nihil sit quod objici possit, ignoro. Aug. Alias hoc opportunius diligcn­ liusque tractabimus: nunc illud quod concedis, sntis est ad id quod conficere studeo. Das enim cognitio­ nem rerum quam signa rerum esse chariorcm. Quam­ obrem cognitio rerum quæ significantur, cognitioni signorum anteferenda est: an tibi non vidctur? Ad. Num ego cognitionem rerum cognitione signorum, ac non signis ipsis præstantiorem esse concessi? quare vereor ut Iiic tibi assentiar. Quid si cuiun ut cœnum nomen melius cst ea re quam significat; ita ct hujus nominis cognitio cognitioni quoque illius rei est ante­ pUDenda, quamvis ea cognitione sit ipsum nomen in­ furius? Quatuor quippe sunt: nomen, ct res, cognitio nominis, et cognitio rei. Sicut ergo primum secundo, cur non ct tertium quarto antecellat? Sed ut non an­ tecellat, num ctiam subjiciendum est? Aug. Mire omnino tc video et trnuisse quid concesseris, et explicasse quid senscris. Sed, ut opi­ nor, intelligis, hoc trisyllabum nomen, quod sonat rum dicimus, Vitium, melius esse quam id quod significat; cnm ipsius cognitio nominis multo sit inferior cognitione vitiorum. Licet itque consti­ tuas etiam ista quatuor atque consideres, nomen et rem, cognitionem nominis et cognitionem rei; pri­ mum secundo jure præponimus. Huc enim positum nomcn in carmine, cum ait Persius, Sed stupet hic vitio, non modo nibil vitii fecit in versu, sed nomihil etiam ornatus dedit: cnm tamen res ipsa quæ signilicatur hoc nomine, in quocumque inest, cogat esse vitiosum. At non ita et tertium quarto, sed quartum tertio vidcmus excellere. Hujus enim cognitio nominis vilis est præ cognitione vitio­ rum. Ad. Etiamne cum ista cognitio miseriores facit, censes esse præferendam? Nam idem Persius omni­ bus pœnis, quas tyrannorum vel crudclitas excogita­ vit vcl cupiditas pendit, hanc unam anteponit, qua cruciantur bnmincs qui vitia quæ vitare non possunt, coguntur agnoscere. Aug. Putes huc modo cognitioni hujus nominis ipsam quoque virtutum cognitionem ucgare præferendam: quia virtutem videre nec tenere, v supplicium est: quo idem ille satyricus tyranni ut puniantur optavit. Ad. Deus hanc avertat amentiam: jam enim intelligo non ipsas co­ gnitiones, quibus animum imbuit optima omnium disciplina, esse culpandas; sed cos omnium rniserri­ mos judicandos, sicut et Persium judicasse arbitror, qui tali morbo affecti sunt, cui nec tanta medicina subveniat. Aug. Bene intelligis: sed quoquo modo se habeat Persiana sententia, quid ad nos? Non enim ho­ rum auctoritati subjecti sumus in talibus rebus. Deinde si qua cognitio cognitioni præferenda sit, non hic fa­ cile est explicare. Satis habeo quod effectum est, cognitionem rerum quæ significantur, ctsi uon cogni­ tione signorum, ipsis tamen signis esse pottorem. Quarejam illud magis magisque discutiamus, quale sit genus rerum quas sinc signis monstrari posse di< cu­ bamus per seipsas, ut loqui, ambulare, sedere, jacere, atque hujusmodi caetera. Ad. Jam recolo quid dicas.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Now, then, I want you to understand that the things signified are to be valued more than the signs. For whatever exists for the sake of something else must be of less worth than that for whose sake it exists; unless you think otherwise.
Ad. It seems to me that one should not agree rashly here: for when we say “filth” (caenum), I think this name far surpasses the thing it signifies. For what offends us when we hear it does not belong to the sound of the word itself; for the name caenum, with one letter changed, is caelum (“heaven”); but we see how great a difference there is between the things signified by these names. So I would by no means attribute to this sign what we hate in the thing it signifies; and therefore I rightly prefer the one to the other: for we hear the word more gladly than we touch the thing with any sense.
A. Most watchful indeed. So it is false that all things are to be valued more than their signs.
Ad. So it seems.
A. Tell me, then, what you think those had in view who gave a name to a thing so foul and despicable; or whether you approve or disapprove of them.
Ad. I dare neither approve nor disapprove of them, nor do I know what they had in view.
A. Can you at least know what you have in view when you pronounce this name?
Ad. That I plainly can: for I want to signify, so as to teach or remind the person I am speaking with about that thing, which I think he ought to be taught or reminded of.
A. Well, is not the teaching or reminding itself, or being taught or reminded, which you suitably supply by this name or which is supplied to you, to be held dearer than the name itself?
Ad. I grant that the knowledge itself which comes through this sign is to be preferred to the sign; but I do not think the thing itself is on that account to be preferred.
A. In that statement of ours, then, although it is false that all things ought to be preferred to their signs, yet it is not false that everything that exists for the sake of something else is of less worth than that for whose sake it exists. For the knowledge of filth, for the sake of which this name was instituted, is to be valued more than the name itself, which we found is to be preferred to filth itself. For this knowledge was preferred to the sign we are dealing with for no other reason than that the sign is proved to exist for the sake of the knowledge, not the knowledge for the sake of the sign. So when a certain glutton, a worshiper of the belly, as the Apostle says, said that he lived in order to eat, a frugal man who heard him could not bear it, and said, “How much better if you ate in order to live?” He certainly spoke according to this same rule. For the former displeased for no other reason than that he valued his life so little as to think it worth less than the pleasure of his throat, saying that he lived for the sake of feasting: and the latter is rightly praised for no other reason than that, understanding in these two which was done for the sake of which, that is, which was subordinate to which, he reminded him that we should eat in order to live rather than live in order to eat. Similarly you too perhaps, and any person who judges things not unskillfully, would answer someone talkative and a lover of words who said, “I teach in order to speak”: “Man, why do you not rather speak in order to teach?” And if these things are true, as you recognize they are, you surely see how much less words are to be valued than that for whose sake we use words; since the very use of words is already to be preferred to words: for words exist so that we may use them; and we use them in order to teach. As much better, then, as teaching is than speaking, so much better is speech than words. Teaching, then, is much better than words. But I want to hear whether you perhaps think something should be said against this.
Ad. I agree indeed that teaching is better than words; but whether nothing can be objected against that rule which says that everything that exists for the sake of something else is inferior to that for whose sake it exists, I do not know.
A. We will deal with this at another time more fittingly and carefully: for now what you grant is enough for what I am trying to establish. For you grant that the knowledge of things is dearer than the signs of things. Therefore the knowledge of the things signified is to be preferred to the knowledge of the signs: or do you not think so?
Ad. Did I grant that the knowledge of things is more excellent than the knowledge of signs, and not than the signs themselves? So I am afraid to agree with you here. For what if, just as the name “filth” is better than the thing it signifies, so the knowledge of this name is also to be preferred to the knowledge of that thing, although the name itself is inferior to that knowledge? For there are four things: the name, and the thing, the knowledge of the name, and the knowledge of the thing. So, just as the first surpasses the second, why should not the third also surpass the fourth? And even if it does not surpass it, must it also be placed below it?
A. I see that you have wonderfully both kept hold of what you granted and explained what you think. But, I think, you understand that this three-syllable name which sounds when we say vitium (“vice”) is better than what it signifies, while the knowledge of the name itself is much inferior to the knowledge of vices. So, although you may set up and consider these four, the name and the thing, the knowledge of the name and the knowledge of the thing, we rightly put the first before the second. For this name, placed in a poem when Persius says, “But this man is dazed by vice,” not only did no harm to the line but even gave it some ornament: although the thing itself signified by this name makes vicious whomever it is in. But we see that the third does not likewise surpass the fourth, but the fourth the third. For the knowledge of this name is worthless compared with the knowledge of vices.
Ad. Do you think it is to be preferred even when that knowledge makes people more wretched? For the same Persius puts this one punishment above all the punishments which the cruelty of tyrants has devised or their greed has weighed out: that by which people are tortured who are forced to recognize vices they cannot avoid.
A. In this way you might also deny that the knowledge of the virtues themselves is to be preferred to the knowledge of this name; for to see virtue and not hold it is a torment, by which that same satirist wished tyrants to be punished.
Ad. God avert such madness! For now I understand that the kinds of knowledge with which the best of all disciplines fills the mind are not to be blamed; but that those are to be judged the most wretched of all, as I think Persius also judged, who are afflicted with such a disease that not even so great a medicine can help them.
A. You understand well: but whatever Persius' view may be, what is it to us? For we are not subject to the authority of such writers in such matters. And whether one kind of knowledge is to be preferred to another is not easy to explain here. I am content with what has been achieved: that the knowledge of the things signified, though not better than the knowledge of the signs, is still better than the signs themselves. So let us discuss more and more what kind of things those are which we said can be shown by themselves without signs, such as speaking, walking, sitting, lying, and others of this kind.
Ad. Now I recall what you mean.

