On the Resurrection of the Dead 18

Of the arguments I set out for examination a little earlier that confirm the resurrection, all are of the same kind, springing from the same origin, which is the creation of the first human beings. But some draw their strength from that first origin itself, while others, which accompany the nature and life of human beings, derive their credibility from God's providence over us. The cause according to which and for which human beings were made, being joined to their nature, has its force from creation; but the argument from justice, by which God judges human beings who have lived well or badly, draws its force from their end. These arguments spring from creation too, but depend rather on providence. Having shown the first arguments as well as we can, it would be good to show our proposition also through the later ones, I mean through the honor or punishment owed to each human being by a just judgment, and through the end of human life; and of these to put first the one that naturally comes first, and to examine first the argument from the judgment. I will say only this much beforehand, out of concern for the proper starting point and order. Those who have accepted God as the Maker of this universe must ascribe to his wisdom and justice the guardianship and providence of all that has been made, if they wish to remain true to their own principles. And thinking this, they must hold that nothing on earth or in heaven is ungoverned or without providence, but know that the Maker's care extends equally to everything unseen and seen, small and great. All things that have been made need care from their Maker, each in its own way, according to its nature and for its purpose; though I think it would be idle ambition to go into detail now, or to try to distinguish or list what suits each nature. The human being, of whom we are now speaking, needs food because he is in want, succession because he is mortal, and justice because he is rational. If each of these is natural to the human being, and he needs food for life, succession for the continuance of the race, and justice so that food and succession may be lawful, then surely, since food and succession belong to the composite, justice too must belong to it; by the composite I mean the human being made of soul and body. Such a human being must be answerable for all that he has done, and receive for it honor or punishment. If a just judgment brings the penalty for deeds done upon the composite; if neither the soul alone should receive the wages of what was done with the body (for by itself the soul has no inclination to the offenses that concern bodily pleasures or food and care), nor the body alone (for by itself the body cannot discern law and justice), but the human being composed of both receives judgment for each of his deeds; and if reason finds that this does not happen in this life (for merit is not rewarded in the present life, since many atheists who practice every lawlessness and wickedness live to the end untouched by misfortune, while, on the contrary, those who have shown their lives to be tested in every virtue live in pain, in abuse, in false accusations, outrages, and every kind of suffering), nor after death (for the composite no longer exists, since the soul is separated from the body, and the body itself is scattered back into the elements from which it was put together, keeping nothing of its former shape or form, much less the memory of its deeds): then what remains is clear to everyone. As the apostle says, this corruptible and dissoluble body must put on incorruption, so that, when the dead have been made alive by the resurrection, and what was separated or even entirely dissolved has been reunited, each may justly receive what he did through the body, whether good or bad.