### Scripture references

- Rom 16:18: allusion, high confidence
- Phil 3:19: allusion, medium confidence

### Extrabiblical texts

- Persius, 3.32 (Persius, Satires): quotation, high confidence
- Persius, 3.35-38 (Persius, Satires): allusion, high confidence
- Aulus Gellius, Noct. att. 19.2.7 (Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights): allusion, low confidence

### Translation notes

- Rom 16:18 (cf. Phil 3:19): “worshiper of the belly.” The saying “eat to live, not live to eat” is traditionally ascribed to Socrates (e.g. Aulus Gellius, Noct. att. 19.2.7).
- Persius, Sat. 3.32 and 3.35–38.
- “the third … the fourth”: the knowledge of the name and the knowledge of the thing.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 9 (PL 32:1209–1211; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/8/#p-9).

## The Teacher 10

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/8/#p-10
- Source: PL 32:1211–1215
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Augustine shows that some things can be shown without signs, as a fowler shows his art by doing it, and argues further that we learn nothing from words themselves: we learn what a word means only by knowing the thing, as with “head” and the unknown saraballae of Daniel 3.

### Latin text

Aug. Omniane tihi videntur, quæ interrogati mox agere possumus, sine signo posse monstrari? an aliquid excipis? Ad. Ego vero etiain atque etiam ge­ nus hoc totum considerans, nihil adhuc invenio quod sine signo valeat doceri, nisi forte locutionem, et se forte idipsuin quispiam quærat, quid sit docere. Video enim cum, quidquid post ejus interrogationem fecero ut discat, ab ea ipsa re non discere quam sibi dcmon­ strari cupit: nam si me cessantem, ut dictum est, vel aliud agontem roget quispiam quid sit ambulare, et ego staliin ambulando, eum quod rogavit sine siguo coner docere; unde cavebo ne id tantum putet esse ambulare, quantum ego ambulavero? quod si putave­ rit, decipletur: quisquis enim plus minusve quam ego ambulaverit, hunc ille ambulasse non arbitrabi­ tur. Et quod de hoc uno verbo dixi, transit in omnia qn;c sine signo monstrari posse consenseram præter duo illa quæ excopimus. Aug. Accipio quidem istud: sed nonne tibi vi­ dctur aliud esse loqui, aliud docere? Ad. Videtur sane: nam si esset idem, non doceret quisquam nisi loqucns; cum vero ct aliis signis, practer verba, multa docea­ mus, quis de ista differentia dubitaverit? Aug. Quid? docere et significare, nihilne interest! an aliquid dff­ ferunt? Ad. Idem puto esse. Aug. Nonne recte dicit, qui dicit idco nos significare ut doceamus? Ad. Recte prorsus. Aug. Quid, si dicat alius ideo nos docere ut significemus? nonne facile superiore sententia refel­ lelur? Ad. Ita cst. Aug. Si ergo significamus ut do­ ceamas, non docemus ut significemus; aliud est do­ cere, aliud significare. Ad. Verum dieis, nec recte idem esse utrumque respondi. Aug. Nunc illud respon­ de, utrum qui docet quid sit docere, significando id agat, an aliter. Ad. Non video quomodo aliter possit. Aug. Falsum cst igitur quod paulo aute dixisti, doceri rem posse sine signis, cum quæritur quid sit ipsuin docere; quando nc hoc quidem videmus sine signi­ ficatione agi posse, cum aliud esse significare, aliud docEre concesseris. Si enim diversa sunt, sicut appa­ ret, neque hoc nisi per illud ostenditur, non per sc utique ostenditur, sicut tibi visum erat. Quamobrem nihil adhuc inventum est, quod monstrari pcr scipsum qncat præter locutionem, quæ inter alia se qooque si­ gnificat: quæ tamen cum etiam ipsa signum sh nondum prorsus exstat quod sine signis doceri posse videatur. Ad. Nihil habeo cur non assentiar.. Aug. Confectum est igitur et nihil sinc signis doceri, etcognitionem ipsam signis quibus cognosci­ mus, chariorem nobis esse oportere: quamvis noti omnia quc significantur possint signis suis esse po. tiora. Ad. Ita videtur. Aug. Quanto tandem circuitu res tantilla peracta sit, meministine, quæso? Nam cx quo inter nos verba jaculamur, quod tam diu fecimus, bxc tria ut invenirentur laboratum est: utrum nihil siue signis possit doceri; et utrum siut quædam signa Jebus-quas significant præferenda; et utrum melior quam ligna sit rerum ipsa cognitio. Sed quartum est, quod breviter abs te vellem cognoscere, utrumnam ista inventa sic putes, ut jam de his dubitare non possis. Ad. Vellem quidem tantis ambagibus atque anfractibus esset ad certa perventum; sed et ista ro­ latio tua uescio quomodo me sollicitat, et ab assen­ sione deterret. Videris enim mUn non hæc de me fuisse quæsiturus, nisi haberes quod contradiceres: et ipsa rerum implicatio totum me inspicere, ac secu­ rum respondere non sinit, verentem ne quid in tantis Involucris lateat, quod acies mentis meæ lustrare non possit. Aug. Dubitationem tuam non invitus ac­ cipio; significat enim animum minime temerarium I quæ custodia tranquillitatis est maxima. Namdifficil­ limum omnino est non perturbari, cum ca quæ prona et procliva approbatione tenebamus contrariis dispu­ tationibus labefactantur, et quasi extorquentur c ma­ nibus. Quare, ut æquum est bene consideratis perspe­ ctisque rationibus cedere, ita incognita pro coguilis habere periculosum. Metus est enim ne cum sæpe subruuntur quæ firnlissimc statura et mansura præ­ sumimus, in tantum odium vel timorem rationis inci­ danaus, ut ne ipsi qaidem perspicuae vcritati fides habenda videatur. Sed age, nunc expeditius retractemus utrum recte ista dubitanda putaveris. Nam qua;ro abs te, si quisquam ignarus deceptionis avium, quae calamis et visco affectatur, obviam fieret aucupi, armis quidem suis instructo, non tamen aucupanti, sed iter agenti, quo viso premeret gradum, secumque, ut Gt, admirans cogitaret et quæreret quidnam sibi hominis ille vellet ornatus; auceps autem cum in se videret attentum, o entandi se studio cannas expediret, et prope anim­ adversam aliquam aviculam fistula et accipitre fige­ ri i, subigeret et caperct; nonne illum spectaiorem suum doceret nullo significatu, sed rc ipsa, quod ille scire cupiebat? Ad. Metuo ne quid hic tato sit, quale de illo dixi, qui quæritquid sit ambulare. Neque enim video, et hic totum illud aucupium esse monstratum. Aug. Facile est bac cura te exuere; addo enim, si ille ita intelligens esset, ut ex hoc quod vidit, totum illud genus artis agnosceret: satis est namque ad rem, et de quibusdam rebus tametsi non omnibus, et quosdam homines doceri posse sine signo. Ad. Hoc etiam ego possum illi addere; si enim sit bene intel­ ligeus, paucis passibus ambulatione monstrata, totum quid sit ambulare cognoscet. Aug. Facias per me licet, nee tantum nihil rcsisto, verum etiam faveo: vides enim ab utroque nostrum id efficit ut quaedam quidam doccri sino signis queant, falsumque illud sit quod nobis p:lulo ante videbatur, nihil esse omnino quod sine signis possit ostendi. Jain enim ex his non unum aliquid aut alterum, sed millia rerum animo occur­ runt, quæ nullo signo dato per scipsa monstrentur. Quid enim dubitcmus, oro te? Nam ut honunum omit - tam innumerabilia spectacula in omnibus theatris sine signo ipsis rebus exhibentium; solem certe istum tu­ cemque hæc omnia perfundentem atque vestientem, lunam et ca:tera sidera, terras et maria, quasqUe in his innumerabiliter gignuntur, nonne per seipsa exhi­ bet atque ostendit Deus et natura cernentibus' Quod si diligentius consideremus, fortasse nihil invenies, quod per sua signa discatur. Cum enim mihi signum datur, si nescientem me invenit cujus rei signum sit docere me nihil potest: si vero scien. tem, quid disco pur signum? Non enim mihi reu: quam significat ostendit verbum cum lego, Et sara­ ballæ 1 eorum nun sunt immutatæ. Nam si quædam capitum tegmina nuncupantur hoc nomine, num ego hoc audito, aut quid sit caput, aut quid sint tegmina didici? ante ista noveram; neque cum appellarentur ab aliis, sed cum a me viderentur, corum est mibi facta notitia. Etenim cum primum istæ dure syllabae, cum dicimus, Caput, aures meas impulerunt, tam nescivi quid significarent, quam cum primo audirem legeremve, saraballas. Sed cum sape diceretur, Caput, notans atque animadvertens quando diceretur, reperi vocabulum esse rei quæ mihi jam erat videndo notissima. Quod priusquam rcperissem, tantum milii souus erat hoc verbum: signum vero esse didici, quando cujus rei signum esset iuveni; qnam quidem, ut dixi, non significatu, sed aspectu didiceram. Itaque magis signum re cognita, quam signo dato ipsa res discilur. Quod ut apertius intelligas, finge nos primum nunc audirc quod dicitur, caput; et nescientes utrum vox ista sit tantummodo sonans, an aliquid etiam significans, quærere quid sit caput memento nos non rei quæ significatur, sed ipsius signi velle habere no­ titiam, qua caremus profecto, quamdiu cujus signum est ignoramus): si ergo ita quxrentibus res ipsa di­ giio demonstretur, bac conspecta discimus signum quod audieramus tantum, nondum noveramus. In quo tamen signo cum duo sint, sonus et significatio, so­ num certe non per signum percipimus, sed eo ipse aure pulsata; significationem autem re, quae signili­ catur, aspecta. Nam illa intentio digiti significare nihil aliud potest, quam illud in quod intenditur digitus; intentus est autem non in signum. sed in membrum quod caput vocatur. Itaque per iilam Deflue rem possum nosse quam noveram, neque signum in quod intentus digitus non est. Sed de intentione digiti non minis curo; quia ipsius demonstrationis signum milii videtur potius, quam rerum aliquarum quæ demon­ strantur, sicut adverbium quod, Ecce, dicimus; nam et cum hoc adverbio digitum silemus intendere, ne unum demonstrandi signum non sil satis. Et id maxi­ me tibi nitor persuadere, si poiero, per ea signa quæ verba appellantur, nos nihil discerc; potius enim, ut dixi, vim verbi, id est signilicationem quae latet in sono, re ipsa quæ significatur cognita, discimus, quam illam tali significatione percipimus. Et quod dixi de capite, hoc etiam de tegmini­ bus, deque aliis rebus innumerabilibus dixerim: quas tamen-cum jam noverim, saraballas illas adhuc usque non novi; quas mihi si gestu quispiam significarit aut pinxerit, aut aliquid cui similes sunt, ostenderit, non dicam non me d cucrit, quod facile obtinerem, si pando amplius loqui vellem; sed dico id quod proxi­ mum cst, non verbis docuerit. Quod si eis forte con­ spectis cum simul adero me admonueritt dicens, Ecce saraballas; discam rem quam nesciebam, non per verba quæ dicta sunt, sed per cjus aspectum, per quem factum est ut etiam nomen illud quid valeret, nossem ac tcnerem. Non enim cum rem ipsam didici, verbis alienis credidi, sed oculis meis: illis tamen fortasse ut attenderem credidi, id est ut aspectu quæ­ rerem quid viderem.

### English translation (Claude)

A. Do all the things we can do soon after being asked seem to you to be able to be shown without a sign? Or do you except anything?
Ad. Considering this whole class again and again, I find nothing yet that can be taught without a sign, except perhaps speech, and perhaps if someone asks what teaching itself is. For I see that whatever I do after his question so that he may learn, he does not learn from the very thing he wants shown to him: for if, as was said, someone asks me what walking is when I am at rest or doing something else, and I try to teach him what he asked without a sign by walking at once, how shall I guard against his thinking that walking is only as much as I have walked? And if he thinks so, he will be deceived: for whoever walks more or less than I did he will not think has walked. And what I have said about this one word applies to everything which I had agreed could be shown without a sign, except those two we excepted.
A. I accept that indeed: but does it not seem to you that speaking is one thing and teaching another?
Ad. It certainly does: for if they were the same, no one would teach except by speaking; but since we teach many things by other signs besides words, who would doubt this difference?
A. Well, is there no difference between teaching and signifying? Or do they differ in some way?
Ad. I think they are the same.
A. Does not one speak correctly who says that we signify in order to teach?
Ad. Quite correctly.
A. What if another says that we teach in order to signify? Will he not easily be refuted by the former statement?
Ad. That is so.
A. So if we signify in order to teach, we do not teach in order to signify; teaching is one thing, signifying another.
Ad. You are right, and I answered wrongly that the two are the same.
A. Now answer this: does one who teaches what teaching is do it by signifying, or otherwise?
Ad. I do not see how he could do it otherwise.
A. So what you said a little while ago is false, that the thing can be taught without signs when the question is what teaching itself is; since we see that not even this can be done without signifying, since you have granted that signifying is one thing and teaching another. For if they are different, as appears, and this is not shown except through that, it is certainly not shown by itself, as you had thought. So nothing has yet been found that can be shown by itself except speech, which signifies itself among other things: yet since it too is a sign, there is still absolutely nothing that seems able to be taught without signs.
Ad. I have no reason not to agree.
A. It has been established, then, both that nothing is taught without signs, and that knowledge itself ought to be dearer to us than the signs by which we know, although not all the things signified can be better than their signs.
Ad. So it seems.
A. Do you remember, I ask, by what a long detour so small a result has been reached? For since we began tossing words at each other, as we have done for so long, we have labored to find these three things: whether nothing can be taught without signs; whether some signs are to be preferred to the things they signify; and whether the knowledge of things itself is better than signs. But there is a fourth thing I would like to learn briefly from you: whether you think these things have been found in such a way that you can no longer doubt them.
Ad. I would like indeed to have reached certainty after such windings and turnings; but this question of yours somehow troubles me and deters me from assenting. For you seem to me not to be about to ask me this unless you had something to say against it: and the very entanglement of the matters does not let me examine the whole and answer securely, since I fear that something may lie hidden in such wrappings which the keenness of my mind cannot search out.
A. I am not sorry to receive your doubt; for it signifies a mind not at all rash, which is the greatest safeguard of tranquility. For it is very hard indeed not to be disturbed when the things we held by easy and ready approval are shaken by contrary arguments and, as it were, wrenched from our hands. So, just as it is fair to yield to reasons well considered and examined, so it is dangerous to hold unknown things as known. For there is a fear that, when the things we presume will stand and remain most firmly are often undermined, we may fall into such hatred or fear of reason that not even plain truth itself seems worthy of belief.

But come, let us now reconsider more quickly whether you were right to think these things doubtful. For I ask you: if someone ignorant of the snaring of birds, which is done with reeds and birdlime, met a fowler equipped with his gear, not fowling but traveling, and on seeing him slowed his step and, wondering, as happens, thought to himself and asked what the man's equipment meant; and the fowler, seeing him attentive, and eager to show himself off, got his reeds ready and, with a pipe and a hawk, caught, subdued, and took some little bird he noticed nearby; would he not teach his spectator what he wanted to know, by no signifying, but by the thing itself?
Ad. I fear there may be something here like what I said about the man who asks what walking is. For I do not see that here too the whole of fowling has been shown.
A. It is easy to free you from this worry; for I add: if he were so intelligent as to recognize the whole kind of art from what he saw. For it is enough for our purpose that some things, though not all, can be taught to some people without a sign.
Ad. I too can add this for the other case: for if he is quite intelligent, once walking has been shown in a few steps, he will know the whole of what walking is.
A. You may do so as far as I am concerned, and I not only do not resist but even approve: for you see that it is established by both of us that certain things can be taught to certain people without signs, and that what seemed to us a little while ago is false, that there is nothing at all that can be shown without signs. For now not one or two things, but thousands of things come to mind which may be shown by themselves without any sign being given. Why should we doubt it, I ask you? For, to pass over the countless spectacles of men in all the theaters, who show things without a sign by the things themselves, does not God and nature show and display by themselves to those who see this sun and the light that floods and clothes all things, the moon and the other stars, the lands and seas, and the countless things born in them?

And if we consider more carefully, perhaps you will find nothing that is learned through its signs. For when a sign is given to me, if it finds me not knowing what thing it is the sign of, it can teach me nothing; and if it finds me knowing, what do I learn through the sign? For the word does not show me the thing it signifies when I read, “And their saraballae were not changed.” For if certain head coverings are called by this name, did I, on hearing it, learn either what a head is or what coverings are? I knew these before; and my knowledge of them came not when they were named by others but when they were seen by me. For when these two syllables, caput (“head”), first struck my ears, I no more knew what they signified than when I first heard or read saraballae. But when caput was said often, noting and observing when it was said, I found that it was the term for a thing already well known to me by seeing. Before I found this, this word was merely a sound to me; but I learned that it was a sign when I found what thing it was the sign of; which, as I said, I had learned not by signifying but by looking. So the sign is learned rather from the thing known than the thing from the sign given.

To understand this more clearly, suppose we now hear caput said for the first time, and, not knowing whether this word is merely a sound or also signifies something, we ask what caput is (remember that we want to have knowledge not of the thing signified but of the sign itself, which we certainly lack as long as we do not know what it is a sign of): if, then, as we ask this, the thing itself is pointed out with a finger, on seeing it we learn the sign which we had only heard and did not yet know. But since there are two things in that sign, sound and meaning, we certainly do not perceive the sound through a sign, but by the ear being struck by it; and the meaning by seeing the thing signified. For that pointing of the finger can signify nothing but that at which the finger is pointed; and it was pointed not at a sign but at the member called the head. So through it I can know neither the thing, which I knew already, nor the sign, at which the finger was not pointed. But I do not much care about the pointing of the finger, because it seems to me a sign of the pointing itself rather than of any things that are pointed out, like the adverb ecce (“look”); for we usually point the finger along with this adverb too, lest one sign of pointing should not be enough. And what I am trying above all to persuade you of, if I can, is that we learn nothing through those signs which are called words; for, as I said, we learn the force of a word, that is, the meaning hidden in the sound, rather by knowing the thing signified, than we perceive the thing by such signifying.

And what I have said of the head I would also say of coverings and of countless other things: yet, though I already know these, I still do not know those saraballae; and if someone signified them to me by a gesture, or painted them, or showed me something they resemble, I will not say he did not teach me, which I could easily maintain if I wished to say a little more; but I say what is nearest the point: he did not teach me by words. And if, when they happen to be in view while I am present, he reminds me, saying, “Look, saraballae,” I will learn a thing I did not know, not through the words that were spoken, but through seeing it, by which it came about that I also knew and retained what that name meant. For when I learned the thing itself, I trusted not another's words but my own eyes; yet perhaps I trusted the words so as to attend, that is, to seek by looking what I should see.

### Scripture references

- Dan 3:27 (3:94 Vulg.): quotation, high confidence

### Translation notes

- Dan 3:27 (3:94 Vulg.): the saraballae of the three young men, a rare word whose meaning Augustine says he does not know (garments or head coverings).
- The fowler uses limed reeds, a pipe, and a hawk to catch the bird.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 10 (PL 32:1211–1215; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/8/#p-10).

## The Teacher 11

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-11
- Source: PL 32:1215
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Words only prompt us to seek things; what we know we know from the things themselves or from the inner Teacher, Christ, the truth within the mind, while what we receive only through words, like the story of the three young men, we believe rather than know.

### Latin text

Hactenus verba valucrunt, quibus ut plurimum tribuam, admonent tantum ut quaeramus res, non exhibent ut noverimus. Is me autem aliquid docet, qui vel oculis, veL ulli corporis sensui, vul ipsi etiam menti præbet ea quae cognoscere volo. Verbis igitur nisi verba non discimus, imo sonitum strepitumque verborum: nam si ea quæ signa non sunt, verba esse non possunt, quamvis jam auditum verbum, nescio tamen verbum esse, donec quid significct sciam. Re­ bus ergo cognitis, verborum quoque cognitio perfici­ tur; verbis vero auditis, nec verba discuntur. Non enim ea vetba quæ novimus, discimns; aut quæ nou novimus, didicisse nos possumus confiteri, nisi eorum significatione percepta, quje non auditione vocum emissarum, sed rerum significatarum cognitione con­ tingit. Verissima quip;.e ratio est, et verissime dici­ tur, cum verba proferuntur, aut scire nos quid signi­ ficent, aut nescire: si scimus, commemorari potius qnam discere; si autem nescimus, ne commemorari quidcm, sed fortasse ad quærendum admoneri. ' Quod si dixeris, tegmina quidem illa capitum, quorum nomen sono tantum tenemus, non nos posse nisi visa cognoscere, neque nomen ipsum plenius nisi ipsis cognitis nosse: quod tamen de ipsis pucris ac­ < epimus, ut regem ac flammas fide ac religione supe­ raverint, quas laudes Deo cecincrint, quos laonorcs ab ipso ctiam inimico meruerint, num aliter nisi per verba didicimus? Respondebo, cuncta quæ illis verbis significata sunt, in nostra noLlia jam fuissc. Nam quid sint tres pueri, quid fornax, quid ignis, quid reI, quid denique illaesi ab igne, caeteraque omnia jam tenebam qune verba illa significant. Ananias vero, et Azarias et Misael tam mihi ignoti sunt quam illæ saraballæ; nec ad eos cognoscendos huec me nomina quidquam adjuverunt aut adjuvare jam potuerunt. Hæc autem omnia quæ in illa leguntur historia, ita illo tempore facta esse, ut scripta sunt, credere me potius quam scire fateor: neque istam differentiam iidem ipsi quibas credimus nescierint. Ait enin pro­ pheta, Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis: quod non dixisset profecto, si nihil dista­ re judicasset. Quod ergo intelligo, id etiam credo: at non omne quod credo, eliam intelligo. Omne autcm quod intelligo, scio: non omne quod credo, scio. Nec idco nescio quam sit utile credere eliam multa quæ nescio; cui utilitati hanc quoque adjungo de tribus pueris historiam: quare pteraque rerum cum scire non possim, quaRta LameD utilitate credan­ tur, scio. De universis autem quae intelligimus non lo­ qucntem qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti præ­ sidentem consulimus veritatem, verbis fortasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapicntia: quam quidem omais ra­ lionalis anima consulit; sed tantum cuique panditur, quantum capcre propter propriam, sive malam sive bonam voluntatem potest. Et si quando fallitur, DOn tit vitio consultæ veritatis, ut neque hujus, quæ foris est, lucis vitium est, quod corporei oculi saepe falluo­ tur: quam lucem de rebus visibilibus consuli fate­ mur, ut eas nobis quantum cernere valemus, ostendat.

### English translation (Claude)

So far words have availed; to grant them the most, they only remind us to seek things; they do not display them for us to know. But he teaches me something who presents to my eyes, or to any bodily sense, or even to the mind itself, the things I want to know. By words, then, we learn nothing but words, or rather the sound and noise of words: for if things that are not signs cannot be words, then, although I have already heard a word, I do not know it is a word until I know what it signifies. So when things are known, the knowledge of words too is completed; but when words are heard, not even words are learned. For we do not learn the words we know; nor can we say that we have learned those we do not know, unless their meaning is perceived, which happens not by hearing the sounds uttered but by knowing the things signified. For it is a most true reasoning, and most truly said, that when words are uttered we either know what they signify or do not: if we know, we are reminded rather than taught; if we do not know, we are not even reminded, but perhaps prompted to seek.

But if you say: those head coverings, whose name we hold only as a sound, we can know only by seeing them, nor can we know the name itself more fully except by knowing them; but what we have received about those young men themselves, how they overcame the king and the flames by faith and devotion, what praises they sang to God, what honors they won even from their enemy, did we learn it otherwise than through words? I will answer that all that is signified by those words was already in our knowledge. For what three young men are, what a furnace is, what fire is, what a king is, what, finally, unharmed by fire is, and all the rest that those words signify, I already held. But Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael are as unknown to me as those saraballae; nor have these names helped me at all to know them, nor could they help me now. And all these things that are read in that history, that they were done at that time as they are written, I confess that I believe rather than know: and the very men we believe did not fail to know this difference. For the prophet says, “Unless you believe, you will not understand”: which he surely would not have said if he had judged there was no difference. What I understand, then, I also believe; but not all that I believe do I also understand. And all that I understand I know; not all that I believe do I know. Nor do I therefore fail to know how useful it is to believe even many things I do not know; and to this usefulness I add also this history of the three young men: so, since I cannot know most things, I know with how great usefulness they are believed.

But about all the things we understand, we consult not the speaker who sounds outside, but the truth that presides within over the mind itself, prompted perhaps by words to consult it. And he who is consulted teaches, he who is said to dwell in the inner man, Christ, that is, the unchangeable Power of God and everlasting Wisdom: whom every rational soul consults, but who is opened to each only as much as each can take in, according to its own will, whether bad or good. And if it is ever deceived, this happens not through a fault of the truth consulted, just as it is not a fault of this outer light that the bodily eyes are often deceived: which light we admit is consulted about visible things, so that it may show them to us as far as we are able to see.

### Scripture references

- Dan 3:1–30: allusion, high confidence
- Isa 7:9: quotation, high confidence
- Eph 3:16–17: allusion, high confidence
- 1 Cor 1:24: allusion, high confidence

### Extrabiblical texts

- Pr Azar 29-68 (Prayer of Azariah and Song of the Three Young Men): allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Dan 3 (the three young men in the furnace, their song, and the king's honors; the song is in the Prayer of Azariah); Isa 7:9 LXX (“Unless you believe, you will not understand”); Eph 3:16–17; 1 Cor 1:24 (“Power of God … Wisdom”).
- Christ as the inner Teacher is the central thesis of the dialogue; translated as written.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 11 (PL 32:1215; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-11).

## The Teacher 12

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-12
- Source: PL 32:1215–1217
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: We learn sensible things from the senses and intelligible things from the inner light of truth; words lead us to believe, reject, or recognize what is said, but never by themselves teach.

### Latin text

Quod si et de coloribus luccm, et de cæteris quæ per corpus sentimus, elementa hujus muhdi ea­ demque corpora quae sentimus, sensusque ipsos qui­ bus tanquam interpretibus ad talia noscenda mens utitur; de his autem quæ intelliguntur, interiorem ve­ ritatem ratione consulimus: quid dici potest unde cla­ reat, verbis nos aliquid discere præter ipsum qui au­ res percutit sonum? Namque omnia qua percipimus, aut sensu corporis, aut mente percipimus. Illa sensi­ bilia, hæc intelligibilia; sive, ut more aucturum nc­ strorum loquar, illa carnalia, hæc spiritualia nomi­ nainus. De illis dum interrojanmr, respondemus, si præsto sunt ea quae sentimus; velut cum a nobis quæritur intuentibus lunani novam, qualis aut ubi si. Ilic ille qui interrogat, si non videt, credit verbis, et sæpe non credit: discit autem nullo modo, nisi et ipse quod dicitur videat; ubi jam non verbis quæ so­ nuerunt, sed rebus ipsis et sensibus discit. Nam verba eadem sonant videnti, quæ non videnti etiam sonuc­ runt. Cum sero nou de iis quae coram sentimus, sed de his qu.c aliquando sensimus quxritur; non jam rcs ipsas, sed imagines ab iis impressas memoriæque mandatas loquimur: quai omnino quomodo vcra di caums, cum falsa intueamur, ignoro; nisi quia non nos ca videre ac sentire, sed vidisse ac sensisse nar­ ramus. Ita illas imagines in memoriæ penetralibus rerum ante sensarum quxdam documenta gestamus, quæ animo contemplantes bona conscientia non men­ timur cum loquimur: sed nobis sunt ista documenta; is euim qui audit, si ea sensit atque adfuit, non di­ scit meis verbis, sed recognoscit ablatis secum et ipse imaginibus: si autem illa non sensit1, quis non cum credere potius verbis quam discere intelligat? Cum vero de iis agitur quæ mente conspicimus. id est intellectu atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur quæ præsculia contuemur in illa interiore luce veri­ tatis, qua ipsc qui dicitur homo interior, illustratur et fruitur: sed tunc quoque noster auditor, si et ipse ilia secreto ac simplici oculo videt; novit quod dico sua contemplatione, non verbis meis. Ergo ne hunc quidem doceo vera dicens, vera intuentem; docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, Deo intus pan­ dente, manifestis: itaque de his eUam interrogatus respondere posset. Quid autem absurdius quam eum putare locutione mea doceri, qui posset, antequam lo­ quercr, ca ipsa interrogatus exponere? Nam quod sæpe contingit, ut interrogatus aliquid neget, aL'luc aJ id fatendum aliis interrogationibus urgeamur, fil hoc imbecillitate cernentis, qui de re tota illam lucem consulere non potest: quod ut partibus faciat, admo­ netur, cum de iisdem istis partibus interrogatur, qui­ bus illa summa constat, quam totam cernere non valebat. Quo si verbis perducitur ejus qui interrogai, non tamen docentibus verbis, sed eo modo inquircn­ tibus, quo modo est ille a quo quæritur, intus discc­ re idoneus; velut si abs te quærerem hoc ipsum quod agitur, utrumnam verbis doceri nihil possit, et ab­ surdum libi primo videretur non valenti totum con­ spicere: sic ergo quærere oportuit, ut tu:e sese vires habent ad audiendum illum iutus magistrum, ut dice­ rem: Ea quæ me loquente vcra esse confitcris, et certus cs, et te illa nosse confirmas, unde didicisti? responderes fortasse quod ego docuissem. Tum ego subnecterem: Quid si me hominem volantem vidisse dicerem, itane te certum verba mea redderent, quem­ admodum si audires sapientes homines stultis csse meliores? Negares profectoct responderes illud te non credere, aut etiamsi crederes ignorare, hoc autem certissime scire. Ex hoc jam nimirum intelligeres, neque in illo quod me affirmante ignorares, ncque in boc quod optime scires, aliquid te didicisse verbis meis; quandoquidem C'liam interrogatus de singulis, et illud ignatum, et hoc tibi notum esse jurares. Tum vero totum illud quod negaveras fatereris, cum hæc ex quibus constat, clara ct certa esse cognosceres; omnia scilicet quæ loquimur, aut ignorare auditorcm utrum vera siut, aut falsa esse non ignorare, aut scire vera esse. Uorum trium in primo aut cre­ dere. ant opinari, ant dubitare; in secundo adver­ sari at'luc rcnuere; in tertio attestari: nusquam igi­ tur discere. Quia ct illc qui post verba nostra rcm nescit, et qui se falsa novit audissc, et qui posset in­ terrogatus eadem respondere quæ dicta sunt, nihil verbis meis didicisse convincitur.

### English translation (Claude)

If, then, we consult light about colors, and about the other things we perceive through the body we consult the elements of this world, the same bodies that we perceive, and the senses themselves, which the mind uses as interpreters for knowing such things; while about the things that are understood we consult the inner truth by reason: what can be said to make it clear that we learn anything by words except the very sound that strikes the ears? For all that we perceive, we perceive either by a bodily sense or by the mind. The former we call sensible, the latter intelligible; or, to speak in the manner of our authors, the former carnal, the latter spiritual. When we are asked about the former, we answer if the things we perceive are present; as when we are asked, while looking at the new moon, what it is like or where it is. Here the one who asks, if he does not see it, believes the words, and often does not believe them; but he does not learn at all unless he too sees what is said; and then he learns not by the words that sounded, but by the things themselves and the senses. For the same words sound to one who sees as sounded also to one who does not see.

But when the question is not about things we perceive in our presence, but about things we perceived at some time, we speak no longer of the things themselves but of the images impressed by them and committed to memory; and how we can call these true, when we are looking at false things, I do not know at all; except that we report, not that we see and perceive them, but that we have seen and perceived them. So we carry those images in the inner places of memory as certain records of things perceived before; and contemplating them in the mind, we do not lie with a good conscience when we speak: but these records are ours; for the one who hears, if he perceived them and was present, does not learn by my words, but recognizes them by the images he too has carried away with him; but if he did not perceive them, who does not understand that he believes the words rather than learns?

But when it is a matter of things we see with the mind, that is, with intellect and reason, we speak indeed of things we look upon as present in that inner light of truth by which the one called the inner man is enlightened and in which he rejoices: but then too our hearer, if he also sees them with his inner and single eye, knows what I say by his own contemplation, not by my words. So I do not teach even him, when I speak true things to one who sees true things; for he is taught not by my words but by the things themselves, made plain by God revealing them within: so that, if asked about them, he could also answer. And what is more absurd than to think that he is taught by my speaking who could, if asked, have set out those very things before I spoke? For when, as often happens, someone asked a question denies something, and is pressed by further questions to admit it, this comes from the weakness of the one seeing, who cannot consult that light about the whole matter; and he is prompted to do so part by part, when he is asked about the very parts of which that whole consists which he was unable to see as a whole. And if he is led there by the words of the questioner, it is still not by words that teach, but by words that inquire in the way that suits him who is asked to learn within. As if I asked you this very question we are dealing with, whether nothing can be taught by words, and at first it seemed absurd to you, since you could not see the whole: then I ought to have asked in a way suited to your powers of hearing that inner Teacher, saying: “The things which you admit are true when I speak, and of which you are certain, and which you affirm you know, from where did you learn them?” You would perhaps answer that I had taught them. Then I would add: “What if I said I had seen a man flying? Would my words make you as certain as if you heard that wise men are better than fools?” You would surely deny it and answer that you do not believe the former, or, even if you believed it, that you do not know it, but that you know the latter most certainly. From this you would surely understand that neither in the one which you would not know though I affirmed it, nor in the other which you knew very well, had you learned anything by my words; since, if asked about each, you would swear that the one was unknown to you and the other known. Then indeed you would admit the whole that you had denied, when you recognized that the things it consists of are clear and certain: namely, that in all the things we say, the hearer either does not know whether they are true, or knows that they are false, or knows that they are true. In the first of these three he either believes, or opines, or doubts; in the second he opposes and rejects; in the third he bears witness: so in no case does he learn. For both he who does not know the thing after our words, and he who knows he has heard false things, and he who, if asked, could answer the same things that were said, are proved to have learned nothing by my words.

### Scripture references

- 1 Cor 2:14–15: echo, low confidence
- Matt 6:22: echo, low confidence

### Translation notes

- “our authors”: Christian writers, especially Paul (1 Cor 2:14–15), who speak of carnal and spiritual things (uncertain).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 12 (PL 32:1215–1217; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-12).

## The Teacher 13

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-13
- Source: PL 32:1217–1219
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Words do not even reliably reveal the speaker's mind, since speakers may repeat what they do not believe, lie, misspeak, sing by rote, or use words in a different sense, and hearers may mishear.

### Latin text

Quamobrem in iis etiam quæ mente cernuntur, frustra cernentis loquelas audit quisquis ca cernere non potest, nisi quia talia quamdiu ignorantur utile est credere: quisquis autem cernere potest, intus est ' discipulus veritatis, foris judex loquentis, vel potius ipsius locutionis. Nam plerumque scit illa quæ dicta sunt, eo ipso nesciente quae dixit; veluti si quisquam Epicureis credens et mortalcm animam putans, eas rationes quæ de immortalitate ejus a prudentioribus tractatæ sunt, eloquatur, illu audiente qui spiritualia contucri potest; judicat iste cum vera dicere: at ille qui dicit, utrum vera dicat ignorat, imo etiam falsis­ sima existimat: num igitur putandus est ca docere qn:c nescit? Atqui iisdem verbis utitur, quibus uti etiam sciens posset. Quare jam ne hoc quidem relinquitur verbis, ut his saltem loquentis animus indicetur; si quidem in.­ certum est utrum ca qurc loquitur, sciat. Adde men­ tientes atque fallentes, pcr quos facile intelligas nou modo non apcriri, verum etiam occultari anamum ver­ bis. Nam nullo modo ambigo id conari verba vera.­ cium, et quodammodo profitcri, ut animus loqucnlis appareat; quod obtinerent omnibus concedentibus, si loqui mentientibus non liceret. Quanquam sæpe ex­ perti fuerimus, cl in nobis et in aliis, non earum re. rum quæ cogitantur, verba proferri: quod duobus modis posse accidcre video, cum aut senno memoriæ mandatus et sæpe decursus, alia cogitandis ore fun­ ditur; quod nobis cum hymnum canimus sæpe con­ tingit: ant cum alia pro aliis verba præter volunta­ tem nostram linguæ ipsius errore prosiliunt; nam hie quoque non earum rerum signa quas in animo habe­ mus, audiuntur. Nam mentientes quidem cogitant etiam de iis rebus quas loquuntur, ut tametsi ne­ sciamus an verum dicant, sciamus tamen eos in aniano habere quod dicunt, si non cis aliquid duorum quae dixi accidat: quæ si quis et interdum accidere conten­ dit, et cum accidit apparere, quanquam saepe occul­ tum est, et saepe me fefellit audientem, non resisto.; Sed his accidit aliud genus, sane lalc patens, et semen innumerabilium dissensionum atque certaminum: cum ille qui loquitur, cadem quidem signi­ ficat quæ cogitat, sed plerumque tantum sibi et aliis quibusdam; ei vcro cui loquitur et itern aliis nou­ nullis, non idem significat. Dixerit cnim aliquis au­ dientibus nobis, ab aliquibus belluis hominem virtute superari; nos illico ferre non possumus, et hanc tam falsam pestiferamque sententiam magna intentione refellimus: cum ille fortasse virtutem, vires corpoi is vocet, et hoc nomine id quod cogitavit enuntiet, nec mentiatur, nec crret in rebus, nec aliud aliquid vol­ vens animo, mandata memorice verba contexit, nec linguæ lapsu aliud quam volvebat sonet; sed tantum­ modo rcm quam cogitat, alio quam nos nomine ap­ pellat, de qua illi statim assentiremur, si ejas cogita­ tionem possemus inspicere, quam verbis jam prola­ tis explicataque sententia sua, nondum nobis pandere valuit. Huic errori definitionem mederi posse dicunt, pt in hac quæstione si definiret quid sit virtus; ela­ eeret, aiunt, non de rc, sed de verbo esse controver­ siam: quod ut concedam ita esse, quotusquisque bonus definitor inveniri potest? et tamen adversus disciplinam definiendi multa disputata sunt; qum ne­ que hoc loco tractare opportunum est, nec usquequa­ que a me probantur. Omitto quod multa non bene audimus, et quasi dc anditis diu multumque contendimus; velut tu nu­ por verbo quodam punico, cum ego misericordiam dixissem, pietatem significari te audisse dicebas ab eis quibus hæc lingua magis nota esset: ego autcm resistens, quid acceperis tibi omnino excidisse as­ screbum; visus enim mihi eras notr pietatem dixisse, sed fidem, cum et conjunctissimus mihi assidercs, et nullo modo hæc duo nomina similitudine soni au­ rem decipiant. Diu ie tamen arbitratus sum nescire quid tibi dictum sit, cum ego nescirem quid dixeris: nam si te bene audissem, nequaquam mihi videretur absurdum pietatem et misericordiam uno vocabulo punice vocari. Hæc plerumque accidunt; sed ea. ut dixi, omittamus, no calumniam verbis de audieritis negligentia, vel etiam de surditate hominum videar commovere: itta magis angunt quæ superius enume­ ravi, ubi verbis liquidissime aure perceptis et la­ tinis non valens, cum ejusdem linguae simus, lo­ quentium cogitata cognoscere. Sed ecce jani remitto et concedo, com verba ejus auditu cui nota sunt, accepta fuerint, poste illi esse nolum de iis rebus quas significant, loqnen­ tem cogilavissc: num ideo etiam quod nuuc quæri­ tur, utrum vera dixerit, discit'

### English translation (Claude)

So even in the things that are seen with the mind, whoever cannot see them hears the words of one who sees them in vain, except that it is useful to believe such things as long as they are unknown: but whoever can see them is inwardly a disciple of the truth, outwardly a judge of the speaker, or rather of the speech itself. For often he knows what has been said while the very one who said it does not know; as if someone who follows the Epicureans and thinks the soul mortal were to repeat the arguments for its immortality which wiser men have set out, in the hearing of one who can contemplate spiritual things; the latter judges that he speaks the truth, but the speaker does not know whether he speaks the truth, indeed even thinks it utterly false: is he then to be thought to teach what he does not know? Yet he uses the same words that one who knew could also use.

So not even this is left to words, that by them at least the speaker's mind is shown, since it is uncertain whether he knows what he says. Add liars and deceivers, through whom you may easily understand that the mind is not only not revealed by words but even concealed. For I do not doubt at all that the words of truthful men try, and in a way profess, to make the speaker's mind appear; and they would achieve this with everyone's agreement, if liars were not allowed to speak. Although we have often experienced, both in ourselves and in others, that words are uttered which are not of the things being thought: which I see can happen in two ways, either when a speech committed to memory and often run through pours from the mouth while one is thinking of other things, as often happens to us when we sing a hymn; or when, against our will, some words leap out in place of others by a slip of the tongue itself; for here too what is heard are not signs of the things we have in mind. For liars do think about the things they say, so that, although we do not know whether they speak the truth, we know that they have in mind what they say, if one of the two things I mentioned does not happen to them: and if anyone contends that these happen sometimes, and that when they happen it is apparent, though it is often hidden and has often deceived me when I listened, I do not resist.

But to these is added another kind, widely open indeed, and the seed of countless disagreements and quarrels: when the one who speaks signifies the same thing he thinks, but often only for himself and some others, while for the one he speaks to, and for some others too, he does not signify the same thing. For someone may say in our hearing that man is surpassed in virtue by some beasts; we cannot bear it at once, and refute this false and pernicious opinion with great energy: while he perhaps calls bodily strength virtue, and expresses by this name what he thought, and neither lies, nor errs about the things, nor strings together words committed to memory while turning something else over in his mind, nor sounds by a slip of the tongue something other than he was considering; but he only calls the thing he thinks by another name than we do; and we would at once agree with him about it, if we could see into his thought, which he has not yet been able to open to us by the words already uttered and his opinion stated. They say that definition can cure this error, so that in this question, if he defined what virtue is, it would become clear, they say, that the dispute is not about the thing but about the word: and granting that this is so, how many good definers can be found? And yet much has been argued against the discipline of defining, which it is not fitting to discuss here, and which I do not approve in every respect.

I pass over the fact that we hear many things badly, and argue long and much as if about what we heard; as you lately said, when I had said that a certain Punic word means mercy, that you had heard from those to whom that language was better known that it means piety: and I, resisting, insisted that you had quite forgotten what you had been told; for you seemed to me to have said not piety but faith, though you were sitting very close beside me, and these two names do not deceive the ear by any likeness of sound. Yet for a long time I thought that you did not know what had been said to you, when it was I who did not know what you had said: for if I had heard you well, it would not have seemed at all absurd to me that piety and mercy are called by one term in Punic. These things happen often; but let us pass over them, as I said, so that I may not seem to stir up a false charge against words because of the carelessness of hearers, or even the deafness of people: those things which I listed above trouble us more, where, though the words are perceived most clearly by the ear and are Latin, we are unable, though we share the same language, to know the thoughts of the speakers. But see, I now relax and grant that, when his words have been received by the hearing of one to whom they are known, it may be known to him that the speaker thought about the things they signify: does he therefore also learn what is now in question, whether the speaker said what is true?

### Translation notes

- The Epicureans held that the soul dies with the body.
- “a certain Punic word”: Augustine and Adeodatus were from North Africa, where Punic was still spoken; the word is not given.

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 13 (PL 32:1217–1219; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-13).

## The Teacher 14

- URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-14
- Source: PL 32:1219
- Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27

Summary: Pupils learn not from teachers' words but by consulting the inner truth, so we should call no one on earth our teacher, since the one Teacher is Christ within; Adeodatus thanks his father, having learned that words only prompt us to learn.

### Latin text

Num hoc magistri profitentur, ut cogitata eorum, ac non ipsæ disciplinæ quas loquendo se tradere pu­ tant, percipiantur atque teneantur? Nam quis tam stulte curiosus est, qai filium suum mittat in scho­ latn, ut quid magister cogitet discat? At istas omnes disciplinas quas se docere profitentur, ipsiusque vir­ tutis atque sapientiae, cum verbis explicaverint; tum illi qui discipuli vocantur, utrum vera dicta sint, apud semetipsos considerant, interiorem scilicet illam ve­ ritatem pro viribus intuentes. Tunc crgo discunt: et com vcra dicta esse intus invenerint, laudant, ne­ scientes non se doctores potius laudare qnam doctos; si tamen et illi quod loquuntur sciunt. Fatiuntur au­ tem homines, ut eos qui non sunt magistros vocent, quia plerumque inter tempus locutionis et tempus co­ gnitionis, nulla mora interponitur; et quoniam post admonitionem sermocinantis cito intus discunt, foris se ab eo qui admonuit, didicisse arbitrantur. Scd de tota utilitate verborum, quae si bene consideretur non parva est, alias, si Deus siverit, requiremus. Nunc enim ne plus eis quam oportet tribueremus, admonui te; ut jam non crederemus tantum, sed etiam intelligere inciperemus qnam vere scriptum sit auctoritate divina, ne nobis quemquam magistrum dicamus in terris, quod unus omnium magister in coelis sit. Quid sit autem in coetis, docebit ipse a quo etiam per ho­ mines signis admonemur et foris, ut ad eam intro conversi erudiamur: quem diiigere ac nosse beata vita est, quam se omnes clamant quærere, pauci au­ tem sunt qui eam vere se invenisse lætentur. Sed jam mihi dicas velim, quid de hoc toto meo sermone sentias. Si enim vera esse quae dicta sunt nosti, etiam de singulis sententiis interrogatus ea te scire dixisses: vides ergo a quo ista didiceris; neque enim a me, cui roganti omnia responderes. Si autem vera esse nna nosti, nee ego nec ille te docuit: sed ego, quia nunquam possum doccfe; ille, quia tu adhuc non potes discere. Ad. Ego vero didici admonitione ver­ borum tuorum, nihil aHud verbis quam admoneri ho­ minem ut discat, et perparum esse qnod per locu­ tionem aliquanta cogitatio loquentis apparet: utinm autem vera dicantur, eum docere solum, qui se intus habitare, cum foris loqueretur, admonuit; quem jam, favente ipso, tanto ardentius diligam, quanto ero in discendo provectior. Verumtamen huic ora­ tioni tuæ, qua perpetua usus es, ob hoc habe maxime gratiam, quod omnia quoe contradicere para­ tus eram, praeoccupavit atque dissolvit; nihilque omnino abs te dcrelictom est, quod me dubium fa­ ciebat, de quo non ita mihi responderet secretum illud oraculum, ut tuis verbis asserebatur.

### English translation (Claude)

Do teachers profess this, that their thoughts, and not the very disciplines they think they hand on by speaking, are to be grasped and retained? For who is so foolishly curious as to send his son to school to learn what the teacher thinks? But when they have explained by words all those disciplines they profess to teach, even that of virtue and wisdom itself, then those who are called pupils consider within themselves whether what was said is true, looking, that is, to that inner truth as far as they are able. Then, therefore, they learn: and when they have found within that what was said is true, they praise, not knowing that they are praising not so much teachers as the taught; if indeed the teachers too know what they say. But people are mistaken in calling those teachers who are not, because for the most part no interval comes between the time of speaking and the time of knowing; and since, after being prompted by the speaker, they quickly learn within, they think they have learned outwardly from the one who prompted them.

But the whole usefulness of words, which if considered well is not small, we will examine another time, God willing. For now I have warned you not to ascribe to them more than is fitting; so that we might no longer only believe but also begin to understand how truly it is written by divine authority that we should call no one on earth our teacher, because there is one Teacher of all in heaven. And what “in heaven” means he himself will teach, by whom we are prompted outwardly through human beings by signs, so that, turned inward to him, we may be instructed: to love and know whom is the happy life, which all cry out that they seek, but few there are who rejoice that they have truly found it. But now I would like you to tell me what you think of this whole discourse of mine. For if you know that what has been said is true, then, if asked about each statement, you would have said that you knew it: you see, then, from whom you learned these things; not from me, to whom you would have given every answer if I had asked. But if you do not know that they are true, neither I nor he has taught you: I, because I can never teach; he, because you cannot yet learn.
Ad. For my part, I have learned through the prompting of your words that by words a person is only prompted to learn, and that it is very little that some of the speaker's thought appears through speech; but whether what is said is true, he alone teaches who, when he spoke outwardly, reminded us that he dwells within; whom, by his favor, I shall now love the more ardently, the further I advance in learning. Yet I am especially grateful for this continuous discourse of yours, because it anticipated and resolved all the objections I was ready to make; and you left out absolutely nothing that made me doubtful, about which that secret oracle did not answer me as your words asserted.

### Scripture references

- Matt 23:8–10: allusion, high confidence
- Eph 3:16–17: allusion, medium confidence

### Translation notes

- Matt 23:8–10; “he dwells within”: Eph 3:16–17 (cf. section 1).

### Citation (SBL)

Augustine, Mag. 14 (PL 32:1219; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-magistro/11/#p-14